

GLOBAL (IN)SECURITY: NATIONAL INTERESTS OF RUSSIA

The conflict between Russia and the “collective West” passed in the acute phase in 2014 represents a part of the “great destabilization” that swept many regions of the world in the last 20 years. Fragments of the Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations, which have become universal, remain; in the first place, it is the UN and fragments of a unipolar world. From the beginning of the XX century, the floors of polycentricism have been built over them. Historically, the transitions from one model of international relations to another have always been accompanied by outbreaks of violence and confrontation. However, this does not mean that the product of such destabilization should be the consolidation of the strategy of hostility and of game for competitor suppression designed for decades to come. It is much more rational to seek to reach an early conclusion of compromises and mechanisms of interaction, which, without eliminating the competition, even fierce one, would not call into question the fundamental national interests of the parties. That was after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Destructive processes in the sphere of international security is one of the most difficult problems that threatens to increase the vulnerability of the world community. We are talking about such disturbing phenomena as degradation of the norms and mechanisms of international security developed in the second half of the XX century, strengthening of the tension between the norm of territorial integrity and the right of nations to self-determination, weakening of control over nuclear weapons. The question of whether the global community will develop effective conflict prevention mechanisms remains unanswered. So far, the challenge is how to keep the existing agreements, primarily on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, from dismantling.

Indeed, it would be incorrect to say that in the field of international security there have not been positive developments in recent decades. For example, the number of inter-State conflicts taking the form of military confrontation has decreased. However, intra-State conflicts no less dangerous to global stability have come to the fore.

The events in Ukraine had only confirmed the urgency of these outstanding issues and the need for the early resolution. Ukrainian and a number of other initially intra-State crises have demonstrated how conflicts of this kind can lead to a sharp deterioration of relations between major powers.

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The accumulation of the problems with a new force stimulates discussions on the need for reform of the UN and the UN Security Council, on strengthening the peacekeeping capacities of the OSCE, on the NATO ambitions, on the importance of preventing the dismantling of the institution of “neutrality” in Europe.

Particular attention should be given to the center-periphery relations. In the global GDP structure, in 1980–2013, the US share decreased from 21.5% to 18.4%, the EU share (27 countries without Croatia) fell from 28.1% to 18.9%, while the China’s share increased from 1.9% to 15.5% and the India’s share rose from 2.3% to 6.1%. Another vivid example: in 1970, the share of 16 developed countries in the global GDP was 76%, while in 2013 the figure was 55%.² Projections confirming trends may be cited, for example, notes from the report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies “Defense 2045”. So, it is expected that by 2030 (compared to 2011), the US real GDP will yield precedence to China, India will rise from 10th to 3rd place, while Brazil until 2050 will shift from 6th to the fourth place following Delhi. In this same period, Japan will drop from 3rd to 5th place, Germany from 4th to 9th place, France from 5th to 10th place, while Italy and Britain will completely leave the top ten largest economies of the world³. It must be said that in these calculations Russia will rise from 9th to the 6th position.

These changes are accompanied by the accumulation of contradictions and disparities within the current model of globalization. However, those who are interested in keeping their dominant positions block major changes. But such a blocking cannot go on forever due to piling-up defects.

The US, Russia and China are the three leading states with global ambitions and the desire to implement them. The resources they have for it vary widely, but in their capacity these players are in comparable categories. For example, these three countries, the world leaders in the field of cyber technologies, the only full-fledged space powers, the owners of the most advanced military-industrial complex (in this respect, Beijing is still inferior to Moscow and Washington). They have a strong fundamental science and some of the world’s most experienced diplomatic and intelligence services at their disposal. These nations can concentrate quickly resources for the solution of the tasks set.

India has the potential of a global player that has yet to be fulfilled in the next decades. In some respects, the European Union belongs to this category. However, if a further increase of Delhi in the political weight in world affairs is a matter of time, then it is not necessary to predict definitely the same in relation to the EU. As they say for decades, this political giant has not yet turned into a political heavyweight. It is unclear whether the new Global Strategy⁴, an-

² RAS Academician V.V. Zhurkin and others. Chapter 2.2. European countries and the EU. Global governance: opportunities and risks. RAS Ans. Ed. Acad. V.G. Baranovsky, RAS Acad. N.I. Ivanova. M: IMEMO RAS, 2015. Series “Library of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations”. P. 184. RAS Corresponding member V.M. Davydov and others. Chapter 2.6. Latin America. Ibid. P. 284.

³ Miller D. T. Defence 2045. A Report for the CSIS International Security Program. Rowman & Littlefield. 2015. Nov. P. 11.

