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DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: VALUES, MEANINGS, COMMUNICATIONS

THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

May 16–17, 2013

*The Conference is held in accordance with
the Decree of President of Russia V. V. Putin
'On perpetuating the memory
of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov'
No 587, dated from May 23, 2001*

*The conference, originally called 'The Days of Sci-
ence in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities
and Social Sciences' is the 21st in number
and the 13th in the status of the International
Likhachov Scientific Conference*

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This publication represents the collection of papers of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference, held on 16–17 May 2013 at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, in accordance with the Decree of President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation ‘On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov’.

Among the 68 authors of this collection are outstanding Russian scientists, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences: O. T. Bogomolov, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, G. B. Kleiner, V. A. Lektorsky, A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, V. L. Makarov, V. V. Mironov, V. V. Naumkin, E. I. Pivovarov, M. B. Piotrowski, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Tishkov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, V. A. Chereshnev, B. G. Yudin and others; heads of academic institutes and research centres, representatives of higher education institutions, mass media leaders, distinguished statesmen and public figures, creative intellectuals: judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation N. S. Bondar, G. A. Hajiyev, and M. I. Kleandrov, Chairman of the Russian Central Election Commission V. Ye. Churov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation G. M. Gatilov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the UK A. V. Yakovenko, Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia E. I. Makarov, President of Moscow Chamber of Lawyers H. M. Reznik, Dean of the Higher School of Television of Moscow State University named after M. V. Lomonosov V. T. Tretyakov and others.

Among foreign authors of this collection are representatives of 17 countries: President of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts F. Unger (Austria), President of an International institute of linguistic and cross-cultural training R. Lewis, Chancellor of Edinburgh University T. O’Shea, Her Highness A. Hamilton, the Duchess of Abercorn (UK), His Royal Highness Prince T. Al Faisal (Saudi Arabia), Ambassador of Spain to the Russian Federation (2008–2011) J. A. March, representative of the International Labour Organisation K. Tapiola (Switzerland), Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies H. Karzai (Afghanistan), French Slavist R. Guerra; representatives of foreign academies of sciences: the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine Yu. S. Shemshuchenko, P. P. Tolochko, the Academy of Social Sciences of China Xue Futsi, Wu Enyuan, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences V. Prodanov; Professor S. Weber (USA), V. Ingimundarson (Iceland), H. Köchler (Austria), P. van Krieken (the Netherlands), and others.

The role of the Likhachov Conference is highly appreciated by President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation, who noted that ‘the Conference has become a recognized, authoritative platform for meaningful and constructive discussions, for a serious dialogue on the most important challenges of our time’.

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**DECREE
OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
'ON PERPETUATING THE MEMORY
OF DMITRY SERGEYEVICH LIKHACHOV'**

Given D. S. Likhachov's outstanding contribution to the development of the home science and culture I enact:

1. the Government of the Russian Federation should:
 - establish two personal grants in honour of D. S. Likhachov at the rate of 400 roubles each for university students from the year 2001 and to define the procedure of conferring them;
 - work out the project of D. S. Likhachov's gravestone on a competitive basis together with the Government of St. Petersburg;
 - consider the issue of making a film devoted to D. S. Likhachov's life and activities.
2. the Government of St. Petersburg should:
 - name one of the streets in St. Petersburg after D. S. Likhachov;
 - consider the issue of placing a memorial plate on the building of the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Science (Pushkin's House);
 - guarantee the work on setting up D. S. Likhachov's gravestone in prescribed manner.
3. According to the suggestion from the Russian Academy of Science the Likhachov Memorial Prizes of the Russian Academy of Science should be established for Russian and foreign scientists for their outstanding contribution to the research of literature and culture of ancient Russia, and the collected writings of the late Academician should be published.
4. **According to the suggestion from St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress the International Likhachov Scientific Conference should be annually held on the Day of the Slavonic Letters and Culture.**

VLADIMIR PUTIN,
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin, May 23, 2001

GREETINGS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Dear Friends!

I am happy to welcome you in St. Petersburg and to congratulate you on the opening of the 12th Likhachov Conference.

Your forum is an important event in the social life of Russia and of a number of foreign countries. It traditionally brings together representatives of scientific and artistic communities and competent experts.

Under globalization, the issues of extending the dialogue of cultures, preventing ethno-confessional conflicts are of paramount importance. There is compelling evidence that the humanistic ideas of academician D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding Russian enlightener and public figure, are still up-to-date.

I am convinced that the suggestions and recommendations drawn up in the course of your meeting will be sought after in practical terms.

I wish you new achievements and all the best.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 17, 2012



Dear Friends!

I would like to welcome participants, hosts and guests of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Your forum, traditionally gathering the cream of the Russian intellectual community, prominent scientists and public figures from all over the world in St. Petersburg is an outstanding and remarkable event in the international scientific and cultural life. It is crucial that the topics of the Conference precisely reflect the most urgent and acute humanitarian issues, the main of them being promotion of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in the modern world, establishment of moral and spiritual foundations of the society. And certainly, one of the priority tasks for you is preserving the invaluable legacy of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, which is as relevant and significant as before.

I wish you fruitful and constructive discussions, interesting and useful meetings.

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 5, 2011



Dear Friends!

I am sincerely pleased to see you in Saint-Petersburg and open the 10th Anniversary International Likhachov Conference.

This reputable forum is always notable for the substantial membership, comprehensive and effective work, and wide spectrum of issues to be discussed.

I am sure that the today's meeting devoted to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations should be one more step forward in promoting interconfessional and international communication to bring people closer to each other. And, certainly, again we can see so many prominent people together, among which are scientists, public figures, intellectuals,

representatives of arts community, everyone who shares notions and opinions of Dmitry S. Likhachov.

I wish you good luck and all the best!

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 11, 2010



I want to extend my welcome to hosts, participants and guests of the 8th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Holding this scientific forum has become a good and important tradition. It helps not only to realise the value of humanistic ideas of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, but also to understand topical issues of the modern world.

That is why the agenda of the Conference involves problems vital for everyone, like personality and society in a multicultural world; economics and law in the context of partnership of civilizations; mass media in the system of forming the worldview; higher education: problems of development in the context of globalization and others.

I am sure that a lively discussion closely reasoned and utterly transparent in its exposition and logic will contribute to the development of the humanities, steadfast and righteous moral norms.

I wish the hosts, participants and guests fruitful cooperation and all the best.

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 22, 2008



I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding the 6th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

I note with satisfaction that for many years this forum has been carrying out a very noble and important mission of preserving, analyzing and popularizing Likhachov's scientific works. The International Likhachov Scientific Conference has become a very important forum where people can exchange ideas and discuss the topical issues of the present time. Likhachov's spiritual legacy is an integral part of our science, of the science all over the world. And we are proud to see Likhachov's 100th anniversary, this memorable event, being celebrated on a great scale in Russia and abroad. I wish a successful discussion to all the participants and guests of the conference.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 25, 2006



I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding this remarkable event, the International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

The most influential and outstanding representatives of intellectual elite — scientists, artists, political figures — participate in this conference to keep up with the tradition. It affords me deep satisfaction to see this forum acquire an international standing. I note with pleasure that its agenda contains the most significant and topical issues of our time. This year you are discussing one of the fundamental problems — impact of education on humanistic process in the society.

The fact that this forum is organized regularly is a great tribute to the memory of D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding scientist, citizen and patriot. His spiritual legacy, scientific works dedicated to the problems of intellectual and moral development of younger generations, has great significance. I wish you a fruitful discussion.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 20, 2004



I should first like to welcome the participants of the International Scientific Conference “The world of culture of academician D. S. Likhachov”. The most prominent scientists and political leaders come together to discuss at this conference the most important issues of the scientific, moral and spiritual legacy of the remarkable Russian scientist D. S. Likhachov. I strongly believe that this tradition will be followed up in the future and the most distinguished successors will develop Likhachov’s humanistic ideas and put them into practice while creating the Universal Home for all people of the 21st century.

I should like to express my hope that the Likhachov scientific conferences will be held in all regions of this country as well as in St. Petersburg, and we will feel part of this remarkable tradition.

I wish you a fruitful discussion and a good partnership that will bring many useful results.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 21, 2001

WELCOME ADDRESSES TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE 13th INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear friends,

I bid you welcome in St. Petersburg at the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. Prominent scientists, politicians, cultural figures of Russia and foreign countries will have to discuss burning humanitarian challenges related to the development of communication, social and legal relations and economics in the context of world culture. It is important that young scientists, young researchers of the creative heritage of academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov are involved in the work of the Conference.

I am confident that this assembly on the banks of the Neva River will stay in your minds thanks to interesting and informative discussions. And suggestions and recommendations made during the forum will encourage modern implementation of forward-looking projects. Good luck to you and my best regards.

D. A. MEDVEDEV,
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
May 15, 2013

To the participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

I would like to greet the participants of the annual Likhachov conference that takes a significant place in academic, social and political life of Russian.

A broad range of issues debated on by prominent Russian and foreign scholars, intellectuals, figures of culture and art enables to hold a profound discussion, and thus, to constantly reaffirm a weighty position of the Likhachov Conference.

I do hope that this year's conference will contribute to the development of intercultural dialogue, to the defence of common civilizational values, which is imperative in order to overcome many modern challenges.

I wish the participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference fruitful work and all the best.

S. E. NARYSHKIN,
Chairman of the State Duma

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

I cordially welcome the hosts, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Over the last years, this forum has been established as an authoritative international platform to discuss burning issues of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations, and it has become a good example of constructive involvement of civil institutes, scientific, professional and political circles in re-evaluation of dramatic changes happening in the world now in terms of a new polycentric world order.

It is encouraging that an integral part of the Conference is a Diplomatic programme 'International Dialogue of Cultures' carried out together with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. We are eager to keep cooperating in order to facilitate its effective work.

Promotion of mutual respect and fruitful interaction between nations and confessions is an absolute priority of Russian policy both domestically and in the world arena. Efforts targeted at developing common values, strengthening moral basis of international relations are important contributions into the task of creating conditions for a genuine partnership between the states and forming a fair and democratic international system.

I am confident that your debates will promote the quest for solutions of topical issues of the modern world, as well as intercultural and inter-civilization dialogue.

I wish you every success and all the best.

S. V. LAVROV,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Moscow, May 16, 2013

To the hosts and participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear friends,

I am delighted to greet the hosts and participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. Your academic forum considers a significant and very relevant topic of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in the modern world. Activities of scientists that pursue a noble goal of dipping into a unique cultural world of every nation, its study and propagation should help to strengthen the dialogue between different countries. It is important that high school students from the most distant provinces of the country take part in this conference, as they will be preserving and developing the national culture in the future. I wish the participants of the conference fruitful scientific discussions, personal and professional achievements.

V. R. MEDINSKY,
Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation
Moscow, May 14, 2013

To the participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

On behalf of the Russian Academy of Sciences I cordially welcome the hosts, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Your authoritative forum that gathered representatives of various scientific schools, leading Russian and foreign scholars is aimed to discuss current challenges and prospects of the development of modern civilization. Over the last years this conference has become the largest academic event by international standards. It has formed a unique spiritual communication environment that enables scholars, politicians, public figures and artistic intellectuals to debate on current humanitarian projects and fundamental scientific ideas that evoke a wide response in the academic world and serve the interests of development of comprehensive humanities studies on man and culture.

Like the previous conferences, the agenda of today's forum includes burning issues on re-thinking trends and challenges of development of modern civilization, on searching 'points of growth' and scenarios of 'response' to the challenges, on analyzing opportunities to harmonize universal values and diversity of national practices.

The relevance of its issues, an impressive list of its participants and its thematic diversity made Likhachov Conference a means of mobilizing intellectual scholarly resources, a celebration of humanitarian ideas, an outstanding scientific event not only St. Petersburg, but also in Russia.

I am sure that this forum will make a significant contribution to the development of models of a stable future, to identification of ways of civilization development for Russian in the global world, while the recommendations drafted by the conference will serve the promotion of the humanities and will be keenly sought in practical applications.

I wish the conference a fruitful discussion and an efficient search for answers to the challenges facing Russia and all modern civilization.

Academician Yu. S. OSIPOV,
President of the Russian Academy of Sciences

To the Organizing Committee, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear friends,

I bid you welcome at the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Your forum annually brings together prominent Russian and foreign scientists, state and public figures, experts, artistic intellectuals.

Traditionally, the topics of the Conference reflects humanitarian aspects of the most pressing challenges of the modernity, it asserts trust between peoples and cultural dialogue and openness in policy as the fundamental principles of peacekeeping.

Education, science and culture are permanently in the focus of attention of state and society, they demand mutual efforts in order to develop successfully.

I am convinced that creative re-thinking of the humanistic scholarly heritage of academician D.S. Likhachov and proposals and recommendations of your conference drafted by the participants will be advantageous when humanitarian projects are carried out.

I wish you efficient work and all the best.

A. A. FURSENKO,
Assistant to the President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, May 15, 2013

To the hosts and participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear hosts and participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference,

On behalf of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia I congratulate you on the opening of this scientific forum that emphasized the aspiration of Russian society to study and master intellectual and spiritual heritage of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov.

As one of the leading higher educational institutions of the country, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences performs a difficult but responsible task of enhancing humanistic ideas of academician Likhachov, whose scientific, educational and public activities have become our moral and civil benchmark.

Reliance on scientific and spiritual heritage of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov helps Russian trade unions to solve important issues in the area of social and economic changes, in conversion of Russia into a democratic and socially oriented state.

Scientists of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences provide a considerable support in re-evaluation of the role and place of the Russian trade union movement.

An excellent tradition of conducting Likhachov Scientific Conference in your University emphasizes importance and relevance of research and study of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in the global world.

I wish all participants of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference fruitful and successful work!

M. V. SHMAKOV,

Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia

**To the Chairman of the Organizing Committee
of the 13th International Likhachov Conference Academician A. S. Zapesotsky,
the hosts and participants of the Conference**

Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honoured to greet all participants to the 13th Likhachov International Scientific Conference on the theme of "The Dialogue of Cultures – Values, Meanings and Communication," hosted at St. Petersburg University.

As you know, UNESCO was created after the devastation of the Second World War, guided by the humanist conviction that peace had to be built on new foundations, "upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind." Dialogue stands at the heart of this vision – to bring people together through the exchange of ideas and experience and through the joint creation of knowledge. This is especially important today, in a world globalizing quickly, when societies are ever more diverse and connected. In this context, promoting intercultural dialogue calls for new skills and new forms of cultural literacy. These goals guide all of UNESCO's action – to promote quality education for all, to make the most of humanity's cultural heritage and cultural diversity, to foster scientific cooperation for greater sustainability and to advance freedom of expression and support the diversity of content in all media. In a world of change, these objectives have perhaps never been so important, to strengthen the foundations of equality, dignity and solidarity between all peoples, in all their diversity.

An outstanding scholar and great humanist, Dmitry Likhachov was a powerful advocate of the need to safeguard cultural heritage, to build on the diversity of cultural expressions, and to promote inter-cultural dialogue. I wish to thank the organisers and participants of this 13th Likhachov International Scientific Conference for their commitment to these values and objectives.

I. BOKOVA,

Director-General of UNESCO

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

I cordially welcome the hosts, participants and guests of the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference annually held in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, and I congratulate you on the opening of the forum that has a particular relevance for the Russian society.

The topic of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations is crucial today as ever, because it touches upon the basis of our existence in the modern world.

I am certain that the work of science and culture figures should primarily contribute to strengthening of cooperation between nations that accompanies global processes in the world.

The results of your scientific debate are likely to enrich contemporary humanitarian ideas and help to develop supplementary measures to develop culture and preserve the world cultural heritage.

I wish all participants of the Scientific Conference successful and fruitful work, interesting discussions and meetings!

M. E. SHVYDKOY,

Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation on International Cultural Cooperation Affairs

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Information

The International Scientific Conference at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences first took place in May, 1993. It was timed to the Day of Slavonic Letters and Culture. It was initiated by academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov. Since then the conference has been held every year. After academician Likhachov had passed away this academic forum received the status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference from the government (by the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin 'On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov' No. 587, May 23, 2001).

The co-founders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Education, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress (founders: J. I. Alferov, D. A. Granin, A. S. Zapesotsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, D. S. Likhachov, A. P. Petrov, M. B. Piotrowski). Since 2007 the conference has enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, since 2013 has the support of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg).

Traditionally, the most universal debatable challenges of the present time are put on the agenda of the conference: 'Education in terms of the new cultural type formation', 'Culture and global challenges of the world development', 'Humanitarian issues of the contemporary civilization', 'Dialogue of cultures under globalization' etc.

Every year greatest figures of Russian and foreign science, culture and art, public and political leaders take part in the conference. The following academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken part in the conference in recent years: L. I. Abalkin, A. G. Arbatov, N. P. Bekhtereva, O. T. Bogomolov, V. N. Bolshakov, Yu. S. Vasilyev, R. S. Grinberg, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, A. V. Dmitriyev, T. I. Zaslavskaya, M. P. Kirpichnikov, M. I. Kleandrov, G. B. Kleiner, A. A. Kokoshin, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, I. I. Lukinov, D. S. Lvov, V. L. Makarov, V. A. Martynov, V. V. Mironov, N. N. Moiseyev, V. V. Naumkin, A. D. Nekipelov, Yu. S. Osipov, A. M. Panchenko, N. Ya. Petrakov, V. F. Petrenko, E. I. Pivovarov, M. B. Piotrowski, N. A. Plateh, V. M. Polterovich, E. M. Primakov, B. V. Rauschenbach, Yu. A. Ryzhov, N. N. Skatov, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Tishkov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, V. A. Chereshnev, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov, B. G. Yudin, V. L. Yanin and others. Academicians of the Russian Academy of Education who have taken part in the conference are the following: S. A. Amonashvili, V. I. Andreyev, G. M. Andreyeva, A. G. Asmolov, A. P. Belyayeva, M. N. Berulava, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, A. A. Bodalev, E. V. Bondarevskaya, G. A. Bordovsky, V. P. Borisenkov, G. N. Volkov, Yu. S. Davydov, A. V. Darinsky, E. D. Dneprov, S. F. Yegorov, V. I. Zagvyazinskiy, I. A. Zimniaya, V. G. Kineliov, I. S. Kon, A. S. Kondratyev, V. G. Kostomarov, V. V. Krayevsky, A. A. Likhanov, G. V. Mukhamedzianova, V. S. Mukhina, V. A. Miasnikov, N. D. Nikandrov, A. M. Novikov, O. A. Omarov, A. A. Orlov, Yu. V. Senko, A. V. Usova, Yu. U. Fokht-Babushkin, G. A. Yagodin, V. Mitter (Germany) and others. Such public and state figures as A. A. Akayev, A. E. Busygin, G. A. Hajiyeu, G. M. Gatilov, S. L. Katanandov, S. V. Lavrov, E. I. Makarov, V. I. Matviyenko, V. V. Miklushevsky, K. O. Romodanovsky, A. L. Safonov, A. A. Sobchak, E. S. Stroyev, V. Ye. Churov, M. V. Shmakov, A. V. Yakovenko, V. A. Yakovlev have also participated in the conference. Among the figures of culture and art who have taken part in the conference are the following: M. K. Anikushin, A. A. Voznesensky, I. O. Gorbachov, D. A. Granin, N. M. Dudinskaya, Z. Ya. Korogodsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, A. P. Petrov, M. M. Plisetskaya, M. L. Rostropovich, E. A. Riazanov, G. V. Sviridov and others.

Since 2007 in the framework of the Conference there has been held Likhachov forum of senior high-school students of Russia, which gathers winners of the All-Russian Contest of creative projects entitled 'Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity' from all over Russia and abroad.

Since 2008, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Programme of the conference 'International Dialogue of Cultures' has been implemented. Ambassadors of foreign states present their reports and give their opinions on acute challenges of present time.

Since 2010 the complex of Likhachov events has been supplemented with an All-Russian cultural-educational programme for senior high-school students entitled 'Likhachov Lessons in Petersburg'.

In 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009–2012, the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin and D. A. Medvedev, in 2008, 2010–2013 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Every year volumes of reports, participants' presentations, proceedings of workshop discussions and round tables are published. The copies of the volumes are present in all major libraries of Russia, the CIS countries, scientific and educational centres of many countries in the world. The Proceedings of the conference are also available on a special scientific website 'Likhachov Square' (at www.lihachev.ru).

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REPORTS

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DIALOGUE LEADING TO COEXISTENCE: HUMANITY SPEAKS

What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.

F. Fukuyama

In 1989, Francis Fukuyama (b. 1952), the American political scientist, penned a controversial essay entitled *The End of History* in which he argued that Western liberal democracy represents that final and most complete manifestation of human sociocultural evolution and the universal ideal to which others must look for inspiration.

Central to Fukuyama's argument was the belief that mature states committed to the universal ideals of Western liberal democracy rarely or never go to war with one another. In other words, Fukuyama is of the opinion that conflicts and wars have escaped Western states but found refuge in non-democratic regions, presumably Africa and Asia (and possibly South America), and as such wars and conflicts in the rest of the world will come to an end when Western liberal democracy is realized.

Noting the not-so-subtle hints of Western triumphalism and unfettered support for capitalism in Fukuyama's discourse, Jacques Derrida, the French philosopher of Algerian origin, writing in his *Specters of Marx*, published in 1993, dismissed Fukuyama's theorem as politically motivated anti-Marxist propaganda which betrayed Western ignorance and indifference to economic oppression taking place elsewhere. Derrida writes: *'For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the 'end of ideologies' and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on the earth'*.

Derrida underscores an important point, namely the West would do well to stop parading, in evangelical style, what it deems successful models of democracy and socioeconomic development; the West should instead participate in solving problems of violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, for example, which continue to affect regions outside the

purview of Western liberal democracies. To this end, Samuel Huntington, an American political scientist, delivered a lecture in 1992 as a way of response to Fukuyama. Therein Huntington hypothesized that in the future, the international arena will witness large and relentless wars and conflicts between different civilizations, occurring predominately between the Western civilization, including America, central and western Europe, Australia, and Oceania, and the Muslim civilization, which encompasses the greater Middle East, northern West Africa, Albania, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and India's Muslim population.

Huntington argues there are fundamental differences among civilizations, these differences gravitate around the axis of religion; in turn religion in the future will replace local identities and customs by transcending national boundaries and uniting subgroups under one civilization with ubiquitous religious identity. Moreover, future conflicts will arise due to cultural differences because cultural characteristics, in Huntington's view, are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic issues. Regrettably, Huntington's hypothesized future not only paints a dim picture of international cooperation, but it erroneously depicts human civilizations as entities with distinct cultural boundaries. As pointed out by Edward Said, the late Palestinian-American literary theorist, the *Clash of Civilizations* recklessly affirms the personification of enormous and complex entities such as "the West" and "Islam". Instead, Said speaks of the *Clash of Ignorance*, which presents the concepts of civilizations and identities as closed, shut-down, and sealed off entities that are unchanging and homogenous. Said argues that these concepts have in fact been open to exchange, cross-fertilization and dialogue: *'Huntington is an ideologist, someone who wants to make "civilizations" and "identities" into what they are not: shutdown, sealed-off entities that have been purged of the myriad currents and countercurrents that animate human history, and that over centuries have made it possible for that history not only to contain wars of religion and imperial conquest but also to be one of exchange, cross-fertilization and sharing. This far less visible history is ignored in the rush to highlight the ludicrously compressed and constricted warfare that "the clash of civilizations" argues is the reality.'*

Hence Said's words underscore the need for the perpetuation of open exchange between Muslims and non-Muslims, those who geographically belong to the West and those who reside in the geographical East, exchange of ideas should be framed by commitment to dialogue,

¹ His Royal Highness, Prince (Saudi Arabia). He serves as the Chairman of King Faisal Centre for Research & Islamic Studies. He was appointed an Adviser in the Royal Court and served in this capacity in 1973–1977. From 1977 to 2001, Prince Turki was the Director General of Al Mukhabarat Al A'amah, Saudi Arabia's intelligence agency, and subsequently served as ambassador to the Court of St. James's (2001–2005) and the United States of America (2005–2007).

to debate differences in order to establish commonalities and find common ground. Dialogue must occur not only in the upper echelons of powers but also between centres of learning, religious institutions, and educational institutions responsible for educating the younger generation. In order to ensure productivity and success, dialogue initiatives ought to be inclusive, political opportunism or regional posturing must not hijack meetings and exchanges, and hence dialogue initiatives should include all strata of society, political or otherwise.

Oftentimes, dialogue is misunderstood for political or religious unity. Differences between cultures and religions are not shameful, nor should points of contention be hidden away from plain sight. On the contrary, the ultimate goal, *the summum bonum* of dialogue is mutual respect leading to peace that is an abode whereby humans live side by side peacefully and hold amicable relations irrespective of religious, cultural, and ethnic differences. In ancient times, for example during the life of the Prophet Muhammad, peace and prayers are upon him, the city of Medina, where Muhammad lived during the latter part of his life, saw Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Pagans, living side by side in complete harmony and peace. Muhammad himself drew a universal declaration, known by historians as the Charter of Medina, which saw people of different faith, or lack of, as equal citizens, each with guaranteed rights. Hence through dialogue, not war, Muhammad brought to an end bitter rivalries and religious infighting between Muslims, Jews, Christians, and Pagans. The end product was peaceful coexistence, economic prosperity, and security. It is when politics intervenes that harmony between people suffers.

Dialogue today must go beyond formal exchanges of pleasantries and niceties; it must cease to provide platforms to political opportunists and insincere advocates of coexistence and peace, but instead must invite scholars, activists, politicians, religious figures, and everyone who strives to bring peace and happiness to humanity as a whole.

Ultimately all faith is private; what defines us first and foremost is our humanity, our compassion and consideration for other than us, our desire to see others happy as we, and our refusal to inflict evil and harm on others. In the words of the Prophet's Companion Ali ibn Abi Talib: *'If he is not your brother in faith, surely he is your equal in humanity'*.

In Saudi Arabia, we strongly believe in interfaith and intercultural dialogue to promote coexistence between people; on 24th April, 1974 Cardinal Pignedoli, the President of the Vatican Office of Non-Christian Affairs, made an official visit to King Faisal. Six months later, Pope Paul VI received the official visit to the Vatican by a delegation of scholars headed by Minister of Justice of Saudi Arabia. It occasioned a dialogue between Christians and Muslims on the "Cultural Rights of Man in Islam". The ongoing meetings and dialogues led to the visit of King Abdallah to Pope Benedict XVI in the Vatican in November 2007. This was the first meeting between the head of the Roman Catholic Church and a Saudi monarch. In March 2008, King Abdallah called for a "brotherly and sincere dialogue between believers from all religions. In June 2008, he held a conference in Mecca to urge Muslim leaders to speak with one voice with leaders of all religions. He took his efforts further by holding an historic conference in Madrid in July 2008 where religious leaders of different faiths participated. He did not limit the dialogue to Muslims, Christians and Jews, but also included religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism, and Shinto. His efforts led to the establishment of the King Abdallah Bin AbdulAziz *International Center* for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue in Vienna which is sponsored by the governments of Austria, Spain and Saudi Arabia. And I would like to end with a Quranic verse that presents the Islamic concept of coexistence: *'Those who believe, those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Sabians and the Christians – any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness – on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve'*.

F. A. Asadullin¹

WHY DOES MOSCOW OWE ITS GRANDEUR TO KHANS?

Meanings and Values of Cross-Cultural Links of Turkish and Slavonic Peoples in Russia

The recent festival of 2012 devoted to 1150th anniversary of the Russian Statehood served a mighty stimulus to a wide-spread discussion among the academic community about civilizational basis of multinational Russian State

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that was triggered by two events different in targets and scale but equally important for the society. The first event was reactivation of the Russian Historical Association (RHA) in Moscow last summer that resulted from a grown public interest towards National history, the second event was implementation of the long-brooded, since the 1990s, idea of Eurasian integration on the CIS territory, and the first step to which was initiated by the Russian authorities by launching the ambitious in its geopolitical aims Eurasian Economic Union. These two circumstances of the public and academic reality focus the historical retrospective, whose multifaceted re-evaluation brings us back to the issue of regaining national all-Russian identity and the idea of cultural code, very close to all Russians.

The process of verification of Russian history, initiated by the Russian Historical Association, based upon the fundamental principles of truly scientific knowledge, i.e. aspiration for objectiveness and authenticity, serves as the grounds to create all-Russian historical culture, which implies introduction into scientific use of the spiritual and intellectual contribution of its all units and open-minded understanding the scope of all events and landmarks of the past, common for all nations. Therefore it is important to refer to the origins of Russian history, because, after V.O. Kliuchevsky 'studying our ancestry, we get to know ourselves' Moscow antiquity gives an invaluable material for such study. The city that has a special status of a capital and a symbolic significance in the bosom of every Russian, can reflect the depth and peculiar features of Russian civilization, whose age does not differ a lot from the age of Russian capital.

Subject to the Federal Law of the Russian federation 'On the capital of the Russian Federation', 'The capital of the Russian Federation is a historically developed centre of cultural, spiritual and social traditions of multiethnic nation of the Russian Federation' [1].

Unlike other European capitals that were founded, as a rule, in the late BC or early AD, on the sites of ruined Roman urban settlements or Roman fortresses (like London in England or Paris in France), Moscow that has celebrated its 866th anniversary, does not have such a 'long' historic genealogy. By the time of the first reference of Moscow, within the boundaries of the Middle Volga and Kama 'the northernmost outpost of Islamic civilization', after academician V.V. Bartold, had already been formed, that is Volga Bulgaria, the first on the territory of modern Russia, state institution with officially defined confessional and cultural traditions. Officially, it happened in 922, 66 years before Christianization of Kievan Rus and adoption of Byzantine-model of Christianity by Prince Vladimir and his retinue. Relations between the Ancient Russian state and Volga Bulgaria were not smooth, but their mutual interest towards the development of trade and exchange of goods stimulated their strive to support peaceful relations [2]. It was largely encouraged by similarity of economic systems of Volga Bulgaria and North-East Rus, that was noticed by L. Gumilyov, who wrote that 'the difference between the Slavs and the Bulgars was not anthropological, racial or economical, but religious' [3]. It is important to note that the volumes of Medieval Arab and Persian travellers and historians of the 9th – 10th centuries, like al-Tabari (*The History of the Prophets and Kings*), al-Mas'udi (*The Meadows of Gold*), ibn Khordadbeh (*The Book of Roads and Kingdoms*), ibn Fadlān (*Travel to Volga*), Abu Ali Ahmad Ibn Rustah (*Book of Precious Records*), as well as Jovayni, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Rustah, ibn Asam al-Qurra, in the terms of scarcity of original Russian records in manuscripts fill up this lacuna and give us general concepts of the Slavs, the Khazars, the Volga Bulgars, the Burtas and other nations inhabiting that area of Eastern Europe [4].

The first record of Moscow, according to the Ipatiev manuscript, was made in 1147, when it was quite a small fortification in the south-west part of Vladimir-Suzdal principality and was part of the estate that belonged to Kuchka, the boyar – the famous Kuchkovo (Kuchkovy villages). Kuchkovy villages were located as follows: one was on the site of to-be Kremlin, another one was on the

site where the monument to the first printer stands, and the third one was on the territory of modern Sretenka, near Sykharevskaya square. This district limited by the beginning of modern Nikolskaya street and the end of Sretenka, descending to Neglinnaya, was popularly called Kuchkovo field. [5]. It is described in the '*The Chronicle of Moscow Origin*' – a literary work, dated back approximately to the late 16th – early 17th centuries. The word 'kuchka', not very mellifluous for the Russian language, might originate from the words with the Turk r 'kuchuk', meaning 'tiny', 'small', or, like the name Kuçum, might be derived from 'kuchu', meaning moving, displacement, migration. Such version seems credible, especially if one take into consideration that by that time between Vladimir-Suzdal Principality and Volga Bulgaria due to geographically close position and constantly enhancing trading relations, the active migration process had been in progress that resulted, in particular, in out-marriages and heterogeneous Bulgarian-Russian population.

Among them might have been the baptized 'Bulgarian' Stefan (Stepan) Ivanovich Kuchka [6]. The credit of founder of Moscow can be fairly shared between Yuri Dolgoruky and the owner of Kuchkovy villages, who died by the hands of Yuri Dolgoruky's warriors, while protecting his property. It is quite obvious that the ancient Moscow had long had another name, Kuchkovo [7].

Thus, all the facts known to us about Moscow, give the proof that since the time of its foundation it had been the city that united ethnically and confessionally two inherent spiritual and cultural traditions, going back to Islam, firstly to the Volga Bulgarians who had adopted it, and Christianity of the Byzantine type. This development plays a crucial role in re-evaluation of the historical ethnical cultural phenomenon that was established when the Russian capital was born.

The conquer in the middle of the 13th century of Vladimir and other Principalities of North-East Russia by the Golden Horde (or, as they called themselves, Ulus of Jochi) started a new period in the history of developing Russian state, which was classified and called 'Tartar' [8] by famous Russian thinker N.A. Berdyaev. The Golden Horde whose basic ethnical substrate was Turkic speaking steppe nations (mostly the Kipchaks), was a developed and progressive for those time state with the borders stretching from the Caspian sea to Novgorod. Successors of Genghis Khan (died in 1227), his son Jochi, and later Batu, followed by Berke and Uzbek took place of Byzantine emperors in the hierarchy of Russian geopolitical concepts: from now on in Rus the title of 'tsar' was given to the khans of the Golden Horde [9]. This tradition was started by Prince of Vladimir Alexander Nevsky (1221–1263) who considered that 'it is necessary to strengthen the defence in the west, and seek for friends in the east' and amidst the feud dominating in Rus placed is bets on allied relations with Sarai khans. Turkic-Slavic two-worldness, embodied by Alexander Nevsky, was the result of his upbringing in the Holden Horde, where he fraternized with Sartak, khan Batu's son. It was Sartak who granted him with the jarliq to authorize Vladimir principality rule. These circumstances moved him to the circle of Sarai courtiers. At that time, in the 70s of the 13th century, Moscow principality became an independent one: it was inherited by the junior son of Alexander Nevsky, Daniil (1261–1303), forefather of all the

Grand Princes of Moscow, whose memory is cherished in the Holy Danilov Monastery founded in 1282, the current residence of the Moscow Patriarchate and The Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the same time Moscow was beginning to turn from an up-country appanage town to the centre of North-East Rus, the process was accompanied by the expanding lands around the town and enforcement of Moscow principality in general. As estimated by N. M. Karamzin, a descendant of one of Nogai khans 'black Murza', 'Moscow owes its grandeur to khans' [10].

Although inclusion of North-East Rus into the Golden Horde did not stop feuds (mutual civil discords between Moscow and Tver princes had lasted long till the 15th century), it temperate, after E.S. Kulpin, 'degradation of manners and mass insanity' prevailing in pre-Mongolian Rus [11]. It is quite symptomatic that one of the first missions on khan's authorities who tried to execute the stock survey of the subject territory of Russian Ulus (urus ulus), i.e. the Great Vladimir Principality, was population census in 1257. The same year another important event happened: after ascending the throne Berke, the younger brother of khan Batu, who had professed the Islam, claimed this religion as imperial, which entailed changes not only in cultural sphere but in public life of the whole ulus. 'A plenty of clergy, prophets, Islamic legalists and adepts and commentator of Quran,' remarked the researcher of the Golden Horde history, V.L. Egorov. 'They were followed by highly-educated Muslim Arab and Persian officials, invited to the public service by the khan. They took the key positions in the state, including the post of vizier, thus challenging poorly educated nomadic Mongolian aristocracy' [12]. A bright evidence of Rus involvement into general economic and financial system of the Golden Horde is Tartar borrowed words into Russian: dengi (money), altyn (a 3-copeck coin), kazna (treasury), kaznachey (treasurer), tamozhnya (the Customs) and others, whose origin nowadays no one thinks about. I do not intend to idealize the Horde that was a typical example of eastern Medieval tyranny with all its fruitage (feudal oppression, rapacious exploitation, political and social instability and others), and I am fully aware that the phenomenon of Mongol invasion is complex for Russian mind to acknowledge (which leaves a good chance for scholars to argue about the missed historic alternative, like poly-centred variant of Rus' development), I'd like to note that it was the time when all required prerequisites were established (and the only possible ones at that time) to create a Russian state-to-be with the centre in Moscow. 'Methods of Mongolian statehood' (after N.S. Trubetskoy) [13], learnt by the first princes of Moscow, became flesh and blood of the political system and social economical system of the ancient Russian state.

After vassalage had been established between Sarai with its higher Appeal Body of the Horde and Rus, the role of appanaged princes involved, mostly, in collecting various taxes – yasak (tribute), tamga (trade tollage), susun and uluf (money on food and drink), konak (international trading tollage, donations), kulush-koltok (extraordinary levy at khan's discretion), kharaj (head and land tax). The most successful in these activities were the sons of the first Moscow prince Daniil – Yury (1281–1325) succeeded by Ivan (1282–1340), called Kalita. The Turk word 'kalita' meant 'moneybag'. This event coincided with the final victory of the Islamic party headed by khan Uzbek in the Horde (1312) and reinforcement of Berke's course towards

Islamization not only of the commanding élite, but of the public life of the ulus on the whole. Yury's claims on having the right to be close to the Horde which he left in 1317 after a 4-year stay there were supported by his dynastic marriage with the khan's system Konchaka (baptized as Agafiya), thanks to which he was granted a jarliq of Grand Prince, i.e. a special Investiture to possess the Great Vladimir Principality.

Yury's brother, prince Ivan (Ivan the First) at the cost of active and keen participation in suppression of the Tver's rebellion in 1328 against the khan's governors supported Moscow's position in Sarai, and in fact, he became a primary tax-farmer all over Rus. It meant that Moscow, as the second large centre after Sarai, had acquired the monopolistic right of the chief partner and ally for the general Horde's policy in Rus. Characterizing Ivan Kalita's activities, academician L.V. Cherepnin states: 'This prince cruelly oppressed those spontaneous popular movements that undermined the supremacy of the Horde over Rus. Cruelly dealing with his rivals among other Russian princes, Kalita achieved the great enhance of Moscow principality might, which contributed to the process of state centralization' [14]. These new historic circumstances put forward as one of the basis principles of Moscow state formation the principle of ethnical tolerance that due to a special status of Islam supposed the same principle in religious issues. 'In Moscow recruitment of public servant has performed only on the basis of their serving abilities, as L.N. Gumilyov wrote, Kalita and his successor accepted for the service tartars, Orthodox Lithuanians, common Russians whose wealth was just a horse and a sword' [15].

In this respect it is important to pay attention to the two birchbark manuscripts found in Kremlin during archaeological diggings in summer of 2007 in Tainitsky garden. One of it directly describes a Kremlin inhabitant Turab or Turabei, who lived at the turn of 14th – 15th centuries. It contains his property inventory. As the chief archaeologist of Kremlin Tatiana Panova considers, Tutabei could be a baptized Tartar [16], though in view of enhanced role of Islamic factor in the life of the then ulus, conversion of religion might not have even happened. Tolerance in religious issues at that time was double-checked both by the Horde's khans and by Moscow princes following the model of the Horde's policy, who (as 'loyal ulus people' – the way Ivan Kalita called himself) were aware of the necessity to keep their privileged position and benevolence of Tartar sovereigns.

Christening as an obligatory condition to enrol to Moscow public service was legitimized later, after the decay of the Horde and gradual decrease of the Islamic factor in the life of Moscow tsardom. For public and political realities of the first Moscow princes' reign, the fact that Islam had been chosen the state religion couldn't be ignored. However, for non-Muslim population of ancient Moscow far removed from Sarai, for its common inhabitants khans' religious preferences could pass unheeded and trouble-free, without any affect on their traditional belief.

'Paradoxically, the strengthen of Islam in the Horde,' as P.G. Landa remarks, 'was accompanied by strengthening of orthodox Christianity in Rus' [17], which contributed to reproduction of social-cultural institutions based on Islam. If we recall the fundamental theological principles of Islam, it assumes tolerant attitude towards 'people of the

Gospel' ('Ahlul Kitab') –towards Christians and the Jews in terms of their political loyalty and payment of head-tax 'jizya' that was transformed in the mentality of the Horde's ulema into the regularly collected tollage or could become its religious grounding. Even later when the mechanism of total Christianization of the Tartars was in full swing, the natural desire to remain their own religion brought to life a wide-spread practice in the Medieval Islam 'at-taqiyya' ('cautious disguise of one's religion' that allows the believer under compulsion or threat of injury to dissimulate in order to protect oneself) which led to the fact that a special group of the Christianized Tartars appeared, 'crypto-Muslims' who on the surface following the imposed religion were Christians, but privately followed the original spiritual tradition and professed the Islam. [18] The significance of the Islamic spiritual tradition in the life of Medieval Rus is indicated by the fact that until the early 18th century on the messages of Moscow governors to Muslim ones an abstract from Quran was inscribed in Arabic 'bi-'inayati Rabbi'l-'alamin' – 'by the mercy of the Lord of the world' [19].

Thus civilizational features of Russia are largely based on the historic result of Medieval Moscow development, whose grandeur, as estimated by Karamzin and other famous Russian historians, was only possible due to its absolute reliance upon the Golden Horde and its khans.

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Thomas Bauer¹

TRUST AND PREDICTABILITY AS VALUES THROUGH THE EXAMPLE OF THE TRANSFORMATION PROCESS IN HUNGARY

When being students, representatives of my generation heard their teachers say that according to the Marxist doctrine social sciences do not provide an opportunity to experiment as natural sciences do. This must be true. A researcher uses comparisons instead of experiments. For instance, if some phenomenon found in a certain country has both specific prerequisites (which are different from other countries) and specific scenarios of development, then, perhaps, it is possible to speak of the existence of cause-and-effect relation.

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Such considerations are applicable, in particular, to such fundamental values in economic life as trust and predictability. What is trust as a value, and what role does it play in economic life? Modern economic life bases on a range of links between business units: enterprises as suppliers and as buyers, banks, investors, etc. Under the conditions of competitive market every enterprise always takes into account the opportunities to substitute the current suppliers for others who offer more profitable conditions (the quality of goods, process, delivery time, etc). However, in reality the opportunity to constantly change suppliers is always limited, so business units try to develop a network of reliable and lasting relations with suppliers, buyers, banks, etc. In this way they bring down the costs of information and of making new decisions all the time. While developing

lasting relations there appears mutual trust between business units as a necessary condition of an uninterrupted course of management. In this respect trust is an irreplaceable element of the economic system, or, in other words, a system unit in economics.

Besides economics, trust is an important element of other subsystems in society. Trust put in the state and trust between single units plays an important part in the sphere of law. The legal ordering of any country is not just a corpus of laws adopted by the parliament or decrees of the President and so on. Besides the formal norms set forth in laws and decrees the interaction between people is regulated by informal rules. For example, there is no formal rule according to which people holding public posts must answer the questions of the press, but this is what they do in real life. It promotes establishing and preserving people's trust in both government bodies and single representatives of the government. Similarly, there is no law which would ban the government majority in parliament from changing the constitution or the parliament regulations without the opposition taking part in making this decision. However, when making such decisions in democratic countries it is customary to cooperate with the opposition and to strive to establishing rapprochement between separate groups in parliament. In a democratic state people who do not belong to any political groups are usually appointed or elected to hold posts at the head of various regulatory authorities such as the office of public prosecutor, the constitutional court, the audit chamber, the state radio and television, the election committee, etc, though there is no such formal ban. It is also customary that parliamentary committees controlling the government in terms of such important issues as the state budget or the state security are chaired by representatives of the opposition. Observing such informal regulations makes the parliament's control over the government effective and thus it is a prerequisite for establishing trust between the majority and the minority in parliament. These specific features of the democratic system let those living in a particular country, irrespective of their political beliefs, consider the state to be 'theirs', but not a hostile power, and consider themselves to be full-fledged citizens of the country. Everybody accepts the results of elections which are believed to be honest. The existence of such trust becomes of utmost importance in difficult situations when the government must convince the citizens of the necessity to take unpopular measures. If a statesman avoids meeting independent mass media, if the majority does not take into account the intentions of the minority when laying down 'the rules of the game' in politics, if it appoints its adherents to hold leading positions in regulatory authorities, it shakes trust in it, and it will make the government unable to convince the people that the pursued policy is correct.

The predictability of the actions of the state, single bodies, departments and offices is of no less importance. Predictability means the logical order of the measures taken within the economic policy of a state. At that, they are supposed to take into account the tendencies of the preceding development of the country's economy. Once this state is achieved there appears trust in the relations between business and the state. The developed market economy functioning effectively in Western countries is based on having both types of trust: trust between particular companies and trust between the state and business. So

the organic link between the value categories of trust and predictability becomes evident. The predictability of the state's economic policy provides for the trust put in the state by the business community.

The use of categories of trust and predictability as system categories allows analyzing the development of the economy of Hungary. The global financial crisis of 2008 resulted in the GDP decreasing almost in all countries of the European Union in 2009 (with Poland being the only exception). However, from 2010 most countries resumed the economic growth and it continued through 2011 and 2012. But there were some exceptions, Hungary, in particular, being one of them. While in a number of countries of Central and Eastern Europe there was recorded an increase in investments from 2010, in Hungary there is still disinvestment which started as early as 2006, which had a negative impact on the GDP growth rate. First this adverse development was caused by the necessity of regaining the macroeconomic equilibrium in 2006, and then by the global financial crisis itself. However it is appropriate to raise a question: why did the disinvestment continue in 2010-2012, i.e. when the crisis was being overcome in other countries? Let us remember that in the conditions of the 'socialist community', i.e. of the communist bloc Hungary was a country where considerable economic reforms were carried out. Owing to these reforms Hungarian state enterprises and communal farms got adjusted to the domestic and foreign demand much better than enterprises and farms of other socialist countries. Thus the supply of the consumer market also was much better. In other words, Hungary was a more successful (economically) country compared to other countries of the socialist bloc. Besides, the first decade of the market reforms was more successful in Hungary. The country exercised privatization, opened its economy for international transactions and actively joined the process of the European integration. While in the 1970s and the 1980s in Hungary there appeared more joint ventures than in all other countries of the Comecon, in the 1990s there came more foreign direct investments to Hungary than to other European post-socialist countries. Owing to this, Hungary was quick at effecting the structural shifts in industry and in foreign commerce. Over the previous years, however, there has been observed a backward tendency. While in Poland there continues a steady economic growth, in Slovakia in the 2000s the amount of raised foreign direct investments is rapidly rising, Hungary is gradually falling behind these and other countries on a number of characteristics. How can this be accounted for? Hungary's lag began in the mid-2000s. At that time this was a short-term process: the slowdown in the growth was caused by the forced constraint of both consumption and investment; these were the measures to overcome the imbalance in the state budget. These measures brought positive results, i.e. the indices of the external and internal equilibrium improved and growth was predetermined. The rate of the Hungarian currency rose, the price of financing the Hungarian external debt decreased. From 2010 the forint sagged, the Hungarian government securities began to sell at higher prices. As I have said before, in the 70s and the 80s Hungary was a country of reforms with a more extensive independence of enterprises. Commercial and financial links of Hungarian enterprises with Western firms developed intensively. It was in the years just before the system upheaval of

1989-1990 when the Hungarian parliament passed the laws of business companies and of transforming the state enterprises into private ones. Liberalization of prices and of foreign commerce took place. There was established the State institution supervising the economic competition. The renewed constitution confirmed the independence of courts. All of these measures resulted in the fact that the conditions of business activities approximated to the conditions of Western market economy. On the one hand, one of the most important prerequisites for the functioning of market economy was formed: an opportunity for new organizations to freely join the market. So, the conditions of competition improved. On the other hand, trust concerning property protection and the force of an agreement was enhanced. All of these promoted both further influx of foreign direct investments and the development of free enterprise within the country. This development based on the experience gained from joint ventures and small businesses in the 1980s.

The effective functioning of the developed market economy in Western countries bases on the presence of both kinds of trust: trust between separate enterprises and trust between the state and business. The development of market economy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe on the one hand promoted the appearance of both kinds of trust and on the other hand presupposed it. It was observed in Hungary in the 1990s. The stabilization measures of 2006, first of all, additional taxes, weakened the trust that businessmen put in the stability of the rules of the game. However, the basic features of the market economy were not affected. The forced diminution in the aggregate demand led to the fact that the investing activities became less intense, but no considerable changes in the nature of the development of the Hungarian economy took place.

When the current government of the country with Viktor Orbán at the head came to power, a different situation appeared. The new government cut down the income tax by way of introducing a fixed tax rate (of 16%) and a considerable increase in income tax concessions at the expense of children. At the same time the taxes imposed on small businesses were also decreased. To preserve a relative equilibrium of the state budget additional taxes were imposed upon commercial banks and large companies of a number of industries where foreign owners prevail (power engineering, telecommunications, networks in retail trade). To solve such problems as families' high loan debts in foreign currency and the growth of utility rates the government by force of law made banks and service businesses decrease the interest rates and prices at the expense of their profit. Furthermore, the government is striving to supplant foreign firms. The Prime-Minister Orbán has declared that he thinks it necessary that no less than 50% of commercial banks be owned by the state. The

state has bought a part of shares of the oil company 'MOL', business units of the German energy utility company 'EON', the car-making factory 'RABA' and made French owners return the water-retaining enterprises to the cities of Budapest and Pécs. The construction of new shopping centres and shops was limited, which will hinder new business units' joining the market.

These actions of the Hungarian government were to a certain extent unpredictable. They shattered the trust that the business put in the state. As a result negative tendencies have become apparent in the economy of the country. There has been a decrease not only in foreign but also in domestic investments. Even Hungarian investors began to transfer their capital to foreign countries. Making use of the opportunity to convert the forint and the complete freedom of the movement of capital within the European Union, individuals transfer their savings abroad. In the first two decades of the market reforms Hungary, along with the Czech Republic, was a country with a low immigration rate, compared to the CIS countries, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia. There has been observed a backward process recently: young Hungarians, especially (but not only) those with degrees, crowd to move to the West. These are huge losses both in the short-run (the country will lose the earned income taxes of these people) and in the long-term perspective: the country will lose the human capital of the highest quality. Other countries of Central and Eastern Europe have also been experiencing difficulties over the previous years. The Global financial crisis made a negative impact on their economies. Nevertheless, in Poland the economic growth is steadily going on, and in a number of other countries it recommences. The main reason of the mentioned difference between Hungary and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe lies in the fact that in other countries there was preserved the trust of business units in the predictability of the behavior of the state and the mutual trust between enterprises. The current government of Hungary supposed that the decrease in income tax by way of introducing a fixed tax rate would encourage Hungarian businessmen to take the initiative, which would lead to the revival of the domestic demand and supply. Then, the supplementary taxes levied on banks and foreign firms were supposed to be supported by the people. However, the government took no account of the exceptional significance of the value categories of trust and predictability as 'factors of production' in the economy of the 21st century. The experience of Hungary of the previous few years, as well as the experience of a number of post-communist countries, is evident of the fact that these values are of utmost importance in the modern economy. These values are like air: while it is available, we take no notice of it, but once there is less of it, we suffer from its shortage.

O. T. Bogomolov¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES BRINGS PEOPLES CLOSER AND ENRICHES THEM

The modern world experiences the time of deep changes, which is called the ‘macroshift’² by some philosophers. It touches upon the economic sphere, which enters the stage of transition to the new regulation forms and new technological ways. The globalization process gets to an unprecedented scale and spreads not only to manufacturing but also to social relations and culture. Quite symptomatic are the shifts in the social system including the birth of new models. There appears a different configuration of international relations and interaction of world civilizations. The humanity faces new challenges that demand finding adequate responses. It causes a conflict between the settled life forms and new forms. When the political regimes show their impotence in the face of the upcoming changes and the population majority spontaneously gives way to its dissatisfaction, it provokes intellectual discontent, unrest in the society and its destabilization. Conflicts in the international relations sharpen.

On the other hand, overcoming destructive sides of the macroshift and finding solutions to the challenges of the new epoch start engrossing the minds of many scientists, politicians and social circles. The search for different solutions is on; it is accompanied by the fighting of views, confrontation of obsolete and newly-formed ideologies. Unfortunately, the progress of scientific and political thought by no means keeps pace with the events. In this context both the dialogue between different cultures and schools of social thoughts should be analyzed. Cooperation between countries and peoples in the mentioned spheres, knowledge exchange, mutual acquaintance with the achievements in science and education, literature and arts can facilitate finding international agreement and open additional opportunities of progressive development for its participants.

I want to note the meaning of the dialogue in the humanitarian sphere and emphasize several trends, which, in my opinion, play the key role in the future development of the Earth civilization – education, ideology, democratic system and culture.

In 1996, UNESCO Commission under the leadership of Jacques Delors (ex-chairman of European Commission) tried to formulate the global tasks for the education

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² *László Ervin. Macroshift (Navigating the Transformation to a Sustainable World). Published by Taidex Co. M., 2004.*

development in the 21st century. It prepared a document named ‘Learning: The Treasure Within’. The preface written by Jacques Delors contained an appeal to create conditions for educating and enlightening the planet’s inhabitants throughout their lives. In his view, it can help to come to the balanced forms of the development of each nation and of the humanity as a whole. Jacques Delors offered the planet’s inhabitants: ‘to learn to live, to learn to experience, to learn to create and to learn to coexist’. The timelessness of his ideas cannot be overestimated. But making them the norm of life for most dwellers of the planet requires enormous efforts of the government and educated part of the society, such as increasing investments into people’s education, upbringing and health.

One part of the education is creation and adoption of the ideas that can encourage planet’s people masses to do good works, mobilize their mind, will and energy for common good achievement and for providing peaceful coexistence with other peoples. Are they not the tasks of philosophers and the international dialogue of politicians, public figures and representatives of creative trades? I would like to share my ideas on this topic.

Any politics leans against some ideas, in other words, it has ideological component. Dominating ideology is known to be forming on the basis of some theoretical conceptions perceived by the ruling class. Promoted and propagated by the state, it can rule the consciousness and behaviour of the significant people masses. History proves that advanced ideas can be motive forces of the social progress as well as the mistaken ideas become its brake. As Victor Hugo said, there is no force in the world that can stop an idea the time of which has come.

The eminent economist of the 20th century John Maynard Keynes wrote: ‘...Ideas of economists and political thinkers – whether they are right or wrong – have more meaning than people usually think. In fact, only they rule the world...’³ Today English journal ‘The Economist’ is even more certain: ‘Mighty force that forms politics is not money or blood, but ideas. Powerful movements of the past – communism, fascism, democracy, liberalism – all of them were created by influential ideas, good or bad. That is why the authorities are mostly influenced by those who generate persuasive ideas or arm the necessary politicians with them in the necessary time’⁴.

Russian market and democratic reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union began and based on the ideological basis borrowed from the arsenal of the Western theoretical thought, its so-called ‘mainstream’. Thousands of American advisers admonished our ministers and other officials. Neoliberalism – the basis of ‘The Washington Consensus’⁵ developed in the USA as a prescription for

³ *Keynes J.M. General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money // Anthology of economic classics. M., 1993. Vol. 2. P. 432.*

⁴ *The Economist*, January 22, 2011.

⁵ Document developed by the US Treasury Department and IMF that contains recommendations for the countries with emerging markets on economic policy. The prescriptions encompassed policies in such areas as macroeconomic stabilization, economic opening with respect to both trade and investment, privatization, liberalization of prices and the expansion of market forces within the domestic economy.

developing countries economic reformation – was adopted by the Russian ‘Young Reformers’. This ideology promised its advocates in power fast enrichment as a result of privatization, liberalization of prices and lawlessness.

People’s multibillion savings devalued overnight; there appeared oligarchs who were second to none of the Americans oligarchs in their wealth. But economics, especially the manufacturing sector, science, culture and educational system suffered great losses. No wonder that today our ultraliberal reforms are supported only by the minority of the Russians according to sociological polls. In 2009, 47% considered that the state voiced and protected the interests of the rich during the reforms, 44% thought that it supported the interests of the state bureaucracy¹ and only 20% shared Western liberal values².

Russian GDP in 2010 remained almost at the same level compared with 1990, industrial output was cut by a quarter, and agricultural output was cut by 40%. This is based on the calculations of the honest scientists. Is it not the time to think about the reasons? Should our overseas store of ideology not be revised?

In the West there appeared already interesting evidences of the neo-liberal ideological postulates review. Two Americans Economics, Nobel-Prize winners Paul Krugman and Josef Stiglitz state ‘the groundlessness of the academic science and fundamental flaws in the American model of capitalism’³.

They are supported by UNCTAD ‘The Global Economic Crisis: System Failures...’⁴ recognizing that ‘market fundamentalism of the last two decades has failed dramatically’. This report connects failure overcoming perspective with the increasing role of the state. ‘The Economist’ states its opinion even clearer: ‘The world is watching the rise of the new economic hybrid that can be called “state capitalism”’⁵. According to the journal, the impressive example of that is the Chinese model. American scientist Stefan Halper even named his book ‘The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century’⁶. Many countries of Latin America and the Middle East are inclined to follow China.

Indeed, China is looking for a post-reform development model calling it socialist harmonious society. This model is to combine civilized market relations with social justice and the state’s regulating role. Europeans, Scandinavians especially, practise something that is called the model of a welfare state and, in Germany, a social-oriented market economy. These new models have got assimilated in Europe and in many ways have justified themselves, though liberals claim that they are only temporal forms and soon the former understanding of market economy will be restored.

In one of his latter publications, ‘Ideological Crisis of Western Capitalism’, Josef Stiglitz writes that ‘the financial crisis would teach Americans (and others) a lesson about the need for greater equality, stronger regulation, and a better

balance between the market and the government. Alas, that has not been the case. On the contrary, a resurgence of right-wing economics, driven, as always, by ideology and special interests, once again threatens the global economy – or at least the economies of Europe and America, where these ideas continue to flourish’⁷. Of course, not everyone shares these ideas, but they signify the emerging revolution of thoughts.

In the centre of the oncoming rethinking there is no doubt the question of the state’s role. It has a special ideological importance both for the West and for the transition economies. In the time of fundamental changes taking up the path of progressive development requires establishing in politics and in public consciousness the idea of statehood strengthening, managerial mechanisms perfection in the name of the nation, people, social justice, but not in the name of several privileged layers of the society.

Thereupon we should remind of the declarative status of Russia’s constitutional definition as a social state. It is not identified and explanations of the scientists are not formally assigned. Population is deprived of the important guideline, i.e. to what social system the country will come as a result of the reforms and what benefits it will bring to people. What form of democracy will be the best for us?

The absence of clear prospects and faith in the future cannot but have impact on the spiritual climate and people’s mood in our country. Sociological polls register psychic oppression of the considerable number of people, the absence of the sense of social justice, uncertainty about the future, more frequent disasters and terrorist attacks – all these factors paralyze people’s creative energy.

The wild forms of Russian capitalism can hardly become an inspiring aim. It is no accident that Josef Stiglitz, who places himself among dissidents in the Western neo-liberal environment and advocates of unconventional wisdom, is looking for the answer to the question: is the dream about the Third way between today’s global capitalism and yesterday’s compromised socialism still alive?⁸

The convergence theory in the 1960s–1970s was advocated by the prominent scientists: Nobel Prize winners: Jan Tinbergen (the Netherlands), Andrei Sakharov, John Kenneth Galbraith – scientist and statesman (the USA). Today it is vital again.

Nowadays many thinkers are convinced of the necessity of social development orientation when a person, his/her culture, knowledge, skills, health, state of mind, i.e. everything that makes up a concept of human potential acquires crucial meaning. That is why they propose to make not innovative technology but a human being the strategic investment priority. The unity of the society, people’s confidence in justice and viability of a social system and trust in the state’s leaders are no less important established goals to achieve. This is what is called the social capital and its building-up more and more becomes the earnest of success of all economic initiatives. In a word, politics and economics cannot do without consistent humanization. And here the decision rests with the state.

Russian reform architects following the neo-liberal mainstream of economic thought called upon the state leaving the economy and did not stand any counterarguments.

⁷ Stiglitz J. Ideological Crisis of Western Capitalism. http://www.project-sidicate.org/series/unconventional_economic_wisdom

⁸ Ibid.

¹ Non-economic faces of economics: unknown interaction. M.: INES, P. 187.

² Ibid. P. 183.

³ Freefall: America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy. Joseph Stiglitz, Norton, 2009. P. 361.

⁴ The Global Economic Crisis: System Failures and Multilateral Remedies. UN, New York, 2009. P. III.

⁵ The Economist. Jan. 23–29. 2010. P. 22.

⁶ Halper S. The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century, Basic Book, 296 p.

The most efficient transformation leverage – the state mechanism of management and order keeping – turned out to be disordered in Russia, not competent enough, eroded by monstrous corruption, deprived of an immune system, cleansing it from vices and preventing from gross errors. The necessity of its improvement and strengthening is evident. Especially as Russian private businesses mostly compromised themselves by the insatiable thirst for profits, social irresponsibility, amorality, disregard of national interests, law and order, and at times interpenetration with crime. They will hardly be able to become a leading power in the country's modernization.

A modern state (not only in Russia, but also in the West) has important functions to prevent and overcome market mechanisms failures. In Russia the solution to many urgent tasks is unthought-of without its participation. Top-priorities are to overcome dangerous property stratification of the society, unjustified and unfair remuneration of many labour types, ruinous inflation, almost total corruption, a large-scale outflow of capital and the brain drain.

Besides, it is responsible and should take care of the prosperity of culture, science, education and health care. Unemployment reduction and protection of the interests, rights and freedoms of all citizens should be added up to this list. Sociological polls testify that the majority of Russians (40% to 60%) dream to live in the just reasonably organized society where human rights for freedom of expression are observed, people have equal rights to realize their potential and the most important is the democratic governmental system that provides order, eradication of corruption and fair allocation of the national income.

According to the private calculation, the gap between 10% of the richest and 10% of the poorest Russians is 33-35 times and it is growing.¹ In the USA the state smoothes over this gap from 65 to 15 by progressive taxes and other means. In comparison with 1998, in 2009 the share of 20% of low-income Russians in the total sum of population income halved, and of 20% of the rich is half as much.²

In 2009 median income in Russia, calculated in accordance with the methods established in the world, was 12265 rubles per month. According to this method, the poor are considered to be those whose income is 60% less than this level, i.e. less than 7340 rubles. In 2009 there were 40% of such people. In other words, according to the Western standards more that a third of Russian population were in the category of the poor³. After the research of the World Bank, social differentiation (more that 0.4 Gini coefficient) prevents economic growth. In Russia it is 0.5,⁴ i.e. it does prevent the growth.

We cannot but agree with the findings of the International Monetary Fund report⁵ saying that government's social functions should occupy more important place in the ideology, which grounds policy and maintain civil peace. It says: 'The key lesson of a post-communist transformation is that state institutions are critically important. A market without a strong government leads to replacement of

the irresponsible government by uncontrolled private enrichment that leads to an economic and social decline.'

The experience of many countries shows that state management system needs stability and cannot stand frequent reorganizations that break the established inner administrative relations and the usual duties and relations between colleagues to each other and to the outer partners and clients. The rage of permanent reorganizations influences negatively the management quality.

The secret is not in officials' replacement or change of their duties but in quality, experience, ethics and managerial skills of the executors at the top and at the bottom of the scale of ranks. Education of the new class of managers is a long-term task, and the results of the measures taken will not be immediate. But we should take these measures as soon as possible if we seriously count on modernization.

In all the developed countries and in the countries that try to overcome their lag at a short historical notice, more and more importance is given to the perfection of the state service and its effective work and authority in the society. Singapore is a vivid example of this; other countries try following its example.

Democratization of lifestyle is another burning topic, which includes the agenda of the international dialogue. The fall of totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, and the aspiration for democratization of public life are typical features of the new era. The process of globalization makes a contribution to this, as the information about the well-functioning state and public system quickly turns into an example for other parts of the world. Democratic procedures, if they are not deliberately rendered innocuous, but are scrupulously followed, provide normal relations of the government and the society, assist in consolidation and mobilization of the people's creative energy in order to achieve common goals, including solutions to national and federal challenges. They contribute to the flourishing culture and knowledge and boosting economy, they provide promotion for the talented, and the choice of the most honest and capable leaders, as well as a formulation of an effective policy. It is needless to prove that the modern economy based on knowledge and innovation results needs such personalities.

The Western democracy is far from being ideal, it is experiencing a crisis and requires reforms, just like capitalism on the whole. In January 2012 *The Financial Times* published a series of articles under the common headline of 'Capitalism in Crisis'. One of them states: 'Greedy bankers, top managers with over-extended bonuses, and steadily high unemployment are those few things that gave rise to the recent street riots and widespread public dissatisfaction with capitalism in the developed world.' Effective democracy could contribute to social peace. However, the behaviour of the masses can easily be manipulated with modern mass-media and sophisticated polling techniques. The authorities and tycoons use it for their benefit and refuse to make significant changes. The majority of electorate lack the necessary knowledge, culture, most of them are inexperienced in politics, all of which makes them victims of political technologists. As a rule, this is the source of errors of the wrong choice, untrustworthy figures at power, the gap between the power and the society. One can not but agree with the words of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who believes that 'the American global power

¹ Shevliakov A. Yu. Myths and reality of social policy. ISESP RAS. M., 2011. P. 8, 20.

² Ibid. P. 12.

³ Ibid. P. 13.

⁴ Ibid. P. 8, 20.

⁵ The Global Socio-Economic Survey. Reframing Global Development // World Economic Outlook Supporting Studies IMF. 2010. P. 35.

opposes democracy, both domestic and exported¹. But the Russian electoral system is far from ideal too. Of course, this does not mean that we should abandon the democratic procedures. We should improve rather than abolish them.

Some scholars consider that the ideal of the future effective democratic system is the power of the most enlightened, conscientious and patriotic representatives of the people, honestly elected by the majority and auditable to them, who use this power for the public benefits and for social justice. But the current kinds of democracy are far from this ideal. The way to genuine democracy leads through the stage of establishing a sufficiently numerous stratum of conscious citizens, educated and conscientious, enjoying the trust of others. The power that lacks such a basis can hardly be considered now an effective democracy that performs its key functions.

The theory usually assumes that the main attributes of democracy are provision of the rights and freedoms, including the right to express views, criticism of the authorities, the free will at the election of governing bodies and persons, participation in rallies and demonstrations. All citizens should have equal rights, including self-fulfilment, they should have equal responsibilities before the law. Democracy expects the materialization of the will of the majority and respect for the minority's interests, mutual search for acceptable compromise solutions, rejecting dispute settlements by means of violence and the use of weapons. Democracy suggests the voters' control over the activities of the elected bodies of power and governance, their responsibility for compliance with laws and public order. And, therefore, it suggests publicity in the country, free access to information, transparency of elected governmental bodies and senior executives. One of the essential attributes of democracy is also the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, independence of the courts and independent media. All branches of government, including the fourth, the media, especially television, should form a system of 'checks and balances', that is, promote taking balanced decisions and avoid blunders and lapses.

For the democratic structure of the state to be quite effective, it should be based on an advanced civil society, a multiparty system, where alongside with the ruling party there is a coalition of opposition parties enjoying their real rights. An advanced civil society requires active non-governmental organizations. All these together serve as the core of representative democracy. However, the model of democracy in which all its main attributes would be consistently manifested, can hardly be found almost anywhere in the world. The interests of the ruling classes, the distinct conditions of the countries, historical traditions, the level of economic development, culture of the population, and other circumstances cannot but affect the specific forms of public life, and how fully democratic principles are put into life. They are often implemented only to the extent that they do not jeopardize the interests of the ruling classes, do not undermine their authority. Sometimes democratic scenery is only an autocratic rule in disguise.

For the sake of maintaining stability and order in the society, for the benefits of the preparation and the gradual evolution of genuine democracy one can justify for a short time control and restrictions on freedom of expression and

choice. However, the authorities may impose restrictions because of their mercenary motives, to keep power for as long a period as possible and to withdraw from responsibility for the corrupt practices and incompetence. Coups d'états followed by the dissolution of parliaments and other unwanted branches, will paralyze the process of democratization for a long time. The Russians have learnt that from their own bitter experience.

The evolution of effective democracy in Russia is a complicated lengthy process. However, it is clear that technological and economic modernization should go hand in hand with improvement of a democratic structure of the state and society. Political scientists and legal professionals play a key role in finding the optimal model of the democratic structure. The experience accumulated by the mankind about the organization of social life should be widely used. Its best model for a country concerned can be a major factor in accelerating economic growth.

The scarcity of an intellectual environment where innovative and strategic ideas are born, where politicians and high-quality governors appear, is one of the main obstacles to further democratization. Such an environment should be carefully cultivated, among other things, one should seek for accurate information about the situation in the country, reject suppression of information on prickly problems and bulging of alleged success, one should encourage debates on complex issues, support and attract creatively thinking people to engage themselves in the politics. It is impossible to make good governmental decisions without a sober and accurate analysis of the economic and social situation, without it being discussed by the most authoritative experts.

The role of national culture in the strategy for further development of many countries, including Russia, is underestimated, in my opinion. We put an emphasis on investing money in some high-tech industries and encourage innovation by increasing the incomes of scientists and engineers. Few people think about where we can get human resources that are not only qualified, but also honest, ethical, dedicated to the Fatherland that are so urgently required to advance the country. Meanwhile, intellectual, spiritual and moral culture of the nation, on which success of modernization depends as ever, is determined by its carriers. But a great scarcity is revealed here.

The notion of culture involves many aspects of human development and its contents are close to the notion of 'civilization'. However, the core of a culture is its spiritual and humanitarian component. Advancements of the human mind, the gains of science, art masterpieces, richness of language and literature, the moral and religious ideals that determine behaviour and relations of people are the elements with which public consciousness usually associates the concept of 'culture' and the estimation of its level.

The culture of people is rightly judged by its prominent members: writers, poets, artists, actors, musicians, scientists, philosophers, educators, preachers, publicists, inventors, etc. They create the spiritual climate of society, enrich people with their creativity, and define the goals and ideals. The efforts of the intellectual and artistic élite of society stimulate the progress of knowledge, technology, arts, the rise of aesthetic and moral ideals and the assertion of the humanist principles. That is why Maxim Gorky called writers 'engineers of human souls'. But in nowadays Russia,

¹ Brzeziński Z. *The Choice. Global Domination or Global Leadership*. Translated from English. Moscow, 2004. P. 179, 183.

the system of education and bringing up of the younger generation has collapsed. The souls of the young and the adults are in the grip of television and cinema that dominate in the media. And they rather corrupt than glorify man. The same situation can be witnessed in other countries.

Culture has ceased to assign to man his ideals, role models, patterns of behaviour, the concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, to focus man on the socially approved qualities and behavioural types. It is the élite that bring culture into the masses. However, this point should be specified. Those who are usually treated as the intellectual élite of society, including its most influential part, the political class, are quite heterogeneous. By no means can they be regarded as carriers of genuine culture. The élite strata are rich in incivility, ignorance, vulgarity, immorality and lack of principles. They use their influence to corrupt the souls, to impose false values and ideals, to implant bad taste and norms of behaviour. In culture, just like in society, there is a clash between the good and the evil, the sublime and the base, the innovations and the misoneism. All in all, the clash of the opposites triggers an eventual evolution but temporary setbacks also happen.

We still believe in the unflagging cultural resources of Russia. However, the analysis requires an independent review of the role of the élitist and mass culture. They both, of course, are interrelated, but have different effects on the economics. Increase of economic efficiency and competitiveness more and more depends on the conditions of mass culture. The élitist culture affects social development in an indirect way, through the mass culture.

Examples of low cultural level among the majority of the Russian population can be seen everywhere. Failure to comply with the laws and basic norms of behaviour in the community and society, selfishness and self-interest that violates the interests of others, fecklessness, carelessness, individualism that neglects the slightest manifestation of human solidarity and team spirit, loss of conscience are the elements that poison social climate in the country, affect labour and economic activities of people. Even more detrimental consequences result from a massive spread of corruption, theft and fraud, which are converted into a mortal disease of the economics. Economics also suffers from alcoholism and drug addiction, petty tyranny of the civil servants. Quite offensive are such manifestations of barbarism, as hygiene and clean habits breaches, pollution, barbaric attitude to nature. As a result, the economics suffers considerable losses, the quality of life is deteriorating, people's health is getting worse. A lot of effort and money has to be spent on garbage and trash disposal in public

places. The country has to provide for a huge army of peace officers and private security guards, to distend bureaucratic bodies controlling the society. I think that Russia is not the only country that is in need of a cultural revolution.

The reason why the Soviet Union had been ranked as one of the great powers in the world was largely associated with the *creation of a large scientific potential* that promoted an impressive boost of modern technologies, including military ones, significant for the national economy discoveries in the topmost fields of knowledge. Ultra-liberal market reforms inflicted a painful blow at Russian science. We are falling behind and it is threatening. The setback in this area today means undermining the country's prestige and influence in international affairs, in economic competition and competition with other countries, to say nothing of the national security. We don't seem to have properly understood all that yet.

Brain drain keeps going on. Academic science is still on a starvation diet. Outstanding Russian scientists, musicians, actors, artists get recognition and worthy reward abroad. Urgent measures to support scientists and artists are long overdue. Their social status is unreasonably belittled. Governmental policies should presume that investments in science, culture, education, health will bring the most fruitful results in reviving the grandeur of our country.

Serious and authoritative academic schools and groups, that governmental policies could be based on, do not appear overnight. It takes many years for them to form, to carefully breed scientists, to cultivate leaders in these schools and groups. Besides, it takes accumulation and cross-checking of extensive information, development of international cooperation, a constant flow of the talented youth. The Academy of Sciences is known for creating such schools under the support of the state demand for their research. Unfortunately, commercialization of science and education devalues the accumulation of fundamental knowledge and encourages the demand for rash results and suggestions. This is one of the reasons for wrong political decisions. It is time to change radically the treatment of fundamental science and its development, including the social science research. Without an advanced and thriving science the country has no future. Actually, it also refers to culture on the whole.

I think that the discussion of the most fruitful ways to develop modern science by scientists from different countries, as well as putting the achieved results into the everyday life of people is one of the priorities for the dialogue of various cultures.

N. S. Bondar¹

OVERCOMING THE CRISIS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONALISM THROUGH THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

In the modern world, geopolitical changes being undoubtedly of constitutional importance (yet, not always positive) are characterized by the intensification of the system crisis of constitutionalism involving its many different aspects, such as: institutional, functional, valuable and axiological ones. This is accompanied by the aggravation of contradictions, the sharpening of irreconcilable struggle for dominating between sacred doctrines and constitutional values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, state sovereignty highly appreciated in the past, and 'current' understanding of 'national interests' (and 'right' to defend them at any place of the world), new demands for security of individual, society and state under the conditions of global threats, humankind encountered in the 21st century.

Therefore, this objectively predetermines the necessity of new philosophy of constitutionalism, fundamentally new approaches to certain integral worldview, moral-ethical, socio-economical and political foundations of modern constitutionalism. At the same time, this predetermines new requirements to epistemology and knowledge of modern constitutionalism on the base of both general regularities and national historical peculiarities of the constitutional development of the modern states.

1. Sociocultural pluralism as a methodological basis for evaluation of modern constitutionalism

Previously unfamiliar to any other historical era, dynamism and swift update of the political, socio-economical, moral-ethical, clerical-confessional, as well as constitutional foundations of public and social life (which have become especially essential for the post-Soviet states) objectively predetermine the need to find new approaches to their analysis and to supplement the dogmatic methods of study of the regulatory-legal, public-authoritative constituent of constitutionalism with the sociological, historical, moral-ethical, philosophical methods for understanding the constitutional phenomena, difficult and complex by nature. Only the comprehensive approach like that, makes it possible to identify and evaluate the inner connections, general regularities and the sociocultural peculiarities of modern globalizing constitutionalism. And this is not an accidental, i.e., the Constitution itself is a sociocultural reflexion and a product of the society-state contradictions, legal measure and basis for their reconciliation. Therefore, the main methodological issue arising from the analysis of any constitutional system in the context of global problems of the modern world is *cultural-historical foundations*

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of juridical mechanism of realization of the universally recognized constitutional values.

This becomes of special significance in Russia, where democracy has always been 'spiritualized', according to N. Berdyaev.² It represents the system of social relations and the set of values, when human behaviour, as well as action of public authority (at any level of its realization) are considered and evaluated, first of all, in terms of good and evil, fairness and unfairness, conscience, sinfulness, honour, duty, human dignity and other moral categories, which are not always legally defined, however retain their universal obligatoriness and moral-ethical normative significance.

Culturological research method, which can be implemented only through the dialogue, interaction and interpenetration of legal cultures, should be one of the most important approaches in the modern philosophy of constitutionalism. It is the method, which makes it possible to penetrate into the essence of political and legal phenomena and, moreover, to generate new knowledge of social and legal reality. We should however keep in mind, that all rational legal arguments should not be devoid of national culture and moral values, which is quite an objective truth for at least impartial researchers.

In this context, according to law theorist Ivan Ilyin, the current philosophy of constitutionalism may be characterized as a loss of faith in salvational methodological monism and deliberate transition to methodological pluralism.³ It is anticipated that under transition to real constitutionalism, different concepts and approaches to the system of law take on a significance of effective doctrinal tools inasmuch as they can be authentically integrated in the sociocultural space of constitutional legal regulation, that requires a sort of 'communicatively-integrated' or — what is extremely significant for the constitutional study of law systems — the constitutional legal consciousness.⁴ This fairly suggests an acceptance and establishment of the philosophical worldview pluralism, as the doctrinal research method and the most important (constitutionally significant) principle of legal and regulatory system of organization and functioning of democratic statehood as a whole.

This totally conforms to the universal nature of the term 'constitutionalism': it can encompass not only juridical phenomena, but also non-juridical (including pre-juridical and post-juridical) ones, as well as 'meta-juridical' phenomena of social, economic, political and cultural character. Moreover, not only they contribute to the shaping of constitutionalism playing the role of *its sociocultural prerequisites*, but they also are *its immanent characteristics* (social, culturological, moral-ethical, etc.),

² See: Berdyaev N.A. Fate of Russia. Moscow, 1990. P. 211. (*In Russian*).

³ See: Ilyin I.A. The concepts of law and force (The experience of a methodological analysis) // Ilyin I.A. Collected Works : in 10 v. Moscow, 1994. V. 4. P. 9–10. (*In Russian*).

⁴ In Russian legal science these approaches have been studied from different perspectives. For example, see: Kruss V.I. The Theory of Constitutional Use of Right. Moscow, 2007 (*In Russian*); Polyakov A.V. General Theory of Law. The Problems of Interpretation in the Context of the Communicative Approach. Saint-Petersburg, 2004 (*In Russian*); Maltsev G.V. Comprehension of Law System. Approaches and Problems. Moscow, 1999 (*In Russian*).

as well as institutional *legal and regulatory subsystem* of constitutionalism; and at the same time, they form an *environment for its existence and development*, which has dramatic influence upon fundamental concrete historical characteristics of this phenomenon.

In this context, philosophical perception of modern Russian constitutionalism is of importance not only for fundamental and scientific-methodological area, but also for applied areas; in such a case an appropriate social practice is understood as a sphere for realization of the philosophy of modern constitutionalism, as well as institutional tool for its development, when, particularly, the judgements of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (hereafter CC RF) take on a significance of embodied (regulatory-doctrinal) sociocultural reflection and philosophical perception of modern constitutionalism.

As for the concept of 'constitutionalism' itself, we may have a long discussion focusing on its semantic and structural characteristics, principles and specifics in order to generate a universal and relevant definition. However, regardless of this, all of us know very well, what means the absence of constitutionalism in the society and state. And it is not accidental, because in this phenomenon there is a high portion of moral and ethical demands for Justice and Truth perceived at the level of faith, creeds, customs and traditions, rather than at the level of juridical knowledge. The words of Apostle Paul are quite relevant in this case: nobody can make excuses for himself reasoning that he did not know how to act in his life, because a moral law is written in the heart of every man, and people 'who do not have the law, by nature do the things contained in the law' and 'the work of the law is written in their hearts'.¹

Finally, this is vital for the analysis of ontological, axiological, epistemological and other problems of the philosophy of constitutionalism, as well as for the effort to assign a '*doctrinal importance*' to the category of 'constitutionalism' in theory and practice of constitutional justice.

2. Constitutionalism as a philosophic-legal category: unity of public- authoritative and sociocultural origins

Against the background of diverse approaches to the definition of the concept of constitutionalism,² the traditional scientific approach to constitutionalism as the political-legal question seems to be insufficient. This concept is too complex to give the complete control over it to the lawyers only. Being one of the universal philosophic-legal categories, constitutionalism is destined to reflect the most significant (universal) values of modern civilization, which especially find their expression in the regularities of democratic organization of the society and state on the basis of triune balance 'authority–property–freedom' involving the rule of law, acceptance and protection of rights and

freedoms of a person and citizen, obedience to moral imperatives established in the society and state. With more specific and schematic approach, constitutionalism as a philosophic-legal, sociocultural and moral-ethical category reveals the following features.

First. It is seen as the *doctrinal constitutionalism* being a special *philosophic-legal theory*, system of political-legal ideas and conceptions, which appear in equal measure as a teaching about the Constitution, constitutional foundations for distribution of authority, and as a certain system of moral-ethical ideas of fairness and equity, freedom and responsibility, good and evil, and, accordingly, of the society–state–individual relationship depending on acceptance (or non-acceptance) of these values. This is a sort of epistemological element of constitutionalism. In addition to the fact that there is a lot of research works upon the balance between law and morality,³ the question about specific mechanisms and the practice of inclusion of spiritual-moral values into the current legislation system remains quite vital. For the time being, admittedly, there are just singular and rather timid efforts in positive juridization and enforceability of the moral values as indispensable regulators of everyday life.⁴

Second. This philosophic-legal category embodies the *regulatory-legal constitutionalism* as a system of *constitutional positivism*, which represents a regulatory-legal space of constitutionalism with the state-hierarchical organization, based on people's moral-ethical and sociocultural values and subordinated to the Constitution as the supreme formal-juridical imperative of the society and state. In this case the Constitution itself is a kind of a regulatory-legal core of constitutionalism.

Third. This is *ontological constitutionalism*, which represents the *constitutional-legal practice* in the widest sense of socio-political and public development, including, naturally, the constitutional activity itself, i.e., legislative, administrative and judicial practice. It is obvious that exactly at this level, in the practical sphere of implementation of the Constitution and the legislation, the moral crisis of modern constitutionalism becomes extremely apparent. In particular, legal positivism completely prevails in the legal conscience of legal practitioners and therefore, this has become one of the origins and indicators of moral crisis of modern constitutionalism, including its system of values. From the constitutional point of view, there are reasons not merely to put the question about professional judicial ethics (of an investigator, judge, public or municipal official), but also to introduce the constitutional maxim into professional and social legal that '*an unjust decision cannot be a constitutional one*'. This maxim, being moral-ethical by nature, but certainly having a constitutional significance, is addressed to all legal practitioners, including the holders of legislative, executive and judicial power, as well as to the whole society.

And the *forth*, at last. Constitutionalism as a philosophic-legal and moral-ethical category embodies also the characteristics of one of the forms of social consciousness, which reflects the unity of constitutional psychology and

¹ Cit. from: Sorokin V.V. Sense of conscience as an element of Russian Orthodox conscience of law (*In Russian*) // Gosudarstvo i pravo. 2011. No. 6. P. 23. For details see: Papayan R.A. Christian Roots of Modern Law. Moscow, Norma Publishers, 2002 (*In Russian*).

² See, e.g., in.: Berman H.J. The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Moscow, 1998 (*In Russian, transl. from English*); Sajo A. Limiting Government. An Introduction to Constitutionalism. Moscow, 1999 (*In Russian, transl. from English*); Kravets I.A. Russian Constitutionalism: Problems of Shaping, Development and Realization. Saint-Petersburg, 2004 (*In Russian*); Kutafin O.E. Russian Constitutionalism. Moscow, 2008 (*In Russian*); Russell G. Constitutionalism: America and Beyond. <http://www.infousa.ru/government/dmpaper2.htm> (09.03.2009) (*In Russian, transl. from English*).

³ See, e.g.: Maltsev G.V. Moral Foundations of Law. Moscow, 2008 (*In Russian*); Lukasheva E.A. Law, Morality, Individual. Moscow, 1986 (*In Russian*).

⁴ These may include adoption of special laws concerning protection of personal and social morality in several constituent entities of the Russian Federation having regard to their national and historical peculiarities (as, for instance, Dagestan, Republic of Sakha (Yakutia), Altai Territory, Krasnoyarsk Territory).

constitutional ideology, and in its turn, becomes a key prerequisite for the creation of a new juridical vision of reality, i.e., *the constitutional worldview*. Constitutionalism in a certain way turns a spontaneous-legal experience into the regulatory-conceptual model based upon the values of rule of law, human rights, social fairness and equality of everybody before the law, social and rule-of-law state, separation of powers, political, ideological and economic pluralism, etc.; and within the framework of this model, it realizes different worldview, human values-oriented, regulatory-legal and educational functions. In particular, it organizes and structures social and individual legal conscience and legal philosophy. In this context, being a special complex axiological, teleological and praxiological system, constitutionalism *per se* is one of the universal, non-material values of civilization; and exactly in this guise, it is recognized as part of the world cultural heritage of humankind, on the one hand, and national-cultural heritage of each particular people, nation and state, on the other hand. However, it cannot be denied that this is, probably, one of those spheres of constitutionalism (especially, taking into consideration that constitutional-legal policy is closely linked to it), where moral compass, as well as constitutional-legal regulators and limiters are ‘neglected’, sometimes apparently.

Imaginary ‘justification’ in this situation may be the reason that constitutionalism cannot be considered as a creature of a state and as a phenomenon under state control; the state applying its laws, is not able to ‘establish’, ‘decree’ and ‘set up’ constitutionalism in desirable form, although it (the state), undoubtedly, should make necessary efforts to develop constitutionalism in the needed direction. *Constitutionalism is an arising actual order of real social relationship* based upon accepted by the society itself moral and legal demands for justice and a measure of attained freedom, impermissibility of arbitrary rule and violence. This order forms on the basis of inner sense of this relationship *per se*, which turns it into bearer of justice and criterion for the measure of freedom. Thus, the relationship, being the foundation of constitutionalism, gains a capability to embody certain demands, normative patterns of behaviour of citizens, administrative officials, state authorities and the state as a whole, according to the ideals of justice and freedom.

While all branches of government are of importance, it seems fair to underline an essential role of judicial power, especially, of the bodies of constitutional norm-control, which, particularly, contributes to the development of axiological origins of modern constitutionalism and unites formally-juridical, moral-ethical and culturological components of constitutionalism.

3. The transformative-culturological function of constitutional justice and the necessity of strengthening it under the circumstances of systemic crisis of modern constitutionalism

The crisis of modern constitutionalism is associated not only with deepening contradictions and increasing competition among classic principles, constitutional values of democracy and new challenges of modern era, new understanding of international rule of law up to proclamation of the right (so-called ‘to the benefit of democracy’) to exercise ‘velvet’ and ‘orange’ revolutions, Arabic (et cetera) ‘spring’ with its ‘off-season’ rivers of blood; this list is continued by declaring the demand for total equity of sexual minorities

and acceptance of same-sex marriages, etc., followed by the attempts to recognize them constitutionally, as universal, new and non-traditional for classic constitutionalism ideas, values of freedom and democracy.

This generates a need for new requirements to epistemology of modern constitutionalism, which — if we speak about political-legal and culturological sphere — is especially vital for constitutional justice. Modern times bring new challenges to constitutional justice. The solutions to these challenges are being more and more influenced by general trends of world constitutionalism development, including globalization of law, on the one hand, and (as opposed to the first), under these conditions, actual strengthening of sociocultural factors of national constitutional development, on the other hand. In this context, constitutional justice, in contrast to other judicial systems, has to realize its functions relying on the close unity of regulatory-legal, positivistic assessments and broad sociocultural approaches, both while analyzing circumstances and conditions of social reality, under which the current legal norms undergone the judicial review for the compliance with the Constitution of the RF are applied and while evaluating regulatory prescriptions subjected to review. Because it is impossible to understand the latter thoroughly without taking into consideration concrete-historical circumstances under which these norms appeared and were adopted (historical interpretation), specifics of their effect within the system of juridical regulation, as well as other forms of normative (moral-ethical, confessional-religious, etc.) regulation in special national conditions of our society and state (systematic interpretation), etc.

Constitutional justice demonstrates a sort of reflex response to these complicated processes and the dynamism of modern times expressing in a tendency for redistribution of the main functions of constitutional justice, i.e., transition *from protective activity only to active realization of transformative potential of constitutional court activity*.

This does not, surely, clash with the traditional definition of constitutional justice describing it as a keeper of the Constitution and the whole system of constitutionalism, which retains basically its significance. The thesis that *the protective function of the body of the constitutional control is the reflection of the deep nature of European model (according to Hans Kelsen) of constitutional control in the narrow sense of this word* — as an evaluation (within the limits of established procedures) of laws, regulatory-legal acts falling within the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court for their compliance with the Constitution, seems to be quite reasonable. In this context, from the point of view of its protective function, the Constitutional Court of Russia, in particular, provides protection, first, of the foundations of the constitutional system, and, second, of rights and freedoms of man and citizen, as it is directly stated in Art. 3 of the Federal Constitutional Law ‘On the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation’. The both activities are of the same importance, as it is proved by the practice of the Court, although when comparing the quantity of tried cases, it may be undoubtedly concluded that the major portion of cases tried by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (hereafter CC RF) includes cases characterizing CC RF as a legal advocacy institution: at least 80% of its decisions are directly associated with the protection of human rights, with about 95% of cases being

tried in accordance with the procedure of the particular norm-control.

At the same time successful and consistent providing of supremacy and direct effect of the Constitution (this is the aim of the constitutional judicial control) cannot take place only and entirely within the framework of protective activity of appropriate authorities. With new constitutional challenges brought by the modern epoch, the problem of protection and harmonization of *values of constitutional stability* with the help of constitutional norm-control, as well as *values of development and modernization of constitutional legal systems* becomes increasingly more urgent. At present the constitutional courts more frequently than earlier have to overcome collisions of constitutional values and to rank their priorities. As this takes place, the desired balance of constitutional values is dynamic and changes permanently.

In the context of the necessity of strengthening the transformative functions of modern constitutional justice, actively developing *processes of interaction and, to a certain extent, of integration, interpenetration of national institutions of constitutional control with international, particularly European, conventional jurisdiction* are of no less importance. At the same time, for the processes of legal integration, there is an actual necessity of constitutional evaluations and development of mechanisms to overcome inevitable contradictions and conflicts at the level of both national state-legal systems and international legal jurisdictions. In this connection, on the European continent, the main areas of regulatory-legal integration interaction are European institutions of international public law, on the one hand, and the national institutions of constitutional law, on the other hand; bearing in mind that today these two branches — international public law and constitutional law — regulate relationships, in many ways similar in their nature and scope. Exactly this enables the emergence of a qualitatively new transnational legal phenomena associated with the formation of *European constitutionalism*. It is important to note that the European constitutionalism is not a kind of regional 'law globalism' on European scale. This is qualitatively novel philosophical-worldview and culturological category, developed to reflect not so much a supranational legal universalization, as *national-constitutional integration* of state-legal systems of Europe in the context of the dialogue of cultures on the basis of mutual enrichment while preserving the sovereignty of legal systems. This does not contradict the fact that the European constitutionalism in a natural way (not only because of the global consequences in the European legal space, but also because of its very nature, taking into account its new qualities) goes far beyond a simple (summational) addition of national constitutional legal systems; in this respect it needs universal, international legal doctrines, regulatory and enforcement decisions.

The logical response to all these complex processes of development of modern constitutionalism is a gradual refusal of constitutional justice bodies to use traditional linear methods of the constitutional control (simple disqualification of the provisions having been reviewed on the basis of their text) and concentration of their attention on the Spirit of the Constitution and on the values of modern constitutionalism as a whole, involving the application of more subtle tools of constitutional justice allowing for the protection and maintenance of the balance of recognized constitutional

values without surgical invasion into the regulatory-legal tissue of statehood and legal institutions of freedom and democracy.

4. Harmonization of Letter and Spirit of the Constitution through the dialogue of cultures as a condition for the balance of constitutional values

Contrary to popular belief, the problem of harmonization of Letter and Spirit of the Constitution has no populist-political or legalistic, but rather sociocultural significance. The basis for relevant approaches is the account of the deep, intrinsic characteristics of the Constitution as an instrument destined to provide a balance of power and freedom in the society and state, given that the Constitution is: *first*, a product of the social contradictions of the society, and, *second*, a reflection and to some extent, positive registration, the recognition of these contradictions, and, *third*, it (the Constitution) embodies a legal mechanism, to overcome and resolve social contradictions, conflicts and collisions.

These, deep in their nature, characteristics of the Constitution are rooted not only in the text, but, above all, in the Spirit of the Constitution. Accordingly, the development and the transformation of the Constitution cannot be limited solely to changing and correcting its text *per se*.

As for the 'Spirit of the Constitution', it is embodied in such categories of constitutional law, sacred in their regulatory characteristics, as 'constitutional principles', 'constitutional foundations (origins)', 'constitutional values'. The category of values has a specific significance here.¹ In the sphere of constitutionalism, it allows us to detect ('obtain') an idealized copy (model) of axiological constitutional and, at the same time, culturological origins, that have the most abstract content, but in addition are filled with extremely high concentration of regulatory (constitutionally significant) energy focused on law maker and law enforcer. Axiological nature of the relevant categories is confirmed in the practice of CC RF, which actively involves axiological potential of the Constitution for the formation of their legal attitudes.

Another no less important variant of the axiological origins of modern constitutionalism is associated with the generation of *constitutional values*, primarily as a result of constitutional evaluation of constitutional review bodies. In his case the constitutional values, in contrast to the values of the Constitution itself, do not have direct constitutional textual expression, they are not formally and explicitly determined by the Supreme Law; their constitutional recognition and their significance are rooted in the deep content and systemic-semantic interrelations of regulatory provisions of the Constitution. Accordingly, their constitutional significance — in the absence of a specific 'registration' in certain articles and provisions of the Constitution — most deeply penetrates into the very Spirit of the Constitution, which requires a subtle hermeneutic identification and positive (categorical and conceptual) shaping of these values in the process of constitutional-control activities of judicial authorities (first of all, at the level of acts of official interpretation or elucidation of the Supreme Law).

In practice CC RF provided the rationale for a broad range of values, formally not recorded in the Constitution, but fundamentally influencing on relevant social relations,

¹ Bondar N.S. Constitutional Values as the Category of the Current Law (In the Context of Practice of the Constitutional Court of Russia // Zhurnal konstitutsionnogo pravosudiya. 2009. No. 6. P.1–11.

including such as fairness and legal certainty¹, sustainability of public legal relations, stability of conditions of economic management, striking the balance between state public interests and private interests of the subjects of civil-law relations², etc.

In this context, the constitutional values, symbolizing the Spirit of the Constitution are, on the one hand, a tool of norm-control activity of the constitutional courts and, on the other hand, at least to a certain extent, — the result of this activity. This becomes possible because of the special status of the Constitutional Court in the system of power separation and as a result of specificity of its judgements, which, being the origins of law, provide the harmonization of the Letter and Spirit of the Constitution.

First. Being undoubtedly a body of judicial power, the *Constitutional Court of the RF* is more than just a court. This is particularly seen from the fact that, being a direct and active bearer of judicial power, the CC RF cannot be regarded as a quasi-court, however it is a ‘quasi-law-making’ body. Due to its nature, its intrinsic characteristics and results of its activities, the Constitutional Court of Russia, goes far beyond law enforcement. Having much more complex character, constitutional justice more and more approximates to the regulatory-legal (laying-down-rules) juridical practice, law-making.

Second. The specificity of CC RF ‘quasi-law-making’ lies in the fact that the judgements of this body, being regulatory-doctrinal in their nature, deal with first of all *regulatory dimensions of the highest and the most abstract level*, i.e., general principles of law, constitutional principles, declarations, constitutional presumptions, status-categorical characteristics of the subjects of constitutional law and constitutional phenomena, etc. (which are the sphere of these judgements’ influence and simultaneously a form of their political-legal existence). On this basis, including the processes of the constitutional-judicial generation of the constitutional values, *sui generis augmentation and actualization of normative content of relevant categories as regulatory dimensions of the highest, constitutional level and the establishment of their balanced interaction* are taking place. This is particularly significant bearing in mind that the Constitutional Court often encounters the situations when contradictions among conceptions of different constitutional values arise, and when the constitutional values themselves may be seen as self-contradictory ones. It means that overcoming these contradictions and collisions and striking the balance may relate not only to the Letter, but to the Spirit of the Constitution. It suffices to mention the constitutional principles and values, that are often in conflict with each other, as for instance, the values of the rule-of-law state, on the one hand, and the values of the social welfare state, on the other hand, etc.

As for the preconditions (prerequisites) for harmonization of the Letter and Spirit of the Constitution by means of the constitutional norm-control, generally, they are as follows. 1) Taking into consideration socio-cultural factors of national

¹ See: Judgement of CC RF, May 16, 2007, No. 6-II // CL RF. 2007. No. 22. Art. 2686.

² See, e.g.: Judgement of CC RF, April 27, 2001 No. 7-II // CL RF. 2001. No. 23. Art. 2409; Judgement CC RF, April 10, 2003, No. 5-II // CL RF. 2003. No. 17. Art. 1656; Judgement of CC RF, July 14, 2005, No. 9-II // CL RF. 2005. No. 30 (p.2). Art. 3200; Determination of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, April 21, 2005, No. 191-O // VKC RF. 2005. No. 6; Determination of CC RF, February 8, 2007, No. 381-O-II // VKC RF. 2007. No. 5.

development by the body of constitutional justice; this can be illustrated through the example of CC RF having solved issues concerning the constitutionality of the establishment of religious,³ regional⁴ and political parties, as well as their further activity. 2) Taking into consideration the specific historical environment for the development of the national statehood (without this a comprehensive evaluation of the institution of the Russian Federation constituent entities governance for its conformity with the RF Constitution throughout different periods of history would be impossible⁵). 3) Taking into consideration universally recognized values of modern constitutionalism and the whole system of universally recognized principles and norms of the international law, as it directly follows from Art. 15 (part 4) of the RF Constitution and realizes almost in all judgements of the body of the constitutional norm-control.

5. Constitutional justice as a generator of the ‘living’ (court) constitutionalism

The authoritative and regulatory-doctrinal spirit of the constitutional control actively influences upon almost all components of modern constitutionalism and all constitutionally significant spheres of legal regulation. It is quite clear, because, as it is stated in the General Report of the 14th Congress of Conference of European Constitutional Courts (Vilnius, June 3–6, 2008), ‘in the absence of a body of constitutional control, authorized to detect the situations when an ordinary statute contradicts the Constitution, the Constitution may be regarded as *lex imperfecta*. When constitutional court can declare an ordinary law as unconstitutional, the Constitution becomes *lex perfecta*. ...It is only the active attitude of the constitutional court, which provides a real, but not imaginary implementation of the principle of supremacy of the Constitution ... The role of the constitutional court in securing the principle of supremacy of the Constitution is a fundamental one. Only with the constitutional control the Constitution, as a legal act, transforms into a ‘living’ law’,⁶ and — we will add — constitutionalism turns in a ‘living’ constitutionalism.

The practice of constitutional justice objectifies both the formal-judicial nature and the social essence of the Constitution as a legal act of the highest juridical force and direct effect. In this context, it becomes possible to consider the formation of the body of constitutional control as one of the most important prerequisites for shaping a real, ‘living’, but not declarative, constitutionalism. Therefore, CC serves as a guarantor of non-separability between the *de facto* and *de jure* aspects of the Constitution, which, in its turn, provides the integrity of ‘the due’ and ‘the existing’ in the constitutional space.

In this case there is no escape from the conclusion that constitutional justice as a specific judicial institution for constitutional control together with the whole judicial power as a cumulative embodiment of the norm-control, create

³ See: Ruling of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, December 15, 2004, No. 18-II // CL RF. 2004. No. 51. Art. 5260.

⁴ See: Judgement of CC RF, February 1, 2005, No. 1-II // CL RF. 2005. No. 6. Art. 491.

⁵ See, Resolutions of CC RF, January 18, 1996, No. 2-II // CL RF. 1996. No. 4. Art. 409; December 21, 2005, No. 13-II // CL RF. 2006. No. 3. Art. 336; December 24, 2012, No. 32-II // CL RF. 2012. No. 53 (part 2). Art. 8062.

⁶ General Report of the XIV Congress of the Conference of European Constitutional Courts (Vilnius, June 3-6, 2008) // Constitutional Justice. Bulletin of the Conference of Constitutional Control Bodies in the Countries of Young Democracy. Yerevan. 2008. Issue 2-3. P.110–111. (in Russian).

one of the main attributes of modern constitutionalism and its stronghold, endowing the Constitution and the whole system of constitutionalism with a relevant sustainability and dynamism. With the bodies of constitutional justice playing the key role in the formation and development of constitutional values, it becomes possible to talk about an appearance of the phenomenon known as the *judicial constitutionalism*¹ in the modern world. It may be represented as a *special political-legal mode to ensure judicially the rule of law and, thereupon, the direct effect of the 'living' constitution, to provide an absolute judicial protection for the constitutional values on the basis of the fundamental origins of modern constitutionalism, such as: the balance between power and freedom, compromise between individual and social interests, unity of sociocultural and juridical regulatory factors in the process of constitutionalization of the legislation and the whole system of legal order in the democratic legal state.*

Judicial constitutionalism enables the establishment and maintenance of the constitutional law and order as the highest juridical expression of the legal social democratic statehood through endowing it with the qualities of practical (applicative) value which penetrates into the public and authoritative activities and into the processes of realization of rights and freedoms of a person and citizen, as well as into the whole system of constitutional exercising of the rights. Constitutional control becomes an essential feature of judicial constitutionalism, while the establishment of the constitutional-judicial control and its functioning transform the constitutionalism taking it to the qualitatively new level of the practical reality.

It is the creation of the Constitutional Court as a material and purpose-oriented embodiment of the constitutionalism, which has become a significant step towards the formation of a whole new state of the constitutionalism, i.e., the judicial constitutionalism. Therefore, in order to understand the judicial constitutionalism and, accordingly, the role constitutional justice plays in its formation and development, it is important to bear in mind at least a few following aspects. The first. The judgements of the Constitutional Court are the legal regulatory foundation for the formation of the judicial constitutionalism and, accordingly, of the whole system of modern constitutionalism. The second. Constitutional justice and its judgements is one of the important sources for the development of modern constitutional doctrine, modernization of the statehood (a doctrinal theoretical component of the judicial constitutionalism). The third. The Constitutional Court is a generator of the constitutional ideology, a creator of the new constitutional culture, constitutional worldview of an individual and society (an ideological component of the judicial constitutionalism). The fourth. The judicial constitutionalism is an embodiment of the constitutional judicial practice, actual fulfilment of the needs in the sphere of cultural studies, and legal supremacy of the Constitution; it is materialization of the constitutional values in the society and state (an ontological component of the judicial constitutionalism).

Therefore, the judicial constitutionalism is rooted, on the one hand, in the essential characteristics of the Constitution

and, on the other hand, in the constitutional identity of the judicial power and especially of constitutional justice. From the objective point of view, participation of the judicial power in making decisions upon constitutionally important issues is vital. Generally, this results from the recognition of the judicial power as one of the foundations of the constitutional order, whose mission is to ensure supremacy and direct effect of the Constitution, that is proven by the national and foreign practice.

Generating the 'living' (judicial) constitutionalism is achieved with the aid of different methods of the constitutional judicial control within the powers of the Constitutional Court, stated in the Constitution.

In the first place, there is an interpretation of the norms in the Constitution as a kind of its transformation without changing the text. Here, the both *official* and *casual* (associated with the resolution of certain disputes) interpretations are involved; this provides not only state-legal (constitutional) evaluation of the appropriate spheres of social reality, but also the development of the content of constitutional provisions without changing the text of the appropriate articles in the Constitution; and at the same time this provides additional constitutional impulses for rationalization of sectoral legislation defining concretely the provisions and institutions described in the Constitution.

In the second place, there is a resolution of the disputes concerning constitutionally legal issues resulting in elucidation and interpretation of direct and reverse associations between provisions in the Constitution and current legislation; their synchronization in accordance with the requirements on the part of the hierarchy of the legal system, on the one hand, and enrichment and development of the regulatory capacity of the constitutional principles and norms, on the other hand.

In the third place, there is the constitutional interpretation of the legal norms of the sectoral legislation. The Constitutional Court activity related to the constitutional interpretation of the legislative provisions is a specific kind of quasi low-making activity — and not only as a 'negative low-maker'.

In the fourth place, there is an elaboration of recommendations on the improvement of legal regulation intended for a low-maker and performed by the body of the constitutional control; this results from the nature itself and the peculiarity of legal force of these recommendations. Elaborated on the basis of solution of particular cases, these recommendations not laying responsibility upon legislative bodies, direct them towards the consistent and systematic realization of constitutional principles and provisions in their low-making activity. Therefore, low-maker's disregard of these appropriate recommendations may result in contradictions and imbalances in the legislation if compared to the Constitution of the RF; this can create a threat of violation of the constitutional rights and freedoms of a person and citizen, as well of social interests and values.

In the fifth place, the adjustment of the Spirit (but not the Letter) of Law is achieved by the Constitutional Court *through correction and 'Richten' ('alignment') of law enforcement practice* in order to provide it with uniformity and to exclude violations of the constitutional requirement of equality before the law. The constitutional 'Richten' ('alignment') of law enforcement, as we would like to notice at the same time, is an immanent and intrinsic property of

¹ For details see: Bondar N.S. *Judicial Constitutionalism in Russia in the Light of Constitutional Justice*. Moscow, Norma Publishers, 2011. The idea of judicial constitutionalism was definitely supported in Russia and in other countries. See, e.g.: Brintsev V.D. *Judicial Constitutionalism in Ukraine: Doctrine and the Practice of the Formation*: in 2 vol. Kharkov, Pravo Publishers, 2013. V.1.

constitutional justice, which becomes clear from the notion of 'Richten', etymologically derived from German 'Richter' (judge).

Applying appropriate approaches, the Constitutional Court ensures the consistent harmonization of the Letter and Spirit of the Constitution, adjusting its formal-juridical regulatory content (irrespective of time period and political environment at the time of its adoption) in accordance with

political reality and sociocultural characteristics of the society and state. Thus, protection of the Constitution and its stability being in a close affinity with the dynamism of the constitutional system, suggest an active sociocultural role of constitutional justice as a generator of 'living' (court) constitutionalism, with a dialogue of legal cultures being the condition and indispensable prerequisite for its formation.

A. E. Busygin¹

CULTURE AS THE ALTERNATION OF GENERATIONS

It was quite a long time ago when my colleague and my old friend V.K. Yegorov wrote a book which was published in 1986 under the title 'History is the Alternation of Generations'; he also had a dissertation on the same topic. Culture also develops from one generation to another and might also be viewed as the alternation of generations. Moreover, the events of the past pass by but the culture of the previous generations continues to live in the traditions, beliefs, literature, art, and architecture. Every time generates its own literature which is read together with the classical literature. Manor architecture, tenement buildings of the beginning of 20th century, Socialism Classics are neighbouring with ultramodern trade and office centres. Citizens see this variety every day. The styles of different epochs might exist in terms of one architectural complex. For example, in the Yusupov Palace in Arkhangelskoye near Moscow (now the Museum Estate of Arkhangelskoye) Baroque, Classicism and Empire coexist harmoniously. In the galleries, visitors go from the hall of the 15th century art to the one of the French impressionists, then to the hall of the contemporary art. And the impressions merge. You go to the concert in the first part of which they play Beethoven, and Schoenberg and Sofia Gubaidulina in the second one. You get highly impressed. Cultural dialogue of the present and the past is always in progress. It is not even a dialogue, it is more like a talk with many interlocutors and each presents a certain historical period. The author of the article does not think that he would fully cover the suggested topic; his aim is to define some problems worth paying attention to.

Not only documents in the archives and contemporary memories can tell about some historical events. These events were also imprinted in the pieces of art of different times. And the interpretation of the events and estimation of the historical figures might differ greatly! For example, Stolypin had an extremely negative image in the historical books of the soviet period but in 2012 a memorial in his honour was built near the Government House in Moscow, moreover the President and the Prime Minister took part in the opening ceremony; it shows that the role of this politician has been reevaluated.

The issue of historical events and the roles played by well-known people is very important for the topic of the article. Evaluation of the events and figures of the past is an essential part of cultural background of the generations. The discussion on the topic in Russia nowadays are very conflict and are focused around the issue concerning Lenin whether to leave him in the mausoleum or not. Are the Romanovs (who were the reigning dynasty within 300 years) tireless workers for the better of the Motherland (and that is why the 400th anniversary of the Romanovs' House should be celebrated at the state level); or were they minor figures in comparison with prominent writers, composers, scientists who glorify Russia with their creations and achievements? The majority of the Soviet people would consider it impossible to publish the biographies of the Russian monarchs in a series devoted to the lives of outstanding people of Russia. Contemporary young people take it for granted. Moreover, the series include biographies of Arakcheyev, Stolypin and other historical figures who had been anathematized within the Soviet period.

School textbooks are an important instrument of forming opinions towards the events of the past for the whole generation. For the last 100 years practically every generation in Russia had different textbooks in schools, thus, the interpretation of the historical events was different. Let me bring some examples. The book 'Russian History for Primary School' was published in 1915. The author of the textbook was assistant professor of the University of Petrograd, later professor, academician of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, A.E. Presnyakov. In the Introduction the author explains what the course of the Russian History is about, 'The History of the Russian people tells us about the changes of the household of our ancestors who had been working hard for many years to establish and set our motherland.' And then, 'We need to know the history of our nation in order to understand our present Russian life, in order to remember all the efforts put and sacrifices made by the previous generations of the Russian people and honourably continue their work on improving our life struggling against need, all kinds of wrong and injustice between people.' In 1922 Lenin raised the question of making Marxist school textbooks on the social sciences; he said that the younger generation is learning social studies using 'old bourgeois rubbish'. There was a competition in the production of new school textbooks on History. In 1923, the textbook for primary schools by E.K. Zamylovskaya appeared. The accents in that textbook were completely different from the textbook by Presnyakov. In particular, the

¹ Director of the State Museum-Estate 'Arkhangelskoye', first Deputy Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation (2008-2013), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, holds the rank of the Class I Active State Advisor of the Russian Federation. He is the author of books and articles on economic theory, economic problems of federalism, a series of articles on state management, state policy in culture, he is the author of the book 'On the Role of Culture in Development of Russian Society' and others. He is awarded with the Order of Honour, the Charter of Honour of the President of the Russian Federation, with the order of the Star of Italy Commander class.

latter did not mention Stepan Razin, Pugachev, Emelyanov and the Decembrists in his textbook, while Zamyslovskaya dwells on them in detail. On the other hand, Presnyakov thought that it would be important to tell about Dmitry Donskoy and the Battle of Kulikovo, the citizen Minin and Prince Pozharsky, Zamyslovskaya did not say a word about them. It is interesting that Zamyslovskaya did not mention Crimean war while Presnyakov devoted the whole chapter to it and the Sevastopol defence was called one of the main events of the Russian history.

There was also the task to bring up hatred towards the exploiters, that is why the textbook has also included a lot of information about the Home Guard of 1812, 'The noble landlords decided to make the militia to support the regular army, and here, of course, they put it across with those bonds who did not please the sir or the landlord. The militia mainly consisted of those who were not profitable to feed, like bad workers presenting it as a patriotic heroism.' In comparison with the textbook of 1915, the accents in the textbook of 1923 are completely different but at the same time they were close in some aspects as if they were created by the people of one generation, though 'the social orders' were different. The reason to study history is understood by both in the same way. In the 'Teacher's Book' to the textbook of 1923 the author writes that the most important thing is 'to motivate children to study history, to accustom them to the idea that history is not a collection of accidental facts, but the urge to reconstruct the past on the basis of the pieces of information which came to us through years'. Then the author adds that 'it is important to teach children to respect and preserve the relics of the past, and even the pictures representing these relics. It is also important to teach children that every person, who excavates an old grave for fun or for money, is a criminal because old artefacts belong to the nation.' How true it sounds today, almost 90 years later!

The textbooks that appeared later put the topic of the class struggle in the first place. The pinnacle of the process of improving the history textbooks in order to enhance topics of revolutionary struggle of working class against the exploiters was a short course in the history of the USSR, under the editorship of Professor A.V. Shestakov, published in 1938. I.V. Stalin might have taken part in the work on this textbook. Practically every page of this textbook is devoted to the oppression of the working class. For example, in the chapter about the state establishment, 'a small group of the rich went to live at the expense of the vast majority of workers'. In the next chapter there are the words like 'in the ninth century, the princes and boyars intensified greatly the oppression of the people'. Even the names of the chapters are very significant – 'Russia in the 18th century – the empire of landlords and merchants', 'Tsarist Russia as the gendarme of Europe'. The aim of the textbook is very simple – to provoke class hatred towards the oppressors. It is ridiculous to read such things today like 'During the uprising of Razin, as well as in the rebellion of Bolotnikov, the peasants did not have such a reliable ally as the organized working class.' How different were the textbooks which shaped the historical consciousness of successive generations!

Nowadays, for the past 100 years mainly, people of every new generation are the people of 'different culture'. It is true for the majority of the countries. The first factor

which changes the culture of generations is revolutionary scientific and technological achievements. This idea was highlighted several decades ago when scientific and technological revolution was in the centre of attention. That time they paid attention to the changes which were coming, discussed the trends and first signs of those trends. By now scientific and technological achievements formed the whole culture of the new generation. Older people should remember that on the eve of May 1st and November 7th all the typewriters in every scientific institute, university, factory were brought together in a room of the so-called 'first department', the doors of which were sealed. It was done to prevent any anti-Soviet elements printing inflammatory materials in the empty rooms because of the holidays. It was a regular action which the majority of the soviet people did not regard as something extraordinary. It was the type of Soviet behaviour which cannot be understood by the new generation. Today, in the age of the internet and mobile phones, it is difficult to imagine any restriction on the information dissemination. It is possible that the Soviet system, with its absurd restrictions, collapsed because the 'iron curtain' was no longer able to separate the country from the common information space of the new age. The last restriction of this kind has been recently removed in Myanmar (Burma) which abolished their old practice of not allowing foreigners with mobile phones – the phones had to be previously deposited at the airport during the stay in the country.

The new information age has an impact on the language of communication. It should be recognized that more and more English words are used in the Russian language due to the widespread information technology. It does not only concern the appearance of words, which have no analogies in Russian (interface, file, Facebook, etc.), but the use of English words instead of Russian. More and more people use special slang to communicate.

The Russian language is on the verge of a 'nervous breakdown'. The literacy rate (in terms of spelling of Russian words and style) among the youth has greatly reduced. The young man, while on active military service, used to write letters home at least once a week to his friends and girlfriends. And so it developed his literacy or at least supported it. And now? Why should we write letters if everyone has got a mobile phone? Texting does not support literacy but quite to the contrary worsens it. It means that learning hours of literature in the secondary school must be increased. It is being discussed but nothing has been done yet. But it has to be done urgently otherwise it will be too late. And the approaches of teaching the Russian language and the Russian literature must be changed.

Recently it a list of 100 Russian films has been made for schoolchildren. It is a very good initiative which shows that together with the classical literature there are classical movies which the new generation should know. According to the list, the majority of the films were made in the 60s of the previous century, the second place is occupied by the films made in the 70s, the third by the films of the 80s, and there is only one film of the 90s on the list. It is 'Burnt by the Sun' (1994) by N.V. Mikhalkov. All the films made later were unable to meet the requirements of the selection.

But there is one more question: Will those films be interesting for the young? The language of cinema also changes as well as the language of communication. Static

images of Eisenstein's films are very different from dynamic frames of modern ones. It is the same as the difference between the language of Lomonosov and Pushkin and that of many modern poets. Children should get accustomed to the classical films the same way they are taught to like classical literature. All the characters in the Soviet films used very good Russian (though many of them smoked). Anyway, the Soviet films must be recommended to watch!

By the way, remember Pushkin, '...But soft! You hear? A scowling critic//bidding us to reject for good//the elegy, grown paralytic//commands our rhymester-brotherhood:// 'oh, quit your stale, your tedious quacking//and your alasing and alack-ing'...// 'as sung of old, in years of glory//as instituted long ago.' <...> 'The elegy's just vain protesting//empty the purpose it proclaims//while odes have high and noble aims...' That point I wouldn't mind contesting//but hold my tongue, lest it appears//I'll set two ages by the ears'. What is right? Is the opposition of the centuries necessary? Should we insist on doing everything as it used to be done in the past? The example from the nearest past – it was the struggle 'against formalism' in the Soviet music in the 40s of the previous century when governmental authorities lectured the great composers how they should write music. Today it might be seen as a joke. But for the previous century it was a tragedy! It meant broken lives, hounding, and cultural damage! In this connection another question arises: should we artificially support something from another century, something that is old-fashioned and belongs to another culture? For example, we should admit that the so-called 'thick periodicals' are becoming extinct, and they would have disappeared by now, were it not for the artificial support from the government. For many people 'Novyi Mir' (The New World), 'Sovremennik' (The Contemporary), 'Yunost' (The Youth), 'Moskva' (Moscow), 'Druzhba Narodov' (The Friendship of Nations) used to be an integral part of the time, 'spiritual support', their content was discussed, every new issue was looked forward to, and libraries had queues. Millions of copies were published. But this tradition is in the past now. And it is not because the new generation is not interested in literary novelties, but mainly because of the time which is needed to publish a book; it only takes a few months now, and the internet offers information much quicker. No matter how sorry we are, 'thick periodicals' are vanishing. Remember how A.S. Pushkin wrote in 'Evgeny Onegin' about Lensky: 'In love with fame, by freedom smitten//with storm and tumult in

his head//what odes Vladimir might have written -//but Olga would have never read!' The same we have here – the circulation of 'thick periodicals' is falling, since the new generation does not read them. But for the older generation they are of great value, the best memory of the years of the experience that 'One Day of Ivan Denisovich' printed in 'Novyi Mir' (The New World) or 'Master and Margarita' in 'Moskva' (Moscow) had made. Besides scientific and technical shifts, the culture of a generation is also influenced by social and political factors. In general, this statement is indisputable. Nuances, subtleties, particularities are very important here because they make generational cultural dominant. Just as an example, V.I. Nemirovich-Danchenko was the man formed in pre-revolutionary Russia; he was the representative of the former culture. And in the 20s he wrote a letter to one of the governmental authorities and concluded it with the words 'Your faithful servant', but after rereading the letter he changed the words into 'Your comrade'. This is the way he plunged himself in the new prevailing cultural context of communication.

There are cases when elderly people can look at their young selves from the distance and analyze themselves as representatives of a different culture and compare. One of the brightest examples of this is the book by D. Granin called 'My Lieutenant'. It presents an extraordinary analysis of the person's behaviour that had to live in different circumstances. D. Granin writes about himself but 70 years ago. The reader can follow the development of his personality, the change of his inner culture, the views on life, and his attitude to people.

It is a gift to be able to look at oneself from a distance like at a typical representative of another generation. But if there is a gift of this kind then we will read a very good piece of literature which is precious and sometimes even more precious than scientific monographs on the same topic.

This topic 'culture as the alternation of generations' seems to be interesting from the philosophical, sociological and cultural points of view. But the change of cultural dominants does not always follow the alternation of generations. However, such changes happen sometimes and they might be very profound. The society is not interested in the presence of the 'lost generations' and 'odd men out' and that is why this topic must be researched and recommendations should be worked out to teach future generations and to instruct the cultural establishments.

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CIVILIZATIONAL, POLITICAL AND ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF PRESENT DAY

The problem of civilizational risks is inwardly and openly inherent to philosophical, anthropological, political and historical discourse, which is revealed whenever the subject of a civilizational development is raised. The matter of civilizational development is discussed more and more often because of numerous reasons, among which five arguments are of primary significance.

First of all, civilizational approach becomes dominant in all the above mentioned spheres as a sharp decrease of society dependence on an extremely rigid ideological indoctrination is observed at the turn of the second and the beginning of the third millennium. Mass consciousness dependence on political doctrines implied the termination of nations' civilizational identity, the forcing out of traditional origins by a new type of a 'prescribed' consciousness, which regulated political behaviour. Total ideological indoctrination shaded and concealed civilizational variety of the world, dividing the states and nations into 'ideologically close=civilized' or 'ideologically alien=barbarian'. Such a rough opposition became unproductive due to the intrinsic changes that occurred in the sphere of an 'ideological production', which has also qualitatively changed as a result of the 'disbandment' of two opposing political systems and 'ideological blocs' – the capitalist system, the socialist system and the so-called counties of 'the third world'. As a result, the modern political map of the world loses its

ideological accuracy, and the outline of 'the initial painting layer' – the contours of world civilizations which were formed centuries ago, long before the epoch of political ideologies domination become visible under 'the bright surface scaling off layer'.

Secondly, the methodological basis of classifications and political estimations of different states and regimes deposed in the direction of two criterion schemes, which are connected with different civilizational schools, although, however, they are mistakenly equated not only in the language of public politics, but also in scientific research. In accordance with the first scheme the circle (or 'the club') of civilized countries includes only 'successful' states, which lead in the technological race and have common notions on exclusive significance of democratic (liberal) values and a certain amount of standard democratic institutes. The expression 'Western civilization' was spread in this meaning, as a bearer of progressive transformations, identified with civilizational development. Everything, which does not belong to this circle or is intentionally extracted from it, is either connected with 'barbarian states', or is added to the list of 'outcast states', or is associated with the image of 'evil axes'. The second scheme implies the coexistence of numerous civilizations, also including the Western civilization, although such an acknowledgement, as a rule, does not mean readiness to accept equipotency and equality of civilizational worlds and their right for 'the privatizing of the future'.

Thirdly, 'the fact' that the Western civilization is a model and a standard of further linear (progressive) development – technological, socio-cultural and political – is taken as self-evident. Since the ancient times in politics when civility was for the first time opposed to barbarity this quite one-sided and shallow opinion about civilization and civility as a universal indicator of the level of a nation's cultural development, civil nations and states was rooted. At the same time, beginning from the 18th century the level of nation and state civility was defined in a rather simple way: the criterion was the correspondence or discrepancy of a certain culture (national or political) with a unique standard. The only possible conclusion which can be drawn from this methodological assumption is the conclusion that the role of models can be prescribed to very few European nations and leading countries, which were able to outpace their competitors ('undercivilized' regions) and use to the full their intellectual, scientific, educational and technological potential. The given assumption led to an unambiguous geopolitical principle, which was placed as a foreground of the international relations system: 'civilized nations' are destined, moreover, ought to bear a heavy and noble mission of civilizers. Politicians and political scientists readily accepted the idea of 'a model-civilization' and, later, an idea of 'a mono-civilization', which is 'free' from 'historical atavisms' (e.g. from the preservation of a language and civilizational variability), in spite of a dead-end character of the given assumption: such 'a model' taken as a standard does not ensure the survivability of native European nations; the adherence to such an assumption leads to a global ecological collapse.

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Fourthly, it is absolutely obvious that the two above mentioned criterion schemes, as well as the stated assumptions and principles, are the sources of a hyper risk as they represent the instrument of maintenance and deepening of artificially created disproportions in the development of the world's regions, and a source of the potential discrimination of 'decelerating states'. One of the consequences of this assumption is the emergence of an additional risk factor, hidden in the methodology of political knowledge – it is the fact that this intrinsically inherent defect remains unnoticed. The result is that the search of methods and ways of minimization or elimination of objective political, ecological and social risks is carried out within a frame of the methodology which often not only fails to help, but even prevents from finding the solutions to the problems.

Fifthly, special attention is needed for the reason of convergence of civilizational subject area and the theory of risk estimation, as well as the theory of risk management, which is gradually taking a more prominent place in the sphere of strategic planning and prediction. In fact, the interest in civilizational subjects is sharply raising, when the circumstances constrain the governments and transnational institutes, which have a right to develop mass strategies in the international blocs and unions, to make *a fortiori* high-risk political decisions. At the same time, the civilizational approach to the exploration of social and political phenomena is characterized by heuristic value and effectiveness in the periods, when the risk levels are high. If the burst of interest in the constants (constants can be defined as civilizational processes as they take place at all the stages of humanity development, connecting generations by means of common identity) is determined by the necessity to find at least something stable in the conditions of the destabilization, then the realization of the connection of these constants with the risks is dictated by the necessity to make a choice between the alternative scenarios of the potential development of the events. The matter is that each of the scenarios has a high and unavoidable element of unpredictability.

