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DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS

THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

May 15–20, 2014

*The Conference is held in accordance with
the Decree of President of Russia V. V. Putin
'On perpetuating the memory
of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov'
No 587, dated from May 23, 2001*

*The conference, originally called 'The Days of Sci-
ence in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities
and Social Sciences' is the 22nd in number
and the 14th in the status of the International
Likhachov Scientific Conference*

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Scientific editor

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In the collection there were materials of the 14th Likhachov's International Scientific Readings published, it was held on May 15–20, 2014 in SPbUHSS in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin "On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov".

Among the 54 authors of the collection there are outstanding Russian scientists, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences: V. A. Chereshnev, A. O. Chubarian, M. K. Gorshkov, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseinov, G. B. Kleiner, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, V. L. Makarov, V. V. Mironov, V. V. Naumkin, V. F. Petrenko, M. B. Piotrovsky, A. V. Smirnov, V. A. Tishkov, J. T. Toshchenko, A. S. Zapesotsky and others; heads of academic institutions and research centers, representatives of higher education institutions, mass media leaders, famous statesmen, public figures and representatives of creative intellectuals: the judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation N. S. Bondar and G. A. Hajiyeve, the Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation V. Ye. Churov, the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation G. M. Gatilov, the Russian Ambassador in the UK A. V. Yakovenko, the Deputy Chairman of the FITUR E. I. Makarov, the President of the Moscow City Advocates' Chamber H. M. Reznik, the Dean of the Higher School of Television of Lomonosov Moscow State University V. T. Tretyakov and others.

In the framework of the 14th Readings there was a round table "Building of Greater Europe: challenges and opportunities" with the participation of the Prime Minister of France (2005–2007) Dominique de Villepin, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain (2004–2010) M. A. Moratinos, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation A. Yu. Meshkov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1998–2004) I. S. Ivanov, the Spanish Ambassador in the Russian Federation (2008–2011) J. A. March.

Among the foreign authors of the collection there are representatives of 15 countries: the ambassadors of Russia G. Kasoulides (Cyprus) and M. Sanaei (Iran), the Consul General in St. Petersburg M. Faillettaz (Switzerland), the literary critic Zhang Yiwu, the writers Wang Hongji, Zhou Xiaofeng (China), the poet P. O. Il'insky (the USA), the representatives of foreign academies of sciences: P. P. Tolochko (Ukraine) and V. Prodanov (Bulgaria); Professor Sh. Weber (the USA), J. Wiatr (Poland), V. Ingimundarson (Iceland), K. Karam (Lebanon), H. Köchler (Austria), F. T. Mamedov (Azerbaijan) and others.

The President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin highly appreciates the role of Likhachov's Readings noting that "Readings has become a recognized, authoritative platform for meaningful and constructive discussions for a serious conversation about the most important issues of our time".

ББК 72



**DECREE
OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
'ON PERPETUATING THE MEMORY
OF DMITRY SERGEYEVICH LIKHACHOV'**

Given D. S. Likhachov's outstanding contribution to the development of the home science and culture I enact:

1. the Government of the Russian Federation should:
 - establish two personal grants in honour of D. S. Likhachov at the rate of 400 roubles each for university students from the year 2001 and to define the procedure of conferring them;
 - work out the project of D. S. Likhachov's gravestone on a competitive basis together with the Government of St. Petersburg;
 - consider the issue of making a film devoted to D. S. Likhachov's life and activities.
2. the Government of St. Petersburg should:
 - name one of the streets in St. Petersburg after D. S. Likhachov;
 - consider the issue of placing a memorial plate on the building of the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Science (Pushkin's House);
 - guarantee the work on setting up D. S. Likhachov's gravestone in prescribed manner.
3. According to the suggestion from the Russian Academy of Science the Likhachov Memorial Prizes of the Russian Academy of Science should be established for Russian and foreign scientists for their outstanding contribution to the research of literature and culture of ancient Russia, and the collected writings of the late Academician should be published.
4. **According to the suggestion from St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress the International Likhachov Scientific Conference should be annually held on the Day of the Slavonic Letters and Culture.**

VLADIMIR PUTIN,
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin, May 23, 2001

GREETINGS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Dear Friends!

I am happy to welcome you in St. Petersburg and to congratulate you on the opening of the 12th Likhachov Conference.

Your forum is an important event in the social life of Russia and of a number of foreign countries. It traditionally brings together representatives of scientific and artistic communities and competent experts.

Under globalization, the issues of extending the dialogue of cultures, preventing ethno-confessional conflicts are of paramount importance. There is compelling evidence that the humanistic ideas of academician D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding Russian enlightener and public figure, are still up-to-date.

I am convinced that the suggestions and recommendations drawn up in the course of your meeting will be sought after in practical terms.

I wish you new achievements and all the best.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 17, 2012



Dear Friends!

I would like to welcome participants, hosts and guests of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Your forum, traditionally gathering the cream of the Russian intellectual community, prominent scientists and public figures from all over the world in St. Petersburg is an outstanding and remarkable event in the international scientific and cultural life. It is crucial that the topics of the Conference precisely reflect the most urgent and acute humanitarian issues, the main of them being promotion of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in the modern world, establishment of moral and spiritual foundations of the society. And certainly, one of the priority tasks for you is preserving the invaluable legacy of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, which is as relevant and significant as before.

I wish you fruitful and constructive discussions, interesting and useful meetings.

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 5, 2011



Dear Friends!

I am sincerely pleased to see you in Saint-Petersburg and open the 10th Anniversary International Likhachov Conference.

This reputable forum is always notable for the substantial membership, comprehensive and effective work, and wide spectrum of issues to be discussed.

I am sure that the today's meeting devoted to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations should be one more step forward in promoting interconfessional and international communication to bring people closer to each other. And, certainly, again we can see so many

prominent people together, among which are scientists, public figures, intellectuals, representatives of arts community, everyone who shares notions and opinions of Dmitry S. Likhachov.

I wish you good luck and all the best!

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 11, 2010



I want to extend my welcome to hosts, participants and guests of the 8th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Holding this scientific forum has become a good and important tradition. It helps not only to realise the value of humanistic ideas of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, but also to understand topical issues of the modern world.

That is why the agenda of the Conference involves problems vital for everyone, like personality and society in a multicultural world; economics and law in the context of partnership of civilizations; mass media in the system of forming the worldview; higher education: problems of development in the context of globalization and others.

I am sure that a lively discussion closely reasoned and utterly transparent in its exposition and logic will contribute to the development of the humanities, steadfast and righteous moral norms.

I wish the hosts, participants and guests fruitful cooperation and all the best.

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 22, 2008



I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding the 6th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

I note with satisfaction that for many years this forum has been carrying out a very noble and important mission of preserving, analyzing and popularizing Likhachov's scientific works. The International Likhachov Scientific Conference has become a very important forum where people can exchange ideas and discuss the topical issues of the present time. Likhachov's spiritual legacy is an integral part of our science, of the science all over the world. And we are proud to see Likhachov's 100th anniversary, this memorable event, being celebrated on a great scale in Russia and abroad. I wish a successful discussion to all the participants and guests of the conference.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 25, 2006



I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding this remarkable event, the International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

The most influential and outstanding representatives of intellectual elite — scientists, artists, political figures — participate in this conference to keep up with the tradition. It affords me deep satisfaction to see this forum acquire an international standing. I note with pleasure that its agenda contains the most significant and topical issues of our time. This year you are discussing one of the fundamental problems — impact of education on humanistic process in the society.

The fact that this forum is organized regularly is a great tribute to the memory of D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding scientist, citizen and patriot. His spiritual legacy, scientific works dedicated to the problems of intellectual and moral development of younger generations, has great significance. I wish you a fruitful discussion.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 20, 2004



I should first like to welcome the participants of the International Scientific Conference “The world of culture of academician D. S. Likhachov”. The most prominent scientists and political leaders come together to discuss at this conference the most important issues of the scientific, moral and spiritual legacy of the remarkable Russian scientist D. S. Likhachov. I strongly believe that this tradition will be followed up in the future and the most distinguished successors will develop Likhachov’s humanistic ideas and put them into practice while creating the Universal Home for all people of the 21st century.

I should like to express my hope that the Likhachov scientific conferences will be held in all regions of this country as well as in St. Petersburg, and we will feel part of this remarkable tradition.

I wish you a fruitful discussion and a good partnership that will bring many useful results.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 21, 2001

WELCOME ADDRESSES TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE 14th INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

To the participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear friends,

I bid you welcome in St. Petersburg at the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. Your authoritative forum is held annually on the initiative of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress and is named after D.S. Likhachov. For millions of people in Russia and abroad the name of this prominent thinker has become the personification of the deep moral principles of our nation.

'Cooperation, dialogue and mutual understanding guarantee justice and democracy, serve as a deterrent for international and inter-ethnic conflicts, violence and wars', Academician Likhachov wrote last century. But these words have never been more up-to-date than today. They are consonant with the tasks that the mankind must decide and resonate with the subject of this Conference: dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations. I am certain that at your meeting the humanist ideas of D.S. Likhachov will gain momentum and will help you to find answers to the difficult questions of history and modern times. I wish all participants of the Conference fruitful communication, every success and all the best and I wish our foreign guests to get unforgettable impressions of their stay in the Northern Capital of Russia.

D. A. MEDVEDEV,
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
May 14, 2014

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

I welcome the hosts, participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference that every year becomes a significant event in the scientific, social and political life of Russia.

I hope that this year's discussion devoted to the dialogue of cultures will also be interesting and profound, and the recommendations drafted in the course of the discussion will contribute to determining the value priorities and to preventing conflicts between different cultures.

I wish the participants of the forum fruitful work and all the best.

S. E. NARYSHKIN,
Chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

I cordially welcome the hosts, participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Every year in the city on the banks of the Neva River, your authoritative forum gathers scientific and artistic intellectuals, prominent public figures, politicians and experts from different countries to exchange meaningful ideas concerning a wide range of issues including the subject of the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations.

In today's turbulent world, understanding the key trends of the global development is intended to contribute to the search for effective responses to challenges which are common for everyone. Opposition to inter-cultural and inter-faith break-ups, which are growing more dangerous during the current transition period in the world affairs, becomes of particular importance in this work. Hence the demand for greater efforts to enhance the atmosphere of partnership and trust in international relations, while relying on the rule of law, basic moral values, principles of justice and respect for the rights of peoples to independently choose the path of their development.

I am convinced that this forum will promote awareness of the inevitability of collective action in order to address the pressing international problems and promote a new polycentric democratic world order. I wish you fruitful work and all the best.

S. V. LAVROV,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Moscow, May 15, 2014

To the hosts and participants of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear friends,

I am delighted to greet the hosts and participants of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. For over ten years your scientific forum has been a kind of laboratory for the study of the dialogue of cultures that you have been considering from various viewpoints for all this time. This time the participants of the Conference are asked to analyse this most important social phenomenon from the perspective of partnership of civilizations. In these latter days international relations have undergone significant changes, there have appeared new challenges to peaceful coexistence of countries and peoples. So today for politicians and public figures, scientists and cultural figures it is very important to find answers to these challenges, as well as new ways of resolving civilizational conflicts. I wish you fruitful scientific discussions, personal and professional achievements, peace, health and happiness.

V. R. MEDINSKY,
Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation
May 8, 2014

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear Alexander Sergeyevich,

Dear members of the Organizing Committee,

Dear participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference,

On behalf of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia I cordially welcome you and congratulate you on the opening of this prestigious forum.

The modern society more than ever before needs a comprehensive discussion of such an up-to-date topic as the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. Your forum is not only a good example of a constructive dialogue that promotes understanding of the radical changes which are going on in the world, but also creates the unique spiritual communication environment. The creative atmosphere of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference helps to find answers to the pressing issues that the international community is concerned with.

Uniting millions of workers of Russia, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions is interested in mobilizing the intellectual resources of leading scientists whose research contributes to the understanding of world trends. Your representative forum will undoubtedly provide input in the development of a model of a stable future, inspiring the Trade Unions of Russia to defend the ideals of social justice.

I wish all the participants and hosts of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference every success.

M. V. SHMAKOV,
Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
May 5, 2014

To the hosts, participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

Dear members of the Organizing Committee,

Distinguished participants and guests of the 14th International Likhachov Scientific Conference,

I am delighted to extend my warm welcome to all of you!

St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences has been performing a difficult and responsible task of cultivating the heritage of academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, whose scholarly, educational and public activities have become a moral and civil standard.

Likhachov's ideas are more than ever challenging in the current situation, when the dialogue of cultures keeps developing, and partnership among civilizations is getting intensified and acquiring new forms. This process has a very complicated and ambiguous nature as well as outcomes, but Dmitry Likhachov's works and those of his followers contribute greatly to its understanding.

Humanistic values lie at the core of the UNESCO's philosophy. They are listed in the Constitution and serve as everlasting guidelines for the Organization in order to strengthen peace, which must be based upon the intellectual and moral integrity of mankind.

Continuing the good tradition of participation in the Conference, I would like to remark that year by year the themes of this Conference get closer to the projects UNESCO is trying to implement on the international scene.

I wish fruitful and successful work to all the participants in the forthcoming discussions. I express my gratitude to St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences for organizing this important event.

I. BOKOVA,
Director-General of UNESCO

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Information

The International Scientific Conference at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences first took place in May, 1993. It was timed to the Day of Slavonic Letters and Culture. It was initiated by academician Dmitry Sergeyeovich Likhachov. Since then the conference has been held every year. After academician Likhachov had passed away this academic forum received the status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference from the government (by the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin 'On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyeovich Likhachov' No. 587, May 23, 2001).

The co-founders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Education, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress (founders: J. I. Alferov, D. A. Granin, A. S. Zapesotsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, D. S. Likhachov, A. P. Petrov, M. B. Piotrowski). Since 2007 the conference has enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in 2013 had the support of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg).

Traditionally, the most universal debatable challenges of the present time are put on the agenda of the conference: 'Education in terms of the new cultural type formation', 'Culture and global challenges of the world development', 'Humanitarian issues of the contemporary civilization', 'Dialogue of cultures under globalization' etc.

Every year greatest figures of Russian and foreign science, culture and art, public and political leaders take part in the conference. The following academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken part in the conference in recent years: L. I. Abalkin, A. G. Arbatov, N. P. Bekhtereva, O. T. Bogomolov, V. N. Bolshakov, Yu. S. Vasilyev, M. K. Gorshkov, R. S. Grinberg, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseinov, A. V. Dmitriyev, T. I. Zaslavskaya, M. P. Kirpichnikov, M. I. Kleandrov, G. B. Kleiner, A. A. Kokoshin, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, I. I. Lukinov, D. S. Lvov, V. L. Makarov, V. A. Martynov, V. V. Mironov, N. N. Moiseyev, V. V. Naumkin, A. D. Nekipelov, Yu. S. Osipov, A. M. Panchenko, N. Ya. Petrakov, V. F. Petrenko, E. I. Pivovarov, M. B. Piotrovski, N. A. Plateh, V. M. Polterovich, E. M. Primakov, B. V. Rauschenbach, Yu. A. Ryzhov, N. N. Skatov, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Tishkov, J. T. Toshchenko, V. A. Chereshev, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov, B. G. Yudin, V. L. Yanin and others. Academicians of the Russian Academy of Education who have taken part in the conference are the following: S. A. Amonashvili, V. I. Andreyev, G. M. Andreyeva, A. G. Asmolov, A. P. Beliayeva, M. N. Berulava, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, A. A. Bodalev, E. V. Bondarevskaya, G. A. Bordovsky, V. P. Borisenkov, G. N. Volkov, Yu. S. Davydov, A. V. Darinsky, E. D. Dneprov, S. F. Yegorov, V. I. Zagvyazinskiy, I. A. Zimniaya, Yu. P. Zinchenko, V. G. Kineliyov, I. S. Kon, A. S. Kondratyev, V. G. Kostomarov, V. V. Krayevsky, A. A. Likhanov, G. V. Mukhamedzianova, V. S. Mukhina, V. A. Miasnikov, N. D. Nikandrov, A. M. Novikov, O. A. Omarov, A. A. Orlov, Yu. V. Senko, A. V. Usova, Yu. U. Fokht-Babushkin, G. A. Yagodin, V. Mitter (Germany) and others. Such public and state figures as A. A. Akayev, F. A. Asadullin, N. S. Bondar, A. E. Busygin, G. A. Hajiye, G. M. Gatilov, A. K. Isayev, S. L. Katanandov, S. V. Lavrov, E. I. Makarov, T. A. Mansurov, V. I. Matviyenko, V. V. Miklushevsky, H. M. Reznik, K. O. Romodanovsky, A. L. Safonov, A. A. Sobchak, E. S. Stroyev, V. Ye. Churov, M. V. Shmakov, A. V. Yakovenko, V. A. Yakovlev have also participated in the conference. Among the figures of culture and art who have taken part in the conference are the following: M. K. Anikushin, N. V. Burov, A. A. Voznesensky, I. O. Gorbachov, D. A. Granin, N. M. Dudinskaya, Z. Ya. Korogodsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, A. P. Petrov, M. M. Plisetskaya, M. L. Rostropovich, E. A. Riazanov, G. V. Sviridov and others.

Since 2007 in the framework of the Conference there has been held Likhachov forum of senior high-school students of Russia, which gathers winners of the All-Russian Contest of creative projects entitled 'Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity' from all over Russia and abroad.

Since 2008, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Programme of the conference 'International Dialogue of Cultures' has been implemented. Ambassadors of foreign states present their reports and give their opinions on acute challenges of present time.

Since 2010 the complex of Likhachov events has been supplemented with an All-Russian cultural-educational programme for senior high-school students entitled 'Likhachov Lessons in Petersburg'.

In 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009–2012, the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin and D. A. Medvedev, in 2008, 2010–2014 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

Every year volumes of reports, participants' presentations, proceedings of workshop discussions and round tables are published. The copies of the volumes are present in all major libraries of Russia, the CIS countries, scientific and educational centres of many countries in the world. The Proceedings of the conference are also available on a special scientific website 'Likhachov Square' (at www.lihachev.ru).

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Farid Asadullin¹

MOSCOW CARAVANSERAI: NEW TRENDS OF MODERN METROPOLIS DEVELOPMENT

The problem of dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations is the main theme of the 14th International Likhachov Conference, it grows particularly acute when we face a life of modern European cities. The urge has evolved to turn this important and topical issue from essentially speculative arguments about the benefits of creative learning and mutual enrichment of different ethnic and religious traditions to purely practical, socially-oriented applications, and this urge is caused by significant changes in the ethnic structure of the population and confessional diversity of many European cities and capitals, such as Berlin, London or Paris. On the streets of these multinational megacities the number of immigrants from different parts of the Arab-Muslim world becomes as large as the number of native residents. Some experts estimate that the modern Berlin is the third largest 'Turkish' city after Istanbul and Ankara. In Brussels, the million city, every fourth resident is an ethnic Muslim. A similar pattern is in a multimillion London, where the natives of Hindustan have long established. Paris suburb of Montreuil today is almost entirely populated by migrants from Mali and Western Sahara, living on their own ideas and religious laws, to say nothing of Paris Maghrebians, holding small cafeterias and shops in the Latin Quarter or near the metro station Bir Hakim. These new social, household, ethnic and religious realities in recent years have appeared in the everyday life of Moscow and St. Petersburg, significantly affecting the dynamics of cultural diversity and changes in the structure of urban life in general.

Intensive development of Moscow, constant growth of its population, expansion of the urban area around the capital and the labour market, respectively, in the beginning of the 21st century resulted in creation of Moscow urban agglomeration, the largest one, not only in Russia, but also in Europe, with permanent population of about 15 million people.

About 10% of this figure belongs to representatives of the Muslim peoples, for whom Islam and its ritual practices are the main marker of their identity. This population is heterogeneous in terms of social status and economic opportunities, they have been incorporated into the realities of modern life in Moscow to different extents. For the majority of Muslims born in the capital (primarily, the Tatars) this problem does not exist, while the labour migrants from Central Asia and their co-religionists of the North Cauca-

sus, born in remote mountain villages, face the problem of social adaptation as the main one. For many of them, caught up in a multicultural metropolis for the first time, it is an issue of preservation of national and religious identity, however, as experience shows, representatives of these peoples live in close communication with their landsmen and rarely contract exogamous marriages. This primarily concerns the migrants from Central Asian states. It is generally recognized that nowadays Uzbeks, Kyrgyz and Tajiks migrants in Moscow and the region provide the needs of the housing and utility sector, construction and trade. 'Dynamics of certain ethnic groups shows that in the capital of the post-Soviet Russia there is a systematic reduction of the Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians, stated O. Kulbachevskaya, the expert of the Net of Ethnical Monitoring. At the same time, the number of peoples from the Caucasus and Central Asia is growing. Here we should also consider unaccounted illegal migrants, among whom peoples from the Caucasus and Central Asia make an essential part'.² Illegal migrant workers, whose number is 4–6 times higher than officially reported, are characterized by high unemployment and social dislocation. It is no secret that there is an informal migrant labour exchange in the 'Three Stations' square or on Perlovka, the outskirts of Moscow, where until recently cheap labour force was recruited daily. Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin during his meeting with reporters noted the increasing number of migrants from Central Asian states and said that the capital 'already has districts where the number of Russian-speaking population is only 25%'.³ The districts of the Northern and Southern Butovo are the best illustration of the words of Moscow Mayor.³

A definite problem of compact residence of Muslim ethnic groups in the capital is a natural for cities competition of its citizens for the place in the sun and complex dialectic relationships between 'new-coming' and 'established' Muslim ethnic groups, Asians and Caucasians, secular and practicing Muslims, and finally, the most pressing issue of relationships with indigenous Russian population. The origin of these conflicts has different nature: historical, religious-dogmatic, national, household or economic. Quite often it is associated with the birthplace and point of origin of a particular ethnic group, complex history of relations between regional neighbours, such as the Azerbaijani and Dagestani, the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Plus the urban environment with its rapid pace of life and emotional pressure, which, of course, is the strongest mutagenic factor that adversely affects the mental health of all residents of the metropolis. Among the modern generation of Muscovites (including residents of other metropolises) there are more mentally unstable people, which also poses the threat of unmotivated aggression towards people of a different race and religion.

¹ Deputy Chairman of the European Russian Spiritual Governance for Muslims, leading researcher of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Candidate of Science (Philology), Honoured Culture Worker of the Republic of Tatarstan. Author of over 100 scholarly publications on the issues of development of Arab culture, history of Islam, Muslim religious doctrine and interconfessional relations, including: *Islam in Moscow* (Islam v Moskve), *Outline of the History of Libyan Literature of the 19th-20th centuries* (Ocherk istoriji livijskoj literatury, XIX–XX vekov), *Muslim Moscow* (Moskva musul'manskaja), *Russia's Main Mosque* (Glavnaja mechet' Rossii), *Muslim Religious Organizations and Associations of the Russian Federation* (Musul'manskije dukhovnyje organizatsiji i objedinenija Rossijskoj Federatsiji). Sheikh. Mr Asadullin is decorated with the medal of the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 2nd degree. He is Laureate of S.F. Oldenburg Award (the Russian Academy of Sciences).

² Kulbachevskaya O. Features of interethnic relations in the Russian capital // *Bulletin of the Russian nation*. 2012. № 4–5, p. 195–196.

³ Independent newspaper. Migrant workers have become labour tourist. 6.06.2011.