⁴ Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe. A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy. 2016 (https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/about/eugs_review_web_4.pdf)

nounced in June 2016 will help it to find its foreign policy essence. It is an ambitious document aimed at turning the EU into a full-fledged global player in politics and security.

A number of theses of the Strategy are of interest. Probably for the first time an official EU document states that the global governance system requires transformation and not renovation. It is unexpected to hear from Brussels that the “European model” is not necessarily suitable for “export” and that cooperation with other projects of regional integration can bring mutual benefits. The global strategy is less ideological than other EU policy documents; the notion of “principled pragmatism” was introduced. One of its refrains is the thesis of “strategic autonomy”, which implies a greater foreign policy independence of the EU from Washington. A consistent focus on the central role of the UN in the global governance deserves support.

However, the global strategy in several of its paragraphs cannot but cause concern. The desire to build up the EU’s own military identity, which ignores the US geopolitical interests and now those of Britain, should bring it dividends in the future. However, the emergence of additional military capabilities in Western and Central Europe, apart from NATO, will certainly be taken into account in the Russia’s military planning. The most problematic aspect of the Global Strategy lies in the fact that Russia is declared in it as “a key strategic challenge”, while “the European security order” is equated to security order solely for the European Union.

Much in Western and Central Europe will depend on political leadership, primarily in Paris, Berlin and Rome, in the capitals of the Visegrad Group countries. If eventually it is recognized that it is futile for the EU to move towards a multinational state or expand its “Neo-Empire”, then the idea of a “Greater Europe”¹ may get a second wind. It appears to be an alternative to insolvable problems of “the EU as an Empire” or the “EU as a state”. In this case, the increase of the EU geopolitical power would occur at the expense of a mutually beneficial strategic partnership with Russia. A definite movement on this path has already been made in the past. One of the essential components of this project is the formation of the pan-European security system. Until that happens, the EU policy continues to be a factor in the potential increase of confrontation with Russia right up to the deployment of a “new cold war”.

In the meantime, the situation in the European security represents a gloomy picture. The system of measures of trust, control, prevent of further militarization of the region is in a dysfunctional state. The mechanisms of the Russia–NATO Council have not yet resumed its work. Military spending is growing. Extra military units with heavy weaponry are deployed in Europe. First of all, the new militarization affects the Baltic States, Poland, and Romania. More and more countries are being drawn into military escalation. The voices of those calling to reconsider the neutral status of Finland and Sweden² are increasing. The confrontation on the anti-missile defense system is growing; the European component infrastructure of the US global missile defense system is being built and put into operation.

The confrontation imposed on Russia based on the idea of a “new cold war” continues to escalate. However, this happens not only in real, but also in an imaginary dimen-

sion. The political establishment of the Baltic States insists stubbornly on its version that any day now Russia will invade the nations. In Lithuania, sabotage instructions are distributed in case of a new “occupation”. With this background, the discrimination against the Russian-speaking population continues.

While discussing these processes, the lessons of the Cold War as a specific form of international conflict are extremely important³. Whichever model of new structural competition (hard or soft) Russia and the West may expect it is necessary to maintain the basic principle gained in the 1940–1980s: the rivalry as the interweaving of competition and cooperation. This balance should not exclude even the elements of alliance, on which now for the first time after the Second World War, both sides are pushing grandiose dangers, primarily international terrorism.

Terrorism in the broad sense of the word is as old as the history of human civilization. Previously, it was mainly talked about the different manifestations of domestic terrorism, such as those in Spain or in the UK, in Corsica or in South Tyrol, but not about international terrorism. This is a fairly new phenomenon, which is not more than 15–20 years old. This type of terrorism is not connected with the domestic or the national liberation struggle. It has a different nature. The struggle is against a certain system of values, lifestyle, identification, and finally, against civilization.

International terrorism cannot be defeated by military means, as for example the activities of the Basque ETA or the Irish Republican army. Military means are nothing more than a mean of suppression of its most smashing manifestations. The main danger lies in the fact that the ideology of international terrorism sits deep in the minds of several hundreds of thousands of people around the world. It can be called indoctrination or barbarism, but many believe in what they are doing, destroy people and turning into living bombs (at least for themselves) not only for money.

What are the roots of this kind of terrorism? In this phenomenon, internal and external causes have mixed up. International terrorism is as inevitable as the globalization itself, which in its current form leads to increased disparities. Where social inequality exceeds certain limits, there will always be people ready to struggle, including by terrorist means, for some kind of idea. However, on the scale of international terrorism, external as well as internal causes are “to be blamed” in approximately equal proportions.