As a rule, such periods are connected with the phenomenon called social and political turbulence, as well as with the catastrophes of a various genesis, first of all with demographic and ecological (techno- and social ones), also with periodically emerging crises, destabilization of international relations, along with a noticeable weakening of the role of containment policy factors. Among these factors there is also the decrease of social trust infirmness of interstate agreements and treaties at the highest level. Its status was significantly damaged in the result of the Soviet Union's collapse along with the bipolar system with its quite efficient 'mechanics' of containments and counterbalance. One of the consequences of the changes of the international system is a cardinal and irreversible overview of European borders with the tendency of the international society (or the so called international civilization) to leading direct local wars for the control over strategic resources. Besides that, less and less trust is given to traditional appeals for the unity of nations for the sake of overcoming common global dangers (ecological, technical, political), which are embodied in the images of 'a common enemy of international civilization'. The decline of trust is connected with the fact that such appeals often deal with an almost

undisguised desire to create coalescence of transnational power.

In all the cases one can observe an interesting tendency: civilizational specificity of the regions, their historical belonging to precise cultural and historical types obviously contradicts the logic of technical development and the logic of world creation in the conditions of accelerated globalization, when two differently directed tendencies coexist and complement each other. The first tendency is the integration, which suggests the creation of a new type of supranational unions, another tendency is disintegration, associated with the intentional division of individual regions, nations and states with new, including non-existing state borders.

The concept of 'civilization' and 'risk' are most often used in various combinations when it comes to the so-called technetronic civilization. This tendency frequently occurs when a technetronic civilization is perceived as some tendencies, typical of the life of local civilizations under the conditions of close cooperation and international cooperation (it would be better to call it cooperation-competition).

Paying a tribute to the so-called general civilizational approach, which fixes the objective purposes of unification and changing technological structures (which is very important nowadays), one must not forget about a civilizational approach based on the theory of local civilizations – the cultural-historical types. It offers a flexible scale of politics measurement (which is nor linearly simplified), taking into consideration real civilizational diversity and, which is extremely important, helping to reveal the true time horizon for strategic planning and forecasting. The existence of a strategy without such a horizon is political nonsense, it is just an opportunistic compromise document created for 'a particular case', for example for the next summit of the leaders of the countries. What is the horizon of the most important world civilizations, among which the most significant researches give a special place to the Russian civilization? The answer is known – it takes centuries. A spiritual constant of world religions, making up the 'core' of diverse civilization identity is an eternity which is revealed to a person. The significance of such a point of reference for realizing, formulating and solving ecological problems, as well as for the development and implementation of large-scale projects, which are ecologically oriented, wakes no doubts.

'Aiming at the eternity' is a factor which sets the confessional-civilizational approach, which allows to focus the consciousness, including a scientific thought, to uncover the mystery of creation. The absence of the mindset factor prevents from the perception both the nature of the state and the nature of power. The reason is that time boundaries of the life of a number of great states, and, first of all, it concerns states-civilizations, are sometimes measured in centuries. However, the institute of state itself, along with the degree of national sovereignty, and, consequently, the duration of the existence of independent individual states becomes shorter and shrinks like shagreen leather with the expansion of the capacity of the so-called social (geopolitical) engineering and the fading of the institutes of sacred power. Social engineering (after Popper) is called the technology of total (utopian) or stepwise geopolitical formation, the main obstacles for which have been and still

remain world's religions, centuries-long traditions and ways of people's life, and, of course, natural barriers. All of these factors give a ground to speak about the entrance of the humanity into the phase of 'the risk era'.

It is important to note that the diversity of local civilizations, associated primarily with the development and the spread of world religions, is not denied by any of the politicians (especially after the emergence and popularization of Samuel Huntington's concept of inevitable clashes of civilizations and political risks connected with them), but is considered as a kind of throwback to the age of intensive technological development. In fact, the discussions about the necessary transnational coordination of efforts in finding solutions to global problems which can lead to an ecological collapse, sometimes lead to a conclusion about an atavistic character of a multicivilizational model. It is important to mention that the alarmist ideas, which are widely-spread among the anti-globalizers and outwardly directed not so much against the existing regimes, but against the risks caused by the concentration of authority on the supranational level, are actually used as a strong argument in the favour of the strengthening of supranational centres of influence and even a force resolution of not only ethno-cultural conflicts, but also confessional and religious ones. All of these actions are carried out on the pretexts of collective environmental safety.

The policy, which is extremely unconstructive and risky from the environmental point of view, combines 'technology race' with the 'planetary division of labour', including the displacement of hazardous activities on the 'periphery' and barely controllable transcontinental migration, quickly erases civilizational differences and borders of confessional spaces. At the same time, as it has already been mentioned above, the Western civilization continues to pose itself as a model to follow, although the maintaining of its stability requires disproportionately high resource use, which makes the imitation and the following (the stated goals of overtaking modernization) unachievable either now or in the long-time period. However, the illusion (the image of an environmentalist and a model of ecological thinking and political behaviour) is largely supported by the fact that Western countries do invest the lion's share of the resources – financial, intellectual and technological – in the creation of the system of collective security environment, including in the support of international environmental funds and movements. Of course, the biggest part of these investments are of a 'double' character, providing the control over the 'intellectual rent' and, consequently, the technological competitiveness of the leading countries and transnational corporations.

This tendency sets and maintains a positive image of Westernization as a dominating trend in the world

development. But Westernization hides the opposite tendencies connected with the deformation of confessional and civilizational core of the Western civilization and spiritual foundations of the leading Western countries and the destructive changes in the social and natural system, which is the most important guarantee of the stable technological and social development. This is the sphere where the reasons for the opinion diversity lie: the public policy is primarily connected with the linear progressivist approach, while the environmental area implies the domination of criticism of this approach.

It is particularly significant to note fundamentally different connotations of the term 'civilization' in the political and environmental discourse, which slightly confuses experts working in the field of environmental policy. Actually, a purely positive connotation of the term has already been long prevailing in the language of politics, where the term is used to denote the accumulated notions of achievements, especially scientific and technological, that distinguish the Western civilization. This intrinsically implied message, which was widely discussed by Russian philosophers (they interpreted the Russian civilization as a certain self-value that requires studying and protecting against the process of complete levelling of mankind), allowed the supporters of a monocivilizational approach to oppose the policy of a single alleged 'civilized world' to the policy of 'barbarians' or 'outcast countries'. As far as the field of ecological knowledge is concerned, one can encounter here with an absolutely different connotation, due to the fact that the majority of ecologists and environmentalists consider the almost pagan cult of technical progress typical of the 'global' civilization as a major threat to the world. The spread of the civilizational approach in politics is complicated, since the attempt to measure it by means of methodology based on the theory of civilizations can lead to a misunderstanding and even a rejection. The rejection is particularly acute in the circles where people are used to measuring things in grams, litres, or, for example, gigahertz. Even if policy is measured, it is still estimated primarily from the narrow economy-bound point of view, based on, say, dollars or euros. In this case, the attention is fixed on the effectiveness of investments.

Summing up the brief analysis of the problem, we must conclude that the development of methodologies for measuring risks – political, social and environmental, connected with the political decision-making – is currently at its initial stage. The interest in the problem of risk measuring does not go beyond merely pragmatic interests and relatively short time horizons, connected with the estimation of damage assessment and the determination of insurance sums. The risks related to the civilization preservation go far beyond the interests of this type.

V. Ye. Churov¹

DISAPPEARING CITIES, OR MEDITATIONS OF A 60-YEAR OLD PERSON

I like to make photos of old blocks in the cities I had to visit doing my job. From the end of the 20th century, more and more cities disappear, and making photos of ancient buildings is but a hopeless effort to preserve in memory things that are impossible to be preserved for real. St. Petersburg disappears very quickly, as well as the last remnants of my Moscow, Odessa, London, Paris, ancient French Casablanca in whose streets magnificent samples of architecture of the 1910th, 1940th of the XX century are only photographed by Russians of which I and my wife were told on the threshold of one of the excellent Art Nouveau ramshackle building by intelligent women whose age far exceeded that of Balzac.

They sort of hinted a few years ago that they will permit to demolish 42 thousand houses in historical part of St. Petersburg. One of the former mayors of Odessa substantiated the new building up in the city by that supposedly the whole sandstone that had been used in house-building in Odessa during these last 100 years has lost its strengthening qualities.

Along with the cities their high culture disappears too. With all my admiration of the excellent acoustics and convenience of the new Mariinsky Theatre building, it does not and will never have the St. Petersburg/Leningrad culture. In the same way as in the Opera Bastille as opposed to the old Grand Opera there is no and will never be Paris culture.

Does preservation of city depend on the people living in it? Practically no. In the coexistence of the city and its inhabitants the city has always been the principal. In Leningrad / St. Petersburg in the 20th century, the population was thrice completely renovated: after the Civil War, after exiles of 1920s... 1930s, and after the Blockade. However, each new wave of resettlement was placed under the authority of the great city, and these people became Leningraders–Petersburgers. In the same way, the Odessa population in the same 20th century several times was fully replaced, but each newcomer, a new Odessa resident became imbued with the spirit of his or her city, the city of Odessa. Nowadays this process has stopped.

Along with the city, a part of history disappears. Building's façade can be restored to its original state, but inside there are no more staircases walked by our ancestors: well known, not quite well known and quite unknown. There are no more banisters touched by their hands, there are no more doors that they opened, no more floor planks

walked over by them, no more stoves or chimneys that used to warm them up.

In disappearing cities, particularly sadly looks the destiny of their historical centres. There are two models of degradation in the world. The first model: when the rooms for clerical work, shops, restaurants, banks force people out of the city centre, and the centre turns into something like London City area, the place that is quite inhuman. The second model of degradation that I was able to see with my own eyes in Lima and Casablanca is like this: rich people move to outskirts, into comfortable new houses and villas, whereas in the centre of the city those people stay or settle who do not have means for support and maintenance of historical buildings in good state. And the buildings stand (if they are not under restoration paid by the UNESCO money or by the money of the King or a society for protection of monuments) with their windows broken, with smashed panes, with crumbling façade swarmed all over with various wires...

Along with disappearance of the cities, our memory disappears too. I have always believed and still believe that the history of any state, history of any city takes shape with stories of families that used to live in this country, in this city. For me it would be important to come and to stand in front of a house where my ancestors had lived. This, probably, would be important for everybody. The house where my grandfather and my grandmother lived in Moscow on the Smolenskaya quay is still there, but it has turned into abode for rich 'new' Russians and foreigners. And now I cannot even enter the yard where I used to play in my childhood because the yard has been enclosed with gratings with digital locks. The house in Michurinskaya Street in St.Petersburg/Leningrad where I lived as a child up to 1959 still exists next to 'Aurora'. But the house on the Peski where my grand-uncle Pavel Andreevich Churov, an official of the Ministry of Appanage had lived, got into the demolition area although it could have stood for more than one hundred years.

The disappearance of the cities leads to a decrease in interest in reading literature works of past years. A good solid book always contains description of the place of action. And it is not important, at that, whether it is Dostoyevsky or Leo Male with his cycle of detective novels of all Parisian arrondissements. So to read now these books is very difficult because the Paris of the Leo Male times is disappearing, St.Petersburg of the Dostoyevsky times is disappearing, and even the 'Children of Arbat' has become more difficult to read when so many houses have been demolished within the Moscow conservation area.

The cities are the keystone of the world culture. Disappearance of the cities in the sense I implicate with this term means fast and obvious degradation of the world culture. Recently while commenting on appearance of the idiot 'Magnitsky List' I said that composing of proscription lists has always been a lot of scoundrels of the Nero, Hitler or Yezhov type. But there are aims for the sake of which it would be worthwhile to unite efforts of all sensible people in the world. I see three such aims. First, the fight against international terrorism so that we could return to former

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quiet and comfortable life with no humiliating inspections in airports, with no more and more narrowing area of the places safe for travelling. Second, the fight against economy crisis for preservation of such prosperity level that is demanded by a cultural person and necessary for buying tickets to a theatre, buying books, communication with one's friends, trips with staying in modest hotels. And the third, it is necessary to unite for the fight against the

wave of lack of culture that has already reached the sizes of tsunami and insistently pounces upon the remains of old civilization, to unite for preservation of classical language, literature, theatre, music, all the values the cultural people have got accustomed to.

Maybe the human civilization will cope with these three problems but, I am afraid, I will not live long enough to see those happy years.

G. M. Gatilov¹

ON CERTAIN INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Last year pervasive changes were still sweeping the world political landscape. The transformation processes involved entire countries and regions, economy, social and political life. They also affected inter-civilizational relations, which placed the peaceful co-existence of different religious denominations in jeopardy.

The sweeping changes are evidence of the fact that another period of historic changes has started. And the changes are developing at a growing rate. The vector of the evolution of international relations brings one to a conclusion that the theory of a unipolar world order is untenable, that any attempts to solve the acute problems unilaterally without basing on collective interaction are futile. The challenges of the global security require a global consolidated answer, which, in order to be effective, must rely on a wide range of the positions of the world centres of power, the leading players and regional formations.

In his speech at the opening ceremony of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly in New York, the Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov emphasized that today when the world is living through a transition period that is characterized by instability in the spheres of economy, politics or inter-civilizational relations, it is particularly important for the UN member states to be able to rely on accepted rules of conduct, and to agree on a joint response to the threats to global stability. We should not allow irresponsible actions dictated by expedient interests to shatter the system of international law. The world order is threatened by arbitrary interpretation of such essential principles as non-use or threat of force, peaceful settlement of disputes, respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of states and non-interference in their domestic affairs.

On the agenda there is work aimed at establishing closer international cooperation to fight terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, spread of weapons of mass destruction; at resolving longstanding regional conflicts and at searching for ways to deal with new crises, including the ones of intra-state nature.

The forms of interaction and the players involved can be subject to change in accordance with specific features of a situation. But this collective work should rely on the principles of international law, the UN Charter, and, first of

all, on respect for the sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, rejection of double standards in politics. We should make common efforts to seek respect for the principle of the rule of law not only on the national level but also in international relations.

Following this policy Russia stands up for the idea that the international system should be equitable, democratic and, ideally, self-regulating. The historical experience proves that as soon as retreat from the 'matrix of principles' enshrined in the international law becomes likely, the stability of the world and regional system is impaired. It gives rise to particular concern that the actions neglecting the UN Charter without consideration taken of the regional specific features and cultural peculiarities are accompanied by the shift of balance in the inter-civilizational relations.

Under globalization the factor of civilizational and religious identity is becoming of particular importance, a tendency rather accurately observed by S. Huntington. This tendency is brought to life by a set of factors: the national borders have become more transparent, the information revolution has thrust the obvious inequality in the levels of social and economic development into the spotlight, and against this background the wish of nations to preserve their uniqueness has become more intense.

The wish to come back to their civilizational background is also observed in the countries affected by the processes of the so-called 'Arab Spring', which at this stage shows itself in the support of parties and movements that come out with the ideas of Islam. At the same time the underside of this process makes itself conspicuous – the rise of inter-ethnic and inter-confessional tension, the displays of nationalism and religious intolerance, which have become more frequent.

One of the key issues in the world politics has been and is the situation in Syria, which is experiencing a phase of a dire domestic conflict. It should be taken into account that the confrontation affects the sphere of inter-confessional relations more and more intensely, which is fraught with additional tempests for a country where many ethnic groups have peacefully co-existed for many years.

It results in a rapid deterioration of the situation of religious minorities, first of all Christians, in the countries where they have been living for centuries and which they quite rightly consider to be their native land. The Russian Orthodox Church has also more than once expressed concern over the rapidly deteriorating situation of the Christians in many regions of the world.

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To break the Syrian 'deadlock' there is political and legal framework practised by the international community. I am referring to the corresponding resolutions of the UN Security Council, the peaceful plan offered by an ex-UN-Arab League Joint Special Representative for Syria Kofi Annan, the plan still being up-to-date, and the Final Communiqué of the meeting of Ministers of the 'Action Group' for Syria in Geneva of June, 30, 2012.

However, for the time being we can see that some of our partners are not comfortable with the political and diplomatic way of deflating the Syrian situation. In fact, by rendering assistance to one of the sides of the conflict and thus inclining the opposition to deny any prospects of a peaceful dialogue with the current government of Syria they lead to the realization of the 'Libyan model'. This is a dead-end track. Our viewpoint is shared by many countries which are aware of the possible consequences if the situation develops under such a scenario. There appears to be only one solution to the situation – making common efforts to influence all the warring sides so as to make them sit down at the negotiating table to discuss the future parameters of their country.

With a view to the longstanding, centuries-old links and traditions uniting our country with many countries of the Middle East and North Africa, it becomes imperative for us to preserve and enrich them. We have no right to lose this wealth and miss an opportunity to contribute to peace and a balanced development of this region basing on the dialogue of cultures and civilizations, as well as on the consolidation around the ideals common for the basic world religions.

It becomes a task for the big-time politics to work out a common value and moral scale, which will be able to become a basis for a respectful and productive intercivilizational dialogue. The starting point for this dialogue should be common interest in reducing the level of instability that appeared at the stage of designing a new international system and, finally, in ending up with creating a safe polycentric world working efficiently. At that, success is assured only provided that extreme excessive approaches are not adopted.

The subject area of value bases in the modern political life was given special consideration to in the Address delivered to the Federal Assembly by President V.V. Putin of Russia. Mentioning the hardships which had been suffered by our country in the bygone century, the demographic and value crisis experienced by Russia at the beginning of the 21st century, the increased competition for 'human resources and intellect', at the same time he made it clear that without a value pivot, the internal energy, without passionarism, the term introduced by Leo Gumilyov, the ability to advance and to change in today's world it is difficult to expect progress. He put it straight that with the new economic and civilizational balance in the background, Russia must be a sovereign and influential country. 'It is necessary not only to develop steadily but to preserve our national and spiritual identity; it is necessary not to lose ourselves as a nation. We should be and remain Russia.' In this work the Russian culture is a great help to us. And our country, as it was noted in the Address, is one of those countries which form their own cultural agenda. Moreover, it is one of the countries influencing the entire world civilization.

Particular consideration should be given to the part of the President's speech where he speaks about the

lack of spiritual ties experienced by our society. Being a professional in international relations and multilateral diplomacy and seeing the turn the modern situation in the world is taking, I tend to think that many of our partners on the international arena also lack such ties as mercy, sympathy, support and mutual aid.

Under these conditions we consider it to be our task to contribute in every possible way to our gaining such spiritual footings and to helping Russia's partners in the West to establish them. This goal is hard to achieve without proper efforts made by our civil society, non-governmental and social organizations.

Russian non-governmental organizations must feel free to address the Western community, academic audiences of ordinary citizens and put our views and ideas on a wide range of issues across to them. To do it, various international platforms, conferences, round-table discussions, collateral events on the sidelines of various inter-state meetings can be used. We need that very commitment, advance and passionarism, of which the President spoke. I am certain we should not be afraid to stand for our ideas, our verities and our truth. It is appropriate to cite the words of a great Russian military commander Alexander Nevsky: 'God appears not in Might but in Truth.'

Some time ago the expert community closely interacting with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs thoroughly discussed the possibilities of realizing the Concept which provides for imparting a sort of a 'vector of moral values, justice and truth' to the modern international relations. Rather heated debates took place. But the agreement was never reached. I believe it was not only because, as they say: 'Where there are two experts there are often three opinions', but also because execution of this idea as a separate and independent document was somewhat ahead of its time.

Morality and foreign policy are not only compatible notions but also notions going hand in hand with each other. We plan our work with a view to this message. S.V. Lavrov has on many occasions pointed out the fact that the issue of moral guidelines of international relations is still up-to-date. It is extremely important that the problems which today's world faces be solved on the basis of justice. As soon as moral grounds are lost, there appears injustice, there appear ideas which do not help to solve a problem but, on the contrary, force it into depth. We consider the consolidation of the moral basis for international relations to be a part of the big-time politics.

It is necessary to work to advance the universal moral and ethic code of conduct in international relations, which would be acceptable for everyone. It is pivotal to gradually popularize the code and cleanse it of ideological stereotypes and 'double standards'.

The basic world religions have always had the common moral denominator, including such principles as striving for peace and justice, honesty, mercy and diligence. The key elements of traditional values are the ideas of dignity, freedom and responsibility. These ideas were enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 1950.

The new polycentric international system which is under construction will inevitably incarnate the diversity and wealth of the cultural and civilizational worldview. So, it is obvious that morality in the modern context of the

evolution of international relations is a relevant concept. Without recognizing the supreme 'moral law' it is hard to expect the efforts to form a stable, equitable and democratic international system to be successful.

The concept of morality is applicable to any element of international relations, particularly to their legal and human aspects. We consistently speak out against politicization and use of double standards when it concerns human rights. Here, as we can see there are a lot of distortions. Unfortunately, it has become an ordinary course for some members of the international community to impose from without their one-sided approaches to the sphere of human rights.

We call upon our partners to work towards conducting an equitable and constructive dialogue based on mutual respect and cooperation in the legal and human sphere. This must be done to effectively solve the problems of this sphere while complying with the fundamental principle of state sovereignty and cultural and historical peculiarities of states.

Seeing how rapidly the situation in the world is changing, what complex combinations it sometimes evolves into, thinking over these puzzle problems one sometimes asks himself a question: Is the situation going to cross the threshold beyond which it will be possible to solve many problems of political, social, economic and public life only in terms of a cross-cultural dialogue and interaction, looking for concord in the inter-civilizational sphere?

Under these conditions the role of those organizations and bodies which are carrying out advanced research

in various aspects in the field of dialogue increases. In particular, among such organizations and events are: the United Nations 'Alliance of Civilisations', which is an inter-state body; initiatives of the civil society, including the ones with a considerable participation of Russia: the International Likhachov Scientific Conference, the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilisations'.

The evidence of the fact that issues of a cross-cultural dialogue are sought-after at the present stage is creating new dialogue platforms in the world, for instance: the Nishan Forum on World Civilizations in China, debates on aspects of inter-religious dialogue conducted in the context of the 'North-South' Forum by the Council of Europe, numerous initiatives advanced by Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Pakistan, the Philippines and other countries.

It would be desirable that representatives of these inter-civilizational events find opportunities to communicate with one another for those, for instance, who will come to the Likhachov Conference to be able to attend the sessions of the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilisations' on Rhodes, and for both the former and the latter to be able to meet our Chinese partners at the Nishan Forum. This movement is sure to lead to mutual enrichment and better mutual understanding between representatives of different cultural, religious and civilizational traditions, and to transfer of their experience in the fields of politics, science, culture and art of their countries.

David Gillespie¹

EVGENII POPOV AND NIKOLAI GOGOL: SATIRE AND LAUGHTER ACROSS TWO CENTURIES

Evgenii Popov (b. 1946) remains a prolific and socially engaged writer whose work shows both a thematic consistency over the decades, as well as a stylistic and formal innovation bordering on the iconoclastic. He began his literary career very much in the spirit of 'village prose' in his early short stories published in the 1979 *samizdat* almanac *Metropol'* ('the 'baker's dozen'), and in the collection published in Ann Ardis in 1982 under the title of *Veseliie Rusi*. Popov has always defined himself within a Russian literary tradition, and his first published works in the Soviet Union in 1976 carried an introduction by his fellow-Siberian Vasilii Shukshin, one of the most popular writers of his generation.

Shukshin was Popov's mentor until his death in 1974, and the two share common ground in their depiction of willful, anarchic male characters at odds with their environment. Shukshin's *chudak* is a hapless, socially disoriented but sympathetic figure whom Popov develops into a much more

self-destructive and morally vacant *mudak*, as characterized by Jeremy Morris: 'While the *chudak* was directly concerned with the relationship between self and society within a milieu of civic consciousness, the *mudak* is part of a comprehensive and complex aesthetic and ontological statement by Popov. This is both anti-utopianism, in that it satirizes the possibility of social progress, and utopian, in that it insists on the primacy of art through absurdism and resists there ascription of meaning (and therefore utility) to writing.'²

Rather like Venedikt Erofeev and Sergei Dovlatov, writers who similarly did not see eye to eye with the Soviet authorities, Popov's protagonists drink themselves into oblivion because they realize that they cannot do anything to improve their lives. Rather like his compatriot Vladimir Sorokin, Popov refuses to acknowledge causality and rationality in post-Soviet society, though he does not go as far as Sorokin's antidote of nihilistic grotesqueness. Popov transforms the world into an absurdist chaos, and resists the writer's marginality in what he consistently refers to as the 'stunted democracy' of the new Russia.³

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² Jeremy Morris, 'From *chudak* to *mudak*? Village Prose and the Absurdist Ethics of Evgenii Popov', *Modern Language Review*, 99 (2004), 696-710 (p. 703).

³ David Gillespie, 'Evgenii Popov and the Satire of Collapse: the "I" of the Narrator', in Seth Graham and Olga Mesropova (eds.), *Uncensored? Reinventing Humor and Satire in Post-Soviet Russia*, Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2009, pp. 1-13.

There is a further curious if perhaps fortuitous connection between Popov and Shukshin, as Popov himself has noted. Shukshin's father was arrested by the NKVD in 1933 when he himself was four years old, and, as he subsequently learned, was shot in 1942. Shukshin never discovered the reason behind his father's arrest, though it may have been connected with 'wrecking' the village technical hardware, a common charge in those years. His mother then changed the family's surname to her own maiden name: Popov. She later remarried. Shukshin bore this surname until he was 16 years old, when he received his passport and insisted it bore his father's name. His childhood spent with his stepfather lies at the basis of his 1968 cycle of short stories *Iz detskikh let Ivana Popova* ('From the Childhood Years of Ivan Popov'). Ivan Popov was the name of Shukshin's second cousin.¹ Popov, indeed, is Shukshin's ebullient, salacious and scabrous alter-ego.

After Popov began to be published again in his native country during Gorbachev's *glasnost*, he turned away from the third-person narratives of the socially abrasive short stories published in *Metropol* and the *Veseliye Rusi* collection, and embraced a first-person narrative which consistently expresses the views, feelings, experiences and more often than not the moral outrage of the author himself. The hero may be called Ferfichkin, Gdov, or Bezobrazov, but the moral standpoint is always that of Evgenii Anatol'evich Popov (not least because they all share features of Popov's own biography).

Popov's cast of characters in his *glasnost* period includes many of his own friends, such as Dmitrii Prigov, Viktor Erofeev and Bella Akhmadullina (in *Dusha patriota*), or Roman Solntsev in later works. His choice of genre self-consciously foregrounds the false solemnity of Soviet official language while simultaneously debunking it, as in his reproduction of press statements, imbued with a knowing sarcasm and often to hilarious effect, in *Prekrasnost' zhizni* (1990). In the early post-Soviet years Popov uses his own "I" as a position of cultural and moral authority from which to attack the lies and crimes of Russian history, where his stance as a formerly repressed writer comes to take second place to that of an angry, socially committed polemicist. In these first-person narratives he seeks to satirize the 'stunted' democracy (*neokrepshaia demokratiia*) post-1991, with particular criticism of the suffering of ordinary people. Both his novels *Podlinnaia istoriia "zelenykh muzykantov"* ("The True Story of the "Green Musicians", 1999) and *Master Khaos* ("Master Chaos", 2002) are prime examples of Popov's self-appointed right to mock, judge and condemn society's failings by affirming his own moral superiority as a writer, a stance squarely within the classical Russian tradition as demonstrated by Nikolai Gogol two centuries previously.

Parody, satire and laughter are never far from the surface of *Prekrasnost' zhizni*, bearing the sub-heading 'chapters from a novel with a newspaper, which will never be begun or finished', and composed essentially of a mammoth series of newspaper clippings and stories. Not only is the cumulative effect to demonstrate the mendaciousness and false optimism generated by the Soviet media, but also,

through retrospective irony and a knowing sarcasm, to show clearly the impoverishment and ultimate corruption of the Russian language. Soviet officialdom becomes the medium for peddling lies or at best half-truths, and for wrapping all citizens in a cocoon of illusion. Sorokin, too, castigates the falsity of official discourse, but Popov alleviates his harsh sarcasm with humour and knowing irony.

On the one hand *Prekrasnost' zhizni* is a work of prodigious labour, containing as it does over 400 pages of assorted headlines and quotations from newspapers (some penned by a certain E. Popov!), doggerel verse by 'official' poets such as Sergei Mikhalkov, author of the lines of both the Soviet and post-Soviet national anthems – who, along with Iurii Bondarev, comes in for particularly sarcastic treatment – and stories and anecdotes, all relating to the development of Soviet society from the early 1960s to 1985. Topics covered include the Soviet Union's internal politics, relations with foreign powers and the country's literary and artistic development. Events reported and discussed in the Soviet media thus include the following: Iurii Gagarin's flight into space in 1961; the Cuban missile crisis of 1962; Khrushchev's removal from power in 1964; the trial of Andrei Siniavskii and Iulii Daniel' in 1966; the 'fraternal assistance' accorded by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies to Czechoslovakia in 1968; Solzhenitsyn's expulsion from the USSR in 1974; Feliks Kuznetsov's fulminations against the 'pornographic' *Metropol* of 1979 (a favourite butt for Popov's sarcasm); the Afghan government's 'request for urgent political, moral and economic assistance, including military aid' in that same year; the Moscow Olympics and the death of Vladimir Vysotskii in 1980; the collapse of the Soviet 'gerontocracy' in the early 1980s, the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev, and the beginning of the end of a hated and bankrupt system.

A defining feature of Popov's narrative is that it covers history as it has affected individuals and societies, ignoring such abstractions as international relations, meetings of world leaders or international agreements, or even the Space and Arms Races. Popov's history is that of a people's suffering and betrayal by successive generations of Russian leaders, history as experienced by the many, let down and exploited by the few.

Of particular curiosity value today are the indulgent references to young and then-unknown writers of the 1960s, such as Eduard Topol', Valentin Rasputin, Fridrikh Gorenshstein and Vladimir Voinovich. Nevertheless, given the time when it was written (1987) and published (1990), life in the Soviet Union was anything but 'splendid', and Popov's novel reads today as a sustained ironic tirade against the falsity and mendacity of the dying Soviet regime.²

Literature and the nature of artistic creativity is the subject of much of Popov's work: his 1993 novel *Nakanune nakanune* ('On the Eve of One the Eve') plays obviously with Turgenev. *Podlinnaia istoriia "zelenykh muzykantov"* ('The Real Story of the "Green Musicians"', 1999) offers

¹ E. Popov, 'Khorosho, chto vy s nami: K iubileiu Vasiliia Aksenova', *Oktiabr* (2007: 7), 122-53; V. Shukshin, 'Ia rodom iz derevni...', in Shukshin, *Sobranie sochinenii v shesti tomakh*, I, Moscow, Nadezhda-I, 1998, pp. 5-6, 500-01.

² Robert Porter notes that 'when the book was published in 1990 its title could hardly have been more ironic... official life had itself become a parody of reality' (Porter, p. 134). Deming Brown agrees: 'Popov lets his mosaic of historic facts speak for itself, but it is so arranged that the ironies are inescapable: in a culture of mass deceit even good men become subtly corrupted, without realizing it. The ultimate irony of the work is the title itself.' See Deming Brown, *The Last Years of Soviet Literature: Prose Fiction 1975-1991* (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 162.

a postmodernist wink at the audience and resembles a metafictional exercise in literary one-upmanship. The reference in the title is to a popular children's cartoon based on a fairy-tale, and in his own foreword Popov acknowledges the work as akin to a 'fairy-tale'. Popov takes a children's story and in very adult terms uses it to attack all things Soviet and totalitarian, peeling away the illusion and artifice to expose the 'real story'. Through the prism of his own experience and subjective reflections, the author uses the act of writing as both a warning and a lament: 'For young people, on the one hand, to be proud of their fathers and, on the other, to avoid their mistakes and sufferings'.¹

In *Podlinnaia istoriia* the focus is not so much the iniquities of the Soviet regime, although they get their customary lambasting, but the struggles of Ivan Ivanych, a budding writer with more than a hint of Popov in him, to get his work published in the USSR. The work is structured in two parts: the first an erstwhile accurate account of Ivan Ivanych's struggles with the censorship and literary bureaucracy, the second, and much longer, a series of footnotes that expand on the text, digress and fulminate, and generally provide a supposed factual background. With this dual structure the work obviously follows in the footsteps of Vladimir Nabokov's *Pale Fire* (1962), which consists of a poem followed by detailed commentary containing all sorts of word games and extra-textual literary illusions.² It is an artistic strategy to which Popov returns in his novel @rbeit (2012).

Popov's primary text justifies, in suitably ironic terms, Ivan Ivanych's acceptance into the literary brotherhood, his increasing conformity and eventual descent into mediocrity, thus offering a mirror image of the trajectory of the archetypal Soviet literary career, as well as perhaps an ironically wistful reflection on what Popov himself may have become had he followed the then rules of the game.

At first this career follows the classic model of the young dissident writer: expulsion from higher education, work as night watchman, then taken down a peg or two by a world-weary journalist:

The point is, old man, that essentially you are a greenhouse plant. A mimosa. Do you remember the children's rhyme? A mimosa. After all, in practical terms you have not experienced *anything* in life. You've always had a roof over your head, you've never gone hungry. I am right, aren't I? Not *anything*, not the terrible alcoholism that sucks away your energy every day, nor debauchery, nor horrendous relationships that end with your face getting slapped, hysterics and vein-cutting... (pp. 41-42)

The commentary, however, subverts this self-serving narrative, and is obviously the work of the sarcastic and unforgiving author himself. The commentary, as with Nabokov's novel, expands the world of its 'literary' space

¹ Evgenii Popov, *Podlinnaia istoriia "zelenykh muzykantov"*, Moscow, Vagrius, 1999, p. 7.

² In her introductory essay to the first edition of *Pale Fire* in 1962, Mary McCarthy uses terms that can be similarly applied to Popov's novel: 'When the separate parts are assembled, according to the manufacturer's directions, and fitted together with the help of clues and cross-references, which must be hunted down as in a paper-chase, a novel on several levels is revealed, and these "levels" are not the customary "levels of meaning" of modernist criticism but planes in a fictive space, rather like those houses of memory in medieval mnemonic science, where words, facts, and numbers were stored till wanted in various rooms and attics, or like the Houses of astrology into which the heavens are divided.' Mary McCarthy, 'A Bolt from the Blue', in Vladimir Nabokov, *Pale Fire*, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1991, p. v.

with what is presented as 'truth'. Fiction and fact coexist, and one cannot do without the other. As footnote 142 explains, fact and reality, and the Soviet literary representation of that reality, are not necessarily the same thing: 'Reality was indeed nonsense. Therefore only the ABSURD is entitled to claim to the title of SOCIALIST REALISM, because many other works by so-called SOVIET WRITERS are sheer fantasy' (pp. 102-03). Footnote 257 begins with a semi-frivolous literary anecdote, but ends by offering a devastating critique of a society governed by lies and secrecy, complete with a metafictional allusion to one of the key texts of socialist realism:

The 'intelligentsia' liked to scare girls just as badly as Party officials! There is a novella by Roman Solntsev which has a scene where some 'poets' on a train journey scare the girls by deliberately speaking nonsense, and waving around fake knives covered in red ink for poetic effect. While some scared them, others screwed them.

They shouldn't have been scaring the girls, but bringing to the people the light of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. For instance, about the Kyshtym disaster in the Urals, when the red swine allowed a radioactive leak but did not bother to inform the local population, who ate the contaminated fish and poisoned mushrooms and slowly died out.

A relative of mine, Boris Baranov, the husband of my elder sister Natasha and an army officer, did his officer training in the late 1950s and did his 'radioactivity practice' in these parts. The 'zone' there was worse than in Tarkovskii's film *Stalker*. The marsh was divided into two parts by a high dam. One step to the right or left of the dam and you were lethally exposed. Also sprach Zarathustra, that is how the steel was tempered. (p. 149)

Just as the author purports to tell the truth behind the fairy-tale of the title, so he sets out to strip away from Soviet society the veneer of respectability and to debunk its compositeness, hypocrisy and lies, and to highlight the brutality and contempt with which it treated its citizens. Half-literary anecdote and half-political criticism, *Podlinnaia istoriia* progresses within accepted narrative models and ends on a Pasternakian note of hope for the world, with also a nod to the 'happy-ever-after' morality of the fairy-tale (footnote 885):

True reality, given to us by God, lies not at all in the vanity of this world, but in the good word, in the vague attempt to gain brotherhood, love and forgiveness, vanquishing the bitterness of one's isolation amid the crowd and thus overcoming death. The earth has long been inhabited and we are all fellow citizens on it, and thus let us stand in dignity not before the Lord, who is our good Father and loves us all, but before cold and aloof Chaos, which is undoubtedly hostile to us, as is any lack of clarity in life. Our world is full of secret harmony, and we will gradually dissolve in it, as a corpse dissolves in the graveyard earth, but this will not be a death and an end, because neither death nor the end exist, and we will all be happy, who said that we should be unhappy? And – young people, children, don't be afraid of anything. Be calm. The evil giants have departed and will never return. Everything is in order. Life goes on. Life is eternal. We will all be saved. (pp. 343-44)

It is no surprise that Chaos raises its ugly head in Popov's next novel, and indeed, features in its very title. *Master Khaos* is another exercise in first-person narrative

that attempts to describe and analyze the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communist-controlled Eastern Europe. *Master Khaos* was first published in the monthly journal 'Oktiabr' in 2002, and appeared in a separate book edition shortly afterwards. It is described by the author as an 'open multiagent literary system with an afterword by an academic' ('otkrytaia mul'tiagentnaia literaturnaia sistema s poslesloviem uchenogo cheloveka'), and this knowing semi-parodic and pseudo-scientific designation fully corresponds to the tongue-in-cheek style and content of the work. *Master Khaos* is a deliriously disorganized trawl through the travails of Russian and Soviet history, with ironic asides and occasionally impassioned polemics against Bolshevik excesses and injustices. It is narrated both in the first person and through the eyes of the fictional cypher Bezobrazov and his views on Russia's post-Soviet 'stunted democracy', a phrase that comes to symbolize the failure of Russia's political establishment to deliver Western-style prosperity or even stability.

Some pages seem totally disconnected from the narrative, such as towards the end of Chapter One where just about every country in the world (apart from Scotland and Wales) is placed in alphabetical order, from Australia to Japan. There is no explanation, no linking words or even conjugations, simply a list. Elsewhere there is the typical criticism of the Bolsheviks, where for Popov politico-economic matters are just as important as the deeply personal:

Bolshevism reduced our society not only to economic, moral and political disaster, but sexual, too. Instead of the purported rosy-cheeked, broad-shouldered but moronic builder of Communism appeared instead a screwed-up creature suffering from all the thinkable and unthinkable complexes.¹

But the Bolshevik moron nevertheless waged sadistic war on the people, as Popov recounts in a single sentence that lasts almost a whole page (this is a reduced extract):

The Chekist Peters, transferred to Moscow, drowned the city in blood, and among his servants there were Chinese and one Negro, whose speciality was to draw out the veins from people's bodies, in Vologda the hatchet-man Kedrov committed many atrocities, in Voronezh people were put into nail-studded barrels which were then rolled down a hill, in Nikolaev people were bricked up in walls, in Orel eyes were poked out or Soviet stars cut into their foreheads or chests, people were thrown into vats of boiling water, joints were broken, skin peeled off, molten tin poured down throats, in Pskov the Chinese sawed 200 captured officers into pieces, in Poltava the Chekist Grishka savagely executed 18 monks by having them impaled on a spike, a method also used by the Chekists of Iamburg, in Blagoveshchensk they drove grammophone needles under people's fingernails, in Omsk they tortured pregnant women, cut open stomachs and dragged out the intestines.²

Popov's history is also told through the sound-bites of selected newspaper headlines and clippings, personal anecdote and occasional satirical aside; it therefore has much in common with *Prekrasnost' zhizni*. The following is a typical example of a potted history of the last twenty years or so of Soviet power:

¹ Evgenii Popov, *Master Khaos*, Moscow, MK-Periodika, 2002, p. 129.

² Popov, *Master Khaos*, pp. 231-32.

So it happened that perestroika came and went. The Communists organized a coup, as it happened, and they were tried then released with honour. There was one Chechen war, then another. In Russia there was freedom and McDonalds. Russia was again awash with money, but not for everyone and not for the country, which had learned to be much smarter in its cap-in-hand begging than under Len'ka Brezhnev. Russia is now a very cheerful place, every day something happens.³

Master Khaos is a seemingly random and disorganized collection of thoughts and clippings on Russian and East European political history, but governed by a sharply critical intelligence that all the time laments the human cost. In the 1990s, for instance, the currency becomes devalued and democracy, as in the eyes of many Russians, becomes synonymous with banditry and penury, as in fact happened. Political leaders are castigated, and Popov's favourite stylistic device of repetition adds an extra layer of irony to the narrative. The final few pages recount all manner of accidents and natural disasters, but such elemental and seemingly unavoidable chaos is nothing compared to the man-made kind that Russia has suffered under the Bolsheviks.

Literature, its importance to the Russian national psyche and the nature of artistic creativity become increasingly the subject of much of Popov's work: apart from *Nakanune nakanune*, his collection *Opera nishchikh* ('The Beggars' Opera') self-consciously references John Gay's 1728 satirical ballad of that name. Gay's work ridiculed the high and mighty of his day, showing how society is riddled with crime and vice from top to bottom. Popov pointedly shows how greed and corruption are as pernicious and widespread in late twentieth-century Russia as they were in early eighteenth-century England.

Scholars have noted Popov's reliance on literary traditions, be it those of Russian folklore, the Russian classics, or more contemporary trends. Alexandre Dumas, Ivan Turgenev, and Boris Pil'niak are all alluded to in the titles of works from the 1990s, and Popov's deliberate mimicry of literary models (the folk-tale or Nabokov, for instance) foregrounds the literary paradigm as a means of passing judgment on the 'brave new world' post-1991.

Popov's abandonment of third-person narrative for first-person polemics in *Master Khaos* is indicative of a much more deeply-felt concern. In his post-Soviet works, many of which touch on personal issues such as the breakdown of relationships, the author essentially abandons all literary pretence and lays himself bare before the reader. Banality becomes a signifier of dislocation, as in the following reflection: 'I had an urge for some watery Soviet beer in the grimy café "Café" of the stagnation period, when the whole country, worn down by totalitarianism, languished under the yoke of tyranny, waiting only for FREEDOM.'⁴ Elsewhere the proliferation of cars is not a signifier of the wealth of the population newly liberated from this tyranny, but the cause of interminable traffic jams on Leningradskii prospekt in Moscow, showing that 'the future is dark, misty, completely undefined' (p. 45).

The work 'Krestovozdvizhenskii: vybrannye mesta iz perepiski Gdova i Khabarova', published in 2007, is a tour-

³ Popov, *Master Khaos*, p. 28.

⁴ E. Popov, 'Krestovozdvizhenskii: vybrannye mesta iz perepiski Gdova i Khabarova', *Znamia* (2007: 1), 42.

de-force of impassioned social commentary, scatological humour, and stream-of-consciousness narrative, whose common themes are the vileness of the recent Soviet past and the moral and material impoverishment of the nation since. Khabarov may be one of Popov's literary alter-egos, but here he has another string to his bow: he also represents the ingrained chauvinism and anti-semitism of the *lumpenproletariat*, who like their vodka and their *Rodina* but who hate the intelligentsia. He also (like Popov) has nothing but contempt for contemporary culture, beloved of the new 'slobs' (*bydlo*), and the work ends with the assertion of Russia's essence: despite the poverty and the cruelty, the 'eternal themes' of Russia are really thievery, drunkenness and fornication: the merry-making of old Russia lives on and thrives today. In a recent celebration of the bicentennial of Gogol's death, Popov raged against the injustices visited since the writer's death on Russians 'who have perished from the inhuman conditions of life, duped and debauched to the marrows of their bones, and who have destroyed their own beautiful land through feckless projects to transform everything and anything for the sake of acquiring something unknown'. Given the scale of the crimes in Russia today, Chichikov's misdemeanours look like 'innocent horseplay' (*bezvinnaia shalost'*) for which, if he were alive today, 'at worst he would receive a suspended sentence and probably escape punishment altogether'.¹

Popov's heart may be on his sleeve, but his pen remains dipped in poison for those who have let down the Russian people. His literary alter-egos Gdov and Bezobrazov are reduced to a bemused helplessness as they ponder the market realities of the new Russia. Popov constructs his satire and parody through an extra-literary space between the reported fact and the words used to report it, a space that alerts the reader to the falseness of authoritarian discourse, and shows how language can be used as tool for suppression. This, of course, was the favoured medium of satirists under the Soviet regime, Popov included, but Popov's post-Soviet emotive, highly personal discourse attempts to replace the 'truth' of authoritative narrative with the truth of the individual story. If during the Soviet period it was writers and artists who suffered materially for their non-conformism, since the collapse of that regime it is the common man who faces the 'beastly snarl of Capitalism'.²

Popov's works since 2000 offer an increasingly grim and ironic account of life for the ordinary Russian since the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as the customary angry condemnation of the iniquities of Soviet history. Chaos threatens here not only in the subject matter, the near-collapse of Russia in the 1990s, but also in the language and syntax of the narrative. History may be to blame, but in *Master Khaos* hope can be found in the symbol of Gotland, the Swedish island that has been bypassed by the major cataclysms of twentieth-century history and, more importantly, by Russians.

Popov's satire in *Master Khaos* embraces radical social commentary, and his first-person narrator bemoans the pauperization of the "new" Russia, where people survive on \$20 per month and resort to thievery and crime. As he travels from St Petersburg to Moscow, he compares his own picture of an impoverished nation with that drawn by the

radical writer Alexander Radishchev two centuries earlier, self-consciously using a historico-literary framework for ironic comment on the state of his nation.

Language for Popov retains a singular importance, for although it can be used to deceive and betray, it also provides a link with the culture of the past, and the hopes of freedom in the future. He is a master of the Russian sentence where the use of participles and gerunds produces effects both of linguistic dexterity and political irony. Popov has excelled in compiling whole books of official (Soviet) sayings, slogans, bureaucratic waffle, and journalistic inanities. Even in his shorter pieces long sentences, sometimes a paragraph long, with subordinate and relative clauses and a confusing multitude of gerunds and participles, convey in a stream-of-consciousness narrative historical events, personalities, more contemporary developments and the author's own feelings or thoughts. This often deliriously convoluted and exuberant delivery is often made up of foreign words (usually English), slang, references to popular culture and comically distorted officialese of both the Soviet and post-Soviet administrations. Humour, above all, is not forgotten amid the harsh polemical tone.

The short story 'Virtual'naia real'nost' begins with Gdov reflecting on the artist Vladimir Boer, his compatriot, who lived 'в слободе 3-его Интернационала, на улице Лагерной, где держали коров, население которой хоть и нечетко, но все же делилось на сидевших и сажавших, проживших длинную поучительную жизнь, неоднократно менявшихся местами' ('in the settlement of the 3rd International, on Camp Street, where they kept cows, the population of which, though strictly delineated, were divided into those who had been inside and those who had put them there, who had lived long instructive lives and several times had changed places').³ Popov uses language as both weapon and instrument, recording and expressing pain, injustice and the humour required to combat the everyday struggle.

Popov's linguistic dexterity can turn the tables on past and present, as in his 2005 article engagingly entitled 'Russkaia literatura luchshe, chem seks':

Previously Soviet propaganda would harp on about the recurrent killings, robberies, thievery, and persecution of the workers, about the drugs trade and rock-'n'-roll dancing. Therefore, Russians were sure that paradise existed over there. In the imagination of many of the Western media in our country today there are recurrent killings, robberies, thievery and persecution of the workers, drugs are sold, monuments are erected to bandits and people dance the *kazachok*.⁴

In this article Popov affirms the power of the Russian writer over his political environment, though he accepts it remains a 'mystery' why the Soviet regime not only could not destroy Russian literature, but actually strengthened its greatest exponents: Pasternak, Akhmatova, Bulgakov, Zoshchenko, Maiakovskii, Platonov, Solzhenitsyn and Sholokhov.

Popov/Khabarov/Gdov can transform the most banal, everyday problem into a symbol of universal chaos. Thus, in the short story 'Starik i skvazhina' Gdov's inability to

³ Evgenii Popov, *Opera nishchikh. Rasskazy o neponiatnom, besedy, sluchai*, Moscow, Vagrius, 2006, p. 13.

⁴ E. Popov, 'Russkaia literatura luchshe, chem seks', *Oktiabr'* (2005: 6), 135.

¹ 'Gogol': real'nost' voobrazheniia', *Znamia* (2009: 4), 171-72.

² E. Popov, 'Oskal', *Oktiabr'* (2008: 1), 105-14 (p. 106).

extract water from the well at his country dacha becomes a metaphor for his (and Popov's) inability to deal with the modern world: 'Even water that looks horrible does not flow from the well, despite my titanic efforts. I cry. But why bother crying, if it's too late to cry?'¹ In the short story 'Pritomyi ad' Khabarov enters a public toilet and sees the words 'fuck off' scribbled on the wall, prompting him to reflect that this 'undoubtedly confirms that the new Russia has moved a long way forwards, at least in the learning of foreign languages'.²

There is no doubt, though, that Popov, through his various literary incarnations, expresses the fears and disillusionment of both the intelligentsia and the ordinary people for the dashed hopes of post-Soviet Russia. There is even a nostalgic whimsy for a more innocent past, as in the 2008 short story 'Oskal' ('The Snarl'), the title expressing the ferocity of the new capitalism and its contempt for the ordinary citizen. The writer Gdov, sitting in a restaurant with his friend Khabarov, surrounded by a cornucopia of wines, cheeses, fish and meat dishes, all of them way beyond the means of the average Russian, notes that 'these days everything, of course, is not the same, [...] the beauty of life has been replaced by universal human progress'.³ Gdov recounts a story twenty-eight years previously when he was on a bus whose passengers were suddenly seized by a collective sexual mania, leading to the eventual crash of the bus from which only Gdov emerges unscathed. Being the only one not at the mercy of an animal-like lust, Gdov is set upon by the others just before the crash takes place. His only defence is in his assertion of basic humanity: 'We are after all human beings. We have to abide by certain laws, or progress will stop. [...] My dear citizens! I don't want to turn into an animal and lose my human face'.⁴ Elsewhere the sexual act is absurd, usually demeaning and used solely for physical gratification (especially by women).⁵

Post-Soviet Popov remains upbeat, though, on the resourcefulness and durability of his native Siberians, a stance he shares with Shukshin and another Siberian 'patriot' Valentin Rasputin (b. 1937), though it is unlikely that he and the latter share any other political or cultural views. In the sketch 'Sibir' ('Siberia', coincidentally also the title of a work by Rasputin) he recalls his own youth in Krasnoiarsk, and how he got to know a Hungarian who had spent more than 15 years in the Gulag, remained in Siberia after his release and became a 'simply Siberian peasant'. This spurs him on the reflection that in Siberia 'any peasant can often have a biography worthy of the pen of Alexandre Dumas-père, creator of the Count of Monte Cristo'.⁶ Siberia is remarkable not so much in its reserves of natural resources, as in the fact that 'people here can mysteriously turn the minuses of life into pluses' (p. 73). He illustrates the strength of Siberia with a story of a village Old Believers who had no electricity, did not drink, prospered by selling various local foodstuffs to tourists and used stainless steel from cosmic jetsam to make their shovels, axes and ploughs.

¹ Opera nishchikh, p. 83.

² Opera nishchikh, p. 106.

³ 'Oskal', 106.

⁴ 'Oskal', 113.

⁵ Sex in public and even in the snow holds a peculiar attraction: see, for instance, the story 'Tainstvennaia krysa, ili Potselui na moroze', *Znamia* (2011:2), 96-103, and chapter XIII of *@rbeit* (entitled, significantly, "'Sex in public' – skazala Zlata").

⁶ E. Popov, 'Sibir', *Oktiabr'* (2005: 12), 71.

In March 2007 Popov began writing an interactive internet blog, his 'live journal', inviting comments from readers on issues of the day. It remains active, and its archive and readers' responses run to thousands of pages.⁷ In 2012 Popov published *@rbeit: shirokoe polotno*, based on this blog, which continues his attacks on the Soviet Union and its vestiges in the post-Soviet present, as well as the corruption of the present. It is structured in two parts: his own musings, or rather those of 'the writer Gdov', then questions on the text as in a school textbook. Part Two consists of readers' responses and questions, and Popov ends the book with a 'thank you' to all his correspondents. The enterprise is indeed new to Russian literature, whereby the writer actively engages in an interaction with his reading public, seeking both approval and consensus.

It remains to be said that Popov's work may attack and discredit a lost world, and lament the injustices of the new, but it still foregrounds the absurd as the one unchanging aspect of Russian life through the decades and centuries. His work remains quintessentially Russian in its affirmation of the unique place of the writer and the written word, and the conflation of the individual and collective experience as valid autobiography, or what has become known as 'life writing'. Through the power of the word Popov seeks to cauterize the social wounds and address historical injustice. Popov as a post-Soviet writer is more than a grumpy old man railing against the iniquities of society and life, such as the 'kitsch', 'trash' and 'popsa' (pop culture) of the modern age; rather, he is very much an angry old man aware that he has little in common with the new Russia. Popov remains a satirical, and often very funny, writer, but in a country, as he says, that is without good-natured, instinctive humour or jokes, 'bez khokhm'. But no matter how bad things are, Popov assures us, two things will always remain in Russia: people will always read books and drink vodka.⁸

Popov's use of first-person narrative celebrates his self-appointed role as the social, political and cultural conscience of his time. Popov, like Trifonov, an acerbic observer of contemporary spiritual and moral malaise, shares an affinity with Iurii Trifonov (1925-81), the foremost Soviet exponent of 'urban prose' whose most revealing comments on Soviet life and history were encouraged by his travels abroad, namely the United States and Western Europe. Popov writes his article 'Russkaia literatura luchshe, chem seks' as he travels through Italy, and Master Khaos is conceived on a trip to Germany.

Popov's own experience and thoughts, or those of his ciphers, are tantamount, they express the truth of the age, and attack its injustices and absurdity. Modern society has lost its moral foundation, its culture, its ability to laugh out loud. Literature is impotent in that it cannot put right the wrongs of history, but it remains important as the only means of expressing despair and disgust. But literature, the written word, is also important in that it shows very clearly how he, Gdov, Bezobrazov and others have become marginalized by the new market realities, a denigration clearly seen as a betrayal of fundamentally Russian cultural values. These values remain sacrosanct, because, as he says towards the end of 'Oskal', only the writer retained his humanity during the Soviet period, a humanity that is

⁷ <http://evgpopov.livejournal.com>.

⁸ 'Russkaia literatura luchshe, chem seks', p. 136.

threatened by the material indulgence of the new Russia but which still (barely) survives.

In his public utterances Popov names Vladimir Voinovich and Vasilii Aksenov as paragons of 'freedom' during the dark days of Soviet repression, but his strongest endorsement is for the role of the literary journal:

I think that the role of the literary journals has only increased, because for many Russian intellectuals they are the only means of escaping the savagery and forced

head-first immersion into this brave new world [...] In this eroded world, where all kinds of popsa rule, literary journals are the solid ground that has clear professional and moral outlines.¹

As culture and the values of humanism associated with it are increasingly threatened and marginalized in the new Russia, Evgenii Popov's highly personalized narrative remains a beacon of cultural authority, as well as a lament for the loss of past certainties.

A. A. Gromyko²

GLOBAL MANAGEMENT AS COMMUNICATION MEANS IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS

Globalization and global management are many-sided and closely connected phenomena. We only start studying them. The Theory of Globalization and Global management is the one that requires special attention.

What breeds success of the global management? In my opinion, the dedication to historical heritage of civilization, especially to the experience of the two World Wars of the 20th century. What is the experience of World War II?

Russia does not celebrate in vain the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. Do we only celebrate the allies' military victory over fascism? Firstly, of course, we do. The remembrance of the millions who died on battlefields burns our hearts. But the victory gained by the Soviet people, was not only the military one. The creation of the new world order in 1945 was its big success. UNO was established; its Charter formalized the legal basis for international relations.

The truth was approved which has not been understood and adopted by the just brought to light politicians – the world's order and stability can only exist within the framework of law and order. These politicians and the elites that attend to them including high-ranked scientists have completely forgotten the lessons of the horrible power slaughter of mid-20th century. They percept history as the fragile chain of epochs where the new always means the break-up with the past.

Such an approach to international relations when the only thing used to evaluate the policy and its aims and possibilities is the balance potential of different powers leads to a growth of turbulence and uncertainty in the world. International conflicts emerge, territorial claims of some states to others appear, some countries and coalitions intervene the others to throw down undesirable regimes, and interference within the inner affairs of sovereign states

grows. Gradually, the danger of the Third World war grows out of small and middle-sized conflicts.

Is the global world management possible under these conditions, including the areas of economics, finance and social relations? The obvious answer is that it is not.

Where are the supporting points, the fulcrums, by means of which the international world can be prevented from slipping into the abyss of eternal discord? Fortunately, there are such points. They were left for us by the outstanding statesmen, the creators of the world's law and order of the second half of the 20th century. Not everyone likes it. Nowadays we observe an alarming situation in the world affairs.

In their attempt to leave the legal framework of democratic principles and norms, the advocates of force faced the situation when the basic principles of international law are embodied in the UNO Charter. Their authors are Soviet, American and English politicians and diplomats. During almost 70 years in spite of all the attempts to weaken and even to liquidate the UNO, to declare it bankrupt, the international community of states expresses its belief in this universal organization and entrusts it with the vital task of keeping peace on Earth. Serious political figures see the UNO as the anchor of the world's stability.

The UNO Charter is not the only document which imprints the basic principles of the international relations. Another source is the determining Declaration of Principles of International Law. It was adopted by the XXV UN General Assembly on October 24th, 1970. The Declaration contains seven basic principles:

- non-use of force or threats of the use of force;
- peaceful solution of the international disputes;
- non-interference into the affairs that are under the state's competence;
- states' responsibilities to cooperate in accordance with the UNO Charter;
- equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- sovereign equality of states;
- states' honest implementation of the obligations taken in accordance with the UNO Charter.

The norms and rules of the international law, including the UNO Charter's core, can and will be transformed, but they should not start *the UNO reformation* under the guise of 'reforms'. Disregard of the UNO Charter principles under the pretext of its 'improvement' will lead to the break-off of the experience and historical memory of the previous generations.

¹ 'Literaturnye zhurnaly: chto zavtra?', *Znamia* (2008: 1), 191-205 (Popov's contribution, p. 201).

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There appear two new 'global management' powers in the modern international relations. The first is the power of force that can be traced back to thousands of years of history and still seems firm to many. The second is the force of law, the possibilities of which has not been exhausted yet. The situation is reflected in the international law, its main achievement being the creation of the UNO. It was very hard to create it, it could be even harder to destroy it, and impossible to restore. If the UNO is weakened or destroyed, the multipolar system will crack and break up into hostile geopolitical blocks opposing each other.

We cannot but see that the supporting points of the world order on the international arena after 1945 are being knocked down or demolished. Political elites in some countries start using military forces bypassing the UNO Security Council, and using double standard diplomacy for this purpose. The world public will lose its faith in the idea that in the foreign policy 'good wins over bad' and the humanity enters the time of the global civil cooperation when empathy, the ability to sympathize, strengthens. Under such conditions, out of state of high turbulence the world community risks to be involved into the abyss of social chaos. This process is already on. It seems that people's world cannot be saved from the social, political and military shocks.

This point of view can be regarded as unsubstantiated. Although it is stated by many serious researches, including those from the West, for example, English scholar W. Hutton says: 'The less developed world considers that its problems – evident poverty, lagging in economic development, population and crime growth – are the heritage of Western capitalism and unjust world business organization. These views are widely spread in China, the Arab world and in Africa. Many are seized with the feeling of powerlessness... because they are not more than pawns on a global chessboard...'¹

The question about universal safety platform arises, especially for Russia. What should be protected and from whom? Where are the safety criteria? Amid ridiculous no-one-threatens-us and Russia-has-become-a-part-of-civilized-world-and-does-not-need-an-Army-or-strong-state conversations, badly thought-out patterns are piled up in mass-media. Their creators forget the basis of Yalta's world order that helped the humanity to survive and avoid the third world war.

It is the UN Charter that frames clearly the principles of humanity's survival. The Global Management is only possible on this basis. Without conserving and following these principles it will not come to life. In the time of conflict of civilizations, fighting against the Earth's ecology destruction will turn out to be inefficient and deadly for such a feeble creature as a human being. International conflicts will not leave time and forces for the effective usage of farmlands and providing fresh water to people. The problems of global demography and migration, terrorism eradication, piracy and drug traffic will be left unsolved.

In the times of international conflicts destructive processes on the world arena will get the scale of uncontrollable crisis which will go beyond the boundaries of economics and finance. It will not be possible to stop this crisis even with the help of new strong-states coalitions and military and political unions. In the times of arms storage

and use, the effective global management is not possible. The law of force will overrun the force of law and the UN is most likely to be demolished. The international law will weaken significantly. If 'political elites' do not feel the danger, the international community will be doomed to proceed from the state of growing uncertainty into the world of gross social conflicts.

The global social conflict will come to the fore; the quarrelling ideologies will gain strength, though they prefer not to mention them today. Such state of the international environment is quite possible and, moreover, predictable. It will be a real challenge to the global management we know today. The process of global powers changing is in full swing. It can be defined as 'the shift of power'.

Global management is developing today in such conditions when it is performed *both by political and economic entities*. They construct globalization supporting structure leaning against new points of growth and development of world economics and politics. This process of creating New Architecture of international relations has only started on the historic scale. Well-established states as well as international organizations formed after the Second World War will be the main subjects of the 21st-century world order. In general, this process will be developing evolutionally, but for the world community it will be painful and filled with risks.

For many states even today, the power of force in its different manifestations remains important means of foreign policy. Wars, however, become a risky business and are more often condemned. Still the actions of force in the world business become more and more sophisticated and are organized with the use of mass media preceded by the propaganda campaigns. Diplomacy, including multilateral diplomacy is used to ensure success.

The global governance of people and conglomeration of civilizations on our planet depends on implementations of ideas of new political thinking. It appeared in the middle of the 20th century and is embodied in the Russell-Einstein Manifesto. It proclaimed the sacramental truth – it is either we destroy nuclear weapon or it is bound to destroy us. During half of the century international relations were developing under the strong influence of this idea, even in the times of ideological confrontations. Several generations of politicians and diplomats were creating conditions for the humanity to avoid new world war and, quite possibly, self-destruction. But the danger of the Big War is not over. Many countries are armed with nuclear weapons. However slowly, but it does spread. Nuclear arms race is not stopped.

The result of the second half of the 20th century is the noticeable influence of the force of law on the world politics. It is the international law that supports democratization processes on the global scale. Those who are for democracy today cannot but spread its principles onto the international relations. The latter must be democratic rather than despotic.

In case of the UNO destruction (in the form that we know it now) the global management will lose the defining centre for international legitimacy of actions. In such conditions it will partially preserve its influence in the spheres of economics and finances. In other areas this influence will be undermined. The number of conflicts at different levels in the world will increase.

I hope and I have no doubts that scientific discussions of 'global management and 21st-century challenges' will not only touch upon but also give answers as to the ways of

¹ Hutton W. Them and Us. Changing Britain – Why We Need a Fair Society. L.: Abacus, 2011. P. 292–293.

strengthening Russia's positions in international relations. Russia's opportunities in the global world, in the times of manageability deficit growth and growing chaos in some regions, have been discussed for a long time. But many questions still remain unanswered.

Globalization consequences are being evaluated only in general, especially the activities of transnational companies. They do use scientific and technical achievements to create new manufactures in the developing countries. They

maintain and even enlarge their profit rates. That is all true. This situation allows using the global management possibilities for people's benefit. However, today this hope is tested to the limit.

Those who were in time and found a profitable place for themselves in the age of globalization, often want to keep it by all means including 'the new approaches'. We should remember how much nonsense is done through the desire to create something 'new' when it is not necessary.

René Guerra¹

THE MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT OF CULTURAL TIES BETWEEN FRANCE AND RUSSIA

Mutual attraction and interest of two countries and two great cultures has a deeply rooted historical tradition.

In the 18th and 19th centuries, the influence of French culture in Europe was predominant. The French language was the *lingua franca* for the nobility of European states. The ideas of the Encyclopédistes in the 18th century were beacons for all those on the forefront of culture and arts. The French language played an important part in the cultural history of Russian people, too. Though some sad historical errors could not be avoided, as the historian Tramond pointed out, friendship grounded on the breadth of outlooks and common features of magnanimity, tightly united the two great nations (Tramond, 1893).

Following the reforms of Peter I, Russia was actively integrated into European life. It was the time when the two cultures began to approach each other rapidly with the tightening of trade ties and the strengthening of social interaction. Russian people began to demonstrate special interest in France and everything which was French, whether it was history, literature, art, science, fashion and, of course, the language. Since that time, young nobles were sent to be educated not only in England or Holland, but in France as well. After 1720, young Russians were sent to Brest and Toulon to study nautical practices.

Starting from the mid-18th century, wealthy nobles, Alexei Razumovsky, Alexander Shuvalov and Alexei Orlov began to travel to Paris, Lyon and Montpellier. Poets and writers Vassily Trediakovsky, Nikolai Karamzin and Dmitry Fonvizin came to France on a cultural pilgrimage. This time was marked by the rapid growth of cultural ties between France and Russia, the latter being the subject of increasing interest on the part of French people. The first 'Russophiles' who experienced the influence of Catherine II were philosophers Voltaire, Diderot and D'Alembert. French architects, painters and philosophers would come on a regular basis to St. Petersburg where they were commissioned to build palaces and erect monuments. In 1782, a monument to Peter the Great was unveiled. It was produced by French sculptor Maurice Falconet. Denis

Diderot showed keen interest in Russia – he believed in her bright future. He followed the advance of Russian science, got to know Mikhail Lomonosov's works and studied Russian with the aim to read Russian writers in the original. Voltaire demonstrated his special interest in Russia being a pen-pal of Catherine II and Russian figures of culture. In 1746, Voltaire was elected an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He wrote *The History of the Russian Empire under Peter the Great*, the work in which he highly praised Peter's reforms. In 1782–83, Pierre-Charles Levesque published in Paris his *History of Russia* in five volumes, and Modrow his *Russian Grammar*.

At the same time Russian scholars embarked on the study of French philosophers – Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu – showing great interest in French literature. Particularly popular, for instance, was *Le Mariage de Figaro* by Beaumarchais. Do you remember Pushkin's line, 'Uncork a bottle of champagne and re-read *Le Mariage de Figaro*,' Mozart advises cheerfully to Salieri? Mikhail Lomonosov, Vassily Trediakovsky, Dmitry Fonvizin and others were busy translating books by Lamartine and Rousseau from French into Russian.

In the early 18th century, translations from French were in third place in Russia after those from Latin and German, while in the mid-18th century French translations made up 55 per cent of the translated literature.

Russia became a refuge for diplomats and the military fleeing from the French revolution as well as for Protestants and Calvinists persecuted for their religious beliefs, for nearly sixty families of wine-growers let alone aristocrats and cultural figures. Among them were the writer and philosopher Joseph de Maistre who was appointed a Sardinian ambassador to St. Petersburg, his brother Xavier de Maistre, the artist, the writer Madame de Staël, the Count of Ségur, the author of the well-known memoirs and others.

In the years from 1789 and to 1812, a French colony was formed in Moscow. After the war of 1812 French commercial companies and guilds engaged in manufacturing and trade were set up in big Russian cities. Many French people were engaged in education – they worked in gymnasiums, lyceums, private schools and universities. Unlike private tutors, school and university teachers were obliged to be highly qualified personnel with necessary degrees and references. Many of them started doing research, for instance, Eugène de Vogué who taught at St. Petersburg University. Among the staff of Moscow University were

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such lecturers as Labonne, Raoul, Leri, Lévi and others. Some subjects were taught in French including history and geography, to say nothing of French philology and literature.

From this point Russian literature began to arouse great interest in the part of French readers, while philosophical ideas drew attention of the thinkers in both countries as early as in the mid-18th century. Russia underwent a period of genuine *gallomania* which expressed itself in the rapid borrowing from the French language and culture into the Russian environment while Russian people began to explore France with French culture penetrating all spheres of Russian society. Knowing French became obligatory for a learned Russian as a measure of his education. This can be explained by a number of factors. The most important of them is connected with the role of France in the cultural, economic and political life of Europe. At the same time, such factor as the popularity of the tongue of Racine cannot be underestimated. French was the language of *salons*, diplomatic talks, and everyday life. A study of some family archives attests to the fact that Russian nobility honed their command and use of French to the extent of finesse, absolute ease and perfection. French was taught from childhood. In high society its knowledge was considered to be mandatory. It was thought that the Frenchman who achieved the Atticism, could with equal ease speak on the most important topics and engage in small talk, doing it with originality, sharpness of thought and precision.

French was widely used in Russian poetry and prose. Half of Trediakovsky's verse was written in French, some French poems can be found in Pushkin's works. Very often literary characters resorted to French. Tatiana wrote her letter to Onegin in French. The opening phrase in *The War and Peace* is 'Eh bien, mon prince!!!'

This diffusion, however, finally led to its rejection by some eminent Russians. Karamzin, for example, suggested that Russian phrases should replace Gallic ones – the *calques* – syntactic and semantic borrowings. But the process was not an easy one. Even highly educated people were faced with problems talking in Russian on the topics of abstract character. Private, business and scholarly correspondence was mostly done in French. The French language was in the spotlight to an extent that in some Russian social circles there were voices against its dominance. Alexander Sumarokov, who in his comedies and satires assaulted all misfortunes and evils of Russian life of the day, among others pointed to the whim of Russian nobles to teach their offspring a foreign language at all costs at the expense of their mother tongue.

Both Sumarokov's comedy *The Monsters* and his satirical sketch *On the French Language* satirized this fad. We read in the latter: 'Your child has been raised and is ten foot tall. He learned, he was taught but has become a boor. Your child has mastered some foreign tongue, so what? He could not draw a lesson from the books. Instead he learned to babble like a parrot or a magpie. But other than that they can do nothing. Brainless people think that the Russian language is inferior. What is tastier – *the pottage* or *the soup*? We only need to know foreign languages in order to read something that we cannot find in Russian!'

In Alexander Griboyedov's comedy *The Misfortune of Being Clever* Chatsky also satirizes the trend to scorn everything that is Russian and to admire what has been

imported from abroad: 'the miserable Frenchman from Bordeaux', on coming to Russia he has encountered neither a Russian sound nor a Russian face'. 'What's the newest fad now? A tendency today at meetings, public gatherings, on feast days is to mix the Nizhniy Novgorod dialect with French.' The writer mocks provincial Russian Francophiles.

In a word, the influence of French culture on Russian culture turned in the end to be so excessive that a lot of Russian educators and public figures started campaigns for the purity of their mother tongue and culture of Russian speech. They would raise their voices more and more often in favour of the priority of learning Russian and Russian literature at schools and universities.

Since the early 19th century, Russo-French relations picked up momentum. Russian nobles get red-carpet treatment in French salons. They throw lavish feasts and organize dancing parties in the luxurious houses which are in their possession. Russian guests in Paris are so plentiful that special shops and cafés open such as *L'Impératrice de Russie*, *Café de Russie*, *Grands Hôtels de Russie*, *Russie Galante*, etc. Russians come to see ballets in the *Grand Opera*, plays at the *Comédie Française* and starting from the 19th century they enrol in the *Collège de France*, the *Sorbonne* and the *Académie de Beaux Arts*.

Among these travellers, liberal ideas become more and more popular. In the early 19th century future Decembrists Mikhail Lunin and Wilhelm Küchelbecker come to France. Some time later in 1828, Russian Minister of Public Education Count Sergei Uvarov suggested that it was French literature that was the source of liberal thinking which eventually led to the uprising on December 14, 1825.

Some time later Mikhail Bakunin came to France to meet Karl Marx, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Lois Blanc. Starting from Alexander Herzen, Russian political émigrés chose France as the 'land of Exodus'. Herzen went as far as setting up a library in Nice for revolutionary students which later became affiliated with the Turgenev library organized by Ivan Turgenev with the help of Pauline Viardot and Émile Zola.

Russia continued its literary and cultural exploration of France. Famous men of letters – Eugene Baratinsky, Vissarion Belinsky, Nikolai Gogol, Leo Tolstoy, Ivan Turgenev, Fyodor Tiutchev, Semyon Nadson, Mikhail Saltykov-Shedrin, Anton Chekhov – come to Paris and Nice. Prosper Mérimée translated *The Queen of Spades* into French. His pursuit of Russian culture and the Russian language was well-known. He called the Russian language the richest of all European patois. Mérimée's encounter with Ivan Turgenev in 1857 became a significant event in the course of the Russo-French dialogue.

One should note that Turgenev was on very friendly terms with Gustave Flaubert, the Goncourt brothers and Guy de Maupassant, with composers Charles Gounod and Camille Saint-Saëns, with singer Pauline Viardot who popularized Russian music in France and French music in Russia.

The waning of *gallomania* in Russia falls on the late 19th and early 20th century, the process which affected many spheres with the exception of education. In the protocols of the pedagogical section of the Congress on technical and vocational education in 1890, we find

comments regarding the French language as a language of international communication and diplomacy and other comments citing France as the country whose importance for Russia in the field of scientific contacts is on a par with Germany.

The study of French literature was also considered to be obligatory for better understanding the works of French classical writers. The obligatory reading list included such names as Racine, Molière, Boileau, Corneille, La Fontaine, Diderot and Beaumarchais.

Throughout the 19th century, the French language found its important place in secondary schools curricula after Latin and German. In the early 19th century, with the restoration of monarchy in France, severed Russo-French relations were restored. Russian nobles were welcomed in French salons again.

In the 1890's the Russo-French alliance gave impetus to the cultural cooperation of the two countries. This cultural dimension was no less important than cooperation in military and economic spheres and is epitomized in the Alexander III Bridge, the most beautiful bridge in Paris, and the Trinity Bridge in St. Petersburg built to the design of Gustave Eiffel.

By the end of the 19th century, Leo Tolstoy's works and some time later Dostoyevsky's novels were translated in France. In 1898, a Russo-French society was set up in Paris which was to unite scholars and writers with the representatives of financial and industrial circles. There appeared publishing houses which specialized in Russian literature. At the same time, French literature and philosophy were actively popularized in Russia. According to Zagryazkina, the creative French élite included such eminent figures as Alexander Dumas, architect Auguste Montferrand, choreographer Marius Petipa who worked

together with Tchaikovsky. They all would visit or live in Russia.

Constantine Korovin's artistic work was also tightly linked to France. The artist painted landscapes of Paris, Marseille, Nice and Bretagne. The World Exhibition in Paris in 1900 brought him to the height of fame. His designs of Russian pavilions at the exhibition were awarded two gold and two silver medals.

The first years of the 20th century was the time when Parisians got to know Russian ballet and Russian opera due to the famous *Saisons Russes* initiated in France by Sergei Diaghilev. Paris of that time was centre of culture while France was viewed as the trendsetter in arts. Young painters, sculptors, writers and musicians from all over the world, including Russia, chose France for living and working enjoying the air of creative freedom.

French people were very proud of the fact that French culture played an important and influential part in Russian life. 'We cultivated a taste in them which they had had none before us, we showed them what freedom of thinking was, we instilled into them love for literature and aversion towards anything savage and rude through books and not only through them. And now we can witness the blossoming of Russian thought. Even if it was formed not by us, it was formed with us at least,' wrote in 1913 Émile Haumant, the linguist and expert on Slavic culture (Haumant, 1859–1942).

The October coup and the seventy years of the Soviet power cut off Russian culture by the notorious iron curtain from Europe and from France. But this is another big topic.

Summing up, let's say, 'The dialogue of France and Russia, which started in the 18th century, fruitful and mutually beneficial, continues until this day and, thank God, there is no end to it!'

P. S. Gurevich¹

IDENTITY: LOSSES AND GAINS

Globalization and the recent global crisis drastically transformed the processes of national and cultural identity. At the same time the view on globalization as a social phenomenon has also changed. Of course, we are still talking about the market dominance and neo-liberal forms of democracy. Nobody doubts the dominance of transnational corporations in various spheres of life – from economy to culture. A unipolar world is still being discussed and there are calls for multi-polarity. Globalization actively continues to influence not only economics and politics, but

also culture, the way of living and the way of thinking. The global crisis has confirmed the reality of planetary trends.

Recent years have seen a huge shift in geopolitics. The crisis has revealed striking contradictions of the modern world and the process of creating planetary civilization. Ideas of bringing all cultures together into some common cultural space have failed the test of time. Old problems of philosophy of culture have re-emerged: can one country's cultural impact on another trigger notable changes in the historical process? What consequences may spiritual expansion of 'active' civilization entail for less 'dynamic' regions? Does social dynamics lead to erasing cultural and civilizational features of nations and epochs, or, on the contrary, do the latter refuse to yield to the pressure of alien influences? Philosophy has longstanding traditions of discussing these issues. However, they have become particularly urgent due to the present crisis.

Experts are getting more and more convinced that it is spiritual characteristics and social and cultural features of a certain nation or the whole region, for instance, Europe, that make impact on social and cultural dynamics. In philosophic works the idea is becoming wide-spread that correctly

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‘grasped’ nucleus of culture, insight into its meaning and value, its peculiarities can promote progress of society and, in the long run, of the mankind. On the contrary, a distorted or perfunctory understanding of the essence of the spiritual heritage and its specific nature is able to generate painful crisis processes.

Current events in culture add evidence to the collapse of centuries-long identities. Previously existing estimates of auto-identity have fallen through. There are new approaches towards mosaic culture. There is a sharpened tendency to fundamentally define the ‘soil and fates’ of different countries, continents and civilizations. The notion of identity has been losing its stable definiteness. There is a carving for seeing different identity frames in the host of cultural variations. There are talks of a current of identities. ‘As a result, the direction of trans-cultural processes which emerged way back in the Renaissance and existed as long as the period of *moderne*, has changed. In this case the term “trans-cultural” does not mean one but a few cultural benchmarks, a crossroads of many cultures, a constant cruising between them and a special state of cultural intermediateness – “neither here nor there”, or “both here and there”. Trans-culturalism is based on cultural dialogue of many which never aims at complete blending of cultures or their conversion. Here cultures meet, but they do not blend, nor do they assimilate or melt.’¹

A century after Spengler’s *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (‘The Decline of the West’), the issues of European auto-identity and the fates of Western culture in general come to the fore again. Famous philosopher Jürgen Habermas in his book *The Split West*² ponders over the idea of European identity, the ever-existing subject-matter of European philosophy. What characterizes the spiritual image of Europe, though? This is not about geographical and spatial notion, as if we tried to encompass all people inhabiting this territory under the notion of European humankind. Spiritually, British dominions and the United States were closer to Europe than the Eskimos and American Indians or gypsies tramping around all of Europe for a long time.

No doubt, the name ‘Europe’ suggests the communion of living and creative work including purposes, interests, cares, concerns, plans, institutions and agencies. Within this community, individuals function at different levels in various social groups – families, clans and nations.

They are tightly knit spiritually. This brings to life a certain cohesive character of culture. Why does this problem acquire a particular importance today? Which events in the world history make us get back to this topic? Jürgen Habermas sees some intrigue in the European identity. What does it mean? When people unite, that does not mean that they need doing it. Quite often unions of countries or peoples turn out to be unnecessary or erroneous. From this standpoint, how trustworthy is the picture of peaceful Europe which positions itself as a culture open to others and capable of the dialogue?

According to Habermas, European welfare states play a vital part as role models of social organization. The experience of ‘tamed capitalism’ is of particular importance.

¹ M.V. Tlostanova. *The Man in the Modern World: Problems of Multiple Identity// Issues of Social Theory. The Man in Search of Identity. Scholarly Almanac/ Ed. by Y.M. Reznik and M.V. Tlostanova. Moscow, 2010, pp. 211–212.*

² Jürgen Habermas. *The Split West*. Moscow, 2008.

This policy, however, has its limitations. ‘The discussion which started within Europe sets direction and gives momentum to self-understanding.’³ This bold assumption is obviously contradicted by two facts. First, haven’t these very important historical achievements of Europe and their recognition in the world resulted in the loss of its momentum necessary to build identity? Second, what must unite from within such a region where, as nowhere else, there is no end to rivalry between many nations claiming for identity?

Edmund Husserl in his time also posed a question regarding the ‘spiritual image of Europe’. Can it be some philosophical idea permeating the whole of European history? Or can we not exclude that this is a certain teaching on the predestination of the West which wants to build its historical life grounding this process of the ideas of reason? Or, at last, is it just a set of some values born precisely here in Europe, which enables people to feel kinship? If we follow through the historical ties, then will the continuity in the pace of history bring us from Germans to their neighbours, from nation to nation, from one epoch to another? In the end, finding ourselves in Antiquity, we will consistently move from the Romans to the Greeks, Egyptians and Persians. The road to pre-history will become endless. We are sure to find ourselves in the Stone Age and will be musing over what caused so many human and cultural types to converge into one.

What, in Habermas’s opinion, migrated from European culture to the other continents? Christianity and capitalism, natural sciences and engineering, Roman law and Napoleon’s code of law, civil urban life, democracy and human rights, secularization of the state and society. It turns out that these achievements are not singularly in European possession today. ‘Western thinking which is rooted in the Judaeo-Christian tradition has some particular features. This spiritual image, however, marked by individualism, rationality and activity, characteristic of European nations is shared by those of the USA, Canada and Australia. In brief, “the West” as a spiritual centre encompasses more than just Europe.’⁴

But still, how to get the feel that we are at home? Should we peruse the history of India with its numerous peoples and cultural forms? There we can also find the unity of family kinship, though alien to us. On their part, Indians take us for aliens acknowledging only Indians as their kin. There is something unique about Europe which is obvious not only to us but to other groups of humans.

The concept of globalization was first perceived as a purely analytical description of real processes taking place globally. However, already in the early years of the new century the term began to be used in the meaning of emotionally coloured political objective. By the way, it could not have been otherwise. Real social phenomena hardly fit the framework of specific doctrines. After all, the world is divided into nation-states whose treatment of globalization has a number of implications and aims. Some scholars claim that national governments have ceased to exist, but nations remain as a heavy burden of the past. However, a number of states recognize globalization while others make attempts to find rationale for what globalization should be. And others are against the process itself. National character reveals itself already at the level of politics.

³ Ibid. P. 43.

⁴ Ibid. P. 44.

Faced with the tendency to go globally, local cultures unavoidably try to recode unifying factors in their own way. So various phenomena are born, such as 'Japanization' or 'Taiwanization' of traditional Chinese culture, 'Africanization' or 'Islamization' of Western culture (in the Republic of South Africa or Algeria). Popular Indian and Brazilian TV-series perform the same task. That is why it is very important to comprehend how profound different aspects of globalization are and how feasible are various cultural and social tendencies.

Nowadays, large communities of mankind, namely civilizations, have been shaped. These include such civilizations as Atlantic (comprising Western Europe and North America), Iberian-Latin American, Asian-Pacific, African. Samuel Huntington who passed away not long ago described modern situation in such a way. But is it correct to consider Eurasian civilization cultural and historical community of peoples inhabiting vast space from the Carpathian Mountains to Kamchatka and from the Pamir to the Arctic?

History attests that the decay of civilizational core triggers extremely powerful geopolitical chain reactions that change the picture of a given part of mankind radically. In the early '70s a group of members of the Club of Rome prepared a special report stating that various religions are innately tied. It excited talks on tremendous cross-cultural contacts and search for ways to a global inter-religious dialogue. But these resulted in a very different assumption that religions lead humankind to separation and probably to deadly confrontations. The core of a particular culture has intrinsic resistance. It is difficult to melt. The French postmodernist Jean Baudrillard says in this connection that the Alacalufe people from Tierra del Fuego were eradicated having never made an attempt either to understand white people or talk to them. They called themselves 'people' and did not want to know any others. All white people looked alike to them, they were just beyond their comprehension.

Neither white people's wealth nor their stunning technology made any impression on the natives. They did not adopt anything of that technology. They continued to paddle their canoes.¹ But if we talk about the general trend, we cannot be certain that the destruction of the Alacalufe's identity will be fatal for the Caucasian race. Cultures stay alive thanks to their originality, their exclusiveness, their imperishable rituals and values.

In the '90s of the last century, Jean Baudrillard pointed out the menacing historical destiny of the African continent. All other continents are usually viewed as a set of countries while Africa is seen as a single country. This is even more surprising, taking into account that there are fifty-five states in Africa today, and four more which are unrecognized. Baudrillard wrote that the idea of freedom can get to Africa as a result of trans-cultural process. In general, he warned that if Eastern countries set in motion the whole huge potential of freedom, which they held, it will be fraught with disaster and, most importantly, will break the metabolism of the values of the West.² The events that are unfolding in Africa today confirm this prediction.

In 2000, Muslims outnumbered Catholics for the first time in human history. Now futurists sometimes avoid using the template of globalization to make their predictions. For example, they point out the possibility of such a scenario for the humanity: radical Islamists will build a transnational theocratic community. The entire non-Islamic world will be declared an 'enemy of the Caliphate'. Terrorist war will be waged against it. The process of globalization will not only come to a standstill, but will also begin to blur. Muslim countries bring trouble to European countries.

So, in the age of globalization, absolute security and total defence are unattainable. We have to go through a serious school 'enlightening' us on 'other values' whether we like it or not. Politicians must make sure that people are able to live in the situation of a new confrontation of civilizations.

A. A. Guseynov³

ON CULTURE, VALUES AND MEANINGS: RANDOM NOTES ON A GIVEN TOPIC

1. I have already had a chance to remark about special features of the Likhachov Conference. It is more than just an academic forum, where scientific results achieved so far are reported; it should rather be regarded as a laboratory for intercultural dialogue studies. From year to year the

¹ Baudrillard J. *La Transparence du mal* (The Transparency of Evil). Moscow, 2006. P. 198.

² Ibid. P. 142.

³ Director of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of more than 500 publications, including books: *Social Nature of Morality* (Sotsialnaya priroda нравственности), *The Golden Rule of Ethics* (Zolotoye pravilo нравственности), *The Great Moralists* (Velikiye moralisty), *Language and Conscience* (Yazyk i sovest'), *Philosophy, Ethics, Politics* (Filosofiya, moral', politika), *The Ethics of Antiquity* (Antichnaya etika), *Negative Ethics* (Negativnaya etika). Managing editor of the yearly 'Ethical Thought' (Eticheskaya mysl), and 'Social Sciences' journal (the English edition), member of the editorial boards of journals: 'Philosophical Sciences' (Filosofskiy nauki), 'Issues of Philosophy' (Voprosy filosofiyi). Vice-President of the Russian Philosophic Society. Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology. Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

perspective on the dialogue of cultures varies and thus our understanding of this phenomenon becomes more specific and extensive. This year it focuses on axiology. Another special feature of this conference is that theoretical reflection on the dialogue of cultures goes concurrent with the dialogue itself, and is naturally entwined into the process. The discussion on axiological and communicative aspects of the dialogue of cultures, scheduled for this year, turned out to coincide with the situation where the dialogue of cultures is doubted because of the differences in their axiological bases and conceptual terms.

In the last year's Likhachov Conference devoted to the 'Dialogue of cultures in the process of globalization', the state leaders of Germany and France were, so to speak, the absentee participants, who had shortly before admitted the failure of the multiculturalist policy. In this year's Conference the distant-participation session is planned too, and it plunges from the very heart of life, this is the civil war in Syria and the terrorist attacks in Boston. If one is

to consider these two events as special cases of conflict, blotted with civilizational differences between the East and the West, they prove that the conflict, in a certain sense, is becoming an internal affair of the West and the East – inter-Arabian conflict and, given that one of Boston's terrorists is an American citizen, it is becoming an inter-American conflict, too. In both cases, axiological differences turned out to be stronger than the dialogue and blew up its space. The idea can't help dawning upon us, the one that we have been endeavouring to drive out, wasn't it too early that we rejected Kipling's words that West is West, and East is East, and neither the two shall meet. ...

2. The issue of values and meanings in the context of intercultural dialogue provokes figuring out differences between these concepts. This is undoubtedly important. It isn't for a philosopher to object to clarification of words and concepts, because some people think that this is the function of philosophy. However I would like to draw attention to another point. No matter what we take for values and meanings, no matter how these concepts are united or separated, it goes without saying that they are essentially and directly related to culture. After all, culture is what people bring into the world, it is a human hallmark, which is impressed onto the world. It involves primarily those values and meanings that make up its basis and for the sake of which man acts. In short, values and meanings are the core of culture. Different cultures have different values and meanings.

A pending and sharp question is as follows: how the difference in axiological basis of cultures reveals itself in the dialogue between them, or, to put it in another way, how is it possible to have a dialogue between cultures, rested on different axiological bases?

The answer, which we explicitly or implicitly have assumed in our discussions and which we have always followed in the democratically organized society, could be formulated in the following manner: The dialogue between cultures takes place in their common space which coincides with the space of public life. The latter is based on the principles of rational communication, law, common sense and prudence, people enter this space as citizens and they are accessed in it by generally accepted criteria of what is considered right and wrong. Everything concerning specific values and claims of cultures, entering into dialogue, as well as ethnic, religious and other special cultural identities of citizens, is treated as a private matter, pushed to the periphery of public space or even taken beyond its borders. If you want to wear Muslim headscarves, wear them at home but not at school (true for our country), or vice versa, if you want to go bare-headed do it at home, but not in public (which is true for Iran), if you want a wedding with shooting – feel free to do it in the mountains, but not on the streets of Moscow, etc.

Such a solution is based on the fundamental issue of separation of the general space of common civic life from private spheres of different cultural identities. However, this distinction is becoming increasingly unacceptable and impossible for many reasons. I shall only mention two of them. Firstly, culturally distilled public space will degrade to a mere formality of political courtesy, and it will also be filled with various substitutes and imitations of culture. Secondly, in terms of modern technology it turns out to be more and more difficult to draw the line between public and

private spheres of life, private spheres are made available for public viewing, and claim for publicity themselves....

3. New challenges that await the process of dialogue of cultures, are most distinctly observed in and can be illustrated by the example of how the role and place of religion in modern society change and how this change is reflected in the debates on post-secular world. Modern democracies have developed and are functioning as secular in general. However, their degree of secularism is registered to different extents of completeness and consistency, but nevertheless, in all cases the church is separated from the state, and religion is a private matter. Today however, religion that seems to have found a new breath, aspires to be presented in the public space and have an impact on education, social policy, law, etc. We see, for example, that the Russian Orthodox Church does not want to be satisfied with the role of a private association of Orthodox Russians and isolate itself in the borders of the church, it takes the responsibility for the development of society on the whole, it is penetrating into education, medicine, army, it is trying to say the final word in matters of public morality, etc. And it is not an exceptional phenomenon. Something similar is happening all over the world, in some places it has more radical forms, like in the Muslim East, in other places it has milder forms, like in Western Europe. But in Western European countries the appeal to Christian values is also becoming a public affair.

The issue that the modern world has become post-secular, almost ceases to be controversial: the matter is what this post-secularity is. Some authors believe that faith can find its place in a rational discourse, while others see it as an independent source, giving legitimacy to public space. All this suggests that faith and religion as elements in the contemporary dialogue of cultures assume that religious values in terms of the validity and public importance are quite comparable with the values of the secular mentality and have the same rights for publicity, as secular values. The matter of principle is as follows: is it possible to dispute this position reasonably under the concept of intercultural dialogue? In my opinion, this is difficult. Today, faith faces rational discourse not in Hegelian perspective of historical development, but in the Kantian perspective of complementarity. They face each other not on the verticality of the historical development, where one step supersedes another, but on the horizontality of diversity of modern life, and they meet as partners whose inequality is guaranteed by the concept of intercultural dialogue...

4. What was said above about the relationship between faith and knowledge can also be applied to other cases of the dialogue of cultures, for example, dialogue between national culture and ethnicity, between the traditional sexual culture and the culture of sexual minorities, between high culture and mass culture, etc. After all, the dialogue of cultures, treated in terms of its axiological foundations, equates all cultures conducting this dialogue. But thus the idea of cultural progress is undermined. Moreover, the possibility of having generally valid criteria in this area, of having more advanced and sophisticated forms and conditions is being questioned. This, in my opinion, is the key issue that the theory and practice of intercultural dialogue face and bump into at present time.

Perhaps, we should come back to the question of what we are really talking about when we talk about the dialogue

of cultures? Do we really talk about the dialogue of cultures, or rather about the interaction, a dialogue between certain people who are individually responsible for what they do, including culturally conditioned motivations and characteristics of their actions? After all, a simple, obvious and at the same time extremely important truth is that culture, civilization, values, meanings, ideas, worldviews do not do anything, cannot do anything (except perhaps in some figurative sense) – everything is done by people

(individuals and organized groups), that belong to certain cultures, civilizations, who have certain values, advocate certain meanings, practise certain ideas and worldviews. And when people act in one way or another, they do it for the reason that they have decided to act so, and that is the most important thing when we talk about guilt and responsibility. And the fact that those acting individuals belong to certain cultures and have certain ideas and values is secondary ('attached', in Bakhtin's terms).

G. A. Hajiyev¹

RUSSIAN STATEHOOD AS A EUROPEAN MODEL OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

From the point of philosophical and legal reflection, 'statehood' as a notion makes one exceed the boundaries of a pure juridical understanding of the nature of the state. Such an approach features Russian philosophy of law and considers the state in its historical perspective as a legal inheritor of other states and their national traditions. Characterizing scientific methods which are used to ground Russian statehood, one may note the syncretic approach together with intuition and even mysticism.

It is obviously opposite to the autopoietic theory where the law and the state are regarded as self-generating.²

Surely, there is the ground for such an 'inheritance' approach. The Russian statehood is a form of political organization of one of the Earth's most numerous people and this is 'the longest European statehood in history'³, if the principle of continuity is taken into account.

As the Russian statehood exists as a part of being, so a specific Russian model of the philosophy of state was formed in the works of K. Kavelin, B. Chicherin, V. Solovyev, N. Berdyaev, V.V. Bibikhin etc. as a reflection of this objective existence.

V.V. Bibikhin was sure that features of a state as well as a person's character are more stable than they might seem, and the stability may be kept for centuries.⁴

This is the way V.V. Bibikhin shortly formulates what we call 'continuity'. Following Arnold Toynbee, an English historian, V.V. Bibikhin is convinced that the Russian statehood inherited much from Byzantium. According to A. Toynbee it is just an illusion that the Soviet power left the past behind. To leave the inheritance behind is not that easy. When we try

to throw away the past, it gradually comes back in a different disguise, said Horace. And Rasul Gamzatov said if you fired a revolver at your past, then your future would fire a cannon at you.

Russia gets westernized in the epoch of Peter I, Lenin and in the 90s of the 20th century but it still has not reached the Western civilization but continues to be the same as it was thousands of years ago, it continues to belong to a completely different civilization, that of Byzantium. Westernization does not take place for Russia to get into the West but quite the opposite – to isolate itself from the West.⁵

According to A. Toynbee, 'When Constantinople was seized by the Turks in 1453 and the Western Roman Empire fell, Muscovy, where at that time was the centre of struggle for the Orthodox Christianity against both the Muslims and the Catholics, gradually and without fuss accepted the Byzantine legacy.'⁶

According to V.V. Bibikhin, the last step to capture all the Byzantine legacy was made when the monk of the Three Hierarchs Eleazar Skete Monastery wrote in his letter to the Grand Duke, 'The Church of the ancient Rome fell because of the heresy; the gates of the second Rome – Constantinople – were destroyed by the Turks' hatchets; but the church of Muscovy – the new Rome – is shining brighter than the Sun in the whole Universe... Two Romes fell but the Third stands firm and the fourth Rome is never to be'.

From 1452 to 1505 within the long and prosperous reign of Ivan III, the ideology of Muscovy as the Third Rome meant accepting of the Byzantine legacy and dissociation with the sinful Rome, with the West which was covered with heresy, distorted the Apostles' Creed by including the non-canonical *filioque*. 200 years later trying to turn Russia to Europe, Peter I said, 'We take from them everything we need and after that we turn our back to them [to the West. – G.H.]'. 200 years after that, suggesting peace instead of the revolutionary war, Lenin said, 'As soon as we have enough money to buy the rope, we will hang them on that rope.'⁷

This ideological opposition of the Russian statehood to the West is also a part of the Byzantine legacy. According to A. Toynbee the second part of this legacy is the totalitarianism. V.V. Bibikhin 'refined' this idea a little. He thinks that Russian statehood must be regarded as *an ideological state* or the state of unanimity, of political symphony, as it was called in Byzantium. This idea excludes branches of power separa-

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² See: Tenbner G. *Laws as an Autopoietic System*. Oxford. 1993.

³ V. V. Rozanov. *Russkaya gosudarstvennost i obschestvo. / Politicheskie instituti, izbiratelnoe pravo i ptvstess v trudah rossiiskih myslitelei of XIX-XX vekov*. M., 2009. P. 610.

⁴ V. V. Bibikhin. *Vvedenie v filosofiyu prava*. M., 2005. P. 175.

⁵ V. V. Bibikhin. *Op. cit.* P. 175.

⁶ Toynbee A. *The Byzantine Legacy of Russia // Toynbee A. Civilization Judged by History*. M.-SPb., 1996. P. 107.

⁷ V. V. Bibikhin. *Op. cit.* P. 190.

tion. The symphony goes far, it presupposes 'moral and political' unanimity of citizens.¹ The idea V.V. Bibikhin noted has actually existed in the Russian statehood for centuries. B. Chicherin, obviously, followed Russian historians justifying the necessity to centralize power by the large territory of Russia and by the raids from the East.²

Andrzej Walitski noted that K. Kavelin and B. Chicherin were the founders of political branch of the Russian historiography. They supported the ideas that the state of Russia was more autonomous and much stronger in its relations with the society than it was in the West.³ Although B. Chicherin recognized the peculiarity of Russia's historical development he considered this factor to be rather circumstantial, which allowed him to identify Russian development model as a variant of the European development model.⁴ Chicherin's early oeuvre made him known as the defender of strong and centralized power. The reason for this, in his opinion, laid in geographical and historical factors but not in the Russian character.⁵

V. Bibikhin's philosophy of Russian statehood is not a distant structural analysis of any positive law which is so common for lawyers, which was made by H. Kelsen in his *Pure Theory of Law*, but it is a solely Russian philosophy of law as a result of philosophical synthesis, integration of historical knowledge, philological and artistic methods of analysis and, again, a syncretic approach to the Russian law.

Bibikhin's method of cognition, as I see it, was formed under the influence of Heidegger's ontology. It is not by accident that the new ideas of interpretation of the Russian law and power occurred in the mind of Heidegger's translator. This was Heidegger's advice to be able to draw a bead on a thing, to see thing-in-itself and its hidden possibilities. Before Heidegger classical ontology was based on Plato's ideas that every thing is just the copy of the everlasting and non-changeable idea which defines this thing *per se*.

V.V. Bibikhin decided 'to change the view' onto the juridical things and to analyze such a thing as the Russian law in terms of its correlation to the human's presence in the world of things. In this case the thing should not be regarded as a material object or as an idea of this object. According to Heidegger, things combine the world, and this is their genuine quintessence: they provoke total interdependence. And if a law (or a thing) is considered from this ontological point of view then the connection between the contemporary Russian law and the genetically preceding law and power would be inevitably found. Thus, the Roman and Byzantine law would become part of the research.

In general, such an approach to the ontology of law is quite acceptable. It is not by accident that the preamble to the Constitution of the Russian Federation includes the words which are very important for understanding its peculiarity, 'accepting the Constitution, we, multinational people of Russia, commemorate the ancestors who passed us love and respect to the Motherland, faith in good and right'. It is not just

¹ V. V. Bibikhin. Op. cit. P. 190.

² The supporter of such B. Chicherin's views in the contemporary political science is V. D. Zorkin who always writes about the strong presidential power in Russia.

³ Andrzej Walitski. *Filosofiya prava russkogo liberalizma*. M., 2012. P. 150.

⁴ See Zorkin V. D. *Iz istorii burzhuazno-liberalnoy politicheskoy mysli vtoroi polovini XIX – nachala XX veka* (B. N. Chicherin). M., 1975. P. 89–96.

⁵ B. Chicherin. *Kurs gosudarstvennoy nauki*. Vol. 3. *Politika*. M., 1898. P. 403.

a sophisticated phrase full of pathos, these words convey a very deep juridical sense, and this is one of the instruments used to interpret the Constitution of the Russian Federation. What is 'the memory of ancestors'? Did they pass us anything else except love and respect to the Motherland? Are there mores in the given legacy or does it only include ethical but not juridical substance? Can we imagine that with the help of these words from the preamble of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, genetic connections between the law and the power are identified with the historic past of the country which, due to their perpetual existence in the legal consciousness, gain their inertness? Is not the Constitution a matter of coding the important legal norms of power and civil society the majority of which were taken from the western constitutional law and is not it the codification of the invisible law given us by the previous generations of Russians?

Developing this hypothesis one might suppose that there is such an independent philosophical and legal concept as 'legal reality' and it exists as a part of the objective being, and that such a concept as 'the reality of law' including the reality of state embraces the whole complex of the legal norms. At the same time the reality of law (including the norms of the Public Law) is a very rough model of the legal reality reduced by jurisprudence. The sphere of the legal reality includes not only legal, actual norms but also traditions, customs, everything that might be called by-judicial components of the legal reality (pluralistic legal systems).

Objective reality defines jurisprudence; the latter partly creates the legal reality. The objectivity of the legal reality might be compared with the nature and the material world around us. Historically, its objectivity is reflected in the idea of the natural law which in this sense will never be at the dump of the ideas. Natural law presents the objective need in neglecting the chaos described by Hobbes, in creating the state and order. These are certain natural rhythms that can also set the rhythm to law, about which Erich Fechner wrote.⁶ That is why the concept of 'legal reality' as well as the concept of 'natural law' are not considered to be purely legal notions.⁷

Statehood in Russia is always influenced by the public mood, made by the intelligentsia, this mood is often very critical and sometimes it is undeserved. And why is there a negative attitude to everything connected with the state in the Russian society? Why does the Russian intelligentsia regard opposing the state as a valour? Or might it be the wish to preach the love to the Motherland with the help of a hostile denial? It was V.V. Rozanov who paid attention to this peculiar phenomenon of social consciousness in his article 'The Russian Statehood and Society'. The first State Duma, noted V.V. Rozanov, did not follow the state path and did not express the state spirit. As if in a mental confusion it was aggressive to the Russian statehood.

In N.N. Alekseev's memoirs we read that he celebrated Christmas of 1908 in Yasnaya Polyana as he was Leo Tolstoy's grandson's teacher. They were sitting together at the table and Tolstoy suddenly asked, 'Nikolay Nikolayevich! Have you been in prison?' This question confused the young jurist greatly. During some time he did not know what to answer, but after some moments said, 'Yes, I have. I was in Butyrskaya prison for six months. 'This is it – concluded

⁶ E. Fechner. *The Philosophy of Law // Rossiiskiy ezhegodnik prava*. 2010. No 3.

⁷ See Slobodniuk S. L. *Pravovaya realnost, pravosoznaniye i mnimost ponyatiynh smyslov // Russian Juridical Journal*. 2013. No. 1.

Leo Tolstoy – all decent people in Russia were in prison and I was not. It is not good!’

And why was it Russia that gave birth to infamous anarchists and Marxists who were quite obsessed with striving to destroy the statehood?

It might be accounted for by our popular belief that Russian political reality is worse than European and that our ‘political fields’ are not that good.

M.K. Mamardashvili in his book *Aesthetics of Thinking* expresses a wise thought about the ‘situation when it is too late’. This social and political metaphor means that ‘it is too late for the citizens to become members of the democratic system because they just decided it one day and started to want’.¹ It is too late to become members of the democratic society just because they wanted it. For if they were not, it is late now. According to Mamardashvili this is the core of the dilemma. Members of the democratic society are not those who live in Europe but those who live in this society for thousands of years. They live in this tradition unlike us. It is not the answer to the question about what to do and what not to do. But this is the element of being, of our legal reality which is objective and ruthless.

The Russian consciousness traditionally considers a kind of inferiority of the Russian statehood. But V.V. Bibikhin saw the reason for this in the ‘tight closeness of the foreign paradise’. This is about the factor of neighbouring with the civilized European statehood. V.V. Bibikhin wrote that we are bothered by something we are pretty far from. We are sure that we were late for the creation of the world and this is our confidence. We are sure that we are always deprived of something that will never let us down.

This ‘tight closeness of the foreign paradise’ is not a religious discourse because it considers the ontology of being. In my opinion, this statement reflects the attitude to the European legal order which roots in the Roman law, to the need in reception of European constitutional and legal values and to their constant kicking. The powers of attraction and repulsion, as in physics, support the balance.

The Russian state is striving to be with Europe but at the same time it realizes that the European paradise cannot be approached.

This is the so-called ‘tight closeness of the foreign paradise’!

It might happen because Russia, unlike Byzantium, was able to overcome the eastern element, and that is why Russia is not only the inheritor of Byzantium but also of the Golden Horde. As V.V. Bibikhin thinks it was possible because of the ‘intimacy’ of relationships Moscow had with the eastern powers – Moscow just absorbed them together with their techniques. According N. Berdyaev, Moscow is a Christianized Tatar state.

In conclusion it is necessary to formulate general statements projecting them to the contemporary Russian state in order to cover the main challenges.

1. N.N. Alekseev’s idea about the necessity of the balance of the two things in the life of any government – stable and flexible, about the necessity of constant goals and principles of the public administration² might help solve the problems of flexibility and firmness of the constitutional basis of the state in Russia. Can we frequently change the Constitution? I think that there should be an epistemological choice, either we accept some dogmas of the statehood and then we are to protect ‘these eternal truths, always real, always present’³; or we choose the light-mindedness of the Athenians and accept that there is nothing eternal in politics and statehood.⁴

2. What is the level of importance of the cultural and historical relativism? Is Russia really special or is it an ‘ever-existing myth’? Are there any understandings of the human rights and the restrictions they apply on the public administration? If so, then their acceptance would be a strong argument against the extreme forms of cultural relativism. Should we, Russians, developing our statehood take into account social and cultural type of the government public relations which formed a very stable national political culture in Russia? It is one of the main ideological problems which reflects one of the main contradictions in the development of the Russian statehood; either we accept the international law and as it is said in the preamble of our Constitution ‘consider ourselves a part of the international society’ or we will be insisting on the priority of the cultural relativism to ‘commemorate the ancestors who passed us love and respect to the Motherland, faith in good and right’, which is also from the preamble to the Constitution!

3. Is the statement of N.N. Alekseev true that ‘the monarch is more responsible than his subjects’? Should Russia be the state of the ‘political symphony’ and should we still hope that Heavens will be favourable to us and that the tsar, the basileus, will prove worthy? Or should we strengthen all state institutions evenly?

4. One of the most difficult challenges to the contemporary Russian state is the element of the private property which is not under control. After the privatization of the state property the economic power emerged that tries the state institutions. Do we have to support the idea that the state has to ensure the inviolability of the looted private property or do we have to find the way for its legitimization?

5. One more serious challenge to the contemporary state of Russia is the need to build confidence and trust in it. This goal means a serious correction of the state philosophy especially in terms of the property relationships with the individuals.

Alexandra Hamilton⁵

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

land to contribute to this most significant dialogue here at the University of St Petersburg in the name of the late Academician Dmitry Likhachev, who throughout his life was the very spirit of Russian dialogue with any and every other culture.

I must explain at the outset that my maternal roots are here in Russia as both Tsar Nicholas I and Alexander

Firebird published in Russian and English. She became a laureate of the Tsarskoselskaya Art Prize in 2000.

It is a great honour to have been invited back to my Mother-

¹ Merab Mamardashvili. *Aesthetics of Thinking*, 2000. P. 65.

² See N. N. Alekseev. *Russky narod i gosudarstvo*. M., 1998. P. 13.

³ See E. V. Spektorsky. *What is the Constitution?* M., 1917. P. 10.

⁴ About the light-minded spirit of the Athenians see: Emer de Vattel. *The Law of Nations*. M., 1960. P. 53.

⁵ Her Highness the Duchess of Abercorn (UK). A poet and a direct descendant of the great Russian poet A. S. Pushkin and a descendant of Emperor Nicholas I. She is the founder of the Pushkin Prize for young authors of the UK. She is the author of a poetic collection *Feather from the*

Sergeyevich Pushkin were my great, great, great grandfathers. My paternal root was Peruvian. I was born in Arizona and lived my childhood in England before I married James, Duke of Abercorn in 1966 and went to live in Northern Ireland at twenty years of age. So I am, myself, a kind of dialogue of cultures.

The story that I would like to tell you had its inception in those early years after my marriage when Northern Ireland – which had seemed, on the surface at least, a serenely beautiful place – descended into 30 years of sectarian warfare, death and destruction. Not only was Ireland divided between two jurisdictions – Northern Ireland under British government and the Republic of Ireland under Irish government in Dublin – but it was also a time of extreme division between the Roman Catholic church and The Protestant church whereby children were educated in separate schools.

There was no dialogue of cultures at the time; the only way each faction of the populace could make itself heard was by the bullet or the bomb. Rancour, hatred and fear erupted in the most terrifying ways, bringing grievous loss and bitterness to the whole of the land's stricken community. Despair and mistrust contaminated the very air we breathed, transforming a fairy tale realm into a nightmare in which to paraphrase an Irish poet, W.B. Yeats, 'the blood-dimmed tide was loosed.'

The terrible gravity of this state of affairs was brought home to me quite literally when my young daughter began to have recurring nightmares of our home being attacked and invaded by terrorists. Her terror concerned me deeply of course, but it also made me wonder how many other children in Northern Ireland might be suffering from the same extreme degree of fear and anxiety. I wondered what impact this might have on their future lives if not addressed in some way; and if left unaddressed would it not lead to more bombs and more bullets? But what could we do to end this cycle of hatred and violence? More specifically, accepting responsibility myself, what could I do?

The answer came to me in 1986, the 150th anniversary of Pushkin's death, Luton Hoo, my grandmother's home in England, became the venue for a weekend of events to commemorate the life and works of Russia's greatest poet. People from diverse backgrounds and ideologies – representatives of the Soviet regime of the time, as well as emigres who had fled the Revolution, their children and grandchildren – were united for a brief enchanted moment by the beauty of Pushkin's words. Russians who had previously regarded each other as mortal enemies found common ground. In the course of that brief magical weekend, poetry and music achieved what seventy years of diplomacy had failed to do.

It struck me instantly that just as Pushkin had brought Russians of different factions together, so he – or his spirit – might kindle a similar spark in Ireland. I wondered whether it might be possible, under his guiding spirit, to bring together children from different traditions in Ireland, from North and South, from urban and rural schools. I wondered if it might thereby become possible to help them to express their thoughts and feelings, their hopes and their fears, their inner lives, by creative means. After all, this inner dialogue has to begin inside ourselves before it can include the world at large.

I soon realised that I would have to find a way to introduce the 'spirit of Pushkin' to children of 9 and 10 years in classrooms all over Ireland, who had most probably never heard of this extraordinary man or the stories and plays for

which he is renowned. Ireland, however, is likewise the land of the oral tradition – a land of fairy tale, myth and legend. So it seemed that the story of Pushkin as a young boy sitting at the fireside listening to his beloved nanny, Arina Rodionovna telling him the stories of Russia would have a deep resonance for the children of Ireland.

I initiated the Pushkin Prizes in 1987 by inviting children in primary schools to tell us their stories in writing. The project encouraged imaginative exploration of both the world of Nature and the created world around them. The hope was that, taking their own experience as inspiration, and working with writers and poets in the classrooms, the children would become 'co-creators' themselves.

Since those early beginnings we have witnessed again and again how finding a 'voice' can restore a child's natural confidence, bringing with it a renewed sense of motivation and an enthusiasm for learning that has surprised the education authorities. A 'spark' has been ignited and children are reclaiming their Birthright to become whole human beings – citizens of the world, who are able to find a voice which can express their thoughts and feelings in a creative way while discovering how to listen to one another and allow space for each others' views. They are in fact discovering that the greatest art of all is the Art of Living Life.

I profoundly believe that the children of this time are the most precious gift we have. It is with them, and with those who are responsible for their up-bringing, that a deeper dialogue needs to be nurtured. I also believe that it is by engaging creatively with the realm of the symbolic imagination that we can begin once again to open up a universal language. A language of the heart that speaks to us all no matter what our background, colour or creed.

Working with the 'spirit of Pushkin,' as we have done, over the past 25 years in Ireland, we have enabled children and teachers to bring their imagination to life – to find a creative rather than a destructive way to voice their hopes and fears. The spark of the creative spirit has been ignited through work in the class room with writers and poets and artists in other mediums and environmentalists. I have witnessed how this release of the imaginatio has given children the opportunity to see, feel and understand from the point of view of others. By educating the compassionate imagination in this way the work of the Pushkin Trust is building bridges across centuries-old cultural divisions in deeper recognition of our common humanity.

Over recent years I have been privileged to witness the healing power of such dialogue at work on two momentous historic occasions. In 1998 I was invited with my mother, my daughter and my sister to attend the ceremony in the Peter Paul Fortress of the re-burial of Tsar Nicholas II and his family. To have the words spoken by President Yeltsin, translated simultaneously as we stood there beside the catafalque was something deeply moving. For he said that unless this moment of history was laid to rest with dignity the soul of Russia would never be returned to her people. I believe that Academician Likhachev, a man who deeply understood the healing power of the symbolic imagination, was responsible for this extraordinary event.

I witnessed that healing power again in 2011 when the Queen of England paid an historic visit to Ireland. As incarnate symbol of the sovereignty of Britain, she addressed President McAleese, representing the ancient sovereignty of Ireland, in Irish, and a movement through into a relationship

of their two nations as acknowledged equals was made at a level far deeper than the formal requirements of diplomacy. Not only by her words at the Banquet in her honour at Dublin Castle but also by her presence at the Garden of Remembrance when she honoured those who had died fighting for the Freedom of Ireland, did she transform centuries of hatred and bitterness into a new form of fellowship and future. My husband and I were at the evening given in her honour at the Convention Centre when the entire audience rose to their feet to most movingly acknowledge her – something that had been impossible to consider for the past decades.

It is my belief that the profoundly humane spirit of Pushkin was present on all those occasions, so let me close by taking us back to those moments at that fireside when Pushkin as a young boy about 9 years old is sitting enraptured by a story that Arina is telling him. It is as if a voice from out of the flickering flames – the voice of the Firebird – is saying, ‘Take Heart!’ I have returned from a long time of banishment – a time when mankind has had to experience the darkest shadows imaginable. I have circled the earth and witnessed devastation and destruction from the wonders of the Natural World to the cultural masterpieces of mankind – to the suffering of the loss of human life itself. But remember that dark and light can never be separated and know that you are capable of as much good as the horror that has been perpetrated. Though the deepest pain suffered may never be forgotten, compassion in equal measure is also close at hand.

The beauty that the world is seeking is in my plumage. I have a feather for every nation in the world wishing to be part of a ‘University of the Universe’ – a place of learning

where the inner landscape of every young person is tended. An inner landscape where the earth, the air, the fire and the water – the four vital elements of humanity are brought to life. So take heed and listen to the Cry of the Child. For the Child is the seed of regeneration for the future of life on earth.’

I believe it is time that we listened closely to the Firebird’s voice because it echoes on the cry of the child. Perhaps if we pay full attention to that cry, and take its resonance inside ourselves, a new imaginative form of democracy can come into being – an inner democracy of balance between the head and the heart – where the shadow of the unconscious latent within every individual will be transformed as it integrates with the light and intelligence of consciousness.

That voice is also the voice of the soul, the voice of our common humanity, and it speaks in the symbolic language of the imagination – the kind of language which will surely be needed if truly transformative dialogue of cultures is to take place.

For in the voice of another great poet, Rainer Maria Rilke:

We are only mouth. Who sings the distant heart
That dwells entire within all things?
Its great pulse lives in us
Divided into lesser beats. And its great pain,
Like its great joy, is too great for us.
So we always tear ourselves away again
And are only mouth
But suddenly the great
Heartbeat enters into us invisibly
And we cry out ...
And then are being, change and countenance.

Robert F. Ison¹

LEXICAL EXCHANGE IN AN ERA OF GLOBALISATION

Linguistic exchange is old. It affects every area of language. We all know how English has a Germanic name for the beast (cow) and a French name for its meat (beef).

We know, too, that in English heraldry the colours (azure, gules) come from French as do the special names of horse-colours (roan, bay): I believe that in Russian the analogous names of horse-colours come from a Turkic language. But linguistic exchange doesn’t stop there. The English sound [zh] (as in measure, treasure) comes from French. And English has two ways of comparing adjectives: red, redder, reddest v azure, more azure, most azure. I believe that the analytic forms with more and most were borrowed from or at least influenced by French. Other Germanic languages (such as Dutch) do show a tendency towards analogous analytic comparisons. But none does so as much as English (and of course Dutch may have been influenced by French, too).

The importance of lexical exchange has long been recognised. So since at least the third edition of its unabridged dictionary (W3, 1961), the American Merriam–Webster company has used in the etymologies of many technical items not only the designation NL = ‘New Latin’ but also the designation ISV = ‘International Scientific

Vocabulary’. For example, in the 11th edition of its Collegiate Dictionary (C11, 2003), we have:

megawatt... *n* [ISV]

phylogenetic... *adj* [ISV, fr NL (from New Latin) *phylogenesis*...]

-ol *n suffix* [ISV, fr. *alcohol*].

In C11, **International Scientific Vocabulary** *n* (ca. 1959) is defined thus a part of the vocabulary of the sciences and other specialized studies that consists of words or other linguistic forms current in two or more languages and differing from New Latin in being adapted to the structure of the individual languages in which they appear.

And since 1929, when CK Ogden coined the term Basic English for what he hoped would become an International Second Language, Basic English has admitted, besides its core vocabulary of 850 items (plus certain permitted suffixes and permitted combinations), some 60-odd International Words held to be already used in many languages (e.g. *alcohol, cigarette, hotel, taxi, telephone, algebra, zoology*) and 150–200 Science Words (eg. *age, focus, substitution, active, exact, particle, reversible, lung, parent, vestigial, wild*).²

It is only to be expected that in today’s globalised world linguistic exchange flourishes as never before. I shall in

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² See Ogden et al., *Basic English*, 1968, NY, Harcourt, Brace & World.

this essay confine myself to lexical exchange in order to concentrate on the various patterns of it that are at work nowadays. Moreover, I shall not deal with all items of vocabulary. In particular, I shall deal not with natural kinds (cow), basic pre-industrial artefacts and products (hammer, cheese), abstracta (beauty, truth), and social relations (cousin, mother-in-law), but with technical and scientific terms (hydrogen, computer), typically as studied in lexicological Terminology.

Here is a very tentative taxonomy of the Lexical Exchanges I shall consider:

- 1) Use of ISV and/or NL; broadly, Classical Nomenclature;
- 2) Borrowing;
- 3) Calquing/Loan-Translation;
- 4) Independent Lexicalisation;
- 5) Description (not Naming).

At the outset the processes of borrowing (adopting) and calquing (adapting) must be distinguished. Consider the English word *intelligentsia*. It has been borrowed from Russian интеллигенция. Now consider the German word *Weltanschauung*. English has borrowed it whole (Spengler's pessimistic *Weltanschauung*). But English has also translated it component by component into something that looks less foreign (Spengler's pessimistic *world-view*). That sort of loan-translation is also called calquing. Interestingly, in English the word *calque* is itself a borrowing from French, whereas the synonymous item *loan-translation* is itself – a loan translation from German *Lehnübersetzung*. Strictly speaking, one ought to know an item's history before calling it a calque on another item. I know that English *world-view* is calqued on German *Weltanschauung* because *Weltanschauung* was attested in German before *world-view* was attested in English. Otherwise, I might have concluded that *Weltanschauung*

was calqued on world-view ! Nevertheless, calquing has gone on here, whichever direction it has gone in. And I must emphasise that in this essay I shall use the terms *borrowing* and *calquing/loan-translation* a-historically (synchronically rather than diachronically), without regard for the direction in which the lexical exchange has taken place.

Sometimes we shall see that a language has lexicalised a concept independently of how other languages have lexicalised the same concept. Thus the object called in British English a *mobile* and in American English a *cellphone* is in German called a *Handy*: here it appears that German has borrowed the English adjective *handy* and converted it into a noun to name the object in question. Once again I am operating a-historically : for all I know, the object may have been invented in Germany and named in German before receiving in British and American English the independently lexicalised names it bears there.

Finally, I distinguish between independent lexicalisation and description. My distinction is part of my more general distinction between Naming and Describing. Naming yields a Lexical Unit (LU) in another language: “mobile = Handy”. By contrast, Description yields what I call a Lexically Relevant Unit (LRU) in another language “mobile = мобильный телефон”. Both LUs and LRUs can serve as Translation Equivalents. But whereas LUs are typically entered in monolingual dictionaries, LRUs are typically not. See my essay “The Explanatory Technique of Translation” (IJL, forthcoming).

I propose to examine selected examples of lexical exchange in English, French, German, Russian, and sometimes Spanish, concentrating on but not confined to items of contemporary relevance or origin. Let us begin with the names of some chemical elements:

English + Symbol	French	German	Russian	Spanish
Oxygen (1788) O	oxygène	Sauerstoff	кислород	oxígeno
Hydrogen (1788) H	hydrogène	Wasserstoff	водород	hidrógeno
Carbon (1789) C	carbone	Kohlenstoff	углерод	carbón
Yttrium (1814) Y	yttrium	Yttrium	иттрий	
Ruthenium (1848) Ru	ruthénium	Ruthenium	рутений	
Californium (1950) Cf	californium	Kalifornium	калифорний	
Rutherfordium (1969) Rf	rutherfordium	Rutherfordium	резерфордий (AI) ¹	

The elements named earlier use in their English and French (and Spanish) names classical components assumed common across European cultures; German and Russian use loan-translations of these; broadly speaking, English tends to be like French and Russian to be like German. The elements named later use in their names the names of places or people associated

with them, thus exhibiting a particularising perhaps even nationalistic tendency – though still respecting the classical tradition by ending in -ium/-ий. But on the other hand, these newer elements have essentially the same (borrowed) forms in English, French, German, Russian, and Spanish. Borrowing has replaced calquing. Note, too, that even when the names are different in our different languages (e.g. carbón, Kohlenstoff), the chemical symbols are the same (e.g. C in both English and German). Both the use of an international system of chemical symbols and the preference for borrowing over calquing reflect in this part of the scientific vocabulary a universalising tendency.

¹ NB. AI = Andrei Ivanov, who has helped greatly with this essay. Dr Ivanov has pointed out that Rutherfordium might well have been called Kurchatovium Ku = «курчатовий». For other such controversies, see the Wikipedia article “List of chemical elements naming controversies”. What is striking is not just the controversies but the eventual acceptance of a common nomenclature.

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
atom (15th c.)	atome	Atom	атом	
electron (1891)	électron	Elektron	электрон	
neutron (1932)	neutron	Neutron	нейтрон	
hadron	hadron	Hadron	адрон (1962: Л. Б. Окунь)	
charm quark	quark de charme	Charme-Quark	c-кварк или очарованный кварк (AI)	
strange quark	quark étrange	fremdes Quark	странный кварк	cuark extraño

The earlier particles had classical names that were intended to be borrowed generally. More recent terminology (quark, charm, strangeness) uses English words that must then be calqued in other languages. A significant minimal pair in this regard is *hadron* (1962) and *quark* (1963/4). Quark was coined fancifully by Murray Gell-Mann, its co-discoverer, who was strengthened in his resolve by its presence in James Joyce's *Finnegans Wake*: 'In 1963, when I assigned the name "quark" to the fundamental constituents of the nucleon, I had the sound first, without the spelling, which could have been "kwork". Then, in one of my occasional perusals of *Finnegans Wake*, by James Joyce, I came across the word "quark" in the phrase "Three quarks for Muster Mark".' By contrast, Okun said of *hadron*: 'I shall call strongly interacting particles "hadrons", and the

corresponding decays "hadronic" (the Greek *ἀδρός* signifies "large", "massive", in contrast to *λεπτός* which means "small", "light"). I hope that this terminology will prove to be convenient.' Okun followed the traditional practice of coining a classical name from a "dead" language that is neutral and therefore "convenient" with respect to living languages; a mere one or two years later Gell-Mann in effect said "We've discovered and named this particle in Anglophonia: if you want to refer to it elsewhere, you must adopt or adapt *our* name for it." That's a bit like what we noticed in respect of the names of more recently discovered elements (californium) as opposed to those of riper vintage (oxygen).