The problem of migration nowadays remains one of the major 'acute points' of Moscow society, which is confirmed by frequent ethnical conflicts that happened in the second half of 2013: on the Matveyevsky market, ended in the police beating a Dagestani, or in West Biryulevo that led to riots and clashes of nationalists with migrants. Migrant-phobia is largely fuelled by Islamophobia, deeply rooted in Russian society, which generally is a common acute social challenge in all large cities that experience excessive flows of newcomers. Moscow, like St. Petersburg, as well as European megacities are open poly-national and multi-confessional communities, experiencing rapid economic and demographic growth in a different rate. In this urban space the interests of different cultures and religious traditions coexist and often overlap, which creates different types of psycho-cultural reaction, ranging from mutual interest to calm indifference and/or mutual alienation. Attempts of authorities to limit artificially the manifestation of Muslims pioussness alongside with the apparent shortage of Muslim temples a few years ago led to the opposite result: spread of the 'alternative' mosques, the so-called 'ethnomusallya' (Compatriot chapels)¹ and demonstration of religious enthusiasm and zeal among the Muslim youth.

This was mostly evident during Friday and holiday services. Today there is a rapid increase in the Islamic religious identity during the holidays Kurban Bayram and Eid festival, it makes the city authorities take adequate measures to regulate and organize mass religious events. To fulfil this purpose, apart from four mosques, religious ceremonies take place in designated areas in Sokolniki, the southern administrative district and Chertanovo, as well as in the surrounding suburban cities. But this number of mosques is not enough. Compare, in the capital of Communist China with the same number of Muslims, there are about 70 large and small Muslim temples and Islamic centres. The best way to integrate Islam into the familiar landscape of the city and at the same time the best way to prevent religious extremism is, in our view, visualization of Islam in the urban environment through the establishment of the necessary Islamic infrastructure. The European experience in this sphere, though it does give a guaranteed positive effect, shows that Islamization of migrant communities in cities is primarily an 'assertion of the impossibility of integration'.² Moscow has a long history of close Islamic-Christian interaction (to be precise, Russian-Tatar one), so it can benefit from it. Early completion of the reconstruction of the Moscow Cathedral Mosque, which area and, accordingly, capacity, will be increased by many times is an important, though not the only one, step in this direction.

Talking about the problems associated with the processes of migrants' socialization and their search for ways to communicate with the hosting society, it is important to note the experience of the Tatar community, which can be indicative for the new Muslim ethnic groups that settle in Moscow and Moscow region. The process of looking for a balance between their own traditional culture and faith, on the one hand, and the new medium and Russian

identity, on the other, is long and difficult, but its only alternative would be mutual suspicion, constantly triggered by both sides, and outbreaks of intolerance. Moscow Tatars have been through it and have generally kept their language, religion and customs. One can agree with a number of well-known scientists who advocate perspective ideas of cross-cultural hybridization of newly-coming and indigenous residents of modern cities. Analyzing the situation with the Muslim diaspora in the West, a correspondent member of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. V. Naumkin claims: 'Successful hybridization can reduce the level of conflict, including those between Muslims and non-Muslims in the West'.³

Among hybridization agents can be both diverse institution of urban social and cultural life (schools, museums and other cultural facilities) and rich national and religious traditions. For example, the hijab in post-perestroika Moscow and Russia was often considered as a challenge to established concepts of normative social behaviour, while today hijab is a legal possibility of a Muslim female to express herself in a democratic society. Overreaction of Muscovites to a Muslim girl in a headscarf a public place is the thing of the past. An important factor of harmonization of inter-ethnic relations is multinational character of Russian history and culture. Recognizing the significant role of the Muslim intellectuals in the country's history, in May 2011, in Moscow, near the Asadullayev House, a monument to Gabdulla Tukay was unveiled, and later in June 2013 a monument to Rasul Gamzatov, which brought a positive feedback from the elders of the Tatar and Dagestani communities.

For the first time in its recent history modern Moscow has faced the phenomenon of migrant networks, which is manifested by formal and informal networks of Uzbeks, Tajiks, Uzbeks from Tajikistan, Kyrgyz, Uighur, etc. Since 2005, a Russian newspaper 'Uzbegim' has been published for migrants in Moscow (editor Habib Abdullayev); in 2013 information and analytical journal 'Russian Kyrgyz' came out as a body Russian public organization 'Kyrgyz Congress'. The Congress initiated some pilot projects aimed at social support, education and business programs for the Kyrgyz diaspora in Russia. Since the end of 2012 the Russian language test for labour migrants in the field of housing, retail or consumer services has become mandatory, in May 2013 interregional public movement of labour migrants from Kyrgyzstan and the Centre for interregional and international cooperation 'Dialogue of Cultures' opened free Russian language courses for immigrants from CIS countries in one of Moscow Libraries. Since 2015 such requirement should be extended to all categories of migrants who, in addition to the Russian language, will take the exam in Russian history and law.⁴

Nowadays we can state that 'Moscow' ethno-Islam presents a significant and growing segment of the socio-religious and cultural life of not only Moscow region, but all over Russia. History of the Muslim community in Moscow, that, like a mirror, reflects the history of Islam in Russia, shows its complex and sometimes tragic fate. The religion that in the beginning had an honourable, and, in fact, an official role in the early 14th century in the era of the Golden Horde, after the conquest of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible

¹ According to unofficial data, about 18 Uzbek-Tajik and Arab-Syrian musallya operate in Moscow on wholesale markets and places of compact residence of Muslim migrants. It is an established practice to conduct midday Friday services in most embassies of the Arab-Muslim countries accredited in Moscow.

² Cf.: Stephen Lation. Muslim youth in Europe: towards a common identity? // Islam in Europe and Russia. Publishing House Marjani, 2009, p. 120–121.

³ V.V. Naumkin. Middle East in world politics and culture. Selected articles, lectures, 2009–2011. Moscow Institute of Oriental Studies, 2011, p. 136.

⁴ 'Russian Kyrgyz', № 4. September 2013, p. 6.

was persecuted, during the reign of Catherine II, it was tolerated with and, finally, at present time, it has regained the status of an official religion, as an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of Russia. Today Islamic life in the capital is concentrated around the Council of Muftis of Russia, which has a great experience of institutional interaction with the State. The Council of Muftis of Russia in a short term has actually become a religious authority unifying Russian Muslim. A noticeable role in this process is played by other social, youth, ethnic organizations such as Mardzhani Fund, Association of cultural and educational institutions 'Collection', 'Elbrusoid', Cultural and Educational Foundation 'Hope', the Centre 'Sacred tradition and modernity'. Traditionally, in cultural and religious life of Muslims in Moscow a great place is occupied by the embassies of the Arab-Muslim states, located in Moscow, as well as various national communities. Modern Moscow is a huge metropolis, the Muslim component of which in terms of globalization will change towards growing importance in social processes. Today the Russian capital, given the rapidly developing national diasporas of Azerbaijan, the North Caucasus republics, Central Asia and other Islamic countries (Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Turkey) is the largest Muslim city in Russia, it numbers about three million people, ethnically and spiritually connected with Islam.¹ Scientists forecast that their role in the public life of

the capital, despite the outbreak of Islamophobia, discrimination, and bureaucratic barriers, will steadily increase.

To make Moscow a livable city, the term offered by urbanists scientists, it is necessary to handle the problem of illegal migration and, as a consequence, overpopulation, together with household, economic and urban issues, which will raise the level interethnic and inter-confessional relations in concord with the interests of the residents of Moscow. According to academician E.M. Primakov, immigration should not only be 'limited by a tough executive and legislative framework', but it is necessary to make people who 'worked in Russia not only stay in our country, but remain our loyal, sincere friends after leaving for home'.² However, given the aforementioned trends, it is important to take into account the increased importance of the Islamic factor in the country and all over the world, and expand awareness of Russians about Islam as an integral part of the historical heritage of the peoples of the multinational Russian state through state and local social programs. In conclusion, it is appropriate to recall the famous words of Aleksander Herzen about the duality of Russia, which 'is destined to become a *great caravanserai* of civilization between Europe and Asia'. This prophecy about the modern Moscow of the very bright and original Russian thinker, whose ideas have taken on new significance, does not look an exaggeration, as a fait accompli.

A. O. Chubarian³

CULTURE OF DIALOGUE AND PROBLEMS OF INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

The ideas of academician D.S. Likhachov on the role of culture and the dialogue of cultures – as the foundation of the spiritual life of mankind – constitute a rich cultural heritage of our country and of all humanity.

In this large and multi-dimensional issue we would like to highlight an issue of the interaction of a 'culture of dialogue and interpretation of history'.

¹ According to statistics, the Azerbaijani make up 14% (i.e. about 1,680,000) population of Moscow, exceeding the number of Tatars and Bashkirs who represent approximately 10% (i.e. more than 1 million people), followed by Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz 5%, Chechens, Dagestani, Ingush 4%, whose number comes to almost 1 million people (the magazine 'RBK' № 11, 2007). See also: The statistical material to the proceedings of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (Autumn 2009).

² Speech of academician E.M. Primakov at the session of 'The Mercury Club'. 'Problems of improvement and application of public policy on immigrants in Russia' 12.03.2014.

³ Director of the Institute of World History of the RAS, the president of the State Academic University of the Humanities, an academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. He is an author of more than 350 scientific papers, including 9 monographs: "Treaty of Brest-Litovsk". 1918", "The European idea in history", "Russian Europeanism", "Eve of tragedy. Stalin and international crisis. September 1939 – June 1941", "The 20th century: a view of the historian", etc. Monographs of Chubarian were published in France, England and Germany. He is an author and executive editor of Volume VI of "History of Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind" (published by UNESCO). He is an editor in chief soon-to-be-published "World History" (6 volumes). He is an editor in chief of the series "History of Europe", a number of leading national and international publications about general and European history: "Russia and the Baltic States", "Civilization", International Social Science Journal, International Journal "Cold War History", the journal of the International Association of Institutes of the history of the CIS countries "Historical space. Problems in the history of the CIS countries". He is a co-chairman of commissions of historians of Russia and Austria, Russia and Germany, Russia and Lithuania, Russia and Romania, Russia and Ukraine. He is a chairman of the National Committee of Russian histori-

The issue of the interpretation of history has occupied the minds and imagination of historians and philosophers since ancient times. In fact, as early as in the writings of Herodotus and Tacitus can we see attempts to reflect on the interpretation of history. Actually, the whole history of the science of the past is full of various explanations and different interpretations of historical events. Medieval annalists, figures of the Enlightenment, Karl Marx and Max Weber, A. Toynbee, and at the present day Fukuyama and Hobsbawm, and many hundreds, thousands of other historians and philosophers have demonstrated a great variety of historical schools and trends.

We all know the heated debates between Russian Westerners and Slavophiles, the works by great scholars of the Russian science V.O. Klyuchevsky and S.M. Solovyov, N.A. Berdyaev and A. M. Ilyin. In the Soviet times, the judgements of history tended to be uniform within a single methodology and a common worldview. It was not until the beginning of the 90s that Russia returned to the variety of historical schools and trends.

ans. He is the President of the International Association of History Institutes of the CIS countries. He is a member of the Norwegian Royal and the Swedish Royal Academy of Sciences. He was awarded with the Orders "For merits to the Fatherland" of the 3rd and 4th degree, the Order of Honour, the Order of the Legion of Honour (France), the Officer's Cross (Germany), the Order of St. Macarius of the 2nd degree (ROC), Gregory VI (Vatican). He is a winner of the Presidium Award of the RAS after E.V. Tarle for the monograph "Eve of tragedy. Stalin and international crisis". He is an Honorary Doctor of Russian and foreign universities and academies. He is an Honorary Doctor of Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences.

In the early twentieth century a famous British historian E. Carr wrote: 'The number of histories corresponds to the number of historians'. This was how he accounted for the relativism in the evaluation of historical events, which is, in our opinion, an obvious exaggeration.

Yet it is obvious that in the field of historical science today, including that in Russia, there are quite different interpretations of history. It is clear that we strive to ensure that these different points of view do not thread the educational process in secondary school. That is why there appeared the idea of a single concept for school textbooks on History. But in science a clash of opinions or interpretation of history is flesh and blood of science, an indispensable condition for the progress of science (both national and interpretive).

And here we turn to the legacy of D.S. Likhachov, his ideas and his approach to the study of culture, including the historical heritage. This refers to the *culture of dialogue*, the culture of different interpretations of history. The controversy between representatives of various historical schools and trends, between individual historians has always been a key point in the comprehension of the historical truth. In history there have been many examples both of fierce debates, and conciliation and coexistence of sometimes opposing views and positions.

The world history is full of examples when supporters of various views sought to impose their interpretation of historical events, religious canons and beliefs by force and blood. It was the case during the Inquisitions, the same happened when people were beheaded at the executioner's block for deviating from the established norms and interpretations. This distinguished the Middle Ages, when obscurantism often prevailed over manifestations of humanism and dissidence.

Unfortunately, these 'experiments' were to be repeated. Even in our civilized twentieth century the Nazi in Germany conducted a campaign to ceremonially burn books by dissenting authors or 'subversive' in their contents.

Yet, in general, the Enlightenment in the 18th century radically changed the situation not only in Europe, but all over the world. Dissent was no longer considered to be a crime; there began a genuine exchange of views, the ideas of humanism began to permeate the cultural life more than ever before.

But in the 19th century ideological factors became involved in the dialogues of interpreters of history. The most striking example of this is Russia. In social circles there broke out heated discussions about the historical past, about the mission of Russia, about the historical roots of the Russian civilization. And in these disputes not only the question of basic values, but also evaluations of various periods, events and figures of Russian history were touched upon. The ideological discordance of opinions often became quite acute, it was accompanied by blaming the opposing sides for anti-patriotism, for treason to the ideals of the country, etc. Today we understand that moderate Westerners and moderate Slavophiles were, by and large, quite close to each other in their judgments of the Russian history.

Then a question arises: Can we assume that the dialogue mentioned above in the middle of the 19th century in the Russian society did not go beyond the scope of the civilized rules and regulations? But in any case, we should admit that the debate about the roots of the Rus-

sian history caused the Russian society to split and did not promote the consolidation of the country.

A similar situation took place in France, where there broke out heated discussions around the nature, the course and the results of the great French Revolution. These discussions were also peculiar for the polar points of view being expressed.

We will not go into detail of the course of development of domestic Soviet historiography. The strict ideological control exercised by the Communist party over the interpretation of history actually put an end to the interesting, though quite sharp debates in the Russian society in the early twentieth century.

The subject of the culture of dialogues and debates over the issues of the Russian history today remains quite up-to-date. Moreover, sometimes it becomes sharp and unpromising. In many cases, the controversy concerns the issues that split the Russian society in the 19th century. These issues are as follows: the general considerations of the Russian identity, Russia's relations with the East and West, the problem of the origin of the ancient Russian state, and the country's history of the twentieth century, the latter being particularly acute. Many debates focus on the Russian Revolution of 1917, the meaning and the place of the Soviet period in Russian history, the history of the Great Patriotic War and the victory over fascism, the history of the Cold War and other issues.

International factors have become actively involved in the general dialogue carried on within Russia. Among these factors are attempts to interpret our common history made in post-Soviet states and sharp criticism of virtually all the events of the Russian history arising in many countries of Western Europe, and first of all, in the United States. In view of this combination of internal and external factors the issue of the culture of dialogue in interpretation of history gains particular importance.

Concerning this, in recent years there has appeared and become very popular the notion of 'historical memory'. It is in terms of the 'memory' that key issues of the Russian and world history are discussed during many international and public meetings. Some state and legislative bodies of many countries have become involved in the interpretation of history recently. In France, at the state level there are held discussions on evaluations of the French colonialism, in Italy they argue about Mussolini regime, in the U.S. the government and the president estimate the results of the Cold War; and there are many similar examples.

In Russia in the State Duma there is being discussed the law of the criminal penalty for defense of fascism or for the rejection of the role that the Soviet Union played in the victory over fascism. Many years ago, this process was started by laws on prosecution of those who deny or do not recognize the Holocaust. All these facts make the deployment of a normal free-flowing dialogue about the interpretation of history more complicated.

I would like to draw attention to some of the principles and rules of the culture of dialogue, in our case related to historical subjects, although their meaning may have a wider application.

Based on the experience of the world history and historiography we could highlight the following provisions:

– the historical dialogue (around the issues of interpretation of history) should be based on objective facts and not on myths or intentional frame-up;

– A multifactorial approach is necessary, i.e. consideration of the most diverse, sometimes very controversial events and intentions. It is through such a multifactorial approach that an unbiased estimate of historical phenomena and events can be given;

– A free dialogue should not be agenda-driven, overly politicized and ideological;

– The fundamental basis for the culture of dialogue is respect for other views, comparison of different opinions and points of view;

– A real dialogue involves the possibility of modifying one's own views while taking into account other opinions and evaluations, the use of the latest achievements of science and new archival materials and documents being necessary;

– The presence of different views and interpretations of history, the dialogue of cultures and civilizations should contribute not to the split but to the consolidation of society.

Unity in diversity – this slogan, well-known in history, may also be applicable to the field of interpretation of history. Studying history, the dialogue of cultures and historical interpretations can actually play an important role in promoting the consolidation of society, in developing the national interests of the country.

V. Ye. Churov¹

WAR AS THE CLASH OF CULTURES: A LECTURE IN FOUR EPISODES

Episode 1

During the Russian-French genealogical seminar at the Russian State Library, I made a joke saying that after the Napoleonic wars the Russian and the French, in fact, are a genetically united nation. Because at first, half a million of healthy young French guys went from Niemen to Moscow and back, and then about the same number of healthy Russian guys marched from the Niemen to Paris and back. Demographic data show that despite the huge losses in 1812–1813, both France and Russia within just a couple of years managed to restore their population. However, the main event, the climax, was occupation of Paris in March 1814, exactly 200 years ago. And what a contrast of cultures! Plundered, burned Moscow with churches turned into stables and silver icon-setting torn from icons compared with a jubilant crowd on the streets of Paris, welcoming Emperor Alexander I, his guards, his Cossacks and Bashkirs. A rain of gold poured down on the Parisians, because the Russians paid for everything they took. This reminds me of another historical fact: while the Russians had already had bath houses at every turn, there were not even latrine facilities at Versailles.

Episode 2

This year marks the 160th anniversary of the Crimean War, Anglo-French-Turkish-Sardinian intervention on the Crimean peninsula. The Crimean War ended in another victory stolen from the Russian Empire. After taking the ruined Sevastopol in 1855, the allied troops in the Crimea found themselves in a mousetrap. On the north side there was a Russian army of hundreds of thousands.

¹ Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. In 1990 professor Churov was elected a member of Leningrad City Council of People's Deputies, in 2003 he was elected a member of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation of the fourth convocation. Author of over 30 scholarly publications, several hundred publications on social and political subjects, short novels *Mystery of Four Generals* (Tajna chetyrjokh generalov), *Travelling with the Guards Major-General of Artillery Vladimir Iosifovich Brezhnev from Budapest to Vienna* (Puteshestvije s gvardii general-majorom artillerii Vladimirom Iosifovichem Brezhnevym ot Budapeshta do Veny), *A Basket Full of Old Handbills* (Korzina so staryimi teatral'nymi programkami). Decorated with the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th degree, the Order of Alexander Nevsky, the Order of Friendship, decoration 'For impeccable service' 20 years, a number of medals.

In the north from Perekop to Simferopol and Karasubazar another Russian army was moving out, which previously had covered output from the Crimea at Perekop. By the way, among other regiments of this army was the Malorossiysky Grenadier Regiment, commanded by my great-grandfather Joseph Ivanovich Brezhnev, who received the rank of Major General for his achievements in the Crimean campaign. Two battalions that he led took Karasubazar, while the third battalion had remained on the shore of the Gulf of Finland, breaking up raids of the British 'commandos'.

Gradually the public opinion was changing, especially in Britain. The fact is that by the end of 1855 a significant number of allied troops had been captured by the Russians and removed from the Crimea to the Southern Urals, where they were allowed to plant vegetable gardens, as the allowance was rather poor. The Turks, Sardinians and even French were accustomed to horticulture, but such work seemed too hard to British gentlemen.

At the same time, the military prisoners were allowed to send letters home. And soon many people in England, Scotland and Ireland started to receive letters requesting to contact their local member of parliament or a lord to facilitate peace and return the captives to their homeland. Probably, such things could be called 'soft power' nowadays.

Episode 3

After the Crimean War, half the victory in the Russian-Turkish war of 1877–1878 was stolen from us, we were also deprived of the victory in the Russian-Japanese War and the Great War for civilization of 1914–1918. This year we will celebrate the 100th anniversary of its commencement. It became the First World War only after the Second (World War II), and before that its official name 'The Great War for civilization' was approved by the Paris Peace Conference on the proposal of Marshal Foch. However, as I found in some publications of the Russian edition of 'Europe and Russia in the Great War', this term had been used in 1916 in Russia. This periodical journal was published by the printing house of Dmitry Yakovlevich Makovsky.

With respect to the Great War for Civilization three issues are now being discussed.

First, when did the Great War for civilization end? I support the view that it was over in 1945, at least for Russia, since the Soviet Union had solved almost all the tasks of the Russian Empire during the First World War. Except for the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, but it was the price for Turkey's neutrality during World War II, as agreed with the Allies.

The second issue is whether Russia won in the First World War. Obviously, it is true, the final victory was delayed until 1945 and cost much blood to Russia. That is why we are so sensitive to the revision of the outcomes of the Great War for Civilization. The writer N.V. Starikov found a documentary argument in favour of the idea that the absence of Russia at the Paris Peace Conference was a political decision rather than a formal diplomatic one. Romania had withdrawn from the war before Russia, and signed a separate peace treaty with Germany, however, it was invited to the peace conference in Paris, where Soviet Russia was not present.

I found two weighty proofs of our victory. These are the Allied Victory Medal minted in the United States, Greece and Cuba. At the Paris Peace Conference on the proposal of Marshal Foch, the Allies agreed to mint a medal of the same diameter (36 mm) on the same 'double rainbow' ribbon, but with a different design, to award soldiers of the Great War for civilization.

Anyway, on the reverse of the medals, minted and awarded in 1920 in America, Greece and Cuba, the main Allies winners were coined. Among them was Russia. So when sceptics, who usually respect the opinion of the United States, doubt our victory in World War I, I say: 'I have a proof. A real proof. A proof belonging to the United States that Russia is a winning country in the First World War.'

The third issue concerns the justice of the process in which the three great empires, Austro-Hungarian, German and Russian, disappeared from the map of Europe. All kiosks of Vienna and Budapest sell a modern, well-published copy of the map of the Austro-Hungarian Empire as of 1890. And in private discussions with my colleagues I often heard both in Hungary, in the northern part of Germany, and in Austria the words of regret about the disappearance of those empires. In fact, the nostalgia for the empires in Europe west of the Bug is much stronger than that

of a democratic Russia. By the way, if I were among the Western Ukrainians, I would hang a 1890 map of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in every office, because at that time the kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria outspread beyond Krakow, it included Przemyśl and significantly extended the area of today's western Ukraine.

Episode 4

The Cold War against Russia has lasted for more than half a century. At some point, we lost it, and suffered heavy losses due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and all the conflicts in the former Soviet Union republics, including the zone of the former socialist countries. The Cold War is a continuous process. In 1945, in preparations for it, a new airfield in Estonian forests around the river Suurkiul was built for the 69th Reconnaissance Regiment of the Baltic Fleet. Long-distance air scouts, American amphibians 'Catalina' PBY-5A were based there, which could take off even on wheeled chassis from ground airfields and could stay in the air for a long time; also, a long-range escort fighter squadron Yak-9P was based on that airfield. By the way, these Yaks, that were subsequently replaced by MiG jet, did not hesitate to shoot down enemy reconnaissance aircrafts approaching to the bases of the Baltic Fleet. This airfield is dear to me, because in 1948, being a student of the Naval Academy, my father underwent a flying practice in this Regiment, and in 1951–1952, as a teacher, brought there groups of students.