In many ways, what is happening in the world is an artificial phenomenon. In Western countries, the term “a denial of the obvious” is widespread. Still, few are those who are willing to admit that their foreign policy was one of the reasons why international terrorism has taken unprecedented scale and shape.

No country in the world is able to cope with this danger alone. The following also aggravates the problem: first, for many countries of the world, international terrorism has not yet turned into an existential threat. In their system of priorities and risks, international terrorism stands high on the scale of the most dangerous challenges, but it is not the main one. Secondly, the centers of international terrorism are far from the “core” countries of the liberal model of globalization. The backbone of international terrorism is 30–40 thousand people, which are concentrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. In this sense, for the United

¹ *Shmelev N.P., Gromyko A.I.A.* Greater Europe: future reality or utopia? Greater Europe. Ideas, Reality, Perspectives. Ed. by A.I.A. Gromyko, V.P. Fedorov. Moscow: Ves mir, 2014.

² *Gromyko A.I.A., Plevako N.S.* On the possibility of Sweden’s and Finland’s membership in NATO // *Modern Europe*. 2016. No 2.

³ *Kremenyyuk V.A.* Lessons of the Cold War. Moscow: Aspect Press, 2015. P. 22.

States international terrorism is a dangerous phenomenon, but still concentrated far from its borders. In this sense, in the future, some countries will be more interested in fighting against it than others.

The way out beyond the permissible limits of confrontation between large centers of power, beyond which they break into confrontation, is no less dangerous. As for the structure of competition, it is a mistake to equate them with confrontation structures. The argument of the supporters of a “new cold war” is a reference to the so-called “eternal” contradictions between the great powers, in particular between Russia in its various historical phases and Western countries. In this interpretation, the complex history of interstate relations boils down to one option – confrontation, although the latter is just one of the forms of rivalry that does not exclude the possibility of cooperation, joint crisis management and even in certain areas of the alliance.

Forthright arguments about the “eternal” enemies and friends leads into logical dead ends and primitivize history. So, in the recent past it was believed in the USSR and China that they are strategic opponents (irrevocably and finally, as it seemed, after the battles for the Damansky Island in 1969). At the previous stage of their relationship, the Communist character of the two political systems was considered as a pledge of eternal friendship. Now, speaking of the strategic partnership between Moscow and Beijing, we should remember that such a scenario seemed so unlikely even 30 years ago. For a long time, France and Germany, Germany and Poland, Japan and (South) Korea and many other countries were considered to be “programmed” enemies. There was a time when the US and the UK were fighting.

In the arguments about the determinants of history, there is certainly a grain of truth. Indeed, there can be structures of confrontation, which for a long time in one form or another remain in place when passing from one model of international relations to another. Thus, in the 19th, in the 20th, and now in the 21st century, rivalry dominated in relations between Russia and Britain. Relations between Moscow and Washington also could not escape a deeply entrenched dislike, despite the seemingly fundamental change in the international environment at the turn of the 1980s–1990s. Moreover, such cases are numerous. Their nature is at least twofold.

We are talking about major subjects of world politics with their own geopolitical projects and global approaches, which for a number of parameters have comparable resources, or, on the contrary, about relations that are characterized by a large asymmetry, when small countries are afraid of the domination of large neighbors. States of the first category are usually located at a distance from each other, for example, Russia and the United States, China and the United States, the second category are bordering nations (China and Vietnam, Russia and the Baltic countries, the United States and Cuba, etc.). The factor of geographical proximity in most cases eventually causes the major players to find compromises and agree on mutual benefits. France and Germany, Russia and China came along this route. Apparently, India and Pakistan, India and China tend to use this formula, while Iran and Saudi Arabia are still betting on confrontation in the struggle for regional leadership.

Thus, history shows that even in the era of hyper globalization the factor of geographical location continues to have considerable weight. Being at a distance from each

other, large and mainly equal players can afford for a long time to be in a state of tough competition, even confrontation, especially if their economic relations are weak. Nevertheless, since the second half of the 20th century, they can no longer afford to follow the course of complete suppression of a major enemy, primarily in the military sense. For the same reason, they do not have enough motivation to embed their rivals into the wake. Obviously, the balance of tough competition will be no less characteristic of the 21st century than of its predecessors.

Paradoxically, the argument for a “new cold war” may be that it is a mechanism for managing the confrontation, without which the confrontation could reach the level of a third world war. However, it was not the Cold War, including its regulatory component, that in the 1940s–1980s prevented a new “world” war, but the creation of nuclear weapons in 1945, i.e. when the Cold War had not yet begun. In the relations of the nuclear powers, atomic weapons make it impossible a settlement of the conflict by means of war. In other words, it was not so much the Cold War that helped prevent the use of nuclear weapons, as the latter, among other things, did not allow it to develop into a hot one. Since nothing in the near future does not forebode abandonment of the “big bomb”, a “new cold war” would only aggravate the issues of WMD control and the nonproliferation regime.