Here are two items from cosmology that show various processes at work:

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
big bang (1948)	big bang	Urknall	большой взрыв	golpe grande
black hole (1968)	trou noir	Schwarzes Loch	черная дыра	agujero negro

The equivalents of Black Hole use adaptation (ie calquing). As for the equivalents of Big Bang, French uses adoption (ie borrowing). The other languages use adaptation – more or less:

Russian uses **взрыв** 'blast', whereas *bang* might be удар.

Let us turn now to the names of various items of contemporary life:

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
welfare state (1941)	état providence	Wohlfahrtsstaat	государство всеобщего благоденствия, социальное государство	estado benefactor
command economy (1942)	économie d'ordre	Befehl-Wirtschaft	командная экономика (AI)	
third world (1963)	tiers-monde (1952)	Die dritte Welt	третий мир	tercer mundo

The equivalents of *command economy* all use Adaptation. The same seems true of Third World. But *Third World* has a hidden history of its own. It appears to have originated in French and to have itself been calqued on *Tiers État*, the Third Estate of the common people before

the French Revolution. As for *welfare state*, German uses Adaptation; French and Spanish use Independent Lexicalisation; and Russian seems to use Description rather than Naming (*if*, that is, my Russian equivalents are idiomatic!).

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
computer	ordinateur	Computer	компьютер	computadora
software	logiciel	Software	программное обеспечение/софт	software
on-line	en ligne	online	интерактивно/онлайн	en línea
e-mail	courriel	E-Mail	электронная почта/мейл	correo electrónico
download	téléchargement	Download	загрузка	telecarga
laptop	portable	Laptop	портативный компьютер/ноутбук (AI)	ordenador portátil
microwave (oven)	four à micro-ondes	Mikrowelle	микроволновая печь	microonda
CEO	Directeur Général/PDG	CEO	главный исполнительный директор	Presidente
peer review	révision de pair	Gleich-Rezension	рецензия; отзыв	revisión por expertos

Most notable here is the tendency of German to adopt/borrow the English terms: Computer, Software, E-Mail, Download, Laptop, CEO. At the other extreme, French exhibits a certain tendency to go its own way through Independent Lexicalisation (*ordinateur, téléchargement, portable*) or through an especially ingenious kind of adaptation (*calquing*), in which *-el* 'électronique' is added to the corresponding French full word, so that *courrier électronique* becomes *courriel*. Russian and Spanish tend towards more conventional calques that to an outsider like me seem hardly lexicalised and more like Descriptions than like Names: are there really no more idiomatic everyday equivalents in these languages?

Are any more general tendencies observable? Perhaps. The earliest items on these lists (such as the first chemical elements to be named) show either Classical Nomenclature (from Greek and New Latin, as in French and English) or Calquing based on such Classical Nomenclature (as in German and Russian): hydrogen/*водород*. Later we find Non-Classical Nomenclature + Borrowing (*californium/калifornий*) or + Calquing (Black Hole/*Черная дыра*). There is generally a wish to create equivalents easily understood by speakers of other languages, with German presenting the most extreme contrasts (e.g. between its "international" *CEO* and its idiosyncratic *Handy* 'Mobile'). So the most striking change seems the replacement of Classical Nomenclature (e.g. *hadron*) by English as a sort of

international reserve currency of scientific terms (e.g. *quark*), which favours Borrowing by other languages, and of technical terms of various kinds, which favours by other languages Calquing (e.g. *command economy/экономика команды/командная экономика (AI)*) or Non-Lexicalised Description (e.g. *laptop/портативный компьютер*).

Nor should we forget that the problems associated with Lexical Exchange exist intra-linguistically as well as inter-linguistically. An international language spawns national varieties, wherein contemporary items may receive different names. Thus the English word *buggy* includes among its intra-linguistic senses two baby-transporters. In British English it can mean 'push-chair' or what Americans call 'stroller'; in American English it can mean 'pram' or what Americans call 'baby carriage'. A related inter-linguistic case is that of *laptop* (see above). Andrei Ivanov (personal communication) reports "The Russian equivalent of 'laptop' is "ноутбук". *Портативный компьютер* sounds archaic. In fact, an absolute majority of Russian speakers of English are quite certain that the English word for *ноутбук* is 'notebook'." The problem here is that the unmarked default meaning of English *laptop* is a kind of computer whereas the unmarked default meaning of English *notebook* is a kind of stationery: *notebook* will be taken to mean 'small laptop' only in an overtly computational context. The example below shows the interplay between intra-linguistic and inter-linguistic variation:

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
mobile BrE = AmE cellphone	mobile/portable	Handy/Mobiltelefon	мобильник	móvil Esp = celular Am

What do Canadian or African French-speakers say?

Moreover, the rise of English as an international lexical reserve currency may have affected dictionaries in at least one rather odd way. My troll, with Andrei Ivanov's help, through bilingual dictionaries in search of lexical equivalents suggests that dictionaries are more hospitable to Calquing (e.g. *экономика команды*) and Non-Lexicalised Description (e.g. *портативный компьютер*) than to Borrowing (e.g. *онлайн, ноутбук*), which last may be felt almost automatically as slangy or even vulgar, the more so as the evidence of such Borrowing is more likely to turn up in what many lexicographers still consider low and trivial sources (such as advertisements and speech), even in this era of Crowdsourcing [= "краудсорсинг" (AI)] and Big Data (e.g. *Megacorpus*) (see Kenneth Cukier and Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, *When Data Speaks: How the Information Explosion Revolutionises Business and Society*, forthcoming).

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
globalisation (1951)	mondialisation/globalisation	Globalisierung	глобализация	globalización

All our specimen languages use Borrowing. Even French attests *globalisation*. But French has also, and tends to prefer, *mondialisation*. So what? Isn't *mondialisation* just a French calque on *globalisation*? No. First, because it, like *globalisation*, is attested since 1951. More important still, because, according to Jacques Derrida, what he calls Anglo-American *globalisation*, derived from *globe* 'sphere', is a purely geographical notion, evoking a spreading all over the globular round world. But for Derrida, *mondialisation*, derived from *monde* 'world', is a socio-cultural notion:

It is in this connexion noteworthy that as regards English, the technical terms (as of farming and sailing) in use when North America was settled are still common to its British and American varieties; the terms associated with 19th-Century technologies (railways/railroads, motor cars/automobiles) exhibit striking British/American differences (when each side of the Atlantic was maximally independent); the terms associated with 20th-Century technologies (aviation, computers) are now once again similar – to the point where in the most recent technologies (such as computers), American norms are used in Britain (*program* instead of *programme*). Much as we may deplore that kind of universalism, it is, I suppose, better than mutual incomprehension.

Besides such general tendencies, there is much to be inferred from the specific choice of equivalents. Take the word *globalisation* itself:

le monde is for Europeans above all Christendom, and *mondialisation* suggests the hegemonic spread of the Western World throughout the Whole World.¹

Another fascinating detail has been pointed out by the late Professor E J Hobsbawm. The word *Socialism* (using Classical Nomenclature) is virtually identical in form among our specimen languages. Not so, however, the word for *Strike* (in the labour sense):

¹ See: Li V. Elliptical Interruptions or, Why Derrida Prefers *Mondialisation* to Globalization // The New Centennial Review. 2007. P. 141–154.

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish	Italian
strike	grève	Streik/Ausstand	забастовка	huelga	sciopero

What this shows to me is that the radical movement of the last 200 years is the result of a marriage between local Movements from below (striking workers) and an international Ideology from above (socialist intellectuals typically from the middle and upper class).

We are all still haunted by the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire and the consequent fragmentation of Latin into the Romance languages. Some years ago Robert Burchfield of OED conjectured that international English might break up into mutually unintelligible languages; earlier still, certain Soviet scholars seem to have harboured similar anxieties about the fragmentation of Russian. But there is an alternative to fragmentation: so-called koinisation. Koine, or Common Greek, emerged as the principal vernacular language of the Hellenistic Mediterranean and resulted from the adaptation to one another of the various dialects of Greek spoken at the time. Its coverage was wide enough and its status high enough for Koine to have become the language of the New Testament. Apparently the peoples of the Western Roman Empire had less need to speak to one another than did the

heirs of Alexander the Great; the post-Imperial Romans' need for written communication could be met by the use of Classical Latin. The evidence of Lexical Exchange suggests that the peoples of the world want to communicate with one another in speech and in writing enough to value the development of mutually comprehensible equivalents for the names of items of our increasingly common culture. What a relief!

When the telegraph finally connected Maine and Texas, Henry David Thoreau rejoiced that at last the people of Maine could communicate with the people of Texas. But he could not help wondering whether the people of Maine and the people of Texas had anything to say to each other.

If the evidence above is anything to go by, the peoples of the world still have quite a lot to say to one another.

Addenda

(1) There are some types of notions that in English have a vernacular name and a Classical (technical) name both of which are in common use. One such type is at least certain bones:

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
collarbone/clavicle	clavicule	Schlüsselbein	ключица	clavícula
breastbone/sternum	sternum	Brustbein (<i>у nmuy</i>), Brustknochen	грудина	esternón

Another such type is at least certain flowers. In an essay read out on BBC Radio 4 (Thursday, 19 February 2013, 9.45–10 am), George Orwell complained of what

he felt was a recent English tendency to use Classical names for flowers instead of traditional vernacular ones:

English	French	German	Russian	Spanish
snapdragon/antirrhinum	gueule-de-loup/muflier	Löwenmaul	львиный зев	dragón
forget-me-not/myosotis	myosotis/'oubliez-moi pas'	Vergissmeinnicht	незабудка	nomeolvides

It appears from my all-too-brief investigation that English is indeed more likely than the other languages in my sample to use two names for at least some bones and some flowers. For the bones, French and Spanish unsurprisingly use Classical nomenclature only; German and Russian, vernacular nomenclature only. For the flowers, the four non-English languages use two flower-names four times and one flower-name four times; moreover, the flower-names in these languages often bear a metaphorical resemblance to their vernacular English counterparts. The tolerance of English for a double nomenclature in such areas may reflect the general tolerance of English for words of related meaning from Germanic, Latin, and Greek sources (eg. *kidney, renal, nephritis*) – as well as,

in the case of flowers, the fact that the English are such keen gardeners!

(2) Another area worth investigating is the translation of euphemisms, especially those that seem to have come into use of late in connexion with matters economic or military; eg. quantitative easing ('increasing the money supply'), friendly fire, collateral damage, surge ('troop escalation'), draw-down ('troop withdrawal').

Many years ago Orwell complained of how "liquidation" had come to be a euphemism for 'mass murder'; the need for such euphemisms seems if anything to have increased since Orwell's day. Unfortunately, however, such euphemisms are in some cases too recent to have found their way into standard dictionaries yet.

Pyotr Ilynsky¹

THE MAGIC MIRROR: 'WINTER NOTES ON SUMMER IMPRESSIONS' –
ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY YEARS LATER OR WESTERN EUROPE
AS VIEWED BY A RUSSIAN WRITER AND A RUSSIAN CONSERVATIVE

...Though socialism is possible, but
only in a country other than France.
Dostoyevsky²

Sometimes a clever Russian happens to write something that falls short of his level of letter and insight. And it is puzzling – he seems to be such a serious gentleman, but... And another thing: this nice man with an unconventional point of view can at times be talented, otherwise, I need hardly say, who would care to read his recorded ideas, both apt and lame ones. Let us put it baldly: the centre of the cyclone is usually a great Russian writer as all others' intellectual impudence is of no interest and cannot be of any interest to us, sinful people. Who can take any interest in the considerations of politicians and political scientists who lived in the times of Ochakov and the conquest of the Crimea!

The number of great Russian writers with strange ideas equals the number of great Russian writers, as all of them are people with passions and interests. All of them became great by writing prose, but at the same time, driven by these or those wishes, they created works in the journalistic genre, as it used to be called in the recent times.

Here we face, as authors of meticulous reviews like to write, questions and questions... Indeed, was it the same giants of literature who created these, at best incredibly naïve, and at worst – shallow essays and at the same time wrote *The Government Inspector*, *The Idiot*, *Anna Karenina*? They were different, some critical school replies; the lives of great authors are divided into periods, 'we covered this in our recent monograph', one was more intelligent when young, another was cleverer when old, a third writer's life developed in the sine curve mode. And do not confuse, others add, social and political essays with fiction written by the titans mentioned above; the fiction that made these titans figures of the treasure-house of literature... and so on and so forth.

There appears a considerable impediment, in other words, a discrepancy between high-browed theories and facts. Firstly, we know for certain that these texts of a very different quality were written by the same individuals; secondly, we are well aware of the fact that these individuals expressed almost the same ideas in some of their fiction works, but in these fiction works the ideas are not so definite. And sometimes these ideas are not definite at all. This is the point at which one should relax, because strange texts written by great authors are read at best by hundreds, while their main works are absorbed by hundreds of thousands (let us not hitch our wagon to a star as these things go). Who cares about absurd considerations of a monumental man? Theorists of literature and biographers are the only people interested in them.

¹ Biologist, poet, writer, essayist (USA). Author of books: *Changes of Colour* (Peremeny tsveta), *Stone Carving: Four Short Novels of Continuity of Time* (Rez'ba po kamnju: chetyre povesti o nepreryvnosti vremeni), *The Long Moment of Birth: An Experience of Reflecting on Ancient Russian History of the 8th-10th centuries* (Dolgij mig rozhdenija: Opyt razmyslenija o drevne-russkoj istorii VIII-X vv.), *The Legend of Babylon* (Legenda o Vavilone), numerous scholarly and journalistic articles. Author and member of the editorial board of poetic miscellany 'Euterpe's flute' (the Russian edition).

² All citations from: Dostoyevsky, F.M. Complete Works in 30 vols. Leningrad, 1972–1990.

But there is an exception – when some people use these ideas. They do so either to belittle the genius: look what he is, not a genius, but a gabber not to say a blockhead. Or to pose the philosophical sins of a classical author as great truths: this is a genius (*our* genius, – is implied in brackets) and see what he says. You are surprised, you have never thought about it, you want to take another look at the cover and verify the quotation? There is no doubt, this is him, our genius, and this is exactly what he meant. So change your immature point of view here and now. Do, please, you ought to do it immediately.

Certainly, in this respect no one can compare to Dostoyevsky. This is why he is so often used and cursed. What ideas has he not expressed in his writings, what mountains has he not moved! (Solzhenitsyn and Tolstoy, as they say, pale in comparison). Let us allow professionals to look into these matters in detail, and now let us try to analyze the emotions experienced by our author, even if the analysis is only superficial. The author is mighty good, there is no dispute about it (for the sake of brevity we will leave out certain opposite opinions, even though one of the opinions is of Bunin and another of Nabokov), but the emotions which he occasionally experienced... And the main point here is that similar feelings are still experienced by authors (and not only authors) of a much less significance. Owing to this fact they (authors) inevitably use Dostoyevsky's considerations as a proof of their own conclusions.

Take, for example, the attitude to Europe (or to the West as a whole, to which all the old-fashioned invectives are easily extended). The idea of the neighbouring and kindred civilisation has always harassed a Russian man, and greatness is no barrier for it as great people have also been harassed by this idea. It is a truly amazing mark that has been left by the West in the Russian 'spiritual heritage' (is there any doubt that Dostoyevsky is our hard-won spiritual heritage?).

It is easy to sum up. Dostoyevsky's first trip to Europe took place in 1862 and resulted, in particular, in him writing an unusual, as they say now, travelogue known as *Winter Notes on Summer Impressions*.³ It is easy to read it especially due to the fact that despite a great number of penetrating remarks concerning minor aspects of life in Europe of that time (mostly of France and England, less of Germany), there are almost no exact and reliable facts concerning the main features of the cultural, political and spiritual development of the countries mentioned above. It is worth mentioning that the ideas expressed in the *Notes* were by no means disavowed in the author's later works. On the contrary, he included this rather timely text in the collected works published a few years later, and as for the further – see *A Writer's Diary* and other articles of the 1870s, where any page in the section *of other countries* contains a gem. At one moment 'England

³ Complete Works, pp. 46–98. All further F.M. Dostoyevsky's citations which have no footnotes have been taken from this text.

has begun to look at our success in Asia with a greater trust put in us' (1874)¹, at another 'it is no longer a dream but certainty that in the near, perhaps even nearest future Russia will become the strongest country in Europe' (1876)².

There is no point in making a complete list, let us stop just at two or three points. The author of the *Notes* tries to persuade somebody that it is not so good in Europe with all its freedoms, as it may seem to the unidentified opponent. There is shadowing in France, the obligatory registration of entrants, the press hobbled so as to work within clear limits, the obedient parliament (this picture drawn with a certain insight reminds us of something modern and not quite French). As for England, the author is astonished by the heartless and mechanical nature of the achievements of the scientific and technological advance witnessed by him. Moreover, he is very concerned with what was then called the problem of gender. Throughout the Western world there is debauchery, sometimes with a flavour of sale, as in France ('a Parisian woman is created for a lover': 'love matches are becoming more and more impossible and are considered to be almost indecent'), and at times flagrantly marketable, as in hypercapitalistic London (though Parisian tradesmen also annoyed our traveller considerably). The author is literally attracted to places where he can get certain impressions: 'He who has been to London has for sure visited the Haymarket at night at least once. This is a quarter where there are crowds of thousands of prostitutes... It is even frightening to enter this crowd.' It means he did enter the crowd. 'In some places I have seen things which I am ashamed even to mention. I also saw such things in Paris.' So, he did enter the crowds in Paris. Even slavery and the secession of the Southern Confederate States in the United States are not left unnoticed by the great writer – he works in the mode of a staff correspondent working for the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). The explanation is not hard to plumb. Certainly, the messages were aimed at Russian liberals who believed that in the West (and in Europe) *everything is fine*. You see, the ex-occupant of *The House of the Dead* tries to prove, – not everything is fine. And being busy with his invectives of slavery, he is ready to forget that he came from a country which had abolished serfdom only a year before.

This is why nothing is said in the *Notes* about the British parliament (it was by no means a puppet one), about the mechanism of the structure of the Swiss Confederation, about the scientific discoveries which rocked the world of those times; these discoveries having been made in the countries which Dostoyevsky visited. There is no information about the great revolution of the Reformation and the Renaissance, which created great cultural values enjoyed by Dostoyevsky as if he were just an ordinary obedient tourist. Or did he ignore the values to avoid being culturally tempted? 'I have been to London, but I haven't seen the Paul. Indeed, I didn't see it. St. Paul's Cathedral has never been seen by me.' Not a word about the Florentine or Venetian miracles created by the centuries-long work of citizens of the free republics.

Besides, the sister Christian religions are spoken of in a highly sharp-tongued and insulting way: 'A Catholic priest will search out and worm himself into a miserable family... he becomes the family friend and in the end converts everybody into Catholicism... An Anglican priest will not even come to a poor person... Poor people are not even allowed into the church...' By the way, this opinion was not correct-

ed by the time and the experience either. Let us rely on N.S. Leskov: 'Dostoyevsky... said what many others say, i.e. that Orthodoxy is the most truthful and the best faith', while he 'was far from knowing the Holy Writ eminently, neglected studying it and when talking about religion he proved to be passionate rather than knowledgeable'.³

This describes perfectly well the writings of great Russian authors about subjects which they do not understand: they are pretty passionate but not knowledgeable enough. But with passion and talent on hand, it results in a long-sustained construction – and still multiplied by the absence of knowledge, even if the God-given talent makes it possible for the author to feel or guess something that he does not understand directly ('I do not speak a word of English'). After all, it amounts to soft-boiled boots, made of the best leather, well boiled, with some heavenly sauce on top. They are still inedible, it is only possible to leak them all over.

In Dostoyevsky's works of fiction the West (where the author spent several years on the whole) becomes the idle Roulettenburg (*The Gambler*), a place of medicine and patience (Switzerland in *The Idiot*) or a place where the played-out Petersburg loafers involved in indecent stories have a rest. Europe always suggests something unlikeable and impoverished. Dostoyevsky the novelist cannot stand the West – there live but Russian idlers and losers. And he himself lives in the West, working hard, and, as it has become clear now, not being one of the losers. But he dislikes the West from the time of his first trip there. One may ask, what is there in the West to love it for? There is nothing good, just a greed for gain.

The author of the *Notes* passes by the proud self-sufficiency of the Swiss and Italian communes (a few years later *The Idiot* was completely written in Switzerland and Italy, this being a twist of history). Sneering at the French bourgeois, who dreams of seeing the sea ('voir la mer') and loves 'se rouler dans l'herbe' (lolling about the grass) demonstrating the unity with the nature, our caustic observer takes no notice of the revolution in painting taking place within his sight, the coming epoch of 'Déjeuner sur l'herbe' ('The Breakfast on the Grass') painted in 1862–63.

The French bourgeois who loves going on holiday to the country and to the seaside most of all should be made a special note of but only after a deferential curtsy addressing the relentless criticism levelled at the French boulevard theatre by the author of the *Notes*. No reviewer of the Russian soap operas of today has ever written anything more keen or scorching. The conclusion is simple: this genre is low, it leaves no trace in the history of culture but at the same time it is not going to die. And indeed, is it possible for the endless variants of the eternal story to die: 'Suddenly it turns out that [the character] is not an orphan, but Rothschild's rightful son. There come millions. But Gustave proudly and contemptuously rejects the millions.' Or: 'Certainly, Cecile is still penniless, but only in the first act; later she finds herself owing a million.'

Wait a minute, an attentive reader will suddenly cry out, I have already seen it somewhere, I remember it very well! Of course, you have, sir, Mr Lebedev would say. '... This is of Semyon Parfyonovich Rogozhin, the hereditary honorary citizen who died about a month ago and left two million and a half of capital?' And a hundred-odd pages later: 'Congratulations, Prince! You may get about a million and a half, or even more.

¹ *Foreign Events*. Complete Works. Vol. 21, p.241.

² A Writer's Diary. 1876. April. Complete Works. Vol. 22, p.122.

³ Leskov N.S. On the 'kitchen muzhik' (*kufel'ny muzhik*, a colloquial corruption of *kukhonny muzhik*) and the rest. Collected Works in 11 volumes. Moscow, 1956–58. Vol. 11, p.147, 148.

Papushkin was a very rich merchant.¹ Inheritance – one, two, millions, femmes fatales, decay, murder, – it is no coincidence that *The Idiot* was made into such a popular series.

But the fact is that *The Idiot* is neither a soap opera, nor a play by Victorien Sardou, but a great book which has not yet been read and understood; the words which Dostoyevsky himself said about *Don Quixote* can be applied to it: ‘This is so far the last and the greatest word of the human thought... and if the world were over and people were asked somewhere there: “Did you manage to understand your life on earth and what did you conclude about it?” – a man could remain silent and present *Don Quixote*.² Or *The Idiot*.

Let us remark that there is a sea of literary parallels between Prince Myshkin and the hidalgo of La Mancha, but they are of no interest to us and, moreover, of no importance. The impact that these characters made on real people is much more significant. The children of the rampant imagination of Cervantes and Dostoyevsky have become the objects of a specific space of human life, the stars with exact coordinates, the rule of movement and radiation parameters. It does not mean that they are subject to explaining – the phenomenon is rather unnatural.

In 1943, in a letter from the front, writing about the death of his brother, who had just been killed in the Kursk Bulge, the author of these lines’ grandfather mentions ‘the question of Ivan Karamazov’ and says that his own experience is evidence to the fact that ‘it is only possible to defeat the wicked power by way of evil’. In the same letter he writes that he ‘came across *The Idiot* not a long time ago. I have re-read it twice and it seems that I have understood much of it. I understood the meaning of many subjects touched upon in the novel, as a development of one and the main subject... Why does *The Idiot* refer to epilepsy?... It is linked to the subject of synthesis, harmony, which the whole novel is devoted to. Myshkin is conceived: the light, harmony, synthesis “overtake” him as a result of the disease, a seizure, i.e. this peak moment of the life of spirit results from the disease, the consequence of “the low”, “the bodily”, “the material” state. It is important that the synthesis still appears.’³

It is important, an officer of the Red Army of 1943 writes, that *the synthesis still appears*. One hundred and fifty years before, working on the *Notes* Dostoyevsky finds a surprise formula, which is much more important than his evidence of Europe: ‘On the contrary, I say, it is not only necessary not to be an impersonality, but to become a personality to a much greater degree than the one that has become formed in the West. A voluntary, absolutely conscious and a free-will self-sacrifice of one’s whole self is, I believe, the feature of the highest development of a personality, its highest power, the highest self-control, the highest freedom... A highly developed personality who is quite confident of their right to be a personality and who no longer has any fear for themselves, can do nothing but ... sacrifice their whole self to everybody, for others to be equally righteous and happy personalities.’ These are the words which have long been seen as the point of appearance of Prince Myshkin’s character.

But this is what the short-sighted Fyodor Mikhailovich adds: ‘In this case it is awful to count on using it to your advantage.’ And comments that ‘it cannot be done’ in a different way, as ‘unconsciously’, ‘instinctively’, when every per-

sonality has voluntarily surrendered their right for the benefit of the community, and the community, on the contrary, will not accept them saying: ‘Take everything from us. We will do our best for you to have as much personal freedom as possible... From now on do not be afraid either of enemies, or people, or nature.’

‘What a utopia in fact, gentlemen!’ – adds the great author believing that he has at last put the Russian (and foreign) positivists on the spot and having no idea that he has just set forth an ideal of any sensible society, the ideal which over the previous two hundred-odd years the West has drawn nearer than any other civilisation in the world.

And it is difficult for him to see, from the time distance of a century and a half, that the first sign of the Russian society making a sure step at all on the same long way will be the wish of Fyodor Mikhailovich’s compatriot who earns at least some money to *se rouler dans l’herbe*, and, also go to the seaside. Surprising though it may seem, the freedom of a personality follows lolling about the grass, and not in the opposite way. You see, these are the rules of the sublunary being.

Though it is not that easy. The author of the *Notes* somehow knows that the characters from Moscow after a ball at Famusov’s are sure to go to see the sunset. ‘The West is loved in Russia, it is truly loved, and *when it comes to the end of tether* everybody goes there seeing it as the last resort (italics supplied – *P.I.*)... The generations of Chatskys of both genders have multiplied there, there are as many of them as grains of sea sand, and there are not only Chatskys: as all of them have left Moscow to go there. How many Repetilovs there are, how many Skalozubs who have already retired from their service and have been sent to take the waters because they are of no use... Only Molchalin is not there: he has made a different decision and stayed at home, *he is the only one who has stayed at home* (italics supplied – *P.I.*). He devoted himself to the native country, so to say, to the homeland... Now he will not have Famusov enter even the hall of his house.’

It sounds like music for a reader of today, no word is off the mark – and these are the words of a great Russian conservator! A seditious thought occurs: perhaps, a Russian writer, or a writer of any origin, should only write about the subjects which he knows, and then there will come a paradise of literature?

What is the point of Fyodor Mikhailovich’s writing about the West, about Europe, which he does not love even when living there? Which he takes no notice of, treats as if it were a non-existent being, an illusion. And he does not like himself in it either.

‘And all of it, all these foreign countries, all this Europe of yours is just an illusion, and all of us abroad are just an illusion... mark my words, you will see it with your own eyes!’⁴ – Dostoyevsky would write the last lines of *The Idiot* on the 29th of January 1869 in Florence. On the opposite side of the Old Bridge, by the side of the road leading to the Pitti Palace, in the city which, according to the writer, is ‘no less glorious than Athens, for instance’; the city which produced a half of the Western culture and which the great writer of the Western civilisation (as well as of the Russian one!) preferred not to notice; to be more exact, he could not notice it, as he was busy labouring hard (‘it has been a year since I have been writing 3.5 printer’s sheets every month’⁵), which

¹ *The Idiot*. Complete Works. Vol. 8, p. 9, 140.

² *A Writer’s Diary*. 1876. March. Complete Works. Vol. 22, p.92.

³ Kostelyanets, B.O. The Family archive.

⁴ *The Idiot*. Complete Works. Vol. 8, p.510.

⁵ From Dostoyevsky’s letter to A.N. Maykov. Cit.: *The Idiot*. Notes. Complete Works. Vol. 9, pp. 383–384.

was finished by sending the last fragment of the novel to 'The Russian Messenger'. He did it behind time, which was customary of him.

The civilisation in its turn did not blame the author for it, but it translated his books first into French (to entertain the bourgeois who love *voir la mer* so much while reading a weighty Russian novel on the beach), then into all other languages of the continent. Some time later the civilisation put a small commemorative token in Florence; the inscription is in the Italian dialect (it means, the sign is made for the natives). It says that around here (to be more exact, in these parts, 'questi pressi' – the house does not seem to have survived, and who can know where this rented apartment was?) Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky finished his novel *The Idiot* between 1868 and 1869. And this commemorative plaque was not put in some unknown place, but in the main street of the South bank of the Arno River.

This place cannot be bypassed by any inquisitive tourist, be he an American, a European, a Chinese, or a Russian. By the way, the travelogue of 1862 does not contain a single bad word about Italians. Did the officials of the city hall of Florence make sure of it? Machiavelli would and would approve of his compatriots. The man knew how powerful words can be and knew when words become actions.

We read and honour the author of *The Idiot*, but not the author of the *Notes*. The problem of Dostoyevsky (and is it just a problem?) is that without the *Notes* there would have been written no *The Idiot*. Or it would be absolutely different. As a lady from St Petersburg wrote almost a century later, 'if only you knew out of what rubbish...'. This is the rubbish out of which the poetry grows.

It is so good when this rubbish includes not only the penal servitude in Siberia, but also the trips abroad.

Valur Ingimundarson¹

CULTURES OF IMPUNITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES TO MASS ATROCITIES

Introduction

States have been motivated, historically, to commit genocides and crimes against humanity by a mixture of factors relating to the exercise of power and ideology. One entails a material desire is to create, expand, and preserve formal states and empires, with the perpetrator bent on the elimination of a perceived threat or on the spread of terror. Another reflects the search for an idealized future—"the end of History"—inspired by an utopian ideology, with the state demonizing a target victim group and deploying intensive propaganda to mobilize mass violence. A third one focuses on a combination of both—the use of political myths, such as those embodied in ultranationalism, to stake out a claim to territorial sovereignty.² The cumulative radicalization characterizing mass atrocities usually results from political crises destabilizing the state, preventing decisive government repression of communal conflicts—except by those influenced by the crises to seek murderous cleansing to attain organic sovereignty.³

While the nature of such crimes can often be defined in precise terms, the problem of determining the timing and methods of preventing, stopping, and punishing them has proven far more elusive. No universally accepted cultural norms have been developed in the international political system to respond, in a preemptive way, to impending mass violence, to intervene militarily in sovereign states, and to deal with states and individuals guilty of pursuing

genocidal policies. Yet, given the persistent failures of states to abide by human rights obligations and the willingness of political leaders to violate them, the so-called "international community" is always bound to face the charge of willful neglect and complicity if and when it ignores genocides and crimes against humanity.

In this paper, I discuss the tension—from historical and contemporary perspectives—between human rights and sovereignty concerns in dealing with cases of state-sponsored atrocities. The international responses to genocides and crimes of humanities are intrinsically linked to political institutions and processes, such as the post-war UN system, prevalent ideological paradigms, and the policies of the Great Powers; legal developments, such as the Nuremberg Trial Charter, the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the establishment of the *ad hoc* International Tribunals, and the International Criminal Court; sovereignty concerns mixed with experiences of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and "regime changes"; contested doctrines on "humanitarian intervention" and the Responsibility to Protect; and transitional justice and post-conflict stabilization.

The focus is here is on three questions: first, I evaluate the impact of external interventions on human rights protection, geopolitics and "regime change." Second, I analyze the tenuous link between international prosecutions and deterrence of genocide and crimes against humanity. And third, I explore how retributive justice, such as trials, and restorative justice—including truth commissions and amnesties—have affected international reaction to large scale human rights violations.

The "International Community" and Mass Atrocities

The term "genocide" was coined by Raphael Lemkin and first used in his book *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe*, which was published in 1944.⁴ Although the word appears in the drafting history of the Charter of the Nuremberg International

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² See Frank Chalk, "Intervening to Prevent Genocidal Violence: The Role of the Media," in Allan Thompson (ed.), *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (London, Ann Arbor: Pluto Press, 2007), p. 375.

³ Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 500–501.

⁴ Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944).

Military Tribunal, the final text opted, instead, for the term “crimes against humanity” to deal with the persecution and physical extermination of national, ethnic, racial and religious minorities. Yet, prompted by Nazi extermination projects in World War II, the United Nations made it an early priority to grapple with the question of how to respond to genocide through preventive and punitive means. Genocide became the central reference point in the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,¹ which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948. It codified the so-called Nuremberg principles for determining what constituted crimes against humanity and war crimes and defined genocide as a crime of intentional destruction of a national, ethnic, racial and religious group, in whole or in part.² Thus, genocide was privileged by its recognition in a treaty and by endowing it with important additional obligations, such as the duty to prevent the crime, to enact legislation, and to punish the crime. Crimes against humanity were also contractually codified in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. But the term was limited in scope and confined to the judgment at the Nuremberg Trial. The only other obligations with regard to crimes against humanity existed by virtue of customary international law.³

Despite the promise of the Genocide Convention, the imperative to protect vulnerable populations quickly became the casualty of balance of power politics and Cold War ideologies. Indeed, the Convention became dysfunctional as soon as it came into force in 1951. It was criticized for defining genocide too restrictively and for the lack of provisions on enforcement. First, it made no distinction between violence intended to annihilate a group and nonlethal attacks on members of a group or on their culture and language. Second, it intentionally excluded the deliberate destruction of political groups and social classes from genocide. That meant that victims of state-organized and ideologically motivated mass killings in Stalin’s Soviet Union, Indonesia or Cambodia were excluded. Thirdly, UN member states were, generally, opposed to the establishment of international judiciary and police powers that would override their own sovereign powers.

Given the fact that sovereign states are usually responsible for mass killings, UN member countries showed themselves unwilling to act against one of their own,⁴ as was the case with the United States when it faced war crimes charges during the Vietnam War. It also explains why efforts to establish an international criminal court, which was one of the central aims of the Genocide Convention, were thwarted. Decades passed without any international war crimes trials. During the Cold War, none of the mass killings from the 1950s until the late 1980s were classified by the UN as genocides. The United States and other Western powers even supported the UN seating of the Khmer Rouge regime, because it would mean the non-recognition of the spoils of the 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia even if it stopped the genocide. Similarly, when Indonesia occupied East Timor

and killed an estimated one-third of its population, nothing was done.⁵ In short, after codifying its condemnation of genocide, the UN condoned it in practice.

It was not until after the end of the Cold War—in the 1990s—when the UN Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and its counterpart in Rwanda (ICTR) that the Genocide Convention was revived as an instrument of international justice. And the first time that the 1948 law was enforced was with the 1998 genocide convictions of Rwandan political leaders. The first state to be found in breach of the Convention was Serbia in 2007. The International Court of Justice cleared Serbia of direct involvement in genocide during the Bosnian war. But it ruled that it breached international law by failing to prevent the 1995 Srebrenica genocide and to transfer the persons accused of genocide to the tribunal.

Consistent with the Yugoslav and Rwandan precedents, special courts were subsequently established for Sierra Leone and Cambodia followed by the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). What motivated these developments was the belief that accountability—in the form of punishment—was crucial to prevention, as former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, emphasized in his Action Plan to Prevent Genocide in 2004.⁶ In cases, where retributive justice did not serve as a deterrent, the UN began to work on an another enforcement mechanism—dubbed the Responsibility to Protect—opening up the possibility of military intervention in exceptional circumstances if states engaged in wars on their own populations. **Rooted in the** 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS),⁷ this initiative stressed the need to reconcile the countervailing logics of “sovereignty” and “human rights protection” in response to mass atrocities.⁸ The UN General Assembly’s World Summit adopted the Responsibility to Protect doctrine in 2005 by affirming that each “individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity.”⁹

While the Responsibility to Protect principle has been described as a norm-in-formation,¹⁰ its military connotations has been contested on the grounds that it infringes on state sovereignty by encouraging or propelling “regime change.”¹¹ The viability of the term has, in fact, been thrown in serious doubt after NATO’s military intervention in Libya—which was seen by Russia, China and some other states as violating the UN Security Council’s mandate. To be sure, one can argue that each violent conflict has different dynamics, depending

⁵ Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, p. 12.

⁶ United Nations, “UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Stockholm Action Plan to Prevent Genocide,” 7 April 2004, <http://www.preventgenocide.org/prevent/UNdocs/KofiAnnansActionPlanToPreventGenocide/Apr2004.htm>

⁷ International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility to Protect (December 2001), <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>

⁸ See Emma McClean “The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International Human Rights Law,” *Journal of Conflict & Security Law*, 13, 1 (2008), p. 125.

⁹ See Emma McClean, “The Responsibility to Protect,” p. 123.

¹⁰ Michael Contarino, Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and Keven T. Mason, “The International Criminal Court and Consolidation of the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm,” *Global Responsibility to Protect* 4 (2012), p. 275.

¹¹ See, for example, Alex J. Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Regime Change,” *e-International Relations*, 27 September 2011, <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/09/27/the-responsibility-to-protect-and-the-problem-of-regime-change/>

¹ Don Hubert and Aliela Blätter, “The Responsibility to Protect as International Crimes Prevention,” *Global Responsibility to Protect* 4 (2012), p. 38.

² United Nations, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 December 1948, <http://www.un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm>

³ See William Schabas, “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide” <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html>

⁴ Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p. 11.

on its nature, geography, proximity to—and interests of—other stakeholding countries. External interventions always pose a challenge to accepted norms of state sovereignty in an international system made up of nation-states. But the problem of protecting vulnerable populations in crisis situations is also based on decades-old humanitarian and human rights norms. And the implementation of international human rights laws still ultimately lies with states. There are no real international enforcement rules that subordinate states to higher international authority.¹

The Responsibility to Protect as a Contested Norm

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink have argued that international norms go through a three-stage process, with each stage characterized by different actors and mechanisms.² During the first one (“norm emergence”), a new idea is introduced into significant international policy discussions, with the aim of persuading others to adopt and embrace it. In the case of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, this role was played, among others, by the UN Secretary General and the ICISS. The second stage of norm-cycle (“norm cascade”) can only occur when the first stage has reached a “tipping point,” after a number of crucial states have endorsed the norm. The institutionalization of the norm is supposed to precede this stage. At the end of the cascade process lies the third and final stage, internationalization, in which the norm becomes an accepted rule of behavior.³

Judged by this admittedly too teleological process, the argument can be made that the Responsibility to Protect norm is stuck at the first stage, because it is still resisted by key actors despite the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document. Russian and Chinese opposition to UN sanctions against Syria or military intervention has already neutralized the effects of the Libyan operation on the consolidation of the doctrine. Russia’s policy is also consistent with its opposition to the 1999 military intervention in Kosovo, which was justified on humanitarian grounds (“humanitarian intervention”). Similarly, China’s policy is also under the influence of its own sovereignty concerns—the need to stifle any secession or self-determination attempts within its own borders—a stance that was also present in its opposition to Western military intervention in the Balkans in the 1990s.

The lack of consensus on the Responsibility to Protect exposes the crux of the dilemma when humanitarian concerns clash with state sovereignty and geopolitical interests. To countries such as Russia, China and Brazil, the West bypassed by the humanitarian rationale in Libya by using the Responsibility to Protect principle to topple the Gaddafi regime. According to this reading, the principle of sovereignty is, in the last instance, more important than the notion of human rights protection if it involves “regime change.” Another related point has do to with selectivity: why some civil wars are considered by influential states to be more important than others. The failure to act in Rwanda is, of course, the most conspicuous example of such double standards.

¹ Michael Contarino, Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and Keven T. Mason, “The International Criminal Court and Consolidation of the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm,” p. 282, 284.

² Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” *International Organization*, 52, 4 (1998), p. 887–917.

³ Michael Contarino, Melinda Negrón-Gonzales and Keven T. Mason, “The International Criminal Court and Consolidation of the Responsibility to Protect as an International Norm,” p. 279–280; see also Rama Mani and Thomas G. Weiss, “R2P’s Missing Link, Culture,” *Global Responsibility to Protect*, 3 (2011), p. 454–455.

The Brazilian government has attempted to break the impasse between those states that insist on the inviolability of sovereignty and those that see the Responsibility to Protect principle as overriding sovereignty under certain circumstances.⁴ It wants to prohibit any efforts to use Responsibility to Protect to further Libyan-style “regime change” or neo-colonialism, while being firmly in favor of upholding the norm itself against crimes against humanity and genocide. The proposal has been criticized for leaving unclear what concrete difference this would make in places where intervention was being contemplated.⁵ But what the approach highlights is the need to move beyond the assumption that the only countries affected are the interveners and those being intervened in.⁶ Interventions have, in some cases, aggravated existing conflicts, produced new conflicts, and increased the vulnerability of civilian populations.⁷ The Iraq War comes to mind in this context, even if it was not justified on humanitarian grounds.

To restrict the use of the Responsibility to Protect to the protection of civilians can raise the counterargument that it serves the interests of the status quo by stabilizing and, indirectly at least, propping up governments that are responsible for mass atrocities by not holding them accountable. The experience of sending in UN peacekeepers to protect civilian populations into civil conflicts—where governments and paramilitary forces are strong—has sometimes proved disastrous. The *Srebrenica* genocide, which took place before the eyes of international peacekeepers, is a case in point. It can also be maintained that the concept of sovereignty cannot be separated from that of legitimacy. The question arises whether the principle of no regime change applies if government power has been usurped illegally or by violent and undemocratic means. The “international community” could then be put in the position of condoning the right of a government to terrorize its own population.

Prevention through Punishment

As Martin Mennecke has pointed out, the Genocide Convention used to be seen as offering only a single understanding of how the “international community” could fight genocide—namely, through the dual acts of “prevention” and “punishment.” It overlooked another possibility: the combination of “prevention through punishment.”⁸ Given the prominent link between the two factors in most domestic criminal courts, it may sound surprising that the deterrent value of retributive justice emerged so late in international political and legal discourse. But since the United Nations had paid scant attention to genocides for such a long time, it was perhaps more indicative of the organization’s inertia during the Cold War.

The premise of the prevention through punishment argument is open to question. While punishment can serve the cause of justice, it is not clear to what extent, it prevents mass atrocities. One can, for example, speculate—a-historically—

⁴ See LXII Session of the UN General Assembly, Statement by Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota, Minister of External Relations of Brazil, on “Responsibility while Protecting,” 21 February 2012, <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/12d-agp-RESPONSIBILITY-WHILE-PROTECTING.html>.

⁵ See, for example, the *Economist*, 7 April 2012.

⁶ See “Welcome to Brazil’s version of responsibility to protect,” *Guardian*, 10 April 2012.

⁷ Statement by Ambassador Antonio de Aguiar Patriota on “Responsibility while Protecting,” 21 February 2012, <http://www.un.int/brazil/speech/12d-agp-RESPONSIBILITY-WHILE-PROTECTING.html>.

⁸ Martin Mennecke, “Punishing Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not,” *Human Rights Review*, 8, 4 (2007), p. 320.

that trials would probably not have played any difference to ideologically driven-leaders like Hitler or Pol Pot. Others, like Slobodan Milosevic, may have realized that they were not the masters of their own fate but, as Michael Mann has argued, they were already playing for high stakes. If they lost, they realized that they would die anyway; if they won, the risk of future prosecution would have paled in comparison to the prospects of being hailed as national heroes.¹ Thus, any firm generalizations about the impact of the threat of prosecution should be avoided. The possibility that the UN Security Council would refer the Darfur situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) proved to be a real deterrent; war lords expressed deep worries about being sent to the Hague. In other cases, however, they were not instrumental: The tribunal for the former Yugoslavia was established in 1993, but the *Srebrenica* genocide took place two years later, in 1995. Similarly, it may be argued that the assumption that those who commit genocides carry out their policies on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis lacks plausibility.² Those who have criticized trials as a failed instrument to prevent massive human rights abuses have sometimes gone to far in the other direction by proposing and praising amnesties—granted to perpetrators in the name of societal reconciliation—as an alternative. This is, arguably, a false dichotomy because it means rewarding criminals and keeping them in power for the sole purpose of achieving political stabilization. Even if international criminal prosecutions may have limited impact on ongoing conflicts, their long-term effects are considerably greater.

As Ruti G. Teitel has pointed out, trials offer ways to express both public condemnation of past violence and the legitimization of the rule of law necessary to the consolidation of a new beginning.³ The international trials in the 1990s were modeled on the postwar Nuremberg Trials. The historical precedent was by no means flawless. The charges and verdicts at Nuremberg were partly based on retroactivity—with some of the norms guiding the prosecutions not being in place at the time of the offenses. But given the spectacular nature of the Nazi crimes—including extermination campaigns against Jews and the Roma and Sinti—this was arguably not a sufficient ground for delegitimizing the court. The charge of politicization has more validity since the Tribunal's construction was political, undermining the ideals of impartiality and universal norms. The silence on war crimes committed by the Allies, such as the atomic bombings or the bombing of German cities, underscored this point. The Nuremberg trials offered, however, standards of accountability in international law; responsibility for atrocities could for the first time be attributed to individuals. Moreover, the Nuremberg principles lifted the defense of immunity from the heads of state—a crucial legal precedent for present-day prosecutions against government leaders for crimes against humanity and genocide.

The recent international trials were political in the sense that they were in some cases driven by interventionist parties, such as the Western powers in the Balkans. In addition, their legitimacy in international law was based on the UN Security Council, whose decisions are often motivated as much by geopolitical interests than international legal norms. These

tribunals also suffer from many of the same flaws as the Nuremberg Tribunal did. The question of selectivity is a case in point. Courts can only deal with a limited number of offenders, even if the perpetrators are far more numerous. Selection is often, if not exclusively, based on who gets caught and whose actions were so public as to create many witnesses. Thus, the method tends to create a sentiment that the prosecution is unfair. Finally, international trials, while highly symbolic politically, punish only a few. Nonetheless, it can be stated that international courts, such as those for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, were less susceptible to charges of Victors' Justice than the Nuremberg tribunal. The defendants were offered extensive lists of due process guarantees. In contrast, even if domestic courts can act more quickly, they sometimes lack legitimacy in the cases of mass crimes due to weak institutional legal structures or political bias through government intervention.

One of the goals of the International Criminal Court, which came into being in 2002, is to overcome such hurdles. The court is intended to be a form of justice of last resort, investigating and prosecuting where domestic courts have failed. True, it is not a perfect tool: It can only prosecute crimes committed since its inception, and its mandate is restricted. Many of the member states have provided their own national courts with universal jurisdiction over the same offenses and do not recognize any statute of limitation for grave crimes such as genocides. More important, some Great Powers do not recognize the jurisdiction of the court, such as the United States, China, and India, and some signatories, like Russia, have not ratified it. The absence of such powerful states undermine the Court's authority and claim of universality. Yet, despite the criticism that the Court has shown bias by limiting its reach—so far at least—to African states, it has managed to investigate war crimes in Congo, Uganda, Darfur, and Kenya. In some instances, the cases were referred to the Court by the concerned states themselves and in others by the UN Security Council. The deterrent value of the Court is uncertain, and it has not indicted many people. But with 121 states being party to it, it has considerable international legitimacy.

Responding to mass atrocity with legal prosecution reflects an effort to embrace the rule of law and to offer some justice to victims. The success of such trials should be measured not by the number of prosecutions or convictions, but whether they are fair or not. Political stability and reconciliation are not among the goals of trials. True, as Martha Minow has pointed out, trials transfer individuals' desires for vengeance to state or official bodies and "cool vengeance into retribution."⁴ Yet, they do not offer forgiveness or apologies to victims since their focus is on the perpetrators. For these reasons, other ways are also needed to deal with the consequences of genocides.

This raises the question of restorative justice as opposed to retributive justice within the context of what has been termed "transitional justice"—that is, the political and legal processes characterizing the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy after internal or external conflicts.⁵ It may be argued that it is not enough to punish perpetrators; victims

¹ Michael Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, p. 528.

² Martin Mennecke, "Punishing Genocidaires: A Deterrent Effect or Not," p. 324–325.

³ See Ruti G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 10.

⁴ Martha Minow, *Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 26.

⁵ See Ruti G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice*; Jon Elster, *Closing the Books: Transitional Justice in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Hugo van der Merwe, Victoria Baxter and Audrey R. Chapman (eds.), *Assessing the Impact of Transitional Justice: Challenges for Empirical Research* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 2009).

also have a moral right to know the truth about past misdeeds and to have their concerns addressed. Truth commissions, reparations, apologies, and truth reports have traditionally been seen as vehicles to deal with such issues. Their focus is less on individuals and more on communities and nation-states; they seek to uncover facts, identify perpetrators and assign responsibility as part of the process of confronting the past and of building new relationships between citizens and the state. Such restorative mechanisms are severed from prosecutions, avoid vengeance, and even retribution, even if they can recommend legal action against perpetrators. Truth commissions fail to create potential closures afforded by trials that end in punishment. They do not order victims to forgive perpetrators, for individuals, not states, are the only ones capable of doing so. And they should, of course, not be used as tools to avoid trials, as some perpetrators want.

Indeed, a strong argument can be made for dismissing the notion that truth commissions alone can produce societal reconciliation after mass atrocities, such as genocides. They resemble theatrical acts, even if they often serve therapeutic aims and help establish the “truth” of what happened. The South African Truth Reconciliation Commission (TRC), grappling with the legacy of Apartheid, had the authority to grant amnesty to individuals who voluntarily accepted responsibility for committing politically motivated crimes. Like the courts, the TRC pronounced guilt and innocence, but did not dispense forgiveness. And the dispensing of amnesty did not require a show of remorse from those indemnified.

The downside of the restorative process in South Africa was, as many victims of crimes against humanity stressed, the deprivation of the right to seek justice through criminal or even civil prosecution. It is true that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission accomplished one of its key aims—that of securing a peaceful transfer of power. The black majority in South Africa gained control of the political system, providing the victimized with the power to rule, but in partnership with the perpetrators—the white elite who still control vital economic resources. But the notion of pardoning mass murderers, whose contrition could be feigned, can be interpreted as being irreconcilable with justice and victims’ concerns. The need for political stabilization after major societal ruptures does not justify the requirement of forsaking accountability and absolving perpetrators.

The combination of retributive and restorative justice is one way to deal with mass atrocities. One innovation contained in the Statute of the International Criminal Court is the series of rights granted to victims. Apart from the Eichmann Trial in the 1960s, which was a domestic trial, victims have now for the first time the possibility to present their views and observations before the Court. Thus, they can offer a balance between the trial’s focus on perpetrators, on the one hand, and the victims, who gain increased authority—or what Shoshana Felman termed “semantic authority”¹—through their participation, on the other.

As Teitel has argued, legal rituals and processes through trials and public hearings not only serve the purpose of facilitating the political transition but also of enabling historical claims to be made in the language of justice, in shared terms relating to rights and responsibilities for past wrongs. The use of this language can perform an important

part in the undoing of a violent past, which is critical to any redemptive political change.²

Conclusion

Despite the close relationship between the terms “genocide” and “crimes against humanity,” their distinctive characteristics have done more to shape international law than their similarities. The justification for preventing or halting atrocities and punishing those responsible for them has not been sought in a broader definition of genocide or by amending the Genocide Convention. Rather, the goal has been pursued through an expanded understanding of crimes against humanity. The term now includes crimes that were originally absent from it, such as apartheid, enforced disappearance, torture, rape, and imprisonment or any of a series of acts “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed at any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack.”³ Unlike genocidal crimes, no special or discriminatory intent is required in cases of crimes against humanity, which has given the UN or other international or regional organizations more leeway to respond to mass crimes.

Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Genocide Convention was a foundational act. It was the first “human rights” convention, although earlier international treaties addressed concerns such as the slave trade, trafficking in women, and workers’ rights. To be sure, Cold War Realpolitik made the Convention meaningless for decades and the UN toothless to deal with mass atrocities. It was only after the end of the East-West conflict that a space opened up in the international arena for addressing questions of prevention and punishment and for breaking a culture of impunity with the aim of introducing accountability. Yet, the political and legal process leading to the decision to intervene militarily or refrain from doing so to stop mass crimes rarely reflects purist or interest-free motives. It often resolves around the question of promoting and protecting political, military or economic interests of states or of preserving historical relationships between states rather than of addressing humanitarian crises.

The UN has not been able to develop uncontested instruments, with general applicability, to respond to mass violence. As a reaction to external threats, genocides and crimes against humanity are no longer prevalent; they have more often become associated with perceived internal threats, as the cases of Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Bangladesh, Algeria and Cambodia indicate.⁴ The principle of Responsibility to Protect seeks to establish a clearer code of conduct reacting to such crises and underplays the “right to intervene”—so prevalent in the discourse on “humanitarian interventions” in connection with the Kosovo War. The “responsibility to intervene” is only supposed to kick in when a state has demonstratively failed in its obligation to protect its own citizens. Yet, the timing of an intervention is as problematic as that of legitimacy: to decide when a threshold has been overstepped.

As the controversy over the Libyan intervention and the divisions within the UN Security Council over Syria show, the Responsibility to Protect has not managed to consolidate itself

² See Ruti G. Teitel, *Transitional Justice*, p. 116.

³ Don Hubert and Aliela Blätter, “The Responsibility to Protect as International Crimes Prevention,” *Global Responsibility to Protect* 4 (2012), p. 47–48; see also United Nations, “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” (1 July 2002), <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/rome-fra.htm>

⁴ See for example, Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide*, p. 35.

¹ Shoshana Felman, “Theaters of Justice: Arendt in Jerusalem, the Eichmann Trial, and the Redefinition of Legal Meaning in the Wake of the Holocaust,” *Critical Inquiries*, 27, 2 (spring 2001), p. 201–238.

as an international norm. Furthermore, the modification of the doctrine—the requirement that “regime change” be excluded from it—may be unenforceable. The experience of civil wars—in places such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras—has revealed that strong authoritarian governments in control of the army are usually responsible for the vast majority of mass crimes. External interventions that tip the balance in favor of those who resist repressive regimes do not necessarily have to be unjust or wrong. And it is rare that widespread international support can be gathered for such operations in the absence of any humanitarian dimension or activation—by the UN Security Council—of Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which specifies a grave situation threatening regional stability. But that does, of course, not justify the geopolitical temptation of promoting interventions, which are designed to topple governments, in the name of humanitarianism or what Noam Chomsky dubbed “military humanism.”¹

The “international community” will always be under pressure to intervene if acts of genocide or crimes against humanity are imminent. The same applies to the handling of the consequences of atrocities. The ad hoc trials for the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda and the International Criminal Court are certainly not beyond reproach. The deterrent value of war crimes trials is uncertain—and their selectivity is an example of flawed justice. What they represent, though, is political engagement in contrast to the calculated inertia that prevailed during the Cold War era. That the major perpetrators in the Rwandan, Yugoslavian, and Cambodian cases eventually ended up in court shows that the UN Security Council has begun to take its treaty-bound obligation to punish perpetrators of genocides and crimes against humanity. As an institution responsible for global security, however, it has failed in its efforts to develop a political and legal instrument to preempt or halt such exceptional violence.

Hekmat K. Karzai²

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN AFGHANISTAN: A SILVER BULLET?

The phrase *intercultural dialogue* is a relatively new phrase in the English lexicon that is widely used by politicians, development workers, and sociologists. The phrase itself, however, is complicated because there is no single, widely recognized definition of the term and for the most part, intercultural dialogue is a relatively new phrase derived from other terms, such as *multiculturalism*, *social cohesion*, and *assimilation*. There are two definitions, however, that have been generally accepted:

1. Intercultural dialogue is a process that comprises an open and respectful exchange or interaction between individuals, groups and organisations with different cultural backgrounds or worldviews. Among its aims are: to develop a deeper understanding of diverse perspectives and practices; to increase participation and the freedom and ability to make choices; to foster equality; and to enhance creative processes.

And:

2. An open and respectful exchange of views between individuals and groups belonging to different cultures that leads to a deeper understanding of the other’s world perception”³

¹ Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe, Maine: Common Courage Press, 1999). Chomsky borrowed the term “military humanism” from Ulrich Beck, using it to describe the ideological underpinnings of the NATO and U.S. intervention in Kosovo. Beck, on the other hand, interpreted the term in a different way. He wanted to draw attention to the danger posed by the development of a new global military human rights system, which would erase the dividing line between war and peace. This reading has, of course, much contemporary relevance in the debate over the “Responsibility to Protect.” See Beck “Über den postnationalen Krieg,” *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 44, 8 (July 1999), s. 985–987; Beck, *Power in the Global Age: A New Global Power, Economy* (Malden, MA: Polity, 2005), p. 333.

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³ A White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue organised by the Council of Europe in November 2006: http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/intercultural/whitepaper_interculturaldialogue_2_EN.asp

Though the concept appears to have taken root in the 1980s and 1990s, the concept of intercultural dialogue became particularly prevalent in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Virginia. That attacks claimed the lives of over 3,000 Americans and gave rise to the subsequent “War on Terror” that witnessed large-scale military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time the United States military and allies waged war on Iraq and Afghanistan, there was some consensus regarding a need for intercultural dialogue as a way to understand both sides of the conflict, culturally and historically. It was hoped that doing so would prevent unnecessary conflict in the future and help both Muslim and non-Muslim nations appropriately interpret and react to the actions of the other.

As the US-led Coalition war in Afghanistan wages on through its eleventh year, cultural dialogue and misunderstandings remain a central feature of the political dialogue, both between Afghans and their NATO allies, but also between different sections of Afghan society. International organizations, civil society members, and even military and political leaders have begun to question whether intercultural dialogue is still a worthwhile endeavour and whether such efforts can truly positively affect national developments towards a peace agreement between the parties to the conflict.

This paper will explore whether notions of intercultural dialogue indicate that we as societies are losing our ability to understand and relate to one another. Part I will explore the emergence of and philosophical underpinnings of the concept of intercultural dialogue as a coping mechanism to Samuel Huntington’s thesis that modern conflicts will be caused by fundamental cultural differences between societies and specific groups. Part II will attempt to discern whether there is truly a “clash of civilizations,” or perhaps more importantly, a clash *within* civilizations. Specifically, is there a clash within Islam? Part III will examine the Afghan context, and the grave impact that cultural differences and our inability to recognize them play, both within Afghan society, and with the general interactions

between Afghanistan and the West. Ultimately, intercultural dialogue is a new term for an old concept; indeed, this dialogue has been going on between social groups for centuries, but has in recent times become more important as globalization and the dissemination of communication through the internet magnifies cultural differences between the people of different nations.

Intercultural Dialogue: A Reaction to Huntington

What has led us, the citizens of the world, to need such lofty terms as *intercultural dialogue*? Has modern technology such as the Internet, satellite television, and the proliferation of mobile phones magnified our differences to such an extent that we are no longer able to relate to one another? In order to understand and answer some of these questions, it is critical to place the concept intercultural dialogue within the historical context from whence it emerged.

The United States and the former Soviet Union emerged from World War II as the world's two dominant world powers. As such, a strategic rivalry developed that dominated global politics for nearly five decades. The two camps existed in bi-polar worlds with the United States, democracy, and laissez faire capitalism on one side and the Soviet Union with single-party communism and a state controlled economy on the other. In both, the role of the state in terms of its political outlook and posture towards its allies were not only exceedingly clear, but the rival was systematically vilified among the populace and government as a threat to domestic culture, philosophy, and general way of life. Clearly this world order came to an end when the former Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

After the collapse of the former Soviet Union, new theories and trends started to emerge, although they remained inextricably linked to some of the sentiments that arose from the Cold War context. Among the emerging political theorists of the time was Samuel Huntington, an American professor at Harvard University who wrote an infamous article and later, a book entitled *The Clash of Civilization*. In his work, Huntington sought to predict the nature of future conflicts in the post-Cold War world. He argued:

It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind are the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.

He further explains:

Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflict of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.¹

Of course, Huntington's thesis remains incredibly controversial even today. Many scholars and intellectuals have refuted this argument with logical historic and contemporary arguments. Of course, a few individuals have not only affirmed, but relished in Huntington's argument. One such individual who not only supported but also escalated this claim was Osama Bin Laden.

Bin Laden believed that, not only is there a culture clash as Huntington might suggest, but also formed his beliefs on the underpinnings of Islamic theorists such as *Milestones*

¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilization?* in: *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993.

author Sayed Qutb that Islam faces a direct confrontation from the West. Bin Laden argued that the West is after the resources and wealth of the Muslim world. Thus, adapting a globalized version of jihadi rhetoric of the 1960s, he called on Muslims across the world to confront the West, particularly the United States, and bring it to its knees as a global empire. In his sermons, Bin Laden regularly referred to jihad – which is obligatory for Muslims – as the struggle against the United States, which he believed was an occupational force. It is generally believed that Bin Laden's labelling the United States as "occupational" arose after the US used bases in Saudi Arabia – housing the holy lands of Mecca and Medina – to launch their operations against Saddam Hussein during the first Gulf War.

A Clash *Within* Islam?

The claims and actions of Osama Bin Laden surely indicate that he and his followers believe in the so-called "clash of civilizations." Was he correct, are we experiencing such a clash? Or perhaps it is more appropriate to question whether there is instead a clash within civilizations. Specifically, is there a clash *within* Islam?

Historically, Islam has a rich culture of civilization. In its early years, Islam was spread by logic and intellect, not by the sword. By the death of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) in 632 AD, Islam had already spread across the Arabian Peninsula, engulfed North Africa, and crossed the straits of Gibraltar into Spain where the Moors ruled for centuries. The Muslims turned Cordoba, the Capital into the largest, most cosmopolitan city in Europe where Jews and Christians lived peacefully aside the Muslim rulers. Greek texts translated and added upon by Muslims scholars were brought to the rest of Europe via Andalucia. Trade thrived and the Muslims introduced paper into Europe. Algebra and Astronomy were Muslim inventions.

Muslim society was far more sophisticated than their European counterparts, and in the year 859 AD, a Muslim woman named Fatima Al-Fihri founded the first university in the world. The university still exists today as its descendent, University of Al-Karaouine, stands in its place in modern day Fez in central Morocco.

Assessing the situation of the Muslim world now and looking at the state of affairs, however, it becomes clear that we set Europe on the path toward the Enlightenment, but became ignorant ourselves. It is true that Muslim nations have often found themselves at odds with their own interests and the interests of the world's larger, colonial powers who sought to divide the centre of the Islamic world up into regional spheres of influence in the wake of World War I. It is also indisputable that Muslim countries were repeatedly told that the development of their state must reflect that of the world's great powers – that state institutions should mirror those found in western nations like Britain and the United States. Unfortunately though not surprisingly, such requests were met with disdain, and outside demands for democracy and transparency have been met with autocracy and darkness.

The leaders of Muslim nations in the Arab world as well as in Central and South Asia are now paying the price for keeping their populations oppressed. The revolutions we have seen fought in Tahrir Square of Cairo, in Benghazi Libya, and on the streets of Damascus are signs of optimism from the younger generation who have the courage to both see and demand a better tomorrow. The best hope really is to ensure

that these movements are not hijacked by individuals and groups who seek their own aggrandizement at the expense of truly home-grown modern political movements recognizing that modernity, democracy, and Islam are not mutually exclusive.

The history of Islam is ripe with historical anecdotes of societies and individuals who explored science, political thought, and the arts in service to their religion. Today, the Muslim world needs to channel the same reason and intellect that will allow both different segments of society – as well as different societies – to work together to improve the lives of the people and to exalt the side of Islam that is not represented by Osama Bin Laden, and their acolytes.

The Afghan Context

The concept of a clash within civilizations is exemplified by the examination of Afghanistan. The landlocked Central Asian nation has been tormented by three continuous decades of war, creating a culture of violence that has permeated most sectors of Afghan society. The impact of war has been grave on the population. Indeed, both the population demographics, and the dynamics between different sectors of society have changed on so many levels.

Prior to Afghan-Soviet war of the 1980s, Afghan culture was one of tolerance, moderation and hospitality. Today, years of conflict and uncertainty have made social interactions between Afghans and people outside their direct familiar, village, or tribal group tenuous. Scarcity of vital resources such as arable land for farming and potable water has created unparalleled competition – and in many cases resentment – even between neighbours. In today's Afghanistan, the culture of the gun has become paramount.

In addition to the unfortunate social consequences of the conflict, the war has introduced radical ideologies into the population. Rural populations, where the reach of the Afghan state is weakest and where critical services such as quality education have been largely absent for decades are particularly vulnerable to radical propaganda that pushes the population to an extreme right. Similarly, many Afghan refugees living abroad in countries such as Pakistan and Iran have been brainwashed by extremists elements within those respective societies. Unfortunately, many young Afghan men now unquestioningly serve as cannon fodder for the Taliban and other insurgent factions.

Perhaps the most disturbing development signalling the fragmentation within Afghan society has been the introduction of suicide bombers into the region and Afghanistan specifically. Studies have shown that many of the bombers are young individuals who are not able to think critically and succeed in the basic responsibilities of life for various reasons such as extreme poverty, lack of education and employment opportunities. Instead they are convinced that, not only are they fighting against segments of society that fail to live up to the tenets of Islam as understood by their insurgent leaders, but that doing so will realize their dreams of another world where they will no longer suffer from life's tribulations and have the opportunity to look upon the face of God. Additionally, they are told that seventy of their relatives will join them in eternal life as a reward for their service to Islam.

The rise of information technology such as television and radio since the Taliban fell in 2001 has also highlighted the diversity of tribal, ethnic, and religious practices of various communities within Afghanistan. These many

identities are all unique yet equally complex, as is their attitude and reaction toward one another. In this context, intercultural dialogue amongst the many identities of Afghan society has become ever more critical. As young men growing up in remote villages become more aware of other groups living within their same country, reaching out and understanding the various nuances of regional, tribal, political, etc groups will help re-build Afghan society into the collective Afghan identity where diversity, tolerance and hospitality are once again celebrated.

This can and is taking place at many levels and through various initiatives throughout Afghanistan. For example my organization The Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies undertakes research and advocacy projects that promote peace and reconciliation. A key component of our programming has been the establishment of a Youth Peace Movement and Empowerment Centre (YPMEC) in the Lashkar Gah, the capital of Helmand province. Located in the south, Helmand has been one of the provinces most heavily affected by insecurity during the last ten years. Our centre, along with other opportunities, gives young people the chance to participate in workshops on leadership and conflict resolution that focus on listening and respectful interaction with their peers and women. In addition, the formation of a youth shura has given young men the chance to participate in intercultural dialogue by working together with youth from all areas and tribes of the province on a council dedicated to tackling the problems faced by the youth of Helmand. In addition, the YPMEC Youth Shura has also provided a forum for intercultural dialogue between the youth and important elders who control most aspect of Helmand society. By focusing on dialogue and understanding, and by providing additional education and technical training the young people who participate in YPMEC have better options to build a life for themselves than joining the insurgency or turning to violence. They also have the skills and encouragement necessary to become citizens who actively engage in Afghan society.

Efforts to increase intercultural dialogue are commendable and must continue. In addition, civil society, Afghan government and international partners should explore possibilities for new forums for dialogue across different segments of society. New technology such as expanded access to mobile internet will undoubtedly prove invaluable to the process, as will open engagement vis-à-vis outlets like YPMEC.

While efforts have been made to use intercultural dialogue as mechanism to bridge isolated segments of Afghan society, the utility of such a dialogue between Afghan cultural norms and the nation's western powers has been largely overlooked during the 11 year NATO campaign. This is not to say there has been *no* effort by international military and government officials to understand and respect Afghan culture and Islam – there certainly has. However, there are over 45 different nations working in Afghanistan in various capacities. Unfortunately, some of our friends and allies, whose contributions are greatly appreciated by Afghans, still struggle and thus do not understand our culture and our way of life.

There has been recognition by high level military and government officials that respect for Afghan culture is a critical requirement for any long-term campaign success in the country. Again, some efforts have been made. For example, military units often get some rudimentary pre-deployment cultural training, as does diplomatic staff.

Regrettably many of these efforts tend to focus on very specific protocols and customs – for example, not shaking the hand of a woman – but fail to account for the same principles and take root at the ground level. For example, Afghan values of domestic privacy and women's honour are routinely underestimated and downright discarded by Coalition Forces who conduct night raids of family houses where insurgents are suspected of living. The Afghan public also loathes the disrespect they feel from unwanted house searches and unlawful detentions by ISAF troops.

The international community must realize that their behaviour is, at times, *political oxygen* to the insurgents and others who do not wish to see peace and stability in Afghanistan. As we speak, the perception is growing among the Afghan population that Coalition Forces do not consider Afghan blood as important as their own. Mistrust and cultural differences, if not addressed, will only exacerbate the gap between the Afghans and the internationals.

Well constructed and genuine dialogue is desperately needed to help both the Afghans and international groups better relate to one another. Many of the challenges could be addressed by a simple understanding of local cultural sensitivities. At the same time, Western partners should explain their intentions and clarify that they do not have other motives beyond the stability of Afghanistan. Doing so will help ease suspicion among Afghans and

may encourage them to give internationals the benefit of the doubt in instances where intentions are outwardly unclear.

Conclusion

Intercultural dialogue is essentially a new term for an old concept. After all, the Muslim world and the West have interacted with one another since the rise of Islam in the 700s. However, the value of intercultural dialogue has become more important in recent years, particularly given the rise of technology and ever-growing economic interdependence in the global economy. Cultural differences between vastly different civilisations, such as Afghanistan and the west as well as differences *within* civilizations like Afghanistan are more easily highlighted through media such as Youtube and SMS-text messaging. Consequently, intercultural dialogue must take root at multiple levels. Dialogue between various sectors within Afghan society will help rebuild an Afghan identity that has been repeatedly fragmented by thirty years of conflict by fostering a climate of understanding and undermining the logic presented in radical propaganda. Similarly, cultural dialogue between Afghans and their international partners can help overcome many of the challenges that arise as a result of perceived differences between values, intention, and actions.

M. I. Kleandrov¹

JUSTICE AND JUSTNESS AS A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE OF CULTURE

There is no mistake in the title of the article, justice and justness act as a twofold composite concept. It is implied that justice becomes genuine justice ('right judgement'), only when it is essentially just, but when it was not just it ceases being justice, it has lots of other negative names. And it's not the issue of semantics, neither is it a philological gimmick, here we are dealing with the fundamental essence of the law.

However, there is an indisputable statement that legal culture is an integral part of the common culture of humanity. At different stages of development of human civilization its common culture also developed, undoubtedly, being in its core committed to certain fundamentals, hence, legal culture did not remain unchanged. But we aren't carrying out a historical survey, we will discuss the current situation, its problems and solutions with a focus on tomorrow.

In its turn, the concept of legal culture is also multi-component, and it consists, at least, of the following units: culture of legislation, culture of relationships, culture of the state, including law enforcement, bodies, law enforcement culture, culture of legal awareness, including training of

legal personnel, culture of legal behaviour etc.). We can differentiate within this concept basing on various criteria, but, undoubtedly, the key one is a legal culture carrier, that is, an enforcer. Of course, culture of law-making is very important, but that even a perfect rule of law usually contains several layers of meaning that lie at different depths for different enforcers, and I am not talking here about chronological layers of legal information (or legal institution and legal sector either).

Accordingly, in the context of separation of powers one can talk about legal culture of figures who directly enforce legislative, executive and judicial powers, in the context of legal professionals one can talk about the legal culture of local precinct officers, criminal detectives, investigators, inspectors, etc., one can also talk about legal culture of government (federal and of subjects of the Russian Federation) and municipal officials, and so on.

But law enforcers are not just officers of the police and judiciary bodies, whose direct functions are security and protection of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens and other persons. Law enforcers are also state agencies, business entities, and officers involved in education, culture, art, media, etc., in fact, anyone who uses (enforces) the law, who operates in the legal field, i.e. in the area of impact of legal regulation. And there are no exceptions here.

But the core essence of law enforcement is judicial practice. It is judicial practice that realigns the behaviour of law enforcers, and it is judges who possess the insider information on all the 'kitchen' of judicial decision-making, that on the whole create judicial practice. While legal culture – the culture of law enforcement – has to be based

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on the principles of justice, the culture of judicial practice and culture of justice are simply naturally based on those principles, they are an organic foundation for such cultures.

It goes without saying that every judge should be a cultured, and ideally, enlightened man. If a law enforcer commits a certain uncultured act, usually it will be a misdemeanour in the field of ethics or morality. But if a judge commits an uncultured misdemeanour (e.g., in the trial addressing to one party the judge says, 'Hey, my dear, you probably want to say...' and, referring to the other party: 'Speak up, what are you mumbling there, haven't you had a hangover in the morning?') this will be a violation of constitutional principle of everyone's equality before the court, it also be a clear violation of the basic principle of a fair trial, which could (even – should) lead to reversing a court order issued by this judge. Because, naturally, such a judicial act would not be just.

However, it is obvious that external manifestations of culture of a certain judge do not provide reasons to believe that his verdicts are unconditionally just. Though it is an indisputable fact that all our judges are highly cultured in the common meaning of the word (the legal mechanism for selecting judges candidates and entrusting them with judicial powers is very imperfect in itself, and the factor of overall culture cannot simply be determined), but that indisputable fact does not mean that judges with obviously low cultural level do not make just judicial decisions, the correlation here is much deeper and more complex. The main thing is that Russian judges feel the fundamental value of culture of justice and are aware of the necessity to upgrade their culture of justice as an absolute basis of fair justice.

That is why the Convention of the 8th Russian National Congress of Judges 'On the Judicial System of the Russian Federation and the Main Directions of its Development' as of 19 December 2012, states (in the Preamble, last paragraph): 'We feel a more and more urgent need to develop a government project of strategic transformation of organizational and legal system of the national justice system, with the ultimate aim to create a fair trial that meets the aspirations of the Russian society. In order to find solutions to this problem it is desirable to attract potential of the higher courts of the country, of the relevant government agencies, academic institutions, judicial bodies and community groups.'

De jure and de facto Russian National Congress of Judges, held once in four years, is the supreme organ of the judiciary of Russia, and it expresses the will of the entire body of the judges of the country. This means that the above-mentioned provision of the Convention adopted (unanimously) by 730 congress delegates is the opinion of 3298 acting judges (24145 judges of general jurisdiction, 3790 arbitration court judges, etc.). Moreover, it is safe to say, the Russian society heard a consolidated opinion of all judges of the country, the direct bearers of judicial power, who every day professionally implement the category of fair justice in practice, or at least endeavour to implement it.

And, inevitably, when talking about the urge to create in Russia a fair trial, an obvious and natural question has to be raised: don't we have today a fair trial? The point here isn't in the subtext: if the trials are fair, why should we start their modernization, when everything is all right. The point here is in setting a reference point.

Almost every judge, making his judgement, is sure that his decision is just, of course, with a few exceptions – both in

terms of certain judges, and in respect of certain judgements. But we are talking in general, excluding these rare exceptions. And then it turns out that on the whole the court decisions are just, respectively, our judges are fair (so you can even believe in the fact that our judgements are benchmarks and they can even serve as a model for our judges-to-be, as well as an example in the educational process for students lawyers around the world), hence, our justice is fair, and the mechanism of our judiciary power is perfect. The principal matters for the judicial power of any state is to ensure fair justice, and if all court decisions in the state are just, then the mechanism of the judiciary power in this country is infallible and provides flawless results, thus there is no need to upgrade it.

But it is true in case the verdict (no matter whether it is just or not) is made by the judge in the course of decision taking. Likewise, it is true if the verdict (in terms of all judicial decisions) is made by the judiciary, or judicial power itself. However, when you take into account that in any state the court is for the public, and not vice versa, we require a different point of reference. Principal verdict should be made by the public.

One can, of course, assume that the society (in the name of its most active and principled representatives) is not able to assess objectively the validity of a certain judgement, as they do not know all the circumstances and materials of the case that the judge issuing the decision is aware of (and justly assessed). And making the wrong assumption about the injustice of this decision, the society (or its representatives) are affected by shill media (or – in a broader sense by – the circles that are carefully attempting to prove inferiority and immaturity of the fundamentals of the Russian state, and especially of its federal government agencies, including judiciary agencies), the media that endeavour (spur of the moment) to discredit a certain judge, or a judicial body, a certain judicial system or the entire judiciary. Consequently, the judgement in question refers also to a group of judicial acts, and to all of them together, including those taken for a long period.

But that is a wrong approach. Our society is not so naive to count unconditionally in its verdict on only these media. Moreover, if it were so, it would be enough to organize and conduct a large-scale counter-propaganda campaign in order to 'open the eyes' of the society.

However, on the other hand, there are no good reasons to assume that the legislative and executive branches of government power are unjust in terms of having drawbacks, poor decisions, and unresolved issues, and that these branches of government (or their agencies) have to be refined and improved, while the judicial branch of power is just and has no drawbacks, or poor decisions or unresolved issues. One should also take into account that every activity is performed (either poorly, or not performed at all) by people, it is them who create focal points of injustice, and the number people in the legislative and executive branches of government, who are potentially capable of making an unjust decision, is some dozens, if not hundreds, as little as in the judicial branch of power.

As far as evaluation of the judiciary by the Russian Society is concerned, the state of things is slightly better nowadays, especially in a situation when hypothetically each of the parties in the trials makes sure: in his particular case, the judge held a just process and a decision made by him is just. So, hypothetically, a few dozens of millions of Russians

every year make sure first hand that the judiciary in the country is just on the example of their own court claim. But, at the same time, these same dozens of millions of Russians are under massive influence of shill media that are steadily and constantly prompting to all Russians that our courts, judges and their decisions are unjust by definition.

As a result, dozens of millions of our citizens, the participants of just, as they believe, trials find themselves in the position of L.I. Brezhnev from the joke that the Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation V.D. Zorkin and Russian President Vladimir Putin together, complementing each other, recalled at the 8th Russian National Congress of Judges on 18.12.12. In this joke, L.I. Brezhnev, referring to a foreign lady, says: 'Dear Mrs Margaret Thatcher!' His assistant prompts him: 'This is Indira Gandhi!' And Brezhnev says to him: 'I can see myself that this is Indira Gandhi! But it is written here: Margaret Thatcher!'

And each of the above-mentioned dozens of millions of Russians, who for many years have been manipulated by the media denying a fair trial in Russia and who have never come across any counter-arguments in this matter, solves this dilemma as follows: yes, I've met a fair judge, I was just lucky, but it is an exception and all other judges in Russia are unfair, just as 'it is written' (i.e. claimed by the media, and no one has refuted it).

While the rest of the Russians, who were not parties in the trials fair for the participants, have never come across even with those exceptions, that's why they are affected to an even greater extent by unfounded discredit of the judiciary in Russia.

Thus, even if each of the 32 thousand Russian judges will always make only just judgements (which, of course, is an ideal, unattainable even from a philosophical point of view), Russian society will not be able to learn about it in today's conditions, and public opinion will still regard the judiciary considerably unjust, because this opinion will be guided, as in the above-mentioned joke by what 'is written', and every year dozens of millions of Russians who personally assured themselves of a fair trial, in which they personally participated, will assume that what each of them 'witnessed' was just an exception that does not change the general rule.

The author of this work has not had a chance yet to find any objective results of a fair sociological survey on how the society evaluates the judiciary enforcing justice in Russia, the survey that was organized and conducted either by the judicial community itself, or by its request. A special, focused and extensive search could not help. The published results of a sociological survey performed 'outside' of the judicial community, compel us to take them sceptical – either it is and obviously biased approach, originally targeted at falsified coverage of the situation, or the poll is unprofessional, and we can't consider its results representative, etc.

What can one answer to a question of the following kind: (exaggerated, of course) 'Do you agree with the fact that the earth is round, water is wet, and our courts could be more just?' Anyone of a hundred, a thousand, millions of reasonable people (including, by the way, all judges) would undoubtedly answer, 'Yes of course.' But shill researchers would make a generalization: if the respondents agreed that the courts could be more just, they believe that now they are 'not fair' or, at best, – 'not fair enough'. And the declared results of their poll would become the conclusion: 'One hundred percent of the respondents consider Russian judges unfair'.

However, the question: 'Isn't our court system is unfair?' has a dark lining provided by certain (and of a large number) judges, they believe that the court (in any country) cannot objectively be fair to everyone simultaneously. And as proof they state: in the trial there are almost always two parties, and the prevailing party will consider the court just, while the losing party will always be dissatisfied. I can also add that usually both parties are dissatisfied with the decision in a civil dispute that satisfies a claim by half, while in the cases with only one party, for example, when the court establishes the facts having the legal significance, there can be no satisfied party at all, if the court refuses to satisfy a petition.

But the point is that to be dissatisfied with a court, a judge, a court decision in a particular case, and to feel dissatisfied with a particular process and an unfair trial, with a judge, or a court decision in the case are not quite identical. After all, if a trial was conducted perfectly by the judge, all parties involved did not feel bias during the procedures, on the contrary, all parties saw, heard, and felt with their skin that the judge endeavoured to reveal all circumstances of the case, they felt that the judge conducted the trial professionally, and, having received the court's decision in the case, they did not find any actual, procedural or other flaws in it, the losing party is naturally unhappy with the results of the case, but they will not experience the feeling of injustice towards the judge or the court decision. Unless, of course, the losing party is sane and adequate. By the way, to appeal the decision is very difficult – in fact, there is nothing to 'get hooked on'. It is a perfect and just decision, made by a highly cultural judge.

And vice versa, when the parties perceive by all means that the judge is biased, the arguments and submissions of the parties are taken selectively, that he conducts the trial with obvious violations of the procedures stipulated by the law, that he is far from being a professional, and his decision is illogical, inconsistent, poorly motivated and far from the standards of basic literacy, even the prevailing party will not treat that court, that judge, and that decision as just. If, again, the representatives of the parties in the trial are sane and adequate. Such a judge, of course, cannot even be called cultural.

But what is the category of 'justness' as a phenomenon? Is it an innate sense or a result of mental activity? Is it an instinct, inherent not only to people but to animals? Or vice versa a sense of justice is peculiar only to the elite, to the most advanced people? Is it possible to 'teach' justness, for example, to law students? Is it possible to foster it, to find the germs of it and strengthen them by education? Is its presence or its absence (as well as a 'fifty-fifty' balance) predetermined by genetics? Is it the same in all people or does it differ geographically, or by gender, age, class preferences, by ethnic, religious, ethical, social, political and other factors, etc. and so on? Is it fair to divide one cake between two hungry people equally? What if the first weighs 40 kg, and the second 140 kg, and that second, not to starve to death, has to take food several times as much as the first one, does it mean that to 'halve the cake' would be unjust? Is it fair to pay equally for different work results (the so-called equalization) or will it be fair to pay according to the quantity and quality of labour? Or, if should we also take into account the number of dependents in the family of the worker, the average level of income per capita in the family, etc.? But perhaps the category of justness is objectively indescribable and even unknowable, such as love, kindness, happiness, joy?

Even a superficial search for the answers to these questions cause surprise in two ways. On the one hand, it is

a relative weakness of framework of categories and concepts. For example, in the dictionary of the Russian language, by S.I. Ozhegov this concept is defined as: 1. Acting impartially, without prejudice. Fair Judge. Fair act. Fair decision. Fairly (adverb) assessed. 2. 'Targeted at the implementation of correct and urgent tasks.' Fair patriotic war. 3. True, correct. The findings turned out fair. [[Noun. Fairness, feminine.] [1].

The Great Dictionary of the Russian Language, compiled by the Institute of Linguistic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, says: Fair, means: 1. Acting in an unbiased way, in accordance with justice. Fair Judge. Fair Head, Commander. Are you fair with your son? Very fair. To be or to turn out fair. Judge. Based on impartial pursuit of truth, the correct attitude to someone, smth. Fair court. Fair decision. Fair sentence. Fair assessment. 2. Based on the demands of justice [cf. 3d meaning], Corresponding to the moral and legal norms. Fair case. Fair state system. Fair laws. Fair requirement. 3. Corresponding to the truth, reality, right, true. Fair rumours. Fair suspicions. The findings turned out fair [2].

The original Universal Encyclopaedic Dictionary (compiled by N.M. Dobrynin (LL.D., Professor, an expert in constitutional law) contains the following definition: justness – fair attitude to anyone, unbiased; just – (1) acting unbiased, veracious; (2) implemented on the basis of legitimate and honest grounds, and (3) a true, correct [3]. And in the Big Legal Encyclopaedia [4] the concept of 'justness' is not mentioned at all.

Naturally, the concept of 'justness' in respect to judicial decisions was constantly considered by scientists, including the dissertation research [5], and other scientific surveys. For example, I. Mikhaylovskaya, correlating the principles of independence, impartiality and justness of justice, draws the scheme of this correspondence as follows: the more effective the guarantee of independence, the higher the probability of its impartiality, and in turn, the higher the level of assurance in an impartial trial, the more likely the arrival at a just court decision. In other words, she points out: legislative and other assumptions that directly affect the independence of the judiciary, indirectly affect the nature of the court decisions, their justness and justice, and all the factors that directly affect the impartiality of the court, indirectly increase or decrease the probability of making just decisions [6].

All the above said is true, but it is of little help to understand what justness is. However, the concept of 'justness' is widely used in Russian national legislation (for example, Article 6 of the Criminal Code referred to as 'Equity'), or in acts of international law (Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms mentions the right to a fair trial) and so on. This concept is not an abstract doctrine for the judges to take decisions. However, the official reveal of the concept of 'justness' in certain acts leaves a lot to be desired, for example, Article 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, referred to as 'legality, validity and justness of the sentence,' reveals as follows in Part 2: 'The sentence is recognized as legitimate, valid and fair, if it was made in accordance with the requirements of this Code and is based on the correct application of the criminal law'. So, it turns out that if a sentence is legal, it is fair. But this is true only under the condition that the law itself (namely, criminal law) is fair. And it's not, because otherwise there would be no need to constantly amend the laws: two-thirds of adopted federal laws are amendments to laws.

Apparently, some weakness, amorphism and incompleteness of the cited definitions determined by philological tools

of comparison of different values (justness = impartiality, justice, truthfulness, accuracy, fidelity, etc.) serves an indication of the objective impossibility of a language to express what is felt by 'heart'. No wonder that the famous philosopher N.A. Berdyaev spoke about ideas, where 'the truth as veracity will be connected with the truth as justice'.

Hardly anyone can answer the question correctly and clearly: is justness sensed, perceived or felt, is it a matter of psychology, morality, or even, perhaps, metaphysics, is the perception of justness / unjustness itself based on non-verbal comprehension of relevant benchmarks or do we deal with specific mental mode here and this osmosis is only achieved on unidentified and subconscious dimensions of ideas?

On the other hand: almost anyone (to say nothing of any judge), usually without thorough considerations, 'in a trice', as it were, will distinguish between justness and unjustness in various social manifestations. And for our Russian society any manifestation of unjustness that everyone 'feels with their heart', is the strongest stimulus. Director of the Institute for Sociology, of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician M.K. Gorshkov points out: 'Our society make the idea of 'justness' the cornerstone (as we have seen it in the course of our survey for dozens of years)' [7].

I should emphasize that in Russia since the ancient times justness has been the fundamental and sacred concept; for its sake in order to 'suffer for the truth' people went to the rack and the scaffold. Inability to 'get justness' often led to a 'going on a bender', but sometimes people even 'took up pitchforks'.

Perhaps that's why today's Russian judge is unlikely to take a decision similar to a judicial act of an Estonian judge on sale of the three-room apartment of a citizen of Estonia, Ms G. for 3200 euros in order to recover a penalty for ticketless travel and traffic violations (together with penalties for a few years it totalled to 3,200 euros), and the decision of that Estonian judge was enforced [8]. It is equally unlikely that a modern Russian judge will pass a sentence of imprisonment, measured in seconds: such a sentence on the deprivation of liberty for a period of 30 seconds, was made by the Supreme Court of Pakistan in regards to the Prime Minister of that State for contempt of a court [9].

Is our society and its public principles just nowadays? They are far from it, to be objective. Can we, 'find justness' today if it flouted in particular manifestations? In principle, both theoretically and practically it is usually possible, but in fact hardly anywhere, or by anyone. But to feel the unjustness and seek protection from it is not an exceptional destiny of a single person. Sometimes entire teams suffer from unjustness and fail to seek protection.

An awareness among more or less broad strata of society about fundamental impossibility of justness, an inability to recover it from trampling, inevitably leads to destructive manifestations, aimed primarily against the central government, which, in the public mind, is to be blamed for the current state of affairs, including the fact that in the governed state 'one cannot find the truth'.

Today we become aware that this strategic problem exists, and it is even referred to in the above-cited provisions of the Regulation of the 8th Russian National Congress of Judges (it is a mandatory first step on a long and thorny way to solve it), and this awareness is based on the belief that this problem solving is as important to the modern civil society as, taking an example from the Russian history, abolition of serfdom by Alexander II.

It was at the second half of the nineteenth century that Russia had grown ripe for such a massive breakthrough for justness. You can compare it with the judicial reform, it is a well-known fact that in the first half of the nineteenth century attempts to duke I.M. Speransky to carry out a judicial reform in Russia failed, because the society was not ready to accept it. But by 1864 the society had been already prepared to radical reforms of the judiciary, and it was successfully implemented. The more it is willing to address to the issue of justness now. Today, in principle, the importance and scope of this problem solving can be compared taking another example from the country's history with nuclear and space projects. But scientific papers note that over the past twenty-odd years, the government has not put any large-scale task before science and economics, comparable, for example, with the development of nuclear weapons or nuclear power, nuclear submarines and icebreaker navy, space exploration [10]. The issue of directions, principles, algorithms, and the dynamics of the Project is secondary, the main and principally necessary thing is a political decision on its development.

The mechanism of restoration of downtrodden justness is multifaceted, diverse and multi-levelled. But today, in a democratic state of law, which Russia is proud to be, the core of this mechanism is the judiciary deliberately established for that purpose, which is an independent branch of the government. More precisely, it should become as such.

Well-known science fiction writers A. and B. Strugatsky in the initial period of their writing career in the 60s of the last century, in some of their works created – very graphically and vividly – the World of Noon (for the first time in their novel 'The Return. Noon, the 22nd century), in literary criticism this

world was later characterized as a world in which you want to live and work. In today's conditions the world, where you want to live and work, can be – above all – a state with a high level of general culture, and correspondingly a high level of legal culture with a highly cultured fair justice.

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Hans Köchler¹

DIALOGUE AMONG CIVILIZATIONS AND CULTURES: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WORLD ORDER

(I)

In our era of globalization, dialogue between different, and potentially contradicting, worldviews and value systems, as embodied in the world's civilizations, has become indispensable for global peace. The encounter of cultures and civilizations² – on the basis of a transcultural philosophical awareness of the origins of our "life-world"³ – has gained new significance as element of world

order in general. Particularly in large multicultural states or groupings of states (such as the European Union), cultural dialogue has become an essential element of social and political cohesion and stability.

In view of the unequal international power balance – whether in military, economic, political or social terms, it is of special importance to highlight a *basic principle* of a credible and sustainable dialogue among cultures and civilizations, namely that it can only be conducted on an *equal level*. Accordingly, cultural hermeneutics must be based on a non-discriminatory approach according to which cultures and civilizations, though not factually identical, are treated as manifestations of the same universal spirit of humanity.⁴

Dialogue is a basic feature of man's intellectual self-realization, individually as well as collectively. It must thus be seen in a *comprehensive* and *multidimensional* framework and can in no way be abstracted from the realities of the life-world (including its political and socio-economic dimensions). At the same time, dialogue will not be credible – and thus will not succeed in terms of realpolitik – if one party tries to exploit the supremacy it

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² For the purposes of this article, we understand "civilization" as a general notion under which "culture" is subsumed as specific notion, both being related to man's perception of the world ("life-world") as such. In this sense, a civilization may have distinct cultural expressions in different historical periods and within a variety of linguistic, ethnic and political settings. For the conceptual distinction between "culture" and "civilization" see also Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72/3 (Summer 1993), p. 24.

³ The term is understood here in the phenomenological-hermeneutical sense as introduced by Edmund Husserl. See e. g. the chapter "Phenomenology of the Life-World," in: Hans Köchler, *Phenomenological Realism. Selected Essays*. Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1986, pp. 42ff.

⁴ Cf. Hans Köchler, "The Clash of Civilizations Revisited," in: Hans Köchler and Gudrun Grabher (eds.), *Civilizations – Conflict or Dialogue?* Studies in International Relations, XXIV. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1999, pp. 15-24.

may enjoy at a given moment in history in the economic, social, or military domain.

In regard to global order, there exists a complex relationship, indeed *interdependence*, which the philosophy of civilization, and in particular philosophical hermeneutics, has to be aware of:

(a) on the one hand, the dialogue of civilizations is a basic requirement for global peace and stability because it contributes to the building of a *just* world order, i. e. a world order perceived as just by the world's peoples;

(b) on the other hand, a just and balanced world order is, in turn, a fundamental prerequisite of *dialogue* since an encounter among civilizations does not happen in a political and socio-economic vacuum.

The "interactive circle of dialogue," as we would like to call this interdependent relationship, does not result from, nor is it indicative of, a logical contradiction. It is structurally similar to the interdependence in the act of human understanding (*Verstehen*), which Hans-Georg Gadamer in his "Truth and Method" described as the "hermeneutic circle."¹ Any form of cultural or civilizational hermeneutics must pay attention to this interdependence.

When, during the 1990s, a "clash of civilizations" was first identified as major threat to global order, almost everyone, including the paradigm's foremost exponent, Samuel Huntington, affirmed a commitment to *dialogue*, not confrontation, as basis of lasting peace among nations.² This, albeit superficial, consensus has manifested itself in the contemporary global discourse on dialogue in the form of solemn proclamations, diplomatic initiatives, summit conferences, etc. – all dedicated to that noble goal which no one dares to object. It found its political expression in the United Nations General Assembly's proclamation of 2001 as the "Year of Dialogue among Civilizations" and in the establishment (in 2005) of the so-called "Alliance of Civilizations" upon the joint initiative of the Prime Ministers of Spain and Turkey.

In the majority of cases, however, the conditions of the co-operative relationship on which dialogue has to be based in order to be effective and meaningful, were overlooked. This is where the *philosophy of dialogue* comes into play, as a reflection of and corrective against the instrumentalization of civilizational and cultural differences for ulterior (political) purposes.

We shall briefly try to identify here the principles and indispensable requirements that have to be acknowledged if "dialogue of civilizations" is indeed to become a sustainable feature of international relations:

1) **Equality of civilizational (cultural) "lifeworlds,"** including value systems, in the normative sense: This excludes any form of patronizing attitudes on the part of one civilization (culture) towards another. "Sovereign equality," one thus might say, is not only an attribute of states as entities of international law, but also a principle that can be used to describe the inalienable right to civilizational and cultural identity.

2) **Awareness of the "dialectics" of cultural self-comprehension and self-realization:** A civilization

¹ Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Hermeneutik I: Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 5th ed. 1986. (English version: *Truth and Method*. Trans. by Garrett Barden and John Cumming. London: Sheed and Ward, 1975.) See also Hans Köchler, "Zum Gegenstandsbereich der Hermeneutik," in: *Perspektiven der Philosophie*, Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 331-341.

² See his opus magnum: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.

(culture) can only fully comprehend itself, and thus realize its identity if it is able to relate to "the other" in the sense of an *independent* expression of distinct worldviews and value systems, i.e. perceptions of the world, which are not merely an offspring of one's particular (inherited) civilization. The process of civilizational or cultural self-realization is structurally similar to how the individual human being achieves self-awareness: *re-flexio* (reflexion) implies that the subject looks at himself from an *outside* perspective, making himself the object of perception ("subject-object dialectic").³ As has been explained in the philosophy of mind, particularly since Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Immanuel Kant, *individual* self-awareness is the synthesis in a dialectical process in which the *ego* defines itself (in the sense of *de-finitio*: drawing the border) in relation to "the other." The same applies to the *collective* self-awareness of a civilization or culture. Only if the latter is able and willing to see itself through the eyes of "the other," will it achieve a status of *maturity* (in the sense of its *internal* development, not in regard to external evaluation!) that will allow it to overcome the fear of the other as "the alien" and, thus, to take part in the global interaction ("dialogue") with other civilizations.

3) **Acknowledgment of meta-norms as foundation of dialogue:** Derived from the normative equality of civilizations (point [1] above), these norms at the meta-level are logically prior to any *material* norms and have to be subscribed to by all partners in a meaningful undertaking of dialogue. "Tolerance" and "mutuality" (mutual respect) are two such examples of meta-norms; they are to be understood as *formal* (as distinct from *material*) values that determine the interaction between civilizations in general and, as such, are non-negotiable. They are the very "conditions of possibility" (*Möglichkeitsbedingungen*) of any such process, enabling an individual civilization to realize its specific, i. e. materially distinct, value system.⁴ Due to their general (formal) nature as quasi-transcendental preconditions in the Kantian sense, they cannot be attributed to just one particular civilization; their status is obviously transcultural.

4) **Ability to transcend the hermeneutical circle of civilizational self-affirmation:** In order to be able to position itself as a genuine participant in the global interaction among cultures and civilizations, a given civilizational or cultural community has to go beyond what Hans-Georg Gadamer described as *Wirkungsgeschichte* ("Reception History," referring to the exclusive impact of the respective community's "autochthonous" traditions on the formation of socio-cultural identity).⁵ In view of the lasting impact on the global order, reference to *Eurocentrism* as basic feature of "the West's" collective identity formation can most pertinently illustrate this hermeneutical dilemma. Over hundreds of years, nations of the Western civilization had been accustomed to propagate their worldview, value system and lifestyle vis-à-vis "the rest" of the world, a process that has often been accompanied by a strategy to reshape the identity of those other cultures and civilizations. Against this background, international cultural exchanges

³ For details see Hans Köchler, *Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie: Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus*. (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Vol. 112.) Meisenheim a. G.: Anton Hain, 1974.

⁴ For details see Hans Köchler, *Cultural-philosophical Aspects of International Cooperation. Lecture held before the Royal Scientific Society, Amman-Jordan* [1974]. Studies in International [Cultural] Relations, Vol. II. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1978.

⁵ See his work *Wahrheit und Methode*, fn. 4.

have all too often been mere self-encounters – or “civilizational *soliloquia*” – of the dominant actor. However, a civilization will only be able to fully understand itself and define its place in the global realm of ideas, if it is able to reach out to worldviews that have developed *independently* of it, namely those that have not already been shaped by that civilization. This is indeed the essence of the dialectics of civilizational self-comprehension or self-definition (point [2] above): *de-finitio* means the ability to see what is *beyond* the (civilizational) border, and to understand one’s own civilization or culture *with regard* to the other, while at the same time preserving – and developing more fully – the very integrity of one’s position.

(II)

A philosophy of dialogue according to the four principles and requirements of self-comprehension and self-realization we have outlined above, may help politics to manage the ever more complex realities of civilizational and cultural diversity – at the global as well as at the regional and domestic level. It is imperative that politics acknowledge the existing multitude of civilizations and cultures and adopt a set of clearly defined rules that ensure respect of the *right to diversity* on the basis of mutuality. Any rejection of this principle is a recipe for conflict and may threaten the stability of political order, and in the long term even the very survival of a polity.

The time for measures to ensure, or reestablish, a “monocultural reality” has long passed – and not only for Europe, which has itself triggered a “multicultural development,” first through colonization and, later, through an economically-driven immigration policy and through the globalization of the economy. The cultural dynamic these historical processes have activated cannot suddenly be stopped, or “switched off,” just as the process of industrialization cannot be reversed for the sake of the nostalgic revival of a pre-modern encounter with nature.

Responsible politics has to create the organizational framework in which distinct – and often (not only geographically) distant – cultural and civilizational identities can develop and interact without threatening the stability of the respective system, and *without* alienating a country from the rest of the world. The simultaneity of *distinct* civilizations, each in a *different* phase of identity formation, and at the *same* place – in the same πόλις, is an existential challenge from which decision-makers cannot escape lest they will be “punished by history.”

Those who engage in the *rhetoric* and *politics* of peaceful partnership among civilizations – certainly the vast majority of UN member states, and especially those assembled in the “Alliance of Civilizations” – should be reminded of the philosophical principles of dialogue, which do not allow a policy of “civilizational double standards.” *Equality* of civilizational expressions necessitates mutual recognition. What states claim for themselves (in terms of national sovereignty), they also have to be prepared to accord to the other; the application of the reciprocity principle to issues of communal identity means that states have to abstain from any claim to civilizational supremacy or hegemony. In order to be credible and sustainable, the politics of global dialogue – within and outside the United Nations – have to incorporate these principles.

The multicultural reality, which is a *fait accompli* in many polities that used to define themselves in the tradition

of the nation-state, has plunged many states into a deep identity crisis. Unless the new reality is also acknowledged at the global level, the world will be headed towards an era of perpetual confrontation along civilizational lines. Accordingly, those who promote the goal of dialogue *internationally* can only do so credibly, and consistently, if they recognize the equal rights of cultural and religious minorities in *their own* countries. In our era of global interdependence, “peace at home” and “peace in the world” are intrinsically linked.

Monocultural nostalgia should thus give way to *intercultural openness* and civilizational curiosity, which alone will ensure a polity’s long-term viability and success (including economic competitiveness) under conditions of an ever more complex interdependence between the realms of cultural diversity at the local, regional and global levels. According to the dialectics of self-comprehension (Chapter I, point 2 above), this does not exclude in any way the assertion of a distinct national and cultural identity.

A sustainable policy of dialogue has to be based on genuine respect for each other’s value system – an attitude that in itself is rooted in basic human rights (individual as well as collective), which the community of nations has solemnly confirmed on repeated occasions since 1948. In distinction from – though not in contradiction to – the specific values inherent in each civilization, these basic rights form a *system of meta-values*, which are the common ground for dialogue. As explained above (Chapter I), the fundamental values of freedom, tolerance, etc., expressing the essence of human dignity, are all norms on the basis of *mutuality*. As regards Western civilization, those norms may be derived from Kant’s transcendental philosophy, in particular his notion of the autonomous subject, and they may be explained by means of his *Categorical Imperative* (“Handle so, daß die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einer allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne” / “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law”).¹ Those norms are the *conditio sine qua non* for the enjoyment of the distinct and specific rights represented – and advocated for – by different cultures and civilizations. In this sense, they are not “exclusive” norms imposed by one side upon the other on a discriminatory basis. However, as rightly stated by the participants of the 2001 Conference on the Dialogue of Civilizations in Kyoto, in order to develop a global ethos – as basis for peaceful co-existence – “it is necessary to reach consensus on which norms are universal and which norms are cultural and specific.”²

In conformity with this normative approach – that highlights common norms of second order (so-called meta-norms) as condition for the acceptance of a plurality of normative systems of the first order, the practice of civilizational dialogue must be *comprehensive* (in regard to its global outreach towards all civilizations) and *inclusive* (in so far as it integrates the economic, social and political levels) at the same time. This requires that no one civilization alone try to establish itself as global “standard-

¹ Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*. Ed. Joachim Kopper. Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam Jun., 1966, § 7, p. 53).

² United Nations University in cooperation with UNESCO, *International Conference on the Dialogue of Civilizations. Tokyo and Kyoto, 31 July – 3 August 2001. Conference Report, Par. 32, p. 8.*

bearer.”¹ The above-mentioned Kyoto Dialogue stressed the need to “carefully contain[ing] attempts at ‘globalizing’ the specific value systems of those currently in power politically or economically.”² In this regard, the Conference called for a “respectful dialogue between members of different civilizations,” emphasizing that “no judgment should be made about the norms of other cultures unless one has first critically examined similar norms within one’s own culture.”³

Conclusion: Universal civilization and the true meaning of globality

If conceived in its genuine hermeneutical meaning, a dialogue among civilizations and cultures may bring out the true meaning of “universal civilization.” By its very nature, dialogue, as quest for mutual understanding, is nurtured by an attitude of openness towards different expressions of humanity – synchronically as well as diachronically. In all historical periods, mankind has expressed itself in a variety of life-worlds⁴ and distinct horizons of understanding⁵ – a process that is still continuing in our era, which is commonly characterized by the term “globalization.” Unlike as proclaimed by an apologist of Western supremacy in the post-Cold War environment, history has not come to an end yet.⁶

In view of the universal history of civilizations⁷ and the simultaneity of a multitude of civilizational horizons, dialogue requires a genuine *cosmopolitan* attitude. This implies the awareness that preserving one’s cultural and civilizational identity is possible *without* excluding the “other,” and that one’s identity is conditioned by the very awareness of and tolerance towards other civilizations.

The deeper meaning of “globalization” is in fact expressed by the “*globality*” of civilization. The essence of globality lies in positioning one’s own cultural and civilizational awareness as member of a *distinct* community while at the same time defining one’s specific life-world in the framework of *universal* culture – by interacting with other civilizations on the basis of equality and mutual respect. This attitude, out of hermeneutical necessity, lets

each member of a civilization appreciate the *common* spiritual heritage of mankind.

Globality, understood in this sense, is not identical to, or to be confused with, economic *globalization*. The latter tends to impose “commercial” values upon virtually all fields of life; it is characterized by a drive towards socio-cultural *uniformity*, subordinating all spheres of life to the economic domain and in particular to the supposed necessity of exploiting all available resources – material as well as human – for material gain.

Although the apologists of this development – or trend – globalization describe it as irresistible or unstoppable, the underlying argument is philosophically not convincing. The rationale of this process is based on the assumption that only unhindered economic and technological development, not restrained by ethical considerations or respect for cultural differences, will bring out the full potential of the human race and thus guarantee prosperity to *all* on a long-term basis.

In sharp distinction from this position – with its “particularist” outlook, based on the supremacy of the economy over all other spheres of life, the project of a dialogue of civilizations is in and of itself *universalist* and, therefore, represents *globality* in its original meaning: as system of open – virtually “borderless” – interaction, on the basis of mutual respect, between distinct expressions of humanity in each and every culture and civilization. This form of universalism is not to be confused with cultural or ethical *relativism* because it is based on the commitment to *common* cultural and civilizational values shared by all members of the human race.

By definition, this attitude precludes any form of exclusivism and unilateralism. The *ethos* of civilizational dialogue is only compatible with a multilateral approach in the cultural as well as the political fields. A genuine and sustainable dialogue among cultures and civilizations may prove to be the only viable alternative not only to the divisive forces of economic globalization and its underlying trend towards socio-cultural infirmity, but to perpetual confrontation on a global scale.⁸

¹ See also Hans Köchler, “Civilization as Instrument of World Order? The Role of the Civilizational Paradigm in the Absence of Balance of Power,” in: IKIM Journal of Islam and International Affairs / Jurnal Islam dan hubungan antarabangsa IKIM, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2008), pp. 1-22.

² United Nations University in cooperation with UNESCO, *International Conference on the Dialogue of Civilizations. Tokyo and Kyoto*, 31 July – 3 August 2001. Conference Report, Par. 33.

³ Ibid.

⁴ In the context of this analysis, we understand the term in the meaning described by Edmund Husserl in his phenomenology of “*Lebenswelt*” (life-world). See his *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie. Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*. (Ed. Walter Biemel) Husserliana, Vol. VI. Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 2nd ed. 1962.

⁵ On the hermeneutical concept of “*Verständnishorizont*” (horizon of understanding) see the author’s analysis *Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue. The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-Comprehension versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict*. Third Inter-Civilizational Dialogue, University of Malaya 1997, “Civilizational Dialogue: Present Realities, Future Possibilities.” Kuala Lumpur, 15–17 September 1997. I.P.O. Online Paper, www.i-p-o.org/civ-dial.htm.

⁶ Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” in: *The National Interest*, Vol. 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18; and: *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York: Free Press; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada; New York: Maxwell Macmillan International, 1992. For a philosophical critique see the author’s *Democracy and the New World Order*. Studies in International Relations, XIX. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1993.

⁷ For a Western view see esp. Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*. London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1948-1961.

⁸ On the implications of the paradigm of the “clash of civilizations” for the global system see the author’s lecture “The Dialogue of Civilizations and the Future of World Order.” Foundation Day Speech, 43rd Foundation Day, Mindanao State University, Marawi City, Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, Philippines, 1 September 2004.

Peter van Krieken¹

THE RIGHT TO PEACE AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

The right to peace and the concept of peace is evidently linked to constructive dialogues and mutual trust. Hereto the need for proper and inclusive education deserves to be underlined. And education should not be organized along the lines of different culture or religion-based institutions. Schools are the ideal places to meet. Schools are at the source of dialogues. Schools are hence crucial for materializing the need for dialogues and the right to peace.

The undersigned spent part of his working life for UNHCR in conflict areas (Beirut, Lebanon, civil war 1975–1978; Ethiopia during the red terror transition, 1978–1981; Juba South Sudan civil war 1987–1989; Peshawar Pakistan/Afghanistan, 1993–1995).

The conflicts concerned can be roughly characterized as follows:

Lebanon: ethnic, political, religious

Ethiopia: political

Juba: ethnic, religious

Afghanistan: ethnic, political.

A human being (apart from being cultured, well-educated, well-behaved, pleasant, beautiful etc) has five main identities he/she carries around: male/female; sexual orientation, colour of the skin, religious beliefs and political & societal convictions.

The first three cannot be altered, cannot be changed (but for some exceptional cases): you are who you are and the very fact that it cannot be changed gives some peace of mind.

Political opinions evolve, and more often than not will change during one's lifetime.

The more difficult part of one's identity is religion: one can adopt one, one grows up with it, one can change it, one can deny it. And here major difficulties creep in: it is all about beliefs, and all about the conviction that one's own belief is the best and only right one (*my god is the greatest*). Moreover, two of the three main monotheistic beliefs have a mission to try and convert so-called non-believers (Judaism being the exception). This all creates major tensions both within, between and across communities. It also means that so-called dialogues often amount to a mere exchange of views, to an effort to convince the other that one's own belief is the only correct one, and hence to an exchange of monologues rather than true dialogues, – unless one tries and focus on what the beliefs concerned have in common and on other points to agree to disagree.

Wars are being fought and the right to peace is being violated most of the time for economic, religious and/or ethnic (tribal, national) reasons. Religious wars are no thing of the past – most unfortunately. Religion and ethnicity have to do with cultural identities and misconceptions of the other. Dmitry Likhachov developed in the 1980s a view that focused on the reorientation of educational goals and ideas. This was based on his looking upon culture as a historical memory and as a process of accumulation, rather than a

process of consecutive changes. That perfectly fits in with the link between peace and dialogues.

The link between peace and the dialogue of cultures

It is quite obvious that proper, constructive dialogues result in *mutua fides*, mutual understanding and appreciation. Mutual trust is crucial for the functioning of communities and societies (and for the economy as well²). This is also true for cross-border contacts. Mutual trust increases self-esteem and hence flexibility and openness towards the other.

Dialogues of/on culture need to be accommodating and peace-oriented. They also should be inclusive. It is with this in mind that dialogues of cultures shall deal with what we have in common, not where we differ. It is with this in mind that our school- and educational systems should put everyone together in the same class room, not in separate schools based on e.g. political, societal or religious doctrines. It is with this in mind that we need to stress that freedom of expression and the need to create a climate of tolerance go over and above freedom of religion. The same is true for the concept of peace which should be considered a primary right and obligation, hence more important than the freedom of religion. It also means that freedom of religion should be considered a freedom of privacy, to be enjoyed in private, and not necessarily in the public domain. Maybe *laïcité* adds to the right to peace.

In this context we need to analyze recent efforts to define and agree on the right to peace within the UN. But before doing so some general remarks on the function of law will be made.

The function of law in relation to the concept 'peace'

Law in itself is a conflict management device, which is crucial for the maintenance of peace and the *ius cogens* obligation to find a peaceful (pacific) solution to conflict/dispute.³ For development and for a peace oriented/focused society, one needs an open society and open minds.⁴

The link between peace, human rights, economic development and even democracy is considered obvious. Yet, this is not necessarily always the case. Many countries enjoy economic development without a fully functioning democracy (ie one-party states). Also, a lack of freedom of expression does not necessarily halt economic development (but may at the end of the day hamper it). Peace research studies clearly indicate that peace yields tremendous dividend. Of course, the status in a country itself has an impact on the enjoyment of both first and second generation human rights (HDI; happiness); internal conflict depends on demographic developments (the youth bulge) and e.g. the Gini-coefficient: differences in income have a direct impact on the presence or absence of violence.

² See Fukiyama's book *Trust* (1993).

³ Law can also amount to an instrument of change; yet, law has as such no impact on 'peace', as 'law' in itself can not bring a solution to armed conflict; that needs to be done by force or (preferably) by negotiations, arbitration, judicial settlement et al (see art. 33 of the UN Charter).

⁴ Regard should be had to Kishore Mahbubani, who, in his book *The New Asian Hemisphere* claims that China is a closed society with open minds, whereas India is an open society with closed minds. One may wonder where Europe and the US stood, stand and will stand in 25 years.

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Peace is not a 'legal' concept as such. It is so much more, and here the difference between negative and positive peace enters the equation: negative peace is the absence of violence, of armed conflict, whereas positive peace is about constructive, pro-active interaction.

This difference is also part and parcel of the concept cross-cultural dialogue: do we just respect each other, do we respect each other's 'otherness', do we consider refraining from violence being the essential part of it all? In other words, are these dialogues in reality different monologues?

Or do we rather go into a dialogue with each other, trying to listen, and not just focusing on where we differ, but rather where we enjoy similarities, focusing on what we have in common.

Roosevelt

Roosevelt delivered in January 1941 his famous four freedoms speech. He elaborated on two first generation rights and two second generation rights as follows.

In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. The first is freedom of speech and expression – everywhere in the world.

The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world.

The third is freedom from want – which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in the world.

The fourth is freedom from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor – anywhere in the world.

Roosevelt referred to 'peace' in both what he labelled freedom from want and freedom from fear, albeit indirectly:

a) Freedom from Want: ...economic understanding which will secure to every nation a *healthy peacetime life* for its inhabitants...

b) Freedom from Fear: ...a world-wide reduction of armaments [so] that *no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression* against any neighbour... (emphasis added).

It goes without saying that the absence of acts of physical aggression can be considered a pre-condition for a healthy peacetime life which, in my opinion includes enjoying all possible rights, the civil and political ones, the economic and social ones, as well as e.g. the right to development. And it is in this context that we have to stress that the absence of acts of physical aggression amounts to what could be labelled *negative peace* (i.e. the absence of violence, the absence of war), but that a healthy peacetime life is built on a *positive peace*, during which we cross borders and relate to other countries and their inhabitants in a positive and constructive manner, be it economically, academically, as tourists or in spiritual exchanges.

Conflict settlement

The UN Charter focuses on pacific/peaceful settlement of dispute/conflict. Ch6, Art. 33 stands central: in this article eight ways to solve conflict have been mentioned. But

also under the purposes and principles, the maintenance of peace, prohibition of the use of force and the obligation to solve conflict peacefully stand out (e.g. artt 1.1 and 2.3).

This was not new. Already during the 1899/1907 Hague Peace Conferences due attention was paid to the pacific settlement of dispute. This was why the PCA was set up. The Peace Palace, harbouring the PCA was opened in 1913 (first stone in 1907 during the 2nd Peace Conference).

Over the years the prohibition to use force (but for the exceptions spelled out in the Charter's article 42 and 51) has become a peremptory norm of international law: *ius cogens*. Both the maintenance of peace, the obligation to solve conflict peacefully and not to use force concern commitments from states to other states.¹

But also the individual is connected/linked to this obligation. Indeed, the individual is obliged not to use his rights and freedoms contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN, as per the UDHR (general principle of law) art. 29.3 (and indirectly art. 14.2). This is an important aspect of human rights law. It underlines that the individual can only enjoy rights to the fullest if he/she also is aware of the implicit and explicit responsibilities and duties. The duty to solve conflict peacefully is one of them.²

So, when it comes to maintaining peace: states have commitments/obligations towards each other; individuals towards each other and towards the community at large. It then follows that to codify a right to peace would mean that the states also commit themselves towards their subjects to maintain peace and to solve conflict peacefully.

And in this respect it should be noted that this commitment does not only refer to inter-state conflict, but also intra-state conflict. In this inter/intra connection reference should be made to a similar development in international humanitarian law. First with common article 3 of the four 1949 Red Cross Conventions, later further developed in Protocol II to these 1949 Conventions.

Human rights generations

Although a bit old-fashioned when it comes to human rights, we differentiate three generations (whilst recognizing that human rights are indivisible, inalienable and interdependent):

– First generation: civil and political rights (abstain, respect, protect, fulfil)

– Second generation: economic and social rights (active role community state; again: respect, protect and fulfil)

– Third generation: group rights, collective rights

When it comes to 3rd generation rights, it has often been submitted that it above all concerns lofty ideals, utopian in character and difficult to handle, like the right to self-determination, right to food, right to development, right to a healthy environment, and indeed, maybe, the right to peace.

The main challenges here are to decide who enjoys the rights and who has the responsibility, the obligation to implement? But above all, the question of justiciability comes to the fore. Can the individual go to court if he/she

¹ The crime of aggression or the crime against peace goes back to the Kellogg Briand Pact 1928. Also: Nuremberg & Tokyo. The GA definition of 1974. And finally Kampala June 2010, adding to the ICC Jurisdiction (as from 2017; opting-in).

² The 1997 draft Universal Declaration on Human Responsibilities, however, does not refer to any responsibility linked to the purposes and principles of the UN.

is of the opinion that the state has foregone its obligation to solve conflicts peacefully? Will there be a committee where to address complaints, or, as certainly will be the case in some years, will there be a World Human Rights Court, where individuals will enjoy a *locus standi*?

The experience the human rights world has with the first article of both ICCPR and ICESCR on the right to self-determination is probably exemplary. The problems with the right to self-determination go of course back to the 1960 GA resolutions (1514/1541); but due regard shall be had to the reparative action needed in this respect as laid down in both the 25th and 50th anniversary GA resolutions 2625(XXV) and 50/6 in which the right to self-determination has been reformulated as a result of a perceived need to do some damage control. Also reference should be had to the involvement of the ICJ on these issues (in e.g. the Namibia, Western Sahara and Kosovo cases). And, indeed, such issues should be dealt with by the SC and the ICJ, – not by a Human Rights Council or similar body.

The same could be argued as to issues relating to the maintenance of peace: the Charter is straightforward on that: the primary responsibility lies with the SC (art. 24), and there alone (in spite of the Uniting for Peace Resolution 377(V)). The system would break down if the HRC or a similar body would get involved in peace or use of force issues.¹

Third generation

To formulate the right to peace as a third generation right will carry some serious challenges, although it all depends on the right formulation. It should therefore also be researched in how far the right to peace could be formulated as a first or second generation right.

Probably the most forward way of dealing with the right to peace is either to link it as an individual right to the right to development or to both the 1st and 2nd generation rights. Some examples:

1. Peace is an enabling right, the condition for the full enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

2. Peace is also an end right, the result of the exercise of human rights by all. (Thus there is a reciprocal relationship between peace and human rights).

3. All persons have the right to live in peace so that they can fully develop all their capacities, physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual, without being the target of any kind of violence.²

The challenges only increase once the right to peace is formulated as a group's right, a people's right. Who will be the main stakeholders? What exactly can be understood under the term 'people'; does it refer to minority groups (be it ethnic, religious, linguistic). This will complicate the discussion, not to mention the implementation, transposition and justiciability.

Even if the right to peace would be laid down in a declaration (only) it should be noted that follow-up conventions are often based on the text of the declaration; that declarations can become declarations+ (like UDHR,

¹ As a matter of fact, the HRC already quite often trespasses the HRL/IHL line. Although a human rights council it often makes statements on war and peace, the use of force and violations of humanitarian law. It remains to be seen whether this development should be welcomed.

² Asian Human Rights Charter (1998, extract).

now to be considered a general principle of law) or can become binding (like what happened with the non-binding EU human rights Charter). Therefore the fine-tuning of any text/instrument is of the utmost importance.

Recent events at the HRC (Geneva) should give reason for further deliberations. In July 2012, the HRC decided to establish an open-ended intergovernmental working group with the mandate to progressively negotiate a draft United Nations declaration on the right to peace, on the basis of the draft submitted by the Advisory Committee, and without prejudging relevant past, present and future views and proposals.³

The draft focused inter alia on International peace and security; Disarmament; Human security; Resistance to oppression; Peacekeeping; Right to conscientious objection and freedom of religion and belief; Private military and security companies; all as core dimensions; and Peace education; Development; The environment, in particular climate change; Victims and vulnerable groups as other *dimensions*.

The draft submitted by the Advisory Committee remarkably contained an article 7 in which it was stated that all peoples and individuals have the right to resist and oppose oppressive colonial or alien domination that constitutes a flagrant violation of their human rights, including the right of peoples to self-determination, in accordance with international law. In other words, the right to peace includes the right to use force.

It is herewith submitted that such a right to peace, trying to encompass so many issues and topics will meet major resistance and a unanimous adoption can not be expected. It should be noted that India was among the countries that abstained from the vote.⁴

Peace education and dialogues

Of the utmost relevance to this conference and hence this contribution is the subject "peace education and training" (not a core dimension for the drafters of a declaration, but nevertheless included as an *other* dimension), as it is closely linked to the dialogue of culture and civilizations and hence of relevance for this contribution. It is hence worth quoting this article 4 in full:

1. All peoples and individuals have a right to a comprehensive peace and human rights education. Such education should be the basis of every educational system, generate social processes based on trust, solidarity and mutual respect, incorporate a gender perspective, facilitate the peaceful settlement of conflicts and lead to a new way of approaching human relationships within the framework of the Declaration and the Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace and dialogue among cultures.

³ It is herewith recalled that the GA already in 1984 adopted a Declaration on the Right of Peoples to Peace.

⁴ HRC resolution 20/15: Adopted by a recorded vote of 34 to 1, with 12 abstentions. The voting was as follows:

In favour:

Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chile, China, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Djibouti, Ecuador, Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, **Russian Federation**, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay

Against:

United States of America

Abstaining:

Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Hungary, **India**, Norway, Poland, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Spain, Switzerland.

2. Everyone has the right to demand and obtain the competences needed to participate in the creative and non-violent resolution of conflicts throughout their life. These competencies should be accessible through formal and informal education. Human rights and peace education is essential for the full development of the child, both as an individual and an active member of society. Education and socialization for peace is a condition sine qua non for unlearning war and building identities disentangled from violence.

3. Everyone has the right to have access to and receive information from diverse sources without censorship, in accordance with international human rights law, in order to be protected from manipulation in favour of warlike or aggressive objectives. War propaganda should be prohibited.

4. Everyone has the right to denounce any event that threatens or violates the right to peace, and to participate freely in peaceful political, social and cultural activities or initiatives for the defence and promotion of the right to peace, without interference by Governments or the private sector.

5. States undertake:

(a) To increase educational efforts to remove hate messages, distortions, prejudice and negative bias from textbooks and other educational media, to prohibit the glorification of violence and its justification, and to ensure the basic knowledge and understanding of the world's main cultures, civilizations and religions and to prevent xenophobia;

(b) To update and revise educational and cultural policies to reflect a human rights-based approach, cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue and sustainable development; (emphasis added).

(c) To revise national laws and policies that are discriminatory against women, and to adopt legislation that addresses domestic violence, the trafficking of women and girls and gender-based violence (emphasis added).

Indeed, where it concerns knowledge and understanding of the world's main cultures, civilizations and religions on the one hand and intercultural dialogue and cultural diversity on the other, it needs to be emphasized that education is an essential element in building and keeping open minds and open societies.

In this context reference should also be made to article 13.1 of the ICESCR on education in which it has been laid down that that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.¹ Remarkably, article 13.3 refers to the non-interference where it concerns the obligation to ensure

¹ Article 13 in full:

1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.

2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize that, with a view to achieving the full realization of this right:

(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all;

(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational secondary education, shall be made generally available and

religious and moral education in conformity with one's own convictions. Other than art. 13.4 in which it has been confirmed that private educational institutions need to observe the obligation laid down in 13.1, 13.3 lacks such reference. In other words, religious education may maybe lack the respect for other religions.²

Indeed, many a religion looks down on other religions. As religion is based on belief and the concept of being the one and only 'truth', other religions are believed to be inferior and sometimes simply 'wrong.' This creates tension. Monotheistic religions speaking favourably about other religions is exceptional, if not next to impossible. Friendship is often out of the question, an unattainable goal. There is therefore a *contradictio in terminis* by promoting special schools based on a single religion and assuring that respect and promotion of other religions go hand in hand. We should not be naïve in these matters. This was not true of catholic primary schools and protestant christian primary schools of my time in my home country, and it is not true for islamic primary schools now emerging in many European countries. Such education will not prepare our youth for mutual trust, mutual understanding and the badly needed mutual respect, i.e. respect in the meaning of acceptance. This contradiction (freedom of religion, freedom of schools and mutual trust, friendship and mutual respect) needs to be addressed in a serious manner. If we care for dialogues, of we care for positive interaction, then we should re-think the education of our youngsters, at both the primary and secondary levels.

accessible to all by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;

(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education;

(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensified as far as possible for those persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education;

(e) The development of a system of schools at all levels shall be actively pursued, an adequate fellowship system shall be established, and the material conditions of teaching staff shall be continuously improved.