Many years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet troops left this airfield unchanged, they did not even blow off the runway. As it turned out, they had left a gift to NATO. In 2008, this organization together with the Estonian authorities started the reconstruction of the airfield that was called Ämari, by the nearby village at the Vasalemma station. The runway was extended, and the airfield was turned into the reconnaissance and shock base targeted at the adjacent regions of North-West Russia. By the way, the Ämari airfield is located 350 km from St. Petersburg, and an American attack 'warhog' aircraft can reach the city within twenty minutes. The airfield was fully ready in 2010, long before the events in Ukraine. And here again we witness the clash of cultures. Russia withdrew its troops from the Baltic states, leaving the entire infrastructure unharmed. What happened next can be called only treachery and aggression. A good Russian bear is again surrounded by a pack of jackals.

Michel Faillettaz¹

SWITZERLAND, A COUNTRY IN THE HEART OF THREE CULTURES. A BALANCING ACT BETWEEN DIVERSITY AND INTEGRATION

First of all, I would like to thank the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Education for having invited me to take part to this conference. I am extremely honoured to present you with some Swiss particularities and the links that can be drawn to this year's theme "Dialogue and conflicts of Culture in the epoch of globalization".

Bordering on Germany and Austria, France and Italy, Switzerland is both on the fault line and at the very heart of three European cultures. Over centuries, Swiss people have shared their history with their closest neighbours whilst keeping with their own values. This has represented, at times, a difficult balancing act that could have affected the unity of the country and it remains a continuous challenge for many. Only through a constant dialogue has it been possible for us to shape our relations across our various communities.

My presentation will address the following topics:

- shaping Switzerland over centuries;
- the political system, the direct democracy and federalism;
- our different languages and corresponding cultures.

As for the historical aspects:

Switzerland evolved over many centuries from a loose alliance of small self-governing towns and states, beginning with the confederation of Uri, Schwyz and Nidwalden in 1291, to a fully-fledged federal state of 26 cantons.

This process took a long time, over 500 years in fact, and it is only in the year 1815 that Switzerland reached its final extension with Geneva, Neuchâtel and the Valais joining the other 23 cantons to form Switzerland as a whole and as we know it today.

Switzerland in its modern form came into being in 1848 when its constitution made it into a federal state, giving it a central authority that counterbalanced and limited the powers of the individual cantons.

The constitution was designed to balance as fairly as possible the interests of the state as a whole with the interests of the individual cantons and laid the permanent foundations for the national cohesion and the pursuit of the common good, while upholding the country's cultural and linguistic diversity.

The federal system has been the key for Switzerland to stay united, despite the fact that we are different in so many ways.

Each Canton has its own political assembly, is managing his finances individually and is very much autonomous in its decision, including the collection of taxes. The Federal authorities are mainly responsible for the defence of the country, its external policy, for two technical universities and for the economy among others domains. This said more and more responsibilities are being transferred to the Confederation. Indeed, the problems and tasks of a modern society (environmental protection, traffic, com-

munications, a.s.o.) can often no longer be dealt with in any other way.

We have two chambers of elected representatives: the National Council that represents by proportion the Swiss population in general and the Council of States that represents the 26 Cantons.

In this respect, this is very similar to the United States of America with the House of Representatives and the Senate. However, our president has less power, being elected by the Federal assembly for only one year and being chosen on a rotation basis within the government of 7 ministers. As such, he is really first among equals.

In our case, both our national and state councils ensure that the rights of the minorities are respected, also through the popular consultations that take place in Switzerland normally three to four times a year in an exercise of direct democracy quite unique in the world. Depending on the importance of the question being put to the people, a qualified majority of both the number of votes and the number of Cantons can be required, giving thus smaller cantons a powerful way of influencing the political life in Switzerland.

The respect of the minorities is a primordial aspect of the political stability that we have experienced in the past. Consensus is essential in many decisions and is best shown in the formation of the government in which all the major parties have been represented since 1959. The so-called "magical formula" implies that the parties are represented more or less according to their individual political weight nationwide. However, all members of the Federal Council are collectively responsible for the decisions that are taken by the government.

If I have described the shaping of my country at greater lengths, it is also to set the scene for its integration in the three cultures that surround us. This was a process that was then not exempt of conflicts as our forefathers were desperate to keep their independence, be it from a territorial or from a cultural point of view.

Much of Switzerland's landscape is covered by mountains – apparently inhospitable terrain for human habitation. And yet the routes across the Alpine and Jura mountain passes have brought in people and goods since prehistoric times. The Swiss Plateau, which stretches from Lake Geneva in the west to Lake Constance in the east was and continues to be the mostly densely populated area of the country. However, the inaccessibility of mountain areas made it difficult for outsiders to impose their rule there, allowing the Swiss to develop their own traditions and forms of government.

Switzerland is a small country by any means. Yet it is very much diversified reflecting thus its geographical position. We have four national languages, the opposition between towns and rural areas, between larger or more densely populated cantons and smaller ones, is real and we see regularly during popular voting that opinions differ from one community to another. Diversity in unity is very much the order of the day sometimes!

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Switzerland and Europe

Neighbouring countries also had a hand in the modern-day development of our nation. Sharing borders with three major European cultures was and continues to be an advantage for Switzerland, which has always nurtured close contact with its neighbours.

Switzerland is a multilingual country. German is by far the most widely spoken language in Switzerland with about 65 % of the Swiss population. French is spoken in the western part of the country, the "Suisse Romande" which represents approximately 21% of the population. Italian is spoken in Ticino and four southern valleys of Canton Graubünden and represents 6.5% of the population.

Finally, Rumantsch is a language with Latin roots that is spoken by just 0.5% of the total Swiss population.

The individual language regions have an easy and natural access to the culture of the countries on their respective borders. This also helps to form one's mind. But at the same time, they also have access to the culture of the other parts of Switzerland. Radio and television programs of all the language regions can be received across Switzerland. However, this doesn't necessarily mean that people will tune in to programs across other languages. There is a natural inclination to read and speak in one's native language.

Communicating in the other national idioms is naturally very important but in recent years, Switzerland has been facing a major debate over the learning of languages at a primary school level. More and more, in particular in the German speaking part of Switzerland, the authorities are introducing English as the first taught language, French or Italian arriving at best only in second position. The reason being that French seems to be, now, too difficult for students to learn and English is being seen as the most common world language, the most useful one to travel and to study abroad. In the other way round, i.e. learning German by French native speakers is also considered difficult but so far it has often remained the primary, first foreign language taught at school, albeit with a very moderate enthusiasm on part of the young generations...

This is a very negative trend in my view. Over the years, I have noticed how young people from my country have to resort to English to speak to each other. With already four national languages, one could think that this is enough...

It is commonly accepted that there is more behind the mere knowledge of one language than the aptitude to understand and to communicate with one's neighbour. In the case of Switzerland, it is an essential part of our national cohesion, of our national identity that we share these languages.

Do we really want to lose the richness that a multilingual society means? Do we really want to cut ourselves off from some of our fellow citizen to embrace yet another culture, in addition to the three that are at our borders? As one newspaper put it very recently, we are at turning point and are indeed living an historical moment.

I, as a native French speaker, write in French, think in French, maybe dream in French, but I am not French! I share this culture, this is my mean of expression, but I am Swiss in mind, soul and above all, I carry a Swiss passport.

The same applies to our Italian speakers with a language that is largely similar to Italian, but with some minor regional changes.

With my Swiss German compatriots it is slightly more complicated. They speak Swiss German, their native language that can differ quite strongly from the German that is spoken in Germany, but they write in German as Swiss German is not normally a written language.

But, and this is probably the heart of the subject, as much as we keep our own culture, our own version of the languages that we speak, if any artist, any writer, any actor wants to succeed professionally, she or he will have to be successful in Berlin, Paris or Rome...

This idea of globalization is not new, not to us and not to anyone else I think. After all and where culture in concerned, to quote the Bible "no one is a prophet in his own land"!

Despite their own origin, most artists will have to perform well in the major capitals of the three cultures that we share if they want to be recognised internationally.

Is this a conflict of culture in an epoch of globalization? It could maybe be seen as such; for myself, I see it more as some differences in our culture altogether. Like there are many accents in a spoken language, there are some variations in the culture that we practice. But in the end, in our case, we are Swiss citizen; we hold Swiss passports that are defined by our roots, our origins and not by our culture which crosses the borders, even within our own country.

It took a long time to create the Switzerland that we know today. It took many careful decisions to shape the way that the political power is shared in between the various segments of population. Maybe that this careful approach helped us also to face with success the challenge of sharing three European cultures without being absorbed in one or another. There could not be a Switzerland consisting solely of German, French or Italian speakers. Switzerland is often considered as the prime example of a Willensnation, a country born by the will of its populations not just of its leaders. Federalism was the key to unite 4 national languages, 3 cultures, 2 religions and 26 cantons in one country.

Thanks to our forefathers who declared Switzerland neutral as early as 1515 following the battle of Marignano in Italy, thanks to the political powers of 1815, including Russia who was a co-signatory of the Treaty of Vienna that confirmed our perpetual neutrality, Switzerland has established herself as an independent state in the heart of Europe.

Yes we have in common with our neighbours their culture, their way of life and we are part of their civilisation. Yet, we remain proud to be Swiss and, maybe and modestly, to contribute with some of our flair to the culture of our neighbours.

Switzerland, small country surrounded by far bigger powers as it is, has constantly been confronted to various forms of globalization from its very early ages. It's only possible choice, be it from a political point of view or from a cultural one, has always been in the way of dialogue, not one of confrontation.

G. M. Gatilov¹

ON SOME TOPICAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AGENDA IN THE EPOCH OF GLOBALIZATION

In the age of globalizing international relations, the issue of intercivilizational, intercultural and interconfessional dialogue has become one of the key elements in the world political practice. It has occupied an important place in the scientific discourse in Russia and in other countries. In this sense, the Likhachov scientific conference has been a unique place, because it sets off the importance of the achievement of intercivilizational harmony, promotes the search of mutual understanding through an open and non-confrontational exchange of opinions and ideas.

The reason for such a demand is connected with the rise of intercivilizational contradictions in the modern world, which is the result of competition aggravation between values and development models of different states and continents. There is a threat that the competition between civilizations will turn into confrontation. Thus it is obvious that the main thing in our agenda is to stop such a development of the international situation. It actualizes because of the latest development of the world political processes, firstly because of the events in Ukraine.

At the modern stage the crucial precondition of global stability and steady development lies in establishing the constructive interaction and dialogue between the representatives of all cultural and religious traditions.

We see it as our main task to promote a positive and unifying agenda in international relations. We act on the premise that only by means of concerted actions can the fundamental problems and challenges be solved that the modern world faces. At the same time we do not accept the use of double standards by some of our partners, which was clearly mentioned by President of the Russian Federation V. Putin in his address of the 18th of March.

We base our work on the new version of the Foreign Policy Conception of the Russian Federation, where our priorities in the globalizing world are actualized, and on the Presidential Decree of May, 7, 2012 'On measures aimed at implementation of the foreign policy course of the Russian Federation'.

These documents define the main directions for Russian diplomacy: providing favourable external conditions for socio-economic development of the country, assisting in bringing more innovations into Russian economics, increasing people's welfare.

An obvious example of realization of our efforts in this sphere is Sochi Winter Olympic Games and Paralympics that has taken place in February and March this year. They became an inalienable part of international cultural-humanitarian cooperation, and by their spirit and mood influenced positively the consolidation of international contacts, en-

¹ Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. An expert in multilateral diplomacy. Author of a number of publications, including: *Peacekeeping UN Blue Berets* ('Golubye kaski' OON na sluzhbe mira), *Results of "The Great Gathering" at the UN General Assembly* (Itogi 'bol'shogo sljota' na Genassambleje OON), *Results of the UN Doha Forum* (Itogi foruma OON v Dohе), *On Some International Aspects of the Dialogue of Cultures Under Globalization* (O nekotoryh mezhdunarodnyh aspektah dialoga kul'tur v uslovijah globalizacii), *Formula of Reconciliation in Syria* (Formula uregulirovanija v Sirii) and some others. G.M. Gatilov is decorated with the Order of Friendship.

couraged the expansion of communication between people and strengthened interpersonal interaction.

An important part of the Games' preparation and organization was 'Cultural Olympics Sochi 2014' that had started four years before the official opening and contributed to the development of our country's cultural wealth, involving Russian citizens into this festival of peace, sport and friendship. Within the Sochi framework more than a thousand cultural events took place all over Russia from 2010 till 2014. Each year was devoted to one type of arts: 2010 – cinema, 2011 – theatre, 2012 – music, 2013 – museums. The best images from the Cultural Olympics were shown to the guests of the Olympic Games in Sochi in February-March in 2014.

The proclamation of the year 2014 as the Year of Culture has a great importance in terms of the promotion of the intercultural agreement. In its framework there are organized cultural and educational events aimed to conserve and develop the folk art and traditional culture of the peoples of Russia, creative projects are realized in different regions of Russia.

Russia insists on the dialogical format and advocates consolidation of tendencies connected with strengthening of collective principles in the world politics. This position gradually pays off. Thus, during the last year important decisions in Syrian chemical weapon liquidation and in Iranian questions were achieved.

President V. Putin paid special attention to the efforts of the world community in the management of conflict in Syria and mentioned the crucial choice made in favour of the collective and responsible decisions pointing the common success, connected with the prevention of external military interventions into Syrian affairs and conflict waves propagation far beyond the region's boundaries.

Thanks to the Russian diplomacy's purposeful and energetic efforts, international conference on Syria was organized in Montreux on January 22 and straight international talks were organised where Syrians themselves are to make fundamental decisions on future development parameters of their state. This entirely coincides with our policy to settle Syrian and other regional conflicts. Historic experience proves that interventions by force and export of development models do not contribute to crisis overcoming but only worsen the existing problems.

Consolidation of our connections with the Islamic world, at a bilateral level and within the framework of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) where Russia is an observer is among the key directions of the home diplomacy work to develop the intercivilizational cooperation. We also develop contacts with the Islamic Organization of Education, Science and Culture that works within OIC, taking part in its work in the same status.

Our country traditionally supports multilateral connections with the majority of the Middle-Eastern and North-African countries over a period of several centuries and is interested in stability and peace on the lands of our Middle-Eastern friends and partners.

Following the policy aimed at opposition to the attempts of certain members of international relations to shake the foundations of the international law system, Russia stands up for principles of observance of justice, democracy and equality of all states participating in the world policy. To avoid the distortion and misbalance at different levels of international cooperation and also to prevent splits on intercivilizational lines and religious conflicts, we proceed from the necessity to act in strict accordance with the UN Charter.

These were the principles we followed when presiding in G20 and planned to continue following them presiding in G8. Our priorities in this integration unity are pressing and important not only for its members, but also for other world community states. They are fighting terrorism and extremism, health protection, creating global control system of nature and anthropogenic risks, assistance in regional conflicts resolution.

These were the aims of international conference 'Resistance to public mood radicalization that nourishes terrorism' that took place on May 3–4 in Moscow as one of the events organized during our G8 presidency. The focus of attention of its members were the questions of joining efforts of states and civil society to oppose the spread of the ideology of terrorism and extremism, to overcome the danger of public and political moods radicalization.

It is known that one of the globalization consequences is the interdependence of all members of this process. This rule applies equally to the members of different integration unions including G8. They all bear together benefits and possible expenses from participating in them. Thereupon, it is difficult to admit the thesis circulating in some groups that Russia needs G8 more than other member countries. Not more. The Russian market in its volume is quite large and it is a privilege to work there.

The work of Russia in major global and regional international structures clearly shows the deep involvement of our state into the solution of world agenda issues. This is an indicator of the role the Russian state can play in the world encouraging harmonization of relationships between countries all over the world, searching for common grounds between conflicting parties, expanding international cultural and humanitarian cooperation, intensification of intercivilizational and interreligious dialogue.

We develop our participation in the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC), an initiative proposed by the General Assembly of the UN that seeks to unite efforts of states and civil society, to achieve certain synergy in conflict prevention that arise due to intercivilizational, intercultural and interethnic disagreements.

The Fifth UNAOC Forum was devoted to these problems. It took place in Vienna in February, 2013. It was emphasized there that the Alliance should try to realize its potential as a leading platform for cooperation of international organizations, governments and civil society in those questions without turning into a place for political fray. The Sixth UNAOC Forum is said to become a new stage in the development of this intercivilizational initiative. It will take place at the end of August, 2014 on Bali Island, Indonesia.

At the earliest stages of Alliance we saw its potential to mobilize the international community's collective will in order to strengthen intercivilizational agreement, to achieve harmony in the relations between cultures, societies and

religions and joined it firstly as a member of High-Level group and later as a Group of Friends of AoC.

Multipolarity of the modern world predetermines an unprecedentedly rich palette of not only all types of cooperation and increasing cooperation links, but also challenges and controversies, contradictions and unsolved problems inherent to such a system that appears in the focus of attention of the world community.

The signs of competition between different civilizational and cultural traditions are becoming more obvious. Often they become quite acute and provoke interreligious contradictions, raise the risks of conflicts based on the cultural identity.

We are concerned with the situation in Ukraine. We understand what made it possible. During the years of independence the government of that country did not take care of people's life and disgraced itself by that. President Vladimir Putin of Russia talked about that in details in his address of March 18, 2014. People's urge for some changes is quite clear in this situation. However, using their justified requests, new characters appeared on the foreground: radicals, nationalists, neo-Nazis. Different mottoes appeared. It is time to say that a national revolution gave place to a rebellion.

Political instability that appeared later resulted in a way from unconstitutional measures of the so-called 'new Ukrainian government' and the outburst of radical movements. It started spreading all over the country and was especially sharp in its southern and south-eastern regions.

In those conditions Russia could not but be worried about the safety of our compatriots who live in Ukraine. That is why we were forced to take certain measures including our support of Crimea citizens' right to choose their life. The result of the referendum that took place there showed clearly that overwhelming majority of the peninsula dwellers voted for joining the Russian Federation.

Thereupon legitimate legislative steps have been taken to include into Russia the two new federal subjects: the city of Sevastopol and the Republic of Crimea. They will have three equal state languages: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean-Tartar. This also reflects our understanding of the importance of an intercivilizational agreement taking into account rich national, cultural and religious diversity of the peninsula.

We are not against international processes of different formats. They are claimed by globalization itself and historical sequence of events. But we are also for this development being gradual, equal and non-discriminatory. Our priority is the Eurasian integration followed by its connection to the European integration process in order to create in future an integrated economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok and to provide free mobility of people, goods and services within it. We go towards this aim step by step, firstly by means of economic basis consolidation and development of large integration project within the Eurasian area – the Eurasian Economic Union.

Speaking about the competition between civilizations and cultures, more attention has recently been paid to some actions of the ultra-liberal approach advocates which are not always adequate. They propagate permissiveness, demand the revision of traditional moral and ethic norms and values that are common for all world cultures, religions and civilizations.

We are concerned about the urge of some participants of the ‘civilized competition’ process to transfer their in no way indisputable ideas into the community of people who reject them and to spread them among the younger generation. Such actions are defective for the society and unfavourable for the young people’s education. It is hard for us to accept such an approach.

The policy we are implementing gains more supporters who see Russia as a moral landmark, a lighthouse in a way that shows a road to the good and justice. President V. Putin of Russia emphasized that ‘there appear more people who support our policy to protect traditional values that have been the moral and spiritual basis for the civilization and every nation: values of family, genuine people’s life, including religious life, not only material but also spiritual, values of the humanity and world diversity’.

The necessity to search for a worthy answer to the challenges of globalization as a phenomenon that links together all participants of the world policy into one system of international interaction becomes imperative for interstate relations in modern period. Simultaneous development of not only classical, but parliamentary, social, economic and cultural diplomacy also contributes to that.

With its great history and cultural traditions, with its centuries-old experience of ethnic and religious tolerance within one state, Russia cannot keep out of the discourse about the dialogue that touches upon intercultural, intercivilizational and interreligious interaction. At the beginning of July, 2014 in St Petersburg, during the Asia-Europe Meeting, there will be held a High-Level Conference on interreligious and intercultural dialogue. The Russian delegation aims to take an active part in the work of the next Conference of the Council of Europe (CE) on the religious dimension of intercultural dialogue, which will take place in Baku in September, 2014 as a central event in the work of the CE.

The issue of interreligious dialogue is also claimed in the UNO. Our country’s delegations take part in meet-

ings of ministers on interreligious dialogue and cooperation for the world’s benefit, Trilateral Forum on interreligious cooperation for the world’s benefit that are being organized within a framework of this international organization.

We would like to proceed with the initiative that was actively promoted before – to create the Advisory Religious Board under the UN. Such a structure could monitor constant interactions between the UNO and the world religions’ hierarchs including consulting on the questions that have ‘religious and value component’. Another sphere of such an authority would be advisory and expert work on peacekeeping, globalization process, promotion of interreligious dialogue, struggle with intolerance and xenophobia, protection of places of worship and religious shrines, preservation of national and cultural traditions.

It is important, in connection to this, to mention the efforts of the civil society on achieving an interreligious and intercivilizational agreement that are taken, among others, by a large non-governmental organization, The World Public Forum ‘Dialogue of Civilizations’. It holds its sessions annually on the Greek island Rhodes. It is comforting that the Russian delegation plays a significant role in this non-governmental organization.

To sum it up, I would like to share an idea that must often occur to people who take an active part in a practical aspect of international relations, not only in Russia. What are we to do so that the situation in the world does not become tenser in the course of years, so that harmony and kindness rule among people and countries? Asking this question, I think of the ‘ten commandments of humanism’ which were proposed by D. Likhachov and which have a lot in common with ten Biblical commandments. No doubt that we should promote Likhachov’s heritage, introduce it to people in other countries, try to reach out to their hearts through his works. This may well make the humanity kinder and more humane.

Yu. S. Goligorsky¹

GREAT BRITAIN: DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

A few weeks ago, just before Easter, British Prime Minister David Cameron unexpectedly came in for sharp criticism when he dared to speak about God and call Britain ‘a Christian nation’. It was the definition of a ‘Christian country’ that incurred keen displeasure of an entire galaxy of prominent British intellectuals.

Actually, British politicians rarely talk in public about their attitude towards religion. In 2003 one of the advisors to the then Prime Minister Tony Blair bluntly told reporters: ‘We have no relationship with God.’ Though formally being wrong (in the UK Church is not separated from the state!), this statement in fact reflects the true state of things: the government and the Church in the UK are quite far from each other. Therefore, Cameron brought down anger

on himself by ‘daring’ to say that ‘Great Britain is a Christian nation’.

Critics have particularly noted Cameron’s desire to bring to the country’s political life ‘more Christian morals and ideals, such as responsibility, diligent work, charity, humility and love’.

The collective letter condemning the Prime Minister’s remarks was signed by more than 50 prominent intellectuals. Their main argument is: in the state where there live so many atheists as well representatives of ethnic minorities it is insulting to talk about the Christian religion as of being a fundamental one when it comes to the issues of morality.

It is hard to debate one point made by critics of the Prime Minister: the collective face of Great Britain is changing at a fantastically rapid speed. At the beginning of May 2014, London published a report – ‘The portrait

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of modern Britain', which causes to think seriously about what is happening in the country. The main conclusion boils down to the fact that by 2051 ethnic minorities will make up to 30 percent of the population of Great Britain.

Currently 14 per cent of the UK population are representatives of ethnic minorities. Although they account for only 4 per cent in the segment of the population over 60, in the age segment of children under 5 they account for 25 per cent.

In major cities in Great Britain the share of ethnic minorities exceeds 40 per cent. In London itself, this share will soon exceed 50 per cent. The overall trend is as follows:

- the birth rate among whites, if not falling, remains stably low;
- the white population is leaving big cities;
- the number of low-income black-skinned children receiving free school lunches, is twice as high as the number of children from white families;
- immigration flows (mostly from the Third World countries), by the most conservative estimate, is 165 thousand people a year.