The election in November 2016 of the new US President raised pressing issues before the states and organizations of the Old World and Eurasia. From the point of view of Europe, Donald Trump belongs to the category of Eurosceptics and even to critics of the liberal model of globalization. In this, thanks to the support of half of the population of his country, he went up against the remnants of the inter-party consensus of the Democrats and Republicans. Political polarization in the United States has already reached new heights under President Obama, but it was not as pronounced in the foreign policy. The template of the latter, according to a frank statement by Ben Rhodes, the Deputy National Security Advisor, was formed in 1990 – 2002: “We could push through the UN Security Council everything we wanted with a small exception. Frankly, we could interfere in the internal affairs of other states in many ways. We could rely on the fact that Russia would not oppose NATO’s expansion. We had time left before China began to influence the situation along its borders”.¹

Trump is reluctant to maintain automatically the existing ideology and practice of relations with the European Union or within NATO. He refused to absolutize the idea of free trade and withdrew his country from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP). There is virtually no chance of a resumption in the near future of negotiations on the conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Barack Obama left hopes of ratification of the TPP, while negotiations on the TTIP were bogged down in contradictions long before the new president came to power. In many ways, the Trump phenomenon barely revealed the old differences.

Russia and the West have all the reasons to help the world to leave the area “the great destabilization” on terms of structural polycentricism, instead of enlarging its area with the dangerous farce of a “new cold war”. The most important task of the world’s leading centers of influence is to

¹ Rhodes B. A dust-up with the Iranians or the Chinese could get out of hand very fast // Politico. Jan. 19, 2017. P. 16.

find a *modus vivendi* appropriate to the global challenges. Consolidation of structural competition in the form of confrontation would be an attempt to reuse patterns of thinking of the previous historical era.

Such a fixation on conditions of hostility, i.e. on the terms of the worst variant of the Cold War – threat containment, hard power and fragmented cooperation – would bring special threats to the world. In other words, it is structural competition as a variation on the theme of the Cold War in the period before the Cuban Missile Crisis and until the establishment of a strategic balance in the 1960s–1970s. This type of a cold war, let's call it "hard", is not so much frozen, as a deferred "hot" conflict. Its delay in the confrontation between the USSR and the US was based on poorly calculated risks of exchanging nuclear strikes, even with asymmetric strategic arsenals and the absence of military parity of opponents. This deferment was almost "overcome" in October 1962. If this had happened, we would not have had the opportunity to be in this room.

As for a "soft" type of a cold war, in analogy with the detente of the 1970s, it was possible in the unique conditions of a "parity" bipolar world that had gone to the past with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp. Theoretically, bipolarity in the first half of the 21st century has a chance to return, if in addition to the US the second side in its dual core would be China headed by a certain group of satellite countries. Today, there is little evidence that history will follow this path. At the same time, the appearance in recent years of the elements of de-globalization, in case of fixation of this trend, can develop into a split of the world in one way or another.

It is important to emphasize that the essence of the problem of a "new cold war" is deeper than the unacceptability

of the revival of any of its known types. After all, justifying the admissibility of restarting a cold war in its "hard" or "soft" version, one can simply refer to history, pointing out that there was no precedent for its escalation into a big hot war; to refer to the fact that today there is a strategic parity and the two leading nuclear powers continue to adhere to the doctrine of "guaranteed mutual destruction".

It seems that the vulnerability of such arguments lies in the fact that the "big bomb", in contrast to the 1940–1980s, does not already guarantee the world free from the "big" and small wars. The danger of uncontrolled escalation scenarios increases. In the context of the weakening of the nonproliferation regime, the emergence of nuclear weapons in poorly controlled states, the development of new high-precision weapons, the destruction of the ABM regime agreed upon in the 1970s, the strengthening of international terrorism, including in the territory of nuclear states (primarily Pakistan), the rapid development of cyber technologies and their militarization, the risks of dangerous conflicts between great powers – direct or through involvement in conflicts on the periphery – are acquiring a new quality.

In this situation, the structural competition in the form of a "new cold war" between Russia and the "collective West" would only pander to destructive processes in international relations. Structural competition based on a constructive polycentricism, on the contrary, would give Russia and the West the opportunity to reduce jointly the risks of regional and global conflicts, to develop, within the framework of acceptable and generally accepted rules, their competitive advantages, focusing on rational and desirable interaction and recognizing strategic interests of each other where it is obvious.