3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty of parents and, when applicable, legal guardians to choose for their children schools, other than those established by the public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions.

4. No part of this article shall be construed so as to interfere with the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions, subject always to the observance of the principles set forth in paragraph 1 of this article and to the requirement that the education given in such institutions shall conform to such minimum standards as may be laid down by the State.

² GC on art.13, 1999: Article 13 (3) and (4): The right to educational freedom

28. Article 13 (3) has two elements, one of which is that States parties undertake to respect the liberty of parents and guardians to ensure the religious and moral education of their children in conformity with their own convictions. The Committee is of the view that this element of

article 13 (3) permits public school instruction in subjects such as the general history of religions and ethics if it is given in an unbiased and objective way, respectful of the freedoms of opinion, conscience and expression. It notes that public education that includes instruction in a particular religion or belief is inconsistent with article 13 (3) unless provision is made for non-discriminatory exemptions or alternatives that would accommodate the wishes of parents and guardians.

29. The second element of article 13 (3) is the liberty of parents and guardians to choose other than public schools for their children, provided the schools conform to "such minimum educational standards as may be laid down or approved by the State". This has to be read with the complementary provision, article 13 (4), which affirms "the liberty of individuals and bodies to establish and direct educational institutions", provided the institutions conform to the educational objectives set out in article 13 (1) and certain minimum standards. These minimum standards may relate to issues such as admission, curricula and the recognition of certificates.

In their turn, these standards must be consistent with the educational objectives set out in article 13 (1).

It is indeed quite exceptional that a non-French would support the French secular school system. And indeed, the French school system is no guarantee for a total absence of hatred for the other, but – at least in my opinion – it is a *conditio sine qua non* for at least trying to build a well-balanced society, based on mutual respect. It is a well-known fact that once one meets, the level of distrust goes down. Even better, by doing things together, by being challenged together, mutual understanding and appreciation go up. It is therefore that I promote the reintroduction of military service in those countries that have abolished it, as it is one of the few venues where all ethnic groups, all religions meet and need to work together.¹

Diversity

Diversity has become one of the most challenging issues in multi-cultural societies. This diversity, whether cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, ideological or historical, can accelerate and enrich progress in society. At the same time, diversity without integration and common citizenship leads to polarization and undermines social and economic structures.²

We need to be aware of the need to pay attention to integration in general realities and to the question whether integration, assimilation and or rather multiculturalism should take centre stage in the immigration *jo* cultural enrichment debate. In particular the question should be dealt with whether religion can be seen as an integratory tool or rather as a hurdle for building a welcoming, inclusive society and in how far dialogues could help bringing positive integration about.

Civilization, Culture and Religion

It is therefore of some relevance to agree on the maxim that civilization, culture and religion are three different features/phenomena.

For the sake of this contribution the following definitions are used:

– civilization: the total culture and way of life of a particular people, nation, region, or period; a human society that has a complex cultural, political, and legal organization

– culture is the set of shared attitudes, values, goals, and practices that characterizes an institution or organization; the totality of socially transmitted behaviour patterns, arts, beliefs, institutions, and all other products of human work and thought

– religion is not different from culture as such, but just an offspring, a result of culture; culture influences religion, but then again, religion influences culture.³

¹ This recommendation should be seen in the light of my 1976 PhD thesis on the relationship between asylum and military desertion / conscientious objection to military service.

² http://www.itinerainstitute.org/en/issues/_issue/migration-integration/

³ It is widely assumed that modern secular culture emerged as a result of a historical break or rupture with traditional religious culture.

It is also widely assumed that if religion has any place in the modern world it is limited largely (maybe even exclusively) to the private and personal sphere. Max Weber's inquiry into religion and the emergence of modern culture suggests a very different relationship between the modern secularity and the traditional religion.

For Weber modern secular culture is not the result of a break with traditional religious culture but rather the result of a particular interpretation of the religious. He goes so far as to note that the "disenchantment of the world" that characterizes secular modernity is the actualization of a latent potential within religion (especially Abrahamic religions.) He identifies modern science as the most important factor that has led to the disenchantment of the world. At the same time Weber explicitly states that science cannot answer the most pressing questions that face all human

The above does not necessarily mean that civilizations, cultures and/or religions are 'civilized'; the yardstick to be used to consider a civilization or culture as 'civilized' is – for the sake of this setting – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and/or the core human rights instruments, including – or in particular – the European Convention on Human Rights.⁴ It is hence perfectly possible that some 'civilizations' or cultures, not to mention religions, do violate these norms. It is obvious that in such situations cultural identity need not necessarily be respected.

Should, in order for a country to become inclusive, Habermas' constitutional patriotism be a better idea than a 'Leitkultur'? Starting point is that there is no country in Western Europe that has seriously considered the complete assimilation of its minorities. Conservation of cultural and/or religious identity is a key value of European democracy. Countries do not aim for the invisibility of individuals in a homogenous society.

Culture and religion v. harmony and trust

The question needs hence to be asked whether diversity should be seen as an asset or a burden/hindrance to building a flexible, harmonious and prosperous society. Should we focus on differences or rather on what we have in common. The answer, it is herewith repeated, is quite obvious: focusing on differences hinders the sense and/or feeling of harmony, social cohesion and trust. Indeed building trust can be accomplished by doing things together, by speaking the same language (literally and symbolically), by knowing that half-a-word suffices. In that context, the history and traditions of a country need to be known and understood by all. The 'canon' – discussion is indeed a relevant one.

Integration nor assimilation mean that everyone should have the same religion, enjoy the same festivities, play the same sport, read the same books or eat the same food. Individuality is one of the great accomplishments of modern times, – thanks to the enlightenment., the power of (individual) human reason. Life is about give and take. Some cultures would appear to be ever so slightly "give-oriented", whereas others tend towards a 'take' approach. Balances need to be found. Let's agree to disagree, but in harmony.⁵

Religion: Political Goals

At this juncture it should be recalled that many religions have their own traditions or utopia, some of them within the law, some others outside the law. In general, as stated above, individual or group religious freedoms are limited by the constitution, the UDHR or the core human rights treaties.

beings (as individuals and as societies) nor can it find any meaning in the universe (including the meaning of/for human existence). Weber's awareness of the limitations of modern science (as well as economics, politics, art, etc.) suggests that a different role can be imagined for religion in the modern world than merely a private one. <http://www.hartsem.edu/academic/COURSES/summer2007/rs652.html>

⁴ The declaration is universal, and valid everywhere and for everyone. This was reconfirmed at various occasions, the most significant one in 1993 (Vienna) when all countries agreed that the universal nature of these *rights and freedoms is beyond question*, an almost non-diplomatic, strong statement indeed. Cultural 'relativism' should in principle be neglected or denied. However, as long as a state-party is over and above the minimum norms, it may act in accordance with its cultural tradition.

⁵ The Enlightenment is held to be the source of critical ideas, such as the centrality of *freedom, democracy and reason* as primary values of society. This view argues that the establishment of a contractual basis of rights would lead to the *market mechanism and capitalism*, the *scientific method*, religious *tolerance*, and the organization of states into self-governing republics through democratic means.

In Europe, obviously, the ECHR plays a pivotal role. It is therefore of the utmost relevance to refer to an important case on political freedoms, in particular the freedom to base your political ideas or future on religious dogmata. What about a political party that strives for the introduction of an Islamic political system, inclusive of Islamic laws. Those laws may deal with heritage, marriage, banking or what not. In a case by a Turkish political party that was forbidden by the Turkish authorities, the Court in Strasbourg ruled in a far-reaching case as follows:¹

The Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party – “Refah”) was a political party founded on 19 July 1983. In 1997 Principal State Counsel at the Court of Cassation brought proceedings in the Turkish Constitutional Court to dissolve Refah, which he accused of having become “a centre of activities against the principle of secularism”. In support of his application, he relied on various acts and declarations by leaders and members of Refah which he said indicated that some of the party’s objectives, such as the introduction of sharia and a theocratic regime, were incompatible with the requirements of a democratic society.

Before the Constitutional Court the applicants’ representatives maintained that Refah, which at the time had been in power for a year as part of a coalition government, had consistently observed the principle of secularism and respected all religious beliefs and consequently was not to be confused with political parties that sought the establishment of a totalitarian regime.

In its judgment of 16 January 1998 the Constitutional Court dissolved Refah on the ground that it had become a “centre of activities against the principle of secularism”. It also declared that Refah’s assets were to be transferred to the Treasury. The Constitutional Court further held that the public declarations of Refah’s leaders, and in particular Necmettin Erbakan, Şevket Kazan and Ahmet Tekdal, had directly engaged Refah’s responsibility as regards the constitutionality of its activities. Consequently, it banned them from sitting in Parliament or holding certain political posts for five years.

Freedoms guaranteed by Article 11, and by Articles 9 (freedom of religion) and 10 of the Convention, could not deprive the authorities of a State in which an association, through its activities, jeopardised that State’s institutions, of the right to protect those institutions. The Court had previously held that some compromise between the requirements of defending democratic society and individual rights was inherent in the Convention system.

The Court considered that a political party might campaign for a change in the law or the legal and constitutional structures of the State on two conditions: firstly, the means used to that end must be legal and democratic in every respect; secondly, the change proposed must itself be compatible with fundamental democratic principles.² It necessarily followed that a political party

¹ Based on the February 2003 press release: <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=84&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=&sessionId=13669692&skin=hudoc-pr-en>

² From the ECtHR (“the Court”) judgment: The Court concurs in the Chamber’s view that sharia is incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy, as set forth in the Convention:

“72. Like the [Turkish] Constitutional Court, the Court considers that sharia, which faithfully reflects the dogmas and divine rules laid down by religion, is stable and invariable. Principles such as pluralism in the political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place in it. The Court notes that, when read together, the offending statements, which contain explicit references to the introduction of sharia, are difficult to

whose leaders incited violence or put forward a political programme which failed to respect one or more of the rules of democracy or which was aimed at the destruction of democracy and the flouting of the rights and freedoms recognised in a democracy could not lay claim to the Convention’s protection against penalties imposed on those grounds.

(...) In making an overall assessment of the necessity of the interference and in particular whether it corresponded to a pressing social need, the Court found that the acts and speeches of Refah’s members and leaders cited by the Constitutional Court were imputable to the whole of the party, that those acts and speeches revealed Refah’s long-term policy of setting up a regime based on sharia within the framework of a plurality of legal systems and that Refah did not exclude recourse to force in order to implement its policy and keep the system it envisaged in place. Considering that these plans were incompatible with the concept of a “democratic society” and that the real opportunities Refah had to put them into practice made the danger to democracy more tangible and more immediate, the penalty imposed on the applicants by the Constitutional Court, even in the context of the restricted margin of appreciation left to it, might reasonably be considered to have met a “pressing social need”.

A final element of this judgment is the firm stand against a plural legal system, often promoted by religious die-hards: The Court examined in how far a plurality of legal systems would be compatible with the ECHR (para 126 of the judgment). It took note of the Turkish Constitutional Court’s considerations concerning the part played by a plurality of legal systems in the application of sharia in the history of Islamic law. These showed that sharia is a system of law applicable to relations between Muslims themselves and between Muslims and the adherents of other faiths. In order to enable the communities owing allegiance to other religions to live in a society dominated by sharia, a plurality of legal systems had also been introduced by the Islamic theocratic regime during the Ottoman Empire, before the Republic was founded.

1. The Court is not required to express an opinion in the abstract on the advantages and disadvantages of a plurality of legal systems. It notes, for the purposes of the present case, that – as the Constitutional Court observed – Refah’s policy was to apply some of sharia’s

reconcile with the fundamental principles of democracy, as conceived in the Convention taken as a whole. It is difficult to declare one’s respect for democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime based on sharia, which clearly diverges from Convention values, particularly with regard to its criminal law and criminal procedure, its rules on the legal status of women and the way it intervenes in all spheres of private and public life in accordance with religious precepts. ... In the Court’s view, a political party whose actions seem to be aimed at introducing sharia in a State party to the Convention can hardly be regarded as an association complying with the democratic ideal that underlies the whole of the Convention.”

The Court must not lose sight of the fact that in the past political movements based on religious fundamentalism have been able to seize political power in certain States and have had the opportunity to set up the model of society which they had in mind. It considers that, in accordance with the Convention’s provisions, each Contracting State may oppose such political movements in the light of its historical experience.

The Court further observes that there was already an Islamic theocratic regime under Ottoman law. When the former theocratic regime was dismantled and the republican regime was being set up, Turkey opted for a form of secularism which confined Islam and other religions to the sphere of private religious practice. Mindful of the importance for survival of the democratic regime of ensuring respect for the principle of secularism in Turkey, the Court considers that the Constitutional Court was justified in holding that Refah’s policy of establishing sharia was incompatible with democracy (see also paragraph 40 of the judgment).

private-law rules to a large part of the population in Turkey (namely Muslims), within the framework of a plurality of legal systems. Such a policy goes beyond the freedom of individuals to observe the precepts of their religion (... This) falls outside the private sphere to which Turkish law confines religion and suffers from the same contradictions with the Convention system as the introduction of sharia.

2. Pursuing that line of reasoning, the Court rejects the applicants' argument that prohibiting a plurality of private-law systems in the name of the special role of secularism in Turkey amounted to establishing discrimination against Muslims who wished to live their private lives in accordance with the precepts of their religion. It reiterates that freedom of religion, including the freedom to manifest one's religion by worship and observance, is primarily a matter of individual conscience, and stresses that the sphere of individual conscience is quite different from the field of private law, which concerns the organisation and functioning of society as a whole. (... States) may legitimately prevent the application within its jurisdiction of private-law rules of religious inspiration prejudicial to public order and the values of democracy for Convention purposes (such as rules permitting discrimination based on the gender of the parties concerned, as in polygamy and privileges for the male sex in matters of divorce and succession). The freedom to enter into contracts cannot encroach upon the State's role as the neutral and impartial organiser of the exercise of religions, faiths and beliefs (see paragraphs 91-92 above).

Conclusion

On a continent where the enlightenment has resulted in a form of liberalism coupled with ethics and virtues and where rights are increasingly linked to responsibilities, the issues of acculturation, assimilation and integration need to be taken up with the utmost honesty and the utmost care. Newcomers need to realize that their legal status can not and shall not be equated to that of the indigenous or the traditionally present minorities. Newcomers and the autochthonous need to appreciate that the freedoms everyone appears to enjoy should be coupled to the UDHR art. 29.3 duties. Also, in the context of respect, protection and fulfil, a clear understanding needs to be developed as to the obligations that the state/community has towards education, health, infrastructure and work opportunities. Those can only strive in a climate of trust, harmony and social cohesion.

With that in mind it should be appreciated that some of the individual rights cannot and shall not take centre stage. Without limiting the personal and private rights to enjoy one's own religion, it is herewith submitted that those enjoyments should take place in the temples and homes where they belong. The public domain, where harmony, social cohesion and trust need to prevail, should not be used for religious purposes. In those public areas a freedom of religion should be agreed on as one of the conditions for a mutually respectful society.

Apart from clearly indicating that the introduction of sharia or a multiple (private) law system is contrary to the principles of the ECHR, it should also be stressed that the European Court has also agreed with the prohibition of scarves, the obligation of wearing helmets, or the non-

regard of so-called praying obligations (rooms, times).¹ The presumption that freedom of religion apart from respect and protection should more often than not result in fulfilment is obviously wrong. The European Human Rights system allows us to be practical, to be pragmatic and to work towards a society in which freedom of religion is guaranteed, but in which religion shall not take centre stage.

Indeed, diversity has become one of the most challenging issues for our European society. Diversity is not always to be celebrated as claimed during the 2008 European Year of Intercultural Dialogue.² Yet, diversity, whether cultural, religious, linguistic, economic, ideological or historical, sometimes accelerates and enriches progress in society. But it also often hinders and is counter to the liberal traditions of that very same Europe. Diversity without integration and common citizenship leads to polarization and undermines social and economic structures. Dialogues should be welcomed, but based on the non-negotiability of e.g. UDHR and the European Convention on Human Rights. Allowing religion to take centre stage and to dominate the public discourse backfires and will delay the necessary integratory processes. Living together means that we focus on what we have in common.

A right to peace should be part and parcel of a 21st century human rights instrument. However, a careful formulation is needed in order to avoid unnecessary challenges. In that context politicization of human rights should be avoided. That can best be done by stating that the right to peace is above all an enabling right. Enabling in the sense that peace is a pre-condition to enjoy first and second generation rights as well as e.g. a right to development.

A right to peace, in whatever form, should moreover stress the need to engage in meaningful dialogues. Dialogues between peoples, between civilizations, between cultures, but always based on that truly universal instrument, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such dialogues

¹ The Court established case-law confirms that in a democratic society the State may limit the freedom to manifest a religion, for example by wearing an Islamic headscarf, if the exercise of that religion clashes with the aim of protecting the freedoms of others, public order and public safety (see *Dahlab v. Switzerland* (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V) [...] The obligation for a teacher to observe normal working hours which, he asserts, clash with his attendance at prayers, may be compatible with the freedom of religion (see *X v. UK*, no. 8160/78, Commission decision of 12 March 1981, Decisions and Reports (DR) 22, p.27), as may the obligation requiring a motorcyclist to wear a crash helmet, which in his view is incompatible with his religious duties (see *X. v. UK*, no. 7992/77, Commission decision of 12 July 1978, DR 14, p. 234).

It is recalled that art. 9 of the European Convention entails limits to the freedom of religion:

Article 9 . Freedom of thought, conscience and religion

1 *Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.*

2 *Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.*

² The European Year of Intercultural Dialogue run the risk of focusing on differences. An example:

The confrontation of cultural traditions as the source for a new cultural language.

The language of prejudice as the starting-point for a culture attentive to differences and with a "communal" ambition – the role of the media in the digital era as a sanctuary for the exchange of points of view – the genesis of new fears – the creation of transnational coalitions based on collective experiences – the instrumentalisation of exchanges as a tool for a common language.

http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/fileadmin/downloads/documents/133-nationalcampaigns/BE/Festival_of_Intercultural_Dialogue_Debates.pdf

will most probably have a positive impact on the realization of both peace and the right to peace.

Indeed, the link between cultural dialogues and peace is obvious.

Indeed, the right to peace and the concept of peace is evidently linked to proper dialogues and mutual trust.

Hereto the need for proper and inclusive education deserves to be underlined. As indicated above, education should not be organized along the lines of different culture or religion-based institutions. Schools are the ideal places to meet. Schools are at the source of dialogues. Schools are hence crucial for materializing dialogues and the right to peace.

A. I. Kuznetsov¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND NATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

The early 21st century was remarkable for an extraordinary growth of interest in history as one of the key factors that shape the public opinion and lasting stereotypes of how people take each other. I am not talking about the re-thinking of the past, which is inherent in each new generation. We are faced with a peculiar phenomenon of updating history, when certain events, usually related to wars and conflicts of long-term international consequences, are re-considered as something directly relevant in the present. Thus, the perception of the past affects not only the opinion of the political elites and the general public, but also the policies of states.

More and more often, we are becoming witnesses of how history performs the role of one of the key elements of 'soft power' in foreign and domestic policy. This is a double-edged dagger. Politically motivated interpretations of history are used for specific tasks aimed at building a positive or negative image of a country, at increasing or decreasing its reputation or image capital.

Famous American historian Barbara Tuchman wrote that one of the greatest mistakes in understanding history is its interpretation based not on circumstances, interests and dispositions that determined actions of people living in the given historical period, but from the standpoint of modern mentality, up-to-date political and ideological principles and benefits. It is the rejection of the historicist principle, sometimes quite conscious, that forms the basis of historical revisionism, which is aggressively asserting itself in a number of countries, particularly in those engaged in searching for their new identity.

Such examples are most noticeable in Europe. Here two contradictory trends face each other. One of them is imbued with the aspiration to confirm the positive values of the historical heritage, to learn lessons from the past and not to repeat its mistakes. These examples include the Franco-German and German-Russian reconciliation. It promotes the formation of a common historical memory that serves the interests of mutual understanding and rapprochement between peoples.

But there exists another trend, when, for the sake of parochial political interests, the fundamentals of national identity bear the images of 'enemy' represented by other states. Material claims for past wrongs are expressed. In

some Baltic states it came to the calls to turn their local national interpretations of the history, imposed on these countries, into mandatory interpretation for all member states of the European Union.

In the first place such a global-scale event as the Second World War is revised. For Russia, it is a matter of principle. The price that our people paid for the victory over the Nazis is too high for us to treat passively the desire to rewrite the history of that war. So for us, attempts to belittle our country's role in the victory over Nazism are unacceptable and offensive, as well as attempts to turn Nazi accomplices into heroes, to equalize politically and morally the winners and the losers, as, for example, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe did when they took the 2009 resolution equating crimes against humanity of Hitler's regime in Germany and the Stalinist regime in the Soviet Union.

Of course, this is a wrong place to start arguments over the disputed interpretations of history. There are other formats for that purpose. The objective of this report is to raise conceptually the question of the role of history in the dialogue of cultures, the question of how certain national interpretations of history correspond to the realities of global interdependent world.

The issue of making a non-confrontational approach to the interpretation of history is not novel. It has long been discussed both in the framework of international organizations, such as UNESCO and in the course of bilateral relations between countries. A useful experience has been accumulated, for example, in editing fundamental international publications on history, in creating cooperative textbooks, in implementing relevant programmes into educational systems of various countries.

However, under modern conditions, this issue requires much more attention, including as a part of the dialogue of cultures. So far, the collision between different interpretations of history have been relatively localized and mainly affected neighbouring countries. Today, in the globalized world, such conflicts can occur on a larger scale. Samuel Huntington wrote about the threat of civilizational gaps between different regions of the world. But now, in intensification of migration flows such gaps can occur within individual states and regions, they can lead to deregulation of international relations in general. Therefore, those are mistaken who for the sake of allied solidarity underestimate the danger of history fiddles, falsification of the truth about World War II and revision of moral and political judgement of Nazism. After all, a one-sided and biased interpretation of certain historical events or periods of history may well be transformed to the grounds of more and more escalating interethnic, intercultural and interreligious relations, thus becoming a cause of conflict

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and confrontation. The European experience of recent years shows that modern civilization is not completely immune to the revival of ideologies and movements close to neo-Nazism. This is manifested by the growing number of crimes motivated by extremism, racial and national hatred and xenophobia. Suffice it only to mention the mass slaughter of people in Norway. However, the glorification of Nazi collaborators and ostentatious parades of the former SS troupers is the way to the creeping legitimization of extremist and neo-Nazi groups. That's why a few years ago the State Duma of the Russian Federation issued a statement which noted that 'responsible politicians of the present time have no moral right to impose the burden of the past on the difficult path into the future of the whole European continent.'

All the above-said suggests that the issue of an unbiased approach to history should play a key role in the dialogue of cultures. What does it mean in practice?

Russia's experience shows that first of all we need to work patiently to bring historical truth to the public opinion, especially to the youth. The main means is to transfer controversial historical issues into the course of unbiased research and debates. It is clear that historians should have priority in this matter. The benefits of this practice can be shown, in particular, by the activities of our Joint Russian-Polish Group for Difficult Matters, by the Common commission of historians from Latvia and Lithuania. Undoubtedly, cooperation and solidarity between responsible historians of different countries should be raised to a new level.

Being a representative of the Historical Archives Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, I cannot help speaking about the role of archives. They are known to be the main source that historians rely on in their work. Archived documents cannot 'be reversed' or rewritten. They speak for themselves, showing the ambiguity and complexity of historical events and facts. They leave no room to tailor the events of the past into the pre-set schemes. In the hands of scrupulous researchers,

genuinely interested in the quest for historical truth, they can withstand all sorts of myths and falsifications. That is why the freedom of access to archives, declassification and publication of documents have become fundamental principles of Russian archives.

The role of civil society is no less great. Our duty is to provide lasting and systematic support to nongovernmental organizations and movements that oppose extremism based on ethnic or religious grounds, xenophobia, radical nationalism and chauvinism, that monitor these phenomena and analyze their social causes. Thus the barriers against the spread of 'special' interpretations of the 20th-century history encouraging nationalist revenge ideas and score-setting will be created.

In general, we are talking about how the scientific community and civil institutes will develop a package of organizational, informational, educational and other measures targeted at promoting thoughtful, objective approaches to history, devoid of political intrigue and myth-making. Of course, all this should not have anything to do with any attempts to impose a 'unified' approach to history, or attacks on freedom of researchers in their quest for historical truth. Pluralism in assessments and opinions is inevitable, but it may well fit into responsible and non-political perception of the past.

We live in a tumultuous world, its further development cannot be accurately predicted. But the range of potential threats and challenges, including intercivilizational and intercultural relations, emerges clearly and comprehensively. Therefore it is necessary to be proactive. Creation of a new world culture that meets the realities of the era of globalization requires development of relevant approaches to history that will go beyond narrow national interpretations. Natural tendency of the new generations to rethink the past should not serve to building artificial barriers of hostility and mistrust between the peoples but should serve for civilizational unity and solidarity of the modern world.

V. A. Lektorsky¹

CULTURAL VALUES: TOLERANCE AND DIALOGUE

How can cultures interact if they are based on different world-views and human visions, on different values and norms?

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Cultural interaction might be understood and practised variously.

First of all, it is tolerance. There are at least two ways of its interpretation.

1. Tolerance might mean indifference to the variety of cultural values, to the variety of world interpretation, to the variety of cultural practices because these differences are considered to be a minor problem civilization deals with. According to this meaning of tolerance true vision of the world and rules of the public life may be rationally proved and might be taken as doubtless for every reasonable person. However, people have some ideas which cannot be taken as a universal truth. First of all, they are values and worldviews in every culture. They are taken for granted on the irrational basis and play an important role in self-identification. As for the true statements, rationally determined moral and juridical norms, tolerance should not be applied to those who break them. Though, in this case it should be obvious that the truth cannot be imposed

physically or by propaganda. The person has to agree with the true statement or with the rational norm of behaviour only in terms of their own argumentation. That is why all the actions aimed at breaking the norms of social life must be terminated, and at the same time, one should be tolerant to the opposite irrational views. It is desirable to persuade those who share irrational views to accept rational and reasonable ideas by making the necessary conditions. According to this understanding of tolerance, cultural variety of values will be gradually reduced as the civilization is developing. It would be the result of the cultural interaction and the necessity to solve common practical problems.

2. However, tolerance might be understood in another way, as respect to another culture which one cannot understand but might only interact with. According to this interpretation of tolerance, specific values and world outlook in the cultures are meant to be trivial for human activity and social development but they shape the ways of its activity and its development. Pluralism of cultural values cannot be avoided because they root in human nature and connected with the need for self-actualization. According to this notion, cultures are incomparable. There is no system of privileged views and values. The only exception is the idea that all human beings, no matter what race, gender and nationality they are, have all equal rights for their physical life and cultural development. Different cultures do not mix up because they live in different worlds.

Thus, one interpretation of tolerance is based on the indifference to other cultures; the other is based on inability to understand them. However both interpretations have something in common. Both of them presuppose preserving cultural differences and do not allow their change or progress.

A popular present-day idea of multiculturalism is often equated with tolerance. Though the practice shows that this understood neither tolerance nor multiculturalism work, moreover they may sometimes cause unpleasant social consequences (this is today recognized by leaders of France and Germany), as a result, both of them start to be criticized. But the thing is that multiculturalism might also be interpreted differently. If cultures are considered to be closed and non-interactive then multiculturalism agrees with tolerance and, as the latter, demonstrates its failure. But if multiculturalism highlights the cultural openness, its international interaction and transfusion then multiculturalism does not agree with tolerance but is interpreted as the idea of intercultural dialogue. And the dialogue overlaps the idea of tolerance.

The peculiarity of the dialogue is that different cultures have their ways of development which means change in certain ways.

The dialogue considers the opponent's point of view. It does not mean to be opposed to another point of view. It means that another culture should not be an enemy, but a friend who can help to solve some common problems. Such dialogue will facilitate not only personal but also cultural self-actualization.

In this aspect I would like to clarify two points.

First, cultures in general cannot indulge in dialogue. 'The dialogue of cultures' is a metaphor. Only persons, groups of people, communities and social institutions can participate in such dialogue.

Second, such topics as world outlook or religious dogmas are not the subject of the dialogue as they constitute cultural identities and basically form personal identities of those who belong to a certain culture. Thus, if the culture does not destroy itself from the inside (which sometimes occurs), then its basic values are not to be discussed. For example, it is impossible to have a dialogue of cultures about religious beliefs that might be connected with self-identification. If any religion is ready to discuss its dogmas from the outside (from the point of atheistic view or from the viewpoint of other religion) it loses its right for further existence.

The dialogue between different cultures is possible and might be very productive in terms of finding the solutions to certain practical issues and in terms of solving those problems considering different values and world outlooks. Every culture realizes the problem from its perspective. Comparison of such understandings is possible and practically productive. Though, in terms of different cultural perspectives, the solutions might not only be different but they might be directly opposite. Moreover, the productivity might be estimated differently depending on the situation.

There are three possible outcomes of the cultural dialogue:

- a) Synthesis of cultures or traits of cultures.
- b) Development (change in some respects) of one or both sides of the dialogue.
- c) Refusal of one side to continue the dialogue and the rise of enmity to the other culture.

There is also a condition for the cultural dialogue. The sides should be common in understanding the issues under discussion (though the sides might consider different aspects of the problem), together with the common understanding of the economic and political instruments of influence on the process and the result of the dialogue. Thus, both sides of the dialogue should have equal rights. Otherwise all multiculturalism recognition looks hypocritical – it is just used to maintain a status quo which might not become desirable for the development of some cultures. Productive cultural dialogue is only possible in terms of universal political and legal institutions like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the system of the international law etc. These are crucial constituents of modern global unity.

But there are several problems in this respect. The thing is that some statements of the Universal Declaration contradict others, such as in terms of individual and collective rights (for example, the right of an individual for the free movement and the right of the culture for its self-preservation etc.) International right is still underdeveloped that is why in several cases it cannot properly regulate international and cultural relations. There is also a problem of the interpretation of some statements in the Universal Declaration and some articles of the international law. In some cases this interpretation is made in favour of certain countries. Such cases erode the importance of the Declaration and the international law in the global consciousness and create obstacles for international interaction.

The sides of the dialogue are usually presented by the distinct cultures. Though, these cultures might exist at various levels. There are national cultures. But there are also ethnic cultures, regional, and local cultures. Some social groups might be regarded as the representatives of some subcultures. Individual identity is based on the belonging

to several shared identities. Every culture deserves to be respected and might become a side in the dialogue. But in this case two issues are to be considered. First, the role of the cultures of different type and different level is different in the process of individual identity forming. Moreover, it might change depending of certain situations. An individual might belong to different cultural identities not only of different levels and also of the same level (an individual might have a multiple identity). Second, and it is crucial, the dialogue should not develop to preserve and cultivate differences and cultural identities but it should facilitate their interaction in order not to destroy but to change the differences (some differences will merge, some will be replaced with the new ones).

The dialogue of cultures is changing greatly. It does not only concern the change of cultures which participate in the dialogue. Individual attitude to the culture is changing, too.

It is true that an individual makes its individual identity on the basis of some shared identities. Today (as opposed to what was in the past) the attitude towards cultural identity change became much easier. The society becomes more and more individualized. In the past, cultures had national and ethnic character, today they are more varied. Many new cultural shapes appear.

In addition, it would be wrong to think that existing cultures participate or might participate in the dialogue of cultures. In fact, some of them were thrown aside by the globalization process and some cannot find their place in this process. In this case, the dialogue of cultures is not what should be spoken about but we should consider animosity of one culture towards another (others). In such cases, cultural isolationism, fundamentalism and nationalism might also be regarded as by-products of globalization.

Richard D. Lewis¹

THE ROOTS AND ROUTES OF CULTURE: FROM HARD-NOSED DIVERSITY TO INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE

Such international communication as we have today is a work in progress – a partly-achieved triumph over miscommunication resulting from obstinately differing cultural styles and world views inherited over millennia. The route to dialogue is consistently impeded and side-tracked by such factors as our implacable geographical environment, our indelible historical experiences, our religious and philosophical convictions and – most inevitably – the language we are born into. In a globalising world, major cultures need and strive to attain ease of mutual understanding. It is interesting to speculate if the 21st century will bring us the end (not of history) but of irrelevant cultural diversity.

When writers of science fiction such as Arthur C Clarke, Isaac Asimov and H G Wells imagine life on another planet – usually it is Mars – they may speculate on the physical characteristics of its inhabitants (little green men etc) or their mental or cultural traits (superior brain power, advanced technological techniques or weapons, intent on attacking and conquering Earth, and so on). Varying pictures have been conjured up of the Martian, Martian Language and Culture. Fecund though the imagination of these famous writers has been, none of them served up for us the prospect of hundreds of Martian tribes, with thousands of different Martian languages and hundreds of different Martian cultures. It would be too much for us to take in – too bizarre, unlikely.

Yet this is exactly the situation that a Martian would find on arriving on earth – 200 tribes called countries, perhaps 300 or more major cultures and a Tower of Babel greeting him in 3000 different modes of speech. This is not imagination – improbable though it is, it is bewildering reality. How did we end up in such a chaotically heterogenous situation? It is true the world population is

huge, but humanoids have been around for only a small fraction of the planet's existence – 7 million years out of 3,500 million – one five hundred millionth of Earth time! How can we have produced so much diversity in a period of 7 million years when crocodiles and sharks have not changed in the last 20 million?

Powerful factors have driven cultural evolution and change during our short existence. Four are dominant:

1. Geography, climate and environment
2. History
3. Religion
4. Language

Out of these four, three are relatively recent. History teaches us lessons, but few peoples beyond Chinese and Indians know their history prior to 5,000 BC though we have to reserve judgement on the 40,000 year Dreamtime of the Australian Aborigines. Religion, though hugely influential, could hardly predate the invention of speech, which is generally considered to have emerged around 200,000 years ago. GEOGRAPHY has been with humans from the start (first in Africa, followed by global wandering) and must be considered basic for human diversity. Since 5000 BC the influence of one's native language has been pervasive, particularly with regard to how it interacts with society, in a manner of mutual reinforcement (eg. Polite Japanese language, polite Japanese society).

The Cultural Categories

A Martian visitor, newly-arrived on Earth, would be inevitably confused (indeed bowled over) by the multiplicity of cultures and philosophies he would encounter. How to begin to communicate with Earthlings? In order to help him, we are able to divide human beings into three types, or categories – as follows: Linear-active, Multi-active and Reactive.

Linear-active people tend to be task-oriented, highly organized planners who complete action chains by doing one thing at a time, preferably in accordance with a linear

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agenda. Speech is for information and depends largely on facts and figures.

Multi-active people are loquacious, emotional and impulsive and attach great importance to family, meetings, relationships, compassion, and human warmth. They like to do many things at the same time and are poor followers of agendas. Speech is for opinions.

Reactive people – good listeners – rarely initiate action or discussion, preferring first to hear and establish the other's position, then react to it and formulate their own opinion. Reactives listen before they leap. Speech is for creating harmony.

Linear-active and multi-active people are types that are basically opposites. They disagree about most things (directness, emotion, multi-tasking, etc.) and often irritate each other (body language, interruptions, agendas). Reactives are different again, but get on slightly better with the other 2 categories inasmuch as they try to *react* agreeably and are basically less aggressive or opinionated.

At all events, international business, even in this Information Age, is continually hampered by cultural differences and misunderstandings.

Let us take a closer look at the factors that have led to this diversity.

Geography, climate and environment

A person's cultural make-up depends largely on where he or she was born and brought up. This is hardly surprising: there might be striking physiological differences, e.g. a blond Norwegian, 1.90 metres tall from Hammarfest in northern Norway and an African from the Gobi Desert. Even in cases of less dissimilarity, cold climates engender different mentalities from hot ones. The Arctic survivor – Norwegian, Finnish or Russian – is cool in character, generally works steadily to keep warm, keeps conversation to a minimum out of doors, engages in little body language wearing bulky clothes and minimal tactility in thick gloves. The Italian, blessed by Mediterranean sunshine, engages in lengthy *chiacchiera* in outdoor cafes, uses hand and arm gestures to the full, accompanied by expressive eye contact and frequent touch.

Hot and cold climatic conditions affect many aspects of culture – food and drink, dress, fashion, buildings, colour. Grey houses in Finland, Sweden and Switzerland contrast with light blue, dark blue, white and pink ones in Greece. Gloomy fishing boats in the Baltic are sombre in comparison with the brightly-coloured ones of Portugal. Mediterranean people eat local vegetables such as, aubergines, tomatoes, zucchini, spinach and asparagus. Norwegians eat much more meat with thick sauces or gravies to combat the cold. Scots warm themselves up with whisky, Russians with vodka.

Geographical influence is not only latitudinal – a matter of hot and cold. It is also longitudinal. Draw a straight line east through France, Turkey, Kazakhstan, India, Mongolia, China and Japan, and cultures will vary according to hill and dale, mountain or valley, desert or steppe, plain, plateau or island. Russia's vast land mass and its many national borders with neighbours, breeds a sense of vulnerability. Japan's island fortress suggests a warrior mentality. Fertile or infertile soil will produce easy-going or stubborn rural populaces. Abundant sunshine, or lack of it, is often linked to national rates of suicide.

History

History chronicles cultural development. Successes and failures in its record will modify the course a people will choose, but cultural change is by nature glacial and it takes a *traumatic* historical event to produce a sudden change. These are few and far between, as there is little new under the sun. But the 20th century gave us one such event: The Atomic Bombing of Japan.

The Japanese change was sensational. One has to have a clear view of Japan's history to appreciate what sudden defeat meant to the Japanese. In her long historical record, Japan had never been defeated in war. It was not possible for her to lose, as Divine Right was on her side. The Emperor was God. Japan was invincible. Suddenly the Emperor, standing beside General MacArthur, announced Japan had lost. The Japanese people "must bear the unbearable". In fact they did. The pacification of the warlike Japanese populace was the greatest cultural change of modern times.

Where history dictates to culture in a more lasting fashion is in regard to Cultural Black Holes – core beliefs of such gravity that they cannot be questioned. Examples are the enduring enmity between Turks and Greeks, Jews and Arabs, Romanians and Hungarians. Cultural black holes – and nearly every nation has one – prohibit intelligent or perceptive analysis of others' cultures or agendas. Democracies such as the USA and Japan have big ones. If you swallow, hook line and sinker, the concept of the American Dream, no other agenda is worthwhile contemplating. If you devote your life to avoiding loss of face and affirm unswerving obedience to the Emperor, you can hardly be a free agent in assessing others' values.

Historical influences on cultural development can also be perceived within the framework of past Empires. The Roman Empire was perhaps the most outstanding. Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese and Romanian cultures bear witness, in varying degrees, to Roman concepts of discipline, militarism, building, colonisation and passion. In a similar manner there is little doubt that the sub-continent of India, as well as other parts of Asia (and indeed Africa), were culturally influenced in matters of government, administration, parliamentary rule and acquiescence to industrialisation by the British. The British Empire, though vigorous and influential, was short-lived (180 years) as were the French, Spanish and Italian versions. The longest-lived was the Ottoman Empire (650 years) though its cultural legacy was more restricted among its subjects.

Religion

Religion, especially organized religion, has had a profound, worldwide influence on cultural behaviour. In the modern era, until September 11, 2001, we might have assumed that religious tenets, as guides to behaviour, were *diminishing in importance* in the face of scientific discovery, the advances of technology, and the globalisation of business. However, on the contrary, events in the last two decades *tend to support the opposite argument*. The partition of the Indian subcontinent, the Gulf War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the break-up of Yugoslavia, the hostilities in Bosnia and Kosovo, all bear witness to the continuing force and tenacity of religious beliefs.

Whatever one's personal view of organised religion may be, one fact stands out: religion is BIG TIME. The

three major religions originating in the Middle East – Christianity, Islam and Judaism, are worldwide and have two billion followers. Islam is the fastest-growing religion, though Hinduism is the world's largest. Buddhism, founded in N. India, is now practised in Burma, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Korea, China, Vietnam, Nepal, Tibet, Central Asia and Japan. Religion and culture are inextricably linked inasmuch as the everyday behaviour of devotees is affected. Even daily business decisions of Hindus, Muslims, and Buddhists are taken within the framework of their religious beliefs.

Religion, though an effective driver of culture, is *not static*. Currently, the Roman Catholic Church faces a crisis of morals. Islam has also had its ups and downs in contrasting periods in the Crusades and (peaceful) El Andalus. Arabs are currently its most vociferous adherents, but actually are a rather small minority of Muslims. Turkey with 80 million people practises a form of Islam which co-exists easily with secularists, while Indonesia, with over 200 million Muslims, might establish a more relaxed worldwide vision of Islam in the future.

Language

The strongest influence on our cultural behaviour, even more than geography and climate, is one we are most likely to be unaware of: our native language. We cannot avoid language, we are born into it. It structures our thought processes.

In past centuries it was assumed by western scholars that thought processes were universal, that people everywhere had the same strategies for processing information and drawing inferences from it. It was only in the 20th century with the stunning influence of Asian, and particularly Japanese, economic success, that increasing credence has been lent to the belief that people in the East hold valid world views that are not necessarily those of the West.

My extensive contact with Asians in academic, social and business life has led me to believe that *a basic difference in cognitive processes* between East and West is a major source of cultural diversity between the two. To be more specific, the basic concepts of truth, logic and reasoning in the East and West are arrived at by completely different routes. *Linear-active* Westerners, including Russians, believe in scientific truth, - one that can be established through Cartesian, Hegelian or other logical systems. They focus on target objects (especially those that can advance their goals).

When Asians focus on objects or things (or even *persons*) they do so holistically, that is to say they refuse (or are unable) to separate them from their context or environment; they see people and objects as parts of a whole that cannot be manipulated or controlled piece by piece. In their eyes the world is too complicated to be contained in linear pigeon-holes. For the Chinese there is no absolute truth, only situational or temporary alignment of facts. Something can be right or wrong or black and white at the same time, as long as the outcome is virtuous and harmony is preserved. The Japanese regard truth as a *dangerous concept* which may destroy harmony and progress. In the West, *multi-active* truth differs from the *linear-active* version. Italians see truth as *negotiable* (in order to produce the best possible outcome in a given situation). Hispanics contemplate *dual truth* – one for immediate necessities and another for the philosophical view.

These diverse concepts of truth and reality cause the three cultural types to organize their lives in quite different ways. Everything is affected: social behaviour, business methods, decision making, problem solving, communication styles, considerations of hierarchy and respect, aesthetics and creativity, standards of ethics, ways of negotiating, societal obligations, sense of duty, and so on. The diversity of conduct springs from one's interpretation of how the world really is. But what cognitive or interpretive tools does one use to sense reality? Why or how do they differ from culture to culture?

To begin with, there was spoken language – indeed a complete linguistic map or blueprint to describe reality for us. But there are strikingly different maps. A person embarking in life with Germans and their tidy, disciplined thought processes will have a different world view from the linguistically freewheeling American or Australian. The schism is much greater between European languages and Japanese. Language determines thought more than the other way round. By the age of 9 or 10 our thought patterns are calibrated for good by either clinically logical French, exuberant Russian, colourful, but vague Spanish, respect-oriented, but even vaguer Japanese.

Language is our first and most basic tool for interpreting the nature of the universe. How else can we think about it? How else can our elders inform us? How else do we pass on information to others? Well, perhaps with writing. Yet if the difference between Western and Eastern languages is formidable, the contrasting nature of the writing systems is even more striking. Indo-European children have at their disposal an analytical, logical language system with a script of 22 to 28 letters. They can concentrate on *what* is said or written. The Japanese or Chinese child is expected to wield languages rich in give-and-take respect mechanisms, with many ambiguous features written with 5,000 to 10,000 ideographs (or pictographs) that will take them 10-20 years to learn. They will concentrate more on *how* something is said or written. The Western script informs with *content*. The Eastern *kanji* (pictographs) have both informative and *aesthetic* impact.

To complicate things further for the Japanese, the *kanji* script, originally Chinese, conveys only isolated concepts – mainly nouns. Japanese is an agglutinative language whose many suffixes (prepositions, etc.) cannot be written in *kanji*. The Japanese therefore had to invent further scripts – *hiragana* and *katakana* – to sit along *kanji* to complete meaning.

A further complication arises when a Japanese reads a text. *Kanji* is aesthetic (pictorial). *Hiragana* and *Katakana* are informational. We use the left-hand side of the brain to process informational or logical concepts (mathematics, etc.), but the right-hand side of the brain deals with aesthetic or creative concepts such as music, paintings, drawings and so on. Japanese, therefore, must use *both* sides of the brain simultaneously to read a book or newspaper!

Quirks and subtleties of language lead to many cultural idiosyncracies. My daughter who worked for a Japanese company in London and speaks fluent Japanese, wanted a raise in salary but found it impossible to ask her (male) boss for it in Japanese. She switched to English and managed it. Japanese is spoken at five or more different levels and registers. There is a complete feminine version of Japanese, unused by males. There is another version used only when

speaking to the Emperor! Other Asian languages are rich in respect forms. It is said there are 46 different words for “you” in Thai. In Chinese the concept of ‘self’ is the sum total of the people you have met and interacted with. Without them, you do not exist. Japanese prefer to *leave out* the various forms of the first personal singular (to appear more modest). Foreigners using the word ‘I’ in Japanese appear assertive!

German businessmen, constrained by tight German grammar, sometimes say they prefer to conduct business meetings in English, as it allows them to be more relaxed and humorous, perhaps resulting in better deals. Words such as ‘*saudades*’ in Portuguese, ‘*sisu*’ in Finnish and ‘*dusha*’ in Russian are difficult to explain in other languages. Most languages have only 2 or 3 words for ‘green’, whereas Zulu is reputed to have 39 (since they need them to describe their nature). Our native language, expressive though it may be, only allows us to think along the grooves or channels by which it is constituted. In this sense it acts as a kind of linguistic strait-jacket.

Cultural differences notwithstanding, we have progressed a long way along the route to international understanding. Methods of studying foreign languages are greatly improved in Western Europe, Russia and even China. English serves as a *lingua franca* for millions especially in the areas of trade, technology and travel. International organisations such as the UN, UNESCO, WTO, IMF, the World Bank, ASEAN and others meet regularly. The BRICS union of Brazil, Russia, India, China (and now South Africa) will

undoubtedly contribute to dialogue between nations in the future.

Yet dialogue between nations and cultures is not easy. Let us take the progress of BRICS as an example. This powerful union comprises half of the world’s population and nearly 50% of global GDP. They wish to enter into a meaningful dialogue with the west about having a greater voice in the running of the IMF, the World Bank and similar institutions. This is likely to present certain challenges.

To begin with, whose is the voice of BRICS to communicate their own values and aspirations? Is it voluble, emotional Indian, fluid, charismatic Brazilian, reserved (often ambiguous) Chinese or resolute, determined Russian? Just as they *communicate* differently, their *values* are even more divergent. Hindu philosophy and Roman Catholic doctrine have little in common with Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism or with Russia’s mix of Orthodoxy and secular beliefs. The BRICS concept is an immensely powerful one. If this union, with its impressive membership, can succeed in exerting leverage on how world finances are organised, the nature of globalisation would change drastically. Put together China as the No. 1 economy, India and China as the biggest consumers, Brazil with its unending supply of commodities and Russian assets of land, minerals and energy resources, and the bloc’s influence would be immeasurable. They have economic clout but how durable is their union from a cultural point of view?

Multi-faceted Russia, with her Eurasian breadth of vision, could be a key player.

Li Shenming¹

MAY ROSE AND VIOLET BLOSSOM IN DIFFERENT SCENTS On Equal-Righted Dialogue and Equal-Righted Communication between Civilizations and Cultures

International financial crisis hasn't been over up to the present and it has a lasting nature. The point is that this process shows the crisis of international economics of capitalist countries, of their system and values. It is a global crisis, its outburst was inevitable, as for many years it had been anticipated but delayed, and it is impossible for a single country to overcome it within 3 or 5 years. It is obvious that globalization, stimulated by neo-liberalism, will be looked at with suspicion all over the world. The ideas propagated by the left forces are being renewed nowadays. It is a critical time for us to gather here and discuss the issues of equal-righted dialogue and equal-righted communication between civilizations and cultures that is significant both theoretically and practically.

In the vast spaces of the Universe, on this small planet, in complex environments, the man as the world’s perfection appeared, and he was lucky. In complex and unique combinations of geological, geographical, ethnical,

economical, political, cultural and other conditions various civilizations and cultures were born. For almost 6000 years of human history 26 types of civilizations have evolved. In the modern world there are about 63 religions, 190 countries, 6700 languages, over 2000 nations. The diversity of cultures and civilizations in the world was elaborately created by various countries, peoples and nations, and it has been inherited in generations. It is a common value of the mankind, we should appreciate it and enhance the dialogue between different cultures and civilizations for the benefit of peoples in these countries.

However, in the 1990s when the Cold war was over, a rare ‘single superpower’ first appeared in the history of the mankind. Globalization of economics promoted by this single superpower accompanied by a new scientific and technological revolution greatly expanded the boost of international monopolistic capital on the global scale. As a result, a large number of countries, nations, regions and communities have been absorbed by the system of the global economics with that single superpower at the centre. In the modern world globalization of economics is not just an economic process. In also lead to the fact that the hegemonic state imposes its cultural values and political ideas through economic expansion. These findings can

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help us understand the basic reasons of hegemony rise in politics and culture, and can also contribute to a deeper understanding of significance of political multi-polarity and diversity of cultures and civilizations in the world. How do we understand different cultures and civilizations? At the turn of the centuries the western political theories experienced outburst of a wide range of books and theories about the future of the mankind. Among them clash-of-civilizations and end-of-history theories are the most demonstrative. Owing to the outbreaks of international financial crisis, the clash-of-civilizations and end-of-history theories are put into question. Even the author of the end-of-history theory had to admit that history is not ended with the capitalist system and the capitalist values.

But we should also realize that *ideological project of hegemony is domination in ideological sphere all over the world*. In the modern world over 90 per cent of news in the flows of global information are controlled by the West, headed by the United States of America. The share of cinema and TV produced by the USA was 6.7% in the world market, but the share of American films was over 50%, and TV – over 70% in the world market. In 1985 the cost of TV and audiovisual production had the 11th place in the American national economy, in 1994 it was the 6th place, the export of TV and audiovisual production took the second place, giving way only to airplanes export. In 2000 the cost of TV and audiovisual production export matched the cost of export of aerospace production and took the first place in the US export. In 2010 the share of culture industry of the USA reached 43% of the world, while the share of Chinese culture industry was less than 4%, less than one tenth of the US share. The share of culture industry in American gross domestic product reached 25%, in Japan 20%, while in China 2.5%. About 80% of global internet resources are occupied by the USA, over 80% of internet database resources are controlled by the USA, almost all rules in the Internet are made in the USA. In China there are over 560 million internet users, but their input information was only 0.1% of the total information flow in the Internet and output information was 0.05%. The USA called the Internet ‘the battlefield’ like land, sea, air and space. It is a clear example of cultural hegemony of the USA. In fact, the USA perform the role of the police for the informational flows of the global Internet, trying to give access only to those that match the values of the western world led by the USA. Not only the most popular Internet, but radio, newspapers, magazines, famous and wide-spread all over the world, as well as universities, research and consulting centres that provide implicit services to the USA, are controlled by the western world, headed by the USA.

Financial, technical and military hegemony of the USA persistently promote their cultural hegemony. In a way, we can say that financial hegemony serves as a concentrated manifestation of economic hegemony of international monopoly capital, and military hegemony is a concentrated manifestation of political hegemony, cultural hegemony serves as a concentrated manifestation of ideological hegemony, and technical hegemony is piercing economic, political and cultural hegemonies. Financial, technical and cultural hegemony can be treated as soft power, while military hegemony as hard power. Combination of hegemonies, including financial, technical, cultural and

military hegemonies, can serve as a new feature of modern period of world capitalist imperialism.

In the sphere of culture and civilization the penetration of the western world with the notorious power at the head into the underdeveloped countries can be witnessed in the following 5 areas: 1) Ideologically, Marxism is criticized; national patriotism is criticized too, with the attempt to replace patriotism with a concept of ‘universal human values’; 2) Propagate of free market economics and privatization; 3) Undermine the form of governing, party system and authorities of other countries; 4) Deny the history of civilization and obvious astonishing success of other countries; 5) In international relations deny the state sovereignty, unleash conflict of civilizations and propagate general concepts of culture and values.

One of the great philosophers K. Marx, long before marked out that man glorifies the rich diversity of nature treasures but does not want the rose and gillyflower to have the same scent. But why do some people demand the unified form from cultures and civilizations, their diversity can accumulate as material and spiritual values and has rich contents. Different cultures and civilizations have different features, just like stone has facets, while water reflects light, but it only adds to the beauty of the world. If you smooth the facets of stone or make the water unreflecting, who will ever come to enjoy this scenery of water and stones that once used to be so picturesque and diverse?

As one of Chinese scientists, I advocate the following items:

Firstly, it is necessary to respect and support the right of different countries to choose their social regime and ways of development. Social regime and way of development are the core essence of culture and civilization of a country, they make the matter that controls other ways to manifest culture, civilization and spirit of the country concerned. If any unique culture was deprived of its peculiar way of production and life, deprived of its basic economic and political regime, no matter how much money it will invest into attempts to preserve the culture and civilization, they are deprived of their bouncing vitality and energy. We should respect and keep intact the diversity of cultures and civilizations in order to preserve diversity of basic economic regimes and ways of development, respect political multi-polarity, object to economic and political hegemony in the world.

Secondly, we have to support equal-righted dialogue of different cultures and civilizations. Every state and nation has their own cultural traditions and a model of development. All countries and nations contribute to thousand-year-old history of the mankind. All countries and nations are beams of culture and civilizations, despite the fact that they are different in size, or that their cultural development reached its zenith in different time, they can't be discriminated, and treated as bad and good, high-grade, or low-grade.

Thirdly, we should support mutual borrowing of different cultures and civilizations from each other. Cultural traditions of different cultures and civilizations should be inherited from the senior generations, they should be exchanged mutually and on an equal-right basis, borrowed and learned from. By mutual cultural exchange each culture and civilization incorporates new contents and provides peaceful environment and reasonable grounds for the universal benefit and flourishing.

Fourthly, we should treat our national culture with love and confidence, remember our origin and roots. Hegemonistic culture has always existed, both in the past and at present, and perhaps, it might even last for some time in future. That is why all countries and nations, especially those that have little advantage of flourishing, should preserve and promote their unique culture and civilization. Cultures and civilizations have

rich and profound contents. We shouldn't measure the progress or underdevelopment of culture and civilizations only in terms of development of engineering and production.

Like at home, like in the international area. Preserving scientific, national and mass culture, every country and every nation should keep intact its unique life and development, cultivate and enhance it.

A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CIRCULATION OF CULTURAL VALUES

Expansion of humanitarian cooperation reveals problems concerning law enforcement of various relations that are evolved in that sphere of international life. The range of these relations is quite wide: from traditional ones, including protection of architectural heritage and protection of rights on it; through illegal export of objects of culture, freedom of migration and visas regimes, or state guarantees on protection of cultural heritage, to relatively new ones, such as law enforcement in cyber-space and circulation of cultural values.

In most cases the force of law focuses directly on the relations concerning protection of cultural heritage or enlightenment activities. However, there can be identified general law issues, typical, in particular, of enforcement of property relations in other spheres, such as international trade. This category of issues include the right of state property on international circulation, issues of international jurisdiction, issues of application of foreign legislation to international private law relations.

Law enforcement of relations concerning the protection and circulation of cultural heritage should be considered as follows. Firstly, the objects defined as cultural heritage are divided into movable and immovable objects. Secondly, enforcement of their protection is performed, basically, subject to public law norms, while their circulation on private law norms. Thirdly, in respect with the objects and relations concerned, the legislation is relevant on both national and international levels. Thus, the sources of law enforcement are: national legislation that suggests its multiple application, and international regulatory acts. The balance between these two categories of law sources for enforcement of any relations including those referred to cultural heritage, is specified in the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

The Constitution of the Russian Federation defines that common principles and norms of international law and international agreements of the Russian federation

are an essential part of its legal system. If an international agreement provides regulations other than stipulated by the law, then these regulations of an international agreement are applied (part 4, clause 15 of the Constitution). Hence, the point of view of Russian legislation in terms of international agreement's role is rather liberal, but precisely defined.

One can hardly imagine a state that ignores the challenge of protection of cultural heritage or does not accept an international agreement as a legal remedy providing the regulations for such a protection. However, as a matter of practice, not all issues demanding international legal enforcement are fixed in certain acts.

Before any state enters into an international agreement, a dilemma of making a political choice antecedes: if a state can accept and share goals, objectives and provisions formulated in the certain clauses of this agreement. An ambiguous situation is often evolved in that case. Having entered into an agreement, the state acknowledges its priority, however, only to the extent that its internal legislation allows to accede the agreement that contains clauses others than in its internal legislation. Sometimes, even the most novel provisions of an international agreement can be unacceptable for a certain state, because the sphere of the enforcing the law fails to meet public law norms of a national legal system that sidelines the government in their wish to introduce a new and 'tempting' enforcement. The issue of keeping a balance between the priority of an international agreement and possibilities of the government to join its provisions perfectly relates to the sphere of enforcement of protection of cultural heritage and their circulation.

For historical reasons, legal regime of cultural heritage, as well as enforcement of its circulation in Europe has its peculiar features, provided first of all by the civilizational solidarity of European states. It can be proved by the remarkable range of international conventions and other international legal documents that originated as far as in the 19th century. Talking about Russian initiatives in this sphere, Nicolai Roerich is worth noting. His ideas and efforts started in 1905 in St. Petersburg went beyond European borders and resulted in signing *Pax Cultura* or the *Roerich Pact* in Washington, April, 15, 1935.

It should be pointed out that the process of creating international legal rules concerning the protection and circulation of cultural heritage was based, firstly, on diversity of approaches in European states, and this diversity begot contemporary legal awareness. However, within the last twenty years, the legal picture of the world

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has dramatically changed. Primarily, it is connected with the intensive growth of the European Union and European law. An outside point of view, it can be a view from Russia, can spot certain alterations in the process of creating international legal rules in various spheres of international activities, including the sphere of protection and circulation of cultural heritage. It seems that this has resulted from the fact that the main direction for the legal ideas to develop in the member countries of the European Union is super-national law. There arises a question, what is happening on the European continent, beyond the border of the European Union and what are the ways of cooperation of other countries, in particular, Russia, with the European Union and/or its member-states? Are there any special features in law enforcement beyond Europe, including Russia?

As far as this issue is concerned, it might be interesting to refer to certain aspects of enforcement of protection and circulation of cultural heritage that are burning today and are involved in the process of legal systems interactions.¹ These aspects are rested upon the factors that are associated with certain global challenges of the 20th century, as well as with the legal status of the participants of the relations for protection and circulation of cultural heritage.

The first factor is disasters of the 20th century that refer to revolutions and wars, in which the victims were not only people but spiritual and cultural values. This turmoil became the driving force to remove people against their will, and to remove cultural heritage that had been collected for centuries by individuals and states. These factors operate ignoring the usual civil institutions and thus cause the problems that are hard to solve in the peaceful time, some

decades later, when it is natural to follow the institutions of a rule-of-law state.

The second factor is inevitable companions of the legal enforcement of relations concerning cultural heritage, that originally lay a claim to be exclusive. These are the status of the state as a proprietor and sovereign, as well as such legal institutions as public order and public interest. Complex legal issues are tangled here, they belong to the sphere of international private and international public law, 'internal' and international civil process.

Thus, in the reality the situations can occur when private persons, laying their claims on pictures, libraries and other movable objects referring to cultural heritage, seek legal remedies not in the courts of the states where the objects are located, but in other jurisdictions more convenient for them. Actually, such an approach is quite popular in international practice and is called *Forum Shopping*. However, in respect with the issues in question, it faces a fundamental problem of both international law and international civil procedure – judicial immunity of a foreign state, because cultural heritage as the object in dispute, is owned by a foreign state.

Thus, identifying burning issues of international protection of cultural heritage, we can come to a very topical challenge that is evolved not only in the sphere of enforcement of circulation of cultural heritage, but it also relates to other relations in the sphere of international communication, i.e. development of a more universal mechanism to solve the disputes aggravated with foreign or international elements. In this respect it is practical to create a universal convention of the international civil procedure under the Hague conferences on international private law.

E. I. Makarov²

SOCIAL AND LABOUR RELATIONS AND THE VALUE OF 'WORKING MAN' IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERNIZATION

1. Following the theme of the Likhachov Conference, as identified by the Organizing Committee in 2013, I would like to highlight the issue of values in social and labour relations from the standpoint of the Russian Federation of Trade Unions.

The historic changes that occurred in our country in the early '90s of the 20th century resulted in a full-scale restructuring of cultural codes that had developed in our society for over 70 years. The Soviet state, originated under the slogan of the proletarian revolution, paid a great attention to social and labour relations throughout the history of its existence. In the USSR, a working man, a proletarian, was in the focus of ideological work, the fundamentals of

communism were based on the liberation of labour. The authorities featured the issue of labour as a very prominent one in domestic politics, in arts, in life and in science, in all cultural practices of the Soviet system.

The transition to capitalism inevitably led to the destruction of the old system and to a gradual change in the value-semantic content of social and labour relations. When economic liberalism, which has become the opposite of the former state system, was accepted, it drew out several teachings according to which employers and employees were deserted in their confrontation over the distribution of the labour results. However, the time has shown that social practices of classical liberalism are negatively treated by the majority of population, besides the economic aftermaths of privatization and free market in Russia are subjected to constant criticism. Nowadays, just like in the days of the Great Depression in the United States, Keynesian ideas are becoming more and more popular in our country. It seems that the 'invisible hand of the market' gives way to a more pragmatic management tools.

In this respect, it is important to re-consider the role and the place of social and labour relations in the value system of our society, it is necessary to use the possibilities

¹ The main source of legal research in this sphere in Russia is the by Professor M. M. Bogyslavsky's *Cultural Values in International Circulation: Legal Aspects*, Moscow, 2005.

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of inter-temporal cultural dialogue in order to transit viable and reasonable ideas from the past to the present.

2. A vast material to consider social and labour issues can be found in the project initiated by St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, for the last two years it has been developed under the name of 'Practical Conflict Studies'. Its special part is being carried out under my leadership: the operations of the Centre for Monitoring and Analysis of Social and Labour Conflicts, and the work of a corresponding academic laboratory.

Without going into much detail, the project can be described as targeted at development of a sub-discipline, that is, social and labour conflict studies. The project is interdisciplinary in its nature, it is created with the aid of Systems Theory, Analysis and Modelling, Linguistics, Statistical Analysis, Programming, and a number of other disciplines. Currently, the project looks as an automated information system enabling to perform two main functions: a real-time monitoring of the conflicts in labour relations on the territory of the Russian Federation and foreign countries; and making technical and contents analysis of social and labour conflicts, such methods are also based on modern approaches to data analysis. Prognosticating element of the project is still under development, which will help social partners to be guided in the current environment on the 'labour front' and to proceed to practical resolution of social and labour conflicts, as well as to take promptly measures directed at prevention of tension in this sphere.

The system of data accumulated in the course of monitoring of social and labour conflicts from November to April 2013, makes us take a fresh look not only at social and labour conflicts, their form and content, but also to raise the issue about the role of social and labour relations in today's social, economic and political spheres.

A few figures will help to provide evidence for this issue. Within the period from 1 November 2012 to 25 April 2013 87 actual social and labour conflicts, which were accompanied by 314 events, were reported on the territory of the Russian Federation. From a dozen to several hundred employees were involved in these conflicts. The conflicts were recorded in ten key sectors of the economy, they occurred in all federal districts. So far 48 conflicts have been resolved, 28 conflict are in stage of development, the rest are just evolving. 63% of resolved cases happened in the most severe and destructive form, the strike. In 25% cases of resolved conflicts the solution of labour disputes was found under the threat of a strike. These data obtained during a constant monitoring were verified by multiple sources and are virtually fully reliable. The information given above resembles in its form a summary of 'field combat operations'. Actually, if this data is combined with calculations on real economic losses, and if we try to assess the scale of a non-economic damage, it becomes clear that *social and labour conflicts are a key problem in our society*.

It is worth noting, that about 80% of resolved conflict were settled only thanks to intermediacy of authorities at various levels, which indicates a non-stop replication of the 'Pikalyovo' syndrome, when the resolution of a labour conflict is performed by methods of state intermediacy, the so-called 'Manual Management', and it always happens at the destructive stage of a social clash.

3. However, social and labour relations, which, in fact, are the causes of labour conflicts, were pushed out of the social and political spheres of the public attention. It can be stated that our country doesn't raise the issue of the role of social and labour relations, in a simplified form, 'the role of the 'working man' in the global changes of our country.

This tendency can be witnessed not only in the social and political aspects, but in scientific ones, too. In the course of the project its authors have faced significant hindrances in applied academic resourcing of Conflict Studies. First of all, in insufficient development of the conceptual apparatus, lack of established typologies and classifications in Conflict Studies in general and in the social and labour sub-discipline. We can make a general conclusion that immature domestic conflict studies are on the stage when the basic features of scientific knowledge are still being developed. Information system developers ensured that weakness of science generates inability to use mathematical tools. The fundamental problems of conflict studies development can not be compensated with piling up classifications, unsystematic social and labour monitoring results, a range of intuitive speculations about psychological aspects of interpersonal and collective conflicts, created within the philosophical and sociological schools.

4. It could be clearly seen during the round table 'Labour in Human Values System', held by the journalism club of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, on March 14, 2013, in which many scholars and practitioners took part. During the discussion, it was remarked that there was lack of attention to the problems of labour not only among scientists (such conclusion is based on the analysis of the dynamics of publications on social and labour issues in Russian scientific journals over the last ten years), but also among politicians, officials and in the information flows that shape the public opinion.

Why is the current situation so dangerous? Why do we need to extract from a dusty closet of the past years now little-known and meaningless phrases: a working man, social and labour potential, social and labour power, labour enthusiasm? The answer is obvious.

5. Top political authorities of the country have declared modernization as a strategic direction of Russia's development. Without further going into details on the contents of the term that politicians ascribe to it, let's take into account that the modernization as a comprehensive civilization process involves socio-cultural, industrial, and information elements. The intention to put the modernization project into life quite rightly raises the challenge of social basis of modernization in general and of its individual components. Given the fact that the industrial component has an equal position with the other two, we have to find an answer about the role and structure of its socio-professional base.

According to the research made by the scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences (corresponding member of the Russian academy of Sciences N.I. Lapin, Dr. Sc. Belyaeva N.A.) [1] in 2010, 75% (64) of the entities of the Russian Federation are on the first stage of industrial modernization, of which 10 are on low levels of the initial phase, and 27 are on the advanced phase. Only 23% (19) regions have transited to the next stage, the information stage of modernization. It is evident that the socio-professional group, of 'blue-collars', skilled workers,

engineers, production managers and other working people are the driving force that should get 75% of the country regions to the next stage of modernization and there is no other alternative. This fact is worth stating, as it enables to abandon platitudes and get to drafting tangible systemic activities in order to achieve the declared objectives on such a large scale.

6. In this respect, it might be beneficial and required to make a retrospective analysis of the role and place of a 'working man', of labour relations and corresponding issues in the history of our country for solving economic, social and political problems of a similar scale.

The most revealing episodes were selected that clearly indicate a critical, in some cases, key role of a social and labour factor in the large-scale transformations. These examples show that counting for, or *visa versa*, ignoring social and labour context may lead to either unprecedented achievements or to devastating disasters.

7. 'To catch up and overtake' was the slogan put forward by Khrushchev in 1957, which referred not only to the economics but, what is more indicative, to enhanced building of communism, that is to a sharp increase in consumption, comparable to the level of consumptions in the United States. At the initial stage, the political authorities recognized the importance of a simultaneous solution of these two interrelated issues. The course of events showed that in a relatively short period of time it is possible to achieve outstanding breakthrough in industry and science, however if you ignore or do not solve the problem of a compensation for labour decisively and vigorously enough, if you not develop industries that provide consumption it is not possible to achieve this goal. This is exactly what happened then. Neither by 1960 or 1970 the then authorities of the Soviet Union could have achieved their objectives. The Festival of Youth and Students in 1957 opened the eyes of millions of our citizens on how working people live abroad. Disclosure Policy, announced by Khrushchev revealed to skilled Soviet workers showed the purchasing power of salaries of engineers and workers in capitalist countries. They saw conditions and labour management, which Russian specialists could only dream of. In this respect, timely steps had to be undertaken to transfer the economics, already remote enough from wartime, mobilization and rehabilitation, to a new type of management, planning and development. In other words, Kosygin's economic reform was to have taken place not in the late 60's, but 10 years earlier. As far as in the late 50's mechanisms to stimulate the growth of labour productivity, intensive use of labour potential, transition to a different model had become urgent. However, inattention and neglect to social and labour relations and, in particular, to increasing production rates at enterprises without a decent compensation, a great decline in the purchasing power of wages of working people led to violence. In Novocherkassk in 1962 by the decision of the political authorities the workers and their families who were demanding some bread and meat price lowering were shot. 23 people were killed [2]. Two years after the events in Novocherkassk Khrushchev was hatched from power.

Stumbling rocks were not only his opportunistic initiatives in agriculture (with the resulting problems of food supply for the population), but also his unjustified account on the post-war labour enthusiasm, which by the mid-'50s, had exhausted its potential.

8. Recovery of the economy after the war, and in particular of the industry in 1948, was only possible due to heroic efforts of the entire working population of the USSR. Despite large irreparable loss of human resources and a severe shortage of personnel, the authorities of the USSR took steps to normalize the working hours, they cancelled overtime work, restored the 8-hour day and annual paid leave as the primary measures in order to transit the economics to a peacetime mode. The government clearly understood that ignoring interests of working men would not solve the problem of restoration of the European part of the country from the ruins. Social policy was distinctly targeted at the increase in welfare of the workforce. An example of sensible governance was the currency reform of 1947, which resulted in the fact that the population of the country received a full-fledged ruble. During the fourth five-year plan prices for consumer goods were repeatedly declining [3]. The purchasing power of wages and consumption steadily grew. The combination of social and economic policy, accounting for important interests of working men in those years made it possible to achieve the goal of restoring the national economy in the short term (8 years). The most significant part of that breakthrough was a balanced social and labour policy, accounting for interests of working men at all levels of decision-making.

9. 'Everything for the front, everything for then Victory' was a mobilization slogan put forward by Stalin in 1941, it claimed the simple truth: the defeat the enemy only by military measures will fail. The outcome of the war depended equally on military and industrial potential of the country. It was necessary to make the best use of the potential of citizens, to create conditions for productive work for the benefits of defence. To maintain industrial potential of the country several thousand enterprises were evacuated, 17 million people (mostly engineers and skilled workers) were redeployed [4]. Working hours were increased to 11 hours at a six-day working week, mandatory overtime was introduced, vacations were cancelled, sanctions against violators of labour discipline were made more rigorous. Formation of an internal 'labour front' was reflected in the slogans 'At work, as in battle', 'Direct all efforts to help the front!' and others. Working people, no less than the soldiers, contributed to the country's independence, and it was a passport to success. For all its problems and costs a specific social and labour policy of war helped to solve not only the problem of complying with front-line needs, but also to transfer industrial enterprises to the east, outside the European part of the country, thus increasing the labour potential in the regions previously devoid of it. Prompt measures on labour mobilization, on the one hand, accounting for interests of working men in food supply and other encouragement techniques, on the other hand, instantly allowed to establish an uninterrupted supply of resources to the fronts of the Great Patriotic War, and in its second phase to make rearmament.

10. It is a well-known fact that the industrialization of the economy in the 1930s was aimed at industry development in the USSR, which at that time was essentially an agricultural country. The political authorities of the country were fully aware that the agrarian economic base could not solve current problems, among which were: to overcome domestic economic crisis generated by NEP, to increase economic and military power, to withstand the foreign

policy front. The focal point was development of heavy industry, energy industry and engineering. The country's leaders clearly understood that the main power to direct the USSR to the path of boosted development were in the hands of working men. Creating conditions for productive and motivated labour was one of the most important tasks for the government. A 'scientific labour management' appeared, as well as material motivation depending on the level of labour productivity. The number of factory workers was increased at an accelerated pace. Industrial development led to the creation of the system of higher technical education in the country. Political authorities encouraged labour achievements, awarded workers and employees with the title the 'Hero of Labour', and Stakhanov Movement was actively promoted. One of the key points was labour enthusiasm based on a set of ideas about the bright future.

The status of a working man, of a qualified professional, of an engineer had considerably grown. Forced industrialization led to significant social changes: urbanization, dramatic increase in the number of industrial workers, increase in literacy and general culture of the country.

11. It wouldn't be inappropriate to recall some of the events and tricks of the political exploitation of the topic of social and labour relations during the February and October revolutions of 1917. As you know, the detonator of the February Revolution was the general strike, which began on February 24. It had been preceded by a wave of economic and political strikes in Petrograd, in which more than half of all regular workers of urban enterprises took part. In this context the transformation of riots and demonstrations into the armed revolution became possible and the fall of the monarchy is March 2, 1917 happened.

The October Revolution continued the chain of events where working men played one of the leading roles. 'Comrades! Workers and peasants' revolution, which had been spoken about for so long by the Bolsheviks has accomplished!' said the leader of the world proletariat, V. I. Lenin, clearly explaining the source of turmoil in the country. According to modern historians, he was right to a great extent, because the events of 1917 were a direct consequence of the Revolution of 1905, which, in fact, triggered the lingering collapse of the Russian Empire.

12. A brief overview of the events of 1905 can reveal a series of fatal errors of the autocracy in respect to the working people. The impulse for the beginning of mass demonstrations in 1905 was shooting of a peaceful demonstration of workers, the Bloody Sunday of January 9. The chain of events that brought workers to the streets of Petrograd, their slogans, the contents of the workers' petition that demonstrators had hoped to present to the tsar, all this indicates rather socio-labour than political roots of the revolution of 1905. It is enough to read the third paragraph of the petition 'Measures against the oppression of capital over labour', which contained the following items: '...legal protection of labour, freedom of production and professional workers' trade unions, eight-hour working day and fixing overtime work, freedom of struggle of labour against capital, participation of the working class representatives in drafting the bill on state insurance for workers; reasonable wages' [5]. In its core essence, the petition served as a program of the workers – peasants' revolution, and if it had had no requirements to

limit the autocracy, then, perhaps, the authorities would not have been so cruel and hysterical. Complying with the demands of the workers (which took place 9 months later) could have given an opportunity of bloodless transition of the Russian empire into one of the world's major powers. But the monarchy was unworthy of its subjects and did not resist shooting the unarmed. The history of similar demonstrations of workers in European countries, methods of settlement of social and labour conflicts, developed as early as in the 18th and 19th centuries, had not been studied and applied yet. The empire was slowly dipping into the abyss of revolutions.

13. Let's confine our examples to this brief but vivid illustration of the role of social and labour relations and working men in the crucial moments of the national history.

The similar scenes in the history of Britain, Germany, the United States and other countries remain outside our scope. Despite the fact that in the course of time the contents of social and labour needs of the working people have been changing, for the last three centuries there has been an obvious tendency to account for those interests both at the level of economic agents and political institutions, and at the level of the state apparatus, regardless of their form of government. Also, the analysis of development of social and labour relations reveals that in the 18-19th centuries major social and labour problems were solved under the pressure of economic and political energy of the working people, but by the end of the 20th century in most competitive economies of the world personnel management system were trying to predict the fluctuations of these interests and take precautionary measures targeted at harmonizing labour environment. For this purpose, states and businesses cultivate a system of social partnership, direct consultation with employees or trade unions. It should be pointed out that harmonization leaves a lot to be desired, as under the project, mentioned at the beginning of the report, we monitor social and labour conflicts in the foreign (neighbouring, as well as economically related to the Russian Federation) countries. The number of labour conflicts in these countries has not been reduced since the last economic crisis, the system records from two to nine major strikes every week. Their reasons are quite different from home-grown (Russian) ones, however, the economic damage is several times as large as the losses from strikes in our country.

14. Concluding my paper, I would like to remark that the evolution of the contents of labour relations is uninterruptedly and consistently progressing. Nowadays, due to the entry of Russia into the WTO, we should raise issues at a completely new level. We should not only declare our commitment to the conventions of the International Labour Organization, but should also develop a system of standards for decent work, and the International High-Level Conference, held in December 2012 in Moscow was dedicated to this issue.

Returning social and labour issues in the context of modern culture of Russian society has grown urgent. It is required not only by international environment, but also by the internal needs of the society. Government offices send orders for the parties of social partnership to do it without delay. President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin placed creation and modernization of 25 million high-performance

workplaces by 2020 as a primary long-term measure of economic policy. Thus, he acknowledged that the key sphere to '...ensure the sustainability of economic growth, increase in real incomes of the citizens of the Russian Federation, achievement of technological leadership of the Russian economy' [6], is a social and labour sphere.

In this respect We have to get rid of gross ignorance and arrogance, which DM (decision-makers) often manifest both on the state and on the business levels in respect to the working people and social and labour issues in general. The issue of social and labour relations will inevitably be in great demand, regardless of time and of the political system.

Diverting attention from the problems of working men leads to fading interest to this issue at the state and public institutions, politicians, academics, business representatives, it encourages the businesses to cash in on the exploitation of cheap labour, at the same time the spring of social and labour conflicts is more and more compressed accumulating a destructive energy. This is when the situations like in Pikalyovo happen. In that case, as you know, the local catastrophe was prevented, but strategic large-scaled tasks aimed at 10-20 years ahead cannot be solved in the

mode of the fire-brigade-like emergency and 'manual management'.

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Juan Antonio March¹

COMPLEMENTARY IDENTITIES VS CONFRONTATIONAL IDENTITIES

One of the essential elements driving the transformation of our societies in the XXI Century, is the power of technologies and its constant renovation an expansion. But while in the XIX century technological change could be used by some countries to hold power over other States and Societies, the new Technological revolution that is transforming our world escapes to be monopolized and penetrates in all societies, reaching all citizens in quite a natural way. To a certain extent, the new technology has in the citizens the new supporters, the new source of power. In this context it is extremely important to keep the markets opened, and to keep a dynamic of cooperation in the world avoiding conflicts that could erode this fast dissemination of the new culture all over the world.

An important element in this perspective is to work on expanding the value of accepting complementary identities versus the more simplistic approach that has traditionally dominated in the world: the pattern of excluding identities and conflicting identities.

In this context of technological revolution when the virtual dimension expand in our lives it is very important to preserve the identity of individual with a certain culture and a certain group. This helps to preserve history and to work for their future in a climate of social inclusion. This allows him/her to devote efforts in the social dimension. The new Technologies are most of the time promoting virtual connections and it is important to keep the local dimension of our citizens to preserve spaces and traditions that have developed as a result of long time

and enduring efforts. But the new perspective is that the local identity has to be seen as complementary of other identities that allow him/her to integrate in larger escale spaces and cultural areas. It s important to promote an approach that allows the individual to think globally and live and act locally. On this objective, two element look quite decisive:

1. To inoculate the "virus" of the value of diversity to the new generations. The other may not be like us but in this differentiation lies the power of mankind, its potential for constant creativity. The difference is an element of richness for human beings not an element of disturbance. By leaving to the other what we do not like of him/her but sharing what we find innovative and complementary we can multiply the ideas, the actions, the innovations in an exponential way. In this emotional technique lies the capability to avoid conflicts and to enhance creativity.

2. to inoculate the idea that identities have to be seen as the survival of customs, traditions, behaviours that are the synthesis of many previous lives and that have per se a great value in being preserved. Each individual by belonging to a certain group and nation is a factor of survival of the peculiar history of the place, so it is very important that people embraces with satisfaction his local identity. But at the same time they must understand that this identity has not to be lived as an excluding identity but as layer of his internal specificity that can very be very well enlarged with other identities of larger spaces and human groupings. All efforts we can make to initiate the new generations in the pleasure of accumulating identities in a complementary scale will be extremely productive in order to favor the interrelation of human beings and pushing away the risks of conflicts and destruction.

In my opinion in the new context of a new capacity of communication on the modern world, this element of a new vision in the idea of the identity is going to be fundamental

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for expanding in a solid way the dialogue of civilisations. Today this dialogue is decisive: The frontiers are opened to the communications and technological change is penetrating in all societies. We have to avoid failures, disappointments and frustration. So we should try to help all societies to be successful and to be able to open constantly new opportunities for their citizens. An interactive dialogue among all is very useful in this context but the prerequisite for it to be effective is to accept that the other is of interest for me, that his experience is a factor of enrichment for me.

The need to work on the concept of complementary identities is very clear for me in the case of Europe. For Centuries the countries of this region have tried to build on over the concept of "Nation" as a factor of exclusion vis a vis the others. Enormous efforts have been done to build identities that could act as element of rejection towards the others. The result has been a long series of bloody wars in which "Death" has been the only winner. The appalling devastation caused by the second world war lead to cooperation among nations and in parallel an effort was made to play down the role of traditional identities and to enhance the European dimension of all the citizens. Nevertheless over half of a century of constant efforts in this direction have been partly neutralized

by the uncertainties caused by the economic crisis initiated in 2008. Again the traditional identities are gaining strenght and taking an excluding appearance. Each day many nationals in our countries prefer to be seen as nationals of a Country instead of being seen also as European. The challenge is to preserve the analysis that both identities are complementary and that there is no need to reduce the capacity of enlarging the scope of linkages. It can be seen as something too conceptual, but I am fully convinced that the future of Europe lies in its capacity to convince its population that by being integrated in a large identity concept -Europe- and not being limited to a narrow local identity - French, German, Spanish, Italians etc- they will keep the capacity of being an area of growth and prosperity and not an area of crisis and decadence. Obviously this capacity of having a role in the future of the History will be even more obvious if we are able to join under a large European identity all the citizens that live from the west Mediterranean to the Chinese frontier, it is to say from Spain to Russia. The capacity to make all citizens of this large space to live embracing simultaneously the local identity -Spanish, Russians, Germans etc- and the regional identity -Europeans- will define our chances to be prosperous and stable in this changing world of the XXIst Century.

Charles McGregor¹

IMPERIALISM AND CULTURE FROM A RELATIVIST POSITION

1. How we know what we know: a personal introduction

This is a conference on culture, including two of its important components, literature and language. Edward Said once called culture "all those practices, like the arts of description, communication and representation, that ...often exist in aesthetic forms, one of whose principal aims is pleasure" (Said, 1994, p. xii). Another principal aim is meaning: through literature and language we hope to see what matters, and so to give our lives high purposes.

The frame in which we are to examine these cultural forms is a globalised world. Like "culture", "global" or "globalised" is a term whose meaning frequently has a hazy perimeter and sometimes also a misty centre. In this paper I hope to provide clearer outlines and details.

Who is the "I" who addresses you? What kind of knowledge does he claim? Like me, you may think that knowledge is relative: that for instance E. H. Carr, a British historian of the Soviet Union, was right when in 1964 he wrote: "Study the historian before you begin to study the facts ... By and large, the historian will get the kind of facts he wants." (p. 23); and "When we seek to know the facts, the questions which we ask, and the answers which we obtain, are prompted by our system of values" (p. 131).

If you agree, and wonder whether to believe what follows, you will want to know my values and the facts that attract me. Since these were presumably formed by my inherited qualities and my circumstances, I should give a short description of those. Here it is.

My circumstances are typical of the generation of the British intelligentsia which grew up after the Second World War. Our hardships have been minor. Few of us have ever known hunger, exile, prison, persecution, torture, prolonged manual labour or enforced solitude, or fear of these realities. Most of us have never fought in a war, at home or abroad. But unlike our parents, we have felt our country's power and influence decline markedly. When the British Empire was at its height, at the beginning of the twentieth century, London ruled a quarter of the world's population and about the same fraction of the earth's surface. Later in that century two wars against rival attempts to build an empire, a German one in Europe and a Japanese in East Asia, cost Britain and other European countries their Asian, African and Caribbean empires. Britain could no longer afford her empire. By the last quarter of the twentieth century nearly all Britain's colonies had become independent, leaving only a few little islands scattered across the world's oceans. Britain had to form new associations, not always on attractive terms, and now Washington and Brussels must often be consulted before London can decide its policy. Even the unity of Britain itself is now in question: some Scots would like their country to become independent of the United Kingdom.

My interpretation of these historical circumstances is mediated through sympathies partly formed by my childhood experience. My parents first met about fifteen years before I was born, at the Student Club of the Labour Party at Oxford University. My father (a clerk's son and so a scholarship boy) was studying History while my mother (the daughter of a lawyer) studied Politics, Philosophy and Economics. They considered themselves social democrats, and so were less friendly to the British Communist Party

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(which they thought impractical and unpatriotic) than to Marx's analysis of capitalism (considered penetrating and thought-provoking). My mother kept till she died her student copy of Marx's *Capital, Volume I* (and inside it, her Oxford tutor's advice that she read only chapters 1 and 2, and 16 to 24). She tried to learn Russian in the late 1940s but it defeated her and when much later I asked her what she remembered, she replied: "Only one word really: товарищ." My father joined the British civil service after Oxford and rose to a fairly senior position: an under-secretary in the Board of Trade (the Ministry of Trade and Commerce) and for several years, the British senior trade commissioner and deputy ambassador in Canada.

I followed my parents to Oxford to study Physiology there, and my student experience radicalised me mildly. For one summer long vacation I worked at *The New Left Review* and during another I was a guest member of Kibbutz Kfar Blum in Upper Galilee. I warmed to what Engels once called the three elements of Marxism: "German idealistic philosophy, French socialism and English economic theory" (McLellan, 1971, p. 15). My first marriage was to the daughter of two lifelong members of the South African Communist Party and the African National Congress, and when we married in 1968 my father-in-law (Fred Carneson) was serving a sentence of five years and nine months in Pretoria Central Prison for his political activities (see Carneson, 2010). My second wife Jane was an academic lawyer whose speciality was public law and the law of socialist societies, particularly administrative law in the USSR/Russian Federation and the CIS, and she found valued colleagues in the Institute of State and Law of the Soviet/Russian Academy of Sciences. From 2009 to 2011, after Jane's death, I was myself a visiting professor at the Faculty of Foreign Languages and Area Studies at Lomonosov MGU, where I taught a course on the environmental history of the 20th century.

Members of this audience, you can decide for yourselves how this upbringing and these circumstances affect the facts I look for and the working models of history which I prefer. Perhaps you should apply this relativist theory of knowledge to your own perceptions too: yours express a different inheritance and very different circumstances to mine. Let us see how these differences affect our views of culture in the contemporary world.

2. Meanings of "culture" and "global"

Let's first decide what we're talking about. What do we mean by "culture"? Something vague and huge. Over the last 350 years, earlier prescriptive senses of "culture" have given way to a descriptive meaning:

(a) *The education of Children (is called) a Culture of their mindes* (Thomas Hobbes, 1651). (Culture = the process of improving nature for human purposes, for example by training and refining plants and animals to provide for us food, clothing, shelter, transport and entertainment. Prescriptive.)

(b) *Culture, the acquainting ourselves with the best that has been known and said in the world.* (Matthew Arnold, 1873) (Culture = getting to know the best in the sciences, and in the arts of the court rather than of the streets or fields. Also prescriptive.)

(c) *Culture ... is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of*

society (Edward Tylor, 1871). (Culture (or subculture) = collective of a human group's learned customs, beliefs, attitudes, way of life and social organisation. Descriptive.)

In the twentieth century, meaning (c) sometimes appears on its own or sometimes contains one or both of the two earlier senses as background shadows.

"We need to distinguish three levels of culture... There is the lived culture of a particular time and place, only fully accessible to those living in that time and place. There is the recorded culture, of every kind, from art to the most everyday facts: the culture of a period. There is also, as the factor connecting lived culture and period cultures, the culture of the selective tradition" (Williams, 1961, p. 49).

The "lived culture" is presumably Tylor's meaning (c) but the "recorded culture" includes Matthew Arnold's meaning (b) though not as exclusively as Arnold's does. The "culture of the selective tradition" blends somewhat mistily all three – Hobbes' meaning, Arnold's and Tylor's.

To keep things clearer, let us restrict ourselves to meaning (c), the descriptive meaning from social anthropology. Even this restriction opens up a vast field. The inventory below (adapted from G. P. Murdock, as cited by Fox, 2004, p. 12) provides a general list of human activities. In the passage above, Williams describes culture as a "structure of feeling" (Ibid, p. 48), and Ruth Benedict reminds us that "the only way in which we can know the significance of the selected detail of behaviour is against the background of the motives and emotions and values that are institutionalised in that culture" (Benedict, 1934, p. 49). But a behavioural inventory is a useful starting point. I have placed each cross-cultural universal in one of three groups: (1) means of survival, (2) amusements and (3) social practices and organisation:

Cross-cultural universals – a behavioural inventory of culture

Group 1 Means of survival

1.1 Food

Agriculture, weather control.

1.2 Medicine

Medicine, surgery, cleanliness training, hygiene.

1.3 Pregnancy

Pregnancy, obstetrics, postnatal care.

1.4 The economy

Fire-making, tool making.

Group 2 Amusements

Bodily adornment, hairstyle.

Decorative art, dancing, music.

Folklore, mythology.

Athletic sports, games.

Group 3 Social practices and organisation

3.1 Social practices

3.1.1 Secular

Language, numerals, gestures, joking.

Greetings, visiting, gift-giving, hospitality.

Cooking, meal times, feasting, food taboos.

Dress.

3.1.2 Religious

Ethics.

Religious rituals, soul concepts, propitiation of supernatural beings.

Divination, luck superstitions, magic, dream interpretations.

Faith-healing.

Eschatology, funeral rites, mourning.

3.2 *Social organisation*

3.2.1 Property rights, economic organisation, government, law, penal sanctions.

Cooperative labour, division of labour, trade.

Population policy.

3.2.2 Weaning, education, puberty, courtship, sexual restrictions, incest taboos, marriage.

Modesty concerning natural functions.

Personal names, family, kin groups, kinship names, inheritance rules.

Age-grading, status differentiation.

Housing, residence rules.

The list is indicative, not comprehensive. For example Group 2 (**Amusements**) does not include all the amusements of urban, industrialised societies whose technologies support a range of entertainment media. (Through these we amuse ourselves with fictions of the world: realisations of what we imagine and observe, in forms such as novels, poetry, plays, films and television programmes, on electronic and paper platforms.)

This list is a work in progress in another sense. It does not show the relative importance of each universal. Each appears to be of equal magnitude, whereas most modern societies rate for example education above faith-healing or hairstyles. It is only a list, not a map: it suggests relations between universals only in outline, by placing them in groups, though without defining what members of each group have in common. It is neither a map, even a small-scale one, nor a topography, representing dimensions and relationships by a three-dimensional model. It is only a first approach to a model of human culture.

A model presents difficult, complex reality in simpler terms without losing any of its essential parts. Consider for example the question of what internal and external influences decide the culture of a state. This very large question might be addressed through some thing much smaller: "how does state A's realisation of universal x_1 affect universal y_1 in state A and how is it affected by x_2 in state B?" That is difficult enough to answer. So instead I'll start with two observations about industrial societies: (1) generally the forms in which these universals are realised now vary less across (national) cultures than they did a century ago and (2) within a culture, the three Groups vary substantially in rates of change and sensitivity to proposed changes.

The items in Group 1 above (**Means of survival**) are now part of science, the world's common culture, although their social features (eg the means of their provision and the status of their providers) differ widely between states. And there are big differences in what each of the 193 member-states of the United Nations contributes to the advance of science. These items are however less sensitive politically: the overall rates of change in forms of realisation are usually more rapid than in the other two groups, and disputes on proposed changes to these forms are resolved mostly by debate rather than physical violence. For example, Germany's view on what constitutes good postnatal care (in Group 1.3) may differ from the Ukraine's but the differences are probably relatively minor and though they may be the subject of conflicting papers in scientific journals, they will not provoke a war between the states.

Group 2 universals (**Amusements**) are more sensitive politically than Group 1. For example, if forms of popular music (Group 2) become forgotten because they have been replaced by imports, there is an uneasiness particularly among older citizens that is qualitatively different from that produced by replacing manual control by digital in a manufacturing process (Group 1.4). New technology in a manufacturing plant may reduce the number and nature of jobs there but it does not threaten social identity as directly as the loss of familiar music may. But proposed and actual changes in Group 3 universals (**Social practices and organisation**) elicit the most violent reactions. Such explosive universals as "food taboos", "courtship", "status differentiation", and "religious rituals" change their realisations slowly: proposers of more rapid change are often punished by other members, and responses to ridicule by outsiders may include even murder of the offenders.

It is convenient to list cross-cultural universals as separate items but they are not discrete units like balls on a billiard table. They have a context, an environment with which their elements are in constant exchange, as compounds in a blood cell are with those in blood plasma through the cell's semi-permeable membrane. What is this environment? To what does "global" in the phrase "a global world" refer? I suggest we describe "globalisation" by its causes and effects.

I propose two principal causes: changes in (1) international trade and (2) communications.

1) In 1995 GATT (the general agreement on tariffs and trade) was absorbed into a new body, WTO (the World Trade Organization). The WTO promotes free trade between its 158 member- states on goods and services, and tries to reduce protectionism of their own farmers by rich countries (who subsidise their farmers and put up tariffs walls against the exports of farmers in poorer countries). The general result of the reduction of tariffs since 1995 has however been to increase the flow of capital and goods across national frontiers throughout the world. In this period the difference between the wealth of the richest quartile of countries and the poorest has increased.

2) This increased flow of artefacts and resources has been facilitated by improvements in information technology. These raise transmission speeds in telecommunications and so make possible very rapid transfers between distant countries of large amounts of information and funds at low cost. Such improvements have not only economic but also social and political effects. Through the growth of the internet over the last two decades information (as text and images) about events and conditions in places distant from the internet user arrive at the user's computer seconds or minutes after they have occurred. As a result, social networks form across and between countries, drawing strangers together in social and political causes and amusements and so making possible coordinated activity that, before the internet, states could have prevented or made much more difficult by controlling their national mass media. Because internal and national frontiers are now more porous than before, knowledge of how cross-cultural universals are realised in other countries is now more widespread throughout the world.

Frontiers are more porous to human migration too. The migratory movements of the second half of the 20th century and the early 21st resemble but do not imitate those of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. From 1830 to 1920 Europe

sent between 55 and 70 million emigrants to North and South America, Australasia and Siberia. In roughly the same period (1834–1937) between 30 and 45 million Indians moved to Asia, Oceania, Africa and the Caribbean (to Fiji, Malaya, Burma, Mauritius, Natal, Trinidad and Guyana). At about the same time large numbers of Chinese migrants went as labourers to Southeast Asia, the Caribbean, California and Peru as well as elsewhere. (McNeill, 2001, p. 277)

But conditions changed as the European empires ended (the French, Dutch, Belgian and Portuguese as well as the British). They dissolved through metropolitan weakness and colonial resistance. Making nationalist resistance effective required in many colonies in Africa and Asia substantial feats of nationalist imagination: the creation of a new cultural identity, to produce a new solidarity among diverse groups, groups united before by resistance to the imperial power but divided by many other cultural features.

Inward migrants as labourers were often not attractive to these new states since they brought more competition for jobs and no fresh capital and sometimes strengthened the dominance of an already established minority. But in the economies of declining imperial powers such as Britain, where capital was now being invested in replacing what the war had destroyed, demand for unskilled and semi-skilled labour began to exceed supply. Word reached British colonies in the Caribbean, West and East Africa and the Indian subcontinent, and from the late 1940s and early 1950s migrants from there came to work in the metropolis in much larger numbers than in the pre-war period.

What pulled them were the job vacancies in the UK at higher rates of pay; what pushed them included a decline in foreign direct investment at home which began with the twilight of empire. In 1913 the percentage of the world stock of capital which went as foreign direct investment to poor countries (with per caput incomes of 20% or less of US per caput GDP) was 25; by 1997 it had sunk to around 5 (Ferguson, 2004, p 368). Once the domestic economies of the richer European countries had recovered, their colonies had become newly independent states and often less secure places than in colonial times for foreign investors; so these investors preferred to put their money into other rich countries. This partly accounts for the difference in wealth between rich and poor countries being now much larger than in colonial times: in 1955, the per caput GDP of Britain was 7 times that of Zambia, a British colony in Central Africa, whereas by 2004, about 50 years later, the multiple required for independent Zambia to equal Britain was 28 (Ferguson, 2004, p 368).

The effect of these migrations is that more of today's citizens of the European Union and North America have been born outside their adopted state. 25% of US citizens are immigrants or the children of immigrants, and Hispanics, Blacks and Asians now make up around a third (34%) of the US population (Lee, 2012, and US Census Bureau, 2011):

Table 1. US Ethnicity (%)*

Total population	%
Whites	64
Hispanics	16
Blacks	13
Asians	5
Others	2

* Source: US Census Bureau, 2011.

The Asians are now the most rapidly growing group. Among new births non-whites are now a majority (Lee, 2012).

Like Hispanics and Blacks, Asians have higher participation rates in US presidential elections than whites. A large majority of non-whites voted for Barack Obama in 2012: 73% of Asians, 93% of Blacks and 71% of Hispanics, compared with a minority (43%) of white voters. Without the non-white support, he would not have been elected (Lee, 2012).

In Britain, whites remain the dominant group, with more than four-fifths of the population.

Table 2. Ethnicity of England and Wales (%)*

Total population	%
Whites	87
Asian/Asian British	6
Black/Black British	3
Mixed	2
Chinese and others	2

*Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2011.

But because of higher fertility rates the Asian population is growing more rapidly than the white. Here for example are the 10 commonest names given to newborn boys in a sample from England and Wales in 2011.

Table 3. Top 10 names for baby boys in 2011*

Name	Incidence
Harry	7523
Oliver	7007
Jack	6844
Mohammed**	5908
Alfie	5524
Charlie	5516
Thomas	5353
Jacob	5047
James	4945
Joshua	4786

*Source: ONS, Aug 2012.

**I have treated Muhammad and Mohammed as the same name.

Asians are only 6 % of the whole population. And whatever other adaptations today's young parents from Asia may have made, they have not adopted British practices for personal names (in Group 3.22).

3. A few determinants of some of culture's components

The global world, then, is a world of large migrations from poor countries to rich, with corresponding changes in the demography of the recipient countries. It is a world where capital moves rapidly from country to country, and the gap between rich and poor countries is increasing. Information flows fairly easily across and within national borders, not tightly controlled by governments, so that more of the population is acquainted with how cultural universals in all Groups vary within and between countries.

It is also a world where a state with about 300 million inhabitants enjoys a unique supremacy, based on the strength of its economy, its spending on defence, its excellence in pure and applied science, the vitality of its media and its inheritance of some cultural conquests from the British empire, of which it was once a part. Of the link between

its cultural features and its political influence one of its leading academics (the Dean of Harvard's Kennedy School) wrote recently: A country may obtain the outcome it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness ... (Soft power) is the ability to entice and attract. (It) arises in large part from our American values ... it comes from being a shining "city upon a hill" (Nye, 2002, p. 8, cited by Ferguson, 2005, p. 19).

America's soft power does not attract the rest of the world irresistibly, any more than the now long-dead British empire did. Behind the soft talk lies a record of military intervention in pursuit more often of national interest than international peace and security, and consciousness of this makes foreign observers of US soft power pause over the moral status of the USA.

Imperial powers like to believe that their ascendancy rests on moral supremacy, not only on military. The British were fond of this illusion too. In Churchill's "iron curtain" speech at Fulton, Missouri, in 1947 he said that he did not believe that Russians wanted war but he thought they wanted "the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and influence." He went on: "If the population of the English-speaking Commonwealth be added to that of the United States with all that such co-operation implies in the air, on the sea, all over the globe and in science and in industry, and in moral force, there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security" (Jenkins, 2002, p. 810).

Not everyone called such conditions "security". Stalin responded briskly by an interview in *Правда*: "Now Mr Churchill is starting his process of unleashing war also (like Hitler) with a racial theory, declaring that only those people who speak English are full-blooded nations, whose vocation it is to control the fate of the whole world ... In point of fact Mr Churchill and his friends in England and in America are presenting those nations who do not speak English with a kind of ultimatum – recognize our supremacy over you, voluntarily, and all will be well – otherwise war is inevitable" (Jenkins, 2002, p. 811).

The British empire's benefits to the world had not been defended before in quite the terms that Churchill chose. Twenty years earlier, writing in 1929 Lord Lugard, the founder of colonial Nigeria and Uganda, recognised two imperial objectives, which he called "the dual mandate": "Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital, and energy have not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual benefit of her own industrial classes, and of the native races in their progress to a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim and desire of civilised administration to fulfil this dual mandate.

He gave examples of what the British had brought: "By railways and roads, by reclamation of swamps and irrigation of deserts, and by a system of fair trade and competition, we have added to the prosperity and wealth of these lands, and checked famine and disease. We have put an end to the awful misery of the slave-trade and inter-tribal war, to human sacrifice and the ordeals of the witch-doctor. Where

these things survive, they are severely suppressed. We are endeavouring to teach the native races to conduct their own affairs with justice and humanity, and to educate them alike in letter and in industry." (Lugard, 1929, p. 617).

He defended these achievements with rhetoric and a more acute point: "British methods have not perhaps in all cases produced ideal results, but I am profoundly convinced that there can be no question but that British rule has promoted the happiness and welfare of the primitive races. Let those who question it examine the results impartially. If there is unrest, and a desire for independence, as in India and Egypt, it is because we have taught the value of liberty and freedom, which for centuries these peoples had not known. Their very discontent is a measure of their progress" (Ibid., p. 618–619)

In those days Europeans often approved of imperialism. Even Marx wrote, not entirely ironically: "The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most barbarian nations, into civilization" (Marx, p. 224).

And in 1890 a prominent British engineer, working at Merv on the Murghab River (formerly the Oxus), told a relative in a letter home: I think no reasonable person can doubt that the country is much better for being under the strong Russian Government. The extreme militarism is an offence to me; but there is public security and order, and the wild Turkomans, the terror of their mild Persian neighbours, - man- stealers and ruffians of the worst type -, have settled down into respectable Russian subjects. This is surely for the good of mankind; and it does not become an Englishman, with our turn for annexation, to object" (Hollings (ed.), 1917).

Strengthened by imperialism's moral superiority, Russians must have induced substantial changes in Turkoman realisations of the cross-cultural universals of Group 3 (**Social practices and organisation**), particularly in government (3.21). And over the longer term Turkoman practices in Group 1 (**Means of survival**) must also have come closer to Russian.

The cultural gifts which the British brought have been summarised recently by a British economic historian who is an enthusiast for empire. He writes: "There is reason to doubt that the world would have been the same or even similar in the absence of the (British) Empire. Even if we allow for the possibility that trade, capital flows and migration could have been 'naturally occurring' in the past 300 years, there remain the flow of culture and institutions. And here the fingerprints of empire seem more readily discernible and less easy to expunge. When the British governed a country – even when they only influenced its government by flexing their military and financial muscles – there were certain distinctive features of their own society that they tended to disseminate" (Ferguson, 2004, p. xxiii).

Ferguson lists nine as "the more important of these", which I give below in a slightly different order. The first six universals come from **Social organisation** (in Group 3.21), the next from **Amusements** and the last two from **Social practices**, one religious and the other secular:

1. English forms of land tenure
2. The Common Law
3. Scottish and English banking
4. The limited or "night watchman" state

5. Representative legislatures
6. The idea of liberty
7. Team sports
8. Protestant Christianity
9. The English language

Like Lugard, he claims that by preaching liberty and representative assemblies the British made their empire self-liquidating. He believes that this preaching was not hypocritical: when the British behaved despotically abroad, a liberal critique of it “almost always” arose at home (ibid., p. xxiv).

The truth of that claim, and which of these cultural features were original to the British, are matters of dispute. But the spread of English is undoubted: the British succeeded in anglicising North America, Australasia and South Africa, and after the end of the empire, English was still widely used throughout other former colonies as an official or unofficial second language. The rise of American power consolidated and extended this spread.

4. “Cultural relativism” as idea and reality

What that implies for other cultures and specifically for speakers of other languages I shall discuss only briefly. Before that, I want to look at a theory about relations between cultures: cultural relativism, based on cultural equality. Ruth Benedict expressed it attractively in the early 1930s by a proverb of North America’s Digger Indians: “In the beginning God gave every people a cup of clay, a different cup for each people, and from this cup they drank their life” (Benedict, 1934, p. 21).

No cup is better or worse than another: all ethnicities express equally good ways of being human, and we should celebrate their diversity. Benedict was an American academic, writing only five years after Lugard. Tolerance is surely the child of freedom, and had not Thomas Jefferson described the US as an “empire of liberty” about 100 years earlier?

But like freedom, tolerance has its limits. Tolerance implies respect, but does everything deserve respect? Should we suspend ethical judgements on each other’s culture by supposing that all manifestations of other cultures are morally neutral? If not, then on what grounds should we judge them? How can we tell what is bad everywhere and always from what we feel is bad because of our own times and culture?

A test case for tolerance has been presented by the English philosopher Mary Midgley (Midgley, 1983): the status rite in feudal Japan known as the *Tsujigiri* or “crossroads killing”, a ritual practice for a samurai. Here the samurai tests his new sword by slicing a stranger met at a crossroads from his shoulder through to his opposite flank. Most status rites now stop short of assassination but some are still cruel and brutal, like the realisation in some societies of other universals from Group 3.2. For example, in some societies “puberty” is realised by female circumcision, in others “marriage” by honour killings and forced marriages, and in yet others “protecting kin groups” by genocide.

These practices seem to contradict the principle attributed to Jesus in the Gospel of St Matthew (chapter 7, verse 12): “always treat others as you would like them to treat you.” But although this sounds like an absolute, it does not free us from moral relativism, since what is regarded as

proper treatment varies widely across societies. Now that international travel in reality and virtually is relatively easy and cheap and migratory movements common, interchange between cultures is common. Our culture affects our relation with other cultures: our own culture shapes and directs what we criticise in other cultures. Not that we are impervious to others: we sometimes criticise our own culture but we do so by comparing it with others, whether or not we acknowledge this.

Our own values are our bases for judgements on other cultures, but we may not wish to acknowledge moral relativism. Absolutes sound better: they give a moral statement a stiffer authority. For example, human rights are often presented as absolutes, entitlements which are everywhere and at all times valid. But the rights we consider most important are prompted by our values: for example, we may value social, economic and cultural rights (such as the right to health or work) above civil and political rights (such as the right to liberty or a fair trial). Is this preference based on absolutes or only on our culture?

And even among absolutes there are contradictions. Article 10 on Freedom of Expression in the Human Rights Act (approved in English law in 1998) reads as follows:

1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises.

2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary (Bailey, Harris & Jones, 2001, p. 22).

The first paragraph describes the right but includes a restriction: the State’s right to control some mass media. The second paragraph lists only restrictions, and is longer. Some restrictions recognise implicitly that rights at times conflict. For example, if a newspaper exercises a right to freedom of expression by exposing hypocrisy in some public figure, that person may claim a right to protect his reputation by stopping publication. Which right is more important or, more concretely, which claim advances the public interest more?

This is a judgement within a culture, whereas a judgement on female circumcision or honour killings is one between cultures. When that judgement was made on Indian religions by imperial Britain, it may have been influenced by Queen Victoria’s views. In 1858 Queen Victoria was shown the draft legislation transferring the government of India from the East India Company to the crown, and she added a note of her own: “Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to impose our convictions upon any of our subjects ... We do steadily charge and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from all interference

with the religious beliefs or worship of any of our subjects on pain of our highest displeasure” (Morris, 1979).

Perhaps she thought that indifference to her Moslem subjects’ religious beliefs had caused the Indian Uprising of the preceding year. In any case the British tolerated Indian culture more easily in India than they do among Indian immigrants in Britain now, where they feel issues of British social cohesion are involved. Immigrants may ignore British practices on some items in Group 3.22, such as personal names, but cannot follow all their own practices on courtship, sexual restrictions and marriage. Some of these are considered honour crimes in Britain rather than patterns on a different cup from which new Brits may freely drink their different life: “A survey of police forces by the Iranian and Kurdish Women’s Rights Organisation (IKWRO) found there were 2,823 incidences of honour crimes a year, or almost eight a day. But those figures are considered a vast underestimate given that 13 of 52 police forces did not respond to the charity’s request for a breakdown in November 2011. Nazir Afzal of the Crown Prosecution Service said the degree of honour crime in Britain – including murders meant to preserve a family’s honour within their own community – was unknown. “We don’t know the true figure of honour killings. It’s anything between 10 and 12 a year in this country. I don’t know how many other unmarked graves there are in this country in our green and pleasant land.” Mr Afzal estimates that there are 10,000 forced marriages in Britain every year, and said a measure of multicultural sensitivity was likely part of the problem. “Forced marriage is the earthquake and what follows is a tsunami of domestic abuse, sexual abuse, child protection issues, suicide and murder. If we can tackle forced marriage then we can prevent all these other things from happening” (www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-17319136 of 19 Mar 2012).

“Multicultural sensitivity” is Mr Afzal’s explanation of a hesitance about enforcing British customs which he clearly deplors. “Multiculturalism”, the public face of “cultural relativism”, may produce segregated rather than integrated cultures. Within our globalised world public policy should prefer cultural interpenetration. Robin Cook, then Foreign Secretary (Minister of Foreign Affairs), articulated this a decade ago in a famous speech: “Today’s London is a perfect hub of the globe. It is home to over 30 ethnic communities of at least 10,000 residents each. In (it) tonight, over 300 languages will be spoken by families over their evening meal at home. This pluralism is not a burden we must reluctantly accept. It is an immense asset that contributes to the cultural and economic vitality of our nation ... And it isn’t just our economy that has been enriched by the arrival of new communities. Our lifestyles and cultural horizons have also been broadened in the process” (Cook, 2001).

He gave an example of this cultural interaction: “Chicken Tikka Masala is now a true British national dish, not only because it is the most popular, but because it is a perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts to external influences. Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish. The Masala sauce was added to satisfy the desire of British people to have their meat served with gravy”.

The result of mutual exchanges of culture is however likely to be a patriotism that is complex, not simple. When a young British Asian was asked recently whether his birth country or his adopted was more important to him, he

replied, “Who was more important at my conception – my mother or my father?”

5. Present and future global interventions

According to Thucydides, “large nations do what they wish, small nations accept what they must.” (Chomsky, 2003, *Hegemony or Survival*, London: Penguin, p. 16). A former publisher-colleague from Hungary once told me mournfully: “The great men of small nations are mostly unknown.” Large nations may leave a cultural mark on smaller nations without conquering them by force, but does this deform them?

That depends on what kind of mark is left on which parts of culture, and whether the change is for the better or the worse. The European empires of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, whether French, British or Tsarist, expected to make major changes in for example forms of government, law and its enforcement, economic organisation, agriculture, transport, education (usually of a small minority) and language. Religion also attracted British attention: British missionaries expected to bring “to Africa’s gloomy surface light, liberty and civilization,” and concluded that “our Asiatic territories ... were given to us, not merely that we might draw an annual profit from them, but that we might diffuse among their inhabitants, long sunk in darkness, vice and misery, the light and the benign influences of (Protestant) Truth.” This conclusion was published in 1792 by a former director of the East India Company. Although by the middle of the nineteenth century the British had become more cautious about missionary activity, as Queen Victoria’s note of 1858 (quoted above) shows, the Indian Uprising of that year encouraged the London Missionary Society in their annual report to draw a vehement lesson about an old antagonist and the diffusely beneficial effects of Protestant evangelism: “By the deed of perfidy and blood which have characterised the Sepoy rebellion, the delusion and false security, long indulged by multitudes both in Britain and in India, have been for ever destroyed and idolatry, in alliance with the principles and spirit of Mahomet, has exhibited its true character, a character only to be understood to be dreaded and abhorred ... The labours of the Christian Missionary, which were heretofore treated with derision and contempt, are now commended as the best and only preservative of property, liberty and life.”

Evidently the mission was not only to teach Christian theology and a Protestant liturgy but also to underline how the British applied it to the political economy of a colony.

The British empire will not return, but it remains of interest now because its Anglophone successor retains some of its features. Aspects of the “National Security Strategy” which President Bush the Younger published in September 2002 have much in common with the cultural legacy from Britain identified by Ferguson and listed on p 10 above. Bush’s document states that a US goal is “to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe,” developing this aim as follows: “We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world ... America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity; the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the state; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.”

These bases for intervention had US precedents. The “doctrine” uttered by President Monroe in 1823 stated as a principle that “the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintained, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” In 1904 the US had the second largest navy in the world after the British and so when President Theodore Roosevelt added a Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine it now had more bite: “Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere, the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power.”

American interventions however differed (and differ) in one respect from their British precursors: they did not (and do not) usually plant US settlers in the recipient territory. They invested, they dominated the territory’s political decisions, they promoted US ideological forms through among other ways Christian evangelism, and they maintained US military bases there or sent the Marines in when necessary; but US citizens did not settle in appreciable numbers, working and raising children there. In this they differed from British (and I believe Tsarist) practices in the temperate parts of British (and perhaps Russian) colonies. Did this make American intervention not imperialist, and if so, what else should it be called?

Americans believe that their Revolution founded a republic of the free, and ideologically this made it impossible that Americans could later become imperialists. Outside this ideological barrier, however, what makes an intervention imperialist?

States are of different sizes and, as Thucydides reminds us, large states have powers that small ones can match only by banding together effectively. Otherwise the larger state dominates the smaller. I suggest that there are three kinds of dominance: suzerainty, empire and hegemony. The *Longman Dictionary of the English Language* (a work of Anglo-American scholarship, jointly by Merriam-Webster and Longman) defines these as follows:

hegemony dominating influence or authority, esp of one nation or group over others; leadership.

imperialism 2 the policy, practice, or advocacy of extending the power and dominion of a nation, especially by territorial acquisitions or by gaining indirect control over the political or economic life of other areas.

suzerainty: the authority of a **suzerain**; overlordship.
suzerain: 2 a dominant state controlling the foreign relations of a subordinate state but allowing it sovereignty in its internal affairs.

What in the culture of the smaller does the larger dominate, and how? An imperial power decides for its colonies most of Group 1 practices (**Means of survival**), much of Group 2 (**Amusements**) and selective parts of Group 3 (**Social practices and organisation**), particularly those in 3.21 but including also language (3.11), giving the imperial language a privileged position. In hegemony, only Group 3’s section 3.21 is directly affected. A suzerain may leave local realisations in all three Groups untouched.

The three types of dominance differ also in the political conditions dominant state A imposes on state B, including these six:

1) units of state A’s military are stationed over a long period in state B;

2) they are paid for by state B;

3) more than a third of critical minerals, goods and services produced by state B are bought by state A, often at below world prices;

4) state B imposes higher tariffs on imports from outside the territory governed by state A;

5) state B’s decisions on which economic sectors to develop conform to state A’s plan for the development of all the territory governed by state A;

6) in general, none of state B’s important political decisions on both foreign relations and internal affairs are taken without consulting state A and only very rarely against state A’s advice.

If all six conditions are present, then B is part of A’s empire. If only the last condition, condition (6), then A exercises hegemony. If state A decides only B’s foreign relations, then A is B’s suzerain.

In today’s globalised world it is to America’s relation to smaller states that we tend to apply these tests. But in the world just round the corner we may apply them to China’s. Incidentally, some leading figures in Britain are well aware of a cultural implication of China’s growth. Martin Davidson, chief executive of the British Council and a fluent Chinese speaker, said recently: “The UK’s future prosperity depends in no small part on our ability to communicate and build relationships with people from around the world, and there are few more important partners for us than China. But, despite perceptions that more and more UK schools are teaching Mandarin, all the evidence suggests that the real number is stagnant at best and far too small. Without a workforce that can understand and communicate effectively with one of the world’s biggest economies, there’s a real risk that the UK will struggle to compete and fall behind as a result.”

China is well aware of its present and future powers. For example, at a recent conference in London of the China Europe International Business School and the London Business School (on Nov 6, 2012) Mr Cheng Siwei (Vice Chairman of the 9th and 10th National People’s Congress Standing Committee) spoke of China’s awareness of “the responsibilities of power”, a phrase applied by US Senator Fulbright in 1968 to US foreign relations. Chinese foreign relations are no doubt animated by these responsibilities but also by domestic priorities. The Chinese government is planning increased domestic consumption, and a stronger welfare state through for example a higher minimum wage, an improvement in social care provision, wider access to better education, and greater equality.

What Mr Cheng did not say was that these higher living standards cannot be provided from China’s resources alone. For at least the last decade, China has been securing foreign assets through ownership of or exclusive contracts with mineral and energy sources and food supplies in poorer, smaller countries in Africa, Asia and South America. In return for these arrangements China improves the countries’ infrastructure, particularly their distribution systems, and expects for example that the recipient country will vote to exclude Japan from permanent membership of the

UN Security Council and will not support UN motions criticising Chinese conduct in Tibet or its record on human rights.

Is this imperialism? China is sensitive to this accusation. At a Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in Beijing on 19 July 2012, China's then President Hu Jintao said: "China is the world's largest developing country, and Africa is home to the largest number of developing countries. The Chinese and African peoples have always treated each other as equals and with sincerity and friendship, extended mutual support and pursued common development" (URL: fmprc.gov.cn/eng).

Lenin defined imperialism as "the highest stage of capitalism", the inevitable result of the dominance of finance capitalism, the concentration of production and monopolies within the stronger capitalist countries, and the division of the world among their larger companies. China's principal means of production and distribution are however controlled by the Chinese state and communism is its public ideology; by Lenin's definition of imperialism a communist state cannot be imperialist.

And China's relations with its supplier states do not fulfil my six political conditions for imperialism. In for example Sudan, the China National Petroleum Corporation owns a controlling share in the exploitation of Sudan's largest oil field (Klare, Michael, 2012). The price paid for this oil is presumably determined by local costs, and China's People's Liberation Army does not station units there. The details of conditions (5) and (6) are not fulfilled, but presumably Sudan respects China's wishes on UN voting and in return, China tries to protect Sudan from adverse UN motions. I suppose that China's cultural influence on Sudan's realisation of the universals in my Groups 1,2 and 3, is still minor. For example, I imagine that the working language for cooperation on site in Sudanese oil fields is English, not Chinese, and so far as I know Chinese is not a language of instruction in Sudan's schools. Nor does China try to weaken the grip of Islam in northern Sudan or Christianity in the south. On these tests, China is at present not even Sudan's suzerain. But it would be surprising if China's influence on Sudan does not increase over the next two decades, for, as folk proverbs about disparity of powers remind us, "the hand of the giver is always above the hand of the receiver," and "he who pays the piper calls the tune".

6. Some limitations

But what does "calling the tune" mean here? Will American hegemony be replaced by Chinese suzerainty, not only in Sudan but more widely? And what then will be the cultural consequences? Will Chinese supplant English not only in China's client states but also more widely, where English is at present a second language? I cannot imagine Chinese instead of English as the European Union's unofficial second language but will Chinese become for example the language of most pop music lyrics, of the most widely distributed books and films, of scientific papers in most international journals, of international air traffic control, and of the largest section by language of the internet? And will English then include many more loan words from Chinese than it does now?

No-one can foresee the future, but we may hope to make better guesses by detecting connections between the

past and the present: current trends that resemble those of the past, whose outcome we know. Detecting resemblance or true likeness is a delicate task, and requires a large imaginative effort to escape even partially our own cultural conditioning, as E. H. Carr reminded us in 1964: "Much of what has been written in English-speaking countries in the last ten years about the Soviet Union, and in the Soviet Union about English-speaking countries, has been vitiated by this inability to achieve even the most elementary measure of imaginative understanding of what goes on in the mind of the other party, so that the words and actions of the other are always made to appear malign, senseless, or hypocritical" (EHC, 1964, p. 24).

Carr was writing soon after the Cuban (or Caribbean) crisis of 1962, and some British politicians then were well aware of how the tendency Carr identified affected international relations. John Wyndham, later Lord Egremont and previously private secretary to the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, once cried out in exasperation: "Much better if the Russians saw the Cabinet minutes twice a week. Prevent all this fucking dangerous guesswork." (Knightley, 1987) Those days are behind us now but mutual understanding between Britain and Russia remains important, and occasions like this express, and I hope contribute to, that importance. A shared understanding of how political events affect cultural life must help. So I hope without exhausting your patience offer one last example, taken from the life of the British empire.

The British believe they created the world's first national anthem. Theirs was sung publicly for the first time in a London theatre in September 1745. There "the men and women present received (the song) rapturously, rising clamorously to their feet in the warm autumn evening and calling repeatedly for encores" (Colley, 2005, p. 44).

The song that aroused this fervour had a narrow focus. Here is its first verse:

God save our noble King,
God save great George our King,
God save the King.
Send him victorious,
Happy and glorious,
Long to reign over us,
God save the King.

The Almighty is asked to protect Britain's head of state by helping him win battles and thereby remain on his throne for many years.

The second verse asks God to smite unspecified enemies:

O Lord our God arise,
Scatter our enemies
And make them fall;
Confound their politicks,
Frustrate their knavish tricks.
On Him our hopes are fix'd,
O save us all.

The threat of a foreign enemy commonly promotes unity at home, and 1745 was a year which tested British unity. A month before this anthem was first sung, Prince Charles Edward Stuart landed on the island of Eriskay in the Outer Hebrides. Two weeks later he sailed to the mainland, where he raised his Royal Standard as James the Eighth of Scotland and James the Third of England. He was suspected of having French and probably also Spanish support.

In the third verse a duty of the monarch is explicitly stated:

Thy choicest gifts in store
On him be pleased to pour;
Long may he reign;
May he defend our laws
And ever give us cause
To sing with heart and voice
God save the King.

The only specific effect of these gifts from the Almighty is to be that the monarch will maintain a rule of law. But the whole song asks God to preserve the nation as a single political unit and to make it victorious in war, and by its reference to laws it invokes ancient freedoms from tyranny. The God invoked, however, is not specifically Christian, the song celebrates a monarch and not a land or a people, and no wider task for Britain in the outside world is proposed.

This anthem is still the official one but another has since the 1920s become a secondary national anthem. For example, it is now the theme song of the English Rugby Union team and is sung at the end of each season's BBC Promenade Concerts in the Royal Albert Hall. It is called *Jerusalem* and was first sung in March 1918, near the end of the First World War, when the militarism appropriate to building the first and second British empires had been darkened by the coffins of World War I. It "made a great impression when sung at a meeting in the Royal Albert Hall, in March 1918, to celebrate the attaining of the final stage in the 'Votes for Women' campaign" (Scholes, 1955, p. 540). It is called *Jerusalem*.

Its four verses are by a Romantic poet-painter, William Blake: they appear in the Preface to his long poem *Milton* and were written in 1803 or 1804. They express his vision of Britain as a garden of true religion, not as the founder of an empire. (Blake supported the American and French Revolutions.) The verses were chosen 100 years later by Robert Bridges, Poet Laureate from 1913, and were set to music in 1915 or 1916 by Sir Hubert Parry, Professor of Music at Oxford. Whereas behind *God Save the King* we hear the redcoats march past, with fifes squealing and drums thumping, in *Jerusalem* we hear the voice of piety and poetry, struggling at times quite pugnaciously to recall Britain to the teachings of Christianity's founder. *Jerusalem* belongs to a different part of the British identity, expressed in this later period by a sense that the empire had passed its zenith and British talents and energies must now be applied to inventing a post-imperial British culture. Here is the song.

And did those feet in ancient times
Walk upon England's mountains green?
And was the holy Lamb of God
On England's pleasant pastures seen?

And did the Countenance Divine
Shine forth upon our clouded hills?
And was Jerusalem builded here
Among these dark Satanic mills?

Bring me my bow of burning gold;
Bring me my arrows of desire;

Bring me my spear – O clouds, unfold!
Bring me my chariot of fire!

I will not cease from mental fight,
Nor shall my sword sleep in my hand,
Till we have built Jerusalem
In England's green and pleasant land.

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ORTHODOX COMMUNALISM: THE PROPOSAL OF THE CHRISTIAN CIVILIZATION TO THE GLOBALIZATION AND THE SOCIAL CRISIS

Since 2008, the Western world has become deeply aware that the financial and social crisis threatens the very foundations of the established civilization and the “western” national cultures. At the notion of “western and westernness” [1] becomes dependent on capitalist principles and norms. In the context of many Western academic institutions that conform to the capitalist-driven models of globalization and multiculturalism [2], we recognize and adopt under the term “West and Western World” all the countries, which belong in the so called globalized society.