It is also noteworthy: while 40 per cent of the black population live in houses and apartments provided by local councils (the state!), 65 per cent of immigrants from India and Pakistan own private property, either purchased for cash or with a mortgage. 75 per cent of children in families of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent leave school with higher grades than their black peers – people coming from the Caribbean islands.

And, finally, probably the most remarkable thing: 70 per cent of children coming from Indian families after school enter elite universities of Great Britain. This is twice as much as the number of white children.

While the Prime Minister David Cameron can afford to ignore those criticising his remarks, statistics is harder to ignore, and here's a reason why: ethnic minorities traditionally feel more comfortable with the left-of-centre Labour Party than with the right-of-centre Conservative party. The Conservative Party has traditionally been considered an anti-immigration one. Simple arithmetic suggests that if the situation does not change, the democratic will expression can simply eliminate the British Conservative Party.

In this situation the conservatives come to a full vicious circle: they cannot stop immigration (and now it is pointless!), and the overwhelming majority of the arriving immigrants join the ranks of opponents of the conservatives.

Incidentally, a similar trend is observed in the United States, where immigrants from the Third World countries traditionally join the ranks of the supporters of the Democratic Party. Many of them see President Obama as their guardian angel, as the national health programme cherished by him meets, primarily, their interests.

The demographic trends that are clearly seen in the UK virtually reflect a pan-European picture: the face of Europe is changing. Moreover, it is changing very quickly: from Spain and Italy, to the Scandinavian countries – all political parties, when working out a programme of their further actions, are more and more obliged to take into account the ethnic factor that is growing strong. However, not only politicians do so: in 2013 a highly popular UK television Channel Four for the first time decided during Ramadan to interrupt their regular broadcasts for brief reminders of the time of the coming Salat to the faithful.

However, this decision also caused a record number of complaints made by the channel viewers – 2011, and 1658 of them concerned nothing but the presentation technique of those reminders. Head of the Department of Themed Programmes of Channel Four, Ray Lee, publishing his comments in the Annual Report of the television broadcasting station, put these complaints down to the 'unexpected level of Islamophobia in certain strata of the society'.

As for religious programmes for the followers of Judaism or even the Protestant religion, there are relatively few programmes of this kind on British television. Moreover, it seems that the Church of England itself lays almost no claims. This conclusion can be made at least because as far back as 2008 the head of the Anglican Church, the previous Archbishop of Canterbury Dr Rowan Williams said that 'the introduction of certain elements of Sharia law in the UK is inevitable'. Williams was succeeded by Archbishop Justin Welby, the one who in October 2013 baptized the newly born Prince George. He also seems prepared to give ground without a fight, saying that he would not mind 'if the Crown Prince when he grows up accepts Buddhism...'

Certainly, neither Williams nor Welby meant that the UK would have to put up with extreme, sometimes – barbaric elements of other religions. But adopting some standards, as a rule, eventually entails adopting other ones, which are much more extreme and unacceptable to modern society. And being on a completely different level of development, the modern society seems to be unaware of how to practically and legally combat the manifestation of medieval barbarism.

For instance, modern Great Britain suddenly found herself facing an acute problem of the so-called 'female genital mutilation' – removal or intentional injury to the female genitalia for religious dictates. It was not until 1985 that female circumcision was officially outlawed in the UK, but many African and Asian communities have not yet abandoned this ritual. In those areas of the UK, where they fail to accomplish this in place, girls are trafficked to Nigeria and Sierra Leone. There they undergo the ritual, and then they are returned to the UK.

Now the Ministry of Health, the police, the border control and the National Crime Agency hurl all effort to combat this phenomenon. Certainly, this is another, additional burden on the British security officials, because they are also to struggle against the threat of terrorism...

British schools are another battlefield. The UK school education system deserves a separate explanation. Following the liberal traditions that have formed for centuries, British schools are free to interpret the nationwide curriculum, which is issued by the Ministry of Education. The question of how closely schools must follow the curriculum has become a subject of years-long public debate and controversy. At the same time, every school has a Board of Trustees (in fact – a Parents' Committee), endowed with considerable powers and authority. Together with the Head teacher the Parents' Committee draws up a curriculum, they are also entitled to employ teachers, determine their salaries, etc.

In April 2014 it was announced that in the area of Birmingham, which is home to a large Muslim community, an inspection codenamed 'The Trojan horse' was being held: 25 schools became the focus of interest of education supervisory authorities because of suspicions that Parents'

Committees were, in fact, captured by Islamic fundamentalists. The inspection was called for by an anonymous letter received by the Ministry of Education. The letter said that in those schools fundamentalists dictated their educational programme and removed unwanted teachers.

The local police in Birmingham refused to participate in the investigation alleging as their reason that their participation could complicate the relations between the Muslim community and the local police.

The central authorities in London, however, found the information so alarming that at the head of the inspection they sent a former senior Scotland Yard officer Peter Clark, who at one time headed the Main Counter Terrorism branch of the British police. Although his investigation is still in the inchoate stage, and it is difficult to say whether the anonymous communicant's allegations are substantiated, it is clear that radicals consider young British Muslims to be potential recruits under the banner of Islamic fundamentalism. This is bitterly attested to by parents of those young British Muslims, who recently went to the civil war in Syria, and died...

...The British political system, the way of life in this country is a complex mechanism, which has been formed for centuries. The state, on the territory of which no occupier has set foot for a thousand of years, has developed a peaceful and effective way of solving domestic disagreements, disputes and problems. Having found no time to create a constitution, the UK moulded its own relationship model, based on the balance between individual rights and the will of the majority.

The Christian worldview has become a contagious example: after all, there is nothing new under the sun, even if it comes transformed, and 'The Moral Code of the Builder of Communism' is nothing but 'Ten Commandments' and 'The Sermon on the Mount' disguised by Khrushchev's speechwriters – a fact recognized not only by one of the authors of 'The Code', journalist Fedor Burlatsky, but also by Gennady Zyuganov and even by Vladimir Putin. (Zyuganov even called Jesus 'the first communist', but this, of course, is his personal opinion...)

Certainly, not all the immigrants arriving in the UK pose a threat to the traditional way of life in this country.

Many people actually come here, fleeing from lawlessness and poverty in their native countries. This also applies to immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and immigrants from the Third World countries.

Over centuries, Britain has seen many waves of immigrants: Huguenots, the Italians, the Jews, and the Germans. Saving themselves and their families, they came to the UK to start a new life. Many of them have managed to preserve their religion, but they have always recognized that the UK is a Christian and a Protestant state.

A considerable part of those who strive to come here today also want to become part of the traditional tolerant British society and accept its moral values. It is sufficient to cite the family story of the newly appointed Minister of Culture of the UK Sajid Javid – the first Muslim occupying a post of a British minister.

Sajid Javid who describes himself as 'a non-practising Muslim' is the son of a bus driver, an immigrant from Pakistan, who came to Britain in 1961. Before being appointed Minister of Culture in April 2014, Javid was Secretary to the British Treasury, which is the second most senior ministerial position – equivalent to the position of a deputy minister. At the age of 25 Javid became the youngest vice-president of Chase Manhattan bank in New York. Taking into account all of the same ethnic factor, Javid is regarded as the most likely candidate to become a future leader of the British Conservative Party, if the party is to survive.

Javid's family is a brilliant example of the integration of people who arrived in the UK to improve their lives by becoming part of the British society. It remains to be seen what proportion of this type of people there are among the new wave of immigrants. But even if they constitute the majority, even the very few – bearers of a completely different morality, of different values, the ones having absolutely different aims and goals – pose a serious threat. These few set goals that are absolutely different from the ones that Sajid Javid's parents set.

Some critics of the policy pursued by several recent governments argue that the UK only has two serious enemies – terrorism and political correctness. And there is still a chance to combat terrorism...

M. K. Gorshkov¹

CULTURE AS A SPACE OF DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

Real life of a society has a huge spiritual and value potential of culture, which is effected not by itself, but rather through a system of social reproduction. Under modern conditions, this system means a mass symbolic production, based on the latest information technology. [1] Actually, we are talking about a cultural industry, regulated by the dictate of the market, where ‘demand breeds supply, and supply breeds demand’, rather than by the immanent laws of culture. That is, not the culture itself as a field of human potential realization, but the system of its social reproduction becomes a lever to manipulate mass consciousness, a means to effect geopolitical interests, or, at least, a way to camouflage the good old world political and economic expansion.

So politics together with modern economy, the basis of which is the development of creative industries, more and more count on culture. After all, culture establishes a human value-semantic paradigm for understanding the world, understanding his place in it and, thus, becomes a way to transform reality. Therefore, it is a powerful resource for social development. ‘It is culture, rather than politics, claims D.P. Moynihan, that determines successful society.’ [2]

The very nature of culture is a dialogic one, so cultural differences initially can not be a *source* of conflict, but only its *tool* in the hands of those who take advantage of the conflict, and whose interests have nothing to do with culture. Of course, a dialogue is a form of internal self-development of culture. For example, in Russian culture, and in any other, dialogue has never stopped: there is a dialogue between tradition and innovation, between the poet and publisher, the Westernizers and Slavophiles, the intelligentsia and authorities, between national languages and cultures. Moreover, this dialogue has not only been a factor of self-awareness of Russian culture, but also an internal mechanism of its self-development.

External dialogue in the process of cultural interaction is another natural and fruitful mechanism for development of any culture that enhances its integrity. Dialogue of cultures is a ‘technology’ of much more profound trend, *increasing of humanity integrity*, despite differences in cultures, value systems and lifestyles. This ‘law of mutual attraction’ can work at full capacity due to mechanisms of

globalization and the latest information technologies, if they are subordinated to the goals to humanize the world, and do not serve the interests of the ‘golden billion’.

What is the point here? The point is that cultures, naturally, can have differences. But they cannot and should not have conflicts. Different cultures are not as hierarchic as economies to compete with each other in terms of GDP, but are equally valuable to humanity, no matter how different from each other they are by their ‘merits’ and special features.

However, their special features deny annihilation and presuppose a mutually beneficial synthesis. Therefore, the concept of ‘conflict’ can only be applied to the interaction of cultures as a way to upgrade culture. This ability to renew culture makes it inherently non-conflicting, when it comes to expansion, and even borrowing methods and practices of establishing the humane in man and in the world around him. Nature of culture is that the more cultures differ from each other, the more they are interested in each other. The mode of their relationship is a mutually enriching interaction. Therefore, the widely used concept of ‘tolerance’ is rather applied to physical objects or systems of coercion and subordination, but not to the cultures that by their very nature are designed to not just to ‘tolerate’ each other, but to respond fruitfully, even if they reject each other. Thus, the cultural space is not conflicting. It is not cultures that are in conflicts with each other, but culture and ignorance, that is deprived of the humanizing mission.

Aggression against another culture is not born in a poet’s den or an artist’s studio, but in the offices of those at powers. Therefore, to treat bloody conflicts from Kosovo to Kiev as the ‘conflict of cultures’ means either political naïveté or propagation camouflage of quite prosaic interests, that have nothing to do with culture, when culture becomes a bargaining chip in the geopolitical game and turns from the way of humanization of the world into a utilitarian means of creating ‘conditions necessary for the prosperity of our interests and values’, as stated in the ‘National Strategy for the New Century’, adopted by the United States in 1997.

In geopolitical conflicts cultures are used as flags and symbols. Quite naturally, the former US Defense Secretary Haig in the early 1990s said a very significant phrase: ‘Russia has lost the war of symbols...’ The two superpowers fought, or opposed to each other, whatever you call it, not only in the Korean sky, in the mountains of Afghanistan and in the depths of the world’s oceans, but on the silver screen, in music, at art exhibitions and on printed pages, because any symbols, both words and colours, sounds, music and architectural forms have not only aesthetic but also a huge value-semantic ‘pressure’.

In terms of globalization, this opposition has only been intensified by an increasingly assertive and persistent implementation of Western geopolitical interests. *A tool to achieve these interests* is the universalization of the Western cultural value paradigm as a mandatory ‘artistic accompaniment’ of globalization. Therefore, in the 90s, many politicians and intellectuals in our country and in the West expected that Russia, like other countries, would humbly

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build into the framework of an established liberal democratic model and, as H. Timmerman claimed, thereby 'become like us'. [3]

However, the dialogue with Russian, as well as with other cultures of the world, has turned into a North Atlantic monologue, as evidenced by the transnational dominance of the West influence in the cultural and information sphere (TV, cinema, the Internet). [4] Russian culture as spiritual integrity, as one of the unique ways of understanding the human world, is not allowed to enter into the information field of the West. The same mechanisms that have always been preventing disclosing of the Russian version of political events still continue to operate. But if this kind of 'dialogue' is targeted not on the exchange, but on 'conversion' of the population of another country, of other culture bearers, it is not a dialogue, it is after the words of writer V. Rasputin, 'cultural intervention', focused on ruining a genotype of the national culture.

Probably, such a definition would annoy opponents who believe, perhaps quite sincerely, that 'our task, as suggested by C. Lindsay, is not to change the culture itself.

The aim is to create conditions facilitating to the establishment of 'competitive' companies, because they are the main engines of economic growth and, ultimately, of social progress'. [5] However, there are 'experts' who believe that national specifics of Russian culture, like a major brake on the liberal social and economic transformations, gets in the way of such companies... and a slow progress in modernizing Russian society is explained by the 'cultural lock'. (A. Auzan).

This conference agenda is not targeted at proving that the ideas of this kind are invalid, and it is hardly required. Competitiveness of companies, social institutions, types of personality does not depend so much on the degree of lability (variability), but on the internal stability of the national cultural value code that is at the basis of any civilization. Therefore genuine competitive advantages are given to a civilization by its identity, which has long been formulated by Luc Vauvenargues: 'to catch up with others, you have to be yourself'.

The topic we should discuss at our debates most lively is how to identify these advantages, how to turn our cultural identity in an acceleration factor of Russian modernization. Only in the dialogue with others a culture realizes itself and finds ways of self-renewal, thus providing acceleration of socio-cultural modernization. But the problem is that there is neither dialogue nor mutual enrichment of cultures. Instead we witness a social polarization, a split of culture into 'cheap ruble' and 'elite from Rublevskoye Highway', followed by particulation and subsequent break in the integrity of socio-cultural environment of the country, which, as the events in Ukraine manifested, after a certain bifurcation point will become irreversible and can lead to disintegration of a country. This is consistent with certain geopolitical interests that have nothing to do with culture. Cultures are designed not to fight, but to interact, enriching each other and increasing their creative potential.

However, the modern reality is as follows: cultural and information expansion, aggressive and largely successful, tends to prove the benefits of liberal and democratic values imposed on the 'traditional societies'. In fact, it is the more aggressive the stronger a profound internal *crisis in the cultural life* of a Western man is manifested. This is a convulsive and self-destructive agony of culture that placed the

golden calf in the centre of the human world instead of God, that replaced a human value with price, that made man a means of development rather than the aim of development, that shifted the meaning of life from a spiritual to material, and even corporal level of human beings, and turned freedom of conscience into freedom from conscience.

Such 'values', historically alien to us, are embedded into the mass consciousness of the peoples of Russia, destroying the cultural foundations of Russian civilization, the foundation of the spiritual world of a person. In our spiritual tradition, people lived for other's sake, for their Fatherland, and 'I' was organically combined with 'We'. To support this idea, Saltykov-Shchedrin wrote: 'The most dangerous man is the one ... who is indifferent to the fate of his country, to the fate of his neighbour, to anything but the fate of his money put into circulation.'

Such fundamental constants are the basis of every civilization, and make a genotype of a national culture as the core of values. For Russians, these constants are *the goodness* as a moral imperative, *the truth* as the only verity, *the beauty* as the internal paradigm in the perception of the world.

Such moral paradigm is not a national prerogative, it has a common human nature and is the basis for the dialogue of cultures in time and space. Plato said: 'Seeking for the happiness of others, we find our own.' But this great for all times truth is contrary to the very nature of the social order, where 'dog eats dog', and where any way to achieve your own well-being is morally justified. Development of such a way of life leads to extreme individualism and 'between the individual and the personality there is a congregational spiritual gap across which there is no bridge'. [6] If we are not able to bridge this gap, based on dialogue of cultures, the humanity will face a catastrophe.

However, not every thing in real life is subordinated to the turn of 'Washington circuit breaker' to left or right. In terms of globalization an intensified dialogue of cultures not only 'drew significant differences in the worldview and mentality of different peoples, in their values, goals, and other aspects of social and cultural life', as the conference program states. It led to a surge of self-consciousness of every culture, and stimulated the process of national and civilizational self-determination. Under these conditions the law of cultural self-preservation and recognition of its identity in a changing world has become even more effective. A way to manifest this law is not only an increase in internal creative impact of each national culture, or increasing importance of traditional forms of cultural life, but also their update, all the more intense the more rapidly conditions of human existence change and the more different cultures contact and interact with each other.

It should be pointed out that the events of the last quarter of the century have contributed to the growth of self-consciousness of the Russian culture, to an enhanced ability 'of Russian culture to enrich itself by a variety of foreign cultures and transformation of its old one'. [7] One of the amazing features of national culture is 'susceptibility and acceptance of alien features as its own', [8] but it does not mean rejection of national identity and loss of social and cultural identity. However contradictory and painful the drift of values and transformation of the cultural field' in the country may be, the backbone remains unchanged, although forms of socio-economic, political and socio-cultural life evolve towards a 'modernized democracy'. Another

issue is that the pace of such indolent, latent modernization does not meet modern requirements. But assessing wisdom of Russian ways to modernization, we should answer the question: whether it is modernization for the sake of Russia or the modernization of Russia? Is the country just a minor appendage in the international distribution of labour, humbly providing smooth transfer of hydrocarbons and billions in profits to the 'metropolis' or it is a full member of the world's civilization process, providing material and spiritual welfare to the people, primarily due to its humane and spiritual potential. In fact, these are two different Russias, two different cultures...

In the new historical context of the second decade of the 21st century, cultural and historical identity of Russia is no longer perceived as a 'hindrance' or 'curse', but as an enduring fundamental value. Currently, almost half of our citizens (47%) undoubtedly support the idea that liberalism, individualism and Western democracy do not suit Russia as much as a sense of community, teamwork and toughly ruled state. Those, who reject this idea, total almost half as many, a quarter of respondents. However, the prevalence of supporters of Russian identity starts with a certain age limit, about 30 years old; in the younger age groups they are inferior to the 'Westerners': for example, among the youngest this ratio is 31% to 41%. At the same time, almost one-third (28%) could not yet clearly define their position on the issue.

Understanding of the real dynamics of values gives us a self-portrait of the modern Russian, 'painted' by the respondents while answering the question of how people and their relationship have changed in the last 15-20 years. About 80% of respondents indicate a rise in aggression, almost $\frac{3}{4}$ a drop of care for elders, more than 70% pay attention to the malevolence, the growth of insincerity between people, decrease in altruistic motivation, 67% a disrespectful attitude towards women and disappearance of a quality, psychologically important for the Russians and the Russian culture, that is, sincerity, 68% the growth of cynicism. Modern Russians, by their own admission, have become less patriotic (64%), less fair (70%), less faithful to the principles of partnership (47%). Over 37% of respondents note the weakening of family responsibility of the Russians. Even the qualities that would have only seemed to be amplified by democracy, diligence, ability to cooperate, intelligence, education have also fallen down in self-assessments of the respondents. Only increased activity, commitment, initiative was noted by a relative majority, 41%, but 34% reported that these qualities weakened.

At first glance, it can be assessed not only as a sentence of time and new social realities, but also as recognition of the changes in the traditional Russian humanistic solidarity vector of spiritual and cultural development. But we should not forget that the negative assessments do not show the real situation, but rather the moral 'level' of such assessments. In fact, it demonstrates the commitment of the majority of respondents to the traditional cultural paradigm that served as the level to assess changes in morality. For the majority of our citizens traditional values and meanings, norms of everyday behaviour are still relevant. A concern (one in three respondents) with the moral and ethical climate in society is a sign that there is an urge for moral and ethical climate in the society and among its citizens. Moreover, today the importance and relevance of most traditional

moral standards is considerably higher than at the beginning of the century and as compared to the 1990s. In those days many Russians refused superfluous 'moral burden' and ignoring traditional moral rules even became economically and socially beneficial, and of all human powers the society appreciated most of all only one, that was a purchasing power. At the same time a relatively new phenomenon for Russia evolved, a moral relativism or multi-morality, when people living within their moral matrix, recognize the right of others to adhere to their own moral principles.

Of course, over the last 15 years the mindset of Russians took a very evident shift towards norms typical for modernist worldview. A belief that people should have the right to assert their views have become stronger, even if the majority support a different opinion (only 9% disagree), that every citizen in every situation has a right to defend their interests by means of strikes and demonstrations (disagree 18%), and that real democracy is impossible without political opposition (disagree 15%). There is a very noticeable decline in the proportion of supporters of the state omnipotence, its legitimacy to govern the justice and limit press freedom. For the young under 25 years old we can see maximum prevalence of modernist views, while in the older age groups traditionalist consciousness characteristics dominate, such as an external locus-control, paternalistic expectations, etc.

However, this process is extremely contradictory, inconsistent and even chaotic. It depends on several factors, both situational and ontological ones, arising from the peculiarities of the Russian civilization. Currently, the Russians are characterized by extremely heterogeneous type of thinking, norms, attitudes and values. This is manifested in sometimes enormous differences in attitude to achievable values, to a focus on efficiency, initiative, competitiveness, individualistic settings, motivation to success, etc. A value gap even among members of one social group reaches such an extent that we can talk about the chaotic state of moral consciousness of Russians. But the science of sociology shows that the basic values of Russians have a surprising stability. In 1989, the main goal of the majority of respondents was to make their beloved one happy, while polls of recent years show that the main thing for the majority of our fellow citizens is to take care of their family, and that the overwhelming number of people want to live in a society where the state guarantees social peace, justice and safety for everyone. So it is not easy to carry out moral and spiritual experience of 'genetic engineering' over the Russian civilization. We can not live alone, we have been surviving thanks to the community for thousands of years, we have felt security and significance in team spirit. The war of everyone against everyone is unnatural for Russia, our country has survived thanks to camaraderie and kindness, spirituality and love, despite the blatant derogation from these principles. Russians will never accept the fact that only a strong human is right, only the one reached a high position is worthy of respect, only a rich one is happy...

Attempt of rapprochement with the West on the basis of the dialogue of cultures proved to be disappointing for the Russians, whose hopes for this process turned out to be exaggerated. So Russian society responded to this frustration with a neoconservative wave, and its leitmotif became withdrawal from Westernist fancies of the period of democracy. By the end of the 1990s there had been a

fundamental reassessment of values, and it happened not so much on the level of ideology, but rather on the level of subconscious feelings and deep semantic structure of the world picture. Russian identity, which had previously seemed to be a drawback, now became an advantage. Sociological diagnostics of emotional reactions of the respondents to the various concepts shows that currently the public consciousness consolidates around Russian values. In this regard, first of all, we should note the emotional significance of the concept of 'Russia', as well as a closely related concept of 'Russian'. The fact that these concepts are perceived by Russians with more warmth than, say, 'America', 'Europe', 'European Union' or 'Asia' may seem quite natural. But in 2000 the word 'Russia' caused positive emotional response in the Russians more than the word 'Germany' in the Germans (94% and 85 % respectively). Compared with 2000, the frequency of positive responses to the word 'Europe' has reduced. Although in the youth under 21 years old, it reached 90% and came very close to the results that 'assessment' of emotional associations with the concept of 'Russia' provided, the results show that the youth negatively reacts to everything connected with the concept of globalization.