Analyzing the historical “West” from Moscow Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin stated that “domestic socio-economic problems that have become worse in industrialized countries as a result of the crisis are weakening the dominant role of the so-called historical West” [3].

International cooperation presuppose common values, common rules and common norms argues for participation in common principles of civilization. Therefore, the management of the international system is not only a geopolitical and economical issue, but first of all a cultural and spiritual issue.

In the second decade of the 21st century, although it became amply clear that the Western World can solve this crisis only with international cooperation, this solution undermines the intellectual and moral presuppositions of that cooperation with the humanity capabilities that it has. There is a huge difference between a world order that is founded on universal humanistic values and a world order that is build upon a chaotic cultural hopper, as it is described by the well-known metaphor of the “Tower of Babel” in the (first) Book of the Holy Bible Genesis [4].

The Hellenic Heritage and Civilization from the ancient era exercised a specific mode to solve the deferent art of historical crisis. The Greek Philosopher Aristotle at the outset of his “Politics” [5] is credited with the first usage of the term “civil society” (in Greek “koinonia politiki”: political society). The Greek noun “koinonia” has been translated by Liddell - Scott [6] as “communion” and the term “politike” [7] as a derivative of the Greek noun “polis”, which means the city as an organized political community. In all forms of crisis in the Ancient Hellenic World, our grandfathers solved the problem in the limits of the “politike koinonia” (civil society). However, the keystone of a viable globalization plan is the reformation of people’s consciousness through a globalist spiritual vision, with emphasis to propose the anthropocentric spiritual approach to globalization.

After the existence and the expansion of Christianity through the so called “Byzantine Empire” (The Empire of New Rome-Constantinople) [8] the Christian citizens never lived the experience of social crisis [9], because the official state idea was Communalism [10], where communion was identified with the Christian Church (Ecclesia).

The basic principle of this (Orthodox) Communalism is not the focus on man (Man-centrism) but rather on God (God-centrism) or the Holy men and women (Holy-centrism), since the members live according to the commandments of Apostle Paul, the Apostle of Nations, “joying alongside those who joy and crying alongside those who cry” (Romans 12,15). Communalism, as a way of life and self-government, saved the orthodox nations (Greeks, Serbs, Bulgarians, Romanians, etc) during centuries of Islamic slavery.

Some types of communal self-government appear in the non-Orthodox Christian world as well, however, they do not have the exceptional results found in Orthodoxy, because they remain extreme man-centered organizations. The simple solidarity to the fellow man does not heal wounds, does not rectify and save, it simply treats, comforts and supports those who are hurt and troubled. What is really interesting is the social phenomenon of the appearance and growth of social formations like the community, zatrouga, mir, obtsina, artel which constituted forms of social autonomy [11].

One country in which the form of political communalism (as self-government) is still saved, is Switzerland. Ioannis Kapodistrias, “the holy man of politics”, first Governor of Greece [12], former Minister of the Russian Empire, is the founder of the Swiss system for communalism and direct democracy, because he was a true expression and carrier of the Orthodox Christian Communalism and he conveyed it to the Swiss culture and reality. He did not manage to convey the Swiss citizens into Orthodoxy, however and they retained the external dimension of communalism that is self-government and direct democracy (political dimension) and rejected (since they were non-Orthodox) the internal dimension, where “everything is in common” (Acts 2, 44 – spiritual dimension), which is “habebant omnia communia” in Latin and inspired Carl Marx for the term “communism”. In this atmosphere, Marx advises in at letter to his followers Mihailovsky and Vera Sasoulitz [13], to follow the Russian (which is Orthodox) tradition in communalism, because this is the fastest and safest path to reach socialism. Of course, his successors created a totalitarian state, which essentially disintegrated, instead of using effectively, the rich and life-giving Russian communal tradition with the known results.

Obviously Orthodoxy played important role in Eastern Europe for the creation of communities and cooperatism instead of capitalism. The way the monastic society of “Holy Mountain” (“Agio Oros”) in Greece is governed, is a more than a thousand years old living example of communalism, where the administrative responsibility of the monastic state is rotated around the holy monasteries. “Holy Mountain”, which authentically saves the communal way of life of the Orthodox Empire of Romania (Byzantium), preserved all the basic characteristics of Orthodox Communalism, in contrast to any deformed or superficial replica. Main characteristics of the orthodox communalism are the transcendence of:

1. national origin, since the orthodox person loves his country (patriotism) by respecting, however, the countries

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of others and knowing that the heavenly country is above all [14],

2. language, since all languages are sacred and are simply different in their history dynamics and usage,

3. differentiability, since there is consciousness that “There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and female” (Galatians 3, 28),

4. multiculturalism, by respecting the individual national civilizations-cultures, since all civilizations owe to converse to the unity of human species and the reference to the One and Only Lord and Judge in History.

The historic reality has proven that in the last few years we hear a lot about Communalism in political for a (White House, United Nations, etc), as a globalized substitute of socialist ideas and as answer to extreme liberalism [15]. That is why we underline the identification to “Orthodox” Communalism, in order to realize that we offer a model of self-government and self-management, tested throughout the period of ecclesiastic history and saved today in the field of Ecumenical Orthodoxy within the monastic, missionary, parish and other ecclesiastic communities.

For most non-Orthodox communalists, liberalism is a carrier with a general self-centered spirit demanding the uncontrolled pursue of personal interests and ignoring the consequences of their competition. Orthodox communalism, in contrast to these political and ideological currents, proposes the values of participation, dedication to each individual community and presentation of the collective goods like civilization and tradition versus personal claims. This is why communalists, in contrast to those expressing liberal ideology, do not regard the individual above the community, on the contrary they regard that the community shapes the individual and is above it valuewise. The Orthodox Communalism offers a warm message, more necessary than ever for the modern troubled man and this is a fact which can not be met in any other modern political or philosophical ideology of modern democracy and open society. In the place of an unconditional “morality”, based on general, abstract and unfounded principles, the (orthodox) communalism designates those Principles, which are interwoven with an ethos, deeply rooted in our social Being. The great Greek, but Orthodox above all, literary legend Alexandros Papadiamantis, saluted in 1908 (about 100 years ago) the establishment of a cooperative in the spirit of Orthodox communalism in Karditsa of Thessalia, with these characteristic words: “the establishment of this statutes appears to me as a glow of light”. The cooperation, co-creation, connection and co-union with our fellow man constitutes heroic act of exiting the darkness of self-centrism (which we all experienced or still experience) to the light of the community a process embedded in human nature (Aristotle). This is why historic research has concluded that the Communalism in the orthodox peoples was the light in the darkness of Islamic (ottoman) domination.

Within this spirit of Communalism, the modern troubled man finds hope and meaning to his life, since everyone contributes to the community according to his abilities and enjoys relevant to his true needs. Modern globalization is transformed in this way to a blessing and unique opportunity of transformation from within, since the same persons (the peoples of the world), are its «actors». More specifically, globalization is transformed into the ecumenical approach (oikoumenikotita), the

faceless state into community of citizens, the individual into person, private ownership into social good, loneliness into communion with the fellow man, money into exchange of services and goods, our virtual surrounding into true community of people, depression into pleasant waiting, despair into true hope of overcoming the earthly and suicide into sacrifice for the fellow man.

We got used in the western world and unfortunately in orthodox countries like Russia and Balkan states and like my troubled country, Greece, to think and act socially according to the guidelines of “New World Order”, that is the modern Globalization. Therefore, we regard as democracy those parties which do not feel bound from their announcements and proposed programmes, relations which buy out votes and support of the citizens, corrupted and low level politicians. In contrast of this existing perception, democracy is communalism, general assemblies of the active and not passive citizens, frequent referendums, draws and frequent rotation in public offices which are not of authority but of service to the community, cooperative companies which create wealth for all society and not corruption, which is wealth for the few, state deficits and dependence from the international oligarchy and its carriers. It is a realistic and feasible vision, as proven from the Greek, Russian and international history, which relates to anyone wishing to enjoy the divine gift of life.

The above are not a theological analysis (preaching) or an ideological proclamation. It is a description of historic reality which our ancestors have been living in the near past, a true community experienced wherever there is communal spirit in our times (monasteries, missions, parish, family, etc). The proclaimed terrorism on the “dictatorship of inevitable solutions” coming from Globalization and controlled Media outlets, has a solution, which only we can offer. It is up to us simply to decide if we will continue our slow death or if we wish to live.

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V. M. Mezhujev¹

VALUES AND MEANINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE

The question of values and meanings in culture has risen in the result of discovery of many cultures; each of them has its unique singularity. This discovery was made rather late (19th cent.), it was preceded by the concept of cultural Eurocentrism that only gave right to European culture to be named ‘culture’. Historical and scientific basis of the idea of multiple cultures was something that Claude Lévi-Strauss called ‘the three humanisms’ – Italian Renaissance that rediscovered the culture of Antiquity for a mediaeval person; Oriental Studies, that turned the cultures of the great Eastern civilizations into the subject of universal interest; Ethnography (or Ethnology, or Anthropology), that stimulated the study of primitive cultures. As a result, something that is called ‘culture’ has spread to the visible historic horizon, although none of the known cultures serves as a predominant model culture, or can be more cultural than the others. Therefore, the culture has multitude of values and meanings, which cannot be brought to each other. But what do we mean by ‘values’ and ‘meanings’?

This question leads us closely to another question: if each culture has its singularity, how can it be shown on a theoretical level? The same question is formulated as a question of a historical cognition method as distinct from a natural science method. In the history of philosophy of the New Era there are two known solutions. The first is attributed to the Baden School of Neo-Kantians (H. Rickert) that tried to ground the ‘sciences of culture’ logic as opposed to the ‘sciences of nature’ logic, the so-called individualizing logic, the method of which is ‘referring to the values’. Value here is a logical notion that helps to distinguish one culture from the other and denotes simultaneously something common that unites all the representatives of each of them. Such generalization is specific for the science of history.

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From this point of view, ‘sciences of culture’ differ from ‘sciences of nature’ in the method but not in the subject. Any phenomenon can be presented both as natural (then we put it under the general law) and as cultural (then we find its value, or in other words its meaning for a certain group of people). The boundary between nature and culture has in this case the character of logical (methodological), but not ontological boundary. But if culture is given to us as a result of a definite logical operation, what distinguishes culture from nature outside logic? Is it possible by means of logic only (even if axiological) to catch something that distinguishes people’s life in culture from the existence of dead bodies and living organisms?

An alternative method of historical cognition towards the value theory (axiology) is hermeneutics, which was called a universal method of all historic studies (or the so-called ‘sciences of the spirit’ – *die Geisteswissenschaften*) according to W. Dilthey. Hermeneutics is not a logical but a psychological procedure, which is also called ‘the art of understanding’ in contrast to the logic of explanation. The hermeneutic subject is not any reality, but the one which contains definite meanings, i.e. not physical but psychical reality. Dilthey determined this reality with the term ‘spirit’ (*Geist*). What Neo-Kantians called ‘culture’, he named ‘spirit’. Thus historical sciences, aimed at perception of ‘the life of the spirit’, differ from other sciences not only methodologically, but also ontologically. Spiritual products not only mean something to a person, i.e. have a certain value, but also have sense, which can be perceived not by means of a logical operation, but by psychological inhabitation into them.

We will not go further into the question of difference between logics and hermeneutics (it has been covered extensively). It is important that value and meaning do not exist at one level of notions but are the consequences of different processes in culture understanding – logical (axiological) and hermeneutical. Which is preferable – let everyone decide for themselves, but they cannot be mixed and taken for something uniform.

The further thoughts about the nature of values lead, in my view, to sociology of knowledge that tries to identify a definite system of social relations behind each value system. Why does one group value something and the other values something different? Can one system of values be regarded as superior to the other? Or are they equal to each other?

During a famous forum on values in Tbilisi in 1965, a group of young Moscow philosophers including

O. Drobnitsky, N. Motroshilova, I. Balakina and myself criticized axiology from the position of sociology of knowledge. In the attempt to axiologize philosophy we then saw the danger of its total relativization. O.G. Drobnitsky later published a book on the subject, *The World of Revived Objects*, which has been forgotten of course, as is our custom to forget all. In the present talk about values it is good to remember what was said at that forum by the philosophers from Leningrad (Tugarinov, M.S. Kagan), Tbilisi and other cities and why Moscow philosophers including Drobnitsky argued with them. By that time axiology had also been criticized in the West, by hermeneutics, phenomenology, symbolic and existential philosophy and so on.

The problem of 'meaning' has a different continuation. It raises a question about the role of interpretation in the process of interaction and dialogue of cultures, about the culture's ability to produce new meanings, which M. Bakhtin called 'creative hermeneutics'. The ability to generate meanings itself is culture's defining feature. I would like to dwell more on this issue. Here is a simple example. A modern director who stages a classical play solves a kind of a double task: he/she should understand what was implied by the playwright, so to say, penetrate into his/her idea (this is the hermeneutic procedure of understanding) and at the same time decide how this play can interest a modern spectator. By doing so the director creates a definite interpretation of the play and extracts new, more modern meaning out of it; the meaning that probably was not implied by the author. He/she sees in the play something that was not meant by the author. Interpretation is always wider and richer than the author's intention. This is creative hermeneutics.

The work's ability to produce new meanings is the main evidence of it belonging to culture. Classics are immortal because they in fact contain inexhaustible meanings. But if the interpretative possibilities have been exhausted, it means that the work has fallen out of cultural life, keeping at best only an antiquarian value, which can only be of interest to specialists. Values can be kept in museums; meanings abide in the real life. Values do not distinguish a living culture from a dead one, meanings characterize only the living. To be honest, I see no meaning what is dead, thus there is no culture in the other world.

Consequently, values are studied while meanings are created by the living people. Values do not have an author, they are passed from generation to generation often unaltered; at the same time each generation rethinks its life. The same idea can be put differently: there are eternal values, but there are no eternal meanings. It is in the meanings where one can feel the presence of time, of changing life that is usually called historicity. I can share with others some values that come from the past but I cannot live with the same meanings as my ancestors did. Values as a rule are inherited and are passed according to the tradition; meanings are always contemporaneous (seasonable). Although values distinguish one culture from the other, they are kind of indifferent towards the time (for example, when speaking about the values of Russian culture – what time do we mean?). The meaning depends right on the time we live in.

That is why there are two diseases that can affect any culture. Firstly, a person's loss of connection to their

culture's values. F. Nietzsche was the first to note this disease of the European culture. He called it Nihilism. He proclaimed 'the death of God' through his Zarathustra and by this announced the crisis of all supersensible values – the values of ancient rationalism and those of the Christianity alike. According to Nietzsche, one should learn to live without the prop of these values relying only on one's own will. After Nietzsche, the theme of European cultural crisis has not left the philosophers' agenda. The turn of philosophy from 'the philosophy of reason' towards the 'philosophy of life' starts from Nietzsche. Now the meaning of culture that should compensate for the loss of values is being searched not in the scientific or moral reason but in the life itself. Thus culture, like all living beings, acquires historicity, i.e. temporality, finiteness of its existence. In its movement as any other life form it has the stages of birth, blossoming, maturity and death. The crisis of values turned out to be culture's loss of connection with eternity, both in its religious and metaphysical interpretation. According to Zygmunt Bauman, culture should learn to live on the new grounds, where there is no eternity and everything is perishable and transitory.

A bit later another disease that affected the European culture was diagnosed – a person's loss of connection to the time, which has resulted in a particular loss of meaning in human's life. It is no coincidence that at the same time (the first half of the 20th century) the so-called third school of psychoanalysis emerged – logotherapy (or meaning-therapy) – that tried to cure the loss of the meaning of life. The disease is connected with something that M. Foucault has called 'the death of man' – not a physical death, of course, but epistemological, i.e. some initial disposition in the scientific discourse. We will not enumerate here all the reasons that led to this crisis – massovization of the society and culture, consumerism, technologization and scientization of social structures and thinking – they are thoroughly analysed in the philosophic and scholarly literature. But can culture exist without a human or is it succeeded by something totally different?

I think that the question of culture's future can be solved not by the way of absolutization of one of existing cultures (each culture in its isolation from others comes to a crisis sooner or later), but by means of restoration of human's connections with all the cultures existing in the world. This connection, however, should be grounded not on the basis of imposing one culture by force, but on the basis of personal cultural preferences and a free choice. Today, many people already try to combine in their cultural ration spiritual products created by different cultural recipes. Each person should have the right to choose his/her cultural niche (or cultural identity), enjoying the fruits of any culture and having an unrestricted access to them. I call it the right to culture, which is possibly the most important of all human rights. Values of any culture get a chance to become values of my culture, and the meaning of this culture (as the meaning of the whole human's life) is a free choice of these values, their creative transformation into a new cultural synthesis. The time of such a life is called free time, and a person living in it is called a free individual. And I see no other way out of the crisis of culture.

V. V. Mironov¹

TRANSFORMATION OF CULTURE: FROM DIALOGUE TO MONOLOGUE?

The world is currently undergoing processes which significantly transform culture and in many respects influence the character of inter-cultural dialogue as a main mechanism of cross-cultural interaction. The system of local cultures is falling apart and, it seems, a new culture emerges from the global communication milieu. This report briefly outlines some peculiarities connected with the local character of cultures which defines the specific features of the cross-cultural dialogue and its changes under globalization.

In the context of this study, we will view culture primarily as a semiotic (sign) system. From this point of view, culture presents itself from the standpoint of an 'outside onlooker' as some coded system of meanings or a text, for the latter is a system of codes in a broad sense, the codes linked together by language structure. A particular feature of the text is that 'it is not only a generator of new meanings but also a repository of cultural memory. The text is able to bear in memory its previous contexts.'² In this sense we can add yet another definition of culture as a mass of texts, and imagine human culture as a whole as a TEXT (uppercase), i.e. a system comprising a variety of all texts produced by the mankind.

In the course of cultural interaction, a constant process of recognizing the codes of each culture goes along. The tool of coding is a live language which forms what we often refer to as memory. 'Language is a code plus its history.'³ In this is its distinction from the artificial language which, according to Yuri Lotman, is a 'structure without memory'. The latter can provide a precise understanding as 'pure communication' of structure, but this kind of understanding will be impoverished since it does not correlate with real history, i.e. with events. Thus, the cognition of culture is necessarily linked to the cognition of not only its structure (grammar of the language) but to the inherent semantic peculiarity linked to real history. By interpreting culture as a semiotic system, we can analyze transformations which are currently going on within it under the influence of the global changes in the communication system.

Following Yuri Lotman, I will define the traditional or classical type of culture as local. Locality is a characteristic feature of the classical model of culture which seems to be quite stationary and 'rigid' a system from the viewpoint of an

individual immersed in the given culture. One could assess the changes in it only from the outside or after a long period of time. Local culture is based on a lengthy adaptation of innovations which claim for the status of cultural values that secured its stability at the expense of a painless adjustment to itself of new components and their gradual modification.

Another sign of local culture is cultural oppositions present in it or, as G. Knabe puts it, cultural dichotomies which act as certain poles of different value attitudes towards one or another phenomenon, being in the contradictory dialectic unity.

The central *dichotomy* is that of 'high-low' which divides culture into two components, namely, high culture and grassroots culture. Of all others, this dichotomy underlies the process of adopting various new phenomena by the culture and granting them either cultural or extra-cultural status. It was brilliantly analyzed by Mikhail Bakhtin who described the features of the so-called 'culture of laughter' of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. The 'low' culture has absorbed stereotypes, traditions and norms of life, typical of daily lives of most people. On the contrary, the 'high' culture has produced things remote from conventional stereotypes and perceptions of life, torn away from the reality, and it represented an ideal cultural layer. This part of culture was intentionally removed from everyday life, even from a particular person. So one required some training and even some special arrangement of cultural environment to assimilate it.

Thus, culture was viewed as a phenomenon comprising conflicting parties in the form of grassroots and elite vectors whose unity was rather relative. This led to narrower dichotomies that reflected certain features of high (élite) and low (grassroots) cultures⁴ and on the whole stimulated cultural dialogue. We will only discuss few of them and will use them as an example for showing the impact of globalization on these structures.

The *dichotomy of 'openness-closedness'* was based on the idea stating that everything related to high culture was postulated by the area of the necessary only to a cultured man, while the elements of everyday life were declared to lie outside culture and presented a kind of periphery or the wrong side of life. In language and behaviour there was formed a culture which focused on covering up those sides of life that were considered indecent to discuss.

The *dichotomy of 'own-alien'* reflected the isolation and self-sufficiency of each local culture which manifested itself in their opposition to each other. This made it possible for cultures to develop 'immunity' to the influence of alien elements of another culture. In this approach, 'own' (inside culture) was seen as true, and 'alien' one was viewed as something denying it, i.e. as something false or even hostile in their extremes. The invention of printing enhanced this dichotomy, opposing national languages which defined the boundaries of 'social unity.'⁵

⁴ Brilliant analysis of the dichotomies we use here was offered by G.S. Knabe. See: Materials for lectures on the general theory of culture and the culture of ancient Rome. Moscow, 1993.

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² Lotman Yu. M. Inside the Thinking Worlds. Moscow, 1996. P. 21.

³ Lotman Yu. M. Culture and Explosion. Moscow, 1992. P. 13.

In this case, the invention of printing increased the tendency towards 'systematic linearity' of the perception of the world,¹ which in its turn led to the formation of such a feature of classical culture as the high importance of the *principle of completeness*. Cultural creativity was directed to the development of completed projects, whether they be works of music, architecture or philosophy, that were to reflect a possibility to cognize the being, the world and the man. Literary text served as a standard for all other texts; it embodied some complete meaning and was opposed to the texts of 'low' culture.

Dialogue between local cultures unfolded within a special communication environment, which Yuri Lotman called 'semiosphere', including in it not only the mass of languages, but also the social and cultural sphere of their functioning.² In the 'semiosphere', the overlapping area (identity) was relatively small as compared to the immense non-overlapping one. Only the smallest meaningful units of cultures overlapped while the remaining ones required cultural interpretation or translation. The want of understanding led to the expansion of the overlapping area, but the most important meaning belonged to the spheres that did not intersect.

At present *powerful globalization* significantly influences all aspects of social life, the life of individuals and structural components of culture. Globalization broadens the scale of communication making our lives more comfortable. Comfort and objectivity of this process bring us to the conclusion that it is none other than a positive phenomenon. Any process of evolution, however, exists as a struggle between opposite sides or tendencies. In particular, globalization pushes the world towards integration processes while, at the same time, prompting disintegration (disruption) of cultures as a defence reaction against their dissolution in the global culture.³

The changes of means of communication affect human culture by transforming it into a radically new type. Transformation here means not just changes through an evolutionary replacement of certain elements of the system, but the changes of the basics of the system, i.e. its transition to a new quality. This is a directed inherent process of changes which unlike revolutions, for instance, is mostly hidden from the viewer, because it is fulfilled at the expense of alien elements building themselves into its sub-systemic parts; these elements do not destroy the system externally, but they gradually make the system work in another way. This process can be compared, as Douglas Rushkoff does it, with the transformation of the cell when it is entered by the fragment of another DNA changing it at the genetic level.

Something similar is happening in modern culture. Culture is attacked by 'media viruses'⁴ and their influence is greater at the points where immune system is most vulnerable, as is the case with living organisms. 'Cultural immunity' of the system or culture is necessarily connected with the carrier of cultural viruses, alien to a given culture. A certain culture gets infection when it is implanted with cultural stereotypes that do not stem from its entity that has been formed over centuries. As a result, the number of separate cultures absorbing portions of cultural infections of the same type grows and leads to its transformation. It is not

a coincidence that we use the term 'Americanization' at the level of mundane consciousness, which does not necessarily stem from the fact that the U.S. themselves are treated negatively. The term just reflects the fact that the country dominating in science and technology including information technologies is a cultural donor of media-viruses spreading throughout the modern culture.

This results in the *destruction of local character of culture*. Semiosphere as a product of communications designed for a dialogue is transformed into the information sphere, a certain media space in which all cultures are drawn and are forced to live under the laws of this product. The space of global communication or otherwise *infosphere* which is being formed becomes an external condition (information field) for this existence. Infosphere is not just a set of information means, it is rather the realm beyond man's control, the realm that makes man and the world dependent on it. Human society has never experienced such processes in the course of its history. Instead of different cultures adapting to each other in the space of the above mentioned semiosphere, we find ourselves caught up in the adaptation process of all cultures to a global communication space. Communication here acts as an independent force, literally forcing us to engage in a 'dialogue' between cultures by its laws and rules. Cultures get engulfed by other environment which percolates into intercultural dialogues, and thus conditions are provided to embed it into Global Communication Environment.

This affects the features of culture which we discussed above.

Integrative language trends begin to prevail in the world. One result of this is that all languages become subjugated by one, which is most able to expand itself due to political, scientific, technical and other conditions. 'Pseudo cultural' field of communication is expanding, and the dialogue in it is based on comprehension of the most available, overlapping or almost identical semantic structures. This communication field is dominated by general stereotypes, shared values, shared rules of conduct, i.e. by the simplest available components. Of course, this involves an array of advantages, but at the same time this can make the dialogue between cultures devoid of any sense. We can understand any person anywhere in the world, but only at overlapping points or at the level of identical meanings. This implies communication for the sake of communication. This is communication with our mirrored image according to the given set of communication stereotypes. The kingdom of dead identity going along with bustling external activity prevails.

Various *phenomena claiming to be given the status of cultural are boosting*. The old value system is under enormous pressure and destruction and the time constraints do not allow new symbols and signs to adapt to the traditional semantic (related to the text) value system. The values and traditions that have dominated for centuries are being destroyed, and new values diverge from the traditional ones so much that their culture-forming meaning is not always clear. Increasing number of people perceive cultural entities, but they are deprived of the subtlety and depth, the level of training, which was required before.

The balance between high and low culture is shaken. The latter is becoming mass culture not only by the number of subjects involved in it, but also by the degrading quality

¹ Marshall McLuhan. Op. cit. P. 207.

² See: Lotman Yu.M. Inside the Thinking Worlds. P. 194.

³ See: Panarin A.S. Globalization as a Challenge to the Living World // Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2004, Volume 74, № 7.

⁴ See: Rushkoff D. Media Virus. Moscow, 2003.

of the product consumed. As a result, the dominant factor is the system of distribution (replication) of the product rather than its meaning or quality. In this sense, mass culture is a typically grassroots culture, but significantly enhanced by the latest means of audiovisual reproduction.

Exactly these conditions facilitate the development of such a phenomenon as 'pop culture', an anti-cultural emission of grassroots culture from the general system of culture. It has become mass culture with its production and consumption on a mass scale, its products being distributed widely thanks to modern means of mass communication. In this sense, popular culture as a counter-cultural phenomenon is opposed not only to high (elite) culture, but to the culture as a whole. That is why we can define it as a simulation of culture, a substitute of the culture *per se*. It does not have national roots (despite being coupled with the language of its culture), and is in the possession of all. The main difference between pop culture and classical culture lies in their production and consumption patterns, the latter is characterized by its huge mass distribution at an extraordinary rate. This leads, in its turn, to an unlimited replication of amusement and entertainment sphere. Modern society turns into a factory of entertainment and at the same time a consumer of its products. Integrated information environment provides conditions for the development of such culture, and mass events which we now call *shows* – its embodiment. It is the medium for media viruses to disseminate, which spread in it 'the same way as biological viruses do.'¹

Shows exploit the principle of participation rather than that of individual or unique creative work. Participation itself becomes a form of communication, yet there is no need to understand others or render any meaning. Since the endless show of pop culture permeates everyone's life today, it is not limited by traditional means of entertainment. It turns the whole social domain into entertainment. Real life is replaced by endless reality shows, prompting us to see ourselves on TV. This is an example of the highest level of simulation, which is not harmless at all, because it develops uniform and therefore easy to manipulate patterns of behaviour in man. We are beginning to sink into the 'reality' that is designed by mass media while 'the signs of popular culture and the shows in mass media cloud people's sense of reality'.² Modern world is growing into a great show, and functions according to the laws of the genre.

In a sense, these shows at a new level resemble a medieval merrymaking, which has come into our lives, even if in a very different information environment. As a result, we live in a society where the festivities linger on and, instead of one or two weeks or a month, last almost continuously and violate the natural balance between high and low culture in favour of the latter. Grassroots culture becomes officially recognized as a converted form of culture, the products of which must be constantly consumed. The Internet provides utterly favourable conditions for

the increment and reinforcement of the merrymaking. The Internet communication is a virtual feast with all its toys. Instead of interlocutors, there are masks that make it possible to say anything, even insults, etc. This is the realm (which was temporary in the Middle Ages) of fools, jesters and clowns wearing fool's caps. But the feast was over in two to three weeks; people would get back to everyday life after a portion of adrenaline and were to wait until another feast. The Internet prolongs the virtual feast transforming it into everyday life, the meaning of which can easily fit into a notorious four-letter word scribbled on an infinitely long fence. We cannot extrapolate moral principles of real life and plant them in the Internet. And in their absence, the vast information space is exposed to never-ending interpretations both conscious and unconscious. The state of culture as described above possesses all the features of 'low' culture with the mundane in its centre. According to G. Knabe, the mundane viewed one way or other is linked to such forms of everyday behaviour as achieving success at all costs, striving for comfort, etc. It permeates all areas of human activity and culture.

Low-brow pop culture invades even such areas as science and philosophy.

In certain branches of science, it resembles the emission into the market of some results of a certain activity which is often adapted beyond recognition or even transformed into its antipode. As Simon Kardonsky justly notes, similar to pop-star singers or religious figures, there spring up pop-scholars with a full set of pop-star attributes. 'Investing money into personified scholarly advertisements and scientific horror stories turned out to be more profitable than in acquisition of new knowledge.'³ Philosophical version of pop-culture is post-modernism which conglomerates various philosophical ideas, literary practices and the recording of modern social experiences. 'Under the mask of post-modernism, you can stage performances and write verses, but also make crêpes, wear bizarre suits, make love and quarrel, as well as announce any writer of your liking from the world art pantheon as your own predecessor.'⁴ Post-modernism is a universal cultural position of destruction. It is another looking-glass of culture at its contemporary stage and one of the manifestations of pop-culture.

Clip consciousness embodies ideas of post-modernism and anti-constructivism at the level of mundane consciousness. This form reflects such a mindset of the present time which implies that the man has got tired of reading long texts whether they are literary or philosophical works. His life is full of dribs and drabs of newly formed cultural phenomena and at the same time he enjoys more freedom in expressing his own ideas. This allows him to suggest his own explanations of various phenomena instead of applying those proposed by others which are to be mastered, too. Thus, though there seems to be active exchange of information, dialogue vanishes away from culture; and dialogue as an exchange of meanings is unnecessary in the global consumer community.

¹ Rushkoff D. Op. cit. P. 15.

² Chernyavichute Yu. From High Culture to Pop Culture: the Production and Consumption of Culture. See: Portal: Social, Humanitarian and Political Education. <http://www.auditorium.ru/>

³ Kardonsky, Simon. The Crises of Science and Scientific Mythology // Home notes. On-line Version. http://www.strana-oz.ru/numbers/2002_07/2002_07

⁴ Weinstein O.B. Postmodernism: History or Language? // Postmodernism and Culture: Proceedings of the 'Round Table' Discussion // Problems of Philosophy. 1993. № 3. pp. 3–7.

V. V. Naumkin¹

THE ISSUE OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION

The 5th Global Forum of the 'Alliance of Civilisations', which took place in Vienna in February 27–28 of this year, gave a special note to the importance of the cultural diversity as a universal value of the world community and one of the driving forces of the global progress. In this context I will remind you of the established truth that most states in the world are not homogeneous in terms of ethnic composition and faith, and regulation of the diverse cultures is the most important issue for all of these states. Recognizing the cultural differences between people as an important component of the civilization space and ensuring equal opportunities for all groups in social and political life are the tasks, on which states' successful functioning depends. At that, at the time of big challenges faced by us due to globalization, self-identification of cultural and civilisational communities becomes of great importance.

Starting from Russia I will remark that in our today's discourse we will not get out of the rusty fetters of the centuries-old clash between the Pochvenniki and the Westerners. But only the 'Asian' choice was not referred to at the time). But even in the past this clash was not so uncompromising. In the 19th century all representatives of the Russian intellectual élite had a controversial attitude to foreign countries (to Western ones, in particular). The great Pushkin at the age of 32 wrote to Chaadayev in his letter in French: 'Je vous parlerai la langue de l'Europe; elle m'est plus familière que la nôtre.' [I will address you in a European language: I am more accustomed to it than to our language.] It is not for nothing that Dostoyevsky made a penetrating remark that 'Pushkin is the only one of all the world poets to have the ability to transform into a different nationality'. Were both geniuses to live today, both of them would come in for a lot of trouble caused by some of our colleagues. I will remind you that according to Dostoyevsky, whom it is hard to blame for cosmopolitanism, 'the destination of the Russian man is sure to be pan-European and universal'. I will cite another well-known idea of his: 'To become a real Russian, to be quite Russian means, perhaps, only to become the brother of all people.' But André Gide, when speaking about Pushkin, wrote that he is 'the most ethnical of all the writers preceding him' and that it is no use searching in his works for what 'is usually considered to be specifically Russian: confusion, duskiness, hyperboles, disorder. In most Pushkin's works everything is:

lucidity, balance, harmony.' This is the part of our heritage which draws us to Europe, to the European culture.

But in the near future Europe can also become Muslim if not mainly, but to a great extent. So, even the European pole of our contraposition will not be able to evade a civilisational split. The European battles over women's head cloths are a worrying sign. But the xenophobic slogan of a prime minister from one of German Lands – 'Kinder statt Inder' (More children, but not the Indians) – is unlikely to awake an echo in the families of native Europeans. The Swiss attack on minarets (fortunately, it did not meet any support in Europe) was also a sign which caused no less anxiety. Our fundamentalists, nationalists and xenophobes also undermine the inter-faith and inter-ethnic concord which has for centuries prevailed in our country (I will cite the words of a famous journalist from a respectable newspaper: 'God forbid any muezzin from ever shouting at the top of his voice here, in Moscow, on Ivanovsky Hill').

It is the Muslim world which is made closer to us owing to the role played by religion. The importance of faith shows itself not in the growing religiosity – people in our country are not particularly pious and, as well as in many other parts of the world, religiosity is generally reduced to ceremonial rites. But the role of church is growing to be more and more important. It is the church which is a consistent advocate of our identity and our civilisational peculiarity ('neither the West, nor the East'); the church is vehemently opposed to the European understanding of human liberties and rights being transferred to the soil of Russia. In the view of the church this European concept involves permissiveness and deviation from human morals. It is sufficient to mention its attitude to homosexuality. Islam is known to have a most uncompromising attitude to this phenomenon, which makes an impact on the Muslim population of our country. However, in some Muslim countries homosexuality has always been more widespread than in contemporary European countries where the attitude to homosexuality is more than liberal. After all, some masterpieces of Arabic and Persian medieval poetry were created in the genre of *ġelmān* ('boys') – the poems in which poets celebrate the beauty of youthful objects of their homosexual love. I will remark that with all the frequent appeals to the necessity of keeping to some chaste bases of our civilisation, it took our legislator much time and even more scandals to pass the necessary strict laws against paedophiles. It was the West which led the battle against this horrific evil.

Certainly, Russia has long been a state of cultural diversity, and imposing standards of one civilisational model (no matter how successful and attractive they may seem) upon our entire population is destined to fail. Cultural diversity is an absolute benefit and virtue, moreover, it is highly beneficial for the country's entering into the process of globalisation. But I will give another example of the fact that entering into various cultural and political formats predetermined by the civilisational polymorphism (and, consequently, by cultural ambivalence) creates challenging tensions. I mean that our country, while quite naturally casting itself as a state belonging to the West and the East at the same time, acts in formats which conflict with each

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other. The report on Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe prepared by the Committee on Culture, Science and Education (Mogens Jensen) and approved of at the June session of PACE in 2010, says (article 4), that the Assembly 'deplores the attempts of the UN member-states to initiate under the auspices of the UN the opposition to the so-called defamation of religions, in particular, of Islam, as such attempts reflect rather theocratic than democratic standards'. I will remind you that the Russian Orthodox Church demands that our state conduct a campaign against defamation of religions. This position is also supported by a number of official figures. Indeed, can we consider that it reflects 'theocratic standards'? And to what degree do democratic standards require following the policy of separating the state from religion (ibid, article 5)? Besides, by no means all the European Union countries adhere to this principle consistently. In Denmark pastors are, in fact, civil servants. It makes the Scandinavian country similar to Turkey, which is not completely secular and where imams are appointed by the state.

In fact, the Asian pole of the contraposition mentioned in the title of our forum is not homogeneous. The Asian reality is multifaceted and extremely diverse. The model of Singapore has lately been considered in our country to be almost the apogee of a successful development along the Western lines, but many standards of democracy are absent there. An example of freedom of press in this part of the world is given not by Singapore (where there is no freedom of press), but by Muslim and non-secular Pakistan. And the flogging of criminals with rattan rods used in Singapore is more similar to the model of Afghanistan than the humane systems of developed countries though in terms of economic development Singapore compares well with these developed countries. In this respect the negative appeal of the model of Singapore is obvious, and other Asian countries of a different level of development, for instance, Mongolia, have quite a number of attractive elements. There are the same high rates of growth, hospitality and freedom of press similar to those of Pakistan. But at the same time it is Pakistan where most egregious cases of religious obscurantism are found. For instance, some time ago a part of Deoband Ulema (Muslim religious scholars of a radically fundamentalist course) called for introducing a ban on television broadcasting as any television inevitably becomes a weapon of corrupting morals. Following this call a part of the local youths publically destroyed TV sets in the streets. It seems to be impossible to imagine a similar thing happening in our country or in the EU countries, though at times most unexpected assumptions come into being.

And still, which direction is Russia moving to? To Asia, where the planet's economic life tends to be centred and where more and more countries rank among the world's richest countries, or to Europe, which is growing older and cannot exist without drawing growing numbers of Asian and African workers? With the mind directed to Asia and the soul directed to Europe? Or the other way around? Are they right – people who think it necessary to establish our own forms of life and a unique political system (this is what Vitaly Tretyakov wrote about not a long time ago) based on our time-honoured national values and traditions? But, perhaps, we should first get outside of these values and traditions, giving our support to what really serves the interests of ensuring a decent life for our compatriots

and rejecting what stops us from developing, from being attractive and from successfully competing with other nations?

I believe we should not present ourselves with a contrived choice. Unfortunately, we are not waited for with open arms either in the West or in the East. The only possible way for a self-sufficient Russia living in the globalised world is to move forward while preserving its civilisational identity and borrowing the best elements from others' experience.

As for the outside world, I will remark that there are two contending tendencies in modern societies: the growing role of religion in their life and secularization. The clash between these two tendencies, which becomes particularly painful if the split line dividing them goes between different ethno-confessional groups, gives rise to conflicts. Thus, according to M. König and P. de Gutcheire, 'the most important issue is how in the course of political regulation of religious diversity to observe a personality's right for religious freedom while recognizing at the same time religious identities in the public sphere'.

Some analysts have gone as far as to blame the existing and deepening split between the world of faith and the world of atheism for the increasing tension between cultures, which interferes with efforts aimed at getting mutual awareness and rapprochement. The bitter fight between advocates of a religious and a secular state in the Near East as a result of the Arab Spring clearly demonstrates that it is necessary to become aware of the possible threats which stem from this conflict of values.

The democratic answer to the challenge of religious diversity on the whole is to provide sensible pluralism, which, however, does not mean that it is equally satisfying for all the social and political forces resorting to religion to advance their goals. I will briefly touch upon such a common feature of religious pluralism as tolerance. Even in societies which have advances in democratic changes we can often hear that tolerance is criticised as an instrument to erode religious identity. The concept of tolerance is confronted with the idea of a unique nature of a certain religion. There are heated debates over the following questions: whether representatives of different Abrahamic religions believe in one and the same God; whether an adherent of a different religion can find salvation, to say nothing of the question of the attitude which must be adopted to the faithless and apostates. These debates have not yet brought rapprochement.

When we touch upon the subject of interconnectedness between religion and ethnicity there is a particular importance attached to the question of what certain groups consider to be the fundamental marker of identity. A representative of the Russian Orthodox Church, Vladimir Legoyda supposes that religion, while being the innermost part of human life, is at the same time a powerful social force due to the fact that 'it is what philosophers call the identity of human limit'. At the same time in Russia there is a split between the cultural and religious and the purely religious identity. In other words the people who consider themselves to belong to a certain confessional group, in real life do not follow the formulae in which, at first sight, they seem to believe. Their religiosity is often reduced to observing the rites – and mostly not all of them. But, according to the director of the department of the Ministry

of Regional Development of Russia Alexander Zhuravsky, as Russia is a secular state the religious affiliation cannot be the dominant identity, only the civil identity must prevail. In Tatarstan, where the role of Islam is growing, the vast majority of the Tatar intellectuals still think that ethnicity must dominate over religiosity. The analyst mentioned above, as well as many others, thinks that the problems which Russia faces in this sphere are caused by the appearance of unconventional forms of Islam, which are not typical of Russia in the traditional context. The struggle between the Sunnite Hanafi and Tarikatist Islam, which are traditional for our country, on the one side, and adherents of the 'pure Islam', the Salafists, on the other side, is becoming rather bitter. Quite naturally, it poses a great problem for managing this aspect of cultural diversity, where it is hard not to make mistakes. Certainly, the democratic institutions in such situations make for the best conditions for a better solution of the problems. But as it has already been said, even in societies with a good democratic reputation there are processes which are unlikely to contribute to finding the appropriate forms of regulating the cultural diversity. I mean the elements of discriminating Muslim communities, which are found in the policies of a number of ruling parties in some European countries.

In this context we can advert to India's experience. According to Gurpreet Mahajan, the ability of India to survive as a multi-cultural democracy 'is mostly attributed to (1) the presence of mature democracy; (2) tolerance of the dominating culture'. I am not sure whether the term 'dominating' is appropriate in the context of the thesis of tolerance, but it is obvious that to support the multi-cultural world it must be shown by all cultures present in a society. But if intolerance is shown by the bearers of the culture of the majority, there is no doubt that bearers of the culture of the minority will respond in kind. Generally speaking, I am also not sure that civilisations can be subdivided into tolerant and intolerant ones. Representatives of many of them tend to apply a thesis of tolerance to their own civilisation, emphasizing that this feature is inherent in it. Unfortunately, however in the history of all cultures there have been periods – some longer, some shorter – when the attitude to people of a different ethnicity or faith did not match the canons of tolerance.

In our globalised world the issue of cultural identity has become an extremely strong imperative, as commitment to your own language, faith and other markers of this identity (irrespective of whether they were inherited from the point of view of symbolic anthropology or constructed) is seen as a determining factor ensuring the preservation of ethno-confessional groups. Prejudice, myths, erroneous perception, as well as fears and a sense of threat give rise to nationalism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, hostility to anything that is different.

In this context we can recall that in the 20th century two world wars and two great revolutions in Russia and in China showed how fragile the world political system, and the world on the whole, is. 'We, civilisations, now are aware that we are mortal,' observed the French poet Paul Valéry. By the end of the 20th century politicians and economists had found out how limited was the range of instruments at their disposal for resolving conflicts and overcoming threats appearing in the world.

It turned out that belonging to a certain civilisation by no means guarantees a harmonious development of a society, as within the society and within different individuals there are hidden destructive elements of barbarism. It is becoming more and more obvious that it is not necessary to restrain the civilisational principles which are different from ours but it is vital to restrain the elements of barbarism which are dormant in the world.

Ending the ideological and partly inter-state confrontation in the late 20th century triggered a crisis of identity of vast masses of people. The state of their minds is increasingly in need of self-identification, and the world has made a leap backwards coming back to its original bases – religion and culture. But this process can potentially cause the world to disintegrate into discrete religious and cultural units, which will not be ready for rapprochement and harmonious cooperation. Some analysts predict that 'a period of intensification of cultural wars' is to come. However, this can be avoided. It is necessary for the national power and for the intellectual élite to be ready for dialogue and cooperation. While civilisational principles in the past provided conditions and opportunities for making political decisions, at present the decisions made by politicians should serve the goals of protecting civilisations which are different from one another and of promoting cooperation between them.

Force still remains to be the weightiest argument in politics but it is becoming less and less important as a factor of the world stability and steadiness. The world is one and indivisible, everything is interconnected in it. Under globalization, hostility and intolerance stop being local phenomena, voluntarily or involuntarily they gain a global context, become a threat to the whole world. Relationship between civilisations cannot boil down to opposition or conflict. On the contrary, the relationship has for a long time been developing as interaction in the spheres of 'high' culture and welfare, as getting to know one another, recognizing and exchanging achievements. It is not a clash of civilisations which threatens the world, but weakening of civilisational principles in today's life of different peoples.

At the 5th Global forum of the 'Alliance of Civilisations' in Vienna when answering the Harvard-Beijing professor Tu Weiming, who advanced a commonly spread idea that today we are living through a period of 'an increasing diversity of cultures', I retorted that in fact today we witness a *decrease* in the diversity of cultures. Some small and weak cultures are on the brink of extinction, they are marginalizing or losing the most important bases of their identity under the influence of globalization, a number of other cultures feel vulnerable, their very survival is threatened by the advance of stronger cultures by way of an aggressive projection of their values and products of culture or by way of direct intervention. It can aggravate the dangerous discord and easily become a source of conflicts. In my view, our aim within the 'Alliance of Civilisations' should be protecting all cultures to allow bearers of small and weak cultures to feel confident, free from the fear of losing their identity.

In this answer I also emphasized that one of the pivots of protecting the cultural diversity, developing democracy and good management should be our respect for the Minority. Minority in terms of views and opinions, ethnicity, religion and culture. Respect for all kinds of Otherness. Respect for

the weak. Along with it, an idea of the importance of cross-cultural dialogue should be given all the possible support, it being the keynote of many speeches. At the same time I put the question of the necessity and, perhaps, priority of a dialogue *within one culture*, taking into account the fact that today we witness a rising tension mostly within one culture, one religion, and one society. For example, as for the interpretation of a universal value such as human rights. In this context we can mention the heated debates going on in European communities – the debates concerning legitimisation of same-sex marriages and the right of same-sex families to adopt children. Or even more heated arguments within Muslim societies over *Takfir*, a declared

right of a group of believers to anathematize others. There is no point in even saying how much these societies suffer from inter-religious armed conflicts, sometimes taking the shape of disgusting acts of brutality, cruel repression and bloody conflicts. The need to combat extremism remains to be a condition for a successful establishment of a new international order based on the common values mentioned above and supported by the 'Alliance'.

The UNESCO's Universal Declaration runs that cultural diversity is 'as necessary for the mankind as is variety of species for the nature'. Social equitability and harmony, democracy and good management provide the best conditions for its preservation and development.

M. B. Piotrowski¹

INTOLERANCE OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA

It has become very fashionable today to scold 'multiculturalism' and talk eagerly about the alleged failure of the policy based on it.

There is nothing to rejoice at! Today, its alternative is civil war. Like the one in progress in Syria now. Secularism versus fundamentalism. Intolerance lies at the heart of many of today's and tomorrow's conflicts. The word 'tolerance' in its 'European' translation is also very trendy now. But it means nothing. Nothing positive in any case. But the derivative word is again turning into a key one, 'intolerance'. Griffith's film should be shown again.

In this respect, there is an urge for new reflections upon the dialogue of cultures, in particular, upon the fact that the dialogue involves two, rather than many participants. Just as in many other cases, the bilateral specificity is more useful than the abstract grandeur. Values and meanings can be different and no one intends to reject most of them. Because a purely religious dialogue is impossible. Dogmas cannot be compromised, and the ideal 'praying together' in Assisi becomes 'praying side by side'. It is always better to pinpoint the position as it has been made in respect to Abrahamic religions in the famous papal message, 'In our age'.

Different meanings conceal different goals. In medieval Europe, the ghetto was a means of protecting their identity and has turned into a means of oppression. 'Multiculturalism' can be used both as a tool of assimilation, and as a defence against assimilation. The difference is determined by many factors. However, it seems that in order to find the right recipes of behaviour we again need the intelligentsia. Maybe we need even the mistakes of the intelligentsia again.

This 'monastic order' has many drawbacks, it often paved the way for absolutely evil people and events. But some of the general principles of the intelligentsia today are very keenly opposed to reality. It is unintelligent to judge people by their money and income. Now money serves both as the criterion for good and bad. This current mixture resulted from the fact that money should not be a criterion of merit or demerit.

These criteria of the right cannot be described in simple words. Human dignity is in education and willingness to educate others. In this sense, a museum is a perfect model. Museums now are made much fuss of. It is difficult to recognize their right to create and store knowledge. They are seen as makers of services to the population, or myrmidons of power. They are willing to recognize the right of a museum to serve as a magnet for tourists and a workshop on 'printing' money. But museums are nobly fighting for the right to be an academy and university, where one can enjoy everything keen and useful rather than 'schnorrng'.

Museums help us understand the amazing entwinement of mirror images and stereotypes that make up the world today. Caucasian abreks are real criminals, but they were begot by romantic images of Russian military writers.

Islamic Jihad is more than real, but it was revived by the cult of the European crusades and the holy war. The hijab has become a symbol of Islam under the influence of missionaries' horror of it. Muslim accusations of Western civilization are the reflection of Western rebukes of Islam: paganism, materialism, physiologism, oppression of women, grubbiness.

As a result, there is a clash at any attempt of rapprochement.

There are plenty of distinctions and the dialogue frequently resembles a conversation between the deaf and the blind. It is not hopeless, but we need to look for points of a dispute, and of a fruitful one.

One of these points may become a concern for cultural heritage. This is an acute problem, but common human approach can be applied here, so we can talk and argue why it is bad to destroy the Buddhas of Bamiyan, statues of Lenin and mausoleums in Timbuktu. These are elements of

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culture and art, and they can find a place outside ideology. Examples of Russia, especially Soviet, can be very useful here.

Another topical issue is the fate of Christianity in the Middle East. Culture as the goal of human existence makes it possible to talk about the fact that the destruction of Christianity in the places of its birth will make these places decay and destroy Christian civilization as a whole. What is meant here is cultural genetics. Humanitarian intelligent knowledge shows that culture has DNA and genetic engineering is dangerous for culture.

There are also acute episodes which can be passionately argued about. 'Argo', a bad film, is accompanied by a good book that provides the basis for the film. It is a gripping story of seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran. All Russians remember a similar story when Griboyedov was killed. Similarities and differences between the two events can make a good example for the dialogue of cultures and cultural stereotypes. Even the two fundamental disagreements together can give a good double-sided result.

The dialogue of cultures should be sharp and dialectical. Otherwise, it becomes just a blabbing.

V. V. Popov¹

THE EURASIAN ESSENCE OF THE RUSSIAN CIVILISATION

Russia's history is her main advocate. All the experiments made on her mysterious fate turned to her advantage.

F. I. Tiutchev

As fate has willed, Russia is at the intersection of the world civilisations between Europe and Asia. Due to the geographical, historical, demographic and cultural aspects it evolved into a continuous integrity of Western and Eastern sides, into an independent unique civilisation.

The Russian civilisation is an amalgamation of the Russian people's historical ties with other groups of the East Slavs, with the peoples of the Uralic and Finno-Ugric groups, with the Altai (Turkic in particular), Caucasian and other language families of Western, Central Eastern Asia, the Pacific culture. As for the religious denomination there is found an interaction of Orthodoxy with the West (Catholicism and Protestantism), with the East (Islam: Volga region, the Caucasus, Dagestan, Siberia), with Northern Buddhism and Lamaism, as well as with numerous local faiths – shamanism, paganism of the peoples of the Far North.

Within the Eurasian space there for ages have co-existed two largest world religions – Christianity and Islam as faiths of two ethnic groups – the Slavonic and the Turanian ones. Dialogue has become a form of their interaction.

Throughout the course of history the Russian civilisation emerged as a unique poly-ethnic, multi-faith integrity and community. (The Soviet people as a successor of this civilisation was a higher stage, as the process of mutual enrichment, amalgamation developed rapidly and ascendingly. The Soviet civilisation is a historically short form of an attempt to build up a society on the basis of justice, to create a structure which is in general agreement with the humanistic ideals. The attempt was not quite a success but it would be false and immoral to pass an exclusively negative judgement on it. It made a massive impact on the world events).

Our outstanding contemporary, the scientist and enlightener, D.S. Likhachov defined Russia in the following

way: 'This is a synthesis of the Russian Slavonic culture based on the cultures of Byzantium and Scandinavia harmonizing with the Finno-Ugric, Turkic, the Tatar and Mongol peoples, through which the culture of China and India were perceived.'

It should be noted that as early as in the 19th century D.I. Mendeleev, whose name has forever been printed in the historical records, predicted 'China's turning into a giant', and emphasized the importance of establishing close links with it.

By entering into friendly relations with its neighbouring ethnic groups, the Russian ethnos gained the features of a super-ethnos of a multi-ethnic community. This is how the great power super-ethnos appeared, the power that made a great impact on the world events of the 19th and the 20th centuries. The disintegration of the Soviet Union did not lead to the collapse of the super-ethnos: states can appear and disappear but the super-ethnos keeps on its existence. It is more viable as it has existed for centuries and accords with the basic interests. (D.S. Likhachov said about St. Petersburg: this city does not belong either to the European or to the Eastern type. This city is of the Russian type with its capability to absorb and transfigure heterogeneous (Eastern) civilisations).

A.P. Bestuzhev-Ryumin, a famous political and public figure of the 19th century, wrote: 'Russians, as well as all great historical peoples, are a mixed people. The Slavonic civilisation of the North and the North-East and the Tatars. While mixing with the Slavs, these tribes inevitably brought elements of their own culture to the lifestyle of the Slavs. Our ancestors absorbed the Scandinavian tribes.'

It should be noted that V.G. Belinsky and F.M. Dostoyevsky admitted that the fundamental feature of the Russian national character is the ability to adopt all sorts of features of any national type. The Russian culture and civilisation have absorbed the best achievements of many neighbouring peoples and nationalities. This process of mutual enrichment, in fact, creates the necessary prerequisites for re-establishing the Eurasian role of Russia in a more active form.

Over the period of the centuries-old formation of the Russian civilisation it has experienced the impact of many

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cultures. If we consider the 9th century to be a starting point the Turkic world made the following global impact: the Mongols and the Tatars introduced elements of the state culture: the system of tributes and taxes, the census, the first lessons of diplomacy. At that, the wish of the Russians to consolidate grew stronger due to their striving for freedom. Our outstanding historian L.N. Gumilyov considers the Battle of Kulikovo of 1380 to be the peak of this process. 'It was of great ethnic importance,' he wrote, 'the natives of Suzdal, Vladimir and Pskov and others went to fight as representatives of their principalities, but they came back as Russians though living in different cities. As a result, Muscovite Russia became a reality, a factor of historical importance. The third global process is the Europeanisation of Russia, which was started at the times of Peter I and continued under Catherine the Great. This period helped Russia put an end to the Middle Ages, brought Russia to the world arena. An important factor was the process of rapprochement with the Caucasus, which took place at that time.'

By the way, Ivan the Terrible made the territory of Russia thirty times larger, created a centralised, multi-ethnic, the biggest – 6 million – Eurasian state, where free primary education, courts and local government were found.

It seems appropriate to give particular note to the significance of the works of L.N. Gumilyov, who is called the great Eurasian of our time (in October 2012 the 100th anniversary of his birth was celebrated) in establishing the idea of the centuries-old community, inter-relationship of the peoples which inhabit the unbounded Eurasian space from the Baltic and the Carpathians to the Pacific. 'It is in Eurasia where peoples are linked not only by some one-way number of features, but by the commonness of historical fates. Eurasia is a great continent not only as a space but in terms of its historical and cultural nature,' the scholar wrote. L.N. Gumilyov's idea of complementariness of the peoples of Eurasia, which provides a favourable ground for dialogue, is of utmost importance. This idea was expressed in his saying which has become well-known: 'We should not try to make people be like us but we should learn to live in concord with them.' Today this thesis of his sounds timelier than ever before.

Russia began to expand actively in the 16th century, naturally absorbing many other peoples and ethnic groups.

Unlike the Americans, who conquered territories by exterminating native Indians, Russian pioneers, who reclaimed neighbouring lands, always tried to establish mutual understanding and interaction with the peoples and ethnic groups inhabiting these lands, though extending frontiers was not always a peaceful process.

The historical peculiarity of our development is that the Russians have never lived alone on their territory; they have always lived in close interaction with almost 200 nationalities. The necessity of living together led to mixed marriages, which had a positive impact resulting in appearance of a number of outstanding personalities of a global scale; the figures who have brought glory to our country. It will be appropriate to mention that 'the sun of the Russian poetry' had an ancestor from Abyssinia, which today is the territory of Eritrea, i.e. Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin had a drop of Muslim blood in his veins. Perhaps, it is no coincidence that his 'Quranic Imitations' are still the high-water mark of the spiritual understanding of a different religion and culture.

Perhaps, it is worth mentioning that many of our famous writers and artists had Tatar relatives, and V.A. Zhukovsky's mother, for instance, was of a Turkish origin. The past-master of harmony K.D. Balmont said that his mother descended from a family of princesses of the Golden Horde, and his father was a well-known Orthodox landowner.

Although in Russia there were some nationality conflicts, in most cases it was an exception to the rule. The policy of tolerant attitude to other nationalities and faiths permeated the Russian history (certainly, there were some exceptions to the rule). And yet, the ideas of tolerance, accumulation of lands, and loyal attitude to other nations and ethnic groups were also predominant during the Soviet period of our history.

This interaction was the basis for creating the great Russian culture, whose achievements we truly take pride in – poetry, literature, music, works of artistic expression, ballet, etc. In this sense the Russians were the driving force of our outstanding achievements in the sphere of culture. It was due to this that the names of such prominent poets and writers as the Kyrgyz Chyngyz Aitmatov, the Avar Rasul Gamzatov, the Balkar Qaysin Quli, became well-known.

In the 20th century the USSR controlled Eurasia from Central Germany to the Pacific Ocean and from the Caucasus to Hindu Kush. Today the border has fallen back to the North Caucasus, has moved 1.5 thousand km. closer to the East to the border with Byelorussia. Centuries of expanding the territory of Russia have turned lost.

It looks absurd now, after the collapse of the USSR, to speak about 'Russia's entering into the world civilisation'. Russia is a great civilisation in itself (over 100 peoples), and this idea must be secured. It will encourage both the Russians in Russia, and 25 million people who have been left beyond the borders of Russia, as Russia proves to be their backbone.

Under the modern conditions the borders of Russian culture and civilisation are extending. Due to its geopolitics: a third of our territory is in Europe, and two thirds are in Asia – the Russian Federation connecting two continents plays a universalising role and by its status it is the main component of the Eurasian civilisation.

There is no doubt that Russia is a unique independent civilisation. Our location on two continents and our vast territories are, on the one hand, certain limiters, and on the other hand, they offer new opportunities, especially in terms of establishing the real partnership of civilisations.

The systemic crisis of capitalism has demonstrated that S. Huntington's concept of the inevitable clash of civilisations is invalid. Moreover, China's and India's advance onto the world arena confirms that the Western model is not universal and is by no means the best.

Eurasia is becoming a region where the most important geopolitical changes are predicted to take place, and the American élite today sees this zone as the main rival and even opponent in terms of the strategy of providing power and superiority of the USA in the world affairs.

The USA strive to carve up the territory of Eurasia, as it is the integral and stable Eurasia, and not China alone, that is the rival of the USA in the world ocean. It is obvious due to its vast territory, access to seas, vast resources of hydrocarbons, metals of value and a promising demographic situation: there is qualified workforce owing to the traditionally existing large scientific centres.

The USA are trying to crawl up to the heart of the world, this is one of the reasons for the campaign against Iran (besides their wish to limit its influence in the Gulf), as Iran lies on the foothills of this region. Central Asia – the territory between the Caspian Sea and China – is of great strategic importance.

In Russia the concept of Eurasia is being restored. The renewed and revived Eurasia is to become the basis of the national idea and strategy. This will guarantee Russia's survival, its security, independence, authority, its preservation in the capacity of a unique civilisation as one of the world powers.

In fact, the basis must be three centres of the economic and political administration: the West-Moscow, Siberia and the Far East, i.e. the horizontal poly-centrism – amalgamation of different regions in harmony and unity, with the Russian language being the connecting element.

In today's rapidly changing society many familiar images, structures and even values are passing. Such states – civilisations as China, India, Brazil are coming to the foreground of the world politics. They are characterised by a high degree of national self-identification, loyalty to traditions and a wish to integrate into the global community while preserving their national sovereignty and their own system of values and disseminating them beyond their national borders.

Some researchers suppose that the most striking display of this, as they say, 'change of phase' is the importance attached to the human potential, which has increased dramatically. In fact, this means a new stage in the civilisational development of the mankind. With regard to the new 'balance of power' on the world arena Russia finds itself 'wedged' between the increasing power of China, the active expansion of NATO and threats from the South. It is concluded in the analytical materials of the *Journal of Moscow State University of International Relations* that 'in this context the Eurasian integration does not only become one of the most important factors for Russia, but a project of the global scale, the very sovereign existence of the Russian state being dependent on it. At that, it is understood not only in the narrow sense of economic and customs integration of a few CIS states but in its widest sense; including its political exercise.'

Ideas of the academician M.L. Titarenko are consonant with this thesis: 'Only Russia, basing on the Eurasian paradigm, is able to handle the issues of revival, preservation of the inviolability of its territory, development of cultures of all the peoples inhabiting it and the prosperity of the Russian culture – the backbone of integrity and interaction of civilisations.'

It seems appropriate and obvious that this was the aspect emphasized in the article by V.V. Putin, which became part of his election programme and was published in October,

2011. The concise version of this concept was put in the following way. 'The Eurasian Union is an open project. We welcome other partners joining it, and, first of all, among these partners are the CIS countries. But we are not going to hurry or prompt anybody. It must be a sovereign decision made by a state; a decision dictated by their own national interests. The Eurasian Union will be built on universal integration principles as an integral part of Greater Europe, united by the unified values of freedom, democracy and market laws.'

Under the modern conditions of the deep global economic crisis, the extremely tense situation in different corners of the world, and the escalation of conflicts, the only strategy possible for Russia is the Eurasian political and economic integration, which will allow Russia to consolidate its own resources and to a certain degree involve the potential of other countries in this process. This idea is clearly stated in V.V. Putin's article: 'We offer a model of a powerful supra-national union capable of becoming a pole of the modern world and of playing the role of an efficient link between Europe and the dynamic Asia-Pacific region.' Here we continue the policy of our remarkable ancestors, in particular, of D.I. Mendeleev who said that 'we should play the role of a mediator between Europe and Asia'.

Under these conditions the question of building a high-speed railway between St. Petersburg and Vladivostok comes to the agenda, as this is a question of immediate interest. This railway would connect with a tie the State of Russia; it would become the biggest national project around which the rapid development of, first of all, our Asian regions could start. The prophet in our own land M.V. Lomonosov thought about it and predicted the fate of his homeland when he said Russia has three strategic tasks: the power grows with Siberia, the Northern Sea Route and the rise of population of the Russians while relations with the peoples of our Asia are developed.

Basing on the modern concept of Eurasianism Russia is to play an important role in developing cooperation between different regions of the world. In fact, even today Moscow acts as an active mediator in various conflicts between the West and the Islamic world, and in the future this niche of ours can be expanded.

The efforts made by our diplomats to reconcile the conflict on the Korean Peninsula, the issues of nuclear weapons in Iran, in Syria, Afghanistan, in the Near East, etc, show that this potential of peacekeeping is huge and, if we manage to realise it in practice, Russia can become one of the leading powers in terms of establishing the partnership of civilisations.

As S.V. Lavrov remarked at the beginning of 2012, 'today ideas of the real cooperation of civilisations stop being part of academic discussions and become part of the real politics'.

Vasil Prodanov¹

THREE TYPES OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CULTURES UNDER CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

There are more than a hundred definitions of the notion of culture. In my understanding proposed here, *culture* presents a system of values and norms, standards of behaviour which underlie *relations between people* and which predetermine distinctive features and identity of a particular community. According to the proposed view, culture subsumes arts, traditions, rituals and ceremonies, morals, manners, ethnic and national identities, particular ways of understanding the history of a community, as well as its language with meanings that are conveyed through it. In this sense, culture is represented by a number of layers, starting from everyday culture, works of fiction and religion to civilizations as understood by Samuel Huntington. This system of values and norms shapes the identity of people, but it is not necessarily related to the issue of social and political structure of a particular society.

In the context of a particular society, culture defines, spreads and establishes values that are taken for granted and cannot be put into question. These values give meaning to a person's individual life by delineating the general meaningful horizon of individual actions, as well as to the lives of big groups of individuals. Culture construes the sacred world, fills it with specific meanings and separates it from the profane world of everyday life, necessities and rationality. The sacred presupposes some higher reality, some super values that one could live or die for.

Secularization and modernization entail the need for new types of the sacred and the profane that are supposed to be secular rather than religious in nature. The main secularized versions of constructing this kind of reality are represented, on the one hand, by a nation, or people, motherland, native land and, on the other hand, by ideology, namely, 'the bright future of communism', 'natural rights of liberalism' and the like.

Under present conditions of the so called 'post-modernity' it is notable that culture is not singled out into a distinct sphere with its specific rationality, as described, for instance, in Daniel Bell's famous book 'The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism';² rather, culture permeates all the spheres of human life including, among others, economics and politics that were previously perceived as something separate from it. The very process of development is undergoing culturalization, and Samuel Huntington³ would even remark that in the 21st century major conflicts would involve different cultures rather than arise from political or ideological reasons.

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² Д. Бел, Даниел. Културните противоречия на капитализма, С., Народна култура, 1994.

³ Хънтингтън, Самюъл. Сблъсъкът на цивилизацията и преобразуването на световния ред, С., Обсидиан, 2000.

The term 'rapprochement of cultures' is based on metaphor and conveys many meanings but it is beyond doubt that the term implies the disappearance of previously existing distances between closely related and distant cultures. Rapprochement could both deepen the interaction and entail conflicts between cultures. On the other hand, both interaction and conflicts influence cultures and bring about changes in them.

1. Rapprochement of Cultures

Meetings, dialogues and interactions took place in previous epochs, but nowadays this has become a more intensive process than ever before. There are seven major forms that characterize the rapprochement of cultures:

First, *the disappearance of spatial distances*. In the past, cultures were distant from one another in space and their rapprochement was a long process that involved overcoming great distances. Nowadays, globalization, which is being increasingly conceived as a special form of spatial compression, is becoming a means for various cultures that were previously distant from one another to get involved in immediate communication and interaction in different kinds of formats.

Second, *the rapprochement in time*. Cultures that in previous years used to be distanced from one another in time are now, according to perceptions of contemporary people, getting closer together due to cultural tourism and digital communications. Industrialization of cultural production provides the possibility for the reconstruction of cultural products that belong to diverse periods of time, which also leads to a mixture of these products in the time of post-modernity. As a result of this, a particular historical period no longer looks as something simply occupying some stretch on the line of sequentially developing history; rather, it becomes the object of continuous actual construction and reconstruction in the on-going struggle for history that involves different groups, communities, ideologies dealing with the historical past. The latter becomes not only the past of 100, 200 or 1000 years ago but the past which is being continuously re-interpreted, and this is consequential both for today's perceptions and today's behaviours. Thus, the relics of John the Baptist have turned Nessebar into a place that attracts thousands of people; the Mayor of Plovdiv has started a dispute with the Ministry of Culture on the issue of where to place the treasure of Kazanlak. At the same time, the Serb people would continue their fight for Kosovo while making references to the Battle of Kosovo that took place six centuries ago in the Kosovo field and that was of utmost significance to them. Today's behaviours are defined through the cultural artefacts of the past and the distance in time is starting to melt away.

Third, *the market rapprochement and types of cultural industry*. Globalization and culturalization of economy involve establishing the global market of cultural production where the market mechanism takes up the key role in the creation, promotion and consumption of cultural products. Today's market of culture includes products of different quality. This market also includes the global market of

all the other products that go to consumers depending on their possibilities and needs. This process depends on the following:

– Changes in the possibilities of technical reproduction and rapid growth in the number of consumers of one particular cultural product; the emergence of mass culture phenomenon. The evolution of forms and genres of culture is closely linked to the growth of labour productivity and reduction of unit costs. Similar to mass production of industrial goods, the volume of art production, as well as the number of respective consumers may increase ad infinitum.

– The increasing involvement of culture into market trading is supported by global privatization and marketization. As a result of this, the global market of cultural products becomes one of those markets that rapidly increase their share.

– A growing amount of free time, rapid growth in the level of education and income of big groups of people, satisfaction of basic needs are becoming the prerequisite for redistribution of time and resources in the use of cultural products. Parallel to that, globalization made possible for a local consumer of cultural products to have access to works from any period of history and from any corner of the world, which in turn contributes to shaping a global market of cultural products. Tourists flows that involve millions of people every year turn cultural tourism, related to visiting museums and historical places, into one of the most rapidly developing markets of the world.

Fourth, *external political mechanisms of rapprochement*. Spreading one's own culture and cultural influence constitutes the key element of external political activities of states, whereby some of the countries not only have a traditional figure of cultural attaché but establish big cultural and information centres. The bigger a particular state is the bigger possibilities it has for establishing its own cultural and ideological hegemony through its embassies and by funding a variety of civil institutions and the so called 'think tanks' that would spread desirable interpretations in public space. Big countries including, for example, France tend to fund the translation and edition of their books in order to establish their own culture in different countries and regions.

Fifth, *internal political mechanisms of rapprochement*. Flows of immigrants and the emergence of new cultural realities bring about – in the first place in such immigrant states as Canada, the USA, Australia – a policy of multiculturalism which consists in supporting cultural diversity within the same nation-state that contains a variety of co-existing and interacting cultures.

Sixth, *hegemonic forms of rapprochement*. Such forms are realized through the domination of the developed countries' culture industries. With the help of modern means of communication and cultural market the developed countries spread their culture products throughout the whole world.

Seventh, *rapprochement resulting from a mixture of cultures*. This is becoming a typical process in the conditions of globalization that involves the disappearance of previously existing borderlines between cultures and styles, especially because of people mixing up and establishing large immigrant communities. Other phenomena involve mutual exchanges and various kinds of cultural mixtures,

such as postmodern pastiche, creolization, metisization, the disappearance of distinctions between high and low, elitist and mass culture, a variety of mixtures across cultures and styles. Different forms and kinds of practices are being transferred from one medium into another one. The processes of development are beginning to encompass cultural hybrids in the form of new trends, mixture of styles, pastiches at different levels, both as trends in particular kinds of art, fashion, in manufactured products, in projects of art creators and as cultures of different groups that undergo changes throughout the process of globalization owing to mutual exchanges.

2. Conflict of Cultures

The rapprochement of cultures necessarily involves the majority of conflicts between them. While distances between cultures no longer constitute an obstacle, differences between them, coupled with today's social and economic distances, easily develop into conflicts. Dialogism is a cultural ideal, but on its way is our world of asymmetric relationships where a great many of states have to reckon with culture, ideology and religion of the strong. Asymmetric military, economic, technological relations between separate countries and regions lead to cultural asymmetry manifested in hegemony, assimilation, discrimination, imperialism, or war of stronger structures against weaker ones. Contradictions and conflicts in a social and economic system are realized by and receive manifestation in groups through ideological, cultural and religious contrasts and conflicts. The most typical varieties of cultural oppositions and conflicts take up the following three basic forms:

First, *inequality between cultures and cultural imperialism*. There is great inequality in resources that a particular culture draws on, whereby the process of cultural interaction entails the establishment of dominating positions of certain cultures at the expense of others. This kind of inequality is related to demographic and economic levels of different countries and to the nature and strength of what is called 'cultural industries' by Theodor Adorno.¹ This results in two types of relationships between cultures:

– *assimilation*, when a more powerful culture subdues a weaker one and while preserving some elements of the latter, gradually eliminates it, which leads to a change in identity;

– *hegemony, or cultural imperialism*, related to the world hegemony of Western and, in particular, American culture, whose impact on other cultures has a destructive nature. In fact, Hollywood and other American cultural industries, as well as a great number of advertising products that promote global consumer culture serve as a medium for the USA to exercise global cultural imperialism with respect to the rest of the world. Every ten most popular films watched in any European country contain at least seven American films. Currently, American films take up 65 % of the film market in France, 85% in Italy, 90% in Germany, and nearly the whole film market in Great Britain.² Seventy percent of films that are on release in Europe are American films,

¹ Adorno, T. *The Cultural Industry*, London and New York: Routledge, 1991.

² Вж. Айзнер, Майкъл. Световни развлечения, В: Новият световен ред. Световни лидери за планетата и нейното бъдеще, С., Труд, 1999, с. 208; Гаврас, Коста. Да устоиш на 'полковниците на 'Дисни'', В: Новият световен ред..., с. 215.

whereas only one percent of films watched in America are European.

Second, the *clash of civilizations* and transformation of a geopolitical space – the idea of all this caused a great stir in connection with Huntington's famous book on the clash of civilizations. The fact is that in the last two decades ninety per cent of military conflicts have happened inside particular states, not between them. People's attitudes and behaviours in these conflicts have been justified through the use of cultural and religious, rather than ideological, arguments. There is a tendency of post-modern fragmentation of states, this process being motivated by factors of cultural, ethnic and religious factors. Suicide bombers in the Middle East and those who directed the planes onto the towers of the World Trade Center were guided by religious motives.

Under the conditions of rapid changes in modern societies the need for the quick shaping of identity focuses on, intensifies and reinterprets past traumas and injustices in relations between communities that have the appearance of the clash of cultures, which gives grounds for supposing that Samuel Huntington's idea on the 'clash of civilizations' is to a certain extent correct.

Third, *culture wars*. The notion of 'culture wars' that has gained popularity in recent years is used with reference to some aspects of a multicultural situation in the USA which involves, in particular, clashes between supporters and opponents of abortion rights, supporters and opponents of gay communities, supporters and opponents of feminism, religious education in school, etc. Culture wars are aimed at the destruction of an alternative cultural system, its radical change and reprogramming. These wars presuppose that basic values and standards that shape alternative cultures are incompatible. Culture wars entail culturalization of political space and the emergence of the right and the left sides in culture. This becomes apparent when in many places of the developed countries supporters of the former left side get transformed into supporters of the liberal left who typically defend different kinds of identity and who are tolerant with respect to differences. At the same time, it is possible to observe the emergence and rise of xenophobic and nationalistic right wingers who are opposed to differences and to tolerant attitudes towards different processes that are typical of new left wingers in culture.

3. Transformation of Cultures

An understanding of rapprochement could only be achieved in an anti-substantialist context which implies that it is not some unchangeable entities that undergo the process of getting closer together; on the contrary, the process involves those that have gone through general social changes and through encounters of cultures under conditions of globalization and it is also accompanied by the intensive ongoing process of cultural construction, reconstruction and transformation. There are eight directions of this transformation and reconstruction of cultures.

First, *transformation of history*. The process of continuous construction and new interpretation of history presented in turn as a search for authentic, or true history underlies various cultures, as well as clashes of history interpretations, which gives rise to different kinds of identity. Religious fundamentalists, for instance, are saying that there is a need of returning to authentic Islam. However, this is not the Islam of the seventh century but a kind of identity

being construed with reference to respective interpretations of Islam in the 21st century. This is especially typical of former socialist countries that have seen – for over three decades – fierce clashes between diverging interpretations of their history.

Second, *enculturation*. The notion of enculturation was introduced by Papal Encyclicals as a tool to expand missionary activities of the church. Enculturation presupposes that in attempts to recruit new believers the church should adapt to local cultures, traditions, beliefs of particular regions. In this sense, enculturation is exerting influence of one culture on another one by means of adaptation to the culture being influenced. For example, church service involves performing religious hymns based on local singing rhythms.

Third, *acculturation*. Acculturation is an exchange of traits between different cultures as a result of prolonged contact between them, whereby each culture preserves its autonomy. Acculturation presupposes a bi-directional process in which cultural interaction leads to adopting certain traits of another culture, with the resulting higher degree of closeness between the interacting cultures.

Fourth, *globalization*. Globalization of some cultures at the stage of their leaving the boundaries of their own area, as well as their spread over new territories can take different forms:

- The spread of characteristics pertaining to a particular hegemonic culture over the whole world, for example, through Americanization.

- Large immigration flows, as it happens, for instance, with Islam and the Muslim world, which resulted in Islamization of a great number of regions, with mosques becoming typical not only of specific regions, but of all territories on a global scale.

- The imposition of global consumption patterns through global marketing and branding both global products by means of brand stamps and franchise system, which leads to uniform cultural patterns of consumption and consumer culture. Of special significance in this process are global stamps and service systems, such as 'McDonalds', 'Coca-Cola', fashion trends, Chinese restaurants, fast-food establishments and so on.

- The spread of global cultural and religious movements. A typical example of this is Evangelical Protestantism, especially Pentecostalism which, while going beyond the boundaries of the USA, is becoming increasingly pervasive throughout the whole world – from Eastern and South-Eastern Asia, throughout the Pacific Islands, the countries of Africa and, especially, Latin America, and up to Eastern Europe. At the beginning of our millennium this movement encompassed more than 250 million supporters and it started to transform behaviours of those where it is spread, which leads to a kind of cultural revolution in people's attitudes to family, sexual behaviour, upbringing of children, to work and economy.¹

Fifth, *globalization*. Nowadays the processes of globalization are accompanied by no less intensive and radical tendencies of particularization, disintegration, differentiation, fragmentation, break of ties, oppositions and contradictions. Globalization is closely linked to sector

¹ П. Бергер, Питер Л. Культурная динамика глобализации, В: Многоликая глобализация. Культурное разнообразие в современном мире, Под ред. П. Бергера, С. Хантингтона, М., Аспект пресс, 2004, с. 15-16.

marketing with its underlying differences, which in turn affects the sphere of culture. The greater part of the global 'mass culture' is essentially permeated by local ideas, styles, genres in the spheres of music, art, way of life, ways of cooking meals, etc. Even two major American institutions of global culture – one from Atlanta (CNN) and the other one from Los Angeles (Hollywood) – are making attempts to adapt their products to differentiated global market that they in part constitute themselves. Hollywood is trying to cast multinational and multiracial groups and to present different local situations, because it is striving to attract any kinds of possible audiences including those who do not accept the American mass culture. CNN distributes news among different regions. For the sake of higher efficiency, advertising companies are getting adapted to local tastes.

Sixth, *the construction of cultural identities*. This is linked to the tendency towards the fragmentation of global cultural identities and the continuous emergence of new identities, such as new religious movements, gay communities, cultural trends. For example, Islam has a global identity but it subsumes the whole range of divergent styles and branches, and nowadays this divergence is growing – from fundamentalist Islam to European and American Islam. Globalization provides a frame for the extension and diversification of the basics. That is why identity is becoming one of the key issues for the humanity. Social dynamics and variety bring about fragmentation of a personal identity into a variety of changing perceptions of existence and types of belonging ranging between ethnic, genealogical, racial, sexual, cultural, linguistic and other types of belonging. Accordingly, starting from the sixties of the 20th century we have been witnessing the development of different policies of recognition and identity and of human rights that are naturally associated with these policies. And since territories that accommodate both individuals and communities are becoming places where different establishments, institutions, subjects (with many of them transnational in nature) have overlapping areas, an individual acquires additional identities, which extends the

scope of his loyalties and at the same time doesn't make him dependent on them. Cultural identities have no fixed appearance; they are in the state of continuous movement, they are related to different cultural traditions and 'cultural mixtures' in the globalizing world.

Seventh, *the return of history*. This happens in the form of ethnic and religious resurrection, which is accompanied by the reconstruction of old religious and ethnic identities that have nearly been buried in oblivion in modern times and that are getting revived again. Thus, there is a variety of new pagan religions thought of as having disappeared ages ago but that are now even sometimes announced on the web. Some local ethnic identities that seemed to have been lost are now on the rise, in Europe as well, and this involves new conflict situations in nation states – from Spain, with its Basque, Catalan and other identities, through Belgium, with its population divided by tensions between the Flemish and the Walloon peoples, to communities that emerged after the split of Yugoslavia and the boiling kettle of ethnic identities in the Caucasus.¹

Eighth, *long-distance nationalism*. The term 'long-distance nationalism' was introduced by Benedict Anderson and, in his understanding, this type of nationalism presupposes a tendency towards a return of nationalism but under conditions of post-modernity when the greatest nationalists turn out to be diasporas that through resort to technical means of communication stay connected with their own countries, which preserves and strengthens their identity outside their territories. Illustrative in this respect are Turks in Germany who in the sixties managed to master German much quicker than they do it now, when they spend whole days watching Turkish TV and maintaining closer connection with their country via the internet, mobile communications and cheap air tickets. This has caused debate about the failure of integration in Western Europe, as well as discussions on reconsidering the policies of multiculturalism that up to now have made the basis for the integration processes in the developed countries of the West.

Michael Pushkin²

ANDREI VOZNESENSKII: POET OF GLOBAL PERCEPTION

Sponge or fountain?

Boris Pasternak wrote that 'Contemporary tendencies have imagined that art is like a fountain, whereas it is a sponge'.³ The poetry of Andrei Voznesenskii is both a sponge and a fountain. Pasternak's protégé, he sucks the world and its culture(s) into his receptive imagination. Successor to

Mayakovskii and the avant-garde, he projects that world back onto the pages of his poetic notebook through his pen and his brush, and onto the stage and into the stadium via his microphone.

Absorbent poet

Aleksandr Voznesenskii, reviewing his namesake's 1998 book of memoirs *On the Virtual Breeze*,⁴ seeks to elucidate the significance of Voznesenskii's multiple engagement with the world around him: Poetry is a particular means of cognition of the world... For the poet the whole world is constructed on consonance – of times, of thoughts, of strangely interwoven destinies, the living, the dead... And here Voznesenskii – despite his deeply-rooted public perception as a gesturing poet-extravert – appears before us above all as an absorbent person... the

¹ Anderson, B. The New World Disorder, In: *New Left Review*, 1992, No. 193, May–June, p. 13.

² Honorary Senior Research Fellow of the Centre for Russian and East European Studies of the University of Birmingham (UK), Bachelor of Arts. Head of the Chair of Russian Language at the University of Birmingham (1998–2003). Author of several publications, including: 'The Professions and the Intelligentsia in Nineteenth-Century Russia', 'Raznochintsy in the University. Government Policy and Social Change in Nineteenth-Century Russia', 'Darlington and the University Question', 'Menya pugayut formalizmom: Voznesensky's Poetic Art Since 1980', 'Andrei Andreevich Voznesenskii 1933–. Poet?'; 'Reference Guide to Russian Literature', etc.

³ *Pasternak Boris*. Contemporary: collection of poems // A. Sinyavsky. The Poetry of Pasternak. No. 1. P. 5; Idem. Poems (Library of the poet). Moscow–Leningrad, 1965. P. 23

⁴ *Voznesensky Andrey*. The Virtual Wind. Moscow: Vagrius, 1998.

poet lives to transmit the alien... To verify the pain of others by his own...¹

This interpretation prompts the thought that the 'absorbent' Voznesenskii inherited at least a fragment of Pasternak's 'sponge'.

Как губка, время набухает
В моих веснушчатых щеках.²

Things as 'neighbours'

Andrei Sinyavskii writes that Pasternak 'likes to define a thing through its boundaries with neighbouring things, in lines about a town he likes to describe a suburb...'³ In Voznesenskii's poetry, by contrast, things mostly become 'neighbours' not through boundaries they share with other objects, but rather through juxtaposition with very different, even distant phenomena.

International range

Introducing Voznesenskii's 1970 collection *The Shadow of Sound*, Valentin Kataev writes that 'the themes of his poems are international. Their geography is highly impressive...' Adapting Olesha's phrase, Kataev sees Voznesenskii's work as a 'depot of metaphors'.⁴ In this 'depot' the poet connects discrete phenomena across space and time.

Universal, encyclopaedic

Vladimir Novikov extends the all-embracing range of Voznesenskii's metaphors to his writing as a whole. He suggests that 'in his themes and vocabulary he is a universalist, an encyclopaedist... orientation towards encyclopaedism, towards a full field of view...'⁵

Interconnections and multiplicity

Vladimir Gubailovskii, reviewing Voznesenskii's internet poem 'ru', writes that his poetics are consistent: 'the principles of association based on visual or phonetic closeness' and a 'somewhat declarative multiple significance'.⁶ Metaphorical linkages in Voznesenskii's verse (and in his *videomy*) often take on a playful character. The verbal fun may be seen as a shorthand for interconnections explored in greater detail in the body of his poems. This is true of his allusions to the writings of other poets. He filters the multiplicity of the world through his personal poetic consciousness.

Monological, dialogical or polylogical?

Aleksandr Voznesenskii examines multiplicity in Voznesenskii's writings in terms of his discourse. 'Voznesenskii's speech style tells us about the speaker – not mono-, though, but dia- and even polylogically...'⁷ His poetry evokes the conversing voices of people across worlds and ages.

Polyglot poetry

In a 1981 dialogue with American poet William Jay Smith ('Poetry is polyglot, poetry is one') Andrei Voznesenskii tried to encapsulate the issue of linguistic multiplicity and unity in poetry in one all-embracing formulation: 'Languages are different, but poetry is one.'⁸ Voznesenskii's poetry incorporates a wide range of lexis, style and register and, like the first chapter of Pushkin's *Evgenii Onegin*, is littered with foreign words.

Andrei Voznesenskii – Hedgehog or Fox?

Isaiah Berlin, writing about Tolstoy, famously quotes the Greek philosopher-poet Archilochus: 'The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.' To the question of whether Tolstoy was a pluralist, Berlin replies: 'The hypothesis I wish to offer is that Tolstoy was by nature a fox, but believed in being a hedgehog.'⁹

Voznesenskii too was a natural fox who wanted to be a hedgehog. The primacy of multiplicity over unity in his work is demonstrated in the title of his first published collection: *Мозаика*.¹⁰ He can express pain and anxiety, but he is only rarely a poet of inner, spiritual experience, although he sometimes aspires to these qualities and declares the existence of an inner self. There is a 'oneness' at which Voznesenskii excels: the oneness of our world, presented through the interconnectedness of a global range of phenomena. He does not need to be declarative about this multiple significance: he demonstrates it constantly in practice.

This paper will explore the nexus of issues addressed above by examining poems composed throughout Voznesenskii's career, across several recurrent thematic areas in his poetic *oeuvre*: global and individual identity; poets and other writers; the visual dimension; music.

¹ *Voznesensky Alexander*. Portraits of the Loved Ones. Andrei Voznesensky, Forward-looking, Virtual and Prophetic // Ex libris NG, July 16, 1998. P. 6.

² Digression in the form of the Beatniks Monologues : 40 lyrical digressions from the poem 'The Triangular Pear'. Moscow : Soviet Writer, 1962. P. 38.

³ *Sinyavsky Andrei*. Pasternak's Poetry // Boris Pasternak. Poems (Library of the poet). Moscow–Leningrad, 1965. P. 47.

⁴ *Kataev Valentin*. A little about the Author // Andrei Voznesensky. Shadow of Sound. Moscow : Young Guard, 1970. P. 6, 13.

⁵ *Novikov Vladimir*. The Philosophy of Metaphor // Novyi mir. 1982. No. 8. P. 247.

⁶ *Gubaylovsky Vladimir*. Andrei Voznesensky on the Internet. The poet has published his new poem 'ru' // Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 6, 2000. P. 7.

⁷ *Voznesensky Alexander*. Op.cit.

⁸ *Voznesensky Andrei*. William Jay Smith, 'Poetry Is Multilingual, Poetry is Unique. Dialogue' // Literaturnaja Gazeta, April 29, 1981. P. 14–15.

⁹ *Berlin Isaiah*. Tolstoy and History. Taken from *The Hedgehog and the Fox*. London : Phoenix, 1996. P. 4–5.

¹⁰ *Voznesensky Andrei*. Mosaic. Vladimir: Vladimir's Publishing House, 1960.

H. M. Reznik¹

LAW AND RELIGION: SOCIOCULTURAL CONTEXT

The conviction of singing feminists to 2 years of deprivation of freedom for their performance in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour gave rise to an impassioned discussion in the society about the balance between the right to freedom of speech and protection of citizens' religious feelings. In the course of the polemics, the sentence after the guilty verdict which had been imposed on the organizers of the 'Caution! Religion!' exhibition three years ago, came back. The representatives of different confessions did not stand aside, insisting (with rare exception) on the introduction of serious criminal liability for 'blasphemy' and 'sacrilege'. As a result of this public dispute, not only a clear divergence between upholders of the freedom of opinion and expression and defenders of the religious beliefs emerged, but also the draft law, prepared by the State Duma deputies, proposing punishment under criminal law for the 'public insult of religious beliefs and feelings of citizens' up to three years of deprivation of freedom.

The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation and the Human Rights Council under the President of the RF gave the adverse opinion upon this draft. Among the counterarguments they mentioned the legal uncertainty of the term 'insult of religious beliefs and feelings' which created conditions for its ambiguous interpretation and application. The proponents of the draft called attention to the fact that the 'insult of religious beliefs and feelings' for ten years had already been considered as an administrative infraction resulted in a penalty, and that in this case the question was about moving these actions into the criminal jurisdiction as well as about enhancing the severity of punishment because of their heightened social danger.

The dispute came to a dead end. Is it possible to narrow the gap and reach a compromise? Searching for the answer to this question seems to be impossible outside the sociocultural context where legal structures make sense.

First of all, it is evident that the administrative regulation, penalizing for insulting the religious beliefs and feelings of citizens, for all ten years of its existence has not been used at all. This means that it is either 'latent' or absolutely inadequate for use. Due to 'absence of any presence' of legal use it is reasonable to refer to the theoretical sources. In the most competent Comment to RF Code of Administrative Offences edited by Deputy Minister of Justice of RF (Moscow, 2002), we read that the insult of religious beliefs and feelings of citizens is committed 'in public or privately by means of rough, disrespectful comment, the derision of religious doctrines and canons a citizen worships, or of personal characteristics of the citizen connected with his/her religious affiliation'.

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Where does this interpretation come from? From the heads of theorists? Or it has its historical ground? Most probably, the second. In the Criminal Code of the Tsarist Russia there was Article 182 talking about 'sacrilege, i.e., sarcasm proving clear disrespect towards the rules and rites of the Orthodox Church or Christianity as a whole'. But the article was abolished by the Ukaz of the 'Father-tsar' on March 14, 1906, together with almost the whole section 'On Crimes against the Faith'. The Russian Empire, by the way, continued to remain the state with Orthodox Christianity. An important argument in favor of decriminalization of sacrilege was a consideration that it was extremely difficult to identify the goal of animadversion against religious faith in the scorn, which, however, according to the explanation of the Governing Senate, the highest court of the country, should not have reached a 'direct insult or abuse', qualified as a blasphemy.

Encouraging the court to determine every time the character of the comment about the faith as a 'rough, disrespectful, derision of the religious doctrines and canons', and to separate bilious attacks from a good-natured banter or chaff, means to put before the court a predeterminedly impossible task, to allow for a limitless subjectivity in the sphere of enforcement, destroying *per se* the freedom of speech, placing a ban on jokes, gags, hyperboles, irony and sarcasm.

The problem, however, is not so simple. Its solution gets rather more complicated not in the event of individual comments in everyday life, politics, or even in the periodicals and newspapers, but, for a wonder, in the events when the religious topic penetrates into artistic creativity. An exhibition of artists' paintings, theatrical performance, and film show — exactly here we have to encounter the protest reaction of mass consciousness, offended feelings of believers and the church hierarch.

The European Court for Human Rights practice shows that it is impossible to disregard entirely perception of pieces of arts by a common, average citizen. The laws imposing criminal responsibility for insult of religious beliefs and feelings (blasphemy) do exist in all Western countries, with the exception of the USA, where the First Amendment to the Constitution excludes fully this type of a crime. The laws exist only on paper like the regulation of our Administrative Code. Thus, in Australia, for 30 years, nobody has been brought to trial for blasphemy. In Great Britain, within 90 years there was only one legal case pertaining to blasphemy: the editor and the author of the poem, where homosexual acts had been metaphorically ascribed to Christ, were convicted. In Germany, since 1969, insult of religious beliefs and feelings has not been a subject-matter for legal proceeding: only two events were reported, when the journalists' articles caused the application of the German Press Council. In Canada, the printed media has not been charged with blasphemy since 1935. In Norway, the regulation concerning blasphemy has not been applied since 1936. Several Muslim leaders filed a lawsuit against the Norwegian publisher of 'The Satanic Verses', but soon called it back, not expecting to win.

At the same time, the European Court (EC) tried two cases — ‘Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria’ (1994) and ‘Müller and Others v. Switzerland’ (1988) — and set in its judgments the criteria, which, in our opinion, allow for the reasonable and least painful resolution of conflicts between the freedom of creativity and the protection of the religious feelings.

The applicant-association, the ‘Otto-Preminger Institute for Audiovisual Media’ located in Innsbruck, was going to show Werner Schroeter’s film ‘Council in Heaven’ in its own cinema-theatre, with the first of the showings having been scheduled for May 13, 1985. After the request of the Innsbruck diocese of Roman Catholic Church, the public prosecutor, three days before the scheduled showing, instituted a criminal proceedings against the manager of the association, charging him in attempt to commit a crime — insult of the religious beliefs (‘disparaging religious beliefs’, Section 188 of the Penal Code of Austria). The film was seized and not demonstrated in public. Later, the criminal proceeding was terminated, and the court examination was focused not towards the conviction of an individual, but towards the confiscation of the film (Article 33 of Media Act of Austria). As a result, the Innsbruck Regional Court delivered its judgment ordering the confiscation of the film, having taken into consideration that the essential interference into the sphere of religious feelings, caused by the provocative content of the film, outweighed in this case the freedom of creativity provided by the Constitution of Austria.

Having examined the complaint of the applicant-association, the EC rejected it based upon the consideration that the right to freedom of expression, provided by Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, was reasonably limited by the Austrian Court in favour of ‘the protection of the reputation or rights of others’, particularly, the right to protection of religious beliefs and for the purposes of ‘the prevention of disorder’. The EC emphasized ‘the role of religion in the everyday life of the people of Tyrol. The proportion of Roman-Catholic believers among the Austrian population as a whole was already considerable – 78%, – but among Tyroleans it was as high as 87%... The Court cannot disregard the fact that the Roman-Catholic religion is the religion of the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.’ In this case, of special interest are the arguments which convinced the EC that in the democratic society there is a strong necessity to limit the right of the applicant-association to impart to the public controversial views and creative ideas. The association asserted that it had acted in a responsible manner attempting to avoid any kind of insult. The association underlined that it had planned to show the film in its own cinema-theatre where the admission fee had been charged. Moreover, its public consisted on the whole of persons feeling an interest in progressive culture.

But the EC made the conclusion that wide advertisement of the film was more important than payment for entrance: ‘There was sufficient public knowledge of the subject-matter and basic contents of the film to give a clear indication of its nature; for these reasons, the proposed screening of the film

must be considered to have been an expression sufficiently ‘public’ to cause offence’ of religious feelings.

Similar arguments were used by the EC in the case of ‘Müller and Others v. Switzerland’. In 1981, several persons, the citizens of Switzerland, organized an exhibition of contemporary art in Fribourg. At this exhibition three paintings by J. Müller were on display; they demonstrated homosexual coitus, bestiality and erect penises. According to the recommendation of the public prosecutor of the Canton of Fribourg, the paintings were seized as coming within the provisions of the criminal law prohibited obscene publications and insult of religious beliefs. The District Court sentenced the organizers of the exhibition to a fine and held ‘to place the paintings in a museum, whose curator will be required to make them available only to a few serious specialists capable of taking an exclusively artistic or cultural interest in them as opposed to a prurient interest.’

The EC held that, the views of sexual morality were modified over the last years and public ideas of concepts of obscenity, immorality, indecency and blasphemy significantly changed and became much more free, and took the side of Swiss authorities. The decisive argument, as it was in the case of ‘Otto-Preminger-Institut’, was that Müller’s paintings were available to the general public without any limitations and that they could catch and really caught the eyes of persons who considered them indecent.

The EC seems to have formulated the important criterion which allows us to strike a balance between the freedom of expression of creative ideas and the protection of other social values including religious beliefs and feelings; this constitutes a space where the products of experimental arts shocking the dominating customs are realized. In some situations, it is relevant not to display the makings of counterculture within the public space with free access for general public. In other situations it is desirable to explain that the exhibition is intended for connoisseurs of modern arts. In its above mentioned resolution upon the case of ‘Otto-Preminger-Institut’, the EC emphasized that ‘it is not possible to arrive at a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a permissible interference with the exercise of the right to freedom of expression where such expression is directed against the religious feelings of others. A certain margin of appreciation is therefore to be left to the national authorities in assessing the existence and extent of the necessity of such interference.’

This state of things lays a special responsibility upon the national courts when they resolve conflicts affecting religious feelings. Here, the resolution of such a conflict which took place in France, may serve as an example. In 1988 several Catholic associations filed acclaim in Paris Civil Court in order to prohibit the screening of Martin Scorsese’s film ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’. The Court rejected to put this film under a ban, but showing a due respect to the religious feelings of the Catholics, ordered to insert into the advertisement of the film the warning about the fabulousness of its content. In 1998, the author of this paper had to represent NTV TV-channel in one of Moscow District Courts under the case in similar claim by several Orthodox activists. The Court dismissed the case, but did not oblige the representatives of the channel to correct the advertisement. It’s a pity

that this idea did not come to plaintiffs' mind. If I had been a defendant, I would not have been against such a determination.

In any event, the protection of citizens' religious beliefs and feelings from offences should not be provided by strengthening the measures of criminal repression.

This concept, taking into account its broad and variable estimate character, should be left in the domain of the Administrative Code and not to be moved into the Criminal Code, which already includes the Article imposing punishment for stirring up religious hatred, as well as for the humiliation of a person on grounds of his/her religious beliefs.

The notion of 'value', which is borrowed from economics, acquired in the 19th century a philosophical meaning. Way back, Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas had been looking into the problem of values.

Values, according to the diagram of cultural differences drawn by the known Dutch sociologist Geert Hofstede, are in the core of an onion covered by the skins of rituals, heroes and, finally, symbols.² Notions of values which stand behind political and economic articulation of power are not ideological superstructure but the scale of its orientation and, in the end, their foundation.

The state cannot impose its value system on another state. It can only try to convince others that they hold true. If the state manages to do that, the notions of values which manifest themselves differently in political and economic sense, stay nearby and constitute parts of the plurality of values. To reduce tension between systems which are in the long term based on different notions of values, we need the dialogue of values.

The dialogue of values is not aimed at something like a costly compromise, for values should not be confused with interests which can be aligned in compromises, but to a certain extent. Values are more fundamental than interests. Values cannot be negotiated.

Values and interests, however, can conflict if the notions of values are ignored while interests prevail. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out the fact that in future a long-term and intensive cooperation based on mutual interests will make the value notions converge.

The dialogue of values can only lead in the long run to a better understanding of the catalogue of values of the other. If this happens, tolerance is needed in order to accept the values of the other party in the sense that he has the right to develop his value notions and represent them without having to seek someone else's approval.

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² Hofstede, Geert/Hofstede, Gert Jan, *Lokales Denken, globales Handeln. Interkulturelle Zusammenarbeit und globales Management*. 4. Aufl., München 2009, S. 8.

It is advisable to keep in mind that the freedom of opinion and expression is one of the bearing pillars of the democratic society, and as it is stated by the EC in the case of Handyside, this concept 'is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas', that are favourably received of regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference; but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broad mindedness without which there is no democratic society.'

On the other hand, as Adam Michnik wisely noted, 'The choice dilemma between the temptation of authoritarian decisions and the logic of boundless freedom is likely to haunt the democratic civilization for ever.'

Eberhard Schneider¹

THE SYSTEM OF VALUES

The plurality of values is not the relativity of values. The latter would mean that there are no absolute values.

Besides, values can undergo changes. These changes of values occur in society and cannot be prescribed by governments. If the changes of values go quite far, this can lead to some political consequences which governments will not be able to prevent, as is demonstrated by the 'Arab spring'.

The plurality of values is something more than mere co-existence of separate values or systems of values. It is rather about the exchange of values in the form of the dialogue of values. In a human body, some body parts do not just co-exist; they form a rational and functional organism. The plurality of values suggests an exchange of different value notions and mutual understanding of general ideas at the meta-level. If this general understanding at the meta-level is lacking, the dialogue of values ends up in a stand-off and confrontation. The dialogue of values requires that the partners in the dialogue acknowledge the dialogue as a value.

What does mutual and general understanding at the meta-level mean? This is the value of human rights, which the mankind has agreed upon and which is documented in Article 1 of the UN Human Rights Declaration of December 10, 1948, and which states, 'All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.'

Since we must do this by teaming up general public and the states, it is necessary to remember what the states are made for. According to Aristotle, the purpose of the state is 'to perfect life'. According to him, the state is the 'interaction between families and clans for the sake of perfect and sustainable life, however, as we state, for a happy and good life.'³

For Thomas Aquinas, the purpose of the state is common well-being, *bonum commune*.⁴ German philosopher Vittorio Hösle expresses his concern over 'the disappearance of the notion of common well-being in contemporary political philosophy' as well as in the 'Realpolitik of modern states.' He thinks that common well-being is not

³ Aristoteles, *Politika*, 9. Buch, 3. Kapitel, 1280 b 34.

⁴ Thomas von Aquin, *Summa theologiae*, II, II, q. 141, a. 8.

‘just individual preferences glued together’.¹ The general mutual understanding at the meta-level as a prerequisite for the dialogue of values could be the acknowledgement of the common well-being.

What is to be understood by common well-being or *bonnum commune*? This can be (1) personal well-being – happiness in the Aristotelian sense – of all members of community if it can be achieved by mutual efforts; (2) all benefits from the outside which result from the community’s work for the benefit of personal common well-being. They include (a) definite goods and agencies set up by the community for common use (police, post, railway, etc.) and (b) the states of the community resulting from the benefits for its members (law enforcement, public order, etc.). This common well-being exists within the

possibilities and advantages which can be drawn from the above-mentioned benefits if they are utilized. The state, with its policy and those who fulfil the policy, exists in order to provide a chance of happiness for one single being.

The means and ways to build conditions for the common well-being can be various. The dialogue of values is only rational when it moves towards the general meta-level which acknowledges human rights and purposes of building of a *bonnum commune* state. If the criticism of values of the other is used just as a tool to discredit it in the political sense, then it is not a dialogue of values. If the criticism of values is mistaken for the interference with the domestic policy and political onslaught, it is not a dialogue of values either.

Yu. S. Shemshuchenko²;
A. V. Skripnyuk³

THE MAN AS THE SUPREME VALUE IN THE SYSTEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER OF STATES

At present, overwhelming majority of countries in the world have their own constitutions. These are basic laws stipulating legal status of their citizens, government and social system of these countries, i.e. their constitutional order.

The term ‘constitutional order’ is widely used in the theory of constitutional law and constitutional and legal practice, but it is seldom used in constitutions themselves. The only exception is the Basic Law for Germany of 1949, the Constitution of the Russian Federation of 1993 and some others.

However, modern constitutions include independent parts or structurally separated constitutional institutions under the title ‘The Fundamentals of the Constitutional System’. A number of constitutions have special sections which are called differently – ‘The Fundamentals of the Constitutional System’ (Armenia, Belarus, Russia and

others) or ‘General Provisions’ (Estonia, Georgia, Azerbaijan and others), or ‘Fundamental Principles’ (Spain, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and others) but still include norms regulating similar social relations. The respective Section 1 of the Ukrainian Constitution is called ‘General Principles’ which for the Russian ear sounds more like ‘General Provisions’. The Kazakh Constitution has a section of like tenor. But the fundamentals of the constitutional order of the Ukraine are not identical to the content of the above mentioned section.

The analysis of the Ukrainian Constitution makes it possible to assert that beside section 1, the constitutional order is further developed and systemically envisaged in section 3 ‘Elections. Referendum’ and in section 13 ‘Making Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’. Section 1 contains provisions of essential nature, and most of them serve as a juridical base for the fundamentals of other constitutional provisions included in sections 3 and 13. It is section 1 that is the core and essence of the entire Basic Law of Ukraine. Most of its norms are norms-principles which determine a more general regulatory level.

In this context, there are grounds to claim that the fundamentals of the constitutional order are a set of the most significant principles which are of particular importance and have the highest juridical power for the organization of activity of the state and society. These principles determine the form and means of organizing the Ukraine as a state, guarantee human and civil rights and freedoms, characterize the country as a constitutional state with intrinsic limitations of the state power as well as acknowledgement and guarantees of democracy. At the same time, in terms of their legal nature and potency, these norms are similar to other constitutional norms and are norms of direct action, too. In other words, the foundations of the constitutional order are fundamental constitutional ideas and ideals underlying the development of the society and state and they contribute to the formation and transformation of the respective legal relations.

¹ Höfle, Vittorio, *Moral und Politik. Grundlagen einer Politischen Ethik für das 21. Jahrhundert.* München 1997, S. 165.

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In terms of its content, constitutional order is a particular type of constitutional and legal relations determined by the level of the development of the society, the state and the law. Keeping this in mind, one must agree that the existing constitutional order reflects mainly a respective state of the society, the country and the law in today's Ukraine. Further development of its constitutional order must be determined by the current constitutional reform in the Ukraine which is under way in accordance with the Constitutional Assembly instituted by President of the Ukraine in 2012.

Since the time when the Basic Law was adopted, its enforcement has often been accompanied by doubts whether the Constitution provided efficient legal system to regulate relations between the society, the people and the state, whether it served as a kind of a barrier to block destructive actions of different branches of the government, recent examples being evidence to that. So far, there are no guarantees that something like that will not happen again in future. The described state of things is due to a rather ambiguous social and economic system of the society, which greatly affects the content of the basics of the constitutional order.

In terms of its content, the constitutional order primarily means that the Constitution envisages and guarantees certain state and social organization, constitutional status of the individual and the citizen, the system of direct democracy, the government and local self-government bodies, the mechanism of territorial division, basic principles of foreign and other international relations of the government and other existing important types of constitutional and legal relations.

As to its form, the constitutional order of the Ukraine is a system of basic organizational and legal forms of social relations provided by the Constitution, i.e. a system of principal types of the organization and activity of the state, society and other parties of constitutional and legal relations. First of all, the constitutional order of the Ukraine embodies the form (forms) of the state according to the state organization and state government as well as forms of direct democracy envisaged by the Constitution. Besides, the constitutional order of the Ukraine is characterized by a number of essential features, namely, sovereignty, democracy, humanism, reality, systemic organization, scientific grounding, historical method, continuity, program approach, ensuring the constitutional order.

Guarantees of the constitutional order of the Ukraine should be understood as a system of general social and specific juridical (regulatory as well as organizational and legal) regulations and means of material and procedural character which provide effectiveness of basic principles and institutes of the social and political system of the Ukraine. As a rule, special attention is paid to specific or juridical guarantees of the constitutional order of the Ukraine, although in reality these guarantees greatly depend on general development of all the spheres of social and public life – political, economic, social, cultural, environmental, information and others. It should be borne in mind that numerous subjective factors are also of importance for guarantees of the constitutional order alongside with objective factors, namely, the appropriate level of development of all spheres of the social and political system, and their inter-relation. These subjective factors are, for example, the relationship between national

political leaders, internal disputes between various members of the political elite, particular political interests of various entities of political power, etc.¹

All said above does not deny the significance of special (juridical) guarantees of the constitutional order of the Ukraine. Now they are divided into regulatory, organizational and legal guarantees of the constitutional order of the Ukraine. Regulatory guarantees of the constitutional order of the Ukraine are determined by the efficiency of the existing constitutional legislation of the Ukraine, and basic institutions of the society and the state are envisaged by its Constitution and laws. Organizational and legal guarantees of the constitutional order in the Ukraine are members of the constitutional legal system. These include: the Ukrainian people, ethnic minorities, political parties and non-governmental organisations, trade unions, the Ukrainian state as a whole and its authorized bodies (the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukraine, President of the Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine, other executive agencies, the Constitutional Court of the Ukraine, general jurisdiction courts, the prosecutor's office, etc.), local communities and authorities, officials of local governments, enterprises, institutions, organizations, international agencies and organizations, media, etc. An important element of the organizational and legal guarantees of the constitutional order in the Ukraine is the parliamentary coalition and the parliamentary opposition.

The textual analysis of modern constitutions gives evidence that sections devoted to definitions of constitutional order contain six groups of norms: a) norms characterizing the state in terms of its independence and sovereignty; b) norms revealing the content of the state's activities; c) norms providing the functioning of civil society; d) norms determining the institutional development of government; e) norms determining the basic principles of foreign policy; e) norms designating national symbols (national flag, national emblem, national anthem).

But the key figure in the constitutional order is the individual as the supreme social value. This means that the man is the basis of the existence of society and state, labour groups and non-governmental organizations. This implies that the state must protect life and freedom of the individual, provide economic and other conditions to exercise rights and freedoms granted to him.²

In this context, the priority is to strengthen the foundations of democracy and civil society development, which are aimed at protecting and defending the constitutional order in the Ukraine. The provisions of the Constitution and post-totalitarian reality differ in terms of the actual existence of both democratic state and social state governed by the rule of law in the Ukraine.

The principle of democracy is perhaps the most important to the development of national constitutionalism and state. If we take the view of the constitutional order as a system of public, state and social relations that are established and protected by the constitution and other constitutional and legal acts of the state, then the principle of democracy implies that all these relationships are built in accordance with the following requirements: people are recognized as supreme and the only source of legitimate

¹ Todyka, Yu.N. Constitutional Law of the Ukraine: Branch of Law, Science, Academic Discipline. Kharkov, 1998. P. 101.

² See: Chirkin, V.E. Comparative Constitutional Law. Moscow, 2011. P. 64.

power, which is exercised by them (or their representatives) in the interests of the majority of citizens. The democratic constitutional order implies the existence of a democratic constitution which really restricts the state and at the same time guarantees rights and freedoms of citizens. The democratic constitutional order means that the principle of the supreme power of people is administered through public life and social practice, this power granted to people and being exercised by people.

Analyzing classical definitions of democracy we can conclude that the main guarantor of the democratic constitutional order is the people themselves who are the sole source of power (Article 5 of the Constitution) in accordance with the constitutional provisions of all modern states (which claim to be democratic). However, an identical provision can be found in other constitutions. For example, in paragraph 2 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of Spain, Spanish people are defined as a bearer of 'national sovereignty' and a source of 'the powers of the state'. Article 1 of the Italian Constitution declares that the sovereignty belongs only to the people. Article 4 of the Constitution of Poland states that the supreme power in the republic belongs to the people. We find this provision expressed in almost the same terms in the constitutions of member-states of CIS: Section 1, Art. 3 of the Constitution of Kazakhstan ('The people shall be the only source of state power'), paragraph 1 of Art. 3 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (the 'The bearer of sovereignty and the only source of power in the Russian Federation shall be its multinational people'), Art. 1 of the Constitution of the Azerbaijani Republic ('in the Republic of Azerbaijan the only source of power shall be people'), Art. 2 of the Constitution of Armenia ('the power [in the country] belongs to the people'), etc.

Under current conditions, democratic constitutional order means, above all, favourable conditions for broad and effective participation of citizens in the affairs of the state and society. This means true service of the authorities and political machinery to people, which includes democratic political regime, separation of powers, acknowledgement of priority of the individual, supremacy of law and justice. At the same time, democratic constitutional order is a way to prevent usurpation of state power and alienation of power from the citizens.

Thus, people are not only a guarantor of democratic constitutional order, but also a necessary foundation, which makes it possible to use the term 'constitutional order.' In fact, constitutional order itself originates as a reflection of actual social relationships that develop on the basis of the constitution, and the population considers the constitution legitimate only if people are the sole source of power.

It is section 3 called 'Elections. Referendum' of the Constitution that determines legal parameters of implementing the idea of democracy and national sovereignty. It is of great importance, because its provisions lay the foundation for the procedure of decision-making directly by people, exercising the right to vote, and, finally, establishing the key elements of the state mechanism.

People can control the level of protection and security of human and citizen rights and freedoms, the authority vested in people and democratic character of the state.

In this case, we understand democracy as power belonging to people, and free exercise of this power by people according to their sovereign will and intrinsic

interests. This definition suggests a correlation, which gives reason to treat the existence of this institution in the system of relations between the society and the state as a precondition of a democratic constitutional order. There are two main forms of people's participation in government and public affairs: direct and indirect. Quite often, they are also characterized by such notions as direct democracy and representative democracy. Direct democracy is an independent expression of people's own will in regard to their own interests, their own destiny, or in regard to other peoples and states with their consent, no matter whether political parties, their fractions and other components of direct democracy promote this expression of will or not. Forms of direct democracy are elections, referenda, plebiscites. As for the right of representation, it has a slightly more complex structure and includes such components as the right to have a body of people's representatives, the right to regularly elect people's representatives, the right to the effective functioning of the organ of people's representation, to elect and to be elected to the bodies of people's representation, the right to recourse to public authorities, the right to recall elected representatives.

Unfortunately, not all of the above components of this right are realized in the political and legal context of our state. For example, it suffices to consider the right to the effective functioning of the body of people's representation. For a long time, the Ukraine has experienced a situation in which the unwillingness or professional inefficiency of people's representatives to administer legislation in the parliament led to deficiency of key laws. They turned out to be an impediment to the development of the most important social, political, economic and cultural relations, which were to contribute to the realization of the fundamental principles the Constitution of the Ukraine. Unless all these problems are solved, further development of the democratic constitutional order may be significantly deformed, if possible at all.

There are some problems in the functioning of the rule-of-law state in Ukraine. They are primarily connected with the fact that the supremacy of law is not ensured. Now the government of the Ukraine defaults on duties determined by the Constitution in the social sphere. This directly leads to the need to clearly articulate and constitutionally recognize the social vector of state power and government's accountability to people. All these problems are objectively linked to the notion of 'constitutional order' which is fundamental to legal science.

Ensuring human and civil rights and freedoms is the topical issue of the contemporary constitutional process in the Ukraine. One of the leading principles of the rule of law is a developed institution of human and civil rights and freedoms. Despite the wide range of the rights and freedoms envisaged by the Constitution, the overwhelming majority of them are empty words that are not supported by the practices of the respective legal relations. In this context, however, the question at issue is not in the state which does not fulfil its constitutional obligations, but in the Constitution which does not have provisions of specific legal mechanisms necessary to ensure human rights, as well as to give the individual the opportunity to effectively protect his constitutional rights, given that the state is either unable or unwilling to act within the limits prescribed by the Constitution. In the rule-of-law state,

there should be a reliable system of protecting human rights and freedoms. This is especially true for judicial and law enforcement agencies. Now these two top functions of the state, namely justice and law enforcement, are the most problematic. Accordingly, there is a problem of entrenching constitutionally the mechanism of recognizing and protecting human rights and freedoms. This mechanism could also help set limitations on state power.

Referring to these groups of constitutional norms, it should be noted that constitutional provisions relating to the organization of state power are particularly inconsistent in the modern Ukraine. In fact, until 2010 satisfactory conditions were not provided either for a continuous and constructive dialogue or for co-operation between the branches of government and hence between the state and the society. Here we are talking not only of an optimal reforming of state institutions but also of transforming the political system, of creating an efficient mechanism of checks and balances and their inclusion in the Constitution. It means the improvement of the functioning of the government, reasonable redistribution of powers between the President, the Verkhovna Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers, the decrease in the concentration of power in one centre, effective cooperation of the legislative and executive branches of the government and their shared responsibility for the implementation of the national policy. In effect, this involves an acceptable division of powers by the units of the state mechanism, the institutional division of powers between autonomous branches, ensuring the existence of checks and balances, the establishment of an effective mechanism to prevent tipping the balance of power in favour of one body. Today the issue which comes to the fore is of further developing, supporting and reinforcing parliamentarism and, at the same time, of increasing the role of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine in the system of the highest bodies of state authority.

While the preparatory work on the conception of modifying the Constitution is under way, another important area of great concern is improvement of the current judicial system. Recently adopted laws regulating judiciary, status of judges and the Criminal Procedure Code fit the European framework of regulatory standards. However, the constitution arguably has an exhaustive list of possible procedures for regulatory and constitutional amendments, including the increasing influence of people on the administration of justice by introducing the constitutional guarantees of a jury, by changing the order of the formation and composition of the High Council of Justice in order to minimize political representation in its work.

Another pressing challenge is the separation of powers between the state authorities and local self-government, the need to ensure effective development of local self-government. It is necessary to create an optimal model of the system of local governments together with the reforms of administrative territorial division.

Finally, it is hardly possible to ensure the foundations of the constitutional order and its basic principles without addressing the problem of its protection. There is no doubt that the constitutional order and its foundations require special legal protection from many negative factors. The current Constitution does not stipulate setting up an institution of protection of the foundations of the constitutional order. All these taken together give evidence that there are no efficient constitutional guarantees of stability and protection of the constitutional order. The amended updated Constitution should envisage safeguarding and protection of the Basic Law. These changes would make it possible to solve a number of urgent and important problems of the modern state and social development in the Ukraine. The priority is to give regulatory meaning to the concept of the constitutional order, ensuring its stability and bringing it into compliance with fundamental human values.

A. V. Smirnov¹

NEW HUMANISM AS NEW UNIVERSALISM?

The idea of 'new humanism' has been proposed by the UNESCO and the points of this speculation are elaborated in detail. This is, however, a question of other publications and of another format. Two notions linked in the title are followed by a question mark because I propose them for careful reflection, pondering and elaboration, in other words, I pose a question and

address it to everyone who is interested in the topics of my speculation.

When we speak of the new humanism today, it does not mean, of course, that we start from scratch getting rid of the old or traditional humanism. It means that we get back to the classical humanism (why then should we mention the term itself?) in order to re-think it over and reconsider its foundations in light of the new situation we are in today. That is why I will begin my speculation from the question of what makes the foundation of humanism in the classical meaning.

Classical humanism in Europe (the Renaissance and the Enlightenment) was connected with the establishment of the universalism of reason in two dimensions.

First, this is the universalism of the object and subject. This means that everything – the world (as the object of cognition by reason of the mind) and all its aspects (all possible subjects of cognition) are *truthfully* cognized by the mind. Hence, there is nothing that could rival the authority

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of reason: religion is relegated to the realm of private life forever losing its function of the guardian of the truth of the universe (while retaining its varied functions in culture).

Second, this is the universalism of the man as a tribal being. This means that reason is one for all people: this is one and the same reason, i.e. one and the same rationality. Rationality in principle is one; it is opposed to what can be called unreasonable or irrational.

This second dimension of the point regarding the universality of reason underlying humanism, presupposes a number of important consequences.

1. Rationality, if it is true rationality giving true knowledge (remember the emotional content of truth inalienable from reason in the Enlightenment sense), cannot be different in different parts of the world or in different cultures and civilizations simply because the truth is one. This means that different cultures are differently related to this genuine and one truth accessible by one and genuine rationality.

2. This is where the deep epistemological foundation of the Eurocentrism lies: it is in the West that sciences sprang up and the ideal of rationality and scientific character of knowledge was realized to the fullest; that is why any other culture aspiring to get closer to this kind of knowledge has either to borrow from Western experience or go along the same road on its own. Despite all our attempts to hush up Eurocentrism and dope it with some coats of politically correct rhetoric, this foundation will not disappear, since it results from the *very logic*. And this means that it will be inevitably reproduced in all speculations, either openly or (which is more dangerous) implicitly.

3. This is also a reason for ascribing exclusively negative meaning to the term *otherness*. Otherness, especially after Edward W. Said's criticism of Orientalism, was interpreted as an indication of inferiority and imperfection. The thing is, however, that criticism of *Orientalism*, inherently controversial, holds as its basis the monologue scale (only in this sense otherness with regard to Western model can be viewed as implicated imperfection) and, consequently, maintains precisely what it would like to deny: the exclusiveness of Western model taken as a universal one, including universal foundation of valuation (this is what I refer to as the monologue scale). Since we speak about logic, this contradiction will be inevitably reproduced despite all new terms which has come out of favour of the terms otherness and which we seek to term by some other politically correct variants (e.g. *alterity*): such solutions are no other than palliative. If some solid solution is to be found, we need to reconsider logic, not just words. In other words, it requires to find a way to use the *polylogue* scale of valuation instead of the *monologue* one.

4. Understanding reason and rationality as one for all, as common for all people, is ultimately based on the conception stating that the world is one and that this world is matched by one and only one, precisely defined truth. This concept underlying scholarly disciplines of the Early Modern Period has not lost its meaning today. Otherwise science could not have been transformed into technology. All this also presupposes one logic of the truth (however 'truth' is interpreted, but primarily in its scientific sense) in knowing the world. I will mention just one law of the excluded middle (*Tertium non datur*): we are ready to reconsider any theory provided it is not in line with it, for departure from

this law would mean the collapse of our faith in rationality and in the possibility of the world to be known. (The law of the excluded fourth and other variants of alternative logic are formal and only visibly alternative: they consider cases of epistemic indefiniteness instead of scientific knowledge. This in principle holds true for variants of formal logic of today: their ontologies are artificial.)

This understanding of rationality and truth was criticized in the 19th and 20th-century philosophies, sometimes very sternly. This criticism took different forms and was originated from different premises, but was aimed in general at the vector of *narrowing* the absolute power of reason. Of course, this is not the place to discuss it. The point is different: I think that criticism of the traditional vision of reason and rationality can be carried out by *broadening* the concept of rationality and universalism instead of narrowing it.

I meant this kind of broadening when I used the term 'new universalism' in the title. Criticism of the traditional concept of reason and rationality which could be *broadening* instead of *narrowing*, denies limitations of universalism by its traditional forms and, at the same time, offers a new interpretation of universalism broadening its understanding. This new interpretation fully corresponds to what can be called 'new humanism'.

So, what is new universalism and what are the ways to approach it?

Classical notion of reason and rationality put forward by Plato and Aristotle, developed in Europe during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment (the time when classical concepts of reason and universalism were formed) and up to this day, is connected with the *substantial picture of the world*; it is inalienable from it, attached to it by numerous close ties, (those ties being at the very core and thus unruptured).

What is the substantial picture of the world? This is a vision of the world consisting of substances, endowed with specifically related features. 'Relation', 'feature' or 'force' if we resort to physical terminology, cannot exist by themselves, they have to belong to some *carrier*. This notion of such a bearer as a basis of the qualitative variety of the world is at the core of the substantial picture of the world.

This concept was suggested way back as the Platonic and Aristotelian paradigm and on the whole has not lost its validity in Western culture of this time. This is by no means coincidence: Western thinking finds in the concept of substance the basis of stability and invariability and, hence, regularity and ability to know the world. (For the change can only be seen as the change of the permanent; otherwise change itself cannot be perceived as meaning: in this case we would have two different things instead of one and the same altered entity. 'One and the same' has a meaningful priority over 'alteration'.) This thesis allows for very different nuances that evoke the names of Whitehead, Wittgenstein, Kierkegaard, Rorty and Deleuze, but cannot deny logical omnipotence of the substantial picture of the world.

Substantial character of the world picture in no way means that its carriers see only substances in the world and that substance is the only thing that exists. It is certainly not so. This thesis means something very different. This, which is not substance in the conventional sense of the word, is either 1) perceived as if it were substance, i.e. according to the same logic, or 2) interpreted via the fundamental notion

of substance (the earliest and most vivid example is the Aristotelian notion of 'becoming' which cannot be perceived without the notion of potentiality and actuality which, in their turn, presuppose substantiality: here substantiality is logically preceding; in general, Western philosophy, when discussing the bond between 'being' and 'becoming' has always given logical priority to being).

Now comes the main question: what if the foundation of the *perception of the world* is not the substance but something else? Something which in the substantial picture of the world occupies some marginal position but can come to the foreground forming another, a different type of rationality? Something that allows to grasp world's stability (and, hence, its regularity and cognoscibility) as other than substantial?

This question is exactly the bridge which leads us to the question of feasibility of a 'new universalism' (or the 'broadening of universalism').

The meaning of comparative philosophy which constitutes the field of my professional interests is in finding approaches towards the experience of other cultures and civilizations from scratch. This means approaching the study of them by seeing these cultures and civilizations as an attempt to perceive the world without *prejudging* the question of what foundation such perception rests on. (Of course, such an approach in comparative philosophy suggests quite a complex technique of a peculiar Husserlian *epoché*, the subject of which in this case is the foundations of rationality of the researcher's own culture – the one he belongs to. This is, however, another topic requiring special discussion.)

I find it important to draw attention to the fact that I speak precisely about *meaningful perception*, not rationality; the meaning of this will be clear from what you read below, but it has to be in the centre of attention now, for these foundations might chance to be different from what we are used to; we might face the possibility to perceive meaningfully and form the picture of the world not as a substantial one.