In terms of dialogue and conflict of cultures, an unfavourable scope of emotional reactions of our fellow citizens to the concept 'the West' is noteworthy. This word is treated positively by about less than half of the respondents, and more than half take it negatively. The difference between these two figures is small, but it is sustainable. The norms and values system of the Russians demonstrates polarization of views in the economic sphere, 42% of Russians tends to support the market, 53% the planned economy. However, the most stable aspiration of Russians is to a *mixed economy with a dominant role of the state and public property*. According to the majority, the state rather than businesses should control all strategic sectors of the economy, and social sphere, designed to ensure the health and well-being of the nation. Russian attitudes toward private enterprise and money significantly differ from the western ones. It is quite enough to give, a surprisingly accurate testimony of Marina Tsvetaeva, though quite beyond the scope of sociology: 'Awareness of money as injustice in the Russian soul is indestructible.' Perhaps, therefore, the current tolerance for small and medium businesses is combined with complete rejection of big business, which has no place in the dominant normative model of economic development. In the paradigm of Russian culture only the state is a real 'owner' of the national wealth.

Social justice became a 'stumbling block' in relations between the West and Russia, over the centuries of oppression it has evolved from the principle of social organization to the fundamental value of social life, the more valuable, the less it complies with reality. Income inequality is perceived by the Russians most acutely. Therefore, the dominant social setting in Russian consciousness is a belief that a man should have only the income that is earned by honest labour, 71% of Russians support it. The number of those who believe the state is obliged to defend the interests of all people over the interests of the individual has increased over the past 15 years by 1.5, from 44% to 60%. While understanding freedom by the Russians does not match a typical interpretation of modern societies: for 60% of Russians (in 1993 67%) freedom is the opportunity to be their own

boss ('Liberty'), and only for 40% it is a set of specific political rights and freedoms.

Time will show whether these figures indicate incompleteness of socio-cultural modernization processes in the Russian society or its fundamental incompleteness. 33% of Russians currently prefer society with the priority of individual freedom (i.e., the American model of social development), while two-thirds of the population of Russia would like to live in society with social equality. It is interesting that for the majority of our citizens freedom during all the years of reform had been more important than material wealth. However, over the last 15 years quite prosaic focus of the population actually increased by 1.5 times, to the detriment of the value of freedom. But this is a litmus test of democratic ideas.

Naturally, the system of values varies considerably by age and welfare groups. And yet, all groups have a common framework of core values, which not only performs an integrative role in society, but also suggests that the value system of the Russians is very stable and far from the ideal 'American Dream'.

In general, there is no speaking about any 'glorious victory' of individualism values in Russian society, although Russians are very tolerant to individualism, and the concept of 'individualism' evokes positive associations in 61% of them. Entry of new generations into life reinforces this trend, but for the last 10 years twice as many respondents have noted an overriding public interest in the current environment. Such changes give rise to the hypothesis of shifting the centre of moral consciousness of Russians towards NON-individualist values. State and the community to which respondents belong, are treated as guarantors of their own safety. Traditionalist model is very stable, and legitimate interests of the individual are very problematic, however, they provide the basis for idea of human rights in modern democracies.

All this is very disappointing for those who are trying to present Russian culture as a conservative one, and therefore 'burning' the bridges to the future. In Russia, conservatism, as Berdyaev wrote, is 'the struggle of eternity with time, resistance of incorruptibility to corruption'.

Contradiction between tradition and modernization is inherent. In Russia, this acute contradiction is aggravated by refunding: historical, cultural, psychological, a tradition that permits only a systemic upgrades covering all areas and aspects of social life. And most importantly, it should have a socio-cultural nature, taking into account the specifics of the value basis of Russian society. But the tradition becomes alive not when it is preserved, but when it is multiplied and developed. Spiritual and cultural paradigm that has served well for many generations of Russians can be undated only through productive dialogue with other cultures, including the west. 'Substitution' of a culture. 'not suitable' for the modernization. or 'transplantation' of a new culture into the Russian reality is bound to fail. The attempt of unification of cultures under globalization has proved it, as it backfired to strengthened traditions in national cultures.

'Multiculturalism', so trendy in the West, will hardly become a productive form of the development of cultural cooperation. This mechanical mosaic of different cultures glued with tolerance turned out to be inconsistent even in the West, and not only due to imperfection of its effecting. The reason is a methodological inconsistency, lack of un-

derstanding of the essence of culture, including a national one. Different cultures can not *coexist* without contacts, like independent individuals in society, as a liberal social paradigm considers. Culture can not help interacting in value-semantic sphere and cannot help 'talking' to each other in 'their' language, i.e. communicating through dialogue. This dialogue turns into the conflict due to social, economic, political destruction, which make this dialogue a monologue, while the culture is used as a means to achieve 'out-cultural' purposes, geopolitical, political, economic ones.

After the collapse of the USSR the national identity of Russia, as a universal indicator of the social state, became the main target of the destructive influence of the West, and civilizational failure of the 1990s led to crisis of this identity. Quintessence of this identity, a national idea, represents the vector of general social development of the country from the past to the future. Transformation of identity in Russian society marks the ability of countries to respond to many challenges of the modern world, to carry out a comprehensive cultural, economic, social and political modernization, to determine the prospects of establishment of Russian civil society structures, the effectiveness of the political institutions, the mechanisms for representing the interests and political involvement, and, ultimately, the social climate of society. At the global level, the preservation of Russian identity contributes to the successful integration of Russia into the world community and its status in the international arena. At the personality level it enhances values of life, a sense of security within 'their own' society, easing of anxiety and frustration. It is not surprising, because a person is not at risk of remaining alone in the face of the storm of globalization and dissolving in it only under a strong national solidarity, a sense of self-identity, ability to feel yourself as a part of a system that guides his life and gives meaning to it. Otherwise, a person 'loses his identity', because identity is the basis of ontological security and continuity of his existence. A man needs identity as 'every fruit needs its own soil, its climate, its breeding' (Dostoevsky).

Numerous studies from different years have convincingly shown that evolution of the Russian identity is carried out in terms of complex contradictory cultural and civilizational interactions, dynamic socio-economic reforms, collapse of the multinational state and resulting necessity of getting used to the new frontiers and territorial outlines, updated ideological system and deformed image of 'we', embedding into a new system of relations, development of new social meanings and values, rethinking of the ethnic structure of the population and political structure, evolving and dying values, changing structure of society. Conflict and convergence of cultures had a considerable impact on the evolution of the Russian identity.

View of Russia as a unique civilization, combining Europe and Asia, whose typical feature is a peaceful cooperation of a variety of nationalities and religions, none of which is prejudiced and is not forced to incorporate into a cultural and civilizational standardized framework, treatment of the Russian people as historical union and a civilization has been repeatedly expressed by many, including the Russian President Vladimir Putin. [9]

Given the multidimensional approach to the interpretation of modern identity of Russians, one could argue that it is a '...complex conglomerate of new Russian, nostalgic Soviet, social, regional, local, ethno-cultural and religious

identities. Naturally, all political, socio-cultural, economic transformations of society are reflected in public-civil identity, so its changes represent tendencies of the social development, but the identity itself, its character, scale, intensity encourages orientation and mobilization of people, becomes a social resource in public development'. [10]

Today, an attentive observer can easily notice that the psychological atmosphere of the Russian socio-political life is increasingly determined by the growing feeling of independence and confidence, accompanied by a desire to distance ourselves from the West. Having defined its goals and interests, and being more clearly aware of its independence, the Russian society has actually lost a psychological need in what we can call a 'hysterical' anti-Westernism, which could be witnessed in previous years. Currently, only about a quarter of our citizens support the view that the European countries are interested in Russia's overcoming the accumulated socio-economic problems. Even fewer (about one in five) agree that Europeans aspire to a comprehensive and equal cooperation with Russia. But quite a lot of Russians are convinced in completely the opposite thing: about half of them believe that Europe sees the strengthening of Russia as a threat, and therefore does not wish Russia's rise, and almost two thirds are convinced that Europe's interest in Russia is exclusively determined by natural resources.

In terms of the constraints of rapprochement, among the main ones Russians name the following: the desire of the EU to impose their understanding of democracy upon Russia and the growing threat from NATO. They also note unwillingness of the EU to allow the Russian business to their markets and the West's urge to rewrite the history of World War II, to question the decisive contribution of the USSR to the victory over fascism.

In the early 2000s, the number of 'Euro-optimists', who connected the future of Russia with its membership in united Europe, was significantly higher than the number of 'Euro-sceptics' who did not see much sense in it, the ratio was 42% to 30%. So far, the picture has dramatically changed: opponents of the union with the European Union account for about 50%, while the share of Euro-optimists fell to 30% of Russians. Undoubtedly, the EU and U.S. intervention in the events taking place in Ukraine has only reinforce this trend. If before the events in Ukraine some part of Russian society still doubted the nature of political relations of the European Community with the post-Soviet Russia, and their attitude to Russia's international prestige and influence on world politics, now for the vast majority of Russians the 'masks have been dropped'.

It is noteworthy that the events in Ukraine, as any other 'colour revolution', are based on socio-cultural technologies and only confirm the hypothesis about the expansion of values as a hidden doctrine of globalism. Its essence is destruction of the cultural code or genotype of culture as a way of depriving its of the ability to consolidate and mobilize inner resources to respond to the new challenges of the 21st century. Such a strategy to 'reform' culture and destruct its historical basis is targeted at depriving social community of competitive advantage. It is aimed at utilization of national cultures and provoking conflicts between them, unification of the world on American patterns and has nothing to do with democracy.

These developments raise the issue of an alternative to modern globalization, aimed at exploiting unique rich-

ness of national cultures and lifestyles, assertion of the unity of the human race as a 'blossoming complexity' (K. Leontiev).

Multinational Russian nation is concerned with successful modernization of Russian society, which is crucial for survival in the modern world. We are talking about a competitive society, which will be able to come to the forefront of the world arena and provide high levels of welfare to its citizens both materially and spiritually. But current Russian modernization should not only have a systemic nature, implying an upgrade in all sectors of society, at all levels of state and public life. Modernization can take place, if we preserve the inner nature of what is called Russia, i.e. the national cultural tradition. D.S. Likhachov stated: 'Historic way of Russia shows enormous reserves in not only materials but also spiritual values.' [11]

Actually, Russia today has become a platform to solve this problem of the humanity, where the past faces the future, a collectivist system faces individualistic morality, and where we are in the quest for a fruitful way out in compliance with the Russian vision of the world and our national character. What will dominate: an acute conflict, a fierce struggle of cultures or dialogue of socio-cultural beliefs? The vector of development of the spiritual aspect of human civilization will largely depend on the answer.

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A. A. Gromyko¹

GLOBALIZATION AS A PROCESS OF INTERACTION OF CULTURES ON THE GLOBAL SCALE

Historians and political scientists, philosophers and economists have not only to understand the roots of modern processes including globalization and global management, but also to give to political elite an easy piece of advice and recommendations to follow. The values of the previous generations' experience cannot be forgotten or misinterpreted.

The 21st-century history cannot fall prey to indifference towards life and destiny of people who work both physically and intellectually. Industrial production and financial markets cannot substitute moral values, ethics, civilization and religion. Economic approaches can only work together with religious approaches. They are said to be difficult to achieve. Of course, they are, but it is important to try and do so.

An active scientific and civic position of most Russian scientists is revealed in their attitude to globalization and global management. There is an aspiration to find an answer to the crucial challenges of our time, to account for the present and the future of international relations, to account for what the humanity has achieved and what the future has in store for us, whether the future will only be an instant of time or whether people will be able to stay there longer.

The great Russian scientist Dmitry Likhachov, whose works we still do not know well enough, understood glo-

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balization as the process of interaction of cultures on the global scale. In culture Likhachov sees the cornerstone for setting of moral pivot in international relations. The urge to learn the history of Russia through its culture is quite natural. The challenges of time in the scale of one country, one civilization and unique humanity cannot be understood without this approach.¹

D. Likhachov saw the 21st century as a century of humanitarian culture development, contrition and the revival of the notion of honour. He asked people to refuse from gullibility to the light-weighted plans of economic and public rescue, solve their politics by themselves relying on the real facts and tradition. He wrote: 'Thinking of our culture and our history we cannot escape from memory as we cannot escape from ourselves because culture is strong with the traditions and memory about our past.'² These thoughts have their meaning for the Russians' attitude towards the historical heritage of the Second World War.

Is there in the world around us or is it possible to create an ideal community of people and ideal states made by them? People themselves, including those who become leaders, are not sinless. This is obvious for everyone. Besides, it is obvious that History is not only created by circumstances, but also by historic personalities. They act in accordance with time, try to interpret the experience of their ancestors and not to lose historic memory.

The world community does not stand still, it changes very fast. But we can track the truth: those who rule not only have their achievements but also make mistakes, including historical ones. Those who witnessed the liquidation of the Soviet Union can more or less understand this truth. What is difficult to understand is whether people have possibility to influence the Roller of History and aim it onto the road of civilized peaceful development, rather than to a road of continuous power conflicts when people eliminate each other in multitudes.

If there is such a possibility it presupposes the existence of stable rules of conduct in the international relations, they are called 'principles'. 'Principles' are the same rules of conduct, but they are not changed at a whim of authorities or political scientists who serve them. The principles of international law are not changed in accordance with the moment or with some groups of people or some individuals. Figuratively speaking they are 'the water of life'; they will not let constructive diplomacy waste away and degenerate. And they make it possible to have a durable track on the way of international life. International morality strengthens diplomacy of agreement with its constructive potential. The latter is only effective when it is based on the UN Charter and international law principles.

After the Second World War military force has become first of all means of defence. In the world business, despite the Cold War and local conflicts, multilateral cooperation and positive diplomacy were being developed. The UNO has become its basic platform. Its Charter was seen as an instrument of peace and safety. Historic memory and loyalty to the aims played an important part; this was something ally soldiers and officers were dying for.

Today the new reality emerges – military force and 'peace enforcement' diplomacy became means of intervention into the inner affairs of sovereign states which are UN members. It has come to reprisals without court decisions about the country leaders who dared to act notwithstanding signals and orders.

In some countries the morality of political elite was ruined. In fact, medieval morality has returned. The wars are not declared any more but started overnight, the targets are not only military objects, but also peaceful establishments. The information about 'collateral losses' conceals the bombardments of civilians. This reality contradicts norms and principles of the UN Charter and the international law in general.

It is not enough to call 'to improve global management, to fight world crisis and to achieve tangible social and economic progress'. It is easy to say 'we will eliminate and prevent new international conflicts'. Is it possible to believe in the national sovereignty and geopolitical stability of any country, including Russia, without realizing that the world community faces a challenge: to find the basic support for survival, not a prop to keep balance before crushing into an abyss of the Third World War.

The world community should stop believing in endless talks about the necessity of new reforms!

The picture of piling up 'new reforms' is joyless. Hardly had people got used to the latest changes, when the new changes came, and they are endless. The 'reformers' passion will not dry out, it becomes even stronger. But there are few people in this flow of dubious requests and actions who ask themselves: 'Where are we rushing to?'

It is high time people of the Earth asked themselves – where is the way that can lead the humanity into the world of prosperity and stability? It is the time for the humanity to remember about reasonable conservatism. The heart of this approach is careful attitude towards moral values. Global equilibrium cannot be kept without them, and the fall is inevitable.

Reasonable conservatism is essential for Russia. Because of the desire to change and break everything in the 1990s many things have been destroyed here.

Let me remind you of Vladimir Putin's words during his speech in the State Duma about the government activities: 'We need new firm measures on peoples' preservation and development. However unless we restore traditional attitude towards basic moral values, no measures of economic and social policy will bring a stable result.'³

Within the international community people's welfare strongly depends on observing 'basic moral values'. They represent one part of the historic memory and must not be declared 'obsolete' and 'unnecessary'. Such a memory loss will cost a lot; in fact, the right to live can be lost.

We can argue about how possible a large-scale or even nuclear war is, but we cannot but believe in the possibility of it. And the processes of globalization can hardly play the leading role here. The field for countries' joint actions on the world stage is vast, but it is unclear what conflicts will gain strength in the nearest decades. The struggle for water which is drinkable and suitable for agriculture, for fertile lands, for raw materials and for biological survival during flood or drought is likely to intensify.

¹ Prominent Russian scientist A. Zapesotsky dwells in details on D. Likhachov's significance as a scientist who has explained the place of Russia in the modern world, in his work 'Cultural Studies of Dmitry Likhachov', St. Petersburg, 2012.

² D. Likhachov. Selected Works, Thoughts about Life, History and Culture. Russian Fund of Culture. Moscow, 2006, p. 266–269.

³ Strategy of Russia, Fund 'Unity in the name of Russia' No. 5, May 2012, p. 13.

Modern liberal model of globalism will not live long. It will transform into Great Chaos fraught with violence.

If Russia in accordance with Article 7 of the Constitution is a 'social state', the basic principle of which is 'social justice', then we should act taking this valuable fact into account. 'World without wars' is the aim of the UN Charter, 'value of human personality' and the basic right of people to live (without this all other rights cease to exist), promotion of social progress – all of these are stated in the UN Charter, which is pierced with the ideas of tolerance and life with more freedom.

There come three key words for Russian foreign policy – peace, justice and freedom. These values can best be ascribed to social-democratic ideology, not burdened with politics from the position of strength of those who love to flex their military muscles. If we minimize the problem of the attractive for outer world Russian foreign and domestic policy only to economic categories, we will not move further on. Instead we will be joining even more with the world economy governed most likely by other countries and political elites.

Processes of globalization are many-sided; they cannot be controlled by economic or financial leverages only. Global power balance changes in favour of new centres of influence on the basis of advanced democratic values and a tendency 'to build a fair democratic and stable, ideally self-regulating international relations system'.¹

Russian foreign policy is based on the key principles of the universal order: defence and promotion of national interests, Russia's geopolitical positions consolidation, multi-vector nature and tolerance, openness and search for mutually acceptable compromises through the positive diplomacy. Russia's foreign policy should be clear not only for political elites, but also for people. Millions of people that make up classes and groups also create history eventually.

Indeed, the world today is multipolar. Globalization and global management are being developed within this historic entity. Network management of the world business from different power centres is the reality of today, but it is not firm and often is changed by means of military force as it was in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya and Syria.

The policy from the position of strength does not create conditions for global management, it can be developed within peaceful cooperation rather than military actions. Such 'success' is ephemeral, such 'victories' are illusory. Military variant of 'global management' can bring nothing but a submersion into chaos.

In my opinion, dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations become more difficult when go into deep analysis of one sometimes very attractive topic to the detriment of system analysis. An overstatement of 'Russian geography' influence on history is an example of this approach.

There definitely exists some influence of geography on the strategic stability and safety of a country or group of countries. But we cannot absolutize it and consider it to be the main historic factor, in Russia or elsewhere. Geography is an important but not the key factor of history. Famous American scientist Robert Kaplan believes that Russian history was defined by geography, including the Soviet history

when the 'cold war' played a noticeable part in the world business. He claims that Russia is 'a strict system of subordinate peoples populating, as a rule, steppes and mountain periphery of Russian forests and plains'.²

This statement does not seem to be unusual. Russia is situated on vast plains and dense forests, it has elevations but no mountains up to the Urals. The USA has approximately the same territory: there are more plains and deserts than mountains.

Kaplan, however, does not base his ideas on geography only and plunges into big-time policy. He points out that parts of the territory always break off the Russian centre. It happened to Kievan Rus' in the 13th century, to Moskovia in the 18th century, to the Tsarist Empire in the 20th century. And in his opinion this leads to the conclusion that there is nothing surprising in the fact that the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and in fact the territory of the Tsarist Empire ceased to exist. The 'Russian geography' was the reason for the collapse of the USSR. Thus, the 'geographical' explanation of Russian history is erroneous. Centrifugal forces that were crushing the Russian state were much more concrete and 'humane' than steppes, forests and mountains. And even more 'subordinate' people are dying First Nations in America, Indians in colonial India, Germanic and Roman tribes in Europe who stayed under the control of Rome for a long time. Many Asian and African people have been oppressed under colonialism for centuries. Little can geography tell us about if we evaluate the influence of hundred million people on the social evolution.

Definiteness in understanding the social evolution processes, including the present stage of human life, gives opposite effects. They are the usage of the rule of force in the world business, first of all wars, and the rule of law that opposes it, especially the international law.

To put it figuratively, international stability and prospects of interstate cooperation climb up the wall of uncertainty. The higher is the wall, the more dangerous is the fall. The supporting points on the international policy steep field are the norms of international law. They are its instruments. And even during the time of increasing competition those steps towards cooperation should not be destroyed. Without them the possibilities of interstate cooperation in the fields of culture, science, communication, transport, trade, and technical cooperation become illusory and fade away. It is diplomacy that suffers most of all from ambiguity of international relations.

International law is based on principles and political elites striving to cooperation, not on the double standard policy. If the latter becomes the usual or even permanent thing in the state's foreign policy, cooperation is impossible. And no interdependence, no globalization processes can save the situation, global management is destroyed. Tension in the international relations grows, and the danger of war increases.

The double standard policy gains crafty force, when some states in the international relations think they can do something that is forbidden to other states. At the same time, they do not conceal it. Moreover, they behave provocatively on the global stage and even offensive towards other states and even peoples.

¹ Foreign Deputy Minister S. Ryabkov's speech at VII Convent RAI, Bulletin of Moscow State Institute of International Relations No. 5 (26), 2012, p. 21.

² Robert D. Kaplan. *The Revenge of Geography*. Random House, New York, N.Y., 2012, p. 174.

Seeking of one-country leadership in the world business and of global management based on double standards seems very tempting. All the more, when the North-Atlantic top is dreaming about permissiveness encouraged (in its opinion) by the ‘weaknesses’ of Russia’s and China’s most careful behaviour in the world business. In my opinion, it is a short-sighted view of one of the many international conflicts that have appeared on the southern borders of Russia. This time the atlanticists use the Ukrainian crisis. What does it mean?

Firstly, that the atlanticists have forgotten with whom and for what their fathers and grandfathers fought during the Second World War, their leaders lost their historic memory. And this deprived the West of any moral brakes. It is proved by the support of the coup d’état in Kiev. People’s urge to social well-being has been used to eliminate the legitimate government.

All talks about the ‘revolution’ in Ukraine are groundless. Revolutions, by the way, change a social and political bases of the society, but those remained unchanged in Ukraine. The changes were for worse, the Nazis, the anti-Semites and the Russophobes came to power. The life has shown that wherever it happens the brown host does not refuse from power. Atlantic hawks still do not understand that, so much the worse for them.

Neo-Nazism will not only destroy Ukraine, but the democracy in Europe as well. Atrophy of civil society only gains its force, social and economic conflicts sharpen, universal culture is being attacked from many sides, including the demolition of the institution of family. Europe is threatened by degradation. To fight this danger there should be sent all forces of culture and reason, new neo-Nazi attack must be nipped in the very bud.