François Jullien, a French sinologist, opens his wonderful book 'The Way to Your Destination: Detour or Access? Strategies of Meaningfulness in China and Greece'¹ with a remark about his profound research into Chinese thinking that enabled him to understand how unusual our own culture is and its roots in ancient Greece. What we take for granted is not so in reality; on the contrary, it is remarkable in its uniqueness.

François Jullien does not discuss otherness but his statement, as it seems, can be mirrored and it will keep its meaning. A scholar from non-Western culture who digs in Western culture might find the foundations of his own culture similarly remarkable, similarly unique and not linked to the foundations of other cultures and civilizations.

What we talk about purely theoretically while staying so far in the field of comparative philosophy, has some practical, and I would say historically practical dimension. I mean some very complex processes initiated by what is called globalization.

Of course, there have always been different cultures and civilizations on the Earth. They, however, never have been

in such a close contact as now. This point certainly needs explanation. The age of colonial wars cannot be called the age of 'close contact' either. But its difference from what is called globalization lies in the fact that there is close interaction and interdependence of processes in different parts of the world today: something happening in one place can almost instantly have some repercussions in another part of the planet.

This close interaction demonstrates that we are entering some new age whose contours are not yet clearly defined. This is an age whose essence can be expressed in negative terminology as inability for cultures and civilizations to exist separately.

The main question which arises in connection with this can be formulated in this way: are we to live in a *monologic* or *polylogic* world? In a world of one civilization or many?

Posing a question like this is unlike posing a question as to which world you would like to live in: unipolar or multipolar. The question of monologic or polylogic organization of the world in future suggests much more than merely a political aspect.

Globalization, to which we are all witnesses, has primarily an economic dimension. I mean that globalization as unification, as a monologic model, is present first of all in the sphere of economy (as well as in the spheres which directly derive from it). But in the sphere of cultures and civilizations we rather have a reverse process.

I would like to discuss one example which is directly linked to my professional interests as an Arabist. I am speaking about the current upsurge in the Arab world, the notorious Arab Spring which prompts such contradictory comments. On the one hand, Arab TV channels are effusive about it as the locus, the point where history of today is in the making. On the other hand, outside the Arab world, this very event causes plenty of scepticism about its results which are *in evidence*.

I think that the events of the Arab Spring cannot be seen from the point of their correspondence to Western vision of the correct (the best and the most successful, competitive; in line with the human nature; in keeping with common human values etc.: there are many ways of expressing this idea) organization of society and life (it is exactly this standpoint which leads to the bitter scepticisms of those who are not ready to applaud to these events). The point is not in the political correctness or some other considerations of political kind. The point is rather in the essence of these events and in what is directly connected with this: in the possibility to use the *monologic model* of their assessment (the model which is built on the concept of the uniqueness of true rationality that precisely depicts the organization of the world and of the individual and society – since we get back to the onset of our discussion of humanism as the universalism of reason), the model which unambiguously assesses the object from the point of how close it is to the maximum set by this linear scale.

From my point of view, these events are the expression of a new civilization reality. Its meaning is in the quest of Islamic world for its own civilization organization after its colonial dependence in the 19th and 20th centuries and its attempt to apply Western models (Capitalism or Socialism, Westernization or Socialist orientation – the second half of the 20th century).

¹ F. Jullien. Le détour et l'accès: stratégies du sens en Chine, en Grèce. P.: Grasset, 1995; translation into Russian: Moscow: Moscow Philosophical Fund, 2001

That is why the events which politically are indicative of the strengthening of Islamists, cannot be seen as reactionary in the historical sense of the word, i.e. as a reverse movement, as a rollback from the models of political, economic and other organization of society which were found and tested by Western civilization. This assessment is only possible if we use the *monologic* scale; it is impossible in principle if we search for the *polylogic scale of valuations*.

That is why I tend to see these events and phenomena from the standpoint of them facing the future. What is happening now, though it looks like an explosion, had been growing and maturing for a very long time. If we look attentively, we will easily see these gradual changes in the Arab (and Islamic) world for the last 30 or 40 years. These changes were not political in character or not only political (the latter was rather derived from them, from its genuine and profound cause). They were of cultural and civilization character.

We must be prepared for this – to answer the question: what are the causes of civilizational (not political, nor economic, nor any other) friction of the world organization which is suggested by the dominant globalization model and its broad cultural and civilizational perception in the Arab (and, probably, on a wider scale, in Islamic) world?

After all, globalization despite its primary economic dimension is inalienable from its civilizational dimension, the latter being implicated but no less powerful at that. One cannot accept *only* Western economic model discarding all the rest: economy is part of culture and it presupposes its cultural foundations; it goes even more for political organization, social institutes etc.: all this will require first of all and at least (if the word 'least' fits in here, of course) a certain idea of the man and his relations with the world and other people.

I believe that the clearance causing this friction (and sometimes sparking) I mentioned above is the clearance of *the ways of meaning supposition*. This clearance is caused by our encounter with another picture of the world built on premises different from the habitual substantial picture with the inherent logic, outlook etc., all drawn from the experience of our contacts with Western culture. That is why we need a polylogic system of valuations – not a single scale which grades phenomena as the best vs. the worst, but as a multi-vector outlook enabling to grasp what cannot be reduced to a single foundation and does not have enough place on a single scale.

Is it tangible? In my opinion, it is. This brief answer needs at least some clarification.

My statement is based on my research into the Arab culture, mostly of its classical period as well as of modern times. To what extent the results drawn from the Arab culture can be extrapolated to the Islamic culture as a whole is debatable. To some extent they can be extrapolated as some principal Greek features can be adapted to Western culture in general (of course, not all but exactly those that determine fundamental logic of culture).

I believe that when speaking about the Arab culture, we can speak about the *processual picture* of the world: it can be clearly seen at the level of language and theoretical thinking.

Processuality of the world picture based on the processual type of meaning supposition generates its own rationality which keeps all the features of 'genuine' (let's

say otherwise, full or complete) rationality – but it is not rationality that is derived from the substantial picture of the world where stability and regularity requires (in order to be seen) to be raised to substance as the invariable.

Processuality demonstrates itself in all spheres of the Arab culture. These are law, religion, philology, philosophy if we take the main segments of theoretical thinking. Individual's understanding and his relations to another man, ethics and Islamic anthropology are constituted by this – all basic moments which determine the outlook of the individual. Finally, processual principle is clearly and very visibly revealed in Islamic art.

Thus, processuality can be traced in both verbal and non-verbal spheres and it *determines general semantic contours* of what can be called the Arab and Muslim culture and, with reservations mentioned above – the *Islamic civilization*.

That does not mean unification of this culture and civilization, its narrowing and squeezing into rigid frames. Processuality is just a leading vector but not an exceptional feature: both in the past and present the Islamic civilization demonstrates phenomena linked to another type of meaning supposition (the most well-known example is the *falsafa* which continued the Greek tradition). The type of meaning supposition determines only basic contours but not the exclusive form.

The above said which goes for the Arab-Muslim culture (and the Islamic civilization in general) suggests substantial research and proofs which, due to the limitations imposed by the amount of the material, cannot be presented here. I can only refer the reader to a number of works, both mine and of my colleagues, which substantiate the point presented here.

If the grounds for meaning supposition, i.e. the procedures by which we achieve perception of the world and due to which the semantic body of culture is being built, are different and cannot be *merged*, if we should really speak about polylogic instead of monologic, if we are to have a possibility of multi-vector valuation instead of a single (mono-vector) scale, if (*if only*) this all holds true, should we pose a question of putting forward the concept of the 'equality of civilizations'?

The idea of the equality of civilizations was proposed and elaborated for Russia and the Russian situation where Muslims are not immigrants but the indigenous population of the country, so the concept of the 'equality of civilizations' for Russia is, in my opinion, *natural*. But not only that: it constitutes one of the most important terms of the country's security – its civilizational dimension. To what extent these concepts and ideas can be imported outside Russia, is yet to be debated.

Civilizations' equality requires that we speak as of equal about what originally is *not* equal and *cannot be equal* due to the impossibility of being brought together, unlike juridical equality where originally unequal subjects of law are taken as equal in a *definite regard*, and it is exactly in this regard that the notion of equality is elaborated while inequality remains outside the boundaries of this elaboration. Unlike this, in order to discuss the 'equality of civilizations', one must learn to speak about the unequal and not to view their equality as a reduction to something singular, as shelling out the content common for all, as setting some *common frame* within which we are to exist (all these approaches

do not bring us outside the limits of monologic and single scale of valuations.)

Why can we speak then of the equality of the unequal, not using these strategies honed during many centuries?

I think that the register of the speculation about universalism as a universalism of rationality should be replaced by the register of speculation about universalism as a universalism of the *ability for meaning supposition*.

Indeed, let's think if we do it right narrowing in the definition of the man the word *sapiens* (knowing) and reducing it to the concept of 'rational' speaking about the man as a *rational animal*? narrowing Greek logos to reason in its certain interpretation and then declaring this interpretation as the only one possible and unique?

Shouldn't we speak that a genuinely human feature is the ability *to think*, the ability to make structures of meaningfulness?

Then we will speak about universalism of meaning supposition instead of universalism of rationality. The *ability for meaning supposition* and for knowing the world is universal in itself. It makes human beings out of us unlike creatures which lack this ability.

Interestingly, humanism in its commonsensical understanding is usually reduced to the thesis stating that 'we are all humans despite all our differences'. But what does being 'human' mean? The difficulties in finding the answer to this question are obvious: 1) it is impossible to define clearly what a man is (the 20th century buried attempts to define 'human nature' unambiguously) and 2) it is not clear what will remain if we remove 'all our differences': will we have some leftover or purely biological substrate only which does not make us different from animals, if we digress from both cultural, historical, racial, ethnic, geographical and other differences as well as from rationality?

I think we will find, and something substantial at that. As a way of answering this question (what does it mean that 'we are all humans'?) I would suggest this one: irrespective of all differences we are united by the ability for meaning supposition.

The guiding principle of the International Labour Organization is *social justice*. Almost a hundred years ago, in 1919, the Peace Treaty of Versailles created the ILO, and the preamble of the Constitution of the new organization said that lasting peace is possible only through social justice.

At around the same time, with the revolution that had started in this city, St. Petersburg, the Russian people were also looking for social justice, peace and democracy. The routes that the ILO and the Russian Revolution took were different. They were based on different beliefs on how social conflict are to be managed. Indeed, one of the fundamental differences was whether such conflicts were

If this *ability* is one and it is this ability that constitutes the universal in the man, then the modes of its realization are different: singleness and universality belong to the sphere of pure ability, while variability and incompatibility belong to the field of realization of this ability. Here to a certain extent the analogy with a language faculty holds true. It is equal and universal for all people in the sense that until a certain age people can master any language as their native and, consequently, are universal in the language dimension. But after it has been mastered (the ability has been realized and has moved from pure ability into the realm of its realization), as soon as one language has become native which means that the man has performed his universal language ability, we at the same time lose our language universalism.

That is why there are different types of rationality as such which cannot be equated to one another but which find their unity as *variation* types of something *one*, namely meaning supposition.

This thesis constituting theoretical basis for all this speculation is grounded on the theoretical elaboration of the question of meaning supposition and detailed research of different phenomena of the Arab and Muslim culture. I can only mention it here, as their thorough discussion requires some other space than the space of this speculation.

I would like to finish it with the following thesis. If we accept the view suggested here, we will not lose anything from what European rationalism suggests, the rationalism which constitutes the foundation of the civilization we live in. On the contrary, we will be ready to meet some other ways of knowing the world and building some perception (and, consequently, rationality) not *just alternative* to the Western rationality (which means alien to it and consequently marginalized – or such which must be marginalized), but as growing from another root, but on the same soil. This, I think, will be the real humanistic attitude towards all those ways of meaning supposition which the man generated in his historical evolution in the variety of cultures and civilizations; this would deserve to be called 'new humanism.'

Kari Tapiola¹

MODERN STANDARDS OF DECENT LABOUR

to be managed through cooperation by employers, trade unions and governments, or should they be eliminated in favour of a regime and rule by the working class – or, at least, in the name of the working class.

The existence of separate ways to achieve social justice characterized much of the last Century. Despite the differences, the competing economic and social systems had significant common aspirations. One of them has been the desire to set rules which provide for protection of workers in their everyday life, both at their work and regarding the conditions of life of working women and men and their families.

In this respect, the last hundred years can be characterized as a century marked by the growing importance of labour and social legislation. Much of this was developed in, and by, the ILO. The ILO also gave a definite push to

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the development of human rights standards, especially regarding trade union rights, collective bargaining, the abolition of forced and child labour and the elimination of discrimination at work.

With the systemic global change since the early 1990s, these standards – human rights at work – became accepted as the social requirements for success in the new global economy. They are the core standards for what became to be recognized in the terminology developed in the ILO as “Decent Work”. As such, they became accepted by virtually all countries, irrespective of their political, economic or social past, or level of development.

In short, they became part of the framework for sustainable growth which could guarantee employment and social protection. They also furnished the method through which this can be achieved: cooperation between those directly involved, employers and workers, governments, other key actors in the society. Very importantly, they showed the way in which the inevitable differences that groups in society have can be reconciled.

The Russian Federation has ratified all eight ILO Conventions in which these standards are embodied – and it continues to ratify and implement many other significant ILO Conventions. The purpose of the Decent Work standards is to create the framework in which the rights and interests of workers, and also employers, are respected.

At the same time unilateral, revolutionary, capitalist or other simplistic approaches, became replaced by the realization that for their future, all societies need social dialogue.

If, for instance, decisions on employment and production are taken in cooperation with all concerned, in full knowledge of the consequences, then they can be fruitful and sustainable. And when adjustments to change and difficulties are needed, negotiations can lead into two things: finding the methods which are least painful to the

people concerned, and finding the way back to growth and employment once a particular difficult situation improves.

This calls for a sufficiently high tolerance of different views, and a culture for listening and dialogue. The aim of Decent Work standards is to create the space for such dialogue, nationally, locally, at the workplaces.

All systems, democratic or authoritarian, whether they have been called capitalist or socialist, have difficulties in giving up tendencies towards solutions from the top down. Sometimes even with increased democracy in a given system, an expectancy remains that a “boss” or a “leader” will somehow solve a problem, through an order, through a telephone call, or in some other way of transmitting a command.

However, today the structures of production and of social life are progressively less and less hierarchies. Even at workplaces, former work collectives are more and more becoming networks. The factors changing our cultures and the way in which we interact with one another are formed by new technology on one hand and by an increased realization of both individual and collective rights on the other hand. This is where personal computers and mobile phones combine with the freedom of expression and association, somewhat in the same way as the printing press served the labour movement in its early days.

Increasingly complicated structures cannot be managed from outside alone. The forces within these structures – and, importantly, workers and their trade unions as well as employers – have to have more responsibility for the results, which can be either economic, social or achievement of human aspirations.

Decent Work standards are an important tool for this process, which is based on expanding responsible democracy and the space for the social partners – workers and employers and their organizations – to fully participate in shaping the common future.

V. A. Tishkov¹

RUSSIAN MULTI-ETHNICITY IN THE WORLD CONTEXT

We do not know what path the world is following in terms of the evolution of cultural forms and systems: whether it is moving towards a unification or towards proliferation and complexity of diversity, but we do know that the complexity itself has become different. New trends and channels of cultural complexity have appeared, new technical and information resources that encourage the destruction of cultural norms or of a monoculture without mandatory marginalization of its carriers, phenomenon and concepts of cultural hybridity have evolved too. This process is global and probably irreversible in its nature. Those countries and regions will benefit that will find adequate political

responses, while those will lose which will step back. And if it is true, then we should treat socio-cultural nature of modern nations in a different way. It is the community of fellow-citizenships (multi-ethnic communities), rather than ethnic groups and religious communities that are the main generators of cultural capital in the modern era. They maintain, preserve and protect ethnic and cultural diversity in the country and even beyond its borders from internal and external threats, when it comes to the so-called compatriots or the ‘disunited peoples’.

Economic bases, educational and information institutions, law enforcement and legislation, agencies and public organizations, high (professional) culture, and much more, created by national communities are the key factors in maintaining ethnic, linguistic, religious and other distinctive cultural systems within national communities. In recent decades, international mechanisms were added to the protective factors, but they are also created by the representatives of the nation-states and live on their money contributions.

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What are modern nations like? In the Russian social science we have a methodological confusion and politicized debates on the issue. For a long time in Russia understanding of the nation has only existed in the ethnic sense, and it is still kept unchanged. Twenty years ago the new meaning and use of this category in its dual (civil-political and ethno-cultural) sense, the elements of which are not mutually exclusive,¹ was suggested, but only in recent years has it been recognized in Russia. Yet this recognition often has a laboured form to the extent of an intellectual schizophrenia. Ideological blabbing and conflict-provoking recipes (such as to establish extraterritorial 'national councils' for all ethnic nations, including the Russians, instead of the Federation with the ethno-territorial component acting subject to the Constitution)² are offered with admirable persistence, especially in the TV debates and on the Internet.

It might seem that Russia has all elements of 'national life' and national discourse, from economy and health / ill-health of the nation up to national projects and national sports teams, but the nation itself does not exist, and even to articulate its name is difficult for many people. One of the reasons for laboured recognition lies in the wrong understanding and perception of civil nations, it is as old-fashioned as the understanding of the Jacobins, or even of the American founding fathers. In their opinion, the ideal nation should consist of free citizens with equal rights who speak the same language, who are united and loyal to the state created by them. But the Jacobin ideal had never been realized, even in France itself, and the American national idea has undergone metamorphosis that have little to do with racial and ethnic realities. Laboured recognition of modern concepts of a nation is noticed in other countries too. In many countries, debates are being held on what should be called a nation, but the most common case is a refusal of the central government on behalf of the state to recognize ethnic or regional communities as nations.

But then what is a nation? It is a historical, cultural and socio-political entity in the context of the state education, it has a cultural complexity that diminishes during the period of political centralization and civil turmoil and regains its old and new-found diversity in the era of democratization, decolonization and mass migrations.

The same situation happens to the linguistic diversity in modern states, because language is still pretty toughly linked with ethnicity, especially in the Russian scientific and socio-political tradition. Russian scientists and experts still believe that a person should have his/her mother tongue, a language of 'one's own nationality', and that there can be only one national language. A reservation made by census takers during the census that 'native language may be different from the nationality' does not improve the situation in this case. In the usual sense language difficulty is existence of many languages in the world and variants of languages. Linguistic atlases and even 'Red Books' of languages endangered as living species have become commonplace in the humanities. Especially as language can be physically perceived through speech and texts better than ethnicity can be perceived through self-consciousness. The language as the most important means of communication encompasses interests of various human coalitions and institutions,

¹ V. A. Tishkov. *What Is Russia? (Perspectives of nation-building) // Issues of Philosophy*. 1995. No. 2.

² Popov G. H. *We Can Do Without 'The Sacred Cow' // Moskovsky Komsomolets*, 2011. June 10. P. 6.

because it ensures their solidarity and functioning. Without a common language modern armies can not exist, and state bureaucratic agencies also prefer to communicate in one official language. Religious institutions have a more flexible approach to language practice in their pastoral and missionary work. It is no mere chance that the pioneers who compiled national and linguistic atlases in the form of the famous 'Ethnologue' were religious institutions or organizations supported by Christian churches.

The traditional view on the situation with languages reduces itself to the fact that in the modern world under the influence of globalization languages disappear at a rapid pace. There are numerous speculations and loud political statements on the issue of the 'languages extinction' and entering endangered languages in the 'Red Books'. The UNESCO and the Council of Europe adopted Declarations and Charters on the preservation and protection of linguistic diversity. The most well-known international document in this area was European Charter of regional or minority languages adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Council of Europe in 1992 as a convention. Russian Federation joined the Charter in 2001, but has not ratified it yet. It would seem that due to globalization, the world is increasingly becoming monolingual. Such dominant languages as English, are taking over the world linguistic space more and more. But the world's linguistic situation and the situation with languages in different countries are more complex. This complexity is rooted in the following processes. Firstly, this is the erosion and mixture of language areas to the extent that no one would risk compiling linguistic atlases, as in the nineteenth century, or as it could be done with ethnicity and religion in the twentieth century. Secondly, it is universal complication of language repertoire of a modern man and spread of multilingualism among the population of many countries. Finally, there is a tendency to revitalize languages, i.e. languages return back to life after decades of dying and/or oblivion. Breton in France, Gaelic and Cornish in the UK, Hawaii in the United States are the examples.

We do not support the views of the advocates of the concept of 'languages extinction'. Despite the dramatic predictions of some scientists and politicians, linguistic diversity will be maintained, accompanied by a complication of language situations in modern nations and accompanied by the expansion of linguistic repertoire of individuals. In its turn, the state language policy will develop towards the recognition and support of multilingualism, including an official recognition at the state level and on the level of individual regions, and also areas of language attendance will become more complex. Bureaucracy and state service offices will speak the language of the taxpayers, and not vice versa. Multilingualism as a personal target and as a policy, alongside with the official mono- or bilingualism will increasingly be a norm of the language of communication among citizens of national communities. By the way, numerous Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Estonia and other countries will be able to improve their situation.

These estimates imply a few questions for science and politics. Firstly, how long outdated narrow understanding of a 'mother tongue' will remain in public practice, including Russian population census and, in general, what this demiurge category of a 'mother tongue' means? Is it the

'main language of knowledge and communication' (after Ozhegov), or is it 'the first language learned in childhood' (so-called mother tongue), or is it something else, for example the language of one's nationality, regardless how and by whom it is used? The Federal Law of 2001 on National Population Census requires, *inter alia*, to collect data on the 'native language', but what is it and how to do it is still unclear from the 2002 and 2010 censuses.

The second question that arises is in what way a modern state and its people are responsible for the unalterability of a language map of a country and for language learning space culture and information? In general, who is to solve and to supervise this question, including supervision and solution at the international level? There is no doubt that language speakers themselves and language users preserve and protect their language systems of communication, but some new dispositions appear at this point. Public activists, scientists, linguists and anthropologists, some international organizations with the targeted mission of safeguarding nonmaterial cultural diversity are concerned with the idea that the population should continue to speak as a hundred or two hundred years ago, and that this diversity should be preserved just like a variety of species in the wild nature. No wonder that a phenomenon of the 'red book' of languages has appeared, like a similar book on endangered species. There are people who pursue the policy of linguistic nationalism, believing that a sovereign state has the right to require a compulsory study of its public or official language from all its citizens. In this case there is no compromise for official bilingualism or multilingualism. It results in indirect violence and discrimination, and in some states of the former Soviet Union, this linguistic discrimination has a massive nature.

Thirdly, there is an issue of levelling linguistic diversity in the context of globalization, including modern economies, information systems and human behaviour. But there is also a problem of linguistic romanticism and linguistic nationalism, when the issue of a language becomes a means of restricting human and even civil rights, it becomes a mechanism of political pressure and manipulation, an element of geopolitical rivalries, including pressure on certain countries and societies. The real language usage and private strategies of people to some extent turned out to be hostages of romantic and politicized views on what a language is and what the language policy should be like. At the end of the twentieth century linguistic utopias and politicized recommendations were put into a practice by post-Soviet states and international organizations, including the UNESCO and the OSCE.

Nowadays, European countries (UK, Germany) have private funds with programs to support endangered languages or languages at risk of extinction. Projects and scientific research are conducted, in which Russian scientists are also involved. However, to what extent this concern and even a political mission complies with the identity of every country, its regions, and most importantly, with the interests and strategies of the people themselves? If we acknowledge the principle of cultural freedom, we should also recognize the right to a language shift (or assimilation), together with the right to preservation of a language, spoken by a certain population group (of ethnic, regional or migrant origin).

In this situation languages of the world cultural systems, which include Russian, English, Spanish and French, will

always be in a preferred position, even in terms of a formal equality of all languages. The explanation is quite simple: knowledge and usage of these languages provides more opportunities for success in life than the so-called minority languages. Therefore, the demand for 'linguistic parity' at the international level (a typical position is: 'We have that many Russian schools, and you have to have the same number of Ukrainian schools!') is not always fair and realistic, if we first and foremost consider needs and interests of people. This issue has its own 'double standards', not necessarily established by politicians. For example, a switch of a Russian émigré of Chuvash or Chechen origin to English or German in the country of emigration (the USA, the UK, Germany or Austria) is considered an acceptable norm of integration, while a similar process of switch to the Russian language by representatives of non-Russian nationalities in Russia can be interpreted by language nationalists and external monitors as a linguistic genocide or as a policy of forced assimilation.

For European countries, including the Baltic States and Eastern Europe, as well as for Russia and other CIS member countries, the issue of preserving linguistic diversity is of a particular importance, including its political perspectives. In Western European countries, the majority of population already knows two or more languages, but the issue of language policy in the EU is far from being settled. This is shown by the lingering process of ratification of the European Charter on regional or minority languages. Russia has formed its own position on this issue. By signing the Charter in May 2001, Russia considers the possibility of joining the Convention through its ratification. Russia is not the only state to postpone the ratification. In Russia there are special features that can prevent making a positive solution of the issue. These features are a huge variety of languages, unequal social and cultural development of Russian territories, and the undesirability of discussion of language topics on the political level in the potentially conflict regions. And at last, significant financial costs that will result from the ratification.

At the present stage language is not only a means of communication of certain population groups, but it is also an independent cultural value, to some extent even autonomous from its carriers, which, like any value, can be lost, but at the same time we are not talking about the physical extinction of humans or the 'disappearance of the people'. Switching to another language does not mean the loss of identity, that is, the awareness of belonging to a particular nation. Religion, emotional and spiritual liaison with the country and its culture, and other components of identity can serve as clamps for self-awareness. The problem of the autonomy of cultural values and their loss without affecting social life of people has grown even more acute in the era of globalization. However, many states are already aware that the cultural losses, such as the loss of non-dominant languages, are damaging the heritage of the present and future generations, create an atmosphere of frustration and degradation. Unfortunately, Russia has not yet learned to react properly to these modern challenges. Its legislation and law enforcement practice, as well as actions in the area of language policy are still based on the concept of 'a language of an ethnic group', 'national language' and they provoke debates about equality and discrimination of one groups over others. Meanwhile, we should rather

talk about differences in status and vulnerability of some languages over others.

As for the current situation in the key area of language education, the conditions for teaching the so-called native languages in Russia do meet international standards. However, in this sphere, governments' efforts should be more consistent. The same can be said about the situation with the media and with the practice of supporting cultural activities in different languages in Russia. The task of the Russian state is to ensure full compliance of study of the Russian language with state standards on the whole territory, and for all citizens. Simultaneously, the state, its regional bodies and local self-governing authorities, together with public organizations and private businesses should support the language requests of the citizens in education, justice, social services and information.

The most important role in the establishment of national identity and in the education of responsible citizens in modern states is allocated to a system of education, although the role of general cultural and informational environment and individual experience has been increasing too. Modern educational standard provides for the spiritual and moral development and education of a young man who is aware of belonging to a nation and who at the same time knows ethnic cultures and traditions of the peoples of Russia, and first of all, of his own people and region.¹ Legal guarantees for such policies were enshrined in the Federal Law 'On education', 1992. Article 2 calls 'humanistic nature of education, priority of human values, life and health, free development of a person above all other principles of the state policy in education. Teaching civic consciousness, hard work, respect for human rights and freedoms, love of nature, home, family ... Protection and development of the education system of national cultures, regional cultural traditions and features in a multi-ethnic state'. Subject to this law, citizens of the Russian Federation shall have the right to receive basic general education in their native language as well as the right to choose the language of education pursuant to possibilities offered by the system of education.

These provisions have appeared to be sufficient for a long time on the level of federal legislation. However, on the level of regional law-making in the field of education serious problems have arisen. Through the 'national-regional' component ethnocentric version of history of the so-called titular nations was taught. The Russian youth was receiving inadequate knowledge of Russian history and the Russian language, which weakened their competitive abilities.² In late 2007 and in 2009 new amendments to the Law on Education were adopted, which made a regional component of education supervised by the federal government, and they expanded opportunities for the schools themselves to enjoy the variability in the choice of programs and subjects. In response to the concerns of local ethnic elites, it was emphasized that the reform of the educational standards created more chances to accommodate the needs of different ethnic and cultural groups living in those regions and republics. Despite these significant

amendments, the problem of multicultural education and education in the regions with mixed population in the whole country remains unsolved. For example, Russia still does not have textbooks that would teach multicultural nature of the Russian people and the contribution of representatives of different nationalities to the history of the country. In the country two extreme points of view on the past face each other: an old Russian-centred one and a new ethno-nationalist version, which causes tension and intolerance between students of different nationalities.

Once, a number of multi-ethnic countries and the EU member countries made an audit of the national versions of history in favour of a more inclusive and multicultural samples, as well as in favour of withdrawing the enemy image in the face of other peoples and nations. The problem of the canon (standard) in the field of history education became a part of the global agenda of the international intellectual community.³ Nowadays Russia is making steps to create a more objective and less conflict-causing versions of the past, too, it is done at the level of the bilateral commission of historians with the countries of the former Soviet Union, Finland, Germany and Poland. This is the part of the democratization of intellectual and educational space of Russia and some other countries.

Fundamental constitutional and legal principle of separation of federal and local self-government in Russia remains rather an ideological intention, than an institutional fact. In multi-ethnic states with elements of ethnic federalism it is impossible to consider 'local government' only in its constitutional and legal definitions, that is, in relation to the level below the federal subjects, namely regions. Even if republics in the Constitution of the Russian Federation are defined as 'states' and their sovereignty is a part of a federal sovereignty, it is them that constitute one of the main focal point of the problems of self-government in local communities, because the territories of the republics and autonomous areas are territories of residence of culturally distinct local communities that may differ from the rest of the population in those areas. The majority of Russian regions and provinces have a complex ethnic composition. In this situation, federalism should be combined with a strong local self-government. Through expansion of rights, resources and initiatives of local community many of the problems of international relations can be solved, and the task of preserving cultural traditions and identity can be solved too.

Firstly, the nature and cultural dependence of the formation of territorial communities, as well as their constant dynamics. Territorial forms of local government are closely related to that. How is formed what can be called a 'local community' in historic and socio-cultural aspects? Is it possible to determine a membership in the local community on formal grounds of permanent residence or other people should also be included there, such as those who abandoned rural life or even went abroad, but, having resources and a certain capital, having interests, still keep exercising authority over the community and determining a lot in its life, including participation in its life (through sponsorship, cultural activities, political mobilization in the support of native(s) of this community, criminal relations and actions, etc.)? What is the current local community like today, if a large part of the funds to support its members,

¹ Danyluk A. Y., Kondakov A. M., Tishkov V. A. The Concept of Spiritual and Moral Development and Education of a Citizen of Russia // *Narodnoye Obrazovaniye*. Moscow, 2010. No. 1. Pp. 39–46.

² Analysis of the situation in the regions, see: *Ethnic And Cultural Education. Methods of Social Orientation of the Russian School* / ed. V. V. Stepanov. Moscow: Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010.

³ Tishkov V. A. *The New Historical Culture*. Voronezh, 2011.

comes from those who are linked with that community, but do not physically reside in it?

Secondly, the issue of the boundaries of local communities and/or municipalities is also related to the topic. It is obvious that these are different boundaries, and administrative boundaries will never coincide with cultural boundaries and boundaries of local economic systems. What defines the boundaries of local entities in a real Russian practice? We believe that the Soviet system of local administrative division still is enacted there. If something new has appeared, it is a Russian sort of American gerrymandering, that is, the boundaries of rural or urban areas can be changed only on the basis of political considerations, because administrative boundaries are associated with electoral districts. The question arises, how the remaining Soviet system of not only local, but of the Republican-regional administrative division has been justified and what 'ideal' principles for determining the territorial grounds of local self-government can oppose it.

Modern anthropology of local community states that they originate under the influence of internal and external factors that have a dynamic relationship. The thing that thirty to fifty years ago seemed and really turned out a real violence in making and defining boundaries of local communities, now is becoming a part of identity and deep affection of their members, that is, it seems a historical norm, and even a 'tradition'. In other words, adaptive abilities of modern people are quite broad, not only can they spontaneously define territorial boundaries of the local communities, but they can also adapt to external regulations, even if these regulations did not take into account local needs. For every new generation the boundaries of a local community are the radius of the local roads which in their youth they could reach by bicycle or motorbike in order to go to a disco or a walk with a girl. It should be also noted that the space mastered by a man in his everyday life is rather expanding than narrowing, it is encouraged, first and foremost, by improving transport and road vehicles.

Undoubtedly, in this area of social life some group (ethnic) boundaries can be preserved and they can manifest themselves, these boundaries, for all their initial mental nature, may acquire geographic parameters. The representatives of some ethnic communities (or better say, of economic and cultural systems) for a long time could occupy a certain space for living and use other territories for their business activities. Sometimes, representatives of two different cultures might use different resource niches in the same territory and reside separately or mingled (villages/ auls separately, but larger settlement mingled). The spatial parameters of ethnic communities are preserved in modern life, especially in the countryside and in some small towns (in Russian cities there are no 'ethnic neighbourhoods' yet). From all of this the image of 'small country' is resulted, and sometimes inter-group rivalry and even open conflict evolve on these grounds.

Thirdly, to what extent ethnic and cultural factor may serve as the basis for determining the boundaries of local communities? Naturally, it can serve as the basis for rural communities, because cultural homogeneity of residential areas is determined not only by a long-dated history, but also by modern human strategies: convenience of linguistic communication, similarity of economic life-support systems, everyday norms, values, ritual life, etc. The value

of cultural particularity does not disappear together with modernization and levelling of economy and life under the influence of market and popular culture. The variety of local communities will not disappear, but its symbolic value (as one of a form of human identity) may even increase.

So, ethno-cultural factor should be recognized among the priority ones in determining the boundaries of local communities, and preservation of local cultural diversity is one of the tasks for the local self-government and for federal policy in respect to local communities. But how far can cultural determinism go in this matter, if we have already noted high adaptability and mobility of human groups? Some public activists and ethnologists speak in favour of a system of a certain local cantonization of culturally complex communities and in favour of the organization of local communities and organizations of settlements on the ethnic principle. This principle is offered for Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kabardino-Balkaria and other regions of the Russian Federation. The argument in favour of this principle is the necessity for protection and proper representation of small ethnic groups in larger multi-ethnic communities, the idea of peaceful stability of ethnically homogeneous populations also counts in its favour. There are serious doubts about this argument, but it is clear that this issue deserves discussion. Moreover, the cultural basis of the territorial boundaries of local communities is not just a problem of the North Caucasus or republics, but of the whole country, because local cultural diversity is in the evidence and proliferates everywhere, although outside observers may not notice it. The local residents can and probably should assess this value themselves. But to what extent this factor is primary in order to serve as the basis to take a decision on the boundaries, and to what extent the decision is really taken as a result of free will, and not as manipulations of 'ethnic entrepreneurs' and of local intellectuals fooled by quasi-scientific texts?

Fourthly, the analysis of the jurisprudential and political science literature raises another fundamental issue: to what extent a unified category of 'local community' is justified for rural and urban entities? For the territory of Alaska or Moscow with its suburbs such a division does not have a fundamental nature (in either area there are no villages). But in Russia, the dichotomy of rural and urban areas has a complex nature, and life in the city and in the countryside and nature of urban and rural authorities are significantly different.

Analysis of the daily life and the meaning of the authorities for urban and rural residents will help to clarify these differences and, therefore, will clarify the need for distinctions in the legal norms and administration, to say nothing of the prospect of categorization of two different classes of social phenomena: the urban and rural (self-) management. Here, we can not ignore the question of existence of mixed municipal communities in Russia with urban and rural areas combined. According to field studies,¹ in this case we are dealing with an administrative 'slink' of personalistic rivalries of authorities and businesses, and the land is becoming a resource for survival and security as in the days of warring tribal groups.

¹ Social Anthropology of the Modern Russian City: Results of Field Studies / ed. V. A. Tishkov. M., 2010, Small Towns In Modern Russia: Preliminary Results Of Field Studies / ed. V. A. Tishkov. Moscow, 2010.

Fifthly, the current level of analysis and common understanding ignores the informal side of the nature of authorities. Rural (village) municipal officials keep spending half of their time in the red-taping offices of district municipalities. One 'local authority' is actually in complete subjection to another 'local authority'. What are the grounds of this daily subordination and dependence, which are not spelled out in the Constitution, laws and decrees? It seems that in some areas the present administrations of districts have completely subdued the authorities of villages, towns and townships, and the latter is an artificial entity or a tool

to perform other functions. But what kind of functions? In any case, in Russia there is a gap between the claimed reality (laws, regulations, decisions, polls, etc.) and the practice of everyday life, built on informal relations, tough dependencies, personal or corporate interests, etc., which make the final assessment of local government far less optimistic. We must admit that in modern Russia many political, ideological and cultural bases of local self-government are absent, and in some Russian regions, there are no normal bases for the functioning of the local government in general.

M. L. Titarenko¹

RUSSIAN SINOLOGY AS A FACTOR FOR DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

1. Sinology in Russia dates back to the establishment of Russian ecclesiastical mission in China, founded under the auspices of the Russian Emperor Peter the Great and the Chinese Emperor Kangxi in 1711. Thus, Sinology has systematically been performed for 300 years. At present Russian Sinology includes about 1500 experts of various fields of research – linguists, economics, historians, philosophers, political analysts, archaeologists, mathematicians, astronomers. Within these 3 centuries Russian scholars have contributed greatly to the objective and overall study of China, and have promoted among the people data on its history and achievements in economics, science, culture, fine arts of this neighbouring country. A typical feature of Russian Sinology is a deep respectful attitude towards the history and traditions of the Chinese.

2. The 18th – 19th centuries were the period of establishment and rise of Russian Sinology. The main fields of research at that period were study of the Chinese language, Chinese culture, traditions, history and promotion of business trading and economic contacts between Russia and China. In the middle of the 19th century the efforts of prominent Russian scholars such as Bichurin N.Y., Vasiliev V.P., and Georgievsky S.M., of metropolitan Kafarov (Pallady) resulted in establishing a specifically Russian school of Sinology, whose key feature is a complex approach to the object of studies, with special emphasis on the primary source of information. The first step of the studies was to compile a dictionary of the Chinese language and studies of moral norms of the Chinese people (Rassokhin, Leontiev, 18th century). The first translation of Chinese primary source of information into Russian was 'The Three Characters Canon' – 'San-tsy-tsin' – 'Code of Moral Practice'.

3. The founder of the golden academic traditions of Russian Sinology was a distinguished sinologist N.Y. Bichurin (in monasticism – Hyacinth), the author of a

great number of unique books on history, ethnical studies, economics, philosophy, literature of China, all of them still have their educational value at present. He was the compiler of the most complete dictionary of the Chinese language and the author of transcription of the Chinese language that most adequately conveys the soundscape of the Beijing dialect of Chinese and is in use nowadays in Russia.

4. It is notable that the ideas of Russian Sinology of the 19th century seriously contradicted the official policy of the tsarist governments. For example, Russian sinologists sympathized with the Taiping Rebellion, criticized the participation of Russia in the suppression of the Boxer Uprising or Yihetuan Movement and expansionist operations of the tsarist government in respect to China.

The history of Russian Sinology of the 19th century also involves such outstanding scholars, successors of Bichurin, as V.P. Vasiliev, S.M. Georgievsky, Skachkov, Popov, Kafarov. Kafarov and Popov made a great contribution, they prepared and published a unique encyclopaedic dictionary of the Chinese language in two volumes.

A salient achievement of that period was 'The History of Chinese Literature' written by professor V.P. Vasiliev, translation of classical writers of Chinese philosophy – Confucius, Mencius, Hang Feizi and others. This period also commenced the studies of Chinese religion, especially Buddhism.

In the 80s of the 19th century V.P. Vasiliev's follower, S.M. Georgievsky issued fundamental works 'Importance of Sinology' and 'Principles of Chinese Life' that were called 'the best book on Chinese ideology' by a soviet sinologist A.A. Petrov. In his works Georgievsky was the first to criticize the thesis of 'historical stagnation of China', an Hegel's thesis that China is 'on the lowest level of self-cognition of world spirit', as well as Kant's claim that 'the Celestial Empire is on a very low stage of development'.

5. In the first half of the 20th century Sinology in Russia was closely connected with a profound interest of Russian public in the life of people in the neighbouring country, their self-sacrificing fight for independence, social progress and opposition to Japanese aggression. The tribute of Russian sinologists was that their knowledge and experience became the source of directing the governmental policy to China, the policy of outspoken support of Chinese fight for independence and their liberation. The embodiment of this policy was issue of a collection of works 'China' in

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1940, edited by academician V.M. Alekseev, that provided encyclopaedic data on all fundamental aspects of Chinese life – from archaeology and history to philosophy and essays on anti-Japanese war progress.

6. Since the beginning of the movement on 4 May, 1919, and during the anti-Japanese war extensive contacts evolved between the best figures of Chinese and Soviet intelligentsia, a full-fledged cultural dialogue between Russian and Chinese civilizations began. Its outstanding representatives from the Chinese party were writers and politicians Lu Xun, Qu Qiubai, Mao Dun, Guo Moruo, Lao She, philosophers Yan San Zhen and Hou Wailu, the singer of Beijing opera Mai Lanfang and others, while representatives of the Russian party were the writers Gorky, Mayakovsky, Ostrovsky, Fadeyev, Simonov and sinologists academician V.M. Alekseev, journalist Rogov, S.L. Tikhvinsky, Fedorenko and many other Russian sinologists - diplomatists Panyushkin, A.A. Petrov and other prominent figures of Russian culture. It was this dialogue between Russian and Chinese cultures that promoted openness of Chinese culture and became a mighty instrument of exchanges and mutual education.

7. In the middle of the 20th century after the People's Republic of China had been formed, Sinology in the USSR got a powerful boost. At that time thousands of Chinese students were educated in Soviet universities and Russian students went to study in China. Thus a dialogue between country experts and Russianists established. It should be pointed out that in the complex and dramatic years of China's development related to the so-called great 'proletarian revolution', among the basic tendencies of Russian Sinology remained thorough complex study of Chinese cultural history, the Chinese language, history of the Communist Party of China and foreign policy of the People's Republic of China. In the 1970s a textbook was published on the history of China. At the same time a number of books were published on the history of revolutionary movement in the 1920s–1940s in the People's Republic of China, history of the Communist Party of China, study of the ideas of Kang Youwei, translation of the legists' work 'Shàngshū', as well as translations of Mao Zedong, Pyn Bai, Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao, Qu Qiubai, Liu Shaoqi, Chen Yun and others, research on philosophy works of Laozi, Confucius, Mo Di and his followers, Shang Yang, Han Feizi, Zhuangzi, Xunzi. In Ulan-Ude a school of Chán Buddhism and Tibetan Lamaism study was established.

In 1972-1973 two more volumes were published – 'Anthology of Ancient Chinese Philosophy' and 'Anthology of Philosophy of the Han Dynasty'. This period also witnessed translation and study of the works of Sun Yat-sen performed by the academician S.L. Tikhvinsky, and 'Anthology of Philosophy of China in the 19th century', an intensive preparatory work on the Great Chinese-Russian Dictionary in 4 volumes was done. This achievement was rewarded with the State Prize. In the 20th century plenty of translations of classical authors of Chinese fictional literature and poetry were published in the USSR: Qu Yuan, Bai Juyi, Li Bo, Li Jingzhao, Tao Yuanming, short stories by Pu Songling, novels 'Romance of the Three Kingdoms', 'Dream of the Red Chamber', 'Water Margin', 'Journey to the West', collections of Chinese fairy-tale, myths, ancient legends, proverbs and so on.

The Institute for Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR regularly held multi-topical and days-long scientific conferences on the topic 'The State and Society in China'. The Institute of the Far East of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR held a variety of scientific conferences on economics, culture, history of modern China. At the end of the 1980s the Institute of the Far East opened the way to traditional international conferences under the general name 'China, Chinese Civilization and the World' that keep going up to the present. In 2011 such a conference covered the theme 'Centenarian Way of China to Progress and Modernization' (devoted to the 100th anniversary of The Xinhai Revolution). At this conference more than 100 papers were presented.

8. Modern astonishing propel of China started by the enforcement of the policy of reforms and openness at the end of the 1970s. Russian sinologists published hundreds of works and scientific reports devoted to various aspects of China's development, over 100 works were published that cover different issues of attempts of Chinese reforms and the policy of openness, including the series of works on development of Chinese industry, agriculture, transport, legal enforcements of the policy of reforms and investments climate, place and influence of Chinese economy in the world economy, as well as multiple works on Soviet-Chinese relationships.

At the same time distinguished Russian sinologist R.V. Vyatkin translated a many-volume work of Sima Qian 'Historical Notes' ('Shiji'). In 1994 Russian sinologists published an experimental unique work – 'An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Chinese Philosophy' that opened the way to a 15-year-long research that resulted in publication of a 6-volume encyclopaedia 'Spiritual Culture of China'. This work was awarded the State Prize in 2010. Following the example of the British sinologist Needham, this encyclopaedia gives a comprehensive picture of the history of establishment and evolution of the 5-millennium spiritual life of China, the origins of viability and self-renewal of the great culture of the great nation are revealed.

A noteworthy fact is that during the years of 'cultural revolution' in China the USSR started publishing the Anthology of Chinese Classical Literature in 40 volumes. Before the Soviet Union had collapsed, 15 volumes were published that included translations of writings by Guo Moruo, Mao Dun, Lao She, Ba Jin, Ding Ling, Zhao Shuli, Ai Qing, as well as classical novels. This publication covers all 3-thousand-years-old Chinese literature. I am proud to inform the participants of the congress that *all basic literary, artistic and historic classics of Chinese literature have been translated into Russian.*

9. Russian sinologists consider that the backbone and methodological basis of establishment of Chinese civilization and Chinese spirituality is Chinese philosophy: the concept of changes and interactions of five elements and the concept of opposite forces of yin-yang interaction, as well as the doctrine of humanism, wise governing, ethical basis for relations in the society and family, of forms of cognition, of ways of 'Tao' and 'De' and relations of a human and nature, theory of harmony and prosperity. Many of these ideas are still weighty, for example the concept of 'xiaokang', of the five elements, of 'yin-yang' and so on. That is why, as it was shown above, Russian sinologists

have always paid a special attention to studies of Chinese philosophical and spiritual culture monuments.

It is safe to say that the majority of classical works of the pre-Qing Dynasty period, as well as philosophical writings of thinkers of the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing Dynasties as well as of modern China have been translated into Russian.

10. The outlined genuine dialogue between Russian and Chinese civilizations promoted rise of profound interest in Russia to Chinese culture and its experience of spiritual and physical perfection. In the recent years in almost 100 universities and institutes of Russia the departments and schools for Sinology have been established. A great many of secondary schools and lyceums have appeared where Chinese recreational practices as Qigong, Taijiquan, Kung fu and others are taught.

Nowadays in Russia more than 20 large centres of modern Sinology are functioning. The leading among them is the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, in which over 100 research fellows-sinologists conduct a comprehensive studies of history, economics, politics, culture, philosophy of China. Within 50 years of its activities, the Institute has arranged the publication of more than 500 fundamental works on Chinese culture, history, economics, politics and philosophy.

Under the guidance of Academician S.L. Tikhvinsky 11 volumes of documents on the history of Russian-Chinese relations since 1686 and up to the present were published. The work on the publication of these documents is continuing. Thousands of important documents were translated from Classical Chinese language wényán, Manchu, Tibetan, Old Mongolian and these works were commented upon. A tremendous work has been done. Now under the direction of academician S.L. Tikhvinsky our staff together with fellows from other Sinology centres of Russia are accomplishing the fundamental 10-volume work 'General History of China from ancient times to the present day', which aims to comply with the huge interest of the Russian public to the history of our great neighbour.

With the support of our German and Chinese friends Russian sinologists in the late 90s of the last century and early 21st century, published a unique seven-volume work, 'the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks), the Comintern and China', which reveals a huge range of top-secret documents from the archives of the Politburo of the Communist Party and the Comintern. Chief editors and contributors of this edition are professors of the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences M.L. Titarenko, A.M. Grigorev, A.I. Kortunova, K.V. Shevelev and professor of the Freie Universität of Berlin Go Heyyuy, M. Leytner, Professor of Humboldt University R. Felber. The publication of these documents made it possible to clarify many obscure points in the history of the Chinese revolution, the history of Soviet Chinese relations and international relations in the Far East in general.

Based on the study of the 400-year history of bilateral relations, Russian scientists have come to the conclusion that the vital national interests of Russia and China are not in conflict, they often coincide or evolve in parallel. Our countries can commonly develop the economy, mutually enrich cultures, support each other on the international

arena. Transition of relations between Russia and China at the level of comprehensive strategic cooperation and partnership trust creates the conditions for the further development and the rise of Russian Sinology, backed by the close cooperation between scientists of the two countries.

Russia highly appreciates the role performed by the Chinese specialists in Russian philology in promoting mutual understanding between our countries. Russian scientists support strong relations with relevant Chinese institutions and universities. Our cooperation in the field of science, following the spirit of the time, is moving to a new phase of large mutual projects. The Russian-Chinese Center for Economics and Foreign Policy was established by the Institute of the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Tsinghua University (with professor Wang Qi as co-director of the Chinese party). The centre for the study of cross-border cooperation between Russia and China at Jilin University in Changchun (co-director of the Centre Prof. Zhu Syanpin) is successfully operating. We highly appreciate the efforts of Russian studies experts of Sichuan University of Foreign Languages, which in 2010 held the first international scientific conference 'The Russian Sinology'. Chinese counterparts in Sichuan University have made the translation of the six-volume encyclopaedia 'Spiritual Culture of China'.

Sinology in Russia and Russian studies in China are two processes that synergistically influence each other, that enhance mutual understanding and mutually beneficial cooperation between our countries and peoples.

The main conclusion that arises after the examination of voluminous documents on the long history of Russian-Chinese relations, is the thesis that our people have over the years sought to find a mutually acceptable basis and mutually beneficial norms of peaceful coexistence, platform for cooperation, good neighbourliness and friendly interaction. Of course, this age-old stories, unfortunately, witnessed both dramatic periods and 'bitter pages'. But not all of them have served as the main driving trend. Study of China by Russian sinologists builds a strong base for the formation of the comprehensive trust and partnership between the two countries in order to maintain a constructive dialogue between civilizations. Interest in contemporary China in Russia is largely due to the fact that our countries share common or similar strategic interests. Both Russia and China follow the path of modernization and rise.

This harmony of interests was well described by President Putin, who said that the challenge of Russia is 'to catch the wind of Chinese reform in Russian sails' in order to stimulate the comprehensive modernization of our country. 'Russia,' as V.V. Putin claimed, 'wants to see a thriving China. We believe that China has a similar desire to see Russia as a mighty and prosperous country.'

11. One of the challenges facing Russian Sinology, is to turn the knowledge of China's history, its tradition to the basis for understanding the attempts of China's reform and its policy of peaceful development and rise.

Our studies have shown that the developing Russian Eurasian identity is in many ways close to the Confucian cultural development approaches. We researched special features and spiritual culture of China and found out that the thesis of 'harmony without the imposing unity' (he er

bu tong), and the dialectics of development 'On merging the two differences into a single unit' (he er er i) and 'splitting of the unity' (i feng wei er) have always been important in the history of Chinese culture.

Russian sinologists in their studies endeavour to create the most favourable prerequisites for mutual understanding and trust between the two nations. In this regard, we often found ourselves under serious the pressure of public opinion, when in Russia of the 80–90s 'the concept of fear' became widespread, the so-called prediction of the inevitable decline and disintegration of China, as well as the concept of a certain 'Chinese threat'. Russian scientists in their research found evidences and objectively demonstrated the failure of these claims.

Russian scientists have developed their own forecasts, which were based on a positive assessment of the prospects for a long-term sustainable growth of Chinese economy, as well as on recognition of China's interest in carrying out the policy of peace and good neighbourliness.

The work by B.N. Kuzyk and M.L. Titarenko, published in 2006, 'China–Russia 2050: strategy of co-development' reveals common interests and aspirations of Russia and China to build a society of justice based on the strategy of co-development. This theory of Russian sinologists has served as an academic basis for political decisions to create mutual programmes for propelling Siberia and the Far East and the Chinese Tungpei.

In this respect, we in Russia are carefully studying the attempt of the modern policy reforms and openness. Russian sinologists have different points of view, but the dominant point remains the one of the exceptional value of China's experience and its international significance.

For the Russian public, the successful experience and lessons of inter-civilizational dialogue and intercultural exchanges between China and Russia play a crucial role in order to form and strengthen the Eurasian identity of Russian civilization and to resist attempts to emasculate Russian cultural identity by means of Westernization.

P. P. Tolochko¹

EMPIRES AS PEAKS OF THE WORLD'S CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 provoked great triumph among the so called democratic public throughout the whole world and on a nation-wide scale. At that time it was a widely spread belief that the disappearance of the last empire from the historical arena would result in greater justice in the structuring of the world. At the same time, political propaganda began to equate the very notion of empire with something not quite natural in the development of world history.

Probably, barbarians who crushed the ancient Rome and European crusaders who swept away Byzantium were euphoric in a similar way. It is not altogether excluded that both stuck to the belief that they had served good cause, but in fact in both cases the historical development was seriously hampered and irreparably damaged.

The important point here is that at any time empires not only presented natural stages in the development of states but were inherently progressive and allowed mankind to reach the highest points of cultural evolution. This is not to say that the worlds that evolved through empires were the worlds of general welfare. All the empires were powerful military and bureaucratic structures that pursued the policies of expansion with regard to other countries and people and that continued to exist through harsh exploitation of their subjects both in colonial periphery and in metropolitan

countries. Naturally enough, empires did not win much love or respect among conquered people, but they constituted those state structures that allowed to accumulate economic resources of big territorial expanses and direct those resources towards cultural development in the broadest sense of this notion. It is no chance that over time a big number of empires evolved into civilizations.

Quite illustrative in this respect is antiquity that laid out the foundation of modern European civilization. Nowadays, people admire the Acropolis of Athens and the Coliseum of Rome without giving much thought to all the sweat and blood of slaves that they contain. Greece and Rome were powerful slave-owning empires of antiquity that conquered great territorial expanses. Greece commanded the basins of two seas – the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, while the territories of Rome extended up to the Atlantic Ocean. Life resources on those territories were directed to the metropolitan states where they were materialized in palaces and temples, objects of art, schools, in the well-developed infrastructure.

However, though Greece and Rome were parasitic in relation to conquered people, they both took from those people and gave to them. Conquered regions became involved in one integrated socio-economic and military-political system; they also acquired the cultural colours of their empires. This certainly applies to provincial versions of Greek and Roman cultures, but even in that case the population of subject territories could benefit a lot. To a certain extent, if one could put it so, barbarians became Greeks and Romans. It was no chance that those people who had got into the imperial orbit of ancient states were subsequently ahead in their development of their neighbours who hadn't been conquered by and subject to empires.

What is said above about Greece and Rome also holds true for the empires of the Dark Ages. Quite well known is the significance of cultural and historical mission of the Byzantine Empire that acquired the legacy of ancient

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civilizations. Byzantium united many European and Asian nations and was the most highly developed country in the medieval world. Undoubtedly, it was a Christian-Orthodox civilization.

The Byzantine commonwealth of nations incorporated Kievan Rus' as its integral part. Kievan Rus' was also an empire and it also had an important historical and cultural mission over the vast territories of Eastern Europe. Owing to Kievan Rus', many nations (including Finno-Ugric peoples in the North-East and Turkic peoples in the South) joined the Christian tradition in its Byzantine-Russian Orthodox version and, ultimately, contributed to the shaping of the Russian cultural space.

The most important prerequisite for economic and cultural development of the countries of Medieval Europe was the formation of the Holy Roman Empire.

The holders of the imperial status in new times have included Great Britain, France, Austria, Russia, Turkey and some other countries. Historical studies of the formation, development and decline of these empires treat them from the perspective of humanism and justice, point out their authoritarian and exploitative nature, reveal their chauvinistic essence in relation to conquered people. Some of the mentioned empires were rated rather low along the scale of evaluation. Especially targeted in this respect was Russia that was defined as 'prison for the nations' and the Soviet Union as Russia's successor that was labelled as 'evil empire'.

Both definitions of Russia were far from actual reality. They were mere products of ideology and attempts of the Western propaganda to tarnish their rival and in this way to make the rival weaker. During Ronald Reagan's presidency, who could presumably be credited with the invention of one of the mentioned epithets, the Soviet Union which at that time was in the period of stagnation could by no means be characterized as an evil empire. This definition applied more to the United States. It is the USA that bears responsibility for the extermination of Indian indigenous peoples of North America. At the same time, no minority people got extinguished either in Russia or in the Soviet Union. And, finally, it is they, not Russia, that have been engaged in permanent wars in different regions of the world.¹

What has been said could hardly provide sufficient ground for either idealizing or demonizing the imperial way of development. It should not be disregarded that the formation of empires always involves violence. To a greater or lesser extent, the stronger always dominates the weaker without giving much consideration to their life interests or traditions. In new times the power of European empires (those of Spain, Great Britain, France, etc.) spread over the peoples of Africa, Indochina, South and North America. Frequently enough, that involved tragic consequences for the local population, as was the case with peoples and cultures of South and North America. By spreading their power over other continents European countries ensured the flow of riches and wealth to their own home states, which enabled rapid development of their science, technology and culture.

In a similar way, Russia also developed high rates of growth, which was in no small measure facilitated by Russia's possession of vast territories and natural resources in Asia. One could recall Mikhail Lomonosov's prophecy that Russia's power would grow with Siberia.

¹ The American writer Gore Vidal sarcastically called these US wars 'perpetual wars for perpetual peace'.

Is this good or bad? Most probably, both. It could hardly make much sense to talk about the possibility of other better alternatives. There is no subjunctive mood in history. Facts will always be facts, and we can only analyze what actually happened. From the perspective of benefits for civilization, it should be admitted that it was the imperial path of development which ensured maximal progress for mankind. Sufficient confirmation for that is provided by such imperial (and civilizational) symbols of new times as the Louvre, the State Hermitage, palaces and cathedrals of St. Petersburg, Paris, Vienna, Budapest, London and other cities. All these places embody the highest achievements in architecture and art.

Similar to the way it happened in the remote past, in new times it was not only metropolitan states that had benefits. A good deal of benefits went also to the empire's periphery. Periphery became involved in legal relations of the European type, acquired socially structured communities and its own officialdom. In a number of cases periphery joined the European Christian tradition in religion and civilization. It was by no chance that after the crash of classical imperial and colonial system many peoples of Asia, Africa and South America were prepared for independent political and state self-development.

Naturally, Russia and the Soviet Union as its successor were no exceptions to this general rule. Critics of these imperial state structures, who had done a good deal towards the split of the 'last empire', called the Soviet Union an unnatural totalitarian and economically ineffective formation in which Russia's main occupation was exploitation and suppression of national periphery and at the same time preserving the latter's colonial status.

Some of these statements are true, but on the whole the evil image of the Soviet Union that was being instilled into the minds of people had little to do with actual reality. It was this imperial state that turned out to be capable of creating powerful industry, advanced science, highly developed culture, that could offer resistance to and win a victory over German fascism in a deadly combat and that was the first to send man into space. All that most certainly required great efforts of the whole society, which was impossible without tough centralization of management system and economic separateness that was the same over the whole state territory.

Unlike many other empires, the Soviet Union did not actually have a metropolitan centre and a colonial periphery. Allegations to the opposite come from ideological propaganda. Industrialization equally involved all the regions of the country. In some national republics, such as, for example, the Ukraine the level of development of industry and agriculture was even higher than in Russia. After the collapse of the Soviet Union the Ukraine, as stated by many foreign experts, was among ten most developed European countries.²

All the Soviet republics were nation-state structures that had their own management personnel, national scientific and creative intelligentsia, that had clearly defined administrative borders. The collapse of the Soviet Union made all these republics sovereign states overnight, and all these states emerged on the same national territory and had the same national administration. The First Secretaries of the central

² Currently, the level of Ukraine's cumulative manufacturing potential does not exceed 70 per cent of the level reached in 1990.

committees of the communist parties easily transformed into Presidents of sovereign states.

There is a question which arises in this connection. If empire-states evolve naturally throughout the development of mankind and, moreover, demonstrate their high cultural and historical efficiency, why should they regularly get crashed? The answer to this question is both simple and complex.

The answer is simple if one considers the general laws of dialectics. There is nothing permanent in this world, and the form of the state organization of society could not be permanent either. Its life period is predetermined by a variety of factors of both external and internal nature.

External factors are those that come from counter-balance with other imperial formations that seek to get rid of their rival. In old times that happened through wars, nowadays – through wars and ideological subversion. An illustrative example of this in our time could be the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is most certain that the country did not die a natural death. There was assistance in bringing this death about that came from the outside and that involved – among others – the USA. This was acknowledged in the words of Secretary of State J. F. Dulles and President B. Clinton. It is known that the first suggested – for the purpose of degenerating the Soviet Union – cultivating nationalism in the country, hate towards Russian people, bringing about mess and chaos, whereas the latter took stock of the job done and said that through loosening the ideological foundations of the USSR they succeeded, without bloodshed, in withdrawing from the battle for world supremacy a state that had been America's main rival. It is most astonishing that imperial Russia, subsequently transformed into the USSR, that had gone through hot wars with the Entente Alliance and had won a victory over Hitler Germany, was not able to withstand cold ideological war.

Internal factors include natural ageing of imperial systems that are undermined – among other things – by eternal reflections of intellectual élite over the question of rationality of the existing state organization. As a rule, their opposition and dissatisfaction was always sympathized with, and found material support from rival countries. Frequently enough, this kind of cooperation led to revolutions that crushed empires. That was the case with Tsarist Russia and Kaiser Austria-Hungary. It should be mentioned, though, that the 'new world' quickly turned out to be no better than the 'old' one and that there was no proverbial liberation of peoples from imperial tyranny. The end of it all was no more than a rather banal change of the ruling élite.¹

Now let us try to explain why the answer to the mentioned question is complex. The main difficulty seems to come from the fact that in real life it was empires, not imperial ideas, that got crushed. In fact, the imperial phenomenon never left the historical arena. On getting crushed in one region it developed again in another one. In many cases one imperial system was followed by another, practically on the same territory. That was the case with the Ottoman Muslim Empire that replaced the Byzantine Orthodox Empire. A more illustrative example is provided by the history of our own country where the communist Soviet Union superseded the capitalist Russian empire

¹ The ideological war against Russia is still going on. Western states and the USA provide financial support for hundreds of institutions in Russia that under the guise of struggle for democracy in fact undermine the state unity of the country.

preserving at the same time practically the whole territorial legacy of the latter.

The subjective factor is certainly least important in everything that happened. Of much greater significance here were objective laws. As soon as it was prompted by accumulated human experience that there was no progressive development when people were disintegrated the establishment of big state structures became a must. It was so in the past, it is so in the present. All the speculations about the collapse of the 'last empire' which was the Soviet Union are no more than self-righteousness, especially when this kind of talk comes from American and West-European statesmen and ideologists. The fact is that they themselves come from empires.

The definition of an empire applies naturally to the USA, the most powerful country in the world. Just like Great Britain in previous times, the USA today rule over oceans and seas. And one could also say that on their subject territories, too, the sun is always up. The European Union is also quite an imperial formation which has supranational administrative bodies, a unified monetary system, unified armed forces and a military block called NATO. There is hardly any need to provide proof that this kind of Union which is powerful both economically and as a military unit is capable not only of exerting significant influence on the development of the European continent but of imposing its globalist will on the peoples of other regions. Regrettably, this frequently happens through resort to military force.²

However, rumours about the death of the 'last empire', to use this classical phrase, appeared to be considerably exaggerated. Russia continues to be a great power even without the territories that split away from it. Besides, the logics of historical development in the post-Soviet space would necessarily result in the country's economic, political and military re-integration. Most certainly, this would be governed by new principles. This is an objective process which is still not fully realized by new élites of post-Soviet countries. They are still dominated by the *unexpectedly acquired sovereignty syndrome*, even though this sovereignty is fairly relative in the contemporary conditions of globalization. That is why if they hope to have successful development of their countries and well-being of people in the contemporary aggressively competitive world they have to follow the way of re-integration or integration with other unions or communities. That was the way it was done by the countries of Eastern Europe and by the Baltic republics that made haste in giving away their sovereignties to the European community and NATO.

Essentially, the processes similar to those in Europe have taken shape in the post-Soviet space. This is evidenced by the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Next to join the union is Kyrgyzstan and some other states.

It is known that the Ukraine also got an invitation to join the Customs Union, but the Ukrainian political leadership

² According to E. Nadochy, Professor of Slavic studies at the University of Lausanne, 'the arguments of those who fight the aggression of damned NATO contain an obvious mistake: they are all living in the world of the "public European law" of some "sovereign states". And the world of this law has been dead for a long time, whereas we are living in a global metropolis where order is maintained by the world police.' There is still one thing obviously overlooked by the Lausanne professor: he does not explain who authorized the USA and NATO to take up the functions of the world police.

is in no hurry to accept it. This is allegedly motivated by apprehensions of losing the state sovereignty and getting again into an imperial formation with Moscow at the head. Surprisingly enough, there are no apprehensions of this kind with respect to the prospect of the Ukraine's integration into the European Union. There is willingness to be in the empire headed by Brussels, even with sovereignty lost. It should be mentioned, though, that the Ukraine has not been invited there; moreover, there are broad hints that in the foreseeable future it is not going to be accepted. There is hardly any need to prove that standing alone at the historical crossroads is worse than moving ahead, whatever the direction of that movement might be. Especially if that is Eastern direction which is the focus of all the main civilizational and economic interests of the Ukraine. The Ukraine's trade exchange turnover with Russia alone is double compared to that with all the EU countries.

United Europe and the USA do not want the rebirth of the Russian empire, even in its confederative forms. Attempts are being made to hamper this process, and this is manifested in flirtation with the Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova and other post-Soviet states. They become the places of the so-called colour revolutions arranged for the most part on American money that are followed by bringing to power political regimes that are loyal to the West and, naturally, have anti-Russian stances.

However, despite active opposition and counteractions, the processes of unification in the post-Soviet space are irreversible. There is no doubt that these processes will ultimately lead to the establishment of a powerful political and economic union with Russia at the head. That would certainly involve the creation of supranational administrative bodies that would act on the basis of consensus; their location would not necessarily be in Moscow. There are grounds to believe that after long knocking on the European door, without getting any response, the Ukraine will have to join the Eurasian Union. Paradoxical as it might seem, but this event scenario might not only be beneficial for Russia and the vast Eurasian area, but for the whole world, since it could most certainly ensure the world's stability.¹

When talking about contemporary empires, we should recognize the fact that they are not the same as their predecessors. To a greater extent this is manifested in their internal polycentric structure which is acquiring confederative forms, as well as in greater balance of interests of states that constitute these neo-empires. As for their relation to

the outside world, there are no big changes here. Empires continue to be as expansive as before, and they impose their globalization will onto weaker communities.

The above said can be supported by many examples. The most recent one is the so called Arab Spring. Instigated by the USA and the North Atlantic Alliance, the Arab Spring has hurled the peoples of the Arab East into chaos and civil opposition. All this is presented as manifestation of concern about freedom and democracy of Arabs, though in reality the purpose which is pursued is that of strategic supremacy and unlimited access to energy resources of the region. Previously, the same happened in Iraq, in the Balkans, in Afghanistan.

One could lament over all these facts and accuse the mentioned empires of expansionism and egoism, but at the same time it is impossible not to recognize the obvious fact that it is owing to these characteristics that empires play the role of locomotives of the world's civilizational progress. And indeed, without the mobilization of strength and resources of many countries and nations, sometimes by means of military coercion, many things could not have been achieved.

This is not to say that the US and the European Union will rule the world forever. The time will come when they will also collapse like their predecessors. The European Union is already going all to pieces. The USA are hardly entering the best stage of their development. Nowadays the ageing processes of empires are proceeding much faster than before.

This does not mean, however, that the imperial path of the world's development has come to an end. The empires that collapsed will be replaced by new ones. They are already taking shape. The emerging empire on the territory of the former Russian empire and the Soviet Union is the Eurasian Union. In the Far East it is China which can undoubtedly be called the world's economic empire. It is not altogether excluded that over time ASEAN would also take the shape of an empire. Sooner or later the path of consolidation will be taken by the countries of the Muslim world. And in this, they will be 'aided' by the USA and the EU. By pursuing the divide-and-rule policy the latter make obvious to these countries that political dissociation could be disastrous and fatal for them.

To conclude, the world's progress has always been and will be determined by the processes of globalization, and therefore by the formation of empires as the most effective state structures. The historical experience has not yet yielded any better, though not perfect, structures.

V. T. Tretyakov²

MONOLOGUE FROM THE POSITION OF FORCE (The cognitive dissonance of the European civilization is supplemented with the ethic and the aesthetic one)

The twentieth century was the period of mass culture, which was predicted and explained by José Ortega y Gasset in his *Revolt of the Masses*.

¹ This is also the conclusion made by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Dwelling on the relations between the Ukraine and Russia, he observed that the two countries could be good neighbours. Otherwise the European continent would get out of, and lose balance.

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works, including the following books: *Russian Politics and Politicians in Health and Disease: Glimpse of Events of Russian Life, 1990–2000* (Russkaya politika i politiki v norme i patologii: Vzgljad na sobyitiya rossiyskoy zhizni 1990–2000), *Do We Need Putin After 2008?* (Nuzhen li nam Putin posle 2008 goda?), *How to Become a Famous Journalist: A Course of Lectures on Theory and Practice of Modern Journalism* (Kak stat znamenitym zhurnalistom: kurs lektsiy po teorii i praktike sovremennoy russkoy zhurnalistiki). Laureate of TEFI Award, of the 'Golden Pen' award of the Union of Journalists of Russia, he is decorated with the Golden Badge of Honour 'Public Acknowledgement'.

in particular, I would like to dedicate my speech to, that is, mass politics.

I would like to quote just one excerpt from the *Revolt of the Masses*:

The command over public life exercised today by the intellectually vulgar is perhaps the factor of the present situation which is most novel, least assimilable to anything in the past. At least in European history up to the present, the vulgar had never believed themselves to have 'ideas' on things. They had beliefs, traditions, experiences, proverbs, mental habits, but they never imagined themselves in possession of theoretical opinions on what things are or ought to be – for example, on politics or literature. What the politician planned or carried out seemed good or bad to them, they granted or withheld their support, but their action was limited to being an echo, positive or negative, of the creative activity of others. It never occurred to them to oppose to the 'ideas' of the politician those of their own, nor even to judge the politician's 'ideas' from the tribunal of other 'ideas' which they believed themselves to possess. Similarly in art and in other aspects of public life. An innate consciousness of their limitation, of their not being qualified to theorise, effectively prevented them doing so. The necessary consequence of this was that the vulgar never thought, even remotely, of making a decision on any one of the public activities, which in their greater part are theoretical in character.

Today, on the other hand, the average man has the most mathematical 'ideas' on all that happens or ought to happen in the universe. Hence he has lost the use of his hearing. Why should he listen if he has within him all that is necessary?

When television appeared and boosted over, it turned into a total system of information (disinformation, rather) and of influence on the audience, hence the popular culture received (1) a Crystal Palace for its existence, and (2) a global system for the distribution of its product.

But the mass culture itself would not be so ghastly, were it opposed by the classical institutions of the upward development of the society, namely, traditional religions (keepers of moral principles and prohibitions), a traditional family, a classical system of education, high culture, classical science and professional open politics.

But all these elements nowadays are either weaker than mass culture, enhanced by the technological power of television, or involved in the circle of mass culture.

With the help of television, mass culture has entrapped the high culture and classical arts in the information ghetto.

Traditional religions (except Islam) are mistreated by mass culture and mass politics and give grounds. They have no opportunities to be the keepers of traditional moral values. Moreover, mass culture has begotten a new pagan religion, a secular-sectarian polytheism of marginalized totalitarian minorities, basically denying common morality.

The traditional family is yielding grounds and breaking down. For sure, it isn't the family that now defines educational standards and a system of education of the younger generation.

The system of mass education, fruitful and forward-looking at the first stage of its existence, has given up the classical curriculum and methods of education for the sake of the masses, and therefore, for the sake of simplification, has turned into a system of reproduction of profane knowledge and quasi-scientific truths (mass science).

By the end of the twentieth century, almost everywhere (in the Western countries, among them in Russia) mass politics had appeared, that is deliberately public, theatrical (mass-cultural) politics, in which the maximal populism of forms (including voting procedures) has lost touch with the maximal closeness of making important decisions. The more the current politics turns into a politics for the masses (mass politics), more precisely – the policy for hundreds of marginalized social groups to meet their needs, the more it loses contact (in its major decisions) with the genuine, real interests of the masses and society on the whole. Absolute theatricalism of the modern politics closely unites it with mass culture.

Formally, it seems that everyone in today's society are in dialogue with each other, mass culture with high culture, classical religion with atheists, the élite with the masses, and so on. But in fact, mass culture in all its forms (including the mass science and mass politics) suppresses all participants of this pseudo-dialogue but itself. Actually, it has ceased to be a dialogue, but rather a monologue of mass culture (and other mass elements), and it is a monologue from a position of force.

It is not only a cognitive dissonance, but also an ethic and an aesthetic one.

The European (Christian) civilization is already in a deep institutional and essential crisis, and the efforts of its core element – Western Europe – are quickly driving it to its collapse.

Felix Unger¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: VALUES, CONTEXTS, COMMUNICATIONS

We are living indeed in a very exciting time where all things are changing entirely and the world seems to grow closer. In overall it is in a big flow to a new unknown future. The time and all the changes are speeding up entirely. What has

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been valid yesterday is not necessarily valid today or some years later. The whole global change is influenced by the communication possibilities (IT) and by the global market with all its negative implications too. In the middle of all the changes stands Man lonely observing and handling those changes. In order to survive and to handle the global changes Man needs a solid basis to understand his own standpoint.

At the end of the last century there was a significant change, a significant revolution towards a global society

with no classes anymore, but driven by money and financial impacts. Therefore it is so important to understand the own personal standpoint. It is an old saying that you have to know your own history as standpoint leading to the future. In German we would say "Wer nicht weiß, wo er steht, weiß auch nicht, wohin er geht." Everywhere we find a severe discussion on values and in reality it is very easy to understand the most important value, which is the life itself. All we have to serve life and to bring all to context with all our endeavours. This is clear, it is very easy to elucidate this importance. We are all human beings, we are all living beings with a limited life. Therefore this is the most important in a global world serving man in his dignity. This leads finally to the question of our own transcendental eternity leading to the question where we should fix our most important value. Religions indicate in the transcendental aspects immediately God. Other people are finding immediately an ideology which is mostly leading to a suppression of man. In the last century we have seen what ideologies can effect, especially when you are suppressing freedom and the dignity of Man.

In the whole cascade of values we have the life as the highest value, then the virtues calling upon how we should handle our everyday life. The optimum is to handle life in a balanced way and together with wisdom in the interplay of the charismatic virtues as love, faith and hope. The third group of values are the ethical values, meaning that you have to give your knowledge to your next generation. This is an indispensable factor within our society. There are always important discussions how to teach pupils, what to tell them and how to establish a whole basis for their future, the sense of their future and to help them to understand real leadership.

When I have spoken before about revolution, of course we are standing in a permanent revolution. Within the whole history we have different forms of governing states starting with tribes, leading to kingdoms, empires with emperors by grace of god and other emperors based on ideology for example as Marxism-Leninism, Hitlerism and the other fascistic regima. All was failing at the end of the 20th century with the result that people are without a guiding line. We have now the transition to a classless society based on the importance of materialism and money focussed life.

What is happening today? You see it in the severe crisis of our finances within the Western World. We see a changing world pattern as the new movement of the BRICS, where Brasilia, Russia, India, China and South Africa are establishing a new Union having a new competition possibility against the Euro-Dollar-Market. Considering what I have said at the beginning, the market and the financial world have an enormous cruelty neglecting Man. They are producing, acting beside the human dimension. Humans do not play a role anymore, the cheap working man is the most desired option. It is to observe how quickly the global companies are changing their national locations while they have exploited the countries where they acted enormously. I am thinking of my own home country. It does not anymore play a role to discharge hundreds of people. We see how the earth is exploited when big mining is done – not only in Europe – mainly in Africa, where the next generations are migrating while their fruitful soils have been exploited, spoiled

and destroyed by the global players. The fundament of life, the rivers are poisoned, woods are deforested in an optimization of the profit. Therefore it is indispensable to know and to act cultivating our human being according to our nature.

In the middle of the last century there has been the concept of a social economic market, then there have been concepts of ecologic markets. But all are not really working, all is too much money driven now. You see it for example in our shops. There you find tons of bags which are really mostly unnecessary. You have disposable things, in our machines, which are breaking very quickly so that new disposables are necessary. It is a very dangerous situation, producing endless. This leads finally to the consequence of asking how long our world can stand us – we are eating our world, ourselves.

The reconsideration to the human dimension is indispensable. I have to recall the King Nydas - Effect: "You can't eat your gold." In context of our global situation we have to focus first on our continent and sharing our confession and compassion that Russia is a part of Europe too. Considering this by looking on a map you will detect that we have endless possibilities in creating a liveable continent with all its consequences. There is a lot of wonderful land, there are many peoples. In this context it is clear to look on the local industry binding people at home avoiding emigration from the old own soil. By the way we have an enormous scientific drainage too. In the eastern countries of Europe students are trained to doctors. After graduation they are leaving to the western parts. The eastern parts have to bear all the costs for education while the benefits go for other societies. I strongly advocate to focus on the European dimension with all the new possibilities. Never before we could discuss such possibilities, it is unique in those days. Europe has been divided during the cold war in two separate entities. Now the frontiers are dissolved and we have already entered a new fantastic area of Europe which is indeed up the Ural and considering this there is much room left for all people to live under human conditions in their own regions.

Communication is a wonderful tool in building up a new European area. We know that we have today enormous possibilities in communication. You can reach everybody at the same time on the whole globe. This is a fantastic possibility to exchange all our minds and give information. On the other hand there is maximal control too. This is a very positive effect of our communication technology but when we are considering information technology. Sometimes it seems that we are losing our freedom being controlled on every step through your whole life by many possibilities. Today you get the maximal control which never could be dreamed of. This endangers our freedom. On a human personal side I observe that people who are acting in all the information controls etc. are getting an attitude in suppressing Man in his freedom reminding me to henchmen. We see with all the terrorism that this should be a fall of our system. But what is more important: control, justice, safety or freedom? I personally think that freedom is the most desired value in combination to the dignity of man. New concepts are necessary to find the proper balance without suppressing the individuum.

Such a conference as the International Likhachov Conference is a very good occasion in developing the dialogue of cultures between scientists and especially to focus on our Europe. We have a lot to do. In overall it is evident that we are living in a classless society where everybody has the same possibilities to live. Now the human dimension with its values, with its virtues and ethical values are based to our transcendental desire and it is to observe that beside our laicistic attempts finding a new way of a new acceptance of god is developing again. The values have to be bound to an undiscussable eternal focus where our life can be derived. There are no human values in this way regarding our own freedom. Beside all one virtue has to be stressed out: the virtue "epikia". This means that we should act in the sense of a law and not stick to the letters.

With all the communication it is now possible to have a new way of education. You can educate young people in blended learning over distances with one common language of communication. All the bridges of information are today really indispensable. We have new tools. We have today enormous tools in a connected world which can also be a fruitful basis for the human development. Such conferences, as the Likhachov Conference, are so valuable, as there is the possibility to exchange different views from different parts of Europe in order to form a new Europe creating a fruitful future for our next generations.

Conclusion

In our modern time, with all our modern communication, we experience an increasing globalization where the exchange of ideas is rapid and is available in any part of the whole world. This communication gives a great deal of information. What people are doing, what people are thinking and how things are developing. Everything in life has two aspects, two sides as a coin. In the case of communication technology we all experience the positive sides in our daily life. Quick transmission of information, new techniques leading finally to new techniques in education too. On the other side freedom is in this case severely endangered and narrowed. Too much personal information is collected while the data safety is not really given. You see it on the example of data hackers, how talented people can break even into so called save environments. Sometimes it seems that it is time to start with "diets" in information – sometimes less is more.

The information is very important due to the different changing within the whole world. I am thinking at present time when the meteorite landed in Russia.

You can witness different developments on the whole globe. A special case are the reports on our global warming. Sometimes it seems that we neglect the fate of our nature and start to create different apocalyptic sceneries. In the past we had the forest dieback or the ozone hole. We have the financial crises in Europe. When we have political information, such as new governments, so that we have a possibility deriving some information. But anyway we witness how difficult it is to judge the situation – for the politicians too. In the final effect we face an enormous unemployment. Let us hope that the world crisis of 1929 can be avoided.

But the other big issue is very important considering the values. The values are mostly unknown and confused by some secondary or tertiary values, built on the demands and imagination of people. Values must be valid globally having a global acceptance too. With the dialogue we have an exchange of all our values. The interpretation of values and the human rights, which are grounded by tolerance. Mostly the basis of values is misinterpreted. The most important value is life itself. All values, virtues, ethics must find the basis serving Man in life.

This dialogue of culture gives the incentive to understand the own position, to reach out to the next and to get a new side for the own standpoint. The dialogue of cultures is indeed intercultural, transnational, overcoming all the frontiers and mainly building up bridges from one idea to the ideas of others overcoming the gap of non-understanding the other.

We have mixed feelings expecting the future in peace. We always feel that with better tools, better understanding we will gain a global peace finally. The world population grows daily with all its consequences. Health, sanitation, food, water and energy will be global topics. This contains the potential of high conflicts. We speak from world peace but this is far away. Despite this message we have to work severely starting in our environment reaching the neighbours and folks.

The bridges have to be built. They are necessary to use them. To get a bridge in function and conferences as the Likhachov Conference are so valuable and important, there is a real chance of discussing the value of the intercultural dialogues in the light of globalization.

Shlomo Weber¹;
Victor Ginsburgh²

LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY, CULTURE, AND ECONOMICS

“If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his language, that goes to his heart.”

Attributed to Nelson Mandela

“My homeland is my language”

Fernando Pessoa, a famous Portuguese writer

Languages

People care about the languages they speak and care even more when the right to use them is taken away. A striking example is offered by the genius of William Shakespeare in his play *Richard II*, where Thomas Mowbray was exiled by King Richard to Venice. Thomas does not lament about the loss of land, wealth and status but rather about the inability to speak his native language in exile:

“A heavy sentence, my most sovereign liege,..
Have I deserved at your Highness’ hands.
The language I have learn’d these forty years,
My native English, now I must forego;
And now my tongue’s use is to me no more...
I am too old to fawn upon a nurse,
Too far in years to be a pupil now.
What is thy sentence, then but speechless death,
Which robs my tongue from breathing native breath?”

His grief was so overwhelming that Mowbray, who was forty years old, indeed died shortly after he was exiled.

In his book *Decolonizing the Mind* (1986), Ngugi wa Thiong’o, a Kenyan writer who is a Distinguished Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, makes it clear why language is an essential expression of culture and self-identification:

“The biggest weapon wielded and actually daily unleashed by imperialism against that collective defiance is the cultural bomb. The effect of a cultural bomb is to annihilate a people’s belief in their names, in their languages, in their environment, in their heritage of struggle, in their unity, in their capacities and ultimately in themselves. ... It makes them want to identify with that which is the furthest removed from themselves; for instance, with other peoples’ languages rather than their own.

African countries, as colonies and even today as neo-colonies, came to be defined and to define themselves in terms of the languages of Europe: English-speaking, French-

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² Professor of Economics, European Center for Advanced Research in Economics, Free University of Brussels, Belgium. Holder of Francqui Chair, University of Liege, Belgium. Author of 185 scholarly publications, including: *How many Languages do we need: Economics of linguistic diversity* (with S. Weber), *The structure of applied general equilibrium models* (with M. Keyzer), *Handbook of Economics of Arts and Culture* (with D. Thorsby), *The Economics and Languages* (with S. Weber), *Expert opinion and compensation: evidence from a musical competition* (with J. van Ours), *Absentee bidders and the declining price anomaly*, *The principle of minimal product differentiation holds under sufficient heterogeneity* (with A. de Palma, Y.Y. Papageorgiou, and J. Thisse) and others.

speaking or Portuguese-speaking African countries”³ Shortly after making this statement, Ngugi wa Thiong’o stopped writing plays, novels, and short stories in English and turned to Gikuyu and Kiswahili, two languages used in his native Kenya.

But similar stances and ideas hold for all other continents, be they North or Latin America, the Australasian world, some parts of Asia, and even Europe is turning to a language commonly known as the *broken English*.

The Thomas Mowbray’s plight and the tragedy of linguistic division of Africa, the continent described by the American political scientist from Stanford University David Laitin (1994) as ‘a principal victim of God’s wrath aimed against those who constructed the Tower of Babel’, are not isolated episodes. One can look at the long war in Sri Lanka the roots of which lie in the linguistic policies of the Sinhalese majority in the post-colonial period, which limited the linguistic rights of the country’s Tamil minority. The linguistic policies often tend to alienate groups of individuals whose cultural, societal and historical values and sensibilities are perceived to be threatened by what we call linguistic disenfranchisement, when linguistic rights are restricted or even denied.

Why does a man have such an intimate relation with his language? What is it that makes the contemporary French linguist Claude Hagege (2000) claim that ‘languages are the flags of dominated people,’ or that ‘the fight for French is a fight of the mind’? Why does political scientist Henry Bretton (1976) suggest that the ‘fear of being deprived of communicating skills seems to rise political passion to a fever pitch’?

The suggestion that language is more than a means of communicating, has been first emphasized in the very beginning of the 19th century by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1988, [1836]). It was further reinforced by anthropologist Franz Boas (1940), linguists Edward Sapir (1949) and Benjamin Whorf (1956), and later came to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: language and culture are interdependent, and the structure of the language that one uses (often as a native language) influences the way of thinking and behaving. The consequences, summarized by Kramsch (1998), imply that despite the possibility of translating from one language to another, ‘there will always be an incommensurable residue of untranslatable culture associated with the linguistic structures of any given language.’

Linguistic diversity and economics

Most of the countries of the world are multilingual (the exception could be North Korea and Iceland). Indeed, the 2009 version of *Ethnologue* lists 6,909 distinct living

languages spoken all over the world, and since there are only 271 nations, dependencies and other entities, the issue of linguistic diversity appears almost everywhere. One must also notice that even though many of these nearly seven thousand languages are spoken in small and often remote and isolated communities, ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity is not an exclusive third-world phenomenon. In Western Europe, for example, despite a long tradition of nation-states, most countries are multilingual, and there is a plethora of indigenous regional languages such as Welsh in the United Kingdom, Catalan, Basque, Galician in Spain, Provençal, Breton and Occitan in France or Frisian in the Netherlands. This number is especially large in Africa, where, e.g., Papua New Guinea has 857 active languages.

The preservation of linguistic diversity and respect of the cultural heritage of the members of the society is an important and much needed task. However, in making policy and operational decisions, one has to recognize two caveats in protecting diversity:

There is no free lunch for diversity: Sustaining a high degree of societal diversity could be an expensive task that requires allocating substantial resources to create educational institutions, develop communication and coordination between groups. The financial costs and communication barriers have a negative impact on national unity, and put a heavy burden on the proper functioning of the society's institutions. It is difficult to assign a precise cost to sustaining diversity, but it nevertheless exists, and is, in some cases, far from being negligible. As Harvard economist Martin Weitzman (1992) points out: "Often there is an implicit injunction to preserve diversity because it represents a higher value than other things, which by comparison are 'only money.' Yet laws of economics apply to diversity also. We cannot preserve everything. There are no free lunches for diversity. Given our limited resources, preservation of diversity in one context can only be accomplished at some real opportunity cost in terms of well-being foregone in other spheres of life, including, possibly, a loss of diversity somewhere else in the system."

When is the meal too salty? Some of us cannot eat without salt. But by gradually increasing the amount of salt, we may quickly move from tasteless to uneatable. Shouldn't there be an optimal amount of salt, not too little, not too much? Also, how many spoons of sugar are needed for our morning coffee or tea? Some do not use sugar at all, but Russians put three or four spoons in their tea, while drinking it with a spoon in the cup and continually stirring their sticky beverage. Again, an optimum has to be found somewhere between zero and four. Some art lovers may find black and white paintings rather dull, but adding an excessive number of colors does not necessarily make a painting more attractive. In all these examples there exists an optimal degree of diversity (salt, sugar, colors) that ensures a tasty meal, a pleasant cup of coffee and, sometimes, a beautiful painting. A study of diverse societies suggests that there is an upper bound on the degree of heterogeneity which still guarantees proper and sustainable functioning. If it is too diverse, the society may fail to develop and implement policies acceptable for large groups of its citizens, and even the basis of societal existence could be questioned and threatened. The challenges of making everybody happy or even obedient are tremendous, and the eventual collapse of the Macedonian, Roman, Ottoman and

Mongol empires was in large part caused by the inability of their rulers to keep all diverse and distant parts of their kingdoms under a unified rule. One can think of the USSR and China with Tibet and Sinkiang. One can also ask and doubt (as many do) whether the potential European Union membership of countries such as Turkey and Ukraine would not increase diversity within the Union too much and rule out a reasonable compromise between its members.

Recently economists turned their attention to studies of the impact of linguistic diversity on various matters of interest to economists, ranging from civil wars to income distribution, investment in public goods and economic growth. Mauro (1995) argues that ethno-linguistic fragmentation has a negative impact on institutional efficiency, political stability, bureaucratic efficiency, and corruption. Alesina, Baqir and Easterly (1999) find that in the United States, the fragmented communities run larger deficits and exhibit lower spending on education. Annett (2001) shows that ethno-linguistic fractionalization generates excessive government consumption that slows the economic growth. Desmet, Ortuno-Ortin and Weber (2009) demonstrate that excessive fractionalization reduced a degree of redistribution and "solidarity" within a country. Easterly and Levine (1997) focus on disastrous findings on growth, education, political stability, consensus on policy choices and infrastructure in the Sub-Saharan African countries between 1960 and 1990, which they call 'the tragedy of Africa'.

Standardization

The challenges of linguistic diversity led many fractionalized society to introduce some degree of *standardization*, the concept taken from Max Weber's celebrated *rationalization theory* outlined in his 1914 essay (translated into English in 1968): the practices of state standardization include a common currency, a common legal system, and a common administrative language.

The modes of introducing standardization vary across countries and historical periods. An extreme and bloody way of imposing such a policy is what came to be called 'ethnic cleansing', that was unfortunately practiced on various occasions. A less extreme and apparently more manageable way of standardizing is to impose a unique language, or to force citizens to speak a unifying language in addition to their native tongue. The central power can also abolish education in languages it does not favor. For example, while the French language was imposed to all French provinces in 1539 by King Francois I, almost everywhere another tongue was spoken next to French, and French was spoken by only 3 out of 28 million citizens. In 1972 the French President George Pompidou claimed that there 'was no place for regional languages in France, which is destined to play a fundamental role in Europe'. In 1975 a new law stipulated that French must be used in commerce, by the media and by the public service. In 1994, the Toubon Act made French the compulsory medium in consumer affairs, employment, education and at congresses held in France. But one can mention that there are still seven languages in France, each having more than half of a million of speakers: Alsatian, Basque, Breton, Italian, Portuguese, Algerian Arabic and Kabyle (Berber).

The Russification of the territories of the Russian Empire, is another example. After quelling the Polish and

Lithuanian uprisings in the 1860s, the Russian government, threatened by the prospect of Polonization, expressed by the increasing influence of the Catholic Church and the Polish and Lithuanian languages, implemented the use of Russian as the only administrative, official and working language. Lithuanian and Polish were banned from usage in public places and later in schools and administrations. General Mikhail Muravyov, the Governor General of Lithuania, claimed that 'what the Russian bayonet did not accomplish, the Russian school will' All students were required to study Russian and social mobility was not possible without being proficient in Russian.

A similar standardization was imposed in China, which after the 1911 Revolution began promoting a vernacular Chinese based on Mandarin as the national language. Within a few years it was understood that the Beijing pronunciation would be the new standard. In 1958 the government initiated a linguistic reform whose main goal was to simplify written Chinese and to promote a "general language" called Putonghua. It is interesting to point out that a similar unifying effort to encourage the Singapore Chinese community to adopt Mandarin had a mixed effect and, according to the 2002 census, only 45 percent of Chinese families speak Mandarin at home, while the rest speak other Chinese dialects or English (Spolsky, 2004).

The attempt to enforce a unique national language led to disastrous consequences in Sri-Lanka (formerly Ceylon) which shows how emotional, explosive and dangerous the choice of official or national languages may become. Sri-Lanka has two major ethnic and linguistic communities, the Sinhalese majority, predominantly Buddhist, and the Tamil minority, mainly Hindu (about 74 and 18 percent, respectively, of the total population of about 21 million people), who had peacefully coexisted over a period of about two thousand years. After hundred and fifty years under the British rule, the island attained self-governance in 1948. The superior system of teaching English in northern Tamil regions allowed Tamils to have easier access and numerically disproportionate representation in university education and jobs in the prestigious government sector. The advancement of a larger number of educated Tamils and the desire for a larger piece of the national pie drew many Sinhalese into supporting the Sinhala-Only (only Sinhalese) movement, which was led by Buddhist monks who claimed that not only the Sinhala language, but Buddhism itself would be threatened if parity between Sinhala and Tamil were sustained. Another important element in rejecting Tamil was the Sinhalese fear of being dominated by the well-developed Tamil literature and culture. The Sinhala-Only Act in 1956, considered by Tamil leaders as a form of apartheid, led to mass riots in which hundreds of people lost their lives. Later it led to twenty six years of a full-fledged civil war, which cost tens of thousands of human lives.

Standardization does not necessarily refer to the imposition of a unique language, but rather to restrict the number of languages used for official, legal or educational purposes. An example of such a policy is the so-called three-language-formula adopted in India some fifty years ago. The formula, whose aim was to balance efficiency, national pride, sensitivity and economic well-being of multiple linguistic groups, was introduced as a national policy response to bitter complaints from Southern states.

Since Hindi is not widely spoken there, the Southerners (mostly Tamil Nadu) felt discriminated against and claimed that the use of Hindi in government services forced them to learn two languages (English and Hindi) whereas Hindi speakers had to learn only English. The three language formula (with some variations across states) implied that children in Hindi speaking states would study three languages: Hindi, English and one of the regional, preferably Southern, languages, whereas children in non-Hindi speaking states were to be taught Hindi, English and their regional language. This masterful and well-crafted formula that seemed to achieve group identity, preservation of mother tongues (by sustaining proficiency in regional languages), national pride and unity (through spreading Hindi), and administrative efficiency and technological progress (by means of acquiring English), failed to achieve the success the formula's creators were hoping for. The reasons were insufficient funding, lack of teachers, inadequate support of the regional administration and little enthusiasm on the part of students and their families to undertake the required efforts to learn languages spoken in other regions. In Hindi regions, relatively little effort or resources were put in studying English and even less so in learning a third language. In Tamil Nadu, English and Tamil are studied quite extensively, whereas Hindi received lip service.

A variant of the three language formula was introduced in Nigeria, the most populous African country with 141 million inhabitants who speak 527 languages and are divided into 250 ethnic groups. Nigeria, like many other African countries, turned out to English as the official language, used in government and education, but Hausa (spoken by 18.5 million in the north), Igbo (18 million in the south-east) and Yoruba (19 million in the south-west) are official regional languages and the three language formula based on the use of Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo, was considered a unifying device for this diverse country. However, like in India, its implementation was inhibited by the lack of qualified instruction and the resistance of linguistic groups, identified with one language, that were forced to learn another major language.

Linguistic standardization inevitably restricts the usage of some languages, which are not included in the set of the official ones, but its effects go much beyond restricting access to information. Standardization may alienate groups of individuals whose cultural, societal and historical values and sensibilities are not represented by the official languages and consequently create *linguistic disenfranchisement*. (See Ginsburgh and Weber (2011)).

Conclusions

That is, standardization breeds disenfranchisement. But how does one balance the effects of standardization and disenfranchisement? It is a delicate task to preserve unity of a diverse society. As pointed out by an Anglo-American poet W.H. Auden: "Civilizations should be measured by the degree of diversity attained and by degree of unity retained." On the wall of the Higashi Honganji Temple in Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan, there are two sentences on the wall: "Living together in diversity. Learning to accept our differences." This is a tough challenge by itself that nevertheless represents a necessary condition for sustaining the societal progress.

While globalization may proceed in English, the importance of protection and sustainability of “smaller” languages and cultures became an important part of public debate in many corners of the world. The emotional part of language policies and issues is undeniable and the language identification turns to be relevant for the participation of various groups in the process of economic growth and development. The society that seeks a fair advancement and balanced development cannot leave parts of the population behind. It is not only sympathy and fairness, but also a cold economic calculation that requires the total mobilization of societal resources to succeed in this highly competitive world.

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Jerzy J. Wiatr¹

LEGAL CULTURE IN POST-SOCIALIST STATES

Several scholars in their comparative studies of political changes in post-socialist states emphasize the role played by the cultural factors. Political culture, defined by the American political scientist Gabriel Almond “as consisting of cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientation to political phenomena”, creates more or less favorable conditions for the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Samuel P. Huntington in his study of the “third wave of democratization” (1991) demonstrated the importance of cultural factors in the transformation of formerly dictatorial regimes in democracies.

The concept of legal culture, while less commonly used, is equally important for understanding the ways in which countries of transition deal with the legal problems. By the legal culture I understand the values, attitudes and patterns of behavior related to the functioning of law. In studying the legal systems from the perspective of their cultural context we follow the tradition established by the world-famous professor of St. Petersburg and Warsaw Universities Leon Petrazycki (1967–1931).

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More than twenty years after the beginning of democratization of the formerly communist states in Europe, the crucial aspects of their legal cultures are: (a) the establishment of the rule of law and the departure from the arbitrary, highly repressive regime, frequently called a “police state”; (b) the not always successful policy of preventing and eliminating administrative and political corruption, and (c) introducing “retrospective justice” in respects to political crimes committed under the former, dictatorial regime and left unpunished for political reasons. Systematic comparisons between post-socialist states would uncover serious differences between individual states.

Compared with the earlier situation even in the most liberal socialist states, the present state of law and order looks significantly better. Arbitrary police repression, especially for political reasons, has been stopped or considerably reduced in almost all countries of the region. Capital punishment has been abolished, to large degree under the impact of the position taken by the Council of Europe. The human rights of prisoners are now far better protected than they ever could be under former communist rule. Yet, although progress in all these respects seems to be taking place in most of the post-socialist states, even the most successful among them still seem to face serious problems that include but are not limited to the weakness of the administration of law, the continuing shortage of

fully qualified specialists, the evident inadequacy of legal rules, the overcrowding of prisons, and the daily obstacles to the effective administration of law. All these shortcomings produce frustration, demonstrated by large sectors of citizenry. In many post-socialist states, surveys show citizens long for a more effective, even less liberal system of law enforcement.

Corruption is a very important problem for all post-socialist states. In his comparative analysis Richard Rose found that the strong majority of respondents believe that the present, post-socialist states are more corrupt than their communist predecessors (*Journal of Democracy*, 2001). Corruption in post-socialist states results from the opportunities created by the collapse of state-controlled economy, the weakness of political and legal mechanisms and the tolerant attitudes of many politicians. Interesting differences between countries indicate that the way in which political leaders behave in this respect have significant impact on the extent to which corruption affects the public life. Public attitudes toward corruption, often quite tolerant, are also an important factor.

A special aspect of the legal system in all new democracies is the application of what is called *retroactive justice*. How should a democratic state treat those responsible for violations of law during the dictatorial rule? The problem offers three main aspects: First, those guilty of having violated the laws valid at the time, if they can be put on trial, should respond for their crimes in a way consistent with the rules of law. Torturing or killing prisoners were crimes against the law that existed even under the communist system, except in its Stalinist period. Punishing those guilty in such instances does not violate the standard rule of jurisprudence: *lex retro non agit*. However, the passage of time creates practical problems for conducting fair trials. Witnesses die, or their memory is impaired by the passage of time. Documents often seem to have been lost or deliberately destroyed in the last days of the communist rule. Although in principle there is no opposition to this aspect of retroactive justice,

one way of dealing with this problem is the passage of laws that lift the statute of limitation for political crimes committed by functionaries of the communist regimes. A more complicated is the second aspect of the problem at hand – the responsibility of communist politicians for the establishment of laws which are now considered undemocratic or even criminal. In some states leading politicians of the former regime have been put on trial for imposing highly repressive, even heinous laws, or for political actions constituting high treason. Trials of East German politicians for the establishment of rules which mandates the killing of people illegally cross the frontier illustrate the first situation, while the trials of some Czech politicians for their collaboration with the Soviet-imposed regime after the intervention of 1968 illustrate the second. The third form of retroactive justice is the attempt to collectively deprive member of leaders of the formerly ruling communist parties of their political rights. In several post-socialist states there have been attempts to introduce such laws under the generic name of *decommunization*. In most cases they have been rejected by the democratically elected parliaments on the ground that such laws would be incompatible with the fundamental principles of democracy and of the rule of law. Collective “decommunization” would mean punishment within the due process of law. It would also deprive the citizens of their right to freely decide who would rule them. In several post-socialist states (Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Slovenia) presidential and/or parliamentary elections were won by the politicians who in the past played significant roles in the communist regimes. “Decommunization” would have made such free election impossible.

Several post-socialist states are now members of the European Union. The membership in the EU made it necessary to adjust the legal systems to the rules and traditions of the older democracies. In such a way European integration contributes to the development of better legal systems and more democratic legal cultures in several post-socialist states.

Wu Enyuan¹

CULTURE AND ECONOMICS IN THE AGE OF SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: THE APOCALYPSIS OF RUSSIAN REFORMS

I. Dependence of social reforms on the level of socialist civilization's development and impact on its development in the process of social reforms

The first socialist system in the history of mankind (the Stalin model), was formed in the 30-50s of the 20th century, and it was a natural result of human civilization's development. On the one hand, this system contributed to the modernization of society and development of civilization in Russia, supplied a sound material basis for struggle against fascism. On the

other hand, this highly centralized political and economic system was not adapted to the boost of a new technological revolution, and could not combine government control and market mechanisms for efficient resource exploitation, it did not encourage people's enthusiasm. These drawbacks became more noticeable over the years.

After Stalin's death, Soviet society was gradually trying to alter the Stalin model that triggered a wave of transformation in the world, especially in those countries where planned economic system prevailed. In many of them transition to a market economic system started. The number of countries carrying transformation, and the impact of reforms on national economic development was on an unprecedented scale in human history.

Chinese-type socialism, that nowadays has a great influence with the world, too, has drawn a lesson from

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reformation experience, that lesson revealed itself in both political and economic aspects. The nature of the reforms depended on the-then level of social civilization's development, on the one hand, and on the other it contributed to development of civilization through the process of social reforms.

II Contribution of Russian reforms to Marxist economic theory

As to the contribution of post-Stalin reforms to the development of Marxist economic theory, 'New Course', developed under the supervision of G.V. Malenkov, is worth noting, its basic economic ideas were reported in August 1953 at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, they involved the demand of a quick boom in agriculture and development of consumer industry and food industry. The new course was aimed at improving the life level of Soviet people. In terms of theory, that approach meant the abandonment of traditional views in Marxist political economy on the nature and pace of development of the first and second division of social production. Subject to it production of capital goods should outrun production of consumer goods. Malenkov put forward the idea that consumer industry and agriculture should be developed through heavy industry development.

Malenkov's reform influenced China to some extent. It is a well-known fact that in 1956 Mao Zedong in his article 'The Ten Major Relationships', wrote that China should learn lessons from the USSR, where lop-sided growth of heavy industry had led to retard development of consumer industry and agriculture. Since then, China has begun to move away from the Soviet model and explore the path of Chinese-type socialism.

In 1957, the Soviet Union began to reform the management system in industry and construction, the reform was targeted at overcoming excessive concentration of power in the ministries and departments and to entrenching power of the local bodies. In May 1957 a number of industrial ministries were dissolved and territorial economic councils were being created instead, but the negative effects of their activities were localism, dictate and authoritarianism, progressive bureaucratization. At the same time, professor E.G. Lieberman from Kharkov Institute of Technology, wrote the article 'Plan, Profit, Bonus' (in the 'Pravda' newspaper as of September 9, 1962) in which he for the first time put forward the following ideas: in development process it is necessary to use material incentives and the law of value, which had been considered unacceptable outside capitalism. His ideas made an enormous impact on subsequent reforms in socialist countries, ideas concerning the antithesis of socialism and capitalism had now changed, and interdependence and mutual influence of socialism and capitalism was admitted. Lieberman's recommendations helped to overcome traditional views that plan is incompatible with the market and the law of value, they indicated the direction of reforms in socialist countries for the future and the direction of Marxism development.

On October 4, 1965 the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the resolution 'On Approval of the socialist state production enterprise'. Thus Kosygin, who was the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, started his economic reform. The key goal of the reform was to raise economic autonomy of enterprises. It became the main result of the

reform, during which the amount of plan figures decreased and initiative activities of enterprises were enhanced. Since then, most of the economic reforms in socialist countries have been associated with expansion of initiative and autonomy of enterprises. The second important result of the reform of 1965-1979 was introduction of an integrated approach to economic and social development. It also stated the fact that economic development is carried out for the benefit of man and is focused on his balanced development.

Kosygin's reforms fell short of expectations in terms of fundamental change in the model of economic management in general, hence evaluation of its results in academic circles is not high. But in spite of that, in my opinion, the correct assessment of historical events does not depend on what kind of social effect was obtained when they were being carried out, but rather on what new direction they gave to the historical process. This article has demonstrated the contribution of the USSR reform to the development of socialist economic theory.

III. The failure of the reform of the Soviet Union in the mid-80s of the 20th century and its causes.

In March 1985, Gorbachev proposed reconstruction project under the slogan of 'acceleration', the main content of 'acceleration' was to continue the general ideological orientation of the reforms in 1957, 1965 and 1979. But why did the reforms fail?

1. Philosophical puzzle: To abandon post-Soviet system or to reform it.

Those days leaders of the Soviet Union and some ideologists of the reforms considered that the infirmities of the old Soviet system of controlling politics and economy were incurable, could not change for the better and the only way was to destroy the system completely.

I personally disagree with this point of view. Any system includes two aspects: negative and positive ones. The system of the Soviet Union should have got rid of its negative aspects. On the whole, social and inter-ethnic conflicts and contradictions in the economic system had not escalated to a very serious degree in the Soviet Union at that time. The society of the Soviet Union was basically stable and the Soviet Union was one of the world's two superpowers. Numerous surveys that have been conducted in Russia show that more than 70 percent of Russians believe: the collapse of the Soviet Union could have been avoided.

2. Complete denial of history of the Soviet Union causes chaos in social sphere.

The leaders of the Soviet Union considered it necessary to destroy the 'braking mechanism' and that the only way to do so was to initiate a campaign of 're-evaluation' of the history of the Soviet Union. But this campaign resulted in 'a complete denial of the history of the Soviet Union', and wonderful social conventions, the concept of morals and values that had been formed over the centuries, suffered a complete collapse, which led to the fact that people lost trust to socialist ideals. Now, lack of ideals prevailed, beliefs and ideas were chaotic.

3. Various parties and groups appeared, a political struggle was triggered, social contradictions grew sharper.

There were only three reform plans: 'Shatalin's plan', 'government plan', 'the president's plan'. But due to the

fact that political reform of that time led to social chaos, establishment of many parties and fight with each other, none of the three plans could be executed. In Russia there is a proverb: 'If you build a new house, do not destroy the old one, as you'll need to live there during construction'. If there is neither new nor old home, people will not survive.

4. Key reasons of the USSR's collapse.

It is generally recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union was stipulated by a number of reasons. Among them were historical and practical, internal and external ones, and so on. A combination of many factors led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. But what reason is the most important? There are different points of view. In my opinion, in any significant event there is a figure who has to bear responsibility, and we should look for this figure analyzing the laws.

On March, 14 1990 the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR adopted the Law 'On the establishment of the post of the President and the Amendments to the Constitution of the USSR', pursuant to which the president of the Soviet Union should take responsibility for the following:

1) he shall acts as the guarantor of the rights and freedoms of Soviet citizens, the Constitution and the laws of the USSR;

2) he shall take the necessary measures to protect the sovereignty of the USSR and the Union Republics, security and territorial integrity of the country, to implement the principles of national and state system of the USSR.;

It should be noted that the then-president of the USSR did not take on this responsibility.

IV. Lessons of Russian reforms

1. Continuous reforming of the socialist system, especially changing of ideas, does lead to revival: firstly, Marxism provides just guidelines to action, and one can not treat it doctrinally, Marxism has to change together with the era. Thus, the reforms of the Soviet Union did not give any significant results because of following Marxism doctrine of 'priority development of heavy industry', 'incompatibility of socialism and capitalism', etc.

2. In order to achieve more, socialism has to accept the general results of human civilization, including those results of capitalism that are worth borrowing and can be used to learn from. Socialism must not retire into its shell, but must positively carry out the policy of 'openness'. At the same time, we must follow the path of a nationally-oriented development, we can not blindly adopt or worship the Western model of development.

3. We should consider in combination the following three elements 'reform, development and stability'. Keeping in mind the lessons of the reforms of the Soviet Union, the theorists and practitioners of Chinese-type socialism made the conclusion that without a stable policy and social atmosphere nothing will be gained.

As one of the achievements of human civilization, socialism reached a universally recognized success for promoting economic and social development in the period of the Soviet Union, and in present-day China. Socialism is undoubtedly evolving and progressing, and by no means the so-called 'end of history' of the socialist civilization will ever come.

Xue Futsi¹

CREATIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE TRADITIONAL VALUES: A CASE-STUDY OF THE POLITICAL CULTURE IN KYRGYZSTAN

Many scholars writing about the transformation and political development of Kyrgyzstan² within the years of its independence regard traditional values which grew through tribalism and influenced greatly the minds and behaviour of political leaders (common members of political processes in Kyrgyzstan) as a remnant, an unfortunate misapprehension to be avoided the sooner the better in order for the country to be able to stick to the path of democracy and freedoms. This author does not deny that democracy and freedoms are universal values gained through suffering. It is likely that the author wants to show that even economic globalization, internet epoch and new kind of mass media (in the form of social networks) cannot reduce the importance of the traditional values and their positive role which sometimes

might be underestimated by many political agents, analysts, and researchers.

In the political history of independent Kyrgyzstan there appear to have been two coups³ – in 2005 and in 2010. And many researchers saw there the signs of clans and tribes struggling for power. In other words, tribalism has done its job. However, the problem is not in the presence of tribalism and the process of dealing with it but how to transform traditional values in contemporary practice. In this respect the author of the article suggests several statements based on the example of Kyrgyzstan.⁴

Firstly, such democratic institutions as power division, checks and balances system, political pluralism, elections, parliament, free speech etc. were borrowed from the outside and could not work, or at least they did not work with the first two presidents, which is proved by the coups of 2005 and 2010. The reason for the failure of the both presidents was power consolidation which led to the absolute political isolation. It means that before the

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² Kyrgyz coup. March–April 2005: The Collection. Compiled by Pawlowski. – Moscow: Publishing House 'Europe', 2005. From the 'island of democracy' to the 'tulip revolution' – the political transformation in Kyrgyzstan. Zao Yichang – Lanzhou: Lanzhou University Press. 2010.

³ It is obvious that the political estimations of the situation in 2005 and 2010 vary greatly among the writers and politicians both within Kyrgyzstan and beyond. The author of this article relies on the classical definition of a revolution, which involves a full transformation of the political system. – *Author's note.*

⁴ Xue Futsi. Political development in Kyrgyzstan 1991–2010. – Beijing. Publishing house 'Intellectual property', 2010.

pressure of the opposition both of them were able to use legal means of influence up to the use of force to protect the power but psychologically they were not ready to do it so they had to give up and leave the country. However this interpretation is very superficial. Power consolidation, authoritarianism is just one of the reasons which led to the dramatic events of those years.

Secondly, Kyrgyzstan obviously did have enough experience (till its independence) of being a nation state in the modern understanding. But it does not mean that it did not have enough experience of political interaction in terms of clans and tribes of the Kyrgyz population. Kyrgyz clans and tribes always interacted and this interaction was an important part of the public memory and political experience. This is an important factor which might help understand the contemporary history of the Kyrgyz state.

Thirdly, Kyrgyz clans and tribes have long history. There is a hierarchy in every large clan. Large clans do not submit to each other, they are independent. Modern conditions make the clans behave as the groups of interests towards the government, competing with each other at the same time. Many, if not all, political structures are based on clans. Ideological platforms of the political parties are washed out and difficult to define.

Thus, the main issue of the political stability is to incorporate some of the key political players such as parties into the political system, and the groups of interests and their involvement into the decision-making process. In these terms parliamentary government might be the most preferable option. It might also be followed by the process of deliberative democracy approbation.

The Constitution of Kyrgyzstan referendum of 2010 should also be regarded from this point of view. The increase of the parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) places (mandates) up to 120, party-proportional electoral system, 5% limit would be the way to filter, which will be advantageous for the big players but the whole system in general will take into account the political reality and involve political powers based on the clans into the political activity. From the point of practical politics, if all the key political players – groups of interest (clans and tribes) had their places in the Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh), then the struggle of those groups outside the parliament walls would be less destructive. Moreover, many groups in parliament think that the status quo must be preserved, thus the challenges inside the parliament or out of it cannot break the system, and vice versa. From this point of view, the Kyrgyz constitution of 2010 has a very positive meaning in terms of political stability in the region.

Fifthly, parliamentary success in Kyrgyzstan depends on the political limits definition which does not exist now. Parliamentary success also depends on general approaches and theories of the national interests which should be worked out by the groups, so that they can admit that there is something more important than their group interests. This criterion will allow to judge the level of political development in Kyrgyzstan.

Summary. Political culture for any nation is a core of stability. And a political tradition like tribalism in the case of Kyrgyzstan is a precious experience of political interaction. And only their creative transformation might solve this problem. And on the whole tribalism is not bad in itself. And traditional values with adequate attitude to them can be a positive factor.

A. V. Yakovenko¹

ON THE ROLE OF TRADITIONAL VALUES IN MODERN SOCIETY

Nowadays, the issue concerning the role of moral values in modern society takes on a new urgency in the context of social and political discourse. The universal status of moral values is being reconsidered, and their fundamental, core concepts are acquiring a different interpretation, sometimes opposite to their original meaning.

There is a need for a clear divide between the undoubted traditional value system that for centuries has been guiding the mankind along the path of self-development, and ultraliberal trends that have most actively spread in the early 21st century.

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Self-disintegration of the USSR and the socialist bloc in the late 1980s caught unaware the Western scholarly community and over the most part of the 20th century led to the loss of the bipolar political and ideological system of the world responsible for stabilizing international relations and accordingly to the triumph of the neo-liberal paradigm. The latter, as well as the ‘unipolar moment’ has become the only ‘regent of our dreams’ for a while. Some idealistic researchers even started talking about the ‘end of history’, which implies the end of the historical development of men and nations. In this regard, I cannot but remember the way ‘the end of history’ was interpreted by the former Archbishop of Canterbury R. Williamson in his book *Dostoevsky*.

However, euphoria in international relations did not last long due to results of the first decade of the present century followed by the global financial and economic crisis. This leads to the conclusion that speculations about the ‘end of history’ rather forebode some serious collisions.

Neo-liberalism caused a series of profound changes affecting social development and established the principles of political correctness and the dictatorship of minority. Certain ‘entitlement’ typical of the trend led to ousting from public consciousness a whole set of traditional values

shared by the majority of people, which is sometimes the 'silent majority'.

It is noteworthy that the liberalism of this kind possesses such distinctive features as unacceptance of dissent as well as quite radical forms of imposing its point of view, with authorities' eager encouragement. It does bring to mind nihilism including materialism bordering on absurdity, which confines human nature to purely consumer needs. George Orwell very convincingly described where such social engineering could lead.

I would like to quote President Putin's recent address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation who said that 'the government's attempts to invade people's principles and views is surely a manifestation of totalitarianism' and that 'morality cannot be established by law'. And it is what is happening today, albeit denied officially.

As a result, cultural and moral space of the society started to blur, its fundamental ideas being distorted. This takes place in the context of the increasing role of religion all over the world including the Islamic nations. Here we are talking of seeking a common denominator for all cultures and civilizations necessary to promote mutual understanding in the modern world. As early as in 2006, Madeleine Albright wrote in her book *The Mighty and the Almighty* that everyone 'should turn in equal measure to transcendental issues of history, self-consciousness and faith'. It is more so because 'the three world monotheistic religions provide a rich tradition of overlapping principles, ethics and beliefs'.

In my opinion, the vision of society as a mechanistic social structure without its subtler spiritual and moral medium is fraught with pernicious consequences for the human activities and future society on the whole.

No wonder that in the modern world, maintaining the norms of morality and ethics is in increasing demand at all levels, both in the dialogue within one given nation and internationally. It is evident now that to establish and maintain a harmonious and fair system of international relations is impossible without traditional values. It is similar to what economies of the developed countries have experienced: as soon as the notorious 'Protestant ethics' wore out they collapsed.

Unfortunately, international relations of the last decade abounded in examples of hypocrisy, 'double standards' and even direct poorly disguised forgery. The age of gentlemen's agreements seems to have faded into oblivion and the relations are guided by the weathercock of fickle narrow-interpreted national interests and benefits, which is prone to change the direction any time and to nullify years-long experience of mutual rapport and partnership.

There is no doubt that such actions undermine the trustworthy nature of the cooperation absolutely necessary to withstand global challenges that threaten human existence itself. This is one of the major factors that make the world unstable. The above-mentioned threats tend to constantly spread and aggravate drawing into their orbit more and more new regions. Obviously, no nation is able to solve such problems solely without resorting to cooperation with its partners.

This only confirms the fact that there is no alternative to multilateral diplomacy and consistently necessitates the shaping of a unifying agenda in world affairs. Thus, there is a need to clearly define spiritual and moral guidelines

common to all sides to be laid as foundation of the joint pursuits of the global community.

This will in the long run define the prospects for a sustainable development of civilization. Particularly, only on these premises can one effectively withstand the displays of racism, xenophobia, intolerance, politicizing of inter-religious and inter-civilizational dialogue, all forms of radicalization including neo-Nazism. It is just part of those 'rules of the game' common for all, the rules which are much spoken of and written about but which, as a rule, lack broad and creative interpretation. Without this foundation, any law and order in the state is prone to fall apart. This holds true for international law as well.

One should also understand that any division and contraposition of moral values and human rights is out of the question, since the latter are directly derived from the former. It is this thesis that is used as basis for the UN Human Rights Council's resolution 'Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind' introduced by Russia in collaboration with over sixty other states including members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the League of Arab States. The Resolution points out an important role of the institution of family, society on the whole and education in establishing these values and urges states to support them in every possible way.

In this regard, a cause of regret is the position of the USA and a number of European countries that voted against the adoption of such a timely and sought-after document. Now of all times indeed, the universal values of morality are being particularly distorted and deprived of its original meaning by proponents of aggressive secularism, which is as intolerant as puritanical fanaticism so aptly described by Sir Walter Scott in his *Old Mortality*.

This is manifested in the absolutizing of human rights. For example, enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, freedom of speech, which is one of the key and unconditional attributes of individual rights, receives an arbitrary interpretation without reference to justice and respect for the views and beliefs of other people.

The above-mentioned views give rise to such phenomena as export of revolutions, invasion of other countries under the guise of a humanitarian aid, secret prisons in other countries. Instead of unification, these attempts too often leading to negative results, are aimed at unifying the world according to one single template, whether it is the development model or a set of values, i.e. they pursue a utopian goal of 'putting an end to history'. These artificial mechanical changes result in destroying unique ways of national history, in blurring social and cultural environment.

These irresponsible views on international relations should give way to a truly intellectual approach, imbued with the spirit of humanism, reflecting the fundamental integration of traditional moral values. And this is a matter of survival of all mankind.

Indeed, this message can be addressed to all countries, and, first of all, to the leading states, which carry the burden of responsibility for global security. According to Patriarch Cyril, 'The way to create good-neighbourly relations between peoples lies through the establishment of spiritual

and moral values that are fundamental to the existence of nations and civilizations.⁷

We can only hope that cultural and civilizational diversity of the modern world will manifest itself more and more to the full. The reverse side of globalization is the tendency to give greater meaning to the idea of civilizational identity. The desire to come back to one's civilizational roots is clearly seen in the events in the Middle East and North Africa, where political, social and economic renewal of the society involves the adoption of Islamic values. Other regions witness similar processes, which leads the issue of preventing standoffs between civilizations, promoting partnership of cultures, religions and civilizations to the forefront of world politics.

Truly combined efforts of the international community require the formation of a shared value system for joint actions, reliance on spiritual and moral common denominator that has always existed within the major world religions, including such principles and concepts as striving for peace and justice, dignity, freedom and responsibility, honesty, charity and hard work. Therefore, one of the main goals of Russian diplomacy, as stipulated in the updated Foreign Policy Concept approved by President Vladimir Putin in February 2013, is as follows, 'Promoting constructive dialogue and partnership between civilizations in order to strengthen mutual concord and enrichment of diverse cultures and religions.'

B. G. Yudin¹

HUMANISTIC VALUES IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSHUMANISM

Ideas and concepts of transhumanism nowadays attract more and more attention, and the transhumanist movement not only acquires more and more new and very ardent supporters, but also gets a variety of organizational forms for its scientific and technological projects, which are often very ambitious. On the platform of transhumanism, institutions of social and political nature are being established. In this situation it wouldn't be inappropriate to put the question how the traditional humanism and the new transhumanism relate to each other.

One of the outstanding advocates of transhumanist ideas, philosopher D.I. Dubrovsky claims with great concern that the modern man is doomed, that humanity is steadily moving to its death and that the only way to resist such a course of events is to take the most drastic measures. In this regard, he notes: 'The overwhelming scope of human activities directed at the outside world ... is an indispensable feature of all historical eras and of all nations, which indicates its dependence on human nature, that is, on genetic factors.'² From Dubrovsky's point of view, a man in his present form has exhausted himself, the author considers this fact to be the anthropological origin of the crisis. Therefore, by the middle of the century a condition of a dynamic chaos may evolve, followed by 'either degradation and destruction of the mankind, an anthropological catastrophe, or a completely new level of social self-organization'.³

According to D.I. Dubrovsky, this transition to a totally new stage can be performed either by changing the

biological nature of man by means of renovations in his genome, in order to 'change the objectives and ways of life'. Or, as the author continues, we will have to 'follow the way of placing a reasoning and social identity into the non-biological self-organizing system, i.e. to follow the way of transhumanist transformations'.⁴ We see, therefore, that in both cases, in both the biologic and the cybernetic project, it is necessary to go beyond the 'human, all too human'.

In this respect, it seems quite reasonable to consider the phenomenon of transhumanism from the viewpoint of humanistic values. It would also be beneficial if such a view was not biased in values. In other words, we do not intend to condemn transhumanism, as soon as we find its fundamental disagreement with humanism. It would be more important to discuss the issue of how these two positions correlate. In the first approximation, this issue can be interpreted as defining the boundary between the human being and a hypothetical creature that can be described as post-human, that is, as figuring out whether, and to what extent, we can consider a post-human to be a real human.

We should point out that our problem has quite an obvious value element, which is found when we put the following question: Is the creation of a post-human good? Or, in other words, how should we treat the concept of transhumanism in general? Indeed, in the value aspect transhumanism can be understood either as a continuation and development of humanist traditions (as long as man remains man), or, the other way around, as the overcoming of the values of humanism, the rejecting of the humanist traditions (taking into consideration the alleged profound differences between the new form of human from ours).

* * *

In the Manifesto of the Russian transhumanist movement transhumanism is described as 'a new humanistic worldview that not only asserts the value of the individual human life, but also the *possibility* and *desirability* – with the help of science and modern technologies – to infinitely evolve the personality, to go beyond the "natural" limits of human abilities'.⁵ In this definition, as we can see, transhumanism is understood as a humanistic worldview. However,

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² D.I. Dubrovsky. Biological roots of the anthropological crisis. What's next? // 'The Man', 2012, No. 6, p. 52.

³ Ibid, p. 53.

⁴ D. I. Dubrovsky. Op. cit., p. 53.

⁵ <http://www.transhumanism-russia.ru/content/view/10/8/>

a significant discrepancy reveals itself here. The point is that the Latin prefix 'trans' means 'across', 'beyond', 'through', 'transverse', that is, in this case it means *overcoming* humanism, but not the humanistic worldview.

In this respect, other definitions of transhumanism seem more sincere and yet more accurate. Here are some examples.¹

One of the leaders of transhumanism, Max More defines transhumanism as 'the kind of philosophies of life ... that tend to extend and accelerate the evolution of intelligent life beyond its current human forms and human limitations by means of science and technology, guided by such principles and values that promote life'. Here, as we can see, the supreme value of the human being is not a human, which is typical only of humanism, but the intelligent life.

Mitch Porter gives the following definition: 'Transhumanism is a doctrine according to which we can and must turn into something more than a human.'

From the point of view of Natasha Vita-More, 'transhumanism is a commitment to overcoming the limits that face a person in all their forms, including increasing life expectancy, increased intellectual capacity, the constantly increasing knowledge, achievement of full control over our personality and individuality and gaining the ability to leave this planet.'

According to Robin Hanson, 'Transhumanism is the concept that in the next hundred years new technologies can alter the world so that our descendants in many ways will not be people any more'.

Obviously, all these definitions state that the transhumanist movement is aimed at overcoming the limitations that are inherent in a man, it is aimed at going beyond human life, to the point that we may even cease to be human.

One of the principles of the Declaration adopted by the World Association of Transhumanism in 2009 reads as follows: 'We protect the welfare of everyone who has sensitivity, including humans, other animals, and any future artificial intelligences, modified life forms, or other types of intelligence, which may arise due to scientific and technological developments.'²

Here the status of man is equal to that of animals and various artificially created forms of life and intelligence. In other words, a man only serves as one of possible forms, one of the carriers of life, intelligence or mind. It is the latter, i.e. life, intelligence and mind, rather than a man, as it is typical of humanism, that have the top value. It is interesting to note that in the previous version of the Declaration (1998) it was stated that transhumanism 'includes many principles of modern humanism', but later this statement was omitted. One can assume that it showed the attempt to distance itself from humanism more thoroughly and unequivocally.

* * *

Generally speaking, the centre of the confrontation between supporters and opponents of transhumanism can be considered the disaccord of the two value systems of how man relates to nature. To explicate these systems, it is wise, first and foremost, to refer to the well-known opposition

of the 'natural' and the 'artificial'. Let us note that the two sides of this opposition, fundamental for any culture, bear a very powerful value-charge, which can be positive or negative for each of the opposed concepts.

(1) The 'natural' can be perceived as wild, undeveloped, alien, non-cultivated, chaotic, disorganized, irrational, as a source of dangers and threats. In this case the 'artificial', in contrast, will be considered as mastered, cultured and close, organized, ordered, and something that gives shelter and protection.

(2) Or, on the contrary, the 'natural' will serve as something that exists outside and beyond us, with its own laws and potentialities of its being, its own system, order and organization, as something that can be perceived not only as dead material for our activities, but as something valuable in itself, as well as something that we can behold, including the purpose to learn lessons from. Under this interpretation, what we mean by 'artificial' is just a secondary thing, obviously imperfect, a fake, just an imitation, more or less successful, of the 'natural', something that may bear the threat of destruction of the 'natural' (and therefore of itself).

Definition (1) may not seem very popular at present, especially in view of the wide awareness of the negative effects of human activities on the environment. But this apparent unpopularity in no way abolishes the fact that at the deeper levels of his consciousness a modern man is generally deeply committed to activities or, in other words, *technological* orientation, associated with his desire to somehow sort, organize, and make the chaos of the 'natural' serve his interests.

In this case the 'artificial' is not just something man-made, it is something defined and mediated not only technically, but also *rationally*, something that is designed, intended, containing and expressing *actual human* activities. Thus, to understand the opposition of the 'natural' and the 'artificial', it makes sense to distinguish between a naturalistic and activity-based orientation of consciousness.

In particular, one of the manifestations of the activity-based orientation can be considered the pathos that is sometimes associated with a radical rejection of the current situation. Naturalistic contemplation serves here as a synonym for a non-critical attitude to the existing social and cultural situation, recognizing its legitimacy, consent to it, conformism. The activity-based position, in contrast, will be associated with the imperative of fundamental disagreement with the status quo and, therefore, its radical transformation.

So, it makes sense to consider another value (and not just value) alternative: we can either focus on the value of the changes – and then we will find ourselves in the centre of the 'artificial', activity-based. Or we can rely upon the priority of values conservation and then we will find ourselves closer to the orientations of the 'natural', contemplative.

Now let us try to differentiate in more detail between the two value systems in respect to the natural world, including wildlife, and, which is especially important for us, the nature of man. One of these systems expresses the values of conservation and emphasizes the urge to preserve and protect the status quo, which can easily and irreversibly be destroyed by our rude and unreasonable actions.

¹ The following definitions are given by A. Sandberg: Sandberg, Anders (undated). Definitions of Transhumanism. <http://www.aleph.se/Trans/Intro/definitions.html>

² Transhumanist Declaration: <http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-declaration/>

Such motives are particularly evident in the perception of environmental issues and the directions where their solutions are sought. In particular, they manifest themselves in the cautious attitude to biotechnological interventions, such as the advent of genetically modified organisms in the environment.

Of course, for the sake of preservation, we have to make a lot of changes, but these changes are targeted at restoring some of the (perceived as natural) damaged or disturbed conditions, terms, structures, processes, functions.

Subject to the other value system, we can put our interests and desires ahead of the imperatives of preserving the natural environment (and not only natural, but our personal, as well). In this case, the nature is perceived primarily as a raw material to be changed in more or less radical ways concurrent to our intentions and by means of our technologies, so that we can achieve our goals. This means that, in the end, the nature is understood as something lacking its own inner value and worth.

This opposition of two value systems can be represented as confrontation of the position of a naturalist *observer* (tending to approach the ideal of a 'pure' observation as close as possible) who observes the phenomena of the external and internal world, on the one hand, and the position of the natural *scientist*, *i.e.* a researcher who performs an active intervention and, ultimately, produces changes in the world, on the other hand.

A brilliant advocate of the first position was J. Goethe, who called upon 'seeing things as they are'. Of course, today's sophisticated philosophy of science considers this position of a 'pure observer' to be too naïve, since it does not take into constructive abilities of our consciousness and, even more, of our very perception. However, this position, the position of 'worshiping the nature' (including Schweitzer's worship of life), despite its thoroughly analyzed weakness, does have some merit.

According to the principles of the observer position, we cognize the nature in order to understand its beauty, or to admire its perfection, or (in more recent versions) to try and save her. Nature exists by its own laws, and as such it deserves respect regardless of our desires and intentions.

The second position is often taken as the most adequate manifestation of the spirit of science as a study, first and foremost. In fact, the naturalist's science is a science of observation, description, classification, the science of *understanding the nature*, science of the existing. At the same time the researcher's science is the science of intervention, influence, experiment as the nature's trial, the science of change, the science of the possible. One of the most influential advocates of the second position was Karl Marx, particularly in his famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: 'Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is *to change it*.'¹

It is customary, and justly so, to interpret the word 'philosophers' in this aphorism widely, including all those who are especially involved in the explanation of the world, that is, first of all, scientists. Marx's criticism, therefore, is directed against the position that claims to explain the world as it is *per se*, without and beyond any human intervention.

¹ Marx's Theses on Feuerbach // K. Marx and F. Engels, Collected Works, 2nd ed. Moscow, 1955. V. 3. P. 4.

In the context of the previous theses on Feuerbach, it becomes clear that Marx, in fact, identifies such an 'explanatory' intention with the contemplative idea of preceding materialism. This identification, in general, is not quite valid, because there are a lot of concepts, according to which the explanation and the understanding of the world (or rather, of its separated elements) does not exist in the form of pure contemplation, but in the form of our effect on these elements, *i.e.* our interaction with the world, and hence our alteration of the world.

We can note that Marx himself did not hesitate to explain the world, especially after his attempt to change it had failed. And he succeeded in it greatly. But, be that as it may, in the 'Theses on Feuerbach' he quite clearly matched against two systems. On the one hand, it is a contemplative idea, a naturalistic one, aimed 'only' at explanation; on the other hand, the idea that focuses on changing the world and that can be interpreted as a technological, designing, engineering one, etc. It is absolutely clear that Marx preferred the latter.

Furthermore, we should point out that one very substantial issue remains open in Marx's interpretation: as soon as we act changing the world, will the truthful, genuine explanation be a result, a by-product, of our attempts to change the world, or does the quest for such an explanation make no sense? Marx himself was probably inclined to the former option, but let us emphasize that in the logic of his argument the latter option does not seem unacceptable at all.

* * *

We can now return to opposition between the supporters and the opponents of transhumanism, armed with distinction of the value of change and the value of preservation. A man serves as the object of change or preservation, a man whom we know from our everyday rather than scientific experience. And, accordingly, we are not interested in the natural environment, but in the human nature and its change/preservation.

It is obvious that the human nature, for transhumanists, is mostly an object of transformation up to most radical. From the viewpoint of their opponents, the human nature, on the contrary, has a value in itself and deserves to be treated carefully.

One of the most consistent proponents of this position was the above-mentioned F. Fukuyama. When, in 2004, the *Foreign Policy* journal appealed to the eight influential thinkers and asked to name the idea that threatens the mankind's well-being most of all, Fukuyama decided on transhumanism, describing it as follows:

'In the last decades, a strange liberation movement has evolved in the developed countries. The purpose of its crusaders leaves the goals of the civil right supporters, feminists and gay rights advocates far behind. They want no more and no less than to liberate the human race from its inherent biological limitations. According to the "transhumanists", people should rip out their biological life from the hands of the blind evolutionary process based on random variations and adaptation, and should go to the next stage of their species' development'.²

It should be emphasized that Fukuyama warns against the widespread humorously scornful treatment

² Francis Fukuyama. Transhumanism // The Foreign Policy, September 1, 2004.

of transhumanism, finding it necessary to treat it very seriously. He stated that transhumanists are often ignored as the followers of some weird cult, of some too seriously taken science fiction. At the first glance, the plans of some transhumanists to undergo the cryogenic freeze in the hope to revive in the future can only confirm that this movement is intellectually marginal.

He continues, 'But is a fundamental principle of transhumanism, according to which we will one day apply biotechnology to make ourselves stronger, smarter, less prone to violence and with a longer life expectancy, so absurd? Some forms of transhumanism are implicitly present in the themes of research in modern biomedicine. New procedures and technology resulting from research labs and hospitals, such as mood-altering tablets, drugs for muscle training or selective purges of memory, prenatal genetic screening and gene therapy, can easily be used not only to relieve or cure the disease, but also to "improve" the human species.'¹

As Fukuyama writes further on, the human race is certainly fairly miserable, with our severe diseases, physical limitations, too short lives. And if we add, so typical of

people, with envy, lust for violence, constant concerns, then the transhumanist project starts to look quite reasonable. Be it technologically possible, why not go beyond the limits of our current species? 'This apparent rationality of the project, especially when we perceive only small improvements is dangerous in itself. The society will hardly fall under the spell of transhumanist worldview so abruptly. It is quite possible, however, that we will be little by little pecking the tempting gifts of biotechnology, not realizing that we will have to pay for them a monstrous moral price.'²

Even taking into account all multiple imperfections of the human race, we should still treat the projects of its biotechnological alteration with extreme caution (as, indeed, any other alteration). It seems that as long as we believe that human nature is valuable, that it requires protection, we will remain in the domain of humanism. If we believe that the highest value is life longevity, or health, or physical, mental or intellectual characteristics, for the sake of which we can alter the person and create a post-human, then we will find ourselves closer to anti-humanism rather than super-humanism.

A. S. Zapesotsky³

TRANSFORMATIONS OF CULTURE: PRODUCING MEANINGS AND MANAGING INFORMATION FLOWS

1. The Cultural Crisis as the Crisis of the Humanity

The culture of the United States, the European Union and, particularly, of Russia is now experiencing a tragedy of dramatic collapse, whose specific features are identified in a broad range of research. New generations who have come into their childhood and youth in recent decades radically differ from their fathers and grandfathers. These differences are fundamental: they result from the system of values that approve of activity goals, they originate in the meanings of basic worldview universals, in the perception of the good and evil, in the worldview. The new type of man is moulded by social practices of the new age, by the new culture, which, as compared to the previous one, can be characterized as culture of degradation and decline. The information flows have become the key factor in the transformation of culture,

¹ Fukuyama F. Op. cit.

² Ibid.

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they have destroyed cultural continuity between generations and are creating another, quite distinctive cultural system. Unfortunately, it can hardly be considered the mainstream development of world civilization.

2. The 'Information-Oriented Society' as New Barbarity

The 20th-century academic thought gave very little credence to the value of scientific and technological progress, the idea of victory of man over nature. The danger of natural resources depletion, different ways of environmental pollution and destruction of nature itself became quite apparent.

Nowadays, we can see conspicuous detrimental tendencies of another round of this progress, coming from the development of information and communication technologies and the formation of the 'information-oriented society'. One would think that the market economy coupled with political democracy, freedom of speech and access to information could offer a whole bunch of golden opportunities for the progress of man and culture, or discover new fascinating prospects for the crest of humanism and spirituality.

But in real life, no such rise happens, rather quite the opposite occurs. In global politics, the system of international law, earlier established with great efforts, is being ruined – it is being substituted by the rule of force. New savagery and neo-barbarity are administered allegedly to defend the true values, created by mankind during thousands of years of development. But in reality these values are severely violated. Triggered from the outside, ethnic and religious conflicts provoked the genocide in Yugoslavia, while a direct NATO military intervention with bombing of civilians collapsed the country. A groundless occupation of Iraq was accompanied by the destruction of

great treasures of the world civilization, and the country was plunged into an interconfessional war, bringing death to tens and hundreds of civilians every day. External intervention is destroying Lebanon and Syria, accompanied by tens of thousands of civilian casualties. Captures of the heads of independent states, who are then given into the hands of hostile tribes for tortures and executions, kidnapped citizens of other countries all over the world, tortures at Guantanamo, embezzlement in banks and such like activities are performed under the control of the legitimate governments and parliaments, the judicial authorities of the West, but, which is more important, under the approval of the majority of citizens of these countries.

As far as 40–50 years ago such things were not possible. The western evolution towards the ‘consumer society’ in the late 1960s resulted in a youth revolution, and the Vietnam War sent into political oblivion a whole layer of the U.S. elite. Nowadays justification and approval of crimes against humanity, compared in scale with fascist prisoners camps atrocities, has become the norm for millions of citizens of the ‘advanced’ countries of the West.

How could that become possible today? That is the problem that the participants of the International Likhachov Conference should analyze. I believe it is not a rhetorical question. This issue refers to radical changes in the sphere of global social production, to fundamental changes in the development of global and national cultures.

A few decades ago public, the opinion was formed by university professors, scientists, writers and thinkers. Now it is formed by the owners of information corporations, by ‘money-bags’ linked to the bureaucrats. Hundreds of millions of people around the world are turning into puppets in the hands of the puppeteers. These fundamental shifts and changes should be revealed and analyzed.

3. The Breakdown of Russian Culture

The course of events in our country gives no fewer facts for that. Neo-barbarity celebrates its triumph in almost everything, be it choosing a site for the construction of a new stage of the Mariinsky Theatre or the introduction of the Uniformed State Exam into schools, or the exclusion of great Russian literature from school curricula, or trade in fake medicines in pharmacies, the replacement of bronze decorative elements with plastic ones during the Bolshoi Theatre reconstruction, or proclamation of universities as profit-making organizations that have to bring profits. Asphalt for roads is replaced in Russia with its imitation. Involvement of children in physical education at school is substituted by teaching cheer-leaders movements. In education, the transition from bringing up a creator to forming a qualified consumer is officially proclaimed. In main spheres of business and public life, conscience is substituted with fear. The mentors of life are not parents and teachers, not Leo Tolstoy and Dmitry Likhachov, but rather the Audit Chamber and the Investigation Committee.

We should admit that aspiring to Western values, Russia has found itself at the forefront of modern neo-barbarity, having ruined its own system of cultural continuity. Beside the old great Russian culture, fading as the Soviet generations are leaving the historic arena, a completely different culture has evolved, that has nothing in common with the old culture. It is a rotten decaying culture that ruins traditional cultural values.

Recently, one of the winners of the beauty contest, a wife of a famous football player and, perhaps, a good mother for her children, became the object of mockery of the Russian state television. She did not know that the Earth goes round the Sun. But this lack of knowledge is a norm for Russian citizens. A great part of the population does not know why you must not hit children at pedestrian crossings, fly aircraft when you are drunk, roast passers-by on the Eternal Fire. And for the newly-established pillars of the society, masterpieces of the human spirit are a picture of a penis made by the group ‘War’ on a bridge across the Neva, nominated for the State Prize of the Ministry of Culture, TV series ‘The School’, that received the highest award of the Russian Television Academy ‘TAFY-2010’ and a the so-called ‘punk prayer’ of the group ‘Pussy Riot’, nominated for all possible awards by our home-grown democrats.

How can it become possible in the country of Pushkin and Sholokhov, Tchaikovsky and Prokofiev, Eisenstein and Kozintsev? It is sufficient to compare the series ‘The School’ with the motion picture ‘We’ll Live Till Monday’ in order to realize the enormous gap created over the last 20–25 years between the great Russian culture and the one imposed on the society now. Within two decades a total shift of values has happened, a new type of human reproduction is being performed, who is significantly lower-cultured than people of the Soviet time.

Has the history of our country again chosen a vicious path accidentally or do some fundamental laws form the base of the current social processes? What is happening to the values and meanings in culture of modern societies of the Western type that are developing on the spiritual and moral platform of Christianity? It is already obvious that the most advanced part of the Christian world is experiencing a profound crisis. And Russia seems to have penetrated into it extremely deeply. What is the core essence and causes of this crisis? This is another issue for participants of the Likhachov Conference to ponder upon.

Meanwhile, we witness that Huntington’s sombre prophecy on the war of civilizations has come true. Asian countries are erecting barriers to stop the influence of the West which they regard as pestiferous. These countries are extremely cautious in respect to all forms of lifestyle of the West. We must bitterly admit that in China, for example, research institutions were set up, whose main task is to analyze the mistakes of the Soviet Union and modern Russia in order not to repeat them in their own development. Such is the attitude to the Western way, to the Western values in the countries professing Buddhist and Confucian philosophy.

The Muslim world has claimed a real proper war against the West, which resulted from the opposition to the basic values in their modern Western interpretation. The Muslim world actively criticizes the western propagation of the same-sex sexual relations, the modern understanding of women and families, drug addiction, alcoholism, social injustice, distribution of mass culture products and rampant pollution of the environment, economic exploitation of people outside the ‘golden billion’.

All over the world, the West is becoming synonymous with lies and deception, speculation on traditional values. It is indicative that even the Latin America (the countries of the Christian world) does not want to move in the wake of the USA and the EU, or to be influenced by them.

4. Values and Meanings

The dispute between the West and the rest of the world does not focus so much on values, but rather on the hierarchies of values, systems of values and meanings ascribed to the concepts of certain values in terms of different cultures.

At any given moment of history, the culture of any society contains a specific set of values and their hierarchy. Their system serves as the highest level of social regulation. The breakdown of current system and formation of another social and economic system (whose milestone in Russia was in 1991) suggests a dramatic change in the value system. However, this can not be performed overnight. The value system is firmly rooted in one way or another in the minds of every member of society. It makes the basis of their world view, their picture of the world. The value system is fundamental for setting goals for a person's activities. People match all their conventional activities to their value system. Their own deeds and those of others are estimated in terms of their compliance with his ideas of the right and wrong, the true and false, the beauty or ugliness, the fair or unfair, the allowed or forbidden.

Values are subject to the influence of social relations. In the individual perception of reality they act as properties of objects and phenomena, but are innate, given by internal objective properties of objects, but rather they result from their involvement in the public life of people.

5. Values and Meanings as Products

Values and meanings nowadays are manufactured as products, but it only happens in the minds of people rather than in the material world. Moreover, this type of production is gradually taking more and more place compared to production of industrial goods in the social production structure.

Potentials of information systems are rapidly expanding. In this regard, creation, design and management of information processes, ways to involve people to them are becoming increasingly important in the development of the global, national, local and individual cultures, together with the process of cultural values creation (social, technical, art and other innovations).

The current situation is characterized not only by the increased scope of information flows circulating in the society, and enhanced power of information systems. Other changes do occur, too. The early bourgeois society with its free competition and spontaneous compulsion of economic instruments, with its marketing of private interests of business entities is replaced with 'information-oriented society' – the state-monopoly production enterprise that covers not only the material sphere, but consciousness of people too.

Manufacture of meanings that emerge in human consciousness is being transformed into an independent branch of industry which pierces all traditional areas of production. Industry of meanings is being formed. The philosophical basis for comprehension of events was formulated by Merab Mamardashvili, who described the changes in the ratio between the effect of social economic laws and mechanisms of people consciousness in our age. [1]

By the end of the twentieth century, democratic ways of social life arrangement were increasingly beginning

to feel strain and gave way to hidden forms of control of economic development and socio-cultural processes by the ruling elites. Information flows serve as the most important instruments of such control. It is known that 90 to 95 per cent of world news is produced by three U.S. corporations that are de facto under control of the country authorities. In China, the governmental bodies officially recognize their control over spread of information, etc. The media play a crucial role among various institutions that manage information flows. Compared to other social institutions, the media effect on people's minds and on general status of national cultures has been steadily rising and so far has reached unprecedented levels. In many respects, this effect outweighs the effect of all other factors combined.

6. The Shift from Bringing Up a Creator to Forming a Consumer

Russia nowadays accomplished the transition from cultural paradigms of the past to the new information order. The past century, despite its massive genocide against the intellectual and cultural elite, was marked by the greatest rise of creative, scientific and philosophical thought.

It was the last century that brought up and invigorated a whole galaxy of outstanding scholars, prominent figures in science and arts, whose humanistic ideals and endeavours brought national science and culture to a new level. At that time, the ideals of humanism and enlightenment became landmarks for the mass culture, and their creators became regent of the dreams of the Russian society. Several generations of Russians grew up in a society where knowledge, bright thought, new concepts and intelligence were really valued. Generations of creators were brought up. These people ensured the greatness of Russian science, education, culture, and, in fact, make a vivid link with the fundamentals of the great Russian culture. Despite all obstacles arisen under the influence of the commanding administrative system, they preserved the pursuit to creative re-thinking of data in terms of reality. It is due to their efforts that in the post-Soviet Russian the humanities made another forward.

It is a known fact that development of culture and civilization in the 20th century in the Soviet Union was largely affected by limited information, primacy of ideology over creative freedom and total control over the activities of mass communications system. But under a strong governmental support of science, culture and education, this led to strengthening and development of educational and cultural self-sufficiency, encyclopaedic knowledge of scientific researchers, flexibility of specialists' creative training, sometimes with a serious lack of information. A cultural figure was to have fundamental and perhaps comprehensive knowledge in order to act and create successfully. The fact that such people lived in the society indicated the greatest crest of spirit.

Modern times presented a new type of personality: a poorly educated man, floating on the waves of information flow under the influence of the prevailing trends. Moreover, a whole layer of ignorant people became involved in the power, and began to make a significant and sometimes decisive effect on adoption of crucial decisions for the country.

Backed up by the state, the mass media pushed back, and in many respects replaced Russian education system.

The last decades resulted in bringing up a new generation, who is targeted not at creativity but at consumption. Millions of young people are now unfamiliar with the great achievements of Russian culture. They have not read the most important books, have not experienced the most important spiritual meanings, have not established a worldview system. Being largely products of the modern system of mass communication, these people are incapable of making decisions, creating something new, living and operating in a culture field. They are eagerly waiting for the media to provide them with new recommendations and tips, plans of action, ways of perception and interpretation of the social reality. They are unable to formulate a coherent picture of the world in their mind. Their thinking has a clip character.

Modern information-oriented society sacrificed ideals of enlightenment and spiritual guidance of the past for the market. Nowadays it has turned out to be profitable to impose and replicate samples of low-grade culture for mass consumption using social technologies. Today's media market is only able to pay for the low-standard cultural products. The main task of the modern 'information society' is an increase in the rate of decision-making not only in a consumption sphere, but also in social life. And under current conditions, the mass media system is not only constantly using manipulative socio-cultural technologies in the field of cultural production, it is becoming manipulative itself.

Mass media have learned to design information priorities effectively and provide right perception of the information interpreted as the authorities require. The growing role of the government and business institutions results from that. Now, when laws are adopted, complex government decisions are taken, large-scale economic projects are implemented, the system of mass communications, controlled by the authorities, quickly and effectively moulds public opinion as necessary. Modern technologies do not only enable the transmitting of information itself, but also cognitive algorithms of information processing, they do not impose final decisions by a direct violence, but rather theatricalise the algorithm of choice and target solutions. The interpretation of reality, meaning are imposed on people.

The authorities will not benefit from bringing up a smart person, intelligent and competent in various fields of human activity. Because such a man shall question public priorities and targets which the authorities are concerned with. He shall take nothing for granted, he shall critically re-think and look for his own solutions, thus an educated man has even become hazardous: it will take too much time and money to inform him and persuade, he demands too much from the production of mass media. This man is too keen on self- production of meanings.

Electronic mass media give almost unlimited possibilities to a large-scaled formation of individual consciousness, by means of new technologies that make use of publicly available information almost automatic. This situation is fraught with many dangers, as it gives the owners of capital a chance to instantaneously purchase an audience of millions, and offers support to incompetent politicians and dishonest businessmen.

7. The Particular Role of Television

It is a well-known fact that nowadays over 30% of Russians do not participate personally in the cultural life of the country. [2] Some do not have a chance to visit

libraries, theatres, museums, concerts and exhibition halls in everyday life. Others do not have enough money. The cost of visiting a number of museums, for example, has increased by 10 times in the last 15 years. Still others do not have enough time and energy for leisure activities. Only about 8% of the population go to the cinema, 4% go to the concerts, 3% to the libraries, 2% visit museums, art exhibitions, 1% is involved in hobby societies and art clubs. However, Russians spend about 60% of their free time in front of the TV-sets. According to the 'Video International' firm the amount of average daily television audience varies in the range of 75–80% of the total population. [3]

Thus, since the 1990s the Russian federal TV channels have become a key, backbone element not only of the information field, but of the whole moral and spiritual sphere of the country. Formation of the world picture, human values system, scope of knowledge, attitude to life and its phenomena, structures of interest, motivation to a particular activity, elocution and culture of everyday behaviour, etc., and all other elements that used to be formed by parents, teachers, professors, figures of culture and art artists, outstanding writers, are nowadays performed by TV. It 'effectively controls all our culture by filtering it... It highlights certain elements of cultural phenomena in the total mass and ascribes them a special importance, increases the value of a single idea, devalues another, thus polarizing the entire field of culture. What does not fall into the channels of mass communication, nowadays has almost no influence on the society development.' [4] These words were said by the Western scholar about Western television about 40 years ago, but today they are even more relevant in terms of the contemporary Russian media.

It is known that television does not inform the viewer of the reality, but gives its own interpretation, moreover, it creates a different 'reality' in the minds of the audience: 'Television is production, is a factory of meanings. It censors reality, which has a number of different simulators, hollow, insubstantial and other structures. The format is the gadget for us to perceive the reality. It is never a "raw" event. Television has no raw events, not even if they conduct a live broadcast from the place.' [5]

Allegedly meeting the needs of the population, the mass media satisfy the demand they create themselves. Karl Marx's formula is presented here, which states that our needs are manufactured the same way as products [6]. The mass media apply significant resources to explain their audience when and what kind of information products should be consumed. In this respect, their activities do not differ from advertisements of coffee, shampoo, towels, etc. It is naturally, for example, that the distribution leaders in the country are films, in whose advertisements the channels have invested tens of millions of dollars. Experts note that expectations and behaviour of people are formatted, designed, created.

Academician V.S. Styopin draws attention to a special role of tacit knowledge in culture: '...this kind of un-reflected knowledge plays a crucial role in reproduction and development even of such a rational way of perceiving the world as science. Tacit knowledge is, first of all, patterns of activity. They are often difficult to describe, even in the form of instructions, but they are absorbed and in-taken by imitation. In everyday life patterns of activity, behaviour and communication are an essential component to reproduce

a particular lifestyle. Imitating, people scan each other's programs of conduct and activities, as it were. In all these situations an acting person is carrying out behavioural acts which are used as a model by others, which function as a semiotic system.' [7] Tacit knowledge, broadcast by television, is transforming the Russian culture.

Virtually all research of qualitative behaviour of the population held in this country in recent years, shows a rapid regression of the main parameters. [8] And if the task of researchers included assessment of regression factors, the influence of the leading federal television channels take the first place. Television sets the direction of society development and imposes certain behaviour models on the population, which later are implemented.

8. Advertising as Ideology of a Consumption Society

It is particularly important how advertisement content makes an impact on the viewer. From a formal point of view, advertising is a way to inform the public about the products and services offered by the seller. Other aspects of advertising impact on the population tend to remain in the shadows. Meanwhile, in this country since the early 1990s, advertising has taken an ideological niche in the mass consciousness, destroying and reconstructing fundamental philosophical values of the population. Due to it nowadays a fundamental re-orientation of young people preferences from non-material values to material ones is happening. Salary is established as the main motive of labour, pushing away such values as work content, self-determination in work, ability to apply knowledge and skills in work. Influenced by advertising, the concept of 'learn to live' is reduced for the young to 'possession': to wear fashionable clothes, to visit expensive clubs and discos, not bother themselves with hard work. The concept of happiness, meaning of life, is changing. It turns out that advertising for a child is primarily the simplest model of getting knowledge about society. This is something he faces every day, that entertains, captivates, plays with the child. Modern advertising in Russia is changing the model of correct social behaviour.

Promotion of certain behavioural models leads to the fact that they are taken as standard. Watching the behaviour of famous people, children adopt their gestures, articulation, appearance, words as a model. Offering a particular behaviour in society, advertising focuses children on social involvement and referentiality. A child's psyche is very specific. A child is not always able to evaluate critically cultural elements, values that are promoted by the mass media, but more often he absorbs them and copies the imposed samples. Mass activity in Russia is artificially directed to a consumption sphere, and our society is turning into a 'consumption society'. Advertising becomes an ideology of consumption and a sort of socialization institution, that moulds and designs the man suitable to it, 'Homo Consumens'.

Particularly tragic is the situation of the youth, on whom a radical cultural gap with the previous generations is imposed. A similar situation existed in theory, but has never been implemented on such a scale before.

9. Immorality as an Essential Feature of the New Culture

For about the last 20 years Russian mass media have been performing the role of the chief architect of the new

national culture. Strictly speaking, the new culture does not spring up out of the old one, it is not created by the modernization of the old one, but is created by denying or ignoring the past. Apical points are not the basic values of Russian society, rooted deeply in many centuries of Russian culture, but rather subcultural formations like glamour, the subculture of 'new Russian'.

Figuratively speaking, the mass media create new culture not as bases on the old one, but aside of it, on smithereens of cultural elements that have already been proved to be ineffective and rejected by mankind. The mass media take cultural elements for further processing, packaging and distribution to the public. The closest analogy of such a result is the Ancient Rome of the degradation and decline era that was actually taken as a model by Moscow's 'elite' in the early 1990s. For the first time in a thousand years Russia has ceased to be a Christian nation, having descended rapidly into paganism. In the 1990s, the authorities excluded the moral from the functions of the state, and even Putin's strong personal commitment to the principles of morality did not alter the situation on the whole: nowadays the Russian government is based only 'on the letter of the law' and ignores morality. Immorality has become the backbone of modern Russian society and its culture. And the mass media has played the role of the main instrument in this situation. The other side of the same process is replacement of folk culture to the mass one, the so-called pop culture. [9, 10] As a result, Russia has lost its great national culture as the mainstream of its development.

The universal decline of culture is accompanied by a decrease in the intellectual level of the population. Cultural degradation is becoming disastrous for the economy. Presidents of universities and professors are sounding the alarm almost everywhere: the general cultural level of enrolees does not allow to train specialists at the same high level. Employers universally complain about the lack of qualified personnel. In recent years, sociological studies have been demonstrating an increase in a welfare mentality of the youth, massive loss of motivation to study, work and self-development.

It can be stated that deformation in the mass influence system on the population in Russia has led to the fact that the 'consumer society', a metaphor used by the Western intellectuals to describe just one of the trends of modern Western society, has become a full-fledged characteristic of the situation. The country has a society that learned to consume, but can produce worse and worse.

The Russian government has formally ignored educational function of the mass media in recent years, which led to the phenomenon of 'down-selection', as the experts call it, a kind of negative education, when a the vile and inhumane is encouraged and cultivated in man. The systematic appeal to primitive animal instincts, involvement of primeval subconscious mechanisms usually repressed by culture, has a destructive influence on personality.

It should be noted that the Soviet system sought to bring up a creator, a moral personality of a creative type. The transition to an immoral person, the upbringing of 'Homo Consumens' does not leave Russia the chance to put into life a model of 'catching up' development in the economy and production sphere, not to mention the innovation development. In general, the type of degrading culture has wasting resources as its main content.

The system of mass media, prevailing in Russia for about 20 years, and its fruits have clearly affected the general cultural status of the nation. On December 22, 2008 the General Assembly of the Russian Academy of Education adopted an appeal to the country authorities on mass media activities, it pointed out the necessity to perform large-scale changes in spiritual and moral sphere of the country, whose backbone is currently mass media, and first and foremost, the federal channels. It was stated that the spiritual and moral rebirth of the country threatens its future. The appeals of many outstanding representatives of Russian intelligentsia to the authorities have the same meaning. The response to these appeals can be seen in the recent speeches of the state leaders, but no practical steps yet followed.

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CULTURE OF ST. PETERSBURG AS THE BASIS FOR CREATING THE CITY'S BRAND IN THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY

Nowadays, the major cities in the world endeavour to benefit from their own image, attracting tourists, students, investments, receiving finances from the budgets of their countries and international organizations. In the recent decades, a professional field of 'sites' marketing' has been expanding in the whole world, and it is creating a sound theoretical base for brand-makers for cities and other areas. These brands are becoming the most valued product in the world, where unification and standardization are dominating more and more. A city that wants to be competitive in today's standards should have its own distinct brand.

Various attempts were made to position St. Petersburg both in the past times and in the modern, post-Soviet period. In the 18th – 19th centuries St. Petersburg was an imperial capital with apparent European roots. The capital of a European power that extended its influence in the Caucasus, beyond the Urals, in Central Asia and in America the same way as England, France, Spain. In the Soviet period Leningrad was the cradle of the three revolutions, the birthplace of the revolutionary proletariat, the city of white nights and the Venice of the North. In the post-Soviet time the skill media following a political order imposed the image of a 'criminal capital' on St. Petersburg. In the '90s,

another concept appeared: 'St. Petersburg as the cultural capital of Russia'.

Nowadays, the main features of St. Petersburg that have to be approved of in the eyes of Russian and world public opinion, have not been clearly formulated yet, in spite of the fact that the city has its own history, philosophy, unique architectural landscape and a specific mentality of the residents.

According to the theory of image formation, a brand can only be made in the area where a city's strengths and the target groups' needs intersect. Only one aspect of positioning the city should be chosen of all possible ways as the leading, the principal one, and all target groups will be made aware of that.

The city cannot gain its identity and a firm brand, if, in the minds of its residents, it has one set of features, while outside St. Petersburg the features it translates are quite different. It is worth noting that residents of St. Petersburg largely have an extraordinary love of their city, they are proud of their affection for it. It is one of the prerequisites for St. Petersburg to obtain a new attractive and firm brand.

Unlike the image, which can be made artificially and have little to do with the reality, a real brand always has essential features of the promoted object. Thus, the positioning of St. Petersburg requires self-awareness and philosophical apprehension of the city, identification of characteristics and priorities of its residents.

The city history becomes important in creating a new way of positioning the city. The views of D.S. Likhachov on the reforms of Peter the Great and on the place of Petersburg in Russian and world culture might prove as interesting

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material to analyse. D.S. Likhachov understood history mostly as history of culture.¹ The prominent Russian scholar viewed Russian culture as part of the European culture, and history of Russia as part of the European history. He believed that Peter the Great's reforms did not actually convert Russia from Asia to Europe, but only accelerated its cultural development.²

It should also be pointed out that D.S. Likhachov considered culture in a broad sense, i.e., he included not only literature, arts and daily life, but also science, education, public-administrative structure, military system, engineering and technology into culture, in short, everything that was created by people manually and mentally.³

Historical and cultural meaning of establishing a new capital by Peter the Great was conversion of the country from the Middle Ages into the European Enlightenment. As head of the state, Peter I was keen on strengthening the might of the country, on presenting Russia as an influential power in the world arena. But putting his desire into life met a formidable obstacle, such as a comprehensive cultural backwardness of the country. The most serious problem and difference of Russia from other world powers was almost complete absence of its own science and university education. However, in the 18th century, education was significantly intensified (during the regency of princess Sophia, for example, the Slavic-Greek-Latin Academy was established), but the real turning point had not been obtained yet. One can't but agree with contemporary American researcher L. Hughes, who wrote in her book about the princess: 'Despite the promising progress ... we must admit that the state education and publishing in Russia left much to be desired by Western standards.'⁴

Peter the Great had to initiate a transition period for Russia from medieval religious culture to secular culture of the modernity. Due to a complicated international and domestic situation of the country, it was necessary to perform this transition decisively and in a very short time. As philosopher K.D. Kavelin brilliantly commented: 'Peter acted as a governor, a physician, a surgeon, who can't be blamed for harsh and violent measures... The urges were too immediate to conduct the reform slowly, quietly, relying on many years to come'.⁵

Tsar the Reformer managed to determine the right course for the country, and the direction of changes was a shift to the West, towards the likeness to Europe. Commitment to the West did not indicate an instinct for imitation. It was a target-oriented programme to master the factors required for the development of Russia, and to solve her inner problems.

Peter the Great's father, Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich, as defined by Canadian historian F. Lockgworth, was torn 'between the Byzantine exclusiveness and a passionate desire to be on equal foot with European manners; between Muscovite obscurantism and a rational world of science and

technology'.⁶ Peter the Great made the decisive choice, and unlike his predecessors, he turned his cultural initiatives into the state policy.

Researching the foundation and development of St. Petersburg, M.S. Kagan articulates an idea close to the one expressed by Y.M. Lotman and B.A. Uspensky, and prior to them by Vladimir Soloviev: in the history of Russian culture there were two decisive turning points, or two 'cultural revolutions', or two cultural 'outbursts' (in Lotman's terms), or two 'revolutions from the above' (in N.Y. Eidelman's terms): Christianization of Rus and the foundation of St. Petersburg. In both cases, the vast and powerful state, which lies on the European continent, between the East and the West, faced Europe by the will of its rulers: first to the dominant Christian religion there, and second to the secular culture of the Enlightenment. These two turning points in the destiny of the national culture objectively became the main milestones in its psychological, political, moral, and artistic development.⁷

It is these two events that are closely linked to the understanding of the status of 'the cultural capital' of Russia. In his books and articles devoted to St. Petersburg, M.S. Kagan essentially insisted that Russia historically originated as a country with bicentric culture, where during the three centuries alongside with changes in legal capitals, two cultural capitals existed, the two centres of spiritual attraction whose relations developed pursuant to the principle 'from confrontation to dialogue'. This bicentricity penetrates all spheres of culture and provides for the richness and diversity of its forms. The future of the national culture should be based on the dialogue of two cultural capitals, and it suggests preserving peculiar features of St. Petersburg and Moscow, and their mutual drive towards the unity of the national worldview.⁸ This idea formulated by the outstanding philosopher and scholar is essential for positioning St. Petersburg as a cultural capital.

The cultural history of St. Petersburg provides another wonderful item that can be used in the city's brand-making. This is how Tsar the Reformer, deliberately and steadfastly used a whole bunch of techniques to re-brand the whole state. First of all, Peter formed the image of St. Petersburg. This was done through his own lifestyle and lifestyles of the general public.

Superficially, Peter the Great's reforms were complete in all aspects, they transformed the whole style of life: state system and governance, the country's elite, the army, legislation, production sphere, everyday life, etc. But D.S. Likhachov selects and focuses on seemingly irrelevant features and events in the whirl of changes that resulted from the tireless work of Peter the Great.

Myth, image and symbol are the phenomena that significantly contributed to the success of Peter's reforms, the prominent scholar believed. The genius of Peter the Great, according to D.S. Likhachov, was revealed, first and foremost, in the radical and rapid change of public opinion: 'One of the peculiarities in all Peter's actions was that he managed to give a demonstrative nature (...) to everything he was doing. His indisputable achievement was a change

¹ Zapesotsky A.S. Dmitry Likhachov: The Diversity of Scientific Heritage // *Modern and Contemporary History*. 2007. No. 3. P. 37.

² Likhachov D.S. Peter's Reforms and the Development of Russian Culture // *Selected Works on Russian and World Culture*. St. Petersburg: SPbGUP, 2006. P. 168.

³ See, for example, Likhachov D.S. Culture as an integral environment // *Selected Works...* Pp. 348–363; Likhachov D.S. Declaration of the Rights of Culture // *Selected Works...* Pp. 390–397.

⁴ L. Hughes Princess Sophia. St. Petersburg: Grand, 2001. P. 33.

⁵ Peter the Great: Pro et Contra. Personality and Deeds of Peter I in the Evaluation of Russian Thinkers and Researchers: An Anthology. St. Petersburg: RHGI, 2001. P. 585.

⁶ Longworth Ph. Alexis: Tsar of All the Russians. New York: Franklin Watts, 1984. P. 117.

⁷ Kagan M.S. Peter's City in the History of Russian Culture. St. Petersburg: Paritet, 2006. P. 31.

⁸ Kagan M.S. The Cultural History of St. Petersburg: Courseware. St. Petersburg: SPbGUP, 2010. P. 316.

of the entire “semiotic system” of the ancient Rus. He changed the army, he changed the people, he changed the capital, deliberately moving it to the West, he replaced the Church-Slavonic script with a civil one.¹

Orders to wear European dress and new uniforms, to ‘shave’ beards, ‘to reform the entire civil and military terminology in the European manner, to recognize the European art’² were made not just to satisfy the monarch’s whims, as well as the ‘invention of a new Russian flag (the Dutch flag upside down)’, transition of the capital beyond the ancient native Russian lands, changes of habits of the upper classes, of the nature of entertainment, of the various ‘symbols and emblems’.³ Likhachov argued that ‘this change of the semiotic system’ boosted changes in culture. ‘It deliberately gave a meaningful direction to the processes that had occurred in a half-conscious form.’⁴ The severance from the semiotics of the previous period of Russian cultural life was not only logical, but also deliberate and, in fact, emphasised: ‘Peter the Great was not the first to raise a dispute of a new Russia with the old Rus. But Peter was endeavouring in every way to make this dispute demonstrative. He tended (...) to generate awareness in the minds of his contemporaries about the depth of the breakthrough. (...) All the changes were performed in a demonstrative form.’⁵

Meanwhile, the change of the semiotic system was far from being a simple task. It is a well-known fact that at the end of the 17th century Russia did not have modern mass media. In this regard, a special role was assigned to the administrative resources and the so-called people’s rumours.

The mechanism of the people’s rumour was launched, first and foremost, by establishing the lifestyle of the emperor and his entourage in a non-traditional way. ‘Peter constantly felt that he was under scrutiny of not only his people, but all of Europe as well. And he knew how to make (...) a demonstrative type (...) of his own figure,’ Likhachov wrote.⁶ And further, ‘he defiantly broke with the previous concepts of “a reverend tsar” and a grave royal court, by means of bringing working tools and machines into the palace, and establishing “The All-Joking, All-Drunken Synod”, communicating with skippers and carpenters, working in the shipyards and performing the duties of a bombardier. He destroyed ceremony and gravity.’⁷ For good reasons the sovereign ‘was seen as a creator of modern Russia, which seemed the complete opposite to the old one’.⁸ ‘Instead of a slow-moving ceremoniously detached Tsar of All Russia, with his lush titles and an opulent lifestyle, Peter the Great created an image of a hard-working tsar, carpenter-tsar, bombardier-tsar, tsar the teacher and the student, the educator and the researcher.’⁹ It is obvious that after he personally turned to science and crafts, the Tsar

raised their standing in the eyes of the people and made these studies prestigious in the society.

Peter the Great deliberately used the techniques that today we would unambiguously refer to the arsenal of PR. This is proved by his involvement in the preparation of his own biography and description of life-style, which took their place in the literature and in textbooks. A portrait became in Peter’s time the main genre of painting with an ulterior motive. It can be explained by implementation of PR goals to increase the influence of images of the tsar and his entourage. By the way, miniature portraits also served as efficiency decoration. Peter the Great also ordered to create his own full-length figure.

Absorbing the Western culture and technology, introducing them in the Fatherland, Peter I not only expanded the consciousness of his countrymen, but also presented a new image of his country and its ruler for the West. The tsar was fully aware that it was impossible to organize an open entry of foreigners to Moscow, where the European influence was stubbornly rejected. Peter the Great could only implement his plans in the new capital, which he took beyond the ancient native Russian lands. It demonstratively received a Dutch name, Sankt-Petersbough. St. Petersburg became an ‘ideal’ city, and foreigners judged all Russia on it, even though it took long for the country to get accustomed to the new capital. As early as in 1720, the Hanover resident wrote about St. Petersburg, that ‘given a few years that its construction had taken, it seems a miracle of the world’.¹⁰ Since Peter I’s time St. Petersburg has become not only a ‘window to Europe’, but also a door from Europe to Russia.

New corporate standards were constantly introduced into the daily life of the upper classes, who influenced the whole society as a result of such targeted implementation, the change of the semiotic system was perfectly realizing itself through the elements of lifestyle and leisure time of the elite. Peter I’s technique of the ‘cultural revolution’ can be represented as the following sequence of cultural influence: ‘eccentricities the tsar – the way of living of the court – the people’s rumour – the way of living of wider strata of the population.

In the first quarter of the 18th century by the tsar decree the first mass media, a newspaper and a magazine, began to be published in St. Petersburg. Also, hundreds of books were printed. Cultural symbols embedded by Peter the Great in the public consciousness, assumed the role of indicators, milestones on the way to improve a social status, career, wealth, social recognition. If you want to thrive, hurry up, show courage, wit, get an education, apply it in the service for the country. If you cannot do it yourself, get your children to serve Peter the Great’s cause. No wonder the country came to motion. It is a well-known fact that during Peter I’s reign Russia made a fast breakthrough in its development. The country turned to Enlightenment. The place of Russia and its role in international relations of the time changed radically. D. S. Likhachov gives some details from the work of historian M. M. Scherbatov, who calculated that to perform Peter the Great’s reforms without Peter, it would have taken seven generations, and that such reforms in Russia would only have ended in 1892.¹¹

¹ Likhachov D.S. Peter’s Reforms and the Development of Russian Culture // Selected Works... P.165.

² Ibid. P.168.

³ Likhachov D.S. Russian Culture of Modern times and Ancient Rus // Selected Works... P.182.

⁴ Likhachov D.S. Peter’s Reforms and the Development of Russian Culture // Selected Works... P.168.

⁵ Likhachov D.S. Russian Culture of Modern Times and Ancient Rus // Selected Works... P.182.

⁶ Likhachov D.S. Peter’s Reforms and the Development of Russian Culture // Selected Works... P.165.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Likhachov D.S. Russian Culture of Modern Times and Ancient Rus // Selected Works... P.172.

⁹ Ibid. P.182–183.

¹⁰ Kagan M.S. The Cultural History of St. Petersburg. P. 51.

¹¹ Likhachov D.S. Peter’s Reforms and the Development of Russian Culture // Selected Works... P.168.

Peter I's reforms and his successors' deeds resulted in the fact that St. Petersburg indisputably became the most European city in Russia, not only due to its geographical location, but also in its cultural and historical appearance. When making a new way of positioning, it is extremely important for the future image not to contradict, but to carry on and support the image the city represented before.

When the capital moved back to Moscow, the city ceased to be an administrative and financial centre of the country, but it continued to perform its cultural, educational and scientific functions. And despite the current weakening of St. Petersburg's positions in culture, it seems logical to highlight the concept of 'a cultural capital' as one of the key ones for its strategic promotion.

But, in the market conditions, is it worth while to consider St. Petersburg only in terms of its functioning as a cultural centre? Perhaps, it would be more promising to focus on the development of industry, or to think about re-targeting Petersburg into the biggest centre of business activity, especially if the city is beneficially located next to the Western countries? The city administration has pointed that out not once and has undertaken relevant actions. In theory, such strategic methods were possible, but they were missed in the early 1990s. The failure was caused by the economic inexperience of the then administration of St. Petersburg, and the overall situation for the development of these areas was unfavourable in the city on the Neva. As a result, up to the present, it has turned out that if Petersburg claims for the status of Russian national business centre, it will have to position itself as 'Moscow No. 2', because it is impossible to overtake the leader in business activity in close perspective.

That is why such features seem to be much more preferable for positioning St. Petersburg in a Russian and international context as the concentration of science, education and culture that has been rooted in its history since its foundation. It should be noted that Anatoly Sobchak was the first person to formulate this idea most actively, clearly and steadfastly in the post-Soviet period.

In the late 1990s, public attention was focused on an assertion of a specific cultural, scientific and educational potential of the megalopolis, it was very vividly and successfully embodied in the formula of the 'cultural capital of Russia', in terms of St. Petersburg's re-branding.

Not only had the Government realized this branding resource of St. Petersburg, but it also used it in order to create a new image of the country. The revival of Constantine's Palace and the establishment of the Presidential residence in it for receiving heads of other states, the celebration of the 300th anniversary of St. Petersburg, G8 summit, a series of bilateral summits are a chain of events that obviously have an image-creating aspect. They emphasize the image of St. Petersburg as one of the unique cultural capitals of the world and seem a well-established and consistently implemented public policy. It becomes evident from the programme of visits of heads of states to our city that President of Russia shows them greatest achievements of the world culture embodied in St. Petersburg. And it breaks the image of Russia as a wild, uncivilized, unpredictable country, which is impossible to do business with, in the minds of the most influential people in the world, of the

world elite, the image that was created and cultivated by many Western media sources. In this respect, Vladimir Putin, undoubtedly, continued Peter I's tradition, suggesting its modern interpretation to the country and the world.

However, rare though bright events are not sufficient for the rebranding of the city. St. Petersburg requires not only an accurate way of positioning, but also a well-adjusted strategy of presenting its own image to the target audiences. And here a number of serious new problems arise.

Without a distinct concept of positioning, St. Petersburg has experienced large-scaled spontaneous transformations over the past decades. The 'corporate culture' of the megalopolis has changed for the worse. For example, the city in the Soviet times had a special household culture that manifested itself in the appearance, behaviour and language of Leningraders. In the minds of modern St. Petersburg residents, urban values occupy less space, giving leadership to shoddy popular culture promoted by the federal television channels. Attractive personality of St. Petersburg residents (and hence, of the city itself), is vanishing, but it could be a part of a firm basis for its positioning.

In the historic centre of St. Petersburg, construction projects of multi-storey buildings are being carried out that destroy its visual appearance and come into conflict with old St. Petersburg cultural architectural dominants, such as the Admiralty, St. Isaac's Cathedral and St. Peter and St. Paul's Cathedral. But the visual symbols are most important elements of the city brand. People all over the world recognize London from the Big Ben, Paris from the Eiffel Tower, Rome from the Colosseum. In contrast to the cities mentioned above, Dubai is recognized by modern multi-storey buildings. And it is natural, because they were built in the desert, where there had been nothing before.

The solution to these problems requires a lot of resources and efficient leadership. Brand-making will cost the city much, but it is more expensive still to reject the brand-making. If history is any guide, mature investments will pay off in such cases in a period of five to twenty years.

A good way of positioning the city cannot be solved only by escalating its economic power, followed by allocation of a sum in the budget 'for propaganda'. Firstly, the relevant government institutions should clearly formulate the features of the image of St. Petersburg that are to be cultivated within the country and promoted to the world community. Secondly, the image must capture the minds of the elite, and then common citizens. Thirdly, a modern adequate set of tools should be employed for shaping the public opinion.

The selected positioning concept should not only evoke support of domestic audiences, but also comply with the state's vision. The state's conversion of St. Petersburg's mission into an element of Russian politics will promote success not only of the city but also of the whole country.

It is essential to emphasize that the opposition between Moscow and St. Petersburg, a kind of competition of the images of these two megalopolises in the public opinion of the country do not harm a comprehensive image of Russia. On the contrary, different images of the two cultural capitals complement each other, creating an overall impression of the cultural diversity and richness.

Yu. P. Zinchenko¹

PSYCHOLOGICAL SAFETY OF CHILDHOOD WITHIN THE SYSTEM OF ADULT VALUES AND THE CULTURE OF MODERN COMMUNICATION

1. Modern development of society is nowadays identified as a transitory stage to informational society where the civilization development is provided for by introspection of human intellect on the basis of communicative-informational technologies of the role of harmony between comfort and wellbeing of humans and preservation of the biological sphere as the main value of the human civilisation from the industrial society whose basic values involve accumulation of the manufacture capital and consummation of goods and natural resources.² This process is accompanied by replacement of the value-meaning paradigm of culture development. The society based on knowledge is regarded as the supreme goal of the modern society evolution.³ According to the intergovernmental program of the UNESCO 'Information for all',⁴ replacement of the value directive by the information is under way. If previously the problem of information availability was interpreted as technological and economic one, then nowadays it is interpreted as humanitarian, social and political that. Development of international informational politics is now under planning, the politics being oriented towards development of human intellectual resources, human creative potential, and informational culture of the personality on the basis of unrestricted and efficient access to information. The priority values now start including the freedom of informational flows, free access to information, and the informational diversity. However, the freedom without introduction of social responsibility standards to the value system of the informational interaction subjects leads to situation when modern informational space is rich in anti-cultural informational content posing a threat for health and vital activity of most people including children. This might lead to intergeneration gap in passing cultural values and meanings.

2. The social situation of development in modern informational society is characterized by a number of specific features begetting social risks of the loss of efficacy

by the socialisation institutes, processes of forming a stable hierarchy of the individual's notional constitutions. Primarily, they include the social anomie: disappearance/erosion of one value system of the society while the other one has not yet been formed. The intergeneration gap in values, the risks of the succession loss during these last twenty years have constituted a threat for the personality development. High social uncertainty, the 'social fluidity' of the society has predetermined the difficulties of professional, vital and personal self-determination and identity discovery in majority of modern children. The informational medium, at that, becomes one of the most important institutes of socialization of the new generation along with the institute of family and school, to some extent replacing the traditionally prevalent forms of socialization. Aggressiveness of some informational channels in foisting ambivalent ideals, personal choices, decisions and the way of actions on children and adolescents, manipulation with consciousness begetting a low level of psychological safety, difficulties in child's personal development, loss of the sense of 'irreversibility of life', clipped consciousness — all these factors constitute a far from complete list of problems generated by lack of conscientiousness specific for some producers of various informational products who allude to the priority of the values associated with the freedom of informational flows. Quite often these values imply freedom of spreading negative content carrying pornographic sites, demonstration of marginal style of life, extreme experiences associated with satisfying basic needs in various types of violence.

Psychology has accumulated large experience of studies dedicated to effects of negative meaning content upon health condition, mental condition, and behaviour of children and adolescents. Extensive number of the studies is dedicated to effects of the violence sights upon children's aggressive behaviour. One of serious consequences of constant watching the violence sights by children involves formation of the attitude toward them as the normal behaviour. The children become hard-hearted, incapable of feeling another's mental anguish, and they quite easily resort to violence in their games.

The six largest professional associations (American Academy of Paediatrics, American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, American Psychological Association, American Medical Association, American Academy of Family Physicians and American Psychiatric Association) warn of the negative effects of the media-violence on children. In children, manifestations of antisocial and aggressive behaviour rise, they become less sensitive to violence and to persons suffering from the violence. In addition, the children are afraid of becoming violence-victim and simultaneously they crave for watching more violence in entertainment and in real life. Moreover, the children start regarding violence as quite admissible means of conflict resolution.

If the violence is performed by a charismatic and attractive individual with whom the child identifies him- or herself, the individual being quite successful at that, then the effect of the violence becomes even greater.

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² Toffler A. *The Third Wave*. Moscow, AST Publishers, 1999.

³ Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society // *Diplomaticheskyy Vestnik*, 2000, No. 8. P. 51–56.

⁴ UNESCO 'Information for All' Programme. <http://www.ufap.ru>

The risks of socialization predetermining interaction of children and adolescents with the Internet are of particular significance. Namely, such risks might include the following: encountering untrue, dangerous and unlawful information capable of forming a distorted system of values, negative effect upon development of the individual, possibility of the Internet-dependence, negative effect upon mental health, damage to the physical health condition, depreciation of moral-ethical values, ousting and limitation of traditional forms of communication. In this connection, we may speak of appearance of a new social situation of the child individual development where the most important coordinate involves value-meaning contents of the informational-communicative technologies and, first of all, the Internet.

3. However, it would be wrong to ignore those new possibilities of the informational technologies, and the Internet in the first place, that significantly extend the zone of the child's nearest development. Modernising of the system of general and pre-school education implies changing of the educational paradigm to development of value-meaning sphere of the individual from the priority of the tasks of

mastering knowledge, know-how and skills. Solution of the foretold task may be successfully implemented by means of creation an educational developing informational medium on the basis of large spectrum of informational and educational resources and abilities: the Internet, mass-media, types of printed produce, etc. Under these conditions, development of children and adolescent media-competence, forming of informational culture providing the possibility of purposeful, sensible and adequate use of the information resources becomes the key task of media-education. Coming into being of the knowledge society based on the net technologies begets new forms of social interaction and integration of social practices and efficient activities of children and youth in space.

The positive key functions of the informational medium in socialization of the child include: introduction of the child to the world of culture; translation of social values, tasks, meanings, norms and rules; orienting of the child within the system of social and interpersonal roles and relations; forming of the informational culture, providing the child with emotional experience of the sense of accepting and safety.

Plenary Session

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: VALUES, MEANINGS, COMMUNICATIONS

May 16, 2013

Theatre Concert Hall of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Chairpersons:

- A. S. ZAPESOTSKY President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation, *Artist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation
- M. B. PIOTROWSKI Director of the State Hermitage, Chairman of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Arts, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor
- V. S. STYOPIN Head of the Section for Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and Law of the Department of Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences
- F. UNGER President of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg, Austria), Professor, Doctor, Honorary member of the Russian Academy of Arts

Speakers:

- N. S. BONDAR Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, LL.D., Professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation, *Lawyer Emeritus* of the Russian Federation
- V. Ye. CHUROV Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences
- A. A. GROMYKO Professor Faculty of World Politics at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History)
- R. GUERRA Doctor of Philology, University of Paris (France)
- G. A. HAJIYEV Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, LL.D., Professor, *Lawyer Emeritus* of the Russian Federation, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences
- Her Highness A. HAMILTON the Duchess of Abercorn (UK)
- H. KARZAI Founding Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (Afghanistan)
- M. I. KLEANDROV Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, LL.D., Professor, *Lawyer Emeritus* of the Russian Federation, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation
- G. B. KLEINER Vice Director of the Central Institute for Economics and Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor
- H. KÖCHLER International Progress Organization (Vienna), President; University of Innsbruck (Austria), Full Professor, Dr. Phil.
- P. van KRIEKEN Professor in International Law and Human Rights, Webster University (Leiden, the Netherlands), doctor
- A. I. KUZNETSOV Director of Historical Documents Department, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, candidate of sciences (History), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
- V. A. LEKTORSKY Head of the Department of Epistemology and Logic at the Institute for Philosophy (The Russian Academy of Sciences), academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor
- R. LEWIS President of the International Institute of Language and Cross-cultural Training 'Richard Lewis Communications' (UK), Professor

E. I. MAKAROV	Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, scientific director of the Centre for Monitoring and analysis of social and labour conflicts of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Honorary Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences
V. L. MAKAROV	Director of the Central Institute for Economics and Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor
J. A. MARCH	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Spain to the Russian Federation (2008–2011)
T. O'SHEA	Chancellor of Edinburgh University (UK), Doctor <i>honoris causa</i> of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Yu. S. SHEMSHUCHENKO	Director of V. M. Koretsky Institute for State and Law of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, academician of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, LL.D., Professor, honoured worker of science and technology of the Ukraine
K. TAPIOLA	Special Adviser to the Director-General of the International Labour office (Geneva, Switzerland)
V. A. TISHKOV	Director of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology named after N.N. Miklukho-Maklay of the Russian Academy of Sciences, head of the history Section of the Department of History and Philology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, <i>Scientist Emeritus</i> of the Russian Federation
M. L. TITARENKO	Director of the Institute for the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, <i>Scientist Emeritus</i> of the Russian Federation
P. P. TOLOCHKO	Director of the Institute for Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, academician of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor
Zh. T. TOSHCHENKO	Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dean of the Department of Sociology, Head of Chair of the Theory and History of Social Studies of the Russian State Humanitarian University, a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief-Editor of the journal 'Sociological Researches', Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor
V. T. TRETYAKOV	Dean of the Higher School (Department) of Television of the Lomonosov Moscow State University
Sh. WEBER	Professor of Economics at the Southern Methodist University (USA)
WU ENYUAN	Director of the Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies of the Academy of Social Sciences of China, Professor
XUE FUTSI	Head of the Department for Strategic Studies of the Institute of Russian, East European, and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Ph. D.
Yu. P. ZINCHENKO	Dean of the Department of Psychology, Head of Chair of Methodology of Psychology at Moscow State University named after M. V. Lomonosov, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Psychology), Professor, Honoured Fellow of Higher Professional Education of the Russian Federation

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Esteemed colleagues, dear friends! Since 1993, the University has been traditionally holding the annual Days of Science initiated by Dmitry Likhachov. In 2001, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin issued a decree in which one of the measures to perpetuate the memory of the late academician. The Days of Science at our University were given a status of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference. Today we celebrate the 20th anniversary of the Days of Science at our University and it is the 13th time that we have held them in the status of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference. One of the co-founders of the Likhachov Scientific Conference is the Congress of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia,

the organization that was registered in 1999 at the initiative of Dmitry Likhachov. Its Chairman is Mikhail Piotrowski, whom I give the floor to open the Conference.

M. B. PIOTROWSKI: — Distinguished colleagues, first I would like to extend my gratitude for gathering here. I believe what we're doing here is essential and urgent both publicly, and scientifically. In my capacity of the Chairman of the Congress of St. Petersburg intelligentsia I would like to say today that in the present time the intelligentsia is necessary. It might seem that everything has calmed down and the intelligentsia have done their job – no matter whether good or bad, hence we can live a normal life. There is a very

strong urge again for the intelligentsia again to take an active part (with all their errors), in public life (in particular pertaining to the dialogue of cultures), as the situation is growing more acute.

At present we are holding the Legal Forum, where based on the initiative of the museums there will be a special roundtable on blasphemy, an aggravating problem with regard to blasphemy. Is it a return to the Middle Ages, or the influence of other civilizations and the dialogue of cultures, or perhaps something else? This issue has always been very acute. We become keenly aware that the critical issues (of what is bad, what offends the aliens in a foreign culture) are important elements in the dialogue of cultures and multiculturalism, scolded today and allegedly failed. What has really failed is one of quite simple schemes, but its failure leads to very serious aftermaths. The events we are witnessing now in the Middle East and the civil war in Syria are the things resulted from the declaration that many cultures and their coexistence of should be smudged out of existence. There is a civil war. The result of the civil war in is the withdrawal of Christianity in the Middle East, its physical destruction that will lead to a completely irreparable consequences to the civilization as a whole, because that's where the roots of our civilization are, which one of fundamental civilization on Earth.

We are always talking about the 'dialogue of cultures', but there is a contradiction. Cultural dialogue is a dialogue between the two parties. And, perhaps, we should return to this meaning. The dialogue of cultures is very complex, one needs to understand all the restrictions in this dialogue. We were living through a very long period of euphoria when everything was a success, all cultures were willing to live together, and we even forgot that religious dialogue is next to impossible, because there are dogmas that can never be compromised. The only level to talk about it is where the position of Christianity is distinctly set out, how Christianity treats Judaism and Islam, and their convergence spots. Religious dialogue is very illustrative. The famous common prayers at Assisi at first was a prayer together, and then a prayer by the side, when representatives of different religions pray together.

We need to seek for those phenomena in the cultural sphere where convergence spots will work, because it's important to work, and not just to declare ideas. It is time to return to the word 'multiculturalism' in the form of a dialogue of cultures and to understand that it can be both an instrument of assimilation and unity, and an instrument of fragmentation and divergence. The classic example is the Jewish ghetto in medieval and past-medieval Europe, they were created as a means of protecting the identity, but they become a tool of oppression (if we put it in primitive historic terms). The same things are happening right now. In this case intelligent dialogue that has no fear of controversies might be and should be very important. And it is associated with practical things, namely with education, because it is education and study of existing differences that are extremely important and can really work.

I would like to talk about a really challenging issue for me, because museums (large-scale encyclopaedic ones) are the place where the dialogue of cultures is in practical operation, where people are talking about each other, learning and getting awareness about their own and alien culture. We have a very dangerous trend, more and more often muse-

ums, like all things in culture, are treated as service-makers, it is considered that their target is to entertain people, serve as a magnet for tourists and money. There are a lot of debates on it. However, a museum is a place where different cultures not only interact, but see their mirror reflection.

Nowadays there is a point of view that the situation is aggravating due to blasphemous attitude of Islam to other religions. Quite often Christians ask, 'Why do they care about integrity of their religion, while we do not care?' But their fanatical attitude to jihad inherent in some of the Muslims, wasn't begot by Islam, but rather by the Christian tradition to worship the history of the Crusades. The great good work here once again mirrored in different cultures. And everything Europeans say about Muslims is reversed to a dot in Muslims' words about Western culture (the oppression of women, materialism, paganism, and such like). And I believe the differences in these concepts have to be scaled on the level of an intelligent conversation, and we have to find some common ground.

One common ground is the concern for the cultural heritage. It is also a very complex issue, because cultural heritage is different. Cultural heritage can be destroyed for ideological reasons, the Christians destroyed the ancient monuments, the Protestants destroyed Catholic monuments, the French and Russian Revolution destroyed the religious monuments, the Taliban destroyed Buddha statues in Bamiyan, Muslim mausoleums were subject to destruction, because they did not meet the strict Islam, or Lenin monuments were destroyed in post-Soviet Russia. All these contradictions result from an important challenge of preservation of cultural heritage. Basically, we can find here not only a point of convergence, ground for some practical work as well, because cultural heritage should be preserved in various ways, in particular through turning ideological matters into museum ones.

The topic of destiny of Christianity in the Middle East can be close to everyone and easy to understand, because it is a part of civilization. Recently on one of the meetings the figures we were given figures of outcome, birth, destruction. In general, a really big part of the world is suddenly losing a very important element, which has always been inherently present, and without which the situation will change completely.

There are many other provocative topics that can also be discussed in intelligent manner in culture sphere. The famous American film 'Argo', which won an Oscar, is bad, to my mind, but its script is based on a good book. This book gives a story of a seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran and a rescue campaign of American diplomats. The book is very well written, and can find no bias and insulting in it. By the way, for us this theme is very close, although in our culture is not thoroughly developed. The seize our embassy in Tehran and the death of Griboyedov, is the plot that gives the right to discuss differences, convergence, and the chance to find some kind of cultural fixes. The point is that critical issues have to be raised, it is necessary to find the areas (and such areas do exist), where challenging issues do not mean hostility. Academic debate always have such a keen practical way, it sometimes makes us careful, but I guess there are some areas in which there is no need to be so careful. I think that at Likhachov Conference we will have many wonderful ideas. The result of the Conference will be distinctly seen when we are through with our debates, all the

results will be intelligent, because after all the intelligentsia is the salt of the earth.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you, Mikhail Borisovich. I call on academician Vyacheslav Semyonovich Styopin.

V. S. STYOPIN:¹ — The topic of our discussion is values and meanings. Why is it so important to talk about values nowadays in the modern dialogue of cultures? First, a problem arises how values, goals and meanings relate to each other. It is both a philosophical and logical problem, and it has plenty of shades of meanings. But I want to make a remark on the following. When it comes to people's activities, it is mandatory to have a purpose, as the purpose prompts us that result we have to gain. A purpose is a perfect image of the results of activities, that occurs before the required result is obtained and is kept in the conscious of the acting person. It is like a program regulates the actions themselves. But the purpose also has a foundation, provided by values. While the purpose gives an answer to the question, 'What do you have to gain from your activity?', the value responds to the question 'What for? Why are you doing all that? What is the basis for this?' Purposes are foundations for human life and activities and their implied meaning.

Values are hierarchical. In the very depths of the culture there are certain basic values and basic life meanings that create a picture of the human life-world, and every culture has its own picture. But there are differences between the pictures of the world in the traditionalist culture and in the technology-related culture that characterizes the modern society. Very often technology-related culture is referred to as a western one by the region of the origin, now this type of civilization has spread all over the world. The epochs of modernization have passed, new civilizations have evolved that conserved many of traditionalist values, but revised them through science, education, new technologies, involved in technological development. That is why they should be fixed, basically.

Why has the issue of fundamental values appeared nowadays? The point is that as far as in the middle of the last century, everyone believed that the way of civilization development would lead to the prosperity of mankind, that following this way humanity would evolve successfully, but suddenly crises began to escalate, ecological, anthropological. Nowadays, the more humanity develops the more engineering and technologies develop, and the more risks appear. And now a society of knowledge is referred to as a society risks. The question is

¹ Head of the Section of Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and Law of the Department for Social Sciences (the Russian Academy of Sciences), academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Chair of Philosophical Anthropology and Problems of Complex Study of Man at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of more than 500 scholarly publications, including 22 monographs: *Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Science* (Filosofskaya antropologiya i filosofiya nauki), *Philosophy of Science and Technology* (Filosofiya nauki i tehniki), *The Age of Changes and Scenarios for the Future* (Epoxa peremen i scenariyi budushego), *Theoretical Knowledge* (Teoreticheskoye znaniye), *Philosophy and Culture Universals* (Filosofiya i universalii kul'tury), *Philosophy of Science: Common Issues* (Filosofiya nauki: obshchiye problemy) and some others. Professor Styopin is President of the Russian Philosophic Society. Dr Styopin is a foreign member of National Academies of Sciences of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, a standing member of the International Institute (Academy) for Philosophy (Paris, 2001), doctor *honoris causa* of the University of Karlsruhe (Germany), Professor *Emeritus* of the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China (Beijing). Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology. He is decorated with the Orders of Friendship of Peoples, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th degree. Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

how the mankind can avoid these global crises, how to dampen them, if it is possible to find a way to escape these crises. They threaten us not with just local disasters, they threaten with the death of the entire civilization. And the values immediately become an acute issue. What lies behind this movement? What are the meanings of life and values like? What is the picture of the world like? What is perception of man, nature, power, personality like? What can be changed and what should not be altered? What will succeed to the future? These are the issues of the humanities. They have to be solved.

The complexity of the modern dialogue of cultures is that universal life values that are present in every cultural tradition are tightly linked with special features, that characterize the difference between the tradition in question and other traditions. And when it comes to, say, world religions, this link is so tight that you cannot separate them, sort out certain values and say, 'You recognize some commandments – thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal, respect your father, and we recognize them too'. This is the basis upon which we must agree. Right on the spot different interpretations of the meanings evolve and immediately discrimination begins.

It turned out that on this basis, only on fixing the universal values, especially inside each culture, it has been proved difficult to build a multicultural society. Leo Gumilyov used to write about the same issue: if a person has been socializing in a particular culture since his childhood (to the age of approximately 10 years old), when he moves to another cultural tradition, and is educated there he still will not be accepted as a native, because in childhood he had absorbed some literally socio-genetic purposes, principles, attitudes, habits that will distinguish him in a new cultural environment, no matter how much he wanted to join it and adapt to it. It is the principal difficulty.

Now we should seek for some new values, new life meanings and purposes. Many of the protests and today's clashes of cultures are resulted from the fact that not all cultures always accept the Western culture version, that emerged in all modern consumption societies of the West, societies of high consumption. And perhaps that is beneficial, because a society of high consumption, as Ervin Laszlo wrote, over the past 50 years has consumed more energy and material resources than ever before in its history. Therefore, it is impossible to escalate the level of consumption, the planet will not survive. If it is true, then the question arises about the search for new values. This search should happen in all cultures, the only thing to find is the points of origin of these new values. It is the task for us, the humanities. That is why, abstract research of philosophers, historians, literary critics, cultural studies researchers suddenly become relevant and practical and the most significant. Either we do that, and then we get a chance, or we fail to do this, and then disaster, clashes and deepening crisis of civilization will occur.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I would like to thank Vyacheslav Semyonovich for giving us the taste of excitement of his speech. I want to give the floor to academician Valery Alexandrovich Tishkov.

V. A. TISHKOV: — I would like to extend my thanks to you, Alexander Sergeyevich, for the invitation and for this grand event, which is held due to your efforts and efforts your associates and is really respected and has authority.

For various reasons (climate, history, business practices, and so on), the humanity begot cultural diversity, linguistic, religious, ethnic, and others. And the cultural diversity will always remain, just like the nature itself, it will thrive. If we all become the same and alike, there will be a kind of social entropy, a kind of social death of humanity. Therefore, basically, nothing vanishes in culture and even in ethnography that takes care of preserving conventions and customs of the so-called traditional culture, too, an awareness arises that tradition is yesterday's innovation, and today's innovation is tomorrow's tradition. For many decades our research and academic interest has been concerned largely with the establishment of cultural differences, with studying discrete units, be it people's ethnicity or any other regional or religious communities.

Nevertheless, in recent years we have become aware that obsession with establishing differences and ignoring similarities and integrity turned into realization of cultural complexity. Modern people and the human community are mono-cultural, and these cultural types are not tough and identical in their set of characteristics, cultural types are a complex and dynamically changing phenomenon, a constant cultural drift. And today, even the sphere of self-consciousness, which would seem very difficult to change, as the academician Styopin said, is actually changing. There is an idea that nowadays it is difficult for the majority of modern people to determine to which cultural tradition, especially in terms of ethnic traditions, a person belongs to, including the citizens of our country. In this respect, the cultural complexity of modern nations that are united under one sovereign power, by co-citizenship in the states, becomes a phenomenon to study, including in the context our own country. So far we have been unable to realize, who we, the Russian citizens, are, or if this term was invented by Yeltsin, or if it is a euphemism or it has an unknown origin, or if it is a tradition that dates back to Peter the Great. Feofan Prokopovich said: 'Who are we burying? Oh, Russians, we are burying Peter the Great.' By the way, one of the books by Dmitry Sergeyeovich Likhachov was entitled 'The National Consciousness of Ancient Rus', it is the concept of identity, collective consciousness, which has always been complicated and has never been monocultural since the very birth of our country. That is the issue I would like to draw your attention to.

The final point is trinity of modern culture. There are three powerful cultural streams that are at our disposal nowadays, of both an individual person, and of various communities: they are regional, ethnic and civil ones. It is the bottom layer of, relatively speaking, particular or ethnic culture, sometimes referred to as the traditional culture, which is reproduced at the level of small communities, by means of the transfer of information from one generation to another, rather than by professional production, it is what we sometimes call a popular culture, namely, in the spiritual culture it is the folklore, in the material it is food, clothing, housing, cultural practices, and so on.

To my mind, there is another very thick layer, the most powerful, the layer that determines national cultures, on governmental level, supported by the government, because without government support professional culture is not possible, and there is no training of specialists in the field of culture: in the (theatre, cinematography). Therefore, the national culture is probably the most powerful cross-section of

today's cultural environment, which at the same time has a powerful international influence.

There is a third layer, the so-called layer of global or the world mass culture, it has its own sovereign sources and forms, but at the same time it powerfully affects national cultures. If we take the Hollywood film industry as an example, it is both a global culture, hence, one of the forms of the world global culture, and it experiences, to some extent, the impact of a national culture, in this case an American culture. But, nevertheless, global culture is a very important layer, though we often disparage it or cast doubts on it, saying that it destroys our lives and our culture. Being a very important part, it must be recognized, respected and we should see not only negatives sides and risks, but also its great benefits, otherwise we will be out of touch with the real life and will not understand the things that have been essential for lives of the new generations of our people.

The dialogue of the three layers of culture is a very interesting thing, today the global and national cultures are hard to imagine without the ethno layer. Nowadays it is impossible to reach the heights and get the Grand Prix at the 'Eurovision' Song Contest and in the film production, if you do not use traditional elements, like Kusturica, Balkan or Gypsy tradition. At the 'Eurovision' Song Contest, Belarusian and Ukrainian artists or our pop band 'Buranovskiye Babushki' use ethno elements not only at a national, but in fact, at a global level. The 'Eurovision' Song Contest is one of the forms of mass global world culture. And this complex interaction does not break the integrity, it is even difficult to say which is more important. It's a most interesting phenomenon to think about and reflect upon. I wish the International Likhachov Conference success, and I am glad to participate in it.

M. B. PIOTROWSKI: — Let me give the floor to President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, a corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Professor Alexander Sergeyeovich Zapesotsky.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Esteemed colleagues, I will deliver my speech in two capacities, both as a scientist and as Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the Conference. Rendering the issue of intercultural dialogue in the context of values, meanings, communications, I was convinced, like my companions, that we have touched on a sore issue of both modern world development and the development of Russia.

Probably never before in the preparation of the Conference have we experienced such kinds of difficulties as this year. Probably, some general trends are being evolved in science, which should be reflected upon. A huge number of people want to speak on the issues of their own narrow-scale research. We more and more resemble the character of Kozma Prutkov's maxim, 'A specialist is like a swollen cheek'. The Organizing Committee received more than 500 applications, not including those from high school students (tomorrow the Forum of Russian high school students will be held), we rejected more than 300 of them due to irrelevant topics or we had to ask approximately half of the authors to revise their papers. This Conference is a scientific forum, and I extend my gratitude to those who submitted their papers, who revised their reports and also those

whose reports were not accepted, but who are present here. The number of accepted reports is about 200, but a much larger number of people are going to participate in the Conference.

We as scientists have to ponder upon the extent of our responsibility for the things happening in this life. As long as 30-40 years ago, scientists' voice was audible all over the world. For example, in the United States when the war in Vietnam was in progress. When the whole academic town Zelenograd near Moscow went to a demonstration against the communist government, the social-economic system of the country changed. Nowadays, scientists can still afford to consider that when something happens in the world, they bear no responsibility for that, it is up to the government to solve it, meanwhile, everything that is dear to us is being eliminated. Representatives of 32 countries participate in today's Conference, a very powerful group of distinguished scientists of the Russian Academy of Sciences is involved, as well as fellows of various universities of the country. Together we have to debate on the most pressing issues until they become urgent.

In regard to the theme of the Conference, I view it as extremely significant to articulate a few remarks. Beyond culture there can be no economics, arts, no scientific, technical and social disciplines. All of them are elements of culture. And now it is high time for experts on various disciplines to judge their activities in terms of how they are related to the general context of cultural development.

I believe that the cultures of the U.S., the EU and, particularly, Russia are living through a tragedy of a disastrous fracture, whose specific features are clearly visible without any further research, with the naked eye. New generations that came into their childhood and youth in recent decades, dramatically differ from their fathers and grandfathers. Those fundamental differences result form a system of values that ratifies activity goals, as Vyacheslav Semyonovich Styopin has remarked, they are rooted in the fundamental world-view universals, in the concept of the good and evil, in the picture of the world. Our picture of the world differs from that of the new generations, or better say, they perceive it in a different way. And, given the video-clip thinking, I do not think that their vision is more comprehensive or better.

Social practice of a new era is when new culture creates a new man. In terms of what we used to have, new culture can be defined as the culture of degradation and decay. And the key factor in this transformation of culture became information flows or, rather, their specific management. These flows destroyed the process of cultural continuity of generations, and they form a very peculiar cultural system. Things that are happening can hardly be considered the mainstream of development of the world civilization.

The scientific thought of the twentieth century made the values of scientific and technological progress very relative. Such as the idea of man's victory over the nature. It has become a relative value, because danger of natural resources depletion, environment pollution, destruction of nature grew quite apparent. Nowadays, detrimental trends of another stage of the progress are getting obvious, trends related to the development of information and communication technologies, to the evolution of the information society. It might seem that market economy, together with political democracy, freedom of expression and access to information

provides us broad and astounding opportunities for human development and culture, and new peaks of humanism and spirituality are discovered. In our childhood we have never dreamed of such information capabilities. But in real life no rise happens, something opposite occurs.

In global politics, the system of international law, established with great efforts, is being ruined. Savagery and the cult of force reigns, neo-barbarism is administered allegedly to defend the true values, created by mankind during thousands of years of development. Ethnic and religious conflicts are triggered from the outside, for example, the genocide in Yugoslavia. Then a direct NATO military intervention with bombing of civilians and collapse of the country followed. This was followed by a groundless violation of international law, the occupation of Iraq is accompanied by the destruction of great treasures of the world civilization. The destroyed cultural treasures are comparable to the Hermitage and the Louvre. I think, Mikhail Borisovich will support my assessment. The country is sinking into an inter-confessional war, bringing death to tens and hundreds of civilians every day. External intervention is destroying Lebanon and Syria, where tens of thousands of lives are sacrificed in the name of human rights. Capture of the heads of independent states happens before our eyes, who then are given into the hands of hostile tribes for massacres, citizens of other countries are being kidnapped all over the world, tortures at Guantanamo occur, embezzlement of funds in banks also takes place. Such activities are performed under the control of the legitimate governments and parliaments, the judicial authorities of the West, but what is more important, let us ponder about that, under the approval of the majority of citizens of these countries.

As far as 40-50 years ago such things were impossible. When the West began to evolve excessively towards the consumer society, in the 1960s, a youth revolution happened. The atrocities of the Vietnam War sent into political oblivion a whole layer of the U.S. elite, everyone resigned, they all were kicked away. Nowadays justification and approval of crimes against humanity has become the norm for millions of citizens of the advanced countries of the West. How could that become possible today? That is the problem that the participants of the Conference should analyze. This issue refers to radical changes in the sphere of global social production, in fundamental changes in the development of global and national cultures.

Today, public opinion is formed not by not university professors, scientists, writers and thinkers, but by the owners of information corporations, as a matter of fact, by 'money-bags', associated with the bureaucrats. Hundreds of millions of people around the world are turning into puppets in the hands of the puppeteers. And it might be not so dangerous if it had happened as in communist times, when we were manipulated quite often too, but manipulated in order to cultivate a person, to bring up something reasonable, good and eternal. Nowadays people are pushed into savagery.

The development of events in our country gives no less amount of facts for that. Neo-barbarism celebrates its triumph in almost everything, be it choosing a site for the construction of a new stage of the Mariinsky Theatre or the introduction of the Uniformed State Exam into schools, or exclusion of the great Russian literature from school curricula, or trade in fake medicines in pharmacies. Original

bronze decorative elements were replaced with plastic ones while repairing the Bolshoi Theatre. Universities are proclaimed as profit-making organizations that are supposed to bring money. Asphalt for road is replaced in Russia with its imitation. Involvement of children in physical education at school is substituted by teaching cheer-leaders movements. In the education, the transition from bringing up a creator to forming a qualified consumer is officially proclaimed. Conscience is substituted with fear. Be it fear of legal punishment, it is no good. Such a change occurs in all aspects of business and social life.

Aspiring to Western symbols, Russia has found itself at the forefront of modern neo-barbarism, having ruined its own system of cultural continuity. A young police college cadet who kills his neighbours, a mother and 12-year-old child because their water pipe leaks to his apartment. Teenagers fried a passer-by in the eternal flame, because he reprimanded them. Such messages are not something extraordinary, this is a characteristic of the almost typical education level of our young generation in its masses. Beside the great Russian culture, fading as the Soviet generations are leaving the historic arena, a completely different culture has evolved, that has nothing in common with the old culture. Recently, one of the winners of the beauty contest became the object of mockery of the Russian state television, because she did not know that the Earth goes round the Sun. This is a typical result of what happens in Russian culture and education. Subject to opinion polls 30% of our citizens do not know what rotates around what in the solar system. A great part of the population does not even know why you must not hit children at pedestrian crossings, or drive a car or fly an aircraft when you are drunk and so on. A masterpiece of the human spirit is a phallic graffiti made by the group 'War' on a bridge across the Neva, which was nominated for the State Prize, as well as TV-series 'School' that received the award of the Russian Television Academy in 2010 and a punk quasi-prayer of the group 'Pussy Riot', nominated for all possible awards by our home-grown democrats. Pushkin, Sholokhov, Tchaikovsky, Mendeleev or Alforyov mean nothing compared with the 'Pussy Riot'. For our generation, it is sufficient to compare the series 'School' with the film 'We'll Live Till Monday' in order to realize the enormous gap created over the last 20-25 years between the old and the new Russian culture. A total shift of values happens, a new type of human reproduction is being performed, this human is significantly lower-cultured than people of the Soviet time.

I respect Chairman of the Government D.A. Medvedev, I consider him a brilliant graduate of the once brilliant university, but some of his statements make me fall into a muse. Medvedev's opinions and dicta are the quintessence of our élite's sentiments. For example, 'The minister is not a silver piece to please everyone.' Let's ask if a silver piece is really the most important value in our lives? Don't we have other values, such as, for example, Fatherland, parents, public duty, and so on? I personally do not like either a ruble or a dollar or a pound or any other silver piece. I love my country, my city, people. Why is such a view on life and a vision of the world imposed on us? Why, speaking of the Ministers of Education, the Chairman of the Government states that it is a killer's hit list? When was the Minister of Education a hit-list position in Russia? I can hardly imagine Vladimir Ilyich Lenin ever saying, 'I am introducing to you

Lunacharsky, the new head of the People's Commissariat of Education, he will be responsible for education, it's a hit-list position.' We have some ministers whose positions are far from being on a hit-list. For example, S.V. Lavrov and S.K. Shoigu. Whatever ministry they may work. Mr. Shoigu does not state that saving people or protecting the Fatherland is a paid service. And we love such a minister much more than a ruble, because he embodies in his work traditional values of our state.

What is happening to the values and meanings in culture of modern societies of the Western type that are developing on the spiritual and moral platform of Christianity? We witness that Huntington's sombre prophecy on the clash of civilizations has come true. Asian countries are erecting barriers to stop the influence of the West, that they considered pestiferous. These countries are extremely cautious in respect to all forms of lifestyle of the West. We must bitterly admit that in China, for example, research institutions were set up, whose main task is to analyze the mistakes of the Soviet Union and modern Russia in order not to repeat them in their own development. Such is the attitude to the Western way, to the Western values in the countries professing Buddhist and Confucian philosophies.

We are also witnesses to what is happening between the Arab world, the Muslim world and the Western version of the Christian civilization. All over the world, the West is becoming synonymous with a speculation on traditional values, a symbol of lies and deception. It is indicative that even Latin American countries of the Christian world do not want to move in the wake of the modern West. We are undoubtedly people of the European culture. And I would like to emphasize again that Russia today is far ahead of the West in the destructive tendencies, or destructive trends as they are called now. And we all have not just to stop, we have to think and see where to move further. We shall not cease to be Europeans, we shall not cease to be neighbours of the Arab countries, of the countries of the Buddhist and Confucian culture, but we have to reflect seriously on what has happened and work out our own positions, recommendations, judgements, which could make a fundamental platform for further development of the Russian state. President Vladimir Putin, who has been supporting the International Likhachov Conference in every way since 2001, calls us to the same thing.

M. B. PIOTROWSKI: — Thank you, Alexander Sergeevich. I give the floor to Professor Gadis Abdulayevich Hajiyev.

G. A. HAJIYEV: — At the beginning of our meeting today, Mikhail Borisovich said some kind words about the intelligentsia, said that intellectuals tend to err. I fully agree with that, I think that energy of errors, inherent in the intelligentsia, is still a great creative force. In my remarks today a small portion of this energy of errors will be present, as I received it from Mikhail Borisovich as a relay baton.

I will say just a couple of words of the phenomenon of statehood and patriotism, in the cultural aspect. I believe that evaluation of statehood is an attempt to look at traditional economic values not just from a legal standpoint, or from civilian positions, but rather from the standpoint of philosophy, and perhaps, in terms of culture studies. Now I would like to recollect one very memorable event that oc-

curred in our history, and I suggest that you evaluate and assess it from a philosophical point of view. This incident happened in the late 18th century, when Empress Catherine II sent Ermolov with an ambassadorial mission to Iran. There he received orders to provide the Shah all sorts of honours, to the point that he had to kiss hands. Ermolov defiantly showed up in dusty boots, and said that he was a direct descendant of the great Genghis Khan, and never in his life would he allow himself to exert the Shah of Iran such honours. This claim was accepted, and he never kissed anyone hands, while the diplomatic representatives of France and Spain had to do so. It seems very interesting to me why this Russian diplomat and military leader had so great ambitions. As it turned out, there were good reasons for that. The Ermolovs family originated in the time of the Golden Horde, approximately as early as in 506. One Golden Horde Khan conveyed Ermolov the family legend that they are not common people, or Russian nobles, they are descendants of Genghis Khan. Perhaps this awareness determined Ermolov's ambition, and pre-determined his patriotism.

I guess we can argue about patriotism from another point of view of scale or evaluation of human culture. We are all patriots, but some of us love their native aul, their home village, while others can rise up to something bigger. Patriotism helps us assess what we are like. I want to recall correct and exact words of Rasul Hamzatov, who celebrates his 90th anniversary this year, 'Yes, of course, we are great. When shall we become mature?'

Patriotism is maturity, maturity can be defined as a situation when a person evaluates his place and his role with some very high positions. Patriotism of our country is very diverse. It includes Lermontov's patriotism, Nekrasov's patriotism, 'He preaches love to all / Through venomous denial', Pushkin's patriotism with his 'To the slanderers of Russia'. It is very close to western models of patriotism. Whatever Homeland might be doing, no matter whether it is good or bad it is Homeland. These are different concepts of patriotism, and one can argue which of these ideas are reasonable. But one thing is unquestionable to me, patriotism is a huge creative force, and we should use that force skilfully. Patriotism is a very important part of the national culture. And, perhaps, Vladimir Pozner was right when he said that Russians must not forget that they are heirs of the great Byzantine culture. We are also heirs of the Golden Horde, and it can't be blacked out from history, although such attempts were made in the 18th – 19th centuries.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on academician Mikhail Leontievich Titarenko.

M. L. TITARENKO: — I wish to extend my deep appreciation for the great honour to speak before this distinguished assembly. Dear friends, I enjoyed the theses made here. And I would especially like to continue the idea that has just been sounded. Russia is the successor of its traditional roots of the great Slavic culture, the great Byzantine culture that had formed the spiritual values of our culture, of culture and political system of the Golden Horde. Russian culture is synthetic in its nature, and we must understand that Russia is a fraternal union, coexistence and an organic symbiosis of 125 cultures of large and small nations living in the state with the largest territory in our planet, which is now called the Russian Federation. Once more I would

like to emphasize: 125 cultures, 125 large and small ethnic groups. The core essence, the backbone is the Russian culture. And we should understand that Russian culture is not only Europe, the Byzantine Empire.

We should realize the place of Russian culture and Russia in the world. It is a great European country, the largest European power. Why is Europe so wary and suspicious of Russia? Because Russia's territory is several times as large as the whole territory of Western Europe. The Russian ethnic group is several times as large as the largest ethnic group in Europe, and these mathematical ratios have to be taken into consideration. But Russia is also a great Asian power. The collapse of the Soviet Union pushed Russia to the north and east. Our only direct outlet to the ocean is in the Far East, and in the Arctic Ocean. That is why I think that Russia has a special mission.

Alexander Sergeevich has rightly said that, unfortunately, the prophecy of Mr. Huntington on the clash of civilizations has become a reality by the efforts of the West. But there is an alternative, two great nations, two great powers have learned the bitter, bloody lessons of 20 years of a hostile confrontation and have realized that only friendship, strategic partnership, trust-based partnership will help. As recorded in the latest declaration signed by Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and the chairman of the People's Republic of China Xi Jinping, a comprehensive strategic cooperation and trust-based partnership are the guarantees of sovereignty, territorial integrity and successful development of our countries. This is a great thesis for our conference on the dialogue of civilizations. In this respect, Russia and China provide an example of coexistence of two great nations, two great local civilizations.

The main thesis of the Chinese civilization was expressed two and a half thousand years ago by Confucius, the founder and one of the greatest figures of the Chinese and world culture. A disciple asked his master: 'Master, is it possible to explain the essence of your teaching in one word?'. 'It is,' Confucius said, 'this word is "reciprocity".'

And another thesis that was later developed in all great religions and cultures, do not do to others what you yourself do not want to be done to you. This idea was articulated by Buddha, Jesus Christ, Muhammad, and this moral principle is at the basis of the Charter of the United Nations.

The second thesis that is distinctly expressed in the Chinese culture, and has now become relevant in the course of a dialogue of civilizations, it is respect, cultivating cultural diversity, because this diversity, (mutual learning and cultural interaction) are factors of mutual benefits and development. Unifications offered by some of our colleagues, based on the Western system of values is a dead end road, this road leads to a conflict of civilizations. 'Harmony of the different' is the thesis, which can and should become a thesis for the dialogue of civilizations. The hard work that St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences is carrying out so enthusiastically is a great contribution to the implementation of the idea of harmony, prosperity, diversity of cultures. I wish the conference a complete success and I wish our young people success in their study of this brilliant experience of your wonderful university.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you, Mikhail Leontievich. I give the floor to Evgeny Ivanovich Makarov.

E. I. MAKAROV: — First of all, I would like, on behalf of the Founder of the University, to welcome everyone who came to this great scientific event. When in 2001 the text of the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation ‘On the perpetuation of the memory of Dmitry Likhachov’ was being drafted, Alexander Sergeevich and I were directly engaged in it. Neither he nor I had any idea that the Likhachov Conference would become a scientific forum of such a great scale and, what is more important, that it would go beyond the analysis of Slavic culture, would expand to an international scale, and would gather serious and prominent scientists.

Following the theme of the Likhachov Conference, I would like to make a little presentation from the position of the Trade Unions, and to contribute to the theme of values, but I would like to consider it from the point that is interesting to the trade unions, and this point is the values of social and labour relations.

Transition to capitalism in Russia has inevitably lead to the collapse of the old system, and gradually to changes in the value content of social and labour relations. In this context, it is important to reconsider the role and place of socio-labour relations, and make a retrospective analysis of the role and place of human labour in our country’s history in carrying out the biggest economic, social and political transformations. Unfortunately, the theme of socio-labour relations is now driven out of the public space, but nevertheless, historic examples show how to reach goals unprecedented in their scale, provided the proper usage of social and labour capacity or how easy it may be to fail in global challenges, provided ignoring the interests of the main driving creative power of the socio-economic development, of the working man.

The first example. The slogan to catch up and overtake was put forward by Khrushchev in 1957 and it belonged not only to the spurt in the economy, but, significantly, to acceleration in building of communism, that is, a sharp increase in consumption, comparable to the level of consumption the United States. Such goal was formulated by Khrushchev. But further development showed that in a short period of time it was possible to achieve major breakthroughs in industry, science, go to space, launch a new nuclear submarine, but if you ignore or do not solve the problem of a compensation for labour decisively and vigorously enough, if you not develop industries that provide consumption, it will not be possible to achieve this goal. In 1962 there was increase in production rates at the enterprises without a decent labour compensation, a catastrophic decline in purchasing power and workers’ wages, which led to escalation of violence in Novocherkassk, when 23 people were shot during a spontaneous rebellion. The attempt to catch up and overtake ‘sank down’ because alongside with adventurous plans in agriculture, food market became completely uncovered, consumption fell down and motivation of most of the labour force in Russia, in the Soviet Union, was then unclaimed.

The second example. Recovery of the economy after the war and, in particular, of the industry in 1948 was only possible due to the heroic efforts of the entire working population of the Soviet Union. Combination of social and economic policy, compliance with important interests of the working men in those years, including a reasonable monetary reform accounted for achieving the goal of restoring the national economy in 8 years.

Another example. The slogan ‘Everything for the front, everything for the victory!’, put forward by Stalin in 1941, claimed the simple truth: defeat of the enemy by only military measures will fail, the result of the war depended equally on military and industrial potential of the country. And formation of an internal labour front was reflected in the slogans: ‘At work, as in battle’, ‘Direct all efforts to help the front!’. With all the problems and costs a specific social and labour policy of war permitted to solve not only the task of meeting the needs of the front, but it also permitted to transfer industrial plants to the East, outside the European part of the country, thus increasing the labour potential in the regions.

Another example: industrialization of the economy in the 1930s. It is a well-known fact, that it was aimed at industry development in the USSR, which at that time was essentially an agricultural country. But the country’s leaders understood that the main power to direct the USSR to the path of boosted development were in the hands of working men of factory labour. The political authorities encouraged labour achievements, awarded workers and employees with the title the ‘Hero of Labour’, and Stakhanov’s movement was actively promoted. One of the key points was labour enthusiasm based on a set of ideas about the bright future.

It wouldn’t be inappropriate to recall some of the events and tricks of the political exploitation of the theme of social and labour relations during the February and October revolutions of 1917. As you know, the detonator of the February Revolution was the general strike, which began on February 24, and the October Revolution continued the chain of events in which one of the most important roles was played the working men. The leader of the world proletariat, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin clearly explained the source of turmoil in the country by his phrase on the accomplished workers and peasants’ revolution, which had been spoken about for so long by the Bolsheviks. To a great extent he was right, because the Bolsheviks had begun to speak about the revolution after the revolution of 1905, which, in fact, triggered the lingering collapse of the Russian Empire. But the events of 1905 can be treated as a series of fatal errors of the autocracy in respect to the working people. The impulse for the beginning of mass demonstrations in 1905 was shooting of a peaceful demonstration of workers, the Bloody Sunday (January 9). The chain of events that brought workers to the streets of Petrograd, their slogans, the contents of the workers’ petition that demonstrators had hoped to present to the tsar, all this indicates rather socio-labour than political roots of the revolution of 1905. The workers’ demands were complied with, but 9 months after the shooting. So the timely compliance of the workers’ demands could have given an opportunity of bloodless transition of the Russian empire into one of the world’s major powers.

In conclusion, I would like to note that the return of the social and labour issues into the context of contemporary culture of Russian society has become urgent, as we have to assess what social, labour, professional resources are at the disposal of our society in order to carry out modernization claimed as one of the strategic objectives of today’s political power. This is required by the internal needs of the community and by the international situation. We have to get rid of gross ignorance and arrogance, which are often present both in the state, and in the busi-

ness in respect to the working people and social and labour issues in general. The issue of socio-labour relations will inevitably be in great demand in Russia, regardless of time and of the political system.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on the President of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts, Professor Felix Unger. Let me remind you that the European Academy of Sciences and Arts is the official partner of the Russian Academy of Sciences in the European Union.

F. UNGER: — Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great pleasure to be here and first of all I'd like to thank academician Zapesotsky for organizing this meeting and inviting me.

It's not the first time that I have the possibility of coming to St. Petersburg and I'll tell you frankly – I feel at home. The topic of this whole meeting is really very challenging because in this respect it is a question to our common life, how we will manage our life and in cooperation in our global systems.

Last year I had a great pleasure meeting your President of State Vladimir Putin. And he told me immediately: 'Russia is a part of Europe.' And I agreed totally because from the whole past we feel it that it's one entity the Europe and unfortunately the last century was not very much helpful when Europe has been split in Western parts, Eastern parts, there was a major crack within Europe.

And now we are standing in a new situation gaining our Europe, gaining a new partnership between Western parts and Eastern parts to focus new ideas. And when I walk through St. Petersburg, what I have done yesterday, I have seen enormous many young people as here today – fresh faces, optimistic faces, wonderful views and therefore all what we are thinking is nothing else to motivate our youth for the future and to prepare them for the future.

Ladies and gentlemen, when we are focusing on the culture between East and West and you see it immediately when you are visiting the Hermitage, there you have really a mixture between East and West and we come immediately what is culture. And culture is quite easy to understand. It's the overall of what we are doing, how we deal with men, and to bring answers in our existence we have different ways to contribute to our culture. There we have the arts, we have the sciences. Maybe I'll say a short word to the sciences.

I personally think that sciences derive from our work in three areas – it's the area with the nature, with inter-human problems, and with spiritual problems. And those fields we have to bring in a certain balance to come to our existence, to get the different answers.

But sciences – as we have learnt it in the past – are always moving, and you can't stay still and remain in your old position. Sciences are also completely changing. And the most intriguing that we have now in sciences is interdisciplinarity to reach new fields.

This means that everybody who is working in the sciences has to enlarge his field. And I'll give you two small examples. One example is the genome technology. And deriving from the genome technology our colleagues in transplantation, immunology told us that we have or the man has in-native immunity. And this is in the epigenomes and controlling the replacement, remodelling of our genomes. And when you are taking the work of the epigenomic, of the in-native im-

munity, then it becomes immediately a broad field. It's not a field in immunology, it's a field in our philosophy.

We have within our Academy a philosopher Sloterdijk. He is always speaking on the philosophic immunity and of course, ladies and gentlemen, we all have an inborn theological immunity. You will ask how is it that immunology and theology fit together. The answer is very simple: it's the act of baptism. The priest is asking you: 'Do you resist evil?' And you say 'Yes', and this is your natural immunity for you, maybe, for your whole life. But, ladies and gentlemen, it is not so easy, and sometimes scientific men like me have a tendency to take it, or to look at it from their own view.

Being a surgeon, I have the language of a medical doctor and my language has to be interdisciplinary. Speaking about communication: when scientists from different countries come together there is no conflict, five minutes after they get acquainted they ask, 'Are you married?' Then it comes to children, education, grandchildren. People are interested.

On the whole, speaking about our culture besides the arts, besides the sciences, besides the trade and commerce, the major part is played by the impact of the religions. This is causing a conflict too. Mr. Piotrowski was speaking about the conflict between the Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant Christians, but now we have in Europe a new wave involving Islamic roots. Inter-religion dialogue is inevitable in understanding the position of every person.

In interconfessional discussion each has a position of his own. In present-day Europe we have lost our religions and that is very dangerous when you lose your ultimate goal and you do not believe any more. Then you are starting to build up ideologies that are ugly, that are neglecting men and have many negative aspects.

Today it's not much better, ladies and gentlemen. Today we have an ideology of money, of materialism. Even in my field, in medicine, the administration is always speaking how we can make the hospitals more efficient, how to get a better profit from the patients. Globally having only money in mind we are destroying people and our major. I will give you a small example. My elder son is an architect, when he worked in Cameroun he saw that the oil company Shell, also working there, polluted all the rivers. Local people could not fish and once a year they were given money so that would have festive evenings.

Yesterday I was in the Russian museum and I visited Malevich's works. In his works in the Supremacist style he used the simplest formulas: the square, the circle and the cross. In our dialogue we are to find the simplest formulas when we are addressing our neighbours or looking at our own position.

Last century the most important thing done was the Human Rights Laws, signed in 1947. It's a good thing to understand each other but, to be honest, human rights are violated day by day. And not only in my country.

So we should be careful not to touch on the wounds of the neighbours, we should always check if we act according to the human rights. What is also very important is tolerance as tolerance is a translation of love. We have one set of values which is universally valid for everybody. Most people are speaking not about values but expressing their desires in the package of values. The highest value is life and we have to serve life, when we are serving life we are

cultivating the society, we are cultivating nature. The next set is virtues, such as justice, love. Education has to teach how to balance, getting the ground for the profession but keeping in mind that we are human beings and all that we are doing has to serve life.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Mr. Unger, as an outstanding surgeon, rallied round the EU scientific community and went beyond national academies of sciences, and we extend our appreciation to him for that. I give the floor to Professor Vladimir Evgeniyevich Churov.

V. Ye. CHUROV: — Most of the theses that I have prepared for today's speech have already been said by my learned colleagues from the floor. I would only like to pay your attention to the tragedy of disappearing towns and the world incivility and barbarism related to that fact. Major cities have played the role of centres of development and preservation of cultures for thousands of years. They were also political centres, because politics is only a part of culture, not the other way around.

And now we are witnessing a sad process of degradation of major historic cities all over the world. St. Petersburg is disappearing, the Moscow that has been familiar since childhood has virtually disappeared too, Paris has vanished, historic London as well as Casablanca, Kiev, Revel, Tallinn. And in my opinion this process has very grave consequences for the world culture, because big cities used to raise generations of people.

Our native Leningrad, St. Petersburg in the twentieth century due to the tragic events three times changed the population list completely. New people who came here very quickly fell under the charm of the city and became indigenous Leningraders, St. Petersburg's residents. The same thing happened in other historical cities, in Odessa, for example. Now, unfortunately, the process has stopped. Now there is no charm and influence of the city on its residents, which I could see in my childhood and youth.

Recently, the Magnitsky list was published. To my mind, it was a crazy thing, because compiling lists of any disqualification is, for such villains as Nero, Hitler or Yezhov. I prefer that people around the world unite around other values, especially in their fight against the three major challenges of the twenty first century.

The first challenge is international terrorism, which is not just an abstract concept. I want to live like I used to before the era of international terrorism, to travel around the world, staying in hotels, without feeling constant danger (in Egypt, Tunisia, Syria and so on).

The second challenge is the economic crisis. I want even being retired to have enough money to buy tickets to the theatre, books and do a bit of travelling. And I think it is the dream of all cultured people.

And the third world crisis is, of course, the wave of barbarism, which now has acquired a tsunami scale and it is flooding all over the world, with very few exceptions. The fight against this wave of barbarism is not an abstract concept, it is preservation of traditional culture, traditional language, traditional literature, traditional theatre. I do not want to speak the 'bird-like' Newspeak, I do not want to use Pidgin English. I think that a lot of people with at least some rudiments of traditional culture will agree with me. Civilization must overcome these three challenges,

but I am afraid that, unfortunately, I will not live to those days.

In the conclusion, I would like to ask the permission of Alexander Sergeyevich to honour with a minute of silence common people who became the victims of horrible crimes in Boston, Beirut Syria, people who did not want to die.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Esteemed colleagues, I propose to honour the memory of our contemporaries who have been victims of modern savagery and neo-barbarism. I call on Alexandra Hamilton, the Duchess of Abercorn from the UK, one of the descendants of Alexander Segeyevich Pushkin.

A. HAMILTON: — Ladies and Gentlemen, dear Conference participants. It is a great honour to be invited back to my Motherland to contribute to this most significant dialogue here in the University of St Petersburg in the name of the late Academician Dmitry Likhachov who throughout his life was the very spirit of a Russian dialogue with any other culture. I must explain in the outset that my paternal roots are here in Russia, as both tsar Nicholas I and Alexander Sergeyevich Pushkin were my great-great-grandfathers. My paternal root was Peruvian, I was born in Arizona and lived my childhood in England before I married James Abercorn in 1966 and went to live in Northern Ireland at twenty years of age. I am myself a kind of dialogue of cultures. I know I only have few moments to speak so I'm not going to refer much to my text but give you a feeling of a story of my life as I lived it in Ireland during severe trouble, severe breakdown in culture. In fact we had no dialogue of cultures for forty years, and as a mother I would like to speak on behalf of children as I was deeply concerned for my own children, for my own daughter Sophia, who as a little girl had most terrible nightmares. She believed that we were being invaded by terrorists, and how could I explain to a little child that this might not happen? It was a reality. But then I began to think that what was happening to every other child in the land of Ireland, not just my own daughter, because if we leave fear, anger, misery within ourselves and we do not transform that energy onwards, we allow more bombs and more bullets on the heads of our children. Damage is done at a very young age, it needs to be transformed somehow. But the problem was how to do this and what could we do?

And then my ancestor, Alexander Pushkin, was being commemorated in 1986 and it was in my grandmother's home near London that commemoration took place. People from so many backgrounds and ideologies came together in the name of Pushkin, and I saw how a great artist can lift us from our trivial differences to the land of the universal language of joy and sorrow, as the two go together. So at the end of that weekend of great inspiration an idea came to me. That was that maybe I could take the spirit of Pushkin back with me to my home in Northern Ireland and see if I can help young children to find a creative voice. And in the name of Pushkin I went to visit Catholic and Protestant schools that normally would not meet each other. Pushkin for me was a passport, he allowed me to go to any school I wanted in the North and in the South of Ireland as we have two separate jurisdictions governed by London and by Dublin. So Pushkin allowed me to travel all around

Ireland and help children and their teachers to find a creative voice. What did they feel? Maybe hatred, maybe sorrow, maybe anguish but maybe lovely feelings of beauty and happiness. They wrote stories and poems. Later this developed in a bigger programme when all the arts were involved. But fundamentally we worked with the environment, with the world of nature and we now take children into the environment to use their senses. We help children to come back to their senses and I believe this a profoundly important thing in education. Certainly we have to have facts and figures, we have to pass exams, we need to use our rational mind but we need our hearts, we need to use our emotional intelligence, we need our senses. And I feel children now need to be educated as whole human beings. Youngsters who are going to be fit for the twenty-first century in a totally new way are going to have a voice. And I suppose I used Pushkin not as the great Pushkin we know, in the sense of great stories he wrote, but more as a young boy, nine years old, as he would sit with his nanny Arina Rodionovna and listen to the fairy tales of his land, this land. Of course, our children were brought up on the fairy tales of Ireland, the Celtic fairy tales. We had a very natural affinity between Russia and Ireland, this is the land of the archetype, this is the land of the symbol. I believe that if we are going to move forward in the new form of dialogue we cannot continue across the surface with meetings with long agendas, we have to listen symbolically more deeply to our hearts.

In the end I would like to imagine that we are all sitting now with Pushkin at the fireside with his old Nanny Arina. We are sitting near the fire and as we see the flickering flames of the fire we begin to hear the voice the firebird. And this is what the firebird is saying to us: 'Take heart. I have returned from a long time of banishment, the time when mankind had to experience the darkest shadows immeasurable, I have circled the Earth and witnessed devastation and destruction. I have seen the wonders of the natural world and the cultural masterpieces of mankind. I have seen the loss of the human life itself. Remember — the dark and light can never be separated. I know that you are capable of as much good as the horror, though the deepest pain suffered may never be forgotten, compassion in equal measure is also close at hand. The beauty that the world is seeking is in my plumage. I have a feather for every nation in the world wishing to be part of a universe. A place of learning where inner landscape of any young person is tended is where the Earth, the Air, the Fire and the Water — the four vital elements are brought to life. So take heat and listen to the cry of a child for the child is the seed of regeneration, the future of life on Earth.'

So I do believe it is time we listened closely to the firebird's voice because it does echo on the cry of a child. Perhaps if we pay full attention to that cry and take its resonance inside ourselves, a new imaginative form of democracy can come into being with the balance between the head and the heart, with the shadows of the unconscious latent within every individual would be transformed as it integrates with the light and intelligence of consciousness. That voice is also the voice of the soul, of our common humanity, and it speaks in a symbolic language of the imagination, the kind of language that will surely be needed if a truly transformative dialogue between cultures is to take place. Thank you.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I would like to express my gratitude to the Duchess of Abercorn for a truly philosophical speech.

A lot of telegrams, congratulations and wishes were received to the address of the Likhachov Conference: from the Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation S.E. Naryshkin, from the Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation V.R. Medinsky, from the President of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yu.S. Osipov, from the Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the our University M.V. Shmakov, from the UNESCO Director-General I. Bokova, from the assistant to the President of the Russian Federation A.A. Fursenko. I would like to read out a message from Dmitry Anatoliyevich Medvedev: 'Dear friends! I bid you welcome in St. Petersburg at the 13th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. Prominent scientists, politicians, cultural figures of Russia and foreign countries will have to discuss burning humanitarian challenges related to the development of communication, social and legal relations, economics in the context of world culture. It is important that young scientists, young researchers of the creative heritage of academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov are involved in the work of the Conference. I am confident that this assembly on the banks of the Neva River will stay in your minds due to interesting and informative discussions. And suggestions and recommendations made during the forum will encourage modern implementation of forward-looking projects. Good luck to you and my best regards. D. Medvedev.'

I consider it essential that for many years, the Likhachov Conference initiated by St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences together with the Congress of St. Petersburg intelligentsia, the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Education, have been supported by the European Academy of Sciences and Arts and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. On behalf of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Igorevich Kuznetsov will present his speech.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — Distinguished colleagues, first of all allow me to express my gratitude for the honour to participate in the annual International Likhachov Scientific Conference. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was one of the initiators of this forum. A diplomatic programme 'International Dialogue of Cultures' is held under this Conference, which we really value very high. For all the years that this forum has been held, our representatives have participated in it and supported it. It was stipulated not by formal considerations, but by a deep conviction that an effective foreign policy of Russia in the modern world today can only be put into effect upon understanding of intercivilizational, intercultural problems, which for many years have been studied and discussed by your forum.

It is said that Russian foreign policy has a pragmatic nature and it is not based on abstract ideas, but rather on national interest, which is recorded in Russian foreign policy concept, but pragmatism does not mean a narrow mercantilism, which has already been mentioned in many presentations today. There are thing in the international relations and foreign policy that can't be measured with rubles or dollars.

And the best example is probably as follows: many of my colleagues who represented Russia in many different countries, and, everyone present here knows, that credibility and reputation of Russia in the world, or as our diplomats in the 19th century would say, the charm of Russia, is determined largely by our national culture. And consequently, our foreign policy interests cannot be considered in isolation from those underlying processes that happen in cross-cultural, intercivilizational relations, that are literally changing the world before our very eyes. And whatever we may be doing, however diverse problems we would face, starting with the situation in Syria and ending with the issue of children adoption, or, for example, the necessity to protect our country from attempts of distorting its history, behind all these issues we will find a set of challenges that are close to International Likhachov Scientific Conference, and is vital for our diplomacy affairs. We are therefore very pleased that the authority of the forum is growing, it draws new creative forces, not only scientific, but also the ones of a civil society, it is also very important.

Today, following the tradition, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Viktorovich Lavrov, sends his welcoming address to our forum. I will quote only one sentence: 'Promoting mutual respect and fruitful interaction between nations and religions is the absolute priority of Russian policy both domestically and in the international arena. Efforts targeted at developing common values, strengthening moral basis of international relations, are important contributions into the work of creating conditions for a genuine partnership between the states, and forming a fair and democratic international system. I wish you every success and all the best.'

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you. I call on the Deputy Director of the Institute of East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Wu Enyuan.

WU ENYUAN: — Dear colleagues, as my report is available on the website of the University, I will try to speak briefly. My first point is an attempt to assess the contribution of the socialist model developed in the Soviet Union in the last century, into development of world civilization, as well as attempts of Chinese development based on the Soviet model. After the collapse of the Soviet Union different, and completely opposite assessments of what was done in the Soviet Union era have evolved. From the point of view of philosophy any phenomenon has both positive and negative elements. And this is true for the attempt of the Soviet Union, which had its negative and positive elements. For example, among the positive moments was the victory of the Soviet Union during World War II. In this regard, I really liked the assessment of events in a fundamental work edited by academician Abalkin 'The history of the Soviet Union'.

All the leaders who followed Stalin (Khrushchev, Malenkov, Kosygin, Andropov) tried to reform the Stalinist model. We leave aside the question how successful these attempts were, but as historians we have to evaluate duly the contribution of these efforts to the development of human civilization. We must identify which areas in these reforms are positive and what role these attempts played for reforms in China.

The first key direction is the attempts to break a magical understanding of the Marxist theory of the economy, to combine both planned and market economy. The second area is an attempt to reform the centralized management system of political and economic processes in the country, allowing more freedom to economic entities and a greater autonomy of society. The third direction, which I consider very positive, is the tendency not only to make GDP grow, but rather to pursue harmonious development of man and society on the whole.

I should point out that in China, at the very beginning of your reforms a great attention was paid to them. China borrowed a lot from the Soviet experience for the reform of its economic system.

So in conclusion I would like to say that the Soviet Union collapsed not because of the fact that its system did not work, this system is operative. The problem lay in the fact that the leaders were not able to resolve properly complex relationships between these three important factors such as reform, development and stability. Chinese socialism was formed taking into account both negative elements in the Soviet experience and positive trends developed in previous reforms of the Soviet Union. And so we need to evaluate the contribution of the Soviet model in the development of a common human civilization.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on Professor Yuri Sergeevich Shemshuchenko.

Yu. S. SHEMSHUCHENKO: — Firstly, I would like to thank the Organizing Committee for the invitation of a small Ukrainian delegation to participate in this Conference. Another representative of the Ukraine is present here, a noted scientist, archaeologist and historian, academician Petr Petrovich Tolochko. We highly appreciate the value of this forum, it is not for the first time that we have participated in this event, and we know that the results of the forum are decisive for the development of various branches of science, in particular.

I have long been working in the field of theory of law. One of the problems that we discuss at this forum, is the problem of the development of law.

One can say that law is a social value. Scientists concerned with law issues have come to this conclusion. Of course, the law is not a panacea for all misfortunes, the law has a lot of negative features, it cannot regulate all social relations. But mankind has not invented anything else so far, to guarantee at least a basic order in society, so that human relationships could evolve properly.

In our history, a theory of the extinction of law and state in the course of building a communist society was developed. Judging from the calculations that were then made, today we should be living without a state and without law, and relations were to be governed only by the rules of morality, etc. But this theory fell behind expectation, and we know that today all of the newly formed states in the 1990s, wrote in his constitution, that they are the law-bound states. That is, the issue virtually favours the idea that the law should play a decisive role in the regulation of social relations nowadays.

Although, about a century ago one of the experts in this field professor Kistyakovsky wrote that the law-bound state is a state that provides a wide field to regulate

public relations of morality norms, rather than law. A law-bound state can be built only in the case all people become saints. Today a difficulty arises in the regulation of public relations, partly, on the verge of morality norms, partly of legal norms, i.e. it is a complex theoretical problem, which should be solved in the context of those problems that we are discussing at this forum in terms of the dialogue of cultures. Law is a social and cultural value.

This approach provides new possibilities for the development of the law-bound state. The famous Russian scientist, Professor Alekseev argued that we are approaching to creation of a state with the law of civilized people, which requires further development with theoretical basis of this issue. The matter is, first of all, that the law should become a more humanistic, and should have a more humanistic content, this is how it should evolve.

At the same time, the law must be enforced, and this is another principle. From this point of view a constitutional and legal reform is being carried out in the Ukraine, and this reform is carried out in an original way, under the President there was established a special Constitutional Commission, which has 100 members, scientists, experts in constitutional law and legal practitioners (over 70 members). It provides an opportunity to discuss draft amendments to the Constitution of the Ukraine relying upon maximal scientific verification. Then this issue is considered at the level of the Supreme Council. Subject to the plans enacted within the framework of this Constitutional Commission, in the end of May, we will adopt the concept of constitutional amendments. Next year the relevant project will be presented to scrutiny. We, certainly, hope that experts from other countries will be involved into this process, especially Russian experts, European organizations, including the Council of Europe and others are already engaged in this process. It becomes significant in the course of process to find an optimal solution to the problem, taking into account the existing experience in other states. On the other hand, it is very difficult to fulfil and to introduce such attempts, and maintain national features of the Ukraine. Taking part in this Conference will help.

Another global challenge is an environmental one. In solving this problem International Law could play a more significant role. In this respect, we have developed some proposals for the drafting and adoption of global environmental treaty. We call it 'Environmental Constitution of Earth'. On the one hand, its importance is recognized by all mankind, on the other hand, the implementation of this issue faces lots of difficulties. I had a chance to speak at the United Nations in order to discuss this issue, and so far some of the advanced countries do not boost this issue, because they are interested in having a possibility to export waste products, etc. to underdeveloped countries and thus they contaminate poor countries, but make their own countries clean a little.

On the other hand, poor developing countries, do not rush to solve this issue, referring to the fact that they have a more important challenge, to fight against poverty. And so at the level of the United Nations, this issue is being resolved very slowly. We should use experience of the United Nations, particularly, the development of the UN International Convention on the Law of the Sea. For 10 years there was no certainty that it would be adopted, special UN conference discussed this problems, and at the

end of 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, was adopted, and today it works perfectly.

It would be appropriate for the United Nations to convene a Conference in order to prepare a draft international treaty or International Environmental Constitution of Earth. It is a good move in order to solve this issue.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I give the floor to Professor Valery Leonidovich Makarov.

V. L. MAKAROV:¹ — Dear friends, I would like to formulate the following problem, There are two tendencies that actually originate from the same point. The first tendency: there is hard power and soft power. This theory was defined by American political scientist Nye (he wrote plenty of books on this issue, which are widely quoted etc.) The core essence of his ideas is that we should gradually spread soft power, and decrease hard power more and more. Instead of conquering territories with guns, it is better to conquer minds, by implying other methods. Soft power has its own methods, information wars, ideological clashes, this technology is now well-developed. A significant role in the notorious 'colour revolutions' was played by the soft power. Nowadays a serious global trend is evolving when the soft power is taking over more and more space, and pushes out the hard power. But it results in a completely opposite trend, when, the hard power is driving the soft power away.

What is the hard power? It is, in particular, adoption of laws that have to be strictly enforced, a relevant court system, etc. The hard power occupies the area that has always been considered as a part of soft power, (it originates from the tradition of social norms, etc.) Soft power is when the society governs itself.

And what do we witness now? For example, a juvenile justice. Instead of allowing the society itself to determine and regulate family relations, a law is adopted, i.e. the hard power is applied. We have plenty of such examples. Take, for example contempt of religious feelings. Instead of permitting the society itself so determine, in what is violated in religious sphere, a harsh law is adopted. But however clever people may be who drafted and formulated the law, it can be interpreted in many different ways.

So the opposite trend is coming to the surface, when, instead entrusting those issues to society and its civil structures, permitting them to take decisions how to determine life, such issues are submitted to legislation. France has adopted the law to legalize same-sex marriages, because it is necessary to regulate the relationship between sexes

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strictly on legal grounds. Isn't society itself able to do it, why should everything be spelled out in the law, whether it is allowed or not for the same-sex families to bring up children. But I'm sure in any case it will be obscure. So, another trend is evolving, when the hard power puts pressure on the soft power.

I believe, that humanity is developing in the soft-power direction, one day we will be governed mainly by soft power, i.e. the ideology, there will be no terrorism, and things like, only due to the fact that we will be controlled by ourselves and by soft power.

I have marked two tendencies that both originate from the same point. Now the soft power is being oppressed, it would be interesting to hear an explanation of this phenomenon.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Valery Leonidovich, the explanation is a total decline of the culture of power, there is no other explanation. We'll discuss that later. I give the floor to academician Vladislav Alexandrovich Lektorsky.

V. A. LEKTORSKY: — I've heard today a lot of interesting things, and I would like to make a few remarks on them. My remarks are related to the issues that have always been debated at the Likhachov Conference. Today many speakers raised issues on what's happening in culture, the lack of culture, the loss of values, the erosion of values around the world, particularly in Russia, especially on the conflict of civilizations and so forth.

In this regard, I only want to put three questions and reconsider the three myths that are being discussed and prevent the right discussion of such issues. The first question is: Why do we need culture at all? Second: Can there possibly be a dialogue of cultures? And third: Do we need dialogue of cultures?

What about the need for culture? I sometimes read very interesting articles by Russian economists, and they argue in particular that it isn't their business, why we ceased to teach and learn Pushkin, the most important thing is to have effective businesses. The task for economists is to make the economy efficient and, perhaps, the fight against corruption, because it prevents smooth operations of the economic mechanism. All other issues might be important, but they do not affect economy.

Recently quite a well-known sociologist and economist surprised me by writing, 'Dear friends, we cannot understand economics without understanding culture, and what is being done in Russian economics is directly related to the cultural type we belong to.' And he provides a long and dubious argument. He says that there are two types of culture. In one culture there are no problems with economics and civil institutions, and there soft power and hard power interact well. As to us, everything goes badly, economics is not growing, the hard power is driving away the soft power, as Valery Leonidovich said.

This same economist believes that Western Europe has adopted its cultural code from the Old Testament, that is why it is based on the rule of law and the principle of Talio 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'. But Russia followed another path, it adopted the principle of Christianity with its love for one's neighbour. And no economy can rely upon such a basis, there will never be any good. Of course, it has nothing to do with the reality, because without Christianity

Western Europe would have never developed. Russia is a Christian country that has its own peculiarities. If there are problems, they cannot be solved on this count, the problems may be related to the fact that we have lost our traditional cultural code, but it is another kettle of fish. But anyway, the economist whose conclusions and analysis I can't agree with, acknowledged this fact.

Behind economic, geopolitical problems, politics, the mass conflict, there is a struggle of cultural meanings and this struggle is taking over the world. And culture is not just a decoration. Cultured people have gathered here and are discussing culture and dialogue of cultures, but not because we have nothing to do, rather because it has become evident nowadays that culture is the basis of everything else. So all other things are impossible without culture. So, considerations that economics is one thing, and culture is a completely different thing, are a myth.