Valur Ingimundarson¹

THE GLOBALIZATION OF THE ARCTIC AND “IDEOLOGIES OF THE RETURN”

Introduction

The discourses on the Arctic – as articulated by stakeholding political elites and media outlets – are deeply influenced by what Michel Foucault termed the “ideology of the return.”² Through continuities and departures, Arctic issues have been “appropriated” and integrated into national policies and geopolitical positions. It reflects efforts to define an “unfinished region” – with unchartered, if great strategic potential due to natural resources and the effects of climate change – historically, in either utopian or dystopian terms. To be sure, the major Arctic stakeholding states issue ritualistic disclaimers against a new Great Game and the need for international cooperation and rules and regulations over Arctic jurisdiction and access to its natural resources, primarily oil and gas. Yet, nationalist sovereignty-driven discourses have raised the geopolitical stakes, even if it is not about expanding power over the Arctic, but more about guarding sovereign territories and territorial waters.³

In this paper, I discuss diverse Arctic national political narratives by showing how notions about the past still insert themselves in – intersect with – contemporary Arctic realities. Instead of disappearing, historical paradigms have undergone a transformation: having lost the capacity to act as officially sanctioned and hegemonic social and political narratives, the old patterns linger on and survive, if in dif-

ferent forms, in the present.⁴ I show that Arctic metanarratives still contain more than a hint of imperial pasts, and some are made up of disparate, if interrelated, historical genealogies: a return to 19th century Great Power politics; a romanticized ideology of a “true” North, exalting a frontier mentality and containing desires to capture a “virgin” territory based on sovereign rights; and recycled Cold War discourses and practices. What these political projections betray is that the construction of Arctic spatiality is not static, reflecting the nature of the terrain itself, but subject to reconfigurations and redefinitions. It underscores what Allan Cochrane has stressed – namely, that territory is not “to be taken as something given, somehow preexisting and waiting to be filled with politics, but rather as something that is actively formed and shaped through a political process.”⁵

Defining the Arctic Political Order

The renewed focus on the geopolitics of the Arctic reflects traditional dichotomies of cooperation and conflict and territorial sovereignty versus international governance. Most Arctic territory is already part of the jurisdiction of Arctic states or their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ). What remains to be settled are maritime disputes between individual Arctic states and the ownership of some territory stretching beyond the 200 nautical miles economic zones in the Arctic Ocean.⁶ The legitimacy of the current framework for integration and governance in the Arctic is rooted in the UN Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS) and in the most influential regional inter-governmental forum –

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² See Michel Foucault, “Space, Knowledge and Power,” in *Michel Foucault. Power: The Essential Works*, ed. by James D. Faubion (New York: New Press, 2001), p. 359.

³ Siemon T. Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic,” SIPRI Background Paper (March 2012), http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=442

⁴ Nenad Dimitrijević, “Justice beyond Blame: Moral Justification of (the Idea) of a Truth Commission,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 50, 3 (2006), 371.

⁵ Allan Cochrane, “Making up a region: the rise and fall of the ‘South East England’ as a political territory,” *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 30 (2012), 95.

⁶ The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) permits the Arctic states to make additional territorial claims if is proven – and accepted by a UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf – that certain areas reach beyond their respective continental shelves. While the UN commission can determine the size of the continental shelf, it has no power to resolve disputes between nations.

the Arctic Council – which has been open to various national and transnational influences exercised by actors, such as Arctic indigenous peoples, non-Arctic states, and inter-governmental, inter-parliamentary and non-governmental organizations. The five Arctic littoral states, Russia, Canada, United States, Norway, and Denmark (Greenland), which make territorial claims in the Arctic Ocean, and the three additional Arctic states (Iceland, Finland and Sweden) which make up the Arctic Council, have carved out a hegemonic role based on sovereign rights and regional presence. They are, however, being pressured to give Arctic indigenous peoples a say in governance and to acknowledge the input of non-Arctic actors, such as China and other Asian states, on the grounds that the global impact of the ecological transformation taking place in the Arctic due to climate change goes way beyond narrow traditional state and regional interests.

Ernst B. Haas used the term “turbulence” to account for such differing perceptions of organizational claimants in a setting of social complexity. Each actor is tied into a network of interdependencies with other actors, while pursuing a variety of individual objectives, which can be mutually incompatible. Given the lack of certainty about the trade-offs between the objectives, they cannot, in many cases, be obtained without cooperation. The structure of the order makes it difficult for organizational actors as a group to develop mutual interests, behavior, and outcomes.¹ The Arctic Eight share many goals, which are primarily designed to maintain their privileged status in the Arctic region. But they also hold different views on stakeholding and governance issues. The same can be said about other Arctic and non-Arctic actors, including indigenous peoples, non-regional states, and non-governmental organizations. Thus, the diverse interests and make-up of Arctic stakeholders act as a restraint on the development of a “final” set of institutions or convergence based on similarity in structures, processes and performances.² Nonetheless, Arctic state interests based on sovereignty claims continue to prevail over regionalist and intergovernmental impulses.

Battling against the Ideology of the Return

Arctic historical representations and references serve various a-historical uses. The phrase the “Scramble for the Arctic” has been used and abused by the media to point to the potential return to raw geopolitics: to the 19th century “Race for Africa” during the New Imperialism period. Given the negatives associated with colonialism, imperialism, and Cold War militarism, Foucault was correct in rebelling against all normative forms of the “ideology of the return”. While the past can be used to criticize the present, it is impossible to base an historical analysis on the following dictum: “Let’s go back to the good old days, when the Western powers were colonizing Africa.” Neither can it be used overtly today to justify the annexation of foreign territories for private gain – or messianistic ideologies such as the “civilizing mission”, as expressed in the European colonial “duty” to bring Western civilization to “backward people.” The same applies to the notion of Manifest Destiny, which laid the foundation for the 19th century doctrine that the United States was destined, or divinely ordained, to expand

across the North American Continent, a doctrine later reformulated to launch Cold War “crusades for freedom” around the globe. To be sure, the resurrection of protectorates and trusteeships – essentially controlled by Western states – but legitimized by the United Nations and other international bodies, such as the EU, NATO, and the OSCE, was one of the starkest manifestations of the international system after the end of the Cold War. Michael Bothe and Thilo Marauhn acknowledge that such protectorates and trusteeships are ideologically still linked to “particular political and historical situations,” to traditional armed conflict, or to colonialism. Such interventions have been justified, some successfully others not, by referring to the UN Security Council’s tasks of maintaining international peace and security.³ But despite historical similarities and precedents, the language and practice has been recast to suit dominant sensibilities in the present, which are contingent on what is “allowed” and “doable” in the geopolitical domain.

Evoking Colonial and Cold War Pasts

The “Scramble for the Arctic” has been used as warning against the “ideology of the return” and the need for maintaining a cooperative order in the Arctic. Indeed, dire predictions of the irrelevance of the main intergovernmental Arctic body, the Arctic Council, especially after the 2008 Ilulissat meeting of the Arctic Five, have given way to a discourse on its elevated position and integrative role. But the reference to Great Power rivalry in the past has also produced counter-effects, neo-colonial spin-offs, serving the purpose of using history to solve contemporary problems.

In an exhortation to the U.S. political class – published in a famous article in *Foreign Affairs* – to abandon its neglect of the Arctic and to assume a global leadership role to prevent the region from “erupting in an armed mad dash for its resources”, Scott Borgerson used the nostalgic paraphrase “Go North, Young Man”! as a way of drawing on a specifically male-bonding American settler experience. This historical reference was meant to rekindle the spirit of a daring and youthful masculine excitement – plus the subtextual lure of personal enrichment – associated with the participation in a frontier pioneering project. Thus, the Arctic was portrayed in the same way as the colonization of the American West: as an aspiring and noble cause for young men. This historical narrative, of course, glosses over the fact that racial minorities were oppressed by the migration movement. And in its contemporary reworking, there is, predictably, no mentioning of the one million “indigenous people” who live in the Arctic. But this evocation of the past is a stark reminder of the continued relevance of such colonial discourses in the imagination of realist commentators on the Arctic. Similarly, in a recent intervention Bary Scott Zellen projects Cold War schemes onto the Arctic in his assessment of future strategic developments. He he argues that an “Arctic Spring” has the potential to transform the Arctic Basin “much like the Prague Spring promised to open up and integrate Czechoslovakia with the West...”⁴ The hope

¹ Ernst B. Haas, “Turbulent fields and the theory of regional integration,” *International Organization* 30, no. 2 (1976), 179.

² Xun Cao, “Global Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: A Network Explanation of Policy Changes,” *World Politics*, 64, no. 3 (2012), 377.

³ See Michael Bothe and Thilo Marauhn, “U.N. Administration of Kosovo and East Timor: Concept, Legality, and Limitation of Security Council-Mandated Trustee Administration,” In Christian Tomuschat, ed., *Kosovo and the International Community: A Legal Assessment* (The Hague, London, New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), 219.

⁴ Barry Scott Zellen, “Stability and Security in a Post-Arctic World: Toward Convergence of Indigenous, State, and Global Interests at the Top of the World,” in *The Fast-Changing Arctic: Rethinking Arctic Security for a Warmer World* (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press, 2013), p. 343.

it expressed, he continues – while temporarily crushed in 1968 – was realized with the Velvet revolution of 1989. Such far-fetched analogies, admittedly, look more amusing than serious, but, again, they attest to the endurance of Cold War metaphors in the present.

Canadian Arctic discourses are also under the historical spell of Northern mythologies, identity politics and power politics. For one thing, they center on Canadian “true North” identities – as a way of demarcation and distance from the United States. True, the Canadians and the Americans continue to “agree to disagree” on the Northwest Passage, which Canada claims as its own but the United States sees as an international waterway. But to Canada, this fabled passage has been a historical and emotional source of frontier myths. In the 19th century, a famous British expedition seeking it ended in death and destruction because the crew, who saw themselves as products of the pinnacle of Victorian civilization, were too proud to ask the Inuit for help. In an attempt to resist the “ideologies of the return,” the Canadian government has sought to work with the Inuit and using them as some sort of territorial guardians in the Canadian Arctic. When taken to its extremes, Canadian territorial discourse borders on “sovereignty fetishism” – as exemplified by a much quoted remark by a Canadian Prime Minister about national control over the passage through the Canadian archipelago – “Use it or lose it.” It shows what Franklyn Griffiths has termed “possession anxiety,”¹ which has kept Canada at arms lengths from the United States when it comes to the Arctic and deeply suspicious of Russia, which has the most to gain from Arctic riches. Yet, as P. Whitney Lackenbauer has argued, as critical Canadians are of Russia’s rhetoric in the Arctic, they are actually mirroring it.

External realities can be created and recreated irrespective of whether they correspond to geopolitical logic, scientific timelines, involving climate change or the opening of sea lines. Even if the Russian North Pole flag-planting in 2007 mainly served internal political aims, it had much impact on other Arctic stakeholders. It spurred intense nationalistic reaction in Canada, speeded up the development of the U.S. Presidential Directive on the Arctic, and contributed to the Ilulissat initiative of the Arctic Five. It may be argued that the flag-planting was a case of the “ideology of the return.” It was not only hailed as a symbolic geopolitical feat but also as a scientific breakthrough. “It is like putting a flag on the moon,” as one Russian spokesman put it.² Such language evokes memories of another frontier narrative and superpower completion and space colonization in the 1950s and 1960s. As John F. Kennedy’s put it in his inaugural speech: “We stand at the edge of a New Frontier—the frontier of unfulfilled hopes and dreams, a frontier of unknown opportunities and beliefs in peril. Beyond that frontier are uncharted areas of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered problems of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus.”³

The Russian decision to resume regular bomber flights in the North Atlantic and elsewhere – a practice that had been abandoned following the demise of the Soviet Union—

was motivated by a desire to restore, symbolically, Russia’s military prowess and to underscore its geostrategic interests in places such as the Arctic. As was the case during the Cold War, these flights have been monitored and/or patrolled by individual NATO countries. On the surface, the bomber flights and NATO’s air policing arrangements constitute links between a Cold War past and an Arctic future. Still, while these acts represent recycled symbolism, they do not constitute an “ideology of the return.” Russian strategic aviation is not seen as posing a territorial threat by Western countries, even if it has been an irritant to some. At the same time, it underscores the ambivalent Western perceptions of Russia. As Chantal Mouffe put it:

[O]ne has to acknowledge that a fully inclusive political community can never be realized. There will always be a “constitutive outside,” an exterior to the community that is the very condition of its existence. Once it is accepted that there cannot be “we” without “them” and that all forms of consensus are by necessity based on acts of exclusion, the issue can no longer be the creation of a fully inclusive community where antagonism, division and conflict will have disappeared.⁴

Like some other Arctic states, Denmark is grappling with colonial and Cold War legacies in Greenland. The key question is whether Danish policies toward Greenland have been motivated, historically, less by a desire to ensure the social and economic well-being of Greenlanders than by attempts to restore an alternative form of colonial relationship in the name of national history, tradition, and prestige within the temporal contexts of the Cold War, decolonization, and Arctic geopolitics.⁵ The Danes are bound to respect Greenland’s sovereignty if the Greenlanders opt for secession from the Danish Kingdom. While Greenland has the potential of becoming self-reliant due to natural resources, the Greenlanders are a small community of only 57,000, with limited capabilities to control their vast territory. Yet, there is increasing willingness on the part of the Greenlandic political elite to distance themselves from Denmark. There has long been a specific imperial formation of Denmark’s involvement in Greenland marked by colonial and neocolonial aspects, while the official line has stressed modernization, integration, and interdependence. The project used to be rested on three pillars: the “moral duty” to assist Greenlanders in gaining access to social welfare, liberal economy and technological infrastructure; the explicit wish on the part of Greenland’s political and cultural elites to acquire assistance from Denmark, and Danish interest in retaining sovereignty over Greenland.⁶ It is still an open question whether Greenland will, in the near or medium term, decide on full sovereignty from Denmark on the basis of the independence clause contained in the Self Rule Act. But irrespective of the outcome, the tension between a Western modernization discourse and indigenous emancipatory impulses continue to characterize the Danish-Greenlandic relationship.

The Norwegian infatuation with Spitsbergen or Svalbard – and its exalted place in the cultural imagination – is an example of historical idealization of what the Norwegians term the “High North” mixed with territorial am-

¹ Franklyn Griffiths, “Towards a Canadian Arctic Strategy,” Canadian International Council. URL: http://www.canadian_internationalcouncil.org

² See the *Guardian*, 2 August 2007.

³ John F. Kennedy’s Acceptance Speech Democratic National Convention, Los Angeles, 1960.

⁴ Chantal Mouffe, *The Return of the Political* (London: Verso, 1993), p. 85.

⁵ See Thorsten Borring Olesen, “Between Facts and Fiction: Greenland and the Question of Sovereignty,” *New Global Studies*, 7, no. 2 (2013), 117–128.

⁶ Kristian H. Nielsen, “Transforming Greenland: Imperial Formations in the Cold War,” *New Global Studies*, 7, no. 2 (2013), 129–154.

bition and power politics.¹ The Norwegians have worked against what they see as delegitimization attempts directed against their interpretation of Norway's sovereignty over Svalbard – that non-discriminatory rights to practice peaceful economic activities of the parties of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty apply to the continental shelf and that Norwegian assumption of a 200-mile Fishery Protection Zone around the island should not be recognized. The Norwegian High North strategy is a case in point; it offers a “flexible” political interpretation of the “High North” as encompassing both the North Atlantic and Arctic. It covers, geographically, the area stretching from the Barents Sea to the Greenland Sea. From a political perspective, however, it betrays an ambitious agenda, involving Norway's relations with neighboring states, such as Sweden, Finland and Russia; Nordic cooperation; the relationship with the United States and Canada through the Arctic Council, and the ties with the European Union as part of the Northern Dimension (together with Iceland and the Russian Federation).² In short, it reflects a catch-all approach, mixing together disparate national interests and transnational processes, such as environmental, fishing and legal concerns with geopolitics and the exploitation of natural resources. But when stripped of its layers, it is very much about power politics: relations with Russia and oil and gas in the Arctic.

Icelandic Arctic discourses are also rooted historical mythologies, with the past being used to create viable political narratives in the present. References to the term “Arctic Mediterranean” – coined by the explorer Vilhjálmur Stefánsson – are being used to evoke utopian materialist potentials based on the prospective opening of new sea lanes and transarctic trade as a result of Arctic ice-melting.³ Thus, Icelandic officials have appropriated, reformulated, and repackaged Stefánsson's early 20th century vision of all-year commercial sea routes around the Arctic, with ports, naval stations, and weather stations on strategically placed islands. According to this scenario, which is conditioned on changed global trade patterns and on the linking of the North Atlantic with the Pacific, Iceland is poised to becoming a transarctic commercial hub – a center for the reception, distribution and transshipment – a result of climate change. All this is part of a game of political positioning. It reflects a nostalgic desire, by way of geographical proximity, to be part

of an Arctic club and cling to a place of strategic relevance, geopolitical interest, and economic potential.

Conclusion

There are strong arguments for seeing regions, such as the Arctic, in relational terms, reflecting the interaction between territorial and non-territorial actors, not as fixed or self-contained geographical entities. Indeed, as regional behavioral definitions – which transcend the geographic and the territorial – stress, political practice and relationships shape and alter regional compositions. Thus, as a spatial entity, the Arctic should not be portrayed exclusively in terms of regional integration, state interdependence, or transnational or globalized processes. It reflects an uneven mixture of these factors. What needs, however, to be taken into account is that the current multilateral Arctic framework is based on various types of open and latent hierarchies, reflecting the power disparities of stakeholders. The portrayal of the “North” as a high-stakes resource base is still within the framework of a different post-Cold War concept of security, whereby sovereign interests, such as territorial and resource claims, mix with transnational processes, such as climate change and international governance. But the ambivalent historical and colonial narratives I have discussed here serve the instrumental purpose of legitimizing Arctic national interests. Some call for the “ideology of the return” and others reflect different state-centered material aspirations. These references certainly do not rule out international governance or structures, such as the Arctic Council. The five Arctic littoral states reiterated at their 2008 Ilulissat meeting in Greenland their commitment to international norms to deal with territorial claims beyond the 200 Exclusive Economic Zone.⁴ And the acceptance of non-Arctic States as observers in the Arctic Council in 2013 was a recognition that actors, such as China, could have opted for sidestepping the Arctic Council by focusing their attention exclusively on bilateral relations with individual Arctic states, where they can pursue their political and economic interests. But, in the end, the current Arctic geopolitical jockeying is about identity politics – about exclusion and inclusion – whereby states and organizations are classified on the basis of power and legitimacy into those on the inside and those on the outside.

¹ On Norway's High North Strategy, see two government reports: “Regjeringens nordområdestrategi” [The Government's High North Strategy] (Oslo: Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006); and “Nordområdene: Visjon og virkemidler” [The High North: Vision and Measures] (Oslo: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 18, 2011).

² Jonas Gahr Store, “Iceland and Norway – Neighbours in the High North,” speech delivered at the University of Iceland, November 3, 2008, http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Whats-new/Speeches-and-articles/speeches_foreign/2008/iceland-and-norway--neighbours-in-the-hi.html?id=534706

³ See Icelandic Foreign Ministry, “Fyrir stafni haf. Tækifæri tengd siglingum á norðurslóðum [Ocean Ahead: Opportunities Linked to Arctic Shipping] (Reykjavik: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2005); idem, “Ísinn brotinn: Þróun norðurskautssvæðisins og sjóflutningar, horfur í siglingum á Norður-Íshafsleiðinni” [Broken Ice: Arctic Developments and Sea Transports; Prospects for Arctic Shipping] (Reykjavik: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2006); idem, “Ísland á Norðurslóðum” [Iceland and the Arctic] (Reykjavik: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2009).

⁴ See, for example, “The Ilulissat Declaration” issued by Arctic states at the Arctic Ocean Conference in Ilulissat, Greenland, 27–29 May 2008, http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat_Declaration.pdf

Khalil Karam¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS

The question of Culture and Partnerships of Civilization in a globalized world with huge challenges is of outmost importance. The very difficult epoch of violent conflicts scattering the world (in Syria, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Central African Republic, just to name a few) makes the debate of even greater significance.

I am coming from a torn Middle East filled with wars and tears, but also dreams, with no lessons to give but a message of painful experience to deliver to this prestigious audience. Before I start, I would like first to thank the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Academy of Sciences for the organization of this conference for which I wish a lot of success.

Lebanon is a multicultural experience of 17 religious communities living together through a consensual democracy that we look at, and address the world as, “a message of hope”.

These days, more than any other time in the past, and because of our history of layered civilizations and the more recent and terrible experience of civil war, we are trying more than ever to protect our model considering all the attempts to abort it and the many regional challenges.

Every day, we work hard and hope that the Lebanese people stay conscious that what brings us together is by far greater than what sets us apart, that being Lebanese and protective of our very unique, rich and millenary culture is our specificity. This is why, we Lebanese, more than any other people, should remain attached to the dialogue of Cultures and the partnerships between Civilizations.

But what is Culture?

And how can we build partnerships in our globalized world?

In Mexico, in 1982, UNESCO defined culture as “not only the arts and letters, but also, the modes of life, fundamental rights of human beings, value systems, traditions and beliefs”. The declaration added that “every culture represents a unique and irreplaceable body of values, since each people’s traditions and forms of expression are its most effective means of demonstrating its presence in the world”.

November 2001, in the wake of the events of September 11, the 31st General Conference of UNESCO reaffirmed this definition in its Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. It stated that “the cultural wealth of the world is its diversity in dialogue”. The declaration aspired to a “greater solidarity between nations on the basis of recognition of cultural diversity, of awareness of the unity of humankind, and of the development of intercultural exchanges”. It pointed out that the process of globalization in this field, though representing a challenge for cultural diversity, creates the conditions for renewed dialogue among cultures and civilizations.

To build partnerships in a globalized world is therefore indeed a challenge. On one hand globalization allows the

flow of goods, of know-how, of all sorts of information, of people and cultures. But on the other hand, more and more conflicts are spreading beyond borders in our multipolar world. The question to be asked nowadays should therefore be: globalization friend or foe?

This dual character of globalization, its risks and benefits, have been in the center of many researches some of which quite controversial.

In 1992, in “The End of History and The Last Man”, Francis Fukuyama argues that “what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such. That is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”.

In 1996, Fukuyama’s professor, Samuel Huntington, answered his student back in “The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking of World Order”. His theory is that people’s cultural and religious identities will be the primary source of conflict in the post-Cold War world.

The outspoken Palestinian intellectual Edward Said disagrees with both and believes in a Universal Civilization. In 2001, as a response to Huntington’s theory, he writes an article in *The Nation* magazine titled “The Clash of Ignorance”, saying that Huntington’s categorization of the world’s fixed civilizations omits the dynamic interdependency and interaction of culture. Feistier in his last book “From Oslo to Iraq and the Road Map”, Said accuses the Huntingtonian paradigm of “racism (...) directed today against Arabs and Muslims”. His belief in a Universal Civilization is also that of the Indian 2001 Literature Nobel Prize, Vidiadhar Naipaul and also the Czech Vaclav Havel who wrote that “we now live in one same and global civilization”.

The discussions around the duality of globalization and its side effects are numerous, but what is essential probably stands on how to really agree instead of agreeing to disagree.

In his essay “Race and History”, the prominent French ethnologist and “father of modern anthropology”, Claude Levi-Strauss reminds us, already in 1952, that the world civilization can’t be anything else but the “coalition” of cultures at a worldwide scale. He warns us later on the risks of a uniformed world based on the unique western model which should be fought in the name of diversity. His learnings are still today of great accuracy and avant-garde.

In the same line, the outstanding Russian author, scientist and scholar, Dmitry Likhachov, doctor in literature and philology, who worked thoroughly on Russian culture and had a great scientific contribution in bringing up the debate to an upper level, gave this definition: “Culture makes populations inhabiting a certain territory a unified nation. Religion, science, education, moral norms of civil behavior and the state, have always been included, and must remain, in the notion of culture”.

It is impossible not to mention Dmitry Likhachov as we meet here, in Saint Petersburg, over the dialogue of cultures. The scientist participated in the preservation of national minorities in danger, helping the return to Russia of public and cultural figures who had emigrated. In

¹ Ambassador, Permanent representative of Lebanon in UNESCO, Professor. He is a member of the working group on multilingualism – International Organization of Francophonie (OIF). He was a Vice President about Development of the University of St. Joseph (Beirut) (2008–2013). He was a Deputy Chairman of the Lebanese National Commission in UNESCO (2005–2008), a member of the Executive Board of UNESCO (1997–2001). He was awarded with the order of the Legion of Honour (France).

1975, Likhachov was one of the members of this Academy of Sciences who refused to sign a letter requesting the expulsion of the famous scientist Andrey Sakharov. He also defended Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and other dissidents during their persecution. He is one of the few who worked on the correlation between culture and nature. And in 1986, he was elected the first President of the Russian Cultural Fund. Throughout his long life he received the most prestigious Russian and foreign honors for his work. His name will always be synonymous of dialogue and of culture, his valuable work and what he stood for, a treasure to Russia and to the world.

As a conclusion, I would like to say, that there cannot be a single model of democracy functioning in various countries of the globe. What is adequate for one country and traditions of government is not necessarily adequate for another country and traditions of government. But what should remain our common goal as scientists, teachers, diplomats, leaders, clerics, civil society, and citizens of the world is to maintain all efforts towards an ongoing dialogue between the cultures.

Our differences, should they be religious, linguistic, racial, differences in thoughts, analysis or other, make us all stronger. This is exactly where lays the interest of partnerships between different civilizations. And that is the message on which we have agreed in Lebanon 70 years ago as we became independent, and for the continuity of which we still struggle for today, with the help of allied nations, aiming humbly to be able to present it to the world as a symbol of coexistence.

But I cannot end this participation without a word from both, the exceptional Russian author, Dostoevsky, who gave us these words as a legacy: "To live without hope is to cease to live", and our beloved Lebanese poet, Khalil Gibran who taught us that: "Progress lies not in enhancing what is, but in advancing toward what will be".

Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen, I thank you for your kind attention and wish you all an excellent and productive conference.

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Hans Köchler¹

CIVILIZATIONS BETWEEN CONFLICT AND DIALOGUE: PERCEPTION AND REALITY IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT²

(I)

Globalization as a tendency – or “globality” as a fact of international relations – is characterized by an increasing interdependence of all geographical regions and constant interaction at all levels of social life beyond national borders.³ The driving force behind this dynamic reality⁴ is “economic competition without borders.” This development has been accelerated, if not triggered, by the end of the East-West conflict, namely, the collapse of the bipolar order that divided the world along ideological lines and military alliances. The process has been greatly facilitated by the rapid development and spread of communication technology, particularly through the Internet. It cannot be denied, however, that the ever more complex economic interaction has been accompanied by a tendency towards *cultural uniformity* – whether in regard to language or “lifestyle” and social habits in general.

In its *Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations*, the United Nations General Assembly apparently tried to stem the tide of uniformization, which is inherent in the economic dynamic of globalization. While acknowledging that globalization brings “greater interrelatedness among people and increased interaction among cultures and civilizations,”⁵ the UN member states also identified a threat of uniformity faced by the world’s cultural and civilizational traditions, emphasizing that “globalization is not only an economic, financial and technological process which could offer great benefit but (...) also presents the challenge of preserving and celebrating the rich intellectual and cultural diversity of humankind and of civilization.”⁶

The *ambiguous nature of globalization* is expressed in the fact that so many groups of people, belonging to different cultural and/or civilizational traditions,⁷ strive to inter-

act with others at the global stage while at the same time trying to *preserve* their national, ethnic, cultural, and civilizational identity. The dynamic of this process has brought about what one might metaphorically describe as “split cultural consciousness.” It characterizes the predicament so many communities are faced with under the conditions of today’s “global village.”

The *attitudes* shaped by the dynamics of globalization somewhat mirror this split consciousness:

On the one hand, globalization, out of economic necessity (that is determined by “competition without borders”), brings about a basic open-mindedness and “businesslike” attitude towards different languages, value systems and lifestyles that may encourage tolerance towards other civilizational expressions (even if, in many circumstances, at a superficial level); as rightly argued by Qurong Shen, “the progress of globalization has set the basic context and major theme” for a global dialogue of civilizations.⁸

On the other hand, the dynamic of globalization generates a somewhat opposite tendency towards *uniformity*, or “uniformization,” for the simple reason of *efficiency* (although there may be other reasons that are more related to considerations of power and privilege). This attitude is at the expense of the erstwhile trend towards intellectual openness and respect for other civilizations.

Whether it is the emergence of *one* language as *lingua franca* (to the detriment of distinct cultural traditions) or the propagation of uniform lifestyles and social trends associated with the preponderant language’s socio-cultural environment: a tendency towards uniformity is obviously not in conformity with the precepts of a dialogue between cultures and civilizations; it tends to generate, or enforce, *hegemonic* structures on a global level.

The danger associated with this overall trend, one of the most debated characteristics of globalization, has been aptly described by the Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the task of working out guidelines for a dialogue among civilizations. In their final report, the experts voiced the concern that “[a] process of globalization without dialogue may increase the probability of hegemony.”⁹

Reactions to this trend towards uniformity are characterized by a desire for *reasserting* the importance of national cultures, traditions, and value systems. This will often be accompanied by a profound distrust of, and at times even aggressive attitudes towards, “alien” cultures and lifestyles that may come to the fore in the process of globalization. The social repulsion of new forms of cosmopolitanism transported by globalization should not catch anyone by surprise. In a fashion similar to the individual subject, the

from other species.” (Samuel Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?,” in: *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 24.) In the context of this report, we understand “culture” as a sub-category of civilization.

⁸ Qurong Shen, “Dialogue among Civilizations: Implications for International Relations,” in: *Xandai Guoji Guangxi* [Contemporary International Relations], Beijing: China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, September 2001 (translation from the Chinese original).

⁹ “The dialogue among civilizations.” *Executive Summary* of the publication of the Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General on the occasion of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, www.un.org/Dialogue/summary.htm (2001).

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² This report is a synthesis of the positions expressed by the author in a series of international conferences organized by the International Progress Organization and other NGOs on globalization and culture.

³ On the nature of globalization see the author’s paper “Philosophical Aspects of Globalization – Basic Theses on the Interrelation of Economics, Politics, Morals and Metaphysics in a Globalized World,” in: Hans Köchler (ed.), *Globality versus Democracy? The Changing Nature of International Relations in the Era of Globalization*. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2000, p. 3–18.

⁴ The phenomenon as such is not entirely new. Trends towards globalization existed in previous centuries in connection with the colonial and imperial powers’ efforts at opening up virtually all known regions of the globe to international trade. In terms of quantity and intensity, however, the globalization of the 20th/21st centuries is a new phenomenon.

⁵ General Assembly, fifty-sixth session, agenda item 25, A/RES/56/6, Resolution adopted at the 43rd plenary meeting, 9 November 2001.

⁶ Loc. cit.

⁷ The term “civilization” is used here in the more general sense as defined, for instance, by Samuel Huntington. According to this definition, civilization means “the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans

dynamic of the *collective subject* develops through an *actio-reactio* scheme in which every force triggers a counterforce as a result of the subject's efforts to preserve its identity.¹ This process must be taken into account if one intends to understand the cultural or civilizational identity crisis many communities are faced with as a result of the ever more rapidly advancing process of globalization.

This brings us to the *political* dimension. At the civilizational level, one can no longer ignore the hard facts of global power relations. Whether it is the propagation of certain notions of human rights and democracy, or the effort at imposing social trends associated with the prevailing economic system, those concepts and habits are made part of a *legitimation discourse* by which the predominant power undertakes to bolster its claim to global leadership, postulating for itself some form of civilizational supremacy. This applies to all areas of interaction between states, including war. Not only in recent history have issues of values and civilizational identity served to justify the use of force. Unavoidably, civilizational justification has made such conflicts even more intractable.

In terms of power relations, the present, albeit transitory, *unipolarity* has the potential of triggering so far dormant civilizational conflicts – or fuelling them even further where it has not been possible to contain them through conventional measures of politics and diplomacy. As recent history has amply demonstrated, the *perception*, or postulation, of civilizational conflicts in the transnational realm (as regards the relations between Islam and the West, for instance), while resulting, to a certain extent, from conflict situations at local or regional levels, may itself aggravate existing ethnic and/or religious conflicts. The conflict in Syria is a case in point.

At the beginning of the 21st century, when ideological rivalry between East and West seems to have receded, the *new risk* to global order lies in the paradigm of a “clash of civilizations” becoming the vehicle of a “post-ideological” justification of international conflicts.² If the civilizational paradigm is being used as cover for the pursuit of a policy of national interests (whether by the dominant global power or by regional powers), everyday conflicts may acquire a quasi-metaphysical dimension, which will make conflict resolution considerably more difficult and, according to the *actio-reactio* scheme of social relations referred to earlier.

Looking back at the history of international relations, we may recall that the era of global bipolarity (which prevailed during the entire period of the Cold War) was characterized by a “clash of ideologies,” namely between capitalism and socialism. Although regional conflicts had broken out and were, in most cases, conducted as proxy wars in the context of superpower rivalry, the two competing powers essentially held each other in check. This constellation amounted to a kind of *mutual deterrence* that prevented open war between the two rival powers.

The antagonistic scheme of the bipolar era has not altogether disappeared in the unipolar constellation of the present time. The rivalry of ideologies has been replaced, at least in the perception of influential sectors of the interna-

tional public, by a risk of conflict among civilizations. The problem, with regard to global order, lies in whether, and to what extent, *perception creates reality*, that is, a *perceived* clash among civilizations becomes something of a self-fulfilling prophecy. The crucial question as to the future world order will be how this interdependent relationship between perception and reality will unfold.

In a unipolar environment such as the present one, that is characterized by the absence of a balance of power, the advocates of international *realpolitik* may be tempted to make use of the confrontational paradigm to advance specific political, economic and military goals. The numerous invocations of Huntington's notion of the “clash of civilizations” since the tragic events of September 11, 2001,³ are vivid proof of this trend. The imbalance of the present global system may reinforce, in certain cases even create, civilizational antagonisms that might otherwise have been subdued by ideological rivalries between two or more competitors for global power.

The political and military actions that are being *justified* (by the actors) or *explained* (by the observers) by reference to Huntington's notion may indeed make of the *perceived* clash of civilizations a transnational *reality*. What may have existed as mere perception will have become political reality by fiat of an essentially ideological interpretation and/or legitimization of events. A major example of the overall political impact of this interdependence – with serious implications for global peace – is the state of relations between the Muslim world and the West.⁴

Two aspects must be differentiated with regard to the *actio-reactio* scheme underlying this interdependence of perception and reality:

The perception of a threat may be “calculated” as being necessary for mobilizing the public in favor of a certain political agenda, advancing a country's national interests vis-à-vis its neighbors and/or the rest of the world; such agenda may also include the use of military force. The latter will have to be justified as measure of legitimate self-defense in order to become acceptable in the eyes of the domestic as well as the international public. In this context, the notion of the “clash of civilizations” may be part of a *rationalization* of otherwise undeclared interests. This is particularly relevant in regard to the rather vague notion of “preventive self-defense” (which has experienced a not so surprising *renaissance* in the present global constellation).

The other aspect relates to antagonistic action from the part of those who are identified by the state(s) or groups referred to under (1) as posing a threat to national and, eventually, international peace and security. This counter-action may amount to:

a reassertion by those countries and/or communities (groups) of their identity vis-à-vis the dominant culture or civilization (which could be described as “*reactive self-assertion*”);

the “targeted” countries or communities taking action, understood as self-defense, against those international ac-

¹ On the various aspects of this dynamic cf. Hans Köchler (ed.), *Cultural Self-comprehension of Nations*. Tübingen/Basel: Erdmann, 1978.

² For a general analysis of the implications of civilizational disputes for international relations see Hans Köchler and Gudrun Grabher (eds.), *Civilizations – Conflict or Dialogue?* Studies in International Relations, XXIV. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1999.

³ His original essay was published in 1993. (See note 5 above.) For the historical record, it must be stated that the term was originally used by Bernard Lewis: “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” in: *The Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 266, September 1990, p. 60.

⁴ Cf. Hans Köchler, “Muslim-Christian Ties in Europe: Past, Present and Future,” in: *IKIM Journal*, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, vol. 7, no. 1 (January-June 1999), p. 97–107.

tors that are perceived as propagators of a dominant civilization for the sake of advancing their national interests.

The risk, with regard to global order, lies in this interdependence becoming a vicious circle of *threat perception* (i.e., the diagnosis of a threat) on the one hand and *measures of defense* against the perceived threat on the other, whereby the latter may finally make the threat a reality, leading to even stronger countermeasures and further strengthening existing enemy stereotypes. Thus, the paradigm of the clash of civilizations may become a *self-fulfilling prophecy*; it may be the “unintended consequence” of otherwise containable conflicts of interests.

At this juncture in history, the world is facing the very real risk of entering a cycle of *mutually reinforcing enemy stereotypes* (or threat perceptions) and related “defensive” actions along civilizational lines. The increasing alienation between the West and the Muslim world (whether along the civilizational “fault lines,” diagnosed by influential analysts, in the Near East, the Middle East, Central Asia, or South-East Asia, or within the increasingly multicultural societies of the West itself) is just one more indicator of this trend.

(II)

One will have to reevaluate the chances of a just and stable global order against this rather bleak background of the mutually reinforcing relationship of *perception and reality*, that is, the cycle of threat perception and defensive action triggered by the former. One of the questions that have to be asked is whether and in what sense efforts at a genuine dialogue among civilizations will contribute to breaking this cycle of inter-civilizational confrontation (in the places where it has already begun to destabilize the regional order) – or preventing it from becoming a reality at the *global level*.

A lot will depend on how the *dynamic of globalization*, which by now appears to be an established fact of international relations, works out over the long term. Let us recall: in the context of globality, civilizational multipolarity has become part of everyday life – mainly due to the rapid development of communication technologies.¹ How much does this (multipolar) social and socio-cultural reality, resulting from the dynamic of the globalization process, bear on international politics which is essentially determined by “national interests” and the drive for the preservation and aggrandizement of power?

Can globalization “neutralize” these realities and the confrontational paradigms related to them – or at least “absorb” them in the wider context of economic interests whose ubiquity and pervasive nature are a basic characteristic of a globalized world? May one realistically hope that the forces of globalization, out of economic necessity, will gradually transform the alienation between civilizations and cultures towards an essentially *cooperative system*? (Rational analysis and moral exhortation alone will certainly not be sufficient to make a difference.)

Furthermore: can the tension between *unipolarity* in terms of power relations and *multipolarity* (or, in specific regional constellations, *bipolarity*) in terms of civilization-

al identities be gradually overcome through the very dynamic of globalization – against and in spite of its tendency towards cultural uniformity (that may, in turn, foster a hegemonic agenda, and has undoubtedly been used for that purpose in the past)? By its very nature, the process of globalization has opened a *cosmopolitan space* of economic, social and cultural interaction, a development which cannot easily be undone. It has created a new social reality at the transnational level with far-reaching implications for the regional and domestic order everywhere.

In this regard, attention should be drawn to the *normative aspect* of the international system: Will a *synthesis* between antagonistic forces of civilizational self-assertion eventually be achieved through a *rational consensus* at the normative level? Could the forces representing different civilizations agree on a minimum set of norms that regulate their *co-existence*, thereby abandoning, on the basis of *mutuality*, any effort at subjecting each other to “missionary” strategies and tactics? In this context, the corresponding values of *freedom* and *tolerance* would figure as central elements of a set of meta-norms that are to be understood as *conditio sine qua non* for the self-realization of every civilization.² Such a relationship between norms and meta-norms (whereby the latter figure as precondition for the realization of the former) is structurally similar to that underlying the doctrine of peaceful co-existence among nations (states) with different ideologies (that prevailed in the earlier bipolar era).

Normative considerations along these lines could make an *agenda of global dialogue* more convincing than merely political arguments, which, by their very nature, will always be “opportunistic” and related to a more or less transitory situation. The implementation of an agenda of dialogue is quintessential not only for the self-realization of each and every civilization (in the sense of collective identity), but also for the collective survival of all nations. It alone will help avoid endless confrontation – a perpetual “clash of civilizations” in the Huntingtonian sense – that would finally defeat all civilizations’ and nations’ efforts at self-preservation.

The Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the United Nations in 2000 – well before the fateful events of September 11, has emphasized another important aspect of inter-civilizational relations, namely that a “dialogue between those who perceive diversity as a threat and those who see it as a tool of betterment and growth is intrinsically necessary.”³ Through this reference to the somewhat *dual face* of civilization (as regards the attitude towards and evaluation of diversity), the experts have drawn our attention to the fundamental challenge faced by today’s international community, namely how to prevent the paradigm of the “clash of civilizations” from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Partly due to the absence of a stable balance of power at the global level, peoples, social and ethnic communities of many regions of the world are threatened to become divided along cultural or civilizational lines. The alienation

² For further details of this normative relationship see Hans Köchler, *Cultural-philosophical Aspects of International Cooperation. Lecture held before the Royal Scientific Society, Amman-Jordan* [1974]. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1978, esp. chapter III: “In search for what is common to all systems.”

³ Group of Eminent Persons appointed by the United Nations Secretary-General on the occasion of the United Nations Year of Dialogue among Civilizations, *Executive Summary, loc. cit.*

¹ For the socio-cultural and political implications see Hans Köchler, “The New Social Media and the Changing Nature of Communication: Anthropological and Political Implications,” in: *News and Views: The Journal of the International Academy for Philosophy (New Series)*, Vol. 4, No. 2–3 (32–33) (2012), p. 42–64.

between social and cultural groups within and between regions is further reinforced by the uncontrolled dynamic of conflicts of interests, disputes over sovereignty issues, economic rights, etc., in an ever more complex interrelation of domestic, regional and global developments. Though issues of cultural or civilizational identity are often not the primary cause of such confrontations, they are frequently being used as *vehicle* of such conflicts, thus functioning like a magnifying glass. The social upheavals commonly referred to as “Arab Spring” are again evidence of this trend.

At the same time, somewhat juxtaposed to this conflictual context, culture or civilization are being cherished as tools, or measures of last resort, to counter what many people describe as *loss of social identity* resulting from globalization and the related trend towards uniformity.

With regard to *civilizational identity*, one can discern two mutually reinforcing tendencies:

Civilizational identity is being reasserted to compensate for what many perceive as a loss of, or threat to, their social identity resulting from the trend towards the uniformity of lifestyles brought about by globalization.

At the same time, issues of civilizational identity are being exploited to serve as justification for a country’s – or people’s – self-assertion in connection with political disputes, conflicts of economic interests, etc., that were initially triggered by the respective actors’ desire not only for self-preservation, but a tendency to increase their power over that of the competitors. This is the “ideological” aspect of globalization, so to speak.

The *structural dynamic* of globalization may be a factor in overcoming such confrontations although, in certain respects, it may, as hinted earlier, itself generate conflicts according to the *actio-reactio* scheme of civilizational self-assertion. (This would mean that the trend towards global uniformity is countered by increased emphasis on a specific culture or civilization.) On a sustainable basis, however, the only antidote to a looming “clash of civilizations” on the global level will be a policy informed by *enlightenment* in a genuine philosophical sense. Only this will foster mutual awareness of and appreciation for each other’s civilization that is at the roots of a systematic and comprehensive *policy of dialogue*, supported by all members of the international community. The General Assembly of the United Nations has aptly described this basic requirement of global peace as “a process *between* and *within* civilizations, founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple perspectives through dialogue.”¹

A civilization will only reach maturity if it engages in *genuine* (as distinct from opportunistic, politically expedi-

ent) dialogue, that is, if it is able to relate itself to other civilizations and to interact with them in a *productive* manner and on the basis of *mutuality*. In conformity with the *dialectical* nature of human consciousness, a civilization can only fully comprehend, and thus define, itself by setting its parameters in distinction from, though not rejection of, the *alter ego* of co-existing civilizations.²

By this way alone will the members of the “civilizational community” become immune against the manifold adversarial stereotypes that are being propagated by those who seek advantage over their competitors in the global struggle for economic and political influence. *Mutual respect* among civilizations embodies the *true Enlightenment*, which is not merely the legacy of 18th century Europe, but has been part of universal history comprising *all* civilizations and religions. If at all, it is due to this attitude that the foundations of “perpetual peace” in the meaning expounded in Immanuel Kant’s classical essay³ may be established.

It is reasonable to assume that the *knowledge* of and *tolerance* towards other civilizations, resulting from the former, will make it less likely that “perception does become reality” – so that the paradigm of the clash of civilizations will be confined to the realm of *ideological constructs* where it originally belongs. This doctrine, being itself an offspring of the ideological strife of earlier decades, runs not only counter to the full realization of each nation’s cultural potential; in the meantime, it has widely been used in political controversies on the domestic and regional levels, and it is being instrumentalized for the sake of the ongoing global power struggle that was triggered by the sudden collapse of the bipolar system.

In the “globalized” environment of the 21st century, the dialogue among civilizations has become the most important *desideratum* of world peace. In view of the destructive capabilities amassed not only by the traditional competitors for global power, the states, but also by non-state actors, it has rapidly become an issue of collective survival. Civilizational dialogue embodies the very norms governing the relations between nations that, in a previous era and in a different context of ideological rivalry, were represented by the doctrine of *peaceful co-existence among nations*.

It is the noble duty of philosophy to expound the *common system* of values that are shared by all civilizations and the recognition of which is the indispensable condition for every civilization’s existence and self-realization on the basis of mutual respect. No one can live in peace unless he accepts the *reciprocity* of the right to express his cultural identity without interference or intimidation. It is the simple *value of mutuality* that is at the roots of a sustainable dialogue between civilizations and, subsequently, a just and stable global order.

¹ Loc. cit. (emphasis H.K.), fn. 3. – See also Hans Köchler, “Unity in Diversity: The Integrative Approach to Intercultural Relations,” in: *UN Chronicle*, Vol. XLIX, No. 3 (2012), p. 7–10.

² For details see the author’s paper *Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue*, loc. cit. – For the implications in terms of the theory of consciousness see Hans Köchler, *Die Subjekt-Objekt-Dialektik in der transzendentalen Phänomenologie: Das Seinsproblem zwischen Idealismus und Realismus*. (Monographien zur philosophischen Forschung, Vol. 112.) Meisenheim a. G.: Anton Hain, 1974.

³ Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf* [1795]. Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1992. English edition: *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay*. Translated with an introduction and notes by M. Campbell Smith. Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1992.

A. B. Kudelin¹

FROM THE HISTORY OF ISLAMIC-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE (‘Abrahamic’ monotheism in the interpretations of medieval muslim theologians)

In 1896, the Russian religious philosopher V.S. Solovyev published an essay ‘Muhammad, His Life and Religious Teaching’, in which he, as one of the researchers stated, ‘tried to find deep reasons for the restoration of the spiritual unity of the Abrahamic religions’. [1] In this respect, I’d like to recall the basic ideas of Solovyev.

In his essay, in particular, in Chapter V ‘The essence of Islam. Faith of Abraham. Relation to other monotheistic religions’, the Russian thinker underlines that Muhammad, relying on ‘God’s word’ condemns ‘any exceptional religious nature’ and requires ‘equal recognition of all historically different manifestations of true religion’: ‘Say (O Muslims), we believe in Allah and that which has been sent down to us and that which has been sent down to Ibrahim (Abraham), Isma’il (Ishmael), Ishaque (Isaac), Ya’qub (Jacob), and to Al-Asbat (the twelve sons of Ya’qub (Jacob)), and that which has been given to Musa (Moses) and ‘Iesa (Jesus), and that which has been given to the Prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and to Him we have submitted (in Islam).’ (Quran, sura III, 78). [2]

V.S. Solovyev continues his thought that according to the Quran, in Islam ‘a very special meaning was given to the father of all believers, Abraham’ because ‘his name connected the new religion with other ‘peoples from the Writings’ contemporary to Muhammad, that is, Christians, Jews, Sabians’. V.S. Solovyev emphasizes that by preaching the truth of monotheism to the Arabs, the Quran claims Abraham as a ‘representative of the ancient truth’ rather than Ishmael: ‘Abraham was not a national prophet, he was not sent deliberately to the Arabs; they honoured him along with other nations, with the Jews and Christians’. The Russian philosopher also emphasizes the importance of the two following issues in the Muslim concept of ‘Abrahamic’ monotheism. 1. ‘Abraham is not placed in the range of other prophets, and his religion is not recognized as one of the equal forms of monotheism, but rather it is treated as an absolute norm for other monotheistic religions.’ 2. ‘Muhammad never considered teachings of the Quran as the highest stage of religious development; he recognized the superiority of this doctrine alongside with the faith of Abraham, as they undoubtedly show identical features, and he recognized this superiority not because the Quran possesses completeness or the highest development of religious truth, but only because this truth remains its original purity and simplicity in the Quran’. [3]

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Solovyev’s essay ‘Muhammad’ that manifested the evolution of his views on ‘development of Christian ideas about Islam’, [4] had been preceded by an extensive preparatory work on studying Islamic works and European translations of the Quran. The list of works on the topic that the Russian thinker was greatly concerned with does not have any research on the books of medieval Muslim scholars that would give the Islamic interpretation of the ‘Abrahamic’ monotheism. [5] Such studies did not exist at that time. Meanwhile, the position of Muslim theologians in this case is undoubtedly important. Let us try to partially fill in this gap.