The second issue refers to the dialogue of cultures. Speaking of the dialogue of cultures, we do understand that without this dialogue no advancement is possible. But for some reasons in culture we do not see any dialogue of cultures, we rather see that these cultures clashed with stranglehold, they are fighting to supersede each other. The struggle for imposing certain cultural meanings on the whole world is in progress. Why does it happen so and what is the way out? The reason lies in stupid and uneducated people.

Here another theory can be applied, which is considered to be a myth. Cultures are so different that there can be no dialogue between them at all. Culture is a way of understanding the world, it is the glasses through which a person looks at everything, it is a system of meanings and values. They are so different in different cultures that they simply cannot understand each other. What is good for one person, is bad for another.

A whole theory exists related to the difficulties of translation in general. A few years ago in France 'The Dictionary of the Untranslatable' was published. There are some philosophical concepts in French which are untranslatable into other languages, we can give a lot of such examples. My friend, a specialist in Arab philosophy at the Institute for Philosophy, believes that there are a lot of things simply untranslatable. But it is concluded that in general the dialogue is not possible, even if we have somehow to live together. But how can we live? Either to live detached, without trying to understand each other, without seeking a dialogue. Or impose our meanings on others. The one who has more power, military power, more money, etc. will succeed in it. I want to say that it is a myth too.

Valery Leonidovich was right to say that in fact there has always been a strong historical interaction of cultures, and each culture is not something homogeneous, it is heterogeneous, it has different meanings, layers. And it has always been this way. Culture is not a closed monad (philosopher Leibniz believed that the world consists of monads that do not have windows, that cannot interact with each other). To interact with each other is possible, but there is a common ground of meanings. When people have a common understanding and thinking, the dialogue is pointless, because the parties know what the other party is going to say. The dialogue is not possible if the parties are completely the same, or if the parties have absolutely different views. The dialogue is possible when there are some similarities and some differences. Therefore, this is a myth, in American

philosophy there is even a theory of the 'impossibility of detailed translation', which has been debated for 30 years.

The third myth. Now some researchers claim that there are traditional cultures, they are diverse, and somehow they may be interacting with each other. But the point is that the whole world, all of the existing cultures, both western and eastern, have found themselves in the new conditions, when a global civilization is evolving, with its techno-science, with a society of information. The society becomes homogenized, science, engineering and technology do not make society more diverse, they rather make it more homogeneous on the whole. This is the first point. And secondly, all these cultures are in general outdated, they have to be abandoned. Man is not perfect, and following this way, no matter what dialogue we may be holding, we need to go beyond today's man.

Today environmental problems were raised. New paradigms are being evolved, which are necessary to talk and think about, and lots of people have already written articles on it. The whole nature has to be changed, everything natural has to be altered, all natural should be substituted into artificial, allegedly, new nanotechnology, bioinformatics provide possibilities for this. A theorist said: 'We have to go beyond the natural limitations and begin with a human, replacing his body and replacing his brain.' Not so long ago a noted Russian neurophysiologist wrote: 'Give me money, and in 10 years I will create a super-brain that will have nothing human.' Indeed, fantastic things are being done now, but their target is different, to create a post-human.

All cultures are different, as man is imperfect. He will always remain vulnerable and contradictory in nature, no matter what dialogue might be conducted. This new biotech utopia can make many interesting things possible, but the goal itself is utopian, in my opinion it is just very dangerous. It can be compared with the situation when you have a headache, and they say that the best remedy from a headache is the guillotine. That's something like that. So, we can say that all the fundamental human meanings, on which any culture (eastern, or western) compassion, courage and care are losing their meanings.

This thing might seem fantastic, but it's not a fantasy, a lot of people are involved in it both in the East and in the West. It should be taken seriously. Even if you create a super-brain, it still will not think like a man with his allegedly deficient brain.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on Kari Tapiola, Special Envoy of the Director General of the International Labour Organisation (Switzerland).

K. TAPIOLA: — Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen! I am grateful for the invitation of the International Labour Organisation to this important event. Judging from the fact that dialogue of cultures is a dialogue in different languages, I will use Russian, not Finnish, my native language. Russian is the official language of the International Labour Organisation. The dialogue of cultures has many different aspects national, international, domestic, foreign, social, political and cultural ones. In modern world dialogue has more and more global aspects and a global nature. Such a dialogue, (or a whole network of dialogue) is very challenging for the International Labour Organisation. The ILO is the first modern international organization, it will soon

celebrate its 100th anniversary. This is not only an interstate organisation, since its origin in 1919 the ILO has involved representatives of the trade unions and employers into its membership.

What was the purpose of the trilateral dialogue of the International Labour Organisation? If we want to have a dialogue, a dialogue should be organized. We should organize a social dialogue on labour relations, on rights to labour. The majority of the population of the world live on their labour. The international labour legislation was on the agenda in Paris in 1919 and it is an element of the secular contract made in that year. The Constitution of International Labour Organization begins with the following words: 'universal and lasting peace can be established only if it is based upon social justice'.

Today, in the context of globalization what practical purposes should the dialogue serve, including a social dialogue? Resolving labour, social disputes is possible on the basis of dialogue, negotiation and mutual respect, meeting the interests of all parties. In globalization process the dialogue possible on the basis of justice, it requires participation of all states, employers' organizations, entrepreneurs, trade unions and society on the whole, as well as of independent public organizations, academic circles, it is a common task for everyone.

The culture of dialogue is also a culture of compromise. When dialogues are conducted, we won't be able to find solutions for complete victory of one party. Dialogue is not a dictate, a dialogue should substitute dictate. The aim of the International Labour Organisation is to develop norms and standards for the processes that can lead to reliable results based on compromise. Conflicts can be resolved on the basis of fundamental rights, better mutual understanding, it will lead to strengthening our mutual interests. I hope that this aspect of social dialogue serves as an important element of the dialogue of cultures.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I invite the Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Professor Mikhail Ivanovich Kleandrov.

M. I. KLEANDROV: — I fully agree with one of theses presented by Alexander Sergeevich, which was not disapproved but rather supported by other speakers, that the task of science is awareness of where we are, what disadvantages we have, what heights we have to move towards, what we should do not to get along the way to a dead end or suffer from uncivilized regression. In this respect, it would be appropriate to recall that as far as half a century ago, well-known science fiction writers Arkady and Boris Strugatsky here in Leningrad created in several literary works of art the 'World of Noon' (after the title of one of the novels, called 'Noon XXII century (Return)'), which later was described in literary criticism as the world in which one wants to live and work. With chronological allowance, how could we imagine the world in which one wants to live and work? The key word here is 'wants', not the one that is mandatory, but what I would like to create. And where do we want to live, and want our children and grandchildren to live, work and be happy? Apparently, this is the world of high culture, a world in which relations between citizens are regulated, including, of course, regulation with soft power, which, in general, is a regulation on moral basis. But relationship has to be regulated with law,

where morality does not work. The state is inevitable, so, high level of legal culture should be in scrutiny. This is a society, a world of the high level of legal culture. And as the state system even in the bright future will have three branches of power, it is the world in which the third branch of power is represented by the mechanism of highly-professional judges with the highest level of professional legal culture, the culture that ensures law enforcement and provides administration of faultless, prompt and fair justice.

It does not mean that now the mechanism of justice is unfair, it just correlates with the current level of society development and sometimes it glitches, but, then, all the government and public institutions of our country sometimes experience serious failures. The point is that this category is estimating, be it fair or unfair, and it is the society rather than the judiciary that should assess it. And the society assumes that judicial decisions are not always fair, not for all parties of a trial, not all judicial acts are just, etc., to put it mildly. Their perfection is far ahead.

And a fundamentally crucial fact is the case that the judiciary, the judicial community of Russia is very well aware of it, they clearly realize and acknowledge it. It is not a self-criticism, it is awareness of the real state of affairs. In late December of the last year, the 8th Russian National Congress of Judges was held, which is held every 4 years. And a provision was formulated in the closing Convention of the Congress: 'We feel a more and more urgent need to develop a government project of strategic transformation of organizational and legal system of the national justice system, with the ultimate aim to create a fair trial that meets the aspirations of the Russian society.' The quotation goes on as follows: 'In order to find solutions to this problem it is desirable to attract potential of the higher courts of the country, of the relevant government agencies, academic institutions, judicial bodies and community groups.'

The decisions of the Congress are not opinions of a certain category of scientists or even a certain categories of judges, is a consolidated opinion of all 32,000 of acting judges, all the 700 members voted in favour of this provision, delegates voted for all the closing Convention of the Congress, and a separate voting was for this provision. It is a serious cause to realize to that the judicial community understands how to act and what to do.

But I should point out that first and foremost it is a strategic task, rather than a matter of only judicial branch, it is primarily a challenge of science, moreover, it is an issue of fundamental science. We should pay close attention to its solution, and science should be engaged not only in making the strategy of the project, but also ideology of the draft, because a general category of justice is very vague and obscure, since it is an assessment category. But we should apply not only social sciences, other branches of science should be involved too, including the branches of geo-sciences, medicine, at least psychology, and others. In its magnitude, in its results, in its global value this research project is probably comparable with such serious high levelled research projects, as, was a nuclear program, or space exploration project. But it is clear that it will take much less financial resources.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — The word is given to the Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Professor Nikolai Semyonovich Bondar.

N. S. BONDAR: — Esteemed participants of the Likhachov Conference, dear colleagues! Keeping our conversation afloat here on a very challenging topic, I would like to say that I had a feeling I am among the constitutionalists, (so I had weighty reasons to you my colleagues). All the issues discussed and debated here have extremely concise, clearly expressed and accumulated constitutional and legal meaning. And in this respect the speech by Alexander Sergeyevich can be called as one of the fundamental reports on the crisis of modern constitutionalism and values of modern time.

My first point, we more and more often are talking about the globalization of the world, including the legal globalization, but the modern world is experiencing a systemic crisis of constitutionalism, in terms of institutional, functional, value-axiological characteristics, etc. And one of the ways and methods to overcome this crisis, can be dialogue of cultures., not in its abstract manifestation. I recall the words by Gabriel Laub, 'The prices when we go to the store are specific, but the values are abstract.' So to overcome the crisis of constitutionalism is the way to inspire, revitalize, ground and specify abstract values, abstract values of freedom, equality, democracy and justice, etc. And it should be done primarily in terms of constitutionalism, values that have both written evidences and spiritual characteristics. It is a twofold nature of phenomena. Here one can probably remember the Gospel according to John, Book 1, verse 17: 'The law comes from Moses, virtue and justice come from Jesus Christ.' I want to draw your attention that in the Gospel there is no contradiction between the law of Moses and the virtue and justice of Jesus Christ. And thus there is no contrasting of the Old and the New Testament in terms of value characteristics.

Strange as it may seem to audience, this fact is important for understanding the constitution, too. The Constitution is not just the fundamental law of the state, even a freshman will hardly be given a satisfactory mark for such an answer. It's just a vulgar normative assessment. Constitution is the embodiment of the integrity of letter and spirit of law. And this spirit, is, first of all, a valuable content of this document as a valid normative act, secondly, it is embodiment of the fundamental principles of norm-setting for life, thirdly, it is the basis of the state and society. And chapter 1 of the Constitution is a sort of an 'icon lamp', which reflects the values mentioned above. But they cannot work by themselves, they require mechanisms, including governmental and legal, and the most important mechanism is constitutional justice.

Now that I have participated in the conference, I have finally realized why the Constitutional Court was transferred to St. Petersburg. Because St. Petersburg is really a cultural capital, but without constitutionalism, without constitutional justice, description of St. Petersburg as a cultural capital will not be complete. And the proof to it is the fact that Alexander Sergeyevich actually created a branch of constitutional justice in his University. Several judges of the Constitutional Court delivered their speeches here.

The last thesis: the constitutional justice performs converting-cultural functions. The Constitutional Court is not just a court, it is much more than a court, not only because it judges the law rather than people, not only because it judges the power. The Constitutional Court provides harmonization of the letter and spirit of the Constitution, the

combination of the values of Moses and Jesus Christ. And each of us is given an opportunity to participate in that, so that in the end we will be living not in a cacophony but in a symphony in our real life.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I am very happy that we meet the judges of that rank in such atmosphere. I call on Professor Richard Lewis, President of the International Institute of Language and Cross-Cultural Training ‘Richard Lewis Communications’ (the UK).

R. LEWIS: — I have never before participated in such a conference, and I am deeply grateful to Alexander Sergeyevich for giving me the honour to speak in front of such a wonderful audience. I’m going now to examine the subjects in question from a different point of view. My report is on the topic of international business in the context of the dialogue of cultures. My remarks will inevitably carry on our morning discussion. In terms of globalization of businesses it is important for individual entrepreneurs and all companies to have closer relationship and communication than in usual conditions of industrial operations. It is a feature of globalization.

A question arises how well or badly we conduct the dialogue. Because global business is a dialogue of cultures, we talk to each other, exchange information with each other, this dialogue of cultures happens every day. Thus we can evaluate how well we conduct this dialogue. Sometimes difficulties do arise. It may take some diplomatic efforts, perhaps we have to come to agreement on the agenda, which can also be quite difficult.

Communication in business activities provides many opportunities for communication and dialogue of cultures. To perform business activities we need common goals, common grounds to do business, because this is way we will earn some money. And we are trying our best to benefit from the dialogue. I’m engaged in International Business with Deutsche Bank, Opel, and with the World Bank. The results of cooperation are good, people do really want to communicate with each other. But some problems inevitably arise. Large international companies, such as IBM, Castrol, Toyota, and others have international teams, that represent the company in different countries. Let’s assume that there are 10 people in an international team, and its members are of 5 or 6 different nationalities, so we see that a dialogue of cultures happens even within such small groups. They need to conduct business operations as smoothly as possible, in order to do that they need to have common grounds. I often work in international teams, I know how this happens. At the beginning some difficulties and tension in mutual relations evolve, they are enhanced by a language difference and different skills of language usage, but later we can see that national conventions and habits also trigger this dialogue.

Different national ways may lead to different behaviour: the Americans tend to act straightaway, the Japanese aspire harmony, the French solve problems, the Germans are punctual, etc. The team leader should rally this international group, typically in 10-12 months in order to establish a common team language. I do not mean English as a common language, but rather a steady style of communication, a common view on things. And in such a case it is easier to conduct the dialogue, people even have common

humour. One can usually keep that pace of work for months and even years, but sometimes due to external problems in business internal problems or crisis arise. Such tension can undermine the dialogue of the team, and here again when national characteristics manifest themselves, the Americans are trying to work faster and faster, the Germans tend to work slower, the French become more cynical, the British appeal to their famous humour, while others are just at a loss: ‘Why cannot we come to an agreement?’

We have already discussed today why we are all so different. Imagine that we have 300 different cultures, 3,000 different dialects. What causes this difference? There are four major factors: climate, religion, language and nationality.

If you were born in Murmansk, it might be more difficult for you to establish communication with someone who was born in Congo. The Mediterranean sun affects your quick style of speaking. Arctic region differs from the Mediterranean, this will affect the manner of speech. People have different attitudes to success and failures, and in this respect we develop different relationships with our neighbours. A lot has already been said today about religion at the Plenary Meeting. Another factor is the language. If you were born in Russia, you will think in Russian terms about a , a Japanese who will think in a Japanese way. Nationality is a very strong factor. In a courteous society, with a rich language, they behave politely. Thus in the language they avoid rude and obscene words. And this can be traced in any language.

For instance, Japanese are very concerned how to save face, that is why their face reflects what they want to tell the other person. There are five different levels of communication in Japanese, it depends on whether you talk with a superior or subordinate. So if you need to speak with a Japanese, you should go to the highest 5th level. It is determined by culture, their rules are very harsh and they can’t avoid restrictions.

People think differently. For example, in the Thai language there are 16 words that mean blue hues, in Russian, three or four. We are different, but we have succeeded in international communication. The English language very well taught in many universities in Russia. In Western Europe Russia and even China are actively learning this language, so they will soon become bilingual. In international organizations such as the ‘UNESCO’, English is used as a working language.

A new organization has appeared, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and the South African Republic). These countries combine 50% of the world population and a corresponding amount of the world GDP. They become a factor in international finance and politics. Of course, these countries treat the West differently. We have 4 cultures: the Brazilians, the Hindus, the Chinese, the Russians, who have their own ways of culture. So in 2–3 years we will see how the common voice of the ‘BRICS’ will be raised. I am sure that Russia will spread its values and its understanding of culture. So, we see that the dialogue is changing all over the world, but we are looking forward to such changes.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — All Russian businessmen, those who participate in international business, study from books by Professor Lewis. I want to call on Dean of the Higher School of Television of the Moscow State Universi-

ty named after M.V. Lomonosov Vitaly Toviyevich Tretyakov.

V. T. TRETYAKOV: — I would like to share my doubts on what has been discussed here. There are beautiful phrases to which we grew accustomed, there are beautiful words that are a priori considered to have positive contents and they are taken as such. The energy of delusion has been mentioned today as something positive. With this energy the intelligentsia despite their mistakes allegedly was doing something great for the development of our civilization and for Russia in particular. But these are two different things: when intelligent, educated and conscientious people are contaminated with the energy of delusion, and it is another cup of tea when the ignoramus bring their energy of mistakes into the public or into politics. I am not going to speak about the intelligentsia, but those, who now consider themselves intellectuals, they are often not very educated or very conscientious people and are far from being smart. I don't care a trifling fig for their energy of delusion though the term itself is quite beautiful.

My paper is called 'Dialogue from the Position of Force', which deals with culture, television and popular culture. I will touch upon my report, but it is directly related to the essence of today's dispute. Because, in my opinion, it is not facts, meanings and values that are important, but mechanisms by means of which any values, meanings and concepts can be broadcast mostly into the mass audience or imposed upon the people.

The two key words that have been articulated today and that are present in the name of our Conference are: 'dialogue' and 'consensus'. These are two very beautiful words, we believe one cannot live without them. Today the core essence of every speech implied it. But almost every speaker showed some doubt and was cautious or wary about them.

I will directly respond to the question put by academician Makarov: 'Why do soft power and hard power originate from the same point. And the hard power oppresses the soft power, though everyone seems to be claiming a completely different thing?' But the fact is that the key word in these two terms is not 'soft', or 'hard', it is the word 'power'. Both versions are power. Therefore, when the situation requires it, the power is soft, when the conditions change it is hard, underhand, public. If we add a third very important word 'power' to the 'dialogue' and 'consensus', everything fits together well. The most fruitful dialogue is a dialogue of capitulation, which a winner conducts with a loser, in this case consensus is very quickly arrived at. It is an act of surrender. I have never seen any other fruitful and effective dialogue. Capitulation doesn't have to be a military one, it can be of any type.

For example, once in the Soviet Union, glasnost and perestroika were initiated, which is still worshiped by some people, as it was shown in the course of our discussion here. It was a dialogue of everyone with everyone. We were writing, debating, the First Congress of People's Deputies was broadcast for hours. What consensus was achieved as the result of the dialogue? The only result was that no one wanted to defend the country. As a result of that most fruitful dialogue, the country simply collapsed. Not Russia, but the country of the-then name and system.

Another example: what can be more ideologically-dependent than the world cinema? Production of some film

companies and countries is constantly transferred to the territory of other film companies, it has become a sort of a business for annual film festivals. Who constantly wins in this dialogue, this polylogue? Hollywood does. Have we won at least once in this dialogue, as we are involved in it? No way. Why do I need a dialogue in which I always lose? Perestroika and Hollywood are two my examples.

Now Perestroika on the global scale: Russia began to conduct a fruitful dialogue with the West. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was a master, an expert, an apostle and an apostate of the dialogue. But what was the result? What was the consensus like? It was a capitulatory type. What were the conditions of the dialogue? The conditions were lousy: we had to withdraw our troops from Central and Eastern Europe. So, I think that, unfortunately, we have much to revise in terms of what we teach the young people who face the realities of life, which are at odds with beautiful speeches, including the ones I have mentioned. We cannot go any further, because the world, as it has been rightly said here, looks more and more complicated, but in its depth it grows simpler. The number of concepts becomes fewer and fewer. But such a concept as 'power' will stay forever. I believe that we should be more honest and keen. I believe if two neighbours want to negotiate, they will have consensus. But as soon as one neighbour feels dissatisfaction with another, no dialogue will help.

Alexander Sergeyevich, perhaps, next year (if you plan to continue this debate), you should chose another topic, not so pompous, not so familiar and stereotypically-positive.

My paper deals with popular culture, culture and TV. Is their dialogue underway, of a mass culture with high art, but where have you seen this process? Do we have a pop star meeting with an acrobat on the stage? The conduct the dialogue in real life, especially on television. Who makes a choice of what to show? TV people do. And television has become a temple of mass culture, and in this temple there is a tiny room where the true art lives. Its admirers can look into this small room, and it can also be visited by representatives of the mass culture that want to pick up some art and turn it into a mass product. If it is called a dialogue, rather than parasitism or theft of intellectual and moral property, there is nothing to add.

My conclusion is that nowadays our society and the entire European civilization (as we are not going to discuss others), finds itself not only in the situation of cognitive dissonance (a popular term that does not have a positive sense, it is something problematic), as I have been trying to prove, but as far as the mass culture is concerned, the culture and morality are even in the situations of ethical and aesthetic dissonance.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Vitaly Toviyevich, your presentation, as always, is very interesting and acute.

I have summed up which of the greatest scientists have presented the most speeches in the last 20 years at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. It turned out that academician Styopin and academician Guseynov have. We can, of course, invite experts on other issues, but we have our own mission, and I think that in my capacity of a University President I cope with it, and we invite the right people to present speeches.

The Likhachov Conference (I will respond to some remarks of Vitaly Toviyevich) is an interdisciplinary scien-

tific conference. We deliberately invite experts in various fields of scientific knowledge, not only brilliant experts in their profession, but also thinkers, distinguished personalities, prominent figures that go beyond their professions, they ponder upon various problems. In this sense, an expert on narrow subjects can take part the Likhachov Conference, (for example, a great surgeon of the Western Europe has just brilliantly delivered his speech), but we must realize that we live at the age of highly specialized knowledge, and when each of us goes beyond his narrow scope, he takes on a bit flimsy ground. We do invite Eldar Ryazanov, major writers and musicians who perceive the world differently, and who convey their vision to the world.

An interesting thing happened today: of all presentations, two people who have bleeding heats for the same thing are: an outstanding economist, mathematician, academician Makarov and an outstanding journalist Tretyakov, they were hooked on the concept 'hard and soft power', our colleagues feel that something wrong happens in our lives. But I'll tell you something, Vitaly Toviyevich, the term 'power' it is not the key one. In sociology, a concept of 'hard and soft controls' is very well developed. Morality, ethics and something that a person should bear in his soul through upbringing, education, are called 'soft controls' in sociology. We can say that we are oppressed by power and strength, but something should be in the inner world of a person. Soft power also includes social norms and the system of social sanctions. When a person has committed a wrong act, he is not respected, it is also 'soft controls', while 'hard power', 'hard controls' is the law. You absolutely rightly pointed out that it is a huge pain of our state. The authorities are mostly illiterate and immoral but they attempt to influence the people by making new laws. 'We adopt the laws all the time, but they are not observed', is an attempt to replace 'soft controls' with 'hard controls', one of the symptoms of a deep crisis and a serious disease of our society.

I call on academicians of the Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, Petr Petrovich Tolochko.

P. P. TOLOCHKO: — My presentation is 'Empires and the World Development'. In a way, it is a rehabilitation of the concept 'empire'. The older generation does remember how the term 'the Soviet empire' was discredited in the 1980s-90s: it was called the 'Empire of Evil' and other names. A conclusion was made that we cannot live like that any longer.

Meanwhile empires are locomotives of the world development. If you consider historically, from the first civilizations of Mesopotamia to the Soviet Union, the peaks of development were in the times of the empire. Empires are active, dynamic, aggressive, empires come into contact with each other and take over one another, but they do not leave the historic arena. When the Soviet Union was ruined, it was debated that the last empire had finally kicked the bucket, and it was said by the people who had lived in an empire, in the United States, where sun never sets down on its territories and its military bases, as once in Britain. It was said in Western Europe, which is also an empire, NATO and the European Union is a new empire. But for some reason they did not like the Soviet empire. We experienced a general euphoria because of the collapse of the Soviet Union. I can understand the joy and delight of the

United States, Western Europe, they got rid of a rival. I can even understand the joy of national elites, who suddenly overnight became Presidents, kings, etc. But I cannot understand the joy of Russian liberals. How did they benefit from the collapse of the great country, its ceasing to be empire. It would be great if a new quality of life had evolved after the collapse. The new quality only got worse. The collapse of the empire is always a tragedy.

The downfall of Rome led to barbarization of cultures, the collapse of Byzantium led to the same aftermaths. Probably, the Soviet Union was not perfect and it had not reached shining heights, but it was the best thing on that huge Russian post-imperial space, and the country had a lot of achievements. And then it was followed by an abrupt collapse. Everyone's conditions worsened. It became worse for national republics, as a dramatic decline in production, culture and population began. It became worse for Russia: it ceased to be a great country. It became worse for the whole world.

Alexander Sergeyevich has mentioned that 30 years ago it would have been unthinkable for Americans to bomb the Middle East or Yugoslavia. But it is not because moral level has fallen down, it rather is because the Soviet Union collapsed, and there were no restraining factors. So I would like us to pause and think together (especially the young audience) that the world development is always determined (highly controversially and difficultly), by large-scale globalization projects that result in the birth of the empires, and these empires boost the world progressive development. This is probably not the best thing that could have been, but we do not analyze what could have been, rather what a real life is like. And paraphrasing a well-known politician, I can say that the empire is probably not the best thing invented by mankind, but they could invent nothing better.

It seems to me that the revival of the Soviet empire, the empire headed by Russia, seems to be imperative and timely, it is the world's urge. Otherwise small countries today who lap in their independence, including my native Ukraine, will become marginal countries, we will lose culture, economics and demographics. The development is only possible in a large community, and there are good reasons that Baltic countries quickly fled from one empire to another, they wanted to have freedom, independence and sovereignty, but they quickly surrendered their sovereignty to another empire. In the Ukraine we do not want to join one empire, and the other empire doesn't want us. I do not know what the result will be. But I am absolutely convinced that this vast territory from Europe to Vladivostok will be reborn as a powerful, new dynamically functioning empire, I see nothing wrong in it.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I give the floor to Juan Antonio March, a diplomat.

J. A. MARCH: — Alexander Sergeyevich, I am grateful for inviting me again to this forum. On the one hand, this Conference provokes a very interesting brainstorming of the older generation, on the other hand, we have a younger generation that will build this world in the future.

I want to talk today about the importance of the concept of identity. Identity is a traditional idea. We used to ignore identity, but now we live in a world where a technological revolution is progressing, that has different characteristics

compared to those we had before. They are limited to some extent by a specific space in the world, it allows some elements to become empires such (Greece, Germany, Rome). Now the situation is different in terms of technologies. The development is evolved horizontally, and the real component of the technology is the citizens, those who become the driving force of the world, regardless of the state.

We have to win the time to avoid confrontation, as the technology is developing at a fast pace, in 15 years the consolidation of technological developments will be completed. One invention, for example, a new application on your Apple phone, in 5 years, perhaps, will automatically have a programme of a verbal translation from any language. Perhaps, people who do not know a foreign language at all will have this opportunity in 5 years to communicate to a person from any part of the world. 7 billion people live now on earth. Having a Smartphone, they will have global communications, which will promote a process of transformation. It is necessary for people to preserve their identity, their local values. We need people who will protect our heritage, the heritage of the places where people were born, the local cultures and, at the same time, they should understand that a local culture is a value that cannot come in any conflict with another culture. We need to define certain values, their importance and richness.

Since the birth of mankind a very simple approach to life has been popular, many people think that only one opinion can be right. We need to think about the diversity, diversification. Just imagine how poor the world would be if we had only one species of butterflies, one breed of dog, but we have millions of different species of butterflies. So diversification, biological diversity and variety are wonderful things that exist in the world. We need variety and flexibility as the driving force of our world, the driving force of development.

It is important to realize that the era of imperialism and nationalism has ended. The new future is the citizens. We need to open up the borders, so that each country could feel like a winner, not a loser. People should understand the identity and diversity of cultures, and Likhachov forum, from this point of view, is very important.

We should consider two things. First of all, it's diversification (or variety), how this idea can be applied in the European Union, I think that we are successfully moving towards diversity. The future gives us a chance to maintain this diversity. We need to ensure two main points: first of all, to preserve diversity, and secondly, to avoid any manifestation of imperialism, imperialist thinking. It is necessary for the European Union to have representatives of different countries and different states in order to avoid confrontation, I hope one day it will happen.

And the last thing is the relationship between Russia and the European Union. It has been said before that Russia is Europe. Spain isn't only Europe, but also former metropolitan countries of Latin America. Spaniards will always be able to go to Argentina, Mexico and Brazil to live. Driving force in Spain originate from a close relationship with Central Europe. From my point of view, now the same is happening in Russia. Russia is not only Europe, it is also Asia, a lot of nationalities live here. In the history of Russia all important key moments come from Europe.

This University always conducts debates on the dialogue of civilizations, maybe next year we will have de-

bate on the concept of Great Europe, not the Europe, which adheres to the model of imperialism and empire, but the Europe, which ensures the preservation of the heritage of all nations maintaining originality. We tend not to decline, but to progress, we will be the driving forces for a positive thinking in order to create a new concept of interaction.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I invite Professor Anatoly Andreyevich Gromyko to speak.

A. A. GROMYKO: — Esteemed presidium, esteemed Alexander Sergeyevich, it is a unique forum in this assembly hall, simply because we will never get together in such a line-up. I hope we will be able to achieve positive results in our work counting on remarks that have been stated here. I worked for six or seven years in the board of the Pugwash movement (it was in the 1980s), which is well forgotten now. Pugwash movement differs greatly from the Russell-Einstein Manifesto or from the Likhachov Conference. But I would really like to see that the international influence of the Likhachov Conference is becoming broader and more effective. The international aspect of our discussions is probably a very valuable element in the Likhachov Conference over the last few years.

I have submitted a paper on the topic: 'Global Governance as a Means of Communication in International Relations, Opportunities and Risks', you can see it on the website. Now I just want to emphasize the following. We recently celebrated the victory in the Great Patriotic War and we will always celebrate it. In the West, many people wonder, 'Why is Russia celebrating Victory Day again? Isn't it time to stop it?'. During the Second World War I lived with my parents in the United States of America, where I actually grew up. From 7 to 16 years, I lived in Washington, later in New York. America had never lived so prosperously as during the Second World War. Everyone was provided with jobs, people got a decent salary, the products were cheap. The Victory Day is not just a celebration of a military victory, it celebrates the victory of the new world order enforced by a new rule of law. It was based on the United Nations Charter, signed, including our delegation, in July 1945. I am proud that my father, Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, took part in the preparation of such an important document as the Charter of the United Nations and contributed to the fact that there remained a veto right of the great powers. Roosevelt did not want to accept this right as the Americans had a majority in the UN Security Council, they didn't need a unanimity rule. President of the US, who felt a sympathy for the Soviet Union and the Soviet Army, which had been fighting the Nazis, began to express doubts about the principle of unanimity of great powers. This principle referred to the world governance, which later transformed into to global. My father told him that this principle had to be accepted, otherwise the Soviet Union would cease a membership in the UN. At that time it was inconceivable that the Soviet Union should give up a membership in such an organization, and Roosevelt relented and accepted the principle of unanimity of great powers, which later became known to us all as the 'right of veto'. By the way, many people may ask, 'Why do some powers have the right of veto?' My father explained that the principle of veto is a compulsion to compromise. Actually, seeking for a compromise is the main thing that should accompany international relations.

It is necessary to distinguish the reforms that we are witnessing in the international life in certain areas, new or old coalition that emerge or expand their functions from the attempts to reform international relations. The UN Charter sets forth the principles that provide the world order, the order that can be called democratic. The first principle is the non-use of force or threat of force. Who can say that it is a bad principle? Another principle is non-interference in the domestic jurisdiction of other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. America had sought all through the 1920s–1930s that the Soviet Union should not interfere in the affairs of other countries especially America. They were afraid of socialist ideas, Communist ideology, etc. But then they began to yield from this principle.

Right now on the world stage, the balance of power is changing, what it will result in is difficult to predict.

Nowadays China's influence in Africa is growing fast, just like the influence of the Soviet Union was growing in the 1970s–1980s. China rather than the U.S., France or any others is recognized by many African countries as a support which they can rely on in order to survive in this complex world.

Those who in a globalized world found a beneficial place quite often have a desire to keep it by all means, including new approaches. Bear in mind how many absurdities are made by people just because of the desire to create something new when it is not required. When change is unwelcome, do not change. I think we are approaching the point when it is necessary to think about Russian conservatism (as it has been mentioned in many remarks). We cannot introduce reforms at the time, otherwise nothing will be left of the life we are accustomed to.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on Sir Timothy O'Shea, the Principal of the University of Edinburgh.

T. O'SHEA: — Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great honour for me to take part in the Likhachov Conference. St. Petersburg is a very important city, it is a place where one feels admiration for the courage that the city and its people showed during the siege in the Second World War, as well as admiration for its architecture and culture, creativity, which in many ways is associated with D.S. Likhachov. This Conference that bears his name. I am of course very pleased that the University of Edinburgh was one of the first universities abroad which gave the honorary degree to D.S. Likhachov, and St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences was the first Russian university to award Dmitry Sergeyevich with the honorary cap and gown. I am grateful to St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences for awarding me with the title of Doctor *honoris causa*.

To see what connects Edinburgh and St. Petersburg, it is suffice to look into the history. Several architects came here from Edinburgh together with a few engineers. Also a medical system used here, originated in my university, it was our contribution to the creation of St. Petersburg.

Creativity of Russia is presented by the fact that in the 18th century Duchess Dashkova became the first woman scientist, who visited Edinburgh and my university. This is an example for young women. Later she became the President of the Imperial Academy of Sciences; also it is important to mention William Robinson came from Scotland to

Russia. Here we see a vast field for creativity in the relationship between our two cities referring to the period of the late 19th century.

Also in the 19th century chemistry rapidly developed, particularly, D.I. Mendeleev researched how elements differ from each other. British scientists too, researched how molecules relate to each other, their similarities and differences. Mendeleev invented the periodic table of elements, but the structure of the molecule was first described by our scientist Carl Brown, who, in particular, used the needle of his wife to build the first models of molecules. In my office hangs the first copy of the periodic table, signed by Mendeleev himself.

Relationships with Edinburgh are also manifested in the fact that we have organized a Duchess Dashkova centre, it is the only centre of its kind, under this centre we hold events that bring Edinburgh closer to Russia. Students of this centre visit St. Petersburg and Russia, we have departments of Russian Studies invite scientists from Russia. It gives a great optimism. In this we discuss new technologies and we often have experiments with mass training courses in the Internet. We have already developed 6 of such courses for distance learning. The audience all over the world can take advantage of them. In many countries of the world people use our courses, and in Russia many students are taught by such courses. They are online course that have a global outlet and are distributed worldwide. For that students use their electronic devices, (for example, in this manner they studies the treatment and spread of disease in Africa). A group of Russian students started to make such courses in the Russian language, so Russian students respond to the worldwide challenge. We invite professors from different countries. It inspires us on the work in future, and gives hope for the future.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I give the floor to Yuri Perovich Zinchenko.

Yu. P. ZINCHENKO: — I would like to thank St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences for organizing the Likhachov Conference. Not even every state will cope with organizational troubles of such a grand conference, while Alexander Sergeyevich with his team for the 20th time has held this forum to which the intelligentsia not only from St. Petersburg, but also from Moscow come. I am grateful to the staff of the University.

This conference, as Vyacheslav Semyonovich Styopin said, has already passed at least three stages of its development. The first stage was a classic form of a standard conference, then it transformed into a self-regulating one, and now it has become a self-sustaining system. This site and Likhachov Square, presented here, are unique for Russia. Moscow seems rather a monologue city, but Petersburg, is the area where all intellectuals can conduct a dialogue.

So getting round to the dialogue of cultures, I would tackle upon the dialogue of generations rather than the dialogue of cultures. Because the dialogue of cultures has much been spoken about, and we also debated on a large gap that arises between us and the younger generation. The new generation that is appearing now and slowly taking up the place at the helm, are naturally different from most of those present here in the hall. On the one hand there is a certain misunderstanding, traditional issue of fathers

and children, on the other hand, certain phenomena become quite natural consequences of what is happening now.

For example, the curriculum and standards of the school, which have recently been introduced. Recently we have discussed how many chapters from 'Evgeniy Onegin' we can remember, while today it will be a God's blessing if our students or prospective students could render a few verses. We have created a situation when Pushkin and Lermontov are treated just as temporary topics for study in our school standards, and Dmitry Sergeyevich would have said that probably, the next step would be introduction of Russian as a foreign language in our schools. In this situation, we obviously should look at the causes of this imbalance, and at the discomfort that we experience in this communication.

The topic of the Likhachov Conference is the 'Dialogue of Cultures and Culture of Dialogue'. There is much to argue upon. Quite interesting ideas were on cognitive dissonance. Until frustration starts, there is still time for us to change something.

The situation in the information space now resembles a kind of information feudalism, when the mass media are both means of communication and means of forming public opinion, at the same time owned by very specific groups or powers. In that sense the feudal fragmentation of the media under the guise of their independence, does not actually enhance establishment of a normal and healthy information space. Another obstacle to it is the lack of values, because on the one hand, we talk about the rule of law, on the other hand, we talk about the legal culture. Ideology as a Constitutional fact was withdrawn from our lives, that is why the system of values is absent. The question arises what should children aspire at school, what should their instructors teach them? When our school teachers come across these are simple questions, it results in nothing good.

In conclusion I would like to say that the dialogue is undoubtedly interesting and useful, and probably it is a beautiful form of art, but if the dialogue is treated not as art, but as a creation technique, then perhaps it would be an indicator of the effectiveness of any ideological activity produced in such forums. And this is one of the platforms where dialogue can be effective and where our conversations can lead to some results.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I invite to the floor Professor René Guerra.

R. GUERRA: — I would like to sound relevant, though I will talk about the past. Yesterday at dinner, which was attended by several members of the conference, we were speculating over one issue, whether Russia belongs to European countries or to Asia. I was shocked a little by this issue. My paper submitted for the Conference deals with establishment and development of cultural relations between France and Russia. Plenty of books have been written about this broad topic. Traditional mutual attraction and interest of our two countries, two great cultures, has deep historical roots, and I would like to give a few brief examples. In the 18th and 19th century, the influence of French culture in Europe was dominant, French was the language of communication of the nobility in all European states. The Encyclopaedists' ideas in the 18th century served as a beacon to all leading figures in culture and art. The French language occupied an important place in the

history and culture of the Russian people, too, and although, as Ramon, the historian, remarked, some grievous historical errors were inevitable, our friendship was based on open-mindedness, on common features, on generosity tightly linked the two great nations. It was written in 1893.

I would like to make a little digression. Today's speakers constantly used the word dialogue and 'consensus', which are the French words. I can't say the percent of Russian vocabulary that originated from French. After the reforms of Peter the Great, Russia became actively involved in European life, it is a historic fact, fast convergence of cultures was initiated, trade relations and forms of communication were strengthened. Russians evolved a particular interest in France and everything French, be it history, literature, art, science, fashion and, of course, language. Since then, young noblemen were sent to study not only to England or the Netherlands, but also to France. Since 1720, Russian boys were sent to study seamanship in Brest and Toulon. Since the mid-18th century rich grandees like Razumovsky, Shuvalov, Orlov had been visiting Paris, Lyon, Montpellier, writers Trediakovsky, Karamzin, Fonvisin had been undertaking cultural pilgrimages. This period was marked with a rapid boost of cultural relations between France and Russia, to which the French were showing growing interest. Today, one of the speakers said some words about the charm of the Russian name, I support this idea. Philosophers Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert became the first genuine Russophiles under the influence of Catherine II. French architects, artists, philosophers made regular trips to St. Petersburg, where they were entrusted with work of building palaces and erecting monuments. I would like to remind (though everyone here knows it) that in 1782, at the Senate Square in St. Petersburg, the monument to Peter the Great by French sculptor Falconet was officially unveiled. Diderot took a keen interest in Russia and believed in its bright future, he followed the progress of Russian science, was aware of Lomonosov's works and studied Russian in order to read works of Russian writers in the original. Voltaire was particularly interested in Russia, he corresponded with Catherine II and the Russian enlightened figures. And there were good reasons that in 1746 Voltaire was elected an honorary member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Voltaire wrote 'The History of the Russian Empire under Peter the Great', in which he praised his reforms. The interest of Russia and France was mutual, it benefited to the cultural enrichment of both countries. Russian scholars were studying works by French philosophers Voltaire, Diderot, Montesquieu, showing an enormous interest in French literature. You remember Pushkin's lines: 'Uncork a bottle of champagne, and read *The Marriage of Figaro*' as Mozart cheerfully advises to Salieri. Books by Lamartine, Rousseau were translated from French into Russian by Lomonosov, Trediakovsky, Fonvisin and others. In the early 18th century French editions took the third place in Russia after Latin and German by number, and the middle of the same century the translations from the French reached the figure of 55% of the total number of translations. Diplomats and military men fleeing the French Revolution, Protestants and Calvinists escaping from the persecution for religion, etc found refuge in Russia. After the October Revolution, as you know, many Russian intellectuals and Orthodox Christians took their refuge in exile in France.

In the period from 1789 to 1812 in Moscow a French colony was organized. And after the war of 1812 many French commercial companies and partnerships that combine factory production and trade began to form in large Russian cities.

Later in the early years of the twentieth century Parisians discovered Russian ballet and Russian opera, thanks to the famous *Saisons Russes* by Sergei Diaghilev. During this period, Paris was the centre of culture, and France was the milestone of all new trends in art, as young artists, sculptors, writers were visiting Paris. The French are very proud of their role in the cultural life of Russia. Alas, the October coup and the 70 years of Soviet power set up the notorious 'Iron Curtain' and cut off Russian culture from Europe, particularly from France, but it is another big topic. Summing up, since the 18th century a fruitful and mutually beneficial Franco-Russian dialogue has been going on, and thanks God, it will not cease. Thank you for your attention.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on Professor Shlomo Weber.

Sh. WEBER: — First of all, I am grateful to Alexander Sergeyevich and the Organizing Committee for the invitation, I am very happy to be here. It is a great excitement that I will never forget. I have been personally involved in the dialogue of civilizations over the years, as I have lived in many different countries and on different continents, I can list them: Europe, Asia, Middle East and America, not only the United States. I have always been very interested in how cultural and other differences determine the behaviour of people, especially economic, political and social development. This is what I devoted my research to. But first a brief excursus. When I was walking around the ancient capital of Japan, Kyoto, I saw a sign inscribed on the wall which read as followed: 'We are different, but let's live together, taking into account our difference.' It would be better if we thought more about this beautiful motto, tried to be sensible of our differences, and, still, kept moving forward.

What does it have to do with my research and my personal experience? I have always been interested in the issue of differences in society, in economic, socio-political behaviour of people. Such differences are a crucial factor in life. Economists used to pay little attention to culture and they only emphasized efficiency, but how one can talk about economic development without allowing for cultural differences, consider Asia, look at Africa, or wherever you feel like.

Culture is one of the determining factors of human behaviour, that is why economic, political and social development cannot be studied without culture's influence. We differ in many aspects, political, language, genetic, economic, ethnical, religious, etc. How do these differences determine the behaviour and development of a society, especially in the Russian real life where diversity – geographic, religious and others has a great affect?

Some points should be mentioned here. Being an economist, I will remind that everything has its price and if we want to do something good, it will always cost a fortune, and will take a lot of resources, that is why society can decide what kind of diversity it can afford. An extensive desire to be diverse can have its consequences.

But there are two more points to mention. My colleagues already been talking today about the European Union, which is a great organization. I agree that in some ways it may be a good organization, but even there the increase in diversity makes the process of EU disintegration completely impossible. There are different blocks in the EU, Western European countries, Slavic countries and others. It is natural that in some countries, namely, the UK, there is a tendency to withdraw from the European Union. So the question whether the diversity is good or bad is very difficult. Sometimes it is good, sometimes bad, to a certain extent. The same way as it is with spices: you are having dinner and you start to sprinkle salt and pepper. If you do not use any, the taste is blank and disgusting, but when we added so much it is impossible to eat.

The same thing happens in the social life, the excessive diversity can cause contradictions and instability, as in the example of the European Union and some other international organizations.

One more thing which is the most significant in all these studies on diversity is as follows. Let's assume that we have several different groups distinguished by a language. For example, there are 125 cultures in Russia, but in a smaller country like Papua New Guinea there are 857 active languages. How can a country function in such a diversity? The situation is as follows: the so-called standardization starts, some languages are eliminated, some languages are declared informal and only 3 or 4 languages begin to function in the country. It seems to be good for an efficient paper flow and economic cooperation, but what happens in terms of feelings and attitudes of the population, when they are not allowed to teach children in their native language, when their opinion is not taken into account at a high level? People feel to be thrown away from life. It really happens in many countries: a part of the population, is expelled from the constructive process, and lost in terms of globalization, which is undoubtedly a very unreasonable thing. So this policy is not sensible. We naturally want to thrive in progress, efficient economic development, but it will never happen if we do not take into account the wishes of large groups of people, if we do not consider their feelings and their wishes. Should economy deal with culture? It is inevitable, because culture already exists and we cannot avoid it, whether we like or not. Even from a practical point of view: in order to involve the population in the creative process, we should act wisely and consider their wishes.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you. I call on Mr. Hekmat Karzai.

H. KARZAI: — Esteemed colleagues, I am honoured and proud to be invited to the Likhachov Conference. This is my second visit to St. Petersburg, and I am pleased to find friends here. Once more I got assured that the environment here serves educational purposes. It's not just a matter of training, I was really deeply touched by comments made by Alexander Pushkin's great-granddaughter. We can talk a lot about civilizations, necessity to improve conditions of life, especially for poor people. And I think today's forum is a great opportunity to discuss this issue here.

I wrote a paper (which you can read online), where I highlighted several main themes: firstly, why intercultural dialogue is very important specifically in the environment

we live in? From my personal point of view it is very significant, because when I was young, I was a refugee, I lived in several countries, then I started to learn English and I began to read literature. The first book I read was Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations*, I personally do not agree with what he states, but I know people who support his ideas. And one of them was notorious Osama bin Laden. Many years ago he arrived in Afghanistan and turned Afghanistan into a cradle of international terrorism, he robbed us of our culture, our identity. Then, when I became a student, I realized that there was a very serious clash of ideologies. I was taught how to live in the common world, how to be moderate. But bin Laden believed in jihad as a mandatory responsibility of Muslims to fight with the West. And now many people have probably asked themselves the question, why can't we, human beings, live together in accord? History testifies that Islamic ideas used to spread everywhere (and they came to Spain, to Cordoba), some religions were on friendly terms, we were conducting peaceful discussions. How could that radical ideology spread, how were the young people brainwashed? We never saw any examples of that in the past. For example, when the idea of suicide terrorism evolved, young people blew themselves up, they believed in another world and they wanted to get there after death. We have established an educational centre where we conduct a large-scale educational work on human rights and peaceful co-existence of many countries. Our students come to conclusion that they get the opportunity to build a better life rather than blow themselves up. And until we can teach young minds, and until we provide them with a better future, we will not be able to coexist together peacefully. We have to learn how to do it, because there is a radical ideology spreading all over, and problems arise, and challenges are becoming more and more complex. We can only find solutions through education.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I give the floor to Professor Hans Köchler.

H. KÖCHLER: — Dear colleagues, I would like to share with you some thoughts on the meaning of cultural identity or uniqueness, what dialogue between cultures means, in its broad sense among civilizations, conducted in terms of today's world order, which has already been described by many speakers through their reflection that they shared with us.

Let me tell you my personal story. A few years after the old world order was over, in the middle of the 1990s, I had a talk with Mr. Samuel Huntington. We attended a conference and we just were about to speak on the dialogue of civilizations, the political world of that time aspired to define the situation and to discuss new terms of cooperation between the Muslim world and the rest of the world. There was such a rapid collapse of the bipolar system, and I expressed my anxiety as to how the West, especially the USA, would cooperate with Iraq. Now we know that their policy has led to casualties of about 1 million Iraqis. If a political confrontation of such a scale evolves, if there is a fight with such a discrepancy of forces, then it becomes difficult to maintain a dialogue between different cultural identities in a broad sense, including religion and other civilization differences. And in this hall I have heard speculation on the concept of cultural and civilization identity.

Here we can actually see that cultural identity is not static, it is the identity on which I build my own understanding of the world. Worldview is the result of hundreds and thousands of years of cultural and civilizational development, to which each person belongs. We witness a result of a very complex interaction of different cultures and civilizations. If there had been none of such interaction, then the history of cultures and civilizations would not have progressed, we would still live at the early stages of human life. And this fact reveals different aspects depending on whether we will consider it in the international or global level. Relationships can be neutral, peaceful, or can be rather turbulent. They can be considered in terms of culture or economics, but they don't necessarily evolve in the form of a dialogue. The word dialogue is of a Greek origin, it was used in Greek philosophy, it means more than just co-existence and relations with each other. Dialogue means exchange, reasoning, mutual benefits, when each party absorbs information from the dialogue. For example, American and Chinese scientists have brought key elements in the understanding of the history of an empire, they tried to explain how empires managed to integrate a variety of cultural identity in order to establish a multicultural reality on their territory. Such empires lasted longer than those that wanted to get rid of everything that differed from their own culture. If some community is unable to determine its own identity, it cannot distinguish itself from other groups. What is the fundamental point of a dialogue in the existing world order? Until the 1990s the world was bipolar, there was a certain balance of powers, and we have now a non-balanced condition, which demoralize people. As a result we see that information and economic cooperation on the global level have been organized in a multicultural reality, and yet we have countries that can't go beyond their monocultures. Germany was monocultural, but now it has turned into multicultural, and we can say that its cultural diversity is a political factor. As I have stated, we have a misbalance of powers, while dialogue assumes equality. The West and the East will have to find a common ground, using this paradigm of dialogue, and the United Nations must continue its usual activities. If we allow the clash of civilization, we will have plenty of problems at hand, so we will gradually create a multicultural unified world order. Thank you for your attention.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on Mr. Xue Futsi.

XUE FUTSI: — Esteemed colleagues! My paper was devoted to the political culture of Kyrgyzstan, but I would not like to consider that country in terms of an abstract political structure. That is why I'll start with the experience of China, and with China's position. Since 1860, when the United Kingdom and other Western powers using their military forces compelled our country to become open we have been experiencing a very huge transformation of culture. This process has a very ambiguous nature. The defeat of our country in the clash with Western powers led to the fact that some of Chinese radicals believed at that time: as we were not able to win, and had fallen behind in all aspects, our culture was to be blamed for that, hence we had to get rid of it as soon as possible. Among the measures that could help us in this regard, it was even offered to introduce Latin alphabet. But luckily we had not done that. Nevertheless, it is a very, very

complicated process, when the country has to adapt to new conditions, un-convenient and unusual. We had a time when the country was completely closed, (I mean the so-called Great Cultural Revolution), later the country became opened to the outside world again, and now I hope it will last for a long time. The development of our country 2000 years of its experience has constantly prompted us that perhaps our culture has a certain extremely stable inner structure, certain fundamentals, the picture of the world, system of values that have been modified over the time, but mostly have remained as they were established centuries ago. And I believe that in the future, the development of our country, its achievements and success or failure will largely depend on how deeply we are aware of these fundamentals, this inner extremely stable structure, very much depends on it.

Kyrgyzstan, our neighbour, is a small country, its area is 200,000 square kilometres and population is 5.5 million. I will consider that country counting on our experience, because historians believe that the peoples of Kyrgyzstan were formed somewhere in the 16th century, but its political memory of course has a long history, that is the fact to be reckoned. In that country for the past 20 years since it gained its independence there have been two coups, it reveals the fact that political institutions that were established under the previous presidents, could not take root in that country. It partly results from its clan-based public structure. And this clan-based identity in the country causes the situation when any President, no matter where he originated from, will always be associated with a particular clan, so when he tries to consolidate power in his own hands, he will find himself in a minority, setting everyone else against him. Both in 2005 and in 2010 Presidents could not protect their power in a dignified manner, realizing that it leads to a civil war.

Both China and Kyrgyzstan (as it can happen in any other country that has such rich historical traditions), creative transformation is the key to success. Thank you for your attention.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I give the floor to Professor Peter van Krieken.

P. van KRIEKEN: — Esteemed colleagues! Do you remember the episode from the old film 'Brian's Life' when Brian talks to the audience and tells them that they are all separate individuals, and one person stands up and says, 'But I am not', so he was not an individual. This demonstrates cultural misunderstanding. I was told that the Russian mentality has not the concept of the individual. I have lived in many foreign countries, in Lebanon, Yemen, Sudan, North and South Ethiopia, I have lived and worked in Afghanistan, Pakistan, recently I have lived in Laos for more than two years. So I was exposed to many cultural influences, but can I say that I understand them? They are different cultures, and I tried to communicate with them, but I cannot say that I understand them.

The Netherlands is proud to be a very tolerant country, but this feature is just a myth. We do not participate in the dialogue of cultures. In my native small town we have various primary schools, Protestant, Catholic, Islamic, Hindu, i.e. we live apart, we are separated in our lives, we are outside the dialogue. If two Dutchmen speak, it is two monologues, we are engaged in a monologue rather than dialogue. However, in different countries I always pay attention to the number of

bookstores and books translated from foreign languages. In Russia this number is large. The same situation is found in Greece and Spain, books in translations are published more than books written in neo-Greek or Spanish. And it means that cross-border cultural dialogue is in action.

In one of their songs 'Pink Floyd' sing: 'We don't need no education, we don't need no thought control. Teacher, leave 'em kids alone. Hey, teacher! Leave 'em kids alone!' We must realize that this trans-cultural dialogue is very important, there are some absolute norms and values and we must not fall below them. I had a peculiar experience in my life. 20 years ago in Pakistan I was in charge of the UN refugee camp. There were two million Afghans, so I had a big budget. Once an Afghani delegation came to me in my office, and referring to the alleged words of my father (as a respectful attitude to the elders appeals to them) I said: 'This is the money you could build a school on, but on one condition. When I come to your school, I will have to make sure that at least 40% of your students are girls.' They insisted that I had to respect their culture, in which they did not provide education for girls. But I replied, 'I understand that you respect your culture. But you also have to respect human rights. We offer you to build a school on our terms.' And they came to me three times, but finally they agreed to teach girls as well.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — I call on Professor Zhan Terentyevich Toshchenko.

Zh. T. TOSHCHENKO:¹ — Distinguished colleagues, I would like to reflect upon the issue of the youth mentioned by Alexander Sergeevich, and the values touched upon by Vyacheslav Semyonovich, but in terms

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Head of the Academic Council of the Russian Academy of Science 'New Phenomena in the Public Consciousness and Social Practice'. Chief Editor of 'Sociological Researches' Journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences ('Sotsiologicheskiye Issledovaniya'). Member of the Editorial Board of the Russian Academy of Science Journal 'Social Sciences' and 'Sociology' (Belarus). Member of the Academic Expert Council under the Chairman of the Council of Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Full member of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan. Honorary professor of the Moscow State University named after M.V. Lomonosov, Doctor *Honoris Causa* of the Institute of Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Laureate of M. M. Kovalevsky Award of the Russian Academy of Sciences, awarded with P. A. Sorokin medal.

of social studies. What is today's youth focused on? The first lines in the list of their values family, health, friends. Sometimes they are referred to as socio-biological values, or primary, basic, core values. These issues are the starting point in the life of a young man, but at the same time they cause a number of problems. Why does almost every second young family break apart? Claiming health as a principal value, 70% of young men and 30% of girls smoke. If you touch upon more serious problems of life stability, the number of suicides among young people is three times the world average. Why do these contradictions appear? Many young people are affected by certain geo-information processes.

The second group of values is socio-civic, socio-material, socio-economic values that are associated with profession, job, career, position. The focus in this area is also generally correct, because young people want to succeed in life, to get some support. But at the same time, these values are being severely oppressed. Almost one in three doubt young men doubt that they could resolve the issue of the future work that could ensure their prosperity in life. The fact that the state youth policy does not help to solve these issue is an acute large-scale social problem.

And the third group is socio-constitutional values. These are the issues related to civil position, attitude to their country, power. The majority of young people are passive in relation to government agencies, have not discerned their faith, or have doubts on how much their country is worth priding, the country where they grow up, get an education and intend to live.

How to solve such problems and what difficulties do we face when solving them? Firstly, quite often though implicitly young people face the question as to what we aspire, what society we are building in our country, which prevents them from detecting their guideline in life. Secondly the state does not proclaim ambitious goals to inspire the younger generation. I hate to seem out-of-date, saying that I used to participate in Komsomol construction projects in Siberia. I realize now that we can't return those goals to dig up the virgin land, but there are other problems, in which the youth could participate more actively. Today my colleagues have spoken of the issues of environmental culture, that shows itself in a thrown cigarette end, beer bottles and the culture of everyday lives. Why not make these commonplace issues the issues of national importance?

Thirdly, we lack moral guidelines. Our surveys show that up to 60% do not have any moral guidelines, while others call as guidelines either literary characters, or heroes of the past, or for some reason figures of show business or sporting world. Moral guideline are not associated with names of scientists, working people.

Finally, fourthly, the problems of education that Alexander Sergeyevich referred to. There are many instructions in mass media how to win trust, how to please an employer, but there are no recommendations how to be honest, responsible, how to match personal interests with the interests of the country and society. All the problems that I have briefly described, have to be solved, their resolution will guarantee the development of our country in the future.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Our plenary session will be brought to a close after the speech of Professor Georgy Borisovich Kleiner.

G. B. KLEINER¹: — First of all, I'd like to express my deep respect to this forum, which has always been an integrating element of the Russian culture. Today St. Petersburg hosts the International Legal Forum, very soon World Economic Forum will be held, a great number of sociological meetings are conducted here, that's all great, but we need a mediator. Likhachov Conference can perform the role of such a mediator, where sociologists, economists and representatives of other professions, lawyers and philosophers are trying their best to join difficulty-combining elements of social life.

I would like to offer to your consideration a metaphorical scheme. We can count on a stable development of the country when it can be compared with a certain crystal, stable to a broad range of external effects. What is the structure of the crystal like, what part of the social life of the country should hold it, what forces of attraction and repulsion must be enacted in order to make this structure stable, so that we could count on our further development. We can find different answers, but my answer is as follows. This structure has four elements: state, society, economy and business. These four pillars form the backbone of the crystal structure called a 'country', and the way they interact, how well they are developed, the way they are balanced stipulate, in fact, the nature of the country, country style and options of the country development. Usually the word 'economics' is considered as a synonym to business and market economy, but actually, they have to be distinguished. 4 different subsystems of the country are 4 different cultures, I would even say, 4 different civilizations. Take as an example government officials, the way they talk, dress up, bear themselves, look at representatives of business, they are two different cultures, different civilizations. Consider economic life, employees, business managers, it is the third culture. While the population as a whole, ordinary people are the fourth culture. Integrating these various forces in the country is the task of dialogue between these cultures. That's why the topic of this Conference seems to me very important, covered in its different aspects in presentations of Russian and foreign participants. To ensure such a dialogue within the crystal, we need a sound system of institutions that provide the relationships between these four systems. Research shows that these 4 elements resemble the structure of the square, be-

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tween diagonal elements the relationships are, to improve them is a difficult but important task; and there are adjacent elements, such as state and society, or government and business. So there are good reasons why business penetrates to the government agencies so that a symbiotic relationship evolves between them, which we treat negatively. But in order to organize a proper interaction between these four components, we need to have the right institution. Now we lack such institutions. Take, for example, a simple question: who should carry out this dialogue? If representatives of society are individuals, they are provided with legitimate law, we understand what the liability of individuals is, etc., but in the economics, now we do not have a legitimize concept of an economic entity. We only have the concept of a legal entity, but, firstly, one and the same economic entity can involve a lot of legal entities and the other way round, one legal entity may dominate over many economic entities. The concept of an economic participant as of an economic entity identifying a certain company could solve many problems of our economy. Likewise, an entrepreneur, a person who is engaged in organizing entrepreneurial projects, should have a possibility to be a party in some institutional relations, nowadays we lack such an opportunity. And finally, there is no concept of an administrative person, if you deal with a state. The state resembles a great leviathan, while we are interested in a liability of a certain state body that could be considered a natural person just like you. So we have to change the entire structure of the term 'entity' and 'person', expanding this concept to the level covering these four subsystems.

Suppose that we have done it. What grounds they will negotiate on, what institution can join the representatives of these four classes or systems on equal rights? Nowadays such an institution does not exist. Neither the State Duma, nor the Federal Assembly on the whole can solve this problem. It seems to me that it is a long-felt need to establish a certain Assembly, which would be represented by administrative, economic, business entities and individuals. I think that Likhachov Conference and our mutual activities are a good venue for such ideas. Thank you for your attention.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: —There is such a body that is quite able to gradually begin solving concerns stated by you, Georgy Borisovich. The representatives of this body are here now. They are the Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions Evgeny Ivanovich Makarov, and a representative of the International Labour Organization Kari Tapiola. The fact is that these organizations develop a tripartite partnership between employers, employees and the state. Over time the issues raised by you can be solved by this very powerful institution. The employees are included in one of the elements described by you. Our trade unions tend to represent the interests of pensioners and of other low-income strata, but it really is another topic for discussion.

Esteemed colleagues, I would like to thank the Presidium and all the participants of the meeting, and I am very pleased to see students here. Tomorrow we will meet at seven sections, where there we will continue our exchange of views considering today's presentations.

Round Table GLOBALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL CULTURES

May 17, 2013
Assembly Hall of the Radisson SAS Hotel

Chairpersons:

R. LEWIS	President of the International Institute of Language and Cross-cultural Training 'Richard Lewis Communications' (UK), Professor
J. A. MARCH	Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Spain to the Russian Federation (2008–2011)
M. L. TITARENKO	Director of the Institute for the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, <i>Scientist Emeritus</i> of the Russian Federation
A. I. KUZNETSOV	Director of Historical Documents Department, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, candidate of sciences (History), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary

Speakers:

F. A. ASADULLIN	Deputy Chairman of the European Russian Spiritual Governance for Muslims, Leading researcher of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Candidate of Science (Philology)
E. M. ASTAKHOV	Professor of the Chair for Diplomacy at Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University), Candidate of Sciences (History), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
Her Highness A. HAMILTON	the Duchess of Abercorn (UK)
V. INGIMUNDARSON	Professor of Contemporary History, Faculty of History and Philosophy, University of Iceland, Ph.D.
H. KARZAI	Founding Director of the Centre for Conflict and Peace Studies (Afghanistan)
H. KÖCHLER	International Progress Organization (Vienna), President; University of Innsbruck (Austria), Full Professor, Dr. Phil.
P. van KRIEKEN	Professor in International Law and Human Rights, Webster University (Leiden, the Netherlands), doctor
T. O'SHEA	Chancellor of Edinburgh University (UK), Doctor <i>honoris causa</i> of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences
E. I. PIVOVAR	Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, President of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor
V. PRODANOV	Corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor
P. P. TOLOCHKO	Director of the Institute for Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, academician of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine, a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor
J. J. WIATR	Honorary rector of the European School of Law and Administration in Warsaw (Poland), Dr. Sc. (Sociology), Professor
WU ENYUAN	Director of the Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies of the Academy of Social Sciences of China, Professor
A. S. ZAPESOTSKY	President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, <i>Scientist Emeritus</i> of the Russian Federation, <i>Artist Emeritus</i> of the Russian Federation

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Good afternoon, esteemed colleagues. I'd like to say a few words that might be helpful to you in today's debate. We deliberately invite representatives of various areas of scientific knowledge in order to get an integral vision of the processes in the field of intercultural dialogue. And it is not the first time today that we have assembled here on the dialogue of cultures, and every time the Organizing Committee summarizes the statements of our guests from various regions of the world. I would like to comment on a few points.

Firstly, I would like to draw your attention to the very concept of 'culture'. In the world, Cultural Studies are actively developing that study this concept. I have to say that this is one of the most complex concepts, as it has more than six hundred definitions. With respect to the dialogue of cultures, it seems most convenient to use one of the oldest definitions of culture, it is as follows: culture is everything in the history of humanity that has been created manually and spiritually. This is the most comprehensive, the most general approach, and under this approach, for example, everything that happens in economics is part of culture. Thus economics is not associated with culture, but rather a part of it. Under this approach, for example, legislation and the whole area of justice, law-making and law enforcement is inside culture as its part. Also administrative institutions, institutions of government, elected bodies and the press all belong to culture, being its specific subsystems interlinked with each other with sometimes visible, sometimes obscure threads.

There certainly are concepts of national administrative institutions, of law, of economy, but that whole sum of knowledge is integrate cultural bulk, subsystems of which are held together by lots of different threads. That's the first thing I would like to say.

The second is that when we talk about dialogue of cultures, we mean dialogue of people who are bearers of different cultural interests. Their interests differ, and we are well aware that in terms of culture their interests do not match well together. In culture there are relatively separate distinct layers. And at the same time it is considered as a certain fact that global culture exists, too. Each of us lives in a world of multiple cultures, we have a culture of our own family, our city has a culture, there is a culture of an ethnic group, a culture of the country, state, and there is also a global culture. Global culture unites a scope of different phenomena, like airports, when we travel to different countries we see that there are unified standards and common rules of conduct. Other elements of global culture can be hotels, but it also includes other things, such as science, because Ohm's law, or Darwin's ideas, or Mendeleev's periodic table do not belong to any single culture. The great scope of scientific knowledge is, of course, a fact of global culture. And we can see that in recent years the sum of elements, which are the heritage of all mankind, is continuously increasing.

Now we witness that together with globalization another very powerful trend, a very strong tendency is evolving, it is a tendency to enhance the role of a national element of culture. In terms of globalisation every ethnic group is actively making attempts to protect their own culture. And so, if we used to consider that there is a danger of destruction of national cultures under the influence of global culture, now we see that almost every ethnic group, every national cul-

ture through the efforts of individuals, organizations, social institutions, is engaged with its own defence. So the danger of suppressing national cultures turned out to be much less than we had expected.

A few years ago Mr. Mikhail Piotrowsky, Director of the State Hermitage Museum, proposed at the Likhachov Conference a very interesting point that every person should learn to live in different cultures. At first sight, it is almost impossible, but outstanding Russian philosopher Guseynov, Director of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, who is of Dagestani origin, showed by his personal experience that it is quite possible. It is a well-known fact that Dagestan is a small region in the Caucasus. Mr. Guseynov says that he himself shifts to another culture like people sometimes change clothes, thought it can be not a very good comparison. When he arrives in Dagestan, he even thinks in his mother tongue of that tiny mountain republic, and he follows its traditions, but when he returns to Moscow, he acts according to the norms and customs of Russian culture.

The point that living in different cultures is possible, is extremely important, and this thesis can help us to understand how a man can master the diversity of cultures without suppressing his personal and national culture. I think that the point of a person's ability to live in many cultures, is probably a very crucial issue for a correct understanding of multiculturalism. We see that a huge problem in the Western countries is when different ethnic groups live in their own cultures, and they are not integrated into the culture of the country where their representatives came. For example, in Germany and France. Of course, a person should have a basic language, as one of the most important elements of community. And at the same time a person should speak several languages to be able to integrate in different cultures, including the main culture of the country where he resides.

There is another very important category, which usually remains beyond the field of view of those involved in areas not directly related to culture, this category is a picture of the world. The picture of the world rests on values, but national understandings of values differ from each other. However, at the same time, there is a concept of universal human values. How important is the concept of universal human values and how does it work? I believe that this concept is not absolute. If we treat it in terms of traditional religions, there are of course, basic concepts such as the concept of ethics, honesty, duty, value of the Fatherland, value of one's own culture, etc. But different cultures perceive it in different ways, for instance, in philosophy of Eastern religions many things like time, space, human activities are understood in a completely different way from the West. Here our colleagues from other regions are present, they have, probably, faced Western culture, so they know well what it means.

So I have expressed some ideas and points of view that have been developed over the time, in the course of many years of discussions at the Likhachov Conference. It seems to me that these considerations may be of some use to you when you make your presentations, so that our discussion wouldn't turn into a stream of consciousness, but should be based on scientific concepts. Availing myself of the opportunity, I would like to extend my gratitude to you for participating in the Conference and wish you every success in

your work. I hope that your stay in St. Petersburg will be a fruitful and pleasant one.

With your permission, I will give the floor to my wonderful colleagues, to academician Titarenko, whom we consider a great scholar, and to Mr. Kuznetsov, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is a well-known figure in the world of science and a prominent Russian diplomat. Mr. Kuznetsov returned to work in Moscow from his office as Ambassador to Spain. He is one of the most authoritative Russian diplomats. And I am pleased to see among the participants of today's plenary session Mr. Juan Antonio March, who had served for many years as Ambassador of Spain to Russia. I would like to say kind words about Mr. Lewis, who represents a very interesting sphere of cultural dialogue that takes place in the field of business. Outstanding, prominent scholars, practitioners and public figures have gathered here. I immensely enjoyed a speech by Her Highness Alexandra Hamilton (Duchess of Abercorn), who contributes to our scientific world an important touch of humanity and sincere treatment of great values, which are surely important for each civilization and each culture. Thank you for your attention. I wish you every success.

M. L. TITARENKO: — Esteemed colleagues, presentation of the host of this forum, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences sets a good direction to our discussion, and I think we will continue in the same manner. I call upon professor Evgeny Mikhailovich Astakhov.

E. M. ASTAKHOV¹: — Inter-civilizational dialogue is obviously in demand, though there are different opinions on it. It is rather a dialogue, than a monologue, because we can witness an attempt to implement a project of a global civilization, the policy to eliminate geopolitical rivals is being carried out now. The ultimate goal, putting aside all rhetoric gimmicks of some authors of the project, is to create a single culture, a single global culture, one nation, if you will, with one language and one world government. The first phase of this policy is well-known, I will not go into many details, it is events in Belgrade, Libya, Iraq, Syria, etc., as well as information oppression of some countries, particularly Russia. It is evident that globalization is useful in terms of technology for communication links between the scientific and industrial entities. But globalization of values is counterproductive, especially of Western values, for example, the Anglo-Saxon version of civilization, as, some Western European countries today face the loss of certain values or their devaluation, and somewhere a direct breakaway from traditional values is observed. For instance, the parents are now called not mother and father, but a parent number one, parent number two.

But let's get back to the information oppression of Russia. Russia is a natural geopolitical rival, say, to the Anglo-Saxon civilization, so the information technologies of the aforesaid project are directed against it, and we can not deny that they work successfully. We can see a split in Rus-

sian society as a whole, and in particular, in socio-economic, cultural and religious spheres. This split has both internal and external reasons. As far as internal reasons are concerned, they are quite clear, throughout the history of Russia, even in the Imperial time, in the society there existed Westerners, nativists, etc. But today I would like to draw your attention to purely external reasons, such as import of Western values, which is being amplified. And we are not talking about the heights of European culture, but about available products of mass consumption, especially since European culture is close to the Russian mentality, and these simple things are not hard to plumb, they improve comfort of life, and are very willingly accepted. I'm not talking about the fact that many Russians, I would even say, Russian Westerners now have their material interests in the West, many of them permanently have wives, lovers, children there, and they work in Russia in the so-called 'shifts', as they live outside and come to Russia to earn money, because in the West they cannot earn money, as all the niches are occupied.

Of course, we have seen Moscow's attempts to counter this Westernization. For example, an issue has been recently raised about a unified history textbook, recently under the Presidential Administration the Office on Patriotic Education was established that will be involved into patriotic education. But so far these attempts have been timid, cautious, looking at the West. And the onslaught, including an internal information one, keeps going. Some media allege there are tightening moves and restriction of freedom of speech in Russia, these media are directly financed by public institutions, and they not only criticize, for example, Putin, which is quite clear, but trigger a real witch-hunt, but as it usually happens in Russia, they target at Putin, but hit Russia. Meanwhile Moscow authorities put up with it, because they presume that this is a systemic opposition, it is controllable and, moreover, it provides an argument for the dialogue with the West, in the sense that we still have freedom of speech and democracy, so everyone is happy. Also one has to admit that the work of our internal opposition through some media does not cover the entire population, it is obvious. It involves a large scale of Moscow and St. Petersburg intelligentsia, which is also obvious. But, in general, the state propaganda and counter-propaganda is still weak: all the time we are justifying and are defending ourselves.

Perhaps it results from the fact that now we have no ideology, no national idea, no clear goals, but the West do have them, even the countries in Latin America where I worked for many years have such goals. Russian internal Westerners do have such goals. An obvious goal of the so-called 'leaders of Bolotnaya Square' is to return to power, that they possessed through the first decade after 1991. They only care about this issue, rather than democracy, freedom of speech and so on, they proclaim it only for Western journalists who are happy to publish in the West some articles about their interviews with the leaders of the opposition, thus creating there a proper psychological overtone. But, to my mind, the project of a global civilization is not accepted by the majority of Russian population. People including the political elite are aware that full integration into another civilization leads to a loss of national identity. However, due to its size and geographical position Russia can not be isolated from globalization processes. In the course of its historical development Russia has absorbed various

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ethno-cultural and religious groups, and by this example, it confirms the thesis on its cultural and civilizational diversity as a natural way of human development.

I would like to say a few words about the following fact: some events happening in Russia are not always understood in Western Europe. In December 1991 there was a historic meeting between the leaders of the three former Soviet republics in Belovezhskaya Pushcha. In general, it was accepted calmly in the West. I would like to take advantage of the fact that, a former Spanish ambassador to Moscow and a former Russian ambassador to Madrid are present here and ask them a question: Can you imagine a situation when representatives of some three, for example, autonomous regions of Spain, brought together in the Galician forests without any consultation with the King or with the central government of Spain and came to absolutely illegal agreements? As a result of those agreements, more than 30 million Russian people, or people at least thinking in Russian, exercising Russian culture, found themselves in foreign countries that used to be republics of one state.

It was not only a geopolitical, but also a humanitarian catastrophe. A day before all those people were living in the same country, and the very next day they happened to live in another one, with another official language, and other laws. What is noteworthy, the best minds of the Russian Diaspora who made major contributions to the world and national culture, perceived both 1917 and 1991 as a national disaster. And a question arises: 'what policy should be carried out towards Russian people who find themselves in a strange land, but who continue to speak and think in Russian?' Most of them do not refuse their genetic homeland, a Russian man can be taken out from Russia, but Russia can not be taken away from him. If he is genuinely Russian. In the 1990-s the then country's authorities maintained the 'Belovezhsky approach'. All former Russian people now live in other countries, and it is for these countries to decide what to do with them, and Russia should not interfere, otherwise it will be blamed for its imperial aspirations and creating a 'fifth column' in the newly-established independent states. Such an approach completely suited the elites of these new states and allowed them to deal with their real state goals, i.e. legitimization of statehood and the borders that used to be purely administrative, and now had become state borders. Consolidation of the statehood meant, among other important purposes, to cut off a genetic memory of the people who lived there, to limit their use of the Russian language, including in nurseries, schools, universities, media and cultural life. So much for culture and dialogue of cultures.

It is worth-noting that if the earlier attacks were directed against the Soviet empire, allegedly the 'prison of nations', now these former critics themselves have become mini-empires and do not give self-determination for their people. This issue rose in the case of Georgia and South Ossetia with Abkhazia, the same is with Moldova and Transnistria, with the Ukraine and the Crimea, etc. What should be done to protect these people? Frankly speaking it is useless to hope for support in the West, we witnessed the reaction of the Western countries that I must say, almost unanimously with the exception of Spain, in 2008 actually took the side of Saakashvili against Russia. But we mustn't abandon our people, and we should not be afraid of a phantom pain for the former empire, we should perform a firm policy to protect our population. Just imagine that, say, in Cana-

da, a minority of the population speaks French, but French is a state language, in the Baltic countries, where half the population speaks Russian, but Russian is not considered a language at all, and the West keeps a low profile, they do not want to get involved in such cases, they say it is an internal affair.

There can be 2 options here: a soft diplomacy, it is a decree on voluntary resettlement of compatriots in the Soviet Union, support for Russian diasporas abroad, but apart from the usual work of mailing textbooks, etc., there is also so-called hard politics, if you will, hard power. There are not simple issues, they are delicate, but can sometimes we can put a question on the so-called economic sanctions, if the rights of the Russian people are ignored and there is a policy of squeezing Russians out of the new state. Experience shows that almost all Western countries are actively working to protect their fellow countrymen to work with their diasporas, such as Cervantes Institute in Spain, Goethe Institute, Alliance Française, etc. They have a pre-planned state purposeful work whose geopolitical goal is to protect their people and to promote their interests.

M. L. TITARENKO: — Evgeny Mikhailovich, in your very frank and sharp presentation you raised a number of real challenges for our life in Russia, genuinely acute issues and different points of view on these issues, it is really a very significant aspect. I give the floor to Efim Iosifovich Pivovarov.

E. I. PIVOVAR¹: — Esteemed colleagues, I'm the President of the University for Humanities in Moscow, established precisely in the era of post-Soviet Russia, because it was the first university known as Russian, in March 1991, (by the way it was the first permit by Yeltsin as President of Russia, when still being a part of the Soviet Union, and it was the first to have in its name the word Humanities. Since I have dealt with the post-Soviet countries and the post-Soviet space (there is a Chair engaged in this issue in the State University for the Humanities, also I head the Chair of Neighbouring Countries in Moscow State University), the topic of intercultural dialogue on the post-Soviet space is very close to me. In my opinion, at the Plenary Session it was stated very clearly and I absolutely support the idea that cultural diversity in the world is a reality, accept it as a given, which will never vanish, I can say that in my capacity of a historian. Yes, it changes, it takes on new forms, it can introduce a new figure, but still, this reality is eternal, and

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the entire history of the humanity manifests it. On the other hand, mutual benefits and interaction of cultures can not be stopped. So we are talking about a global culture, actually this is the process of mutual beneficitation and interaction.

And those two paradigms hold both positive and threatening elements. The positive element is that in the course of mutual interaction some unification and losses are inevitable, they can not be avoided. These are objective losses, which, on the one hand, are losses but, on the other hand, are gains, we have to consider and accept it as a reality of the process. But there are losses that can be prevented, so that the diversity of cultures will continue to exist, so that each culture will have its own future. For us, for the Russian Federation, this issue, to be honest, is the issue of life and death. The Russian Federation has only 2% of the world population and 12% of the world area, but when there are more than a hundred cultures, it is a very burning challenge for us. There are mono- or almost mono-cultural countries, there are countries, like us, who have a huge variety of cultures and there are plenty of such countries in the neighbouring territories. I look at our Chinese colleagues, they, of course, have a great number of cultures, although at a distance China seems to be a single culture, but it is not so. Strictly speaking, the same thing happens to us. The entire Russian emigration is called Russian, though they are Russian at a pinch, they are more Russian-speaking. Of course, in Argentina they refer to Ukrainians, Azerbaijanis and Jews, Belarusians and others as Russian. Even in Israel, where almost everyone is a Jew, they are called Russians, they call me Russian, though I am a Russian Jew, but, nevertheless such is a tradition. So it's a typical delusion.

Anyway, what do we do? I think that education can help us, as it faces the future, and we pass the past to the future generation through the process of education. Education has been aimed at it since the time of ancient Greece and earlier periods, Plato, Aristotle and other great thinkers spoke about it. So education should look for ways to preserve the process of cultural diversity and to minimize losses in the dialogue of cultures. How can we do it? Well, of course it can be done in terms of tolerance to each other. What is dialogue? It's not only understanding and awareness of what others suggest, dialogue is accounting for rather than denial of what is suggested by others. It does not mean that we have to accept, but we should account for a different point of view and conduct a dialogue accordingly. Such is the dialogue as I see it. On the one hand, I can well understand the pathos of the previous speaker and I share his concern, because I also believe that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a geopolitical tragedy, but at the same time I would like to caution against a misunderstanding of the other point of view. Of course, we are talking about the Russians, who remained outside the Russian Federation, but we can not help talking about those Azerbaijanis, Ukrainians, Belarusians, Kazakhs, etc., which were in the Russian Federation. So it is a one-way process.

And the attitude of the Russian state on the whole, to those internal diasporas is also an important element, which is a true touchstone of our attitude to ethnic communities in these countries. For example, when the Swedes pay attention to the Finnish minority in their country, and vice versa, they thereby strengthen the interaction between these peoples, between the neighbours. This is one point. The second point is that we rightly aspire for the Russian language as a great

achievement of the previous period of the Soviet and the Russian Empire to become a language of international communication, so that the Russian language could help to acquaint all nations, large and small, of this great country, or now of several countries, with the global culture. But we have to study the languages and cultures of those people who became independent. We, alas, began this work only when the post-Soviet space has emerged as a reality. We have to study Ukrainian culture, Belarusian culture, Kazakh, Azerbaijani, otherwise, we will not get any dialogue. However, we must admit that we are poor in doing that, just as poor we are in defending the interests of the Russian language in those countries. I mean that these two things are equally bad.

In the conclusion I want to say that there have gathered people who are well aware that the dialogue of cultures is inevitable, that it is of great political importance, that without it we can not communicate. It is obvious, but we need specific actions. We have to confess that the educational practices in post-Soviet Russia are inferior to Soviet in educational cooperation between the then different regions and now individual states. We are not involved in training specialists to exchange with each other, which should become paramount for us. We do not seek for support of those who still want to strengthen our cooperation. There still are some achievement. On the European Economic Area and in the Economic Commission activities, it is a unique case when Kazakhstan, Belarus and Russia begin economic convergence. A complete turn has begun in relations between Ukraine and Russia in terms of the interaction of the humanities. I'm personally involved in this process, we have begun to publish books together, to hold forums, we have association for Ukrainian and Russian studies, but for the first 10 years we could observe a totally opposite policy. And finally, this process is beginning, but it will die out without our efforts. So I think we should involve the younger generation in this process. Thank you.

M. L. TITARENKO: — Thank you, Efim Iosifovich. I welcome the constructive approach of yours on how to solve the critical issues raised in the first speech. This is very valuable and very important. I give the floor Professor Jerzy Joseph Wiatr.

J. J. WIATR: — First of all, I would like to express my profound gratitude for the invitation to take part in this important Conference, this is the second time I have been here. Also I would like to make short comments that relate to the concept of dialogue of cultures and to the two provocative, so to say, speeches of my predecessors at our Round Table. In his opening remarks, the President of this University emphasized the importance of multicultural situation and said that there are some aspects of culture key ones in terms of a dialogue, while some features of multiculturalism are not as significant for the dialogue. Of course, we travel all over the world, and we also see different styles of architecture, but what of that? There is no ground for a dialogue, but we can bring up more narrow concepts of culture that encourage us to conduct discussion in the form of a dialogue of cultures, they are defined as a system of values, and we can use the definition of cultural values. Put simply, this means that different cultures have different order of priority of these values, some things are appreciated more in one culture, while others are more valuable to us. For example,

if we consider how different countries treat women, we see a profound difference and this can serve as a sound ground for discussion.

We can respect the culture and traditions of Islam, they solve this problem on their own way, but it does not mean that we will accept their idea here that women are more inferior than men. We can not accept this situation, and we have to encourage activities of our citizens, so that the difference of cultures could be reduced to a very simple question: 'what is more important, common interests, interests of the State or interests of a single person, individual citizen?' If we tackle upon two different political cultures in Europe, which are a Western liberal culture and Eastern culture, we can reduce the topic to these key issues. Here we can consider an example from the great Russian novel 'War and Peace', when Prince Bolkonsky has a conversation with his son and the core essence of what the old prince is trying to convince his son in is the fact that the empire, the state is the most important thing, is the central value, and everyone must sacrifice his life, it is an element of culture. Tolstoy deliberately put such ideas into the mouth of an elderly father in order to pass this value to the Russians. And on the other hand, the liberal western culture is focused on individuality, though some large Western politicians made efforts to reduce that individualistic approach to politics.

Over 50 years ago, John F. Kennedy in his famous speech, said: 'Dear Americans, ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country'. It was said intentionally. In terms of Russian culture, referring to what was formulated by John F. Kennedy, Russia can not say, 'Ask not what Russia can do for you, ask yourself what you can do and should do in Russia'. Vice versa, ask yourself a question: 'What can Russia do for you as an individual?'. This form of dialogue includes a compromise. We see that over the last two decades, after we gave up the communist system, we have emphasized human rights. Culture received a new support, and a deep awareness evolved that citizens have rights, and even more than rights, they have duties to control those who hold the power in their hands, that is, rulers, on the other hand, should be accountable to the citizens, etc. That's where I see a vast space for cultural dialogue, for dialogue, but not necessarily for a clash of cultures.

By the way, recalling the Plenary meeting, Huntington's idea of clash of civilisations was mentioned. I want to say I had known Samuel Huntington for more than 50 years, and our points of view were very alike. You really have misunderstood what he stated. In his book 'The clash of civilizations, he did not mean that the clashes were necessary and inevitable, on the contrary, he warned of the danger of such a collision. In the last chapter of his book, he refers to a new world order that is based on mutual understanding, and to the very last days of his life, he opposed the U.S. politics, a demonian politics. It is very logical, because he had lived in the U.S., and he believed that neither the United States nor any other superpower should impose its values on other cultures. That's what we have to keep in our collective memory. And history is a set of different versions and explanations, descriptions and even different sociological terminology. We know that certain events happened, which can not be described in neutral terms. We know that in 1941, Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union, but that it meant for the peoples of the Soviet Union, what it meant for

the Germans, which meant that for the Poles, we have very different memories, that is why different opinions collide.

In Poland, we had an attempt, partially successful, to reconcile these different memories. I was born 8 years before the outbreak of war, I lived in Warsaw during the occupation, and I did not think that one day I would be told that such a close relationship between contemporary German and Poles could evolve, but it has happened. Another successful idea is that many Polish politicians attempted to reconcile different views about the past between Russian and Polish politicians. We have reached a partial progress here. I also want to make another comment, referring to the concern of my colleague. I understand the pain of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. Two federations: Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union broke up, but in Yugoslavia it led to three bloody wars and hundreds of thousands of victims, but it did not happen in the Soviet Union. Here we need to understand that it is a tragedy on the one hand, but on the other hand, it is the politics that should be respected: Russia, the driving force of the Soviet Union accepted the collapse of the Soviet Union, and refused to use its power, including military forces in order to preserve that union. And I see that in the long historical perspective this will be the most important.

H. KARZAI: — Allow me to say a few words. I've heard here unflattering comments on the traditional Islamic culture. To my mind those who make them do not clearly understand the Islamic culture that has plenty of achievements. The sacred texts of Islam say that women and men are equal in rights. We know examples that during the days of the Taliban in Afghanistan, women were forced to cover their faces, but that has nothing to do with religion.

J. J. WIATR: — I believe that we can discuss this issue on two different levels. The first is what Islam as a religion actually posits, I think it's right, but I was not talking about classical interpretation of the Quran, rather about how it is represented in practice. I will give two examples. Not so long ago, a few years ago, Yemen, where I worked as a consultant, changed its family law and allowed polygamous marriages. But polygamy meant that a man can have more than one wife, not vice versa. Another example is the new Constitution of Egypt, developed under the influence of the Muslim Brotherhood, which enshrined the impossibility for a woman to become the president of the republic. I can agree, it's not written in the Quran, but it is something that the modern Muslim scholars do. It seems to me that it is an example of how fundamental ideas oppose gender culture in Europe and the United States.

M. L. TITARENKO: — Thank you. I give the floor to the Professor Vasil Prodanov.

V. PRODANOV: — Thank you. I would like to draw your attention to two most important functions of culture and, in this regard, to two phenomena. The first function is a 'soft power', the ratio of cultures is the balance of power. Soft power has experienced dramatic changes for centuries, and global Euro-centrism had existed because Western Europe was the global state. In the last 50 years of the twentieth century, we were subjected to Americanization as a result of the development of communication cultures. The

strongest impact of American culture led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. The USA had the greatest power. Now we see a tendency of regional fragmentations of culture, due to puralisation of powers a single hegemonic power is disappearing and empires are coming back. I live in the Balkans Peninsular, where, for example, the Turkish soap operas are gradually replacing the U.S. soap opera, there are no Russian films, and a process of neo-Osmanization is underway. The same processes occur in different parts of the world. Upsurge of 'BRICS' is the rise of a new balance of 'soft power'. It is my first point.

The second point is very significant, to my mind, is that culture is identity, and balance of cultures is the ratio of different identities. Here the role of history becomes a key one, the way how we perceive history, how we explain history. We can notice two important trends. I call the first trend as the 'return of history'. In the Soviet Union, for example, identity was formed through the future communist society. Now on this territory all the former Soviet republics want to return back their national history. History is a tool of creating identity, I think the process of ethnic revival is in full swing, where we can observe reconstruction of old identities and ethnic identities forgotten in the modern era, now we live through their re-birth. For example, on the Internet there are a lot of sites on pagan religions and this is an return to the old identity, which allegedly to have gone, but now are experiencing their new rise, this trend includes Europe, too. All this creates new conflicts in the national states ranging from Spain with the regional Basque issue, Catalan issue, etc. to the UK with Scotland.

And the second trend is transformation of history, when new interpretations of history are continuously formed, which are presented as a search for authentic genuine history, forming various types of new identity. So I think now we are having the strongest battle in the historic field, the strongest trend of different interpretations of history is evolving, because we are now creating a new history. On the Balkans, for example, the Macedonians consider that they have the most ancient history, they originated from Alexander the Great. Albanians claim that they have the oldest language in the world, the Kurds state they are the most ancient people, because they created pyramids. And this trend observed all over the world. They are very important trends of creating history, on the one hand, battles for history, and on the other hand, changes associated with the global balance of power. Thank you.

M. L. TITARENKO: — I give the floor Alexander Igorevich Kuznetsov.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — The topic of my presentation is identical to what has just been said by Professor Prodanov. This is the issue of intercultural dialogue and national interpretations of history. Indeed, I agree with Professor Prodanov that we have recently seen some extraordinary outbursts of interest to history, the phenomenon that has been called 'historical revisionism'. But it seems to me that I have to make a very important clarification. Actually, historical revisionism, review of history can be considered as a completely natural phenomenon, because every generation of historians obviously tends to reinterpret historical events, to say a new word in the historical science, to find some new approaches, to introduce new documents

and new sources into science, it is a normal process. But we are now talking about a completely different thing, when history becomes a tool of soft power in foreign and domestic policy. Professor Prodanov was talking about his region; Russia also constantly faces the new interpretations of history, which not only collide with the others, but cause a direct damage to the mutual understanding and trust between the people, they become sources of hostility and conflicts.

Again, I agree that history naturally becomes one of the main tools to create national identity, especially in those states that have recently gained their independence, and, of course, they face the issue of a new self-identity. And it would be perfectly normal if this process was based on positive values, when self-identification is rested upon such values such as cultural heritage, language, national traditions, etc. But we witness an entirely different phenomenon, when the grounds of the national identity are relied upon the image of the enemy. In general, it is a very easy way, to build identity not on the basis of positive values, but to follow the path of least resistance when it is enough to throw a cry that the enemy is at gate, we must come together against it, we must integrate out society, etc. Unfortunately, it happens in a number of countries. Far be it from me to start a debate on controversial historical interpretations, I'd like to put the question more broadly: 'to what extent does this approach correspond to the realities of the global world and if there is a danger of conflicts and clashes between some states and nations on a local, regional level, between the neighbouring countries, and if there is any threat to civilization dialogue and inter-civilizational relations in a broader sense'. Now we can trace how in terms of migration flows, in terms of mixture and convergence of people with different world-views and different cultural traditions the question arises, that history as one of the fundamental elements of social consciousness can serve not only as a basis for dialogue, but also the source of conflict.

For example a very sore issue, that exists and is extremely painfully perceived in Russia both on the state level and the level of public opinion; it is the attempts to rehabilitate, to glorify Nazi collaborators in some countries, when the former SS troopers openly hold their parades and all officially declared patriots and freedom fighters, especially since we know how the Nuremberg Tribunal had assessed that organization.

In some countries of the European Union they have a very relaxed attitude to this issue, that is, we are told, 'Why are you are paying so much attention to this? They are small country, they had a difficult past, they were sacrifices, and now you feel offended at them, you are a big country enough to take this insult'. But in fact it's fraught with very serious challenges, because in terms of globalization, in terms of emigration flows that occur in almost all countries of Europe, both in the European Union and Russia, we can see how a variety of extremist groups are raising their heads, the groups that confess xenophobia, hatred and moreover, some crimes are committed on this ground. We have seen a horrible tragedy in Norway, it was a crime that was ideologically motivated, and the ideology was very close to Nazism. And the question arises, 'if in some countries of the European Union a legalization of Nazism is happening, will it lead to a legitimization of other extremist groups that are spreading in Europe?'

What to do with it and how to respond to this alarming tendency? When it comes to a clash of historical interpretations mutually exclusive one another, especially about the Second World War, (as you may know for Russia it is an extremely sensitive issue, because our country had paid a heavy price for the victory over Nazism), when international organizations or some countries attempt to equate Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, it certainly causes a very painful reaction both in our public opinion and on the state level. These are not innocuous statements, they entail attempts to put financial claims and attempts to use all these discussions for well-defined geopolitical goals.

In such cases we believe that, after all, under these circumstances we should aspire to leave historians the last word in the discussion on history, because there is a great difference between how history is perceived by public opinion in general and by experts who are professionally engaged in these issues. The latter have much more opportunities to see different sides of historical events that are never easy enough, they are always controversial, multifaceted, they have a lot of different angles, while public opinion thinks in more simplified categories. Sometimes the perception of history is replaced by a national historical mythology, this is unavoidable, such things will always remain. But the opinion of historians, of course, should be articulated.

We do have favourable examples, Professor Pivovar and I are members of a Russian-Polish Group on the complex issues of common history. I cannot speak for Efim Iosifovich, but my impression is that this work is extremely useful because it allows to soothe, to push aside these acute emotional issues that sometimes affect the relations between states. This is also a way to take the heat out of the situation on the historical issues, but, what is more important, it is the way to find out the truth, because we are not just conducting discussions, but we are working on a collection of documents, our archives provide documents that draw a broader picture of historical events than those discussed here. Of course we should put greater efforts, namely, civil society should participate in the assertion of values that have to be diverse. It would be absurd to try and develop some sort of a unified view of history, it will never happen, but we should endeavour to take away and get rid of the elements that do ruin the mutual understanding between nations, that cast in a bone and create sustainable stereotypes for different peoples to perceive each other. It seems to me that so far this issue has only been typical for Europe, but we have to think ahead in terms of globalization that still have obscure ways of development, we are unable to predict this development, but we see what dangerous trends are evolving. I believe this topic should be present in our cross-cultural, cross-civilization dialogue, I am pleased to see that this topic is relevant for scientists, that this phenomenon is studied, it means that they will seek for some solutions to this problem.

M. L. TITARENKO: — I have to say that this problem is typical not only of Europe. Our Chinese colleagues can prove that, I think that if Korean or Vietnamese counterparts were present here, they would tell us about very acute problems that exist in their relations with Japan, because Japan does not recognize itself as an aggressor. It is thought that the second World War officially started on September 9,

1939, but in fact, it began in 1937 with Japan's aggression against China. And Japan does not recognize this fact, which is a key challenge in Japan's relations with many countries, including Russia. This point seems very acute in discussions with Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, actually with all countries involved. This issue really has a broad meaning, and I think that in the course of our forum in future this topic will be expanded. I call upon Professor Wu Enyuan.

WU ENYUAN: — First, allow me to express my gratitude for the excellent organization of this event. In the course of our discussion, we even had some ideas on closer cooperation. In China at our Academy we hold forums of a similar direction, i.e. on globalization and the dialogue of cultures, so we believe that in future we can consider combining our efforts in order to attract more participation from Chinese academic community.

Now I would like to say a few words on the topic of globalization and cultural diversity in terms of globalization and human rights issues. The first point: the diversity of cultures is a natural development of mankind on the whole. And it is obvious that in terms of globalization contacts between people are intensified, it gets impossible for any culture or civilization to remain closed within itself, it reflects a certain trend toward mutual penetration of cultures into each other and formation of sets of common values, in particular it is associated with industrial civilization. I also mean mutual penetration of a market and planned economies, etc., as well as creation of a new approach and development of ecological civilization to protect the environment. But we also have to be careful with the uniqueness of each culture, which has evolved as a result of years of history. There are good reasons why a new Convention on the Protection of Cultural Diversity was adopted under the United Nations in 2005 in Paris, which has a provision that culture is an important impulse for sustainable development of each country. And so my first point is that we should respect the diversity of culture and prevent destruction of minor, seemingly underdeveloped nations for the benefit of a high national culture.

The second point refers to the relationship between cultural diversity and human rights. I have to point out that the same idea was proposed by the UN. The aforesaid convention states that we can celebrate cultural diversity only as a result of the full realization of human rights, but at the same time, we are well aware that different countries have their own understanding of what human rights are. My thesis is that the rights of an individual are a very specific concept, there are some universal standards, still the system of human rights has its national characteristics. In particular, in developing countries the right to life and the right to economic development are an integral part of human rights. For this reason, we oppose a unified approach to human rights issues. Thank you for your attention.

M. L. TITARENKO: — I give the floor to a prominent public figure in Spain, Mr. Juan Antonio March.

J. A. MARCH: — Very interesting ideas have been articulated here, especially the issue of how to build a sustainable system of our new world, it is very important for the progress and development. The very first speaker

mentioned that the collapse of the Soviet Union was unexpected, but, as far as I understand, it was a natural logical result. That huge space was not actually the Russian Empire, it was a wide territory of a particular social model, and when that social model collapsed, people realized that their system had no future, then all this bulk collapsed as the system. Then the Russians saw that their territory decreased, because the model itself had collapsed. We in Spain have the same problems between Castile and Basques, because the architecture of our political system is not correct. Thus, we must develop the architecture of public spaces, and the only country that has constructed a good architecture is the United States. Why? Because it is based on the cement that unites all the people who live there, on the American way of life, where the possibility to succeed is very important, etc. It brings people together, not only as an imperial idea, but rather as the aim to create a place where you want to live. We can see this process in California, New York, etc. Each state is trying to convince the others that the people there are happy, and this is a very important factor to unite all their territory.

Hence, we now have to find a good idea of how to organize our public space in this part of the world. We have the potential, we have very experienced scientists, however, in Spain we still have not built the proper architecture of our public space. In the European Union we have huge problems, as we are a diversified union, we cannot utilize the idea that one nation or one model is correct, because, as history teaches us, such approach always leads to failure. And the same suits Russia. I believe that Russia has one huge advantage, that its people aspire for the future, they have a great intellectual capacity, great scientific power, but they should not forget, how the history evolved in the twentieth century, and they have to build a full-fledged structure of the 21st century.

I believe that we should create a common public space from the Mediterranean to Asia. We are a common civilization, but it will be very difficult to achieve that because plenty of elements in history that have to be preserved, but we should be reasonable enough to build here a common space. Here the dilemma between the state and the individual is risen. I am convinced that technology has already solved this problem. We see that millions of people daily invent something, and this diversity is so large, that there is no one who will order others what to do. Both in physics, in legislation or any other sphere no one can believe that he will dictate the others, it simply refers to the past, not the future. Anyway, what is our historic challenge? The challenge is to organize a space for 800 million people, so that they can maintain diversity and live comfortably in this space, so that every day they became more prosperous and flourishing. And we essentially have or will have several models: the United States, and this part of the world, from the Mediterranean to Asia, has such a huge spaces like China and India, where everything is well established, they are very special and historically unique, they are extremely monolithic civilization. But the question arises that is a challenge for all of us: how all the spaces will develop? But I think that in the 21st century, the subject of architecture of public space is the key one. Thank you.

M. L. TITARENKO: — I give the floor to Professor Ingimundarson.

V. INGIMUNDARSON: — I would like to point out that the conversation we are having is extremely interesting and I would like to speak on responsibility in the field of culture in cases of mass destruction on a global scale and to discuss it from historical and contemporary points of view. And, apart from that, I would like to discuss the concepts of human rights and sovereignty, as well as responses to cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and the impact of the prevailing ideological paradigm on the world conflicts. Such historical precedents, as the Nuremberg trial, the adoption of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, establishment of international courts, international tribunals, the ad hoc tribunals and the concept of sovereignty are viewed through the prism of colonialism, neo-colonialism and regime change. Here such terms can be used as ‘humanitarian intervention’, the ‘responsibility for protection’ and ‘traditional processes of stabilization and pacification’. Despite the close relationship between the terms ‘genocide’ and ‘crimes against humanity’, their distinctive characteristics are specified in the international law more than the similarities between the two.

Justification of crimes against humanity and punishment of the guilty are not considered within the definition of genocide and were not included in the Genocide Convention. However, this goal was pursued in the course of development of the concept of ‘crimes against humanity’, these are such crimes as apartheid, mop-up operations, violence, and the actions that are treated as permanent persecution of certain ethnic groups subjected to attacks. That’s why the definition of genocide as a crime requires a clear response of the international community to the atrocities and crimes against the people. The first Convention on Human Rights directly touched upon human trafficking, workers’ rights, but for years the UN had been quite powerless and could not enforce a number of provisions of the Convention in relation to the states guilty of mass slaughter. This was the case with the United States that have not taken responsibility for war crimes committed during the war in Vietnam.

Only after the end of the conflict between the West and the East, when at the international arena conditions emerged to solve the issues of guilt and punishment for mass repression and crimes against humanity, had it become possible to create agencies that would establish the motives of crime, intent, and accordingly make their own decisions about the ways how a state pursues its own political, economic, or military goals. No documents have been developed to fight successfully with crimes against humanity and oppression of masses. As it was, for example, in Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Bangladesh, Algeria, Cambodia. The principle of responsibility should include establishment of a distinct code of conduct in respect to such crimes, such as happened in the case of humanitarian intervention to Kosovo. The parties of this conflict had to take on the obligation to protect the citizens and it was necessary to have the appropriate tools in order to set the limits at which the protection of its citizens outgrows self-defence and becomes a war crime.

The requirement for a regime change that resulted from the doctrine of human rights can have a very powerful effect. The experience of civil wars in countries such as El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras showed that strong

authoritarian regimes that control the army, as a rule, are responsible for most of the war crimes. The external intrusion cannot restore the balance in favour of those who oppose repressive regimes, and with the exception for the cases when they get a massive international support. Such attempts subject to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter did not succeed. If in the name of humanitarian goals a regime is overturned, we get a phenomenon called a 'military humanism'. And the international community will always be subjected to pressure in the cases of crimes against humanity with the requirement to intervene and prevent massive repression against the people, as it happened in Yugoslavia or Rwanda. Now legal assessment of war crimes is being questioned and, as a rule, it is all about the political background in trials. The UN Security Council has begun to include in some of its documents a provision on obligatory punishment of those guilty of mass killings and atrocities. That is why more attention should be paid to the development of tools that could support human values and prevent violence. Thank you.

M. L. TITARENKO: — Thank you for your very bright and very informative statement that shows the highest principles of moral judgment over politics and over thing the politicians are doing. As it has been stated many times in the course of our history, politics is a dirty business, and sometimes it is very difficult to combine it with high moral principles, I absolutely agree with you. I give the floor to our distinguished colleague, Farid Abdulovich Asadullin.

F. A. ASADULLIN: — By coincidence or not, but this very time St. Petersburg hosts the second very significant intellectual event, the International Legal Forum, and since I had to attend its first two days, I'll just remark for myself that the range of issues to discuss both here and there is approximately the same. Actually, globalization apart from positive things that we encounter every day, has begot global turbulence in all spheres of human activity, it virtually refers to everything that we are facing today. This concerns relationship of a secular society with people who see their future and their children's future in terms of traditional values that they learnt at mother's knees. In short, a lot of questions are difficult to respond adequately, but, nevertheless, our forum has gathered for the 13th time, and every time we identify new achievements in development of cross-cultural and inter-ethnic dialogue.

I believe that today traditional way of life that is inherent both in Christianity, Islam and other world religions, face the pressure of the liberal, or rather, pseudo-liberal values that come from the center of Europe. For example, it is difficult to justify the law passed in France today that legalizes same-sex marriages. Today Mr. March told us about the new architecture of public space, that Europe allegedly shows us new values, adopted by a part of the European society, and I know that there is a category of people who live on these new laws. But again, if we start from traditional values, in this case I'm going to talk about Islam. The Islamic understanding of the marriage institution basically does not leave any chance to same-sex unions, it is the sin that is very difficult to justify. And a very complex issue evolves here, I am sure that Europe will be confronted with it all the time: those new Europeans, who come from the Arab-Muslim world, will not accept these innovations in the institution of family, I think. This

is a problem common to all mankind, we have to give some moral judgments to what happens in Europe. It is true that very many useful things come to Russia from Europe, we have accepted European experience, European technology is also becoming a part of Russian society, but, nevertheless, there are things that I personally reject.

I would like to expand today's debate in a slightly different direction, because since we are in St. Petersburg, it's very important to pay attention to the new opportunities offered by such cultural institutions as the Hermitage. Due to the fact that I am engaged in Oriental Studies and got my degree in St. Petersburg, and fortunately, I am acquainted with Mikhail Borisovich Piotrowsky, I follow the tremendous cultural and educational work, we can even call it cultural coaching, when the Hermitage constantly updates its exhibitions, we constantly have a chance to go to exhibition of Islamic culture, Islamic civilization. Recently a very successful exhibition has been held, which came up all the way to Edinburgh, 'The Muslim art from China to Europe'. At the same time they hold exhibitions that demonstrate achievements of Christian, Buddhist and other cultures. It seems to me that this resource is very important because, in my opinion, the possibilities of verbal dialogue of cultures are still limited and we need to engage some optical historic tools, when people can not only hear, but also see. I believe it has a greater efficiency in terms of strengthening the dialogue of civilizations, and therefore, I mark it as a positive development.

Exhibitions of Muslim civilization, Muslim culture are opened today at the Louvre, the British Museum holds a permanent exhibition which describes not only the achievements of Islamic civilization, but also of other Eastern civilizations. If we try to predict how the human community will develop, we must clearly realize that the driving forces of civilization in 21st century, and if we are destined to live in the 22nd century culture, will be cultures associated with China, the Arab-Muslim world, that is, the centre of the global cultural geopolitics is shifted from Europe to Asia, and in that sense, of course, Russia has a very strong advantageous position. Russia has always served as a kind of bridge between the East and the West, and therefore we have to estimate our historical resource correctly, and use it for the benefits of our multinational state, and I am totally against certain opposite approaches.

I respectfully listened to the presentation of our Polish colleagues Mr. Wiatr, and I want to say that I carefully read the Constitution of Egypt, but I do not know its latest revision, perhaps, there is another version of the Constitution, but I do not remember that it has a provision that in Egypt a woman cannot become president. Moreover, development of the Muslim world, the political history of the Muslim world shows that Benazir Bhutto has long been the President of Pakistan. We know that in India, the state that has absorbed both Hindu and Islamic tradition, the President was a Muslim. So building up an intercultural, inter-civilizational and inter-religious dialogue, we still have to be more engaged in control of what is happening in our cultural space. And I want to ask a question to Mr. Wiatr, has Poland ever had a woman president? I guess in the history of the Commonwealth of Poland, and the present-day Poland such as issue has never appeared. Thank you for your attention.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — I give the word to Professor van Krieken.

P. van KRIEKEN: — I would like to join the discussion and talk about the right for peace, as well as education and upbringing. After 1991 Mr. Fukuyama wrote his book 'The End of History and the Last Man', he was optimistic but his optimism was not justified. A few years later Huntington wrote his article 'The Clash of Civilizations', at first the title had a question mark, but later, when he reviewed this article, a question mark was omitted. Mr. Fukuyama wrote a book about trust, and he wondered why some societies are more economically successful than others. The answer is clear, the main cause is mutual trust. Success of civilization depends on whether we're going to trust our neighbours, foreigners and those who may have different views on life. The concept of civilization, as we have heard today, has more than 300 definitions, and we agreed that there should be some minimum standards and values. We realize that they should be incorporated into our way of life and our civilization. These minimum standards and values were identified in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, December 9, 1948, (by the way, on December 10 the same year the Declaration on the Genocide was approved.) We should not forget that the Universal Declaration was adopted by such countries as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, India. Many people think that this declaration is a typical product of the West, but it is the other way round, most of the third world countries signed it, developing countries also voted 'for' this Charter. Both the Chinese and the Lebanese had their representatives in the team that developed the draft declaration, in general, the draft team involved representatives of the countries that have differences ways of effecting their economic and social rights. South Asia and the South African Republic abstained from voting. Talking about the dialogue of civilizations, we should first and foremost focus on mutual respect and mutual trust. And that means much more than tolerance, we have to demonstrate our understanding actively.

I will now tackle upon the issue of education and upbringing. In my country there is a system where every religious minority can have its own system of education up to university level. It turns out that kids do not study in the same classroom environment, if they are atheists or Hindus or Christians, etc. This of course, works against mutual understanding, but it happens in my country and in some northern countries. But so we do not live idly in our part of Europe, we have had five silent revolutions in recent years. The first revolution was in the field of gender relations and it concerned the position of women in Western European society. Of course, our politics was much more advanced compared to the eastern countries, though in my country only in the mid 1960-s women got equal rights with men. It was just one and a half generation ago. The second revolution was between children and parents. Children received rights, not only duties. The third revolution is a homosexual revolution. I will not impose anyone a duty to marry someone of the same sex, but I insist that we should recognize that people have the right to make a family with any person they choose, and it should be taken at the official level, by law. The most important thing is to make them feel happy. The Fourth Revolution concerned relationship between individuals

and the church, that is, religious institutions. The final, fifth revolution was between the individual and the state, that is, authorities. All this manifests that civilization changes are progressing in my country. Whatever definition we may use, the civilization has changed significantly and keeps changing. As far as I understand, civilization is work that goes on, we are moving forward, and I believe that we are moving in the right direction, where we will learn to show respect to all the other civilizations, because they recognize the same standards as we find in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — I call on Leontievich Mikhail Titarenko.

M. L. TITARENKO: — In my brief speech I would like to attract attention of my distinguished colleagues to two three issues. The first issue: Russia as a state has been established in the form of a conglomerate, union, co-subordination, interdependence of a great number of small and large nations. There was an opinion that Russia is the 'prison of nations', according to this concept Russian people allegedly served as jailer, but in fact, if we look closer at this concept, the very Russian people were imprisoned and shared their prison rations with other prisoners. And the tragedy of the collapse of the Soviet Union clearly showed, as they say, who feeds whom. Our Ukrainian friends often criticized Moscow and 'Muscovites', that they eat their bread, eat their bacon. The independent Ukraine was formed, and where does this glorious republic buy bread and bacon? In Georgia, which considered to be oppressed in the Soviet times, had a standard of living twice as high as Soviet Russia. The oppressed Baltic republics preserved themselves as an ethnic group, only because, using their own term, they were 'the oppressed parts of the Russian Empire'. There is a place-name 'Prussian'. There used to be such an ethnos, but they disappeared, the same fate could have awaited our Estonian, Lithuanian and Latvian fellows.

I want to draw your attention, dear colleagues, not to any panegyric features of Russia, I rather want to tell you that Russia ascribes a different type to relationship among civilizations and cultures, not horizontally, but vertically. The principle of relations of Russian culture with other cultures of the multinational Russian state, where there are 125 large and small ethnic groups, is based on the principle of a symphony orchestra. There is a large air for violins, we can assume that it is the Russians, but there are also lot of trombones, flutes, and there are very tiny instruments that comprise a symphony orchestra. There is a musical instrument called tuning fork, which can be compared with a small culture of the small people, for example, the Buryats, but without it Russian culture can not exist. It seems to me that our friends in Europe and all over the world do not pay enough attention to this huge experience of Russia in establishing symphony relations between cultures.

Another issue refers to the experience of Russian-Chinese relations. Russian and Chinese cultures are great, but very different cultures. And I want to say that Russia since the very the beginning has treated the Chinese culture with huge respect and it developed relationships by means of mutual education, mutual influence and cooperation. The first work that was translated from Chinese into Russian was a canon of ethics of Chinese culture, 'The Three

Characters Canon' — 'San-tsy-tsin' — 'Code of Moral Practice'. The other day the Institute for the Far East of the Russian Academy of Sciences published the fifth, the latest translation of this edition. The attention that Russia and the Russian public paid to the dialogue with the culture of China can be manifested by the following fact: virtually all classic works of Chinese culture in the fields of philosophy, history, literature, art, porcelain, script art and international relations have been translated into Russian language, these are thousands of volumes. Our institute has a unique Sinologist library, the only existing library of that kind in the world, which stores only 300,000 volumes about China. In the most difficult time, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the team of our institute challenged the fate and began to create a unique work, 'Encyclopaedia of the Spiritual Culture of China', which was published in six volumes, and received the state award. This work was highly appreciated by our Chinese friends, there are no analogues to it even in China itself. I want to say that the relationship between our two countries have about 400 years of history, and all kinds of events happened in our history, but the dominant trend has always been the trend of neighbourhood, the search for mutually beneficial, advantageous cooperation. I want to draw your attention to one historic event that is happening now. For the first time in the history of relations between our countries Patriarch Cyril of Moscow and All Russia, is paying China an official visit. Russian Orthodox Church was established in China by mutual agreement between the Emperor Peter the Great and the Great Chinese Emperor Kangxi-educator. It was preceded by a conflict on the border of the countries. A large group of Russians heroically defended their city Albazin, which made a huge impression on the Emperor Kangxi, and he acted as it is sung in the opera 'Prince Igor', 'You are not my prisoners, you're my guard', he took them captive and made them a part of his personal guard of the Emperor of China. The emperor donated them a plot of land in Beijing, which is now the Russian Embassy and allowed to worship Orthodoxy. When the priest, who had come along with these former prisoners died, Kangxi wrote a letter to the Emperor Peter the Great, asking to send a priest for his new subordinates. Thus Russian spiritual mission was established, and it was the first dialogue of civilizations based on the mutual understanding, mutual tendency to understand each other's position and take it into account.

I want to say that our two countries have learned lessons from the 20-year quarrel between the Soviet Union and China, which had arisen due to the fault of our two leaders, Mao Zedong and Khrushchev, and have built our relationships on non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, respect of each other's choice, and the desire to learn from each other, help each other. They created prerequisites for the fact that in a very short historical period of 20 years Russian-Chinese relations have risen to the level of a comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership and trust, and the Treaty on Good-neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation was signed. We take into account the experience of our Sinologists, and try to enroot in the minds of the Russian public those useful principles that are inherent in Chinese culture. One of the most important principle is the principle of respect and a desire to preserve and foster diversity, because it is the factor that contributes to the mutual enrichment, mutual development, not to unification

or imposing Russian culture on the Chinese or visa versa, but namely, to mutual learning and mutual influence. I want to emphasize that this is the principle on which the Russian state builds its relations with other cultural civilizations.

The third issue refers to how this principle is applied in establishing relations between cultures. I would like to point out, that in order to build good relations in order to study the core essence, to understand problems and national interests of all other nations, Russia has established a whole system (a unique one, no other country can boast of having such a system) of academic, Humanitarian, Pedagogical studies and mastering cultural heritage of other nations. At the initiative of Yuri Vladimirovich Andropov, in the late 1950s — early 1960s under the Russian Academy of Sciences there were established institutions that studied culture of all peoples, of all major civilizations. The oldest in this regard is the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, which years has studied the culture of our eastern neighbours in the Middle East and North Africa for over 200. At the same time there were created Institutes for the United States and Canada Studies, as well as the Institute for Africa Studies, the Far East Institute (to study the contemporary China), the Institute for Latin American Studies, the Institute for Slavic and Balkan Studies, all these institutions summarize the experience of other cultures, other civilizations and on this basis we build our relationships, establish contacts and conduct dialogue with partners in all countries. I want to say that in this respect, our experience is useful for further strengthening of the dialogue of civilizations. Thank you.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — Thank you, Mikhail Leontievich, your remarks are a genuine anthem to the principle of unity of diversity, which could be the motto of all the dialogue of cultures. It is an ancient principle stated by the Apostle Paul, and it is common to all cultures and all civilizations. I give the floor to Professor Richard Lewis.

R. LEWIS: — First of all, I would like to say that I'm just amazed at the profoundness of ideas from our assembly of scholars. And I was pleased when academician Zapesotsky spoke not only of the dialogue of civilizations, and the dialogue of peoples, but of the dialogues of businesses. I've been involved in the work of about 60–70 foreign companies and have to say that the dialogue between businesses, the dialogue between companies, usually is pretty smooth, and there are certain reasons for that, they want to make money. Large companies really work very hard and improve dialogue of their international subsidiaries. If we look at the list of top 10 companies in the world, many of them are even larger in their scale than the government of some countries, and they are involved in all sorts of activities, and we can not ignore what is happening. I show my optimism, because I see what has happened over the last 20 years. The quality of discussion in international teams has increased greatly, they communicate very successfully.

Consider a country like Switzerland, which no one has spoken about yet. Switzerland is a good example of a country where various cultures co-exist and co-operate very successful. I am not sure, perhaps, it might be difficult to have the French, Germans and Italians to work together, it took both a long time and national genius. Business, I would

say, is ahead of political sphere, business can stimulate progress and help to learn in this process how to deal with completely different views and approaches. I think that the global culture is bound to be evolved, and it must co-exist with the local culture, a narrower concept, but it will happen in a slow pace. It took the United States 170 years after the revolution to become a genuinely united nation. It is hard to expect from Europe, that it could happen in 20–30 years, it is too optimistic. I think that Europe, too, will have to live through 100–150 years before the culture is formed, similar to the one in the United States. And Russia can not remain isolated in its vast area from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok. It has the largest territory in the world, the longest borders, great mineral deposits. Of course, Russia with nearly 150 million people should take a leadership position in Europe, I am convinced that it will happen one day.

Global civilization, global culture will be born from the relationships that are formed now. Take, for example, the Internet, which did not use to exist some years ago, and what may happen to it in 10-20-30-40 years? World culture will be forming very quickly, and Russia will be a mandatory element for that. We have already mentioned BRICS, and this union will be a very powerful factor of development in the nearest future, as it encompasses half of the world's population. And Russia could become the voice of the BRICS, a real mediator between the countries of the Old World and the new leaders. Russia is sometimes, so to speak, not very popular in the world, but it is much more popular than we think. In England, we had people from Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan coming to study in my institute, and all of them spoke Russian among themselves while their stay in England.

They all thought the world of the Russian experience, which saturated the contents of their national experience, and treated it very positively. Or consider a country like Finland, your neighbour, Finland has shown the world that it is a very advanced country and it has very good relations with the West and with Russia. I lived in Finland for 5-10 years and I know that it's true, so do not feel pessimistic about Russia. Russia, evidently, needs a different branding. Russia is now in the process of re-branding, and it can only be welcomed. So I would be very optimistic, as Russia will play a great role not only in the dialogue of cultures, but the dialogue of business. Thank you very much.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — I give the floor to Her Highness Alexandra Hamilton.

A. HAMILTON: — Thank you for a very interesting discussion this morning. I'd like to remark about my impressions yesterday, as it was very interesting to listen to and discuss report of various participants throughout the day at the Plenary Session. I think that in the evening many participants went to the theatre to see the ballet 'Sleeping Beauty'. At this remarkable performance I became a witness to and a participant in another dialogue, a dialogue of the heart. If we do not find place for heart in our discussions, we will not progress, and we can not restore our role as human beings. Yesterday we saw the story of Sleeping Beauty, when the entire kingdom fell asleep and lost all consciousness of the world. And now in the world some nations are also in a state of unconsciousness. And then

there appears dark energy, as it was in ballet Carabosse, the fairy, (it is interesting that the part of Carabosse, the fairy was danced by a man, that's very unusual). But what saved them? Light and love did. When the prince kisses the young princess, and returns humanism to life, this is where love manifests itself. We need love in order to understand each other, and I suppose and believe that it will repent our historical errors. So thank you for the opportunity presented to me to see such a wonderful event.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — Thank you, Your Highness, I do want to applaud, because you gave such an emotional, humane element to our discussion. I admire the way some people can understand works of art and extract from them very useful lessons for everyone. I give the word to Dr. Hans Köchler.

H. KÖCHLER: — I would like to make a brief comment on the main topics of today's discussion. For me one of the greatest challenges related to intercultural communication, intercultural dialogue, is the tension created between uniformity and diversity. This is the effect that can not be denied, because the dynamics of globalization follows the trend of standardizing the way of life. It has lasted for already half a century all over the world. Wherever I go, to Europe, to the Muslim world, to the Far East, I can see these basic components, ingredients of Western culture in music, in consumption, in all aspects, everywhere. Whether you go to the supermarket here, or in Tokyo, even in Tehran, everywhere you can find the same products in the same style and developed under the same brand names. So there is no difference. I'm Austrian, and we are proud of our elegant shops, but you can find there the same things as in any other parts of the world. But in spite of that monotony there is an opposite reaction experienced by many people in those regions, that are now subjected to the influence of the Western way of life, which encourages people to confirm or re-affirm their cultural identity. Long ago, despite their authorities and all Western influence, the Iranians suddenly decided that the essence of their national identity is their Islamic heritage. What we have called the 'Arab Spring' in recent years, or what other people called the 'Arab revolution' or 'uprising', can partly be resulted from that assertion of cultural identity.

And a last small comment regarding what has been said today. A major challenge that we face is to distinguish the general and the particular, in terms of values, so we do not fall into a false universalism, as Professor Richard Fox called it. Let's consider, for example, the issue of human rights, the interpretation is very important here. Most countries adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but what are their special features and what is dialectics of relationship between the West and the traditional conservatism? I believe that in Europe, for example, despite the fact that we use the usual interpretation of the status of an individual in society, we think that it should be the same in other societies. We have to change our approach, at this late stage of industrial development, or perhaps even at the post-industrial society we can not impose our principles to anyone, because there are different principles and different stages of social identity, there are ways for a society to survive. If only we could find a new weapon for it, but it is something called the culture of imperialism.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — The floor is given to Professor Pyotr Petrovich Tolochko.

P. P. TOLOCHKO: — Dear colleagues, I have three remarks on today's discussion and debate. The first is caused by the speech of Prof. Prodanov regarding the fact that often in the course of current national development history becomes a hostage of our national preferences, and we would like to see ourselves in ancient times the same as we are today, which really is impossible. The issue of responsibility of the scientific community to the current development arises. Scientists do not have the right to follow public opinion, they should not be liked by public opinion, they have to only practice the principle of truth, but, of course, to the possible extent of our knowledge, rather than to follow public opinion, they should guide public opinion, and then, I think, we will have less problems. Commission between Poland and Russia, the Ukraine and Russia, Poland and the Ukraine, of course, should play a great role in stabilizing our relations and in balancing the dialogue here, we should not argue endlessly and present historic bills to each other.

My second remark refers to the speech of distinguished Ambassador March Juan Antonio, that the Soviet model or the model on a sixth part of the world was not viable, and it allegedly became obsolete, but there is a very good model, an American model. I can argue here with my colleague, because as academician Titarenko said, our poor model preserved all 120 small nations, and the good American model destroyed all the peoples that had lived before their model arrived. After all, I do not think that the principle of a modern man is 'where it is good, it is Fatherland'. If suddenly my Ukraine or Russia ceased to exist and I had to choose, I would still prefer Spain rather than the United States of America.

The third remark refers to rights and freedoms of man. You see, I'm not convinced that it is necessary to

overemphasize rights and freedoms, as they have become opposed to the God's administration of the world, some countries are essentially engaged in a denial of life. I would have mourned for the fate of Europe due to the fact that its peoples will disappear. But, thanks God, there are other peoples who live a traditional way of life, and if you disappear, your place will be taken by others, but is this path worth following? It is better to save Europe. Thank you.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — I give the floor to Sir Timothy O'Shea.

T. O'SHEA: — We had interesting conversations both yesterday and today, I would like to emphasize once again what was said by Lady Abercorn. If you think about the culture, do not think about the narrow political and economic issues, of course, culture must include arts and business, but it must be treated much more widely. I think that in the future, we will have no difficulty with solving the problems of male domination in the governments in Europe. I am one of those who are ready to see around us people of different cultures, so we should not limit our approaches and attitudes. For me, dialogue is when someone says something, and someone else from the audience argues against it on the basis of his experience or available information. I think that the goal and aspiration of international meetings on cultural dialogue is very noble. Thank you.

A. I. KUZNETSOV: — We have come to the end of our work, I should point out remarkable organization and quality of the discussion. If we call it an interesting and fascinating exchange of views, it won't be just a courtesy or formality, it will be true. And in the conclusion I would like to thank our interpreters, who helped us in this interesting dialogue of cultures. Thank you.

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