Many of the essential elements of the ‘Abrahamic monotheism’ concept are explained by Muslim theologians in interpretation of elements of the ‘miraculous’ in various medieval volumes about the prophet Muhammad. I would like to refer to the ‘Life of the Prophet’ (al-Sira al-Nabawiyya) by the two authors Ibn Ishaq (d. 767) and Ibn Hesham (d. 833 or 828).

The ‘Life of the Prophet’ contains, at our estimates, more than 120 episodes with elements of the miraculous. Quite naturally, a considerable part of the miraculous elements in ‘The Sira’ has a direct relationship to the head of the Muslim community. Let us consider a few episodes of Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Hesham’s work.

The first two tells us about a miraculous ability of the Prophet of Islam to know by the will of Allah about such events of the past and future that a mere mortal can not know.

The first episode depicts conversion to Islam of Umayr ibn Wahb, a bitter rival of Muhammad, or more precisely, it describes the miraculous circumstances which made the latter consider the idea of becoming a Muslim.

The son of ‘Umayr ibn Wahb was taken prisoner by Muslims in the battle at Badr. Soon after the battle he told the following in a conversation with another Meccan Safwan b. Umayya: ‘If it weren’t for the debt that I can’t pay back, and if it weren’t for the children that I’m afraid would die without me, I swear to Allah that I would go and kill Muhammad. I even have a reason to do it – my son is held captive there’. Safwan answered him: ‘I take your debt and I will pay it for you. You children will be like my own children. I will take care of them and they will have everything that I have’.

On this condition ‘Umayr agreed to go to Madina and the companions decided to keep their arrangement in secret.

In Madina an armed and dangerous ‘enemy of Allah’ seeking a meeting with the Prophet rose suspicion of the Muslims, but Muhammad ordered to let ‘Umayr approach him.

On hearing that ‘Umayr exclaimed: ‘I witness that you are Allah’s messenger. Messenger of Allah, we thought that the word from heaven that you told us and the revelations that came to you were lie, however, during that conversation there were only two of us – Safwan and I. I swear to Allah, only Allah could tell you what we were

talking about. Praise be to Allah, who set me on the path of righteousness by converting to Islam and showed me the witness of truth'.

In the second episode the Prophet of Islam can see visions, thus, showing a miraculous ability to foresee actions of people in future. Suhayl ibn 'Amr, who had caused a lot of troubles to the Muslims before, was among the imprisoned in the battle at Badr. The winners agreed to keep his life because of a rich ransom, but to avoid possible troubles in future 'Umar ibn al-Khattab made the following proposal to the Prophet: Messenger of Allah! Let me pull out two front teeth of Suhayl inb 'Amr. His tongue will be falling out and he will never be able to talk against you at the meetings. [7]

The Prophet of Islam disagrees with his closest companion knowing that Suhayl is under high protection for the pieties that will be accomplished by him in future. Indeed, in the end of 'Life' after the description of Muhammad's death Suhayl stood up against 'polytheists' being converted to Islam by that time. [8]

A miraculous ability to know things that are hidden from ordinary people is one of the elements of Muhammad's hagiographical portrait. The third episode describing the Prophet's miraculous deed contributes to this portrait. This deed demonstrates to the true believers the ability of the Prophet to perform miracles: by the will of Allah the Prophet turns a wooden pole in the hands of a valiant Muslim soldier into a smashing sword. [9]

Other chapters of Sira also include descriptions of miracles performed by the Prophet. Let us mention just several examples. In the course of a battle known as 'The Battle of the Trench' (627) the Muslims dug a trench 6 km long in quite a short time period to protect Madina from the Meccans. When digging, the Muslims dashed against a large rock that could not be cut into pieces. The Prophet of Islam said a prayer to Allah and poured a bucket of water onto the rock turning it into sand dunes. During those days in the presence of Muhammad a handful of dates and, then, a roasted lamb multiply into an abundant meal helping to restore many Muslims exhausted after long hours of digging. [10]

At least twice during war campaigns (Hudaybiyya 628, Tabuk, 630) the Prophet provides soldiers with water in a miraculous way according to Sira [11].

Without any doubts miracles in 'Life of the Prophet' aimed at glorifying Islam and actions of the Muslim community leader attributing to them special meaning of sacred historical events. At the same time inquisitive minds called for sophisticated theoretical conceptions of a prophetic miracle in view of interpreting these episodes as acts of Divine Providence.

It is worth mentioning that medieval Muslim scholars had no uniform concept of miracle. Without openly disputing traditionally accepted miracles performed by Muhammad one group of theologians nevertheless un-ambiguously declared that Muhammad performed no miracles at Allah's will, the only miracle related to him being the Quran. Another group of scientists developed theoretical grounds to support an opposite point of view. Beginning with the 11th century scholars of this group started to combine stories about miracles in the Prophet's life into narratives of hagiographical genre (*dala'il*, a 'lam or *amarat al-nubuwwa*, literally meaning: 'signs, indications of Prophecy').

Overview of the first group position can be found in the book 'Perfection in Quranic Sciences' by a renowned and prolific scholar Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti (1445–1505).

Al-Suyuti gives the following definition to a miracle: 'Know, that a miracle (*mu'jiza*) is something raising above the limits of ordinary (*amrun harikun li al-'add*) containing a challenge, but impossible to compete with (*salimun 'an al-mu'arada*). It can be perceived with senses or with mind' [12] The scholar refers to the following hadith: 'The Prophet, may the prayers and peace of God be upon him, told: 'Each Prophet got something corresponding to him that people believed in. I came with a revelation that Allah sent to me and I hope that I will have more followers than other prophets.' [13] Then, two possible interpretations of this hadith are discussed: 'They said that this phrase meant the following: 'Miraculous deeds of other prophets did not outlive their time and only the contemporaries eye-witnessed them. The miracle of the Quran will last till the Resurrection Day. The Quran style, eloquence and its message about the sacred go far beyond the limits of the ordinary...' They also said: 'The thing is that obvious miracles of the past were perceived with senses. One could see them with the eyes... Miracles of the Quran can be perceived with spiritual vision... That is why it will have more followers, as what is seen with the eyes will not outlive the observers, while what is seen with mind vision is open to anybody, who will come after the first witnesses, whenever it happens.' [14]

Thus, according to al-Suyuti, a miracle as 'something raising above the limits of ordinary' is characteristic of all prophets. However, the miracle of Muhammad is 'perceived with mind' and not 'with senses' as is the case with other prophets. That is why it 'will live till the Day of Resurrection' and will attract more followers than other prophetic miracles.

In the end of his theoretical conception al-Suyuti argues that the scripture sent to the Prophet of Islam is already a sufficient sign that makes further miracles unnecessary: And the Almighty said: 'They say, 'Why have signs (*ayat*) not been sent down upon him from his Lord?' Say: 'The signs (*ayat*) are only with God, and I am only a plain wamer. What, is it not sufficient for them that We have sent down upon thee the Book that is recited to them?'" (Quran, sura XXIX, 50–51). By these words He proclaimed that the Scripture belongs to His signs, that the testimony of the Scripture is all-sufficient and that it substitutes the miracles and signs of other prophets. [15]

In his work al-Suyuti summed up findings of the relevant Muslim research of a long time period. Many of the ideas had been expressed long before him, which he repeatedly mentions in the 'Perfection in Quranic Sciences'. Divergence in interpretation of certain provisions makes no essential difference for us. [16] Most important is that the followers of this viewpoint build a certain hierarchy of prophets with their miracles and placing Muhammad on top of it, one way or another they recognize the Quran as the main, if not the only miracle of the Prophet of Islam. [17]

Let us consider the position of their opponents now. The most famous works about the miracles performed by the Prophet belong to 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Hamadham (d. 1025), Abu Nua'ym al-Isfahanl (d. 1038), al-Mawardl (d. 1058) and Ahmad ibn Husayn al-Bayhaql (d. 1066). In works of

Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328) some essential provisions of the second group viewpoint are generalized.

Taking into account that in the course of time this approach underwent many changes we will mention only the landmarks of its formation.

In the work 'A 'lam al-nubuwwa' ('Indications of Prophecy') by a renowned Shaft'i faqih al-Mawardi [18] we find a description of two groups of miracles: the first includes only the Quran, the second contains other miracles performed by Muhammad at Allah's will.

Al-Mawardi characterizes the Quran as the first miracle (mu'jiza), with the help of which the Allah called Muhammad to prophecy. Unique characteristics of Quran (inimitableness) single Muhammad out among other messengers making the Quran the most evident of all miracles (ayat) of the Almighty.

Then, al-Mawardi develops his idea. Miracles performed by any messenger totally corresponded to the idea of miracle in people's minds at that time. Being sent with a mission in the epoch of thaumaturgy dominance, Musa put all magicians to shame with his miracle of dividing the Red Sea and turning his staff into a snake. 'Isa was sent in the epoch of medicine dominance and by curing incurable patients and resurrection of the dead he amazed all doctors. When in the epoch of eloquence Muhammad was granted the Quran, neither pompous orators, nor poets could compete with him.'

Concluding remarks of al-Mawardi are rather close to those of al-Suyuti. the miracle of Quran will be more enduring and will find more followers than the eye-witnessed miracles that stayed in the past. Having a greater persuasive power the Quran takes the first place among other miracles [18].

However, as the author of 'Indications of Prophecy' unfolds his viewpoint, it significantly departs from that of theologians making a hierarchy of miracles 'perceived with senses and with mind'. After considering indications of the Quran inimitableness [19] al-Mawardi turns to detail enumeration of actions and events related to Muhammad. Here we find already mentioned events during preparation to 'The Battle of the Trench' with a reference to al-Bukhari (810–870) one of the most renowned sunni hadith collectors), namely, getting over an obstacle in the form of a rock, multiplying small quantities of food for as many as 600 or 800 diggers. Al-Mawardi noted that the latter 'could be compared to 'Isa's miracle with food.' [20] We also find mentioning other miraculous events like finding water in the desert. The author of 'Indications of Prophecy' points out again that Muhammad's miraculous actions here resemble those of Musa. [21]

Al-Mawardi also compares Muhammad to Musa in the story about a miracle that took place during the campaign to conquer the oasis of Khaybar (628). According to 'Abi Talib's witness that underlies the story, in a critical moment the Muslims found themselves in front of a wadi with turbulent torrents pulling out trees with their roots and shaking the mountains. The Muslims measured the depth of the river that equaled 14 man's heights. The Prophet prayed and told: 'Go in the name of Allah.' The Muslim soldiers with horses and camels crossed the wadi and won the battle. Al-Mawardi finds this event similar to Musa's division of the sea. [22]

Let us mention two more cases, where al-Mawardi insists on resemblance between Muhammad and 'Isa. In the

first case the Prophet of Islam rose a girl from the dead, in the second – cured a leper. [23]

Giving an account of Muhammad's miracles, the author of 'Indications of Prophecy' repeatedly emphasizes that such actions can be performed at the will of Allah only by a prophet. Particularly, he mentions that once people came to Muhammad complaining about poor water and the Prophet of Islam made it good for drinking. When they turned with the same request to a false prophet Musaylima, the source immediately filled with bitter water resembling ass's urine. In another case a woman brought to the Prophet a boy who was losing his hair. Muhammad put his hand on the boy's head and healthy hair started to grow there. Musaylima tried to do the same thing, but the boy, whose head he touched, turned bald. [24]

The above mentioned examples allow us to make an important conclusion. In relation to the Quran al-Mawardi contraposes Muhammad to the previous prophets emphasizing that the miracle of the Muslim Sacred Scripture is preferred to short-lived miracles of Musa and 'Isa. However, in the stories about miraculous actions performed by the Prophet of Islam the author of 'Indications of Prophecy' singles out in every possible way their similarity to miracles of Musa and 'Isa. Al-Mawardi uses a new context to do justice to the eye-witnessed short-lived miracle. In other words, Muhammad is not different from Musa and 'Isa being neither inferior nor superior to those prophets.

Examination of all Muhammad's miracles recorded by the tradition clearly showed an antinomy (equality – inequality) in the hierarchy of prophets and their miracles by al-Mawardi. The defects of al-Mawardi's approach and inconsistent juxtaposition of Musa and 'Isa to Muhammad, all the three figures being prophets of the so-called Abrahamic monotheism [25] were eliminated in the work *Kitab al-Nubuwwal* ('The Book of Prophecies') by a renowned Hanbali scholar Ahmad b. Taymiyya. [26] Without claiming to give an exhaustive analysis of this significant and multiple-aspect composition, we will briefly characterize it in relation to the present research.

First of all Ibn Taymiyya tries to give a definition to the notion of 'miracle' stating that 'a prophetic miracle should raise above the limits of the ordinary in the sense that it is an extraordinary event for common people'. However, according to Ibn Taymiyya, it would be wrong to see a miracle in any extraordinary phenomenon. Soothsayers (kahins), magicians, doctors, astrologists, theologians, and grammarians know and perform things that are more than ordinary practices. For instance, people will be amazed at an astrologer predicting the time of solar or lunar eclipse as they do not possess the same knowledge, but still there is no prophetic miracle in this event. In the same way monumental work 'The Book' by a great grammarian Sibawayhi (8th century), Hippocrates' knowledge in medicine, erudition of a renowned Muslim scholar surpassing the abilities of common people, will not indicate their prophecy. Here we are talking only about high degree of professionalism in a certain field of human activity that can be attained by other people with the same kind of professional training. In contrast to the abovementioned examples one of the main characteristics of prophetic miracle is that 'all humankind apart from prophets' can not 'compete' with it.

Asserting that miracles can be performed and repeated only by prophets, Ibn Taymiyya draws another clear distinc-

tion between prophetic miracles and magic actions of false prophets and magicians. Magic of the latter only has an appearance of a miracle. On the contrary, miracles of prophets and messengers have little to do with magic despite speculations of their detractors. [27]

Then, Ibn Taymiyya compares miracles performed by the prophets of Abrahamic monotheism. We realize that in certain respects al-Mawardi places the Quran higher than Musa and 'Isa's miracles. The author of 'The Book of Prophecies' assumes a different position that allows him to overcome the weak point of al-Mawardi antinomian conception that claimed the prophets to be simultaneously equal and non-equal in relation to the performed miracles.

Ibn Taymiyya takes the following statement as an initial point in his conception: 'Miracle of any of the prophets is a miracle for all prophets'. In other words, if a prophet performed a miracle at Allah's will, then other prophets (here we speak only about the prophets of Abrahamic monotheism) are allowed to perform a similar miracle. For instance, a miracle of resurrection was a distinctive feature of the prophets before Muhammad as well as of the prophetic mission of Muhammad himself. [28] In an analogous way Ibn Taymiyya turns to the discussion of miraculous inimitableness of the Quran from the retrospective viewpoint of his conception of prophetic miracle.

The Quran as a sacred scripture is indeed inimitable in many respects and any attempt to imitate it is condemned to failure. However, this statement refers to ordinary people and ordinary texts. It is inconsistent in relation to the prophets of Abrahamic monotheism that are also called 'prophets of the Scripture'. [29] Being Sacred Scriptures the Tawrat, the Injil and the Zabur are also unique, but this circumstance cannot impair the Muslims, since it is evident that the prophets of Abrahamic monotheism can be equally involved and actually were involved in performing miracles including that of the Sacred Scripture. According to Ibn Taymiyya the Tawrat, the Injil and the Zabur constitute a miracle from the viewpoint of sacred information they contain. The miraculous status of these scriptures as compared to the Quran can be questioned in terms of nazm, i.e., certain features of language constructions used. [30] However, even in this case before making such conclusion about the Tawrat, for example, one should consult with the connoisseurs of Hebrew (ahl al-lugha al-Hbraniyya) and conduct considerable research. In other respects the abovementioned scriptures of the prophets without any doubt present a miracle. To fully convince his potential opponents Ibn Taymiyya brings forward the last argument that hardly any Muslim would dare to call in question. These scriptures constitute a miracle already for the reason that at the will of the Almighty they predict Muhammad's prophecy long before he started to perform his mission: 'miracles performed by Musa, 'Isa and others actually indicate Muhammad's prophecy as they help other prophets to notify Muhammad of his prophecy'.

Final discussion leads Ibn Taymiyya to an important conclusion that preferences make no sense, when we consider miracles performed by prophets of Abrahamic monotheism or 'prophets of the Scripture'. The author of 'The Book of Prophecies' sums up his arguments in the following statement: Our purpose here is not to show preference to one prophets among others (tafdil ba'd al-anbiya' 'ala ba'd), but to emphasize that prophets differ from other peo-

ple by a unique ability to perform miracles, which serves as an evidence of their prophecy for reasonable people. [31]

Ibn Taymiyya was probably the most important figure in the second group of theologians, who in the course of time created a theoretically valid and consistent conception of prophetic miracle based on Islamic ideas of 'Abrahamic' monotheism. In our opinion, it is in the light of this conception that for a long time educated Muslims have been interpreting numerous miraculous elements in 'Life of the Prophet'. And it is these fundamental Islamic concepts of 'Abrahamic' monotheism comprehensively and accurately were described by the Russian religious philosopher V.S. Solovyev. And they have always been one of the main foundations of constructive Islamic-Christian dialogue.

References

1. Zhuravsky A.V. Christianity and Islam: social and cultural problems of dialogue. Moscow, 1990. P. 43.
2. To verify how accurate the basis for Solovyev's ideas was, let us quote from the Quran in the universally accepted modern translation by the academician I.Yu. Krachkovsky: 'Say: 'We believe in Allah and in what has been revealed to us and revealed to Abraham, and Isma'il and Ishaq, and 'Isa and to the prophets from their Lord. We make no distinction between any of them, and unto Him we surrender.' (Quran. Trans. and comm. I.Y. Krachkovsky. 2nd edition. Moscow, 1986).
3. Solovev V.S. Muhammad. His life and religious teaching. St. Petersburg, 1902. P. 26-34, etc. Detailed characteristics of V.S. Solovyov's views on this issue see: Zhuravsky A.V. Christianity and Islam... P. 43-46.
4. Thus, the first approach to the topic was the publication by Solovyev 'Three Powers' (1877) (see: A.V. Zhuravsky Christianity and Islam ... P. 43, 45, etc.).
5. V.S. Soloviev. Muhammad... P. 5-6.
6. Das Leben Muhammads nach Muhammed Ibn Ishak bearbeitet von Abd el-Malik Ibn Hischam, herausgegeben von F. Wustenfild (Göttingen, 1858-1860), i, S. 449-50. Translated from Arabic by A. B. Kudelin and D. V. Frolov.
7. Ibid. P. 462-463. Translated from Arabic by A. B. Kudelin and D. V. Frolov.
8. Ibid. P. 10-22.
9. Ibid. P. 452.
10. Ibid. P. 671-672.
11. Ibid. P. 742, 904.
12. Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti. Al-Itkan fi 'Ulum al-Quran. Volume 1-2. Ed. 4th. Cairo, 1978 (hereinafter: Itkan). V. 2. P. 148. Hereinafter the quotes from al-Suyuti are given following the Russian translation by D. V. Frolov from: As-Suyuti Djalal ad-Din, 'Perfection in Quranic Science' (hereinafter Al-Suyuti Jalal ad-Din, 'Perfection'. Issue V: Doctrine on Inimitableness of the Quran) (Moscow, 2006). P. 15.
13. Itkan, v. 2. S. 149; Perfection ... issue 5. P. 15.
14. Itkan, v. 2. S. 149; Perfection ... issue 5. P. 15-16.
15. Itkan, v. 2. S. 149; Perfection ... issue 5. P. 16.
16. In particular, similar to al-Suyuti, the thought about the miracle of the Quran as of something well-known are given by al-Marzouqi (d. 1030) not in theological, but rather in philological context upon clarifying the advantages of prose before poetry: 'Miracles of the prophets - let there be peace on them - in their time were kind of what their communities were passionate about in their time... Such was the miracle of Musa (Moses) - let there be peace on him - because came to him at the of witchcraft and magicians, and it was such a miracle and the most significant in it. And the same was situation with Isa (Jesus) - let there be peace on him - because it was the period of medicine, and therefore his miracle, namely, the resurrection of the dead, was this kind and the most significant in it. And when the time of the Prophet - may Al-

lah bless him and welcome – the time of eloquence and clear comprehension, Allah made his miracle of what people were passionate about, and the most significant in this way, and he surpassed everyone in the Quran prosaic speech, rather than metric poetry' (Sharh 'Diwan al-Hamas' li Abi 'Ali Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn al-Hasan al-Marzouqi /? -421 A.D./, V. 1–4. Cairo, 1951–1954. V. 1. P. 19 [second pagination]. Translation by: A.B. Kudelin. Term 'pillar of poetry' in medieval Arabic criticism [Commentary of al-Marzouqi to 'Divan of Valor' by Abu Tammama]. – Monuments of literary thought of the East. Moscow 2004. P. 150). Without going into a detailed analysis of the above passage, we will note one of its important feature: the author in contrast to al-Suyuti gives no preference to any of the prophets.

17. In the last assertion they rely on the text of Islam, which does not recognize the miracles of Muhammad, but special emphasis is placed on his 'signs' (ayat), which are understood as the fact of revelation of verses of the Quran to him (which later became known as the ayats) (for details see: Wensinck AJ Mu'djiza. EI; cf.: Knish A.D. Mu'djiza. – Islam: Collegiate Dictionary. Moscow, 1991. p. 168). Idealization of this point of view often leads to too categorical and far-reaching, therefore not always accurate, conclusions. As an illustrative example, we can mention the work of famous art critic R. Ettinghausen. Relying on the provision according to which Muhammad is treated in the Quran as an ordinary man chosen by God to convey his message to the earth, the scholar claims that the Prophet of Islam 'never pretended to be a supernatural miracle worker or the owner of supernatural abilities', which was, ultimately, reflected in Islamic Art (Ettinghausen R. La Peinture arabe. Genève, 197. P. 13).

18. Abu al-Hasan 'Ali ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi. A'lam en nubuvva (Signs of prophecy). Beirut, 1989. P. 73–74.

19. Ibid. P. 74–91.

20. Ibid. P. 103–104.

21. Ibid. P. 106 etc.

22. Ibid. P. 107.

23. Ibid. P. 107–108.

24. Ibid. P. 106–107.

25. For more details see: Gainutdinova A. Images of prophets in the Quran. Moscow, 2002. P. 81–141; Gainutdinova A.R. Prophetology of Quran: stories of the prophets as part of construction of the Quranic text. Synopsis of thesis candidate of Philology. Moscow, 2008. P. 8, 19, 22, etc.

26. Ibn Taymiyyah, along with al-Ghazali (d. 505/1111) and Ibn al-'Arabi (d. 638/1240), belongs to the number of the medieval thinkers who had the greatest impact on contemporary Islam. His idea gained new impetus in the 18th century.

27. Ibn Taymiyyah. Kitab al-nubuwwat (The Book of Prophecies). Beirut, 1985. P. 5–7, 19–23, 35, 47, 309, etc.

28. Ibid. P. 154.

29. See: A. Gainutdinova Images of the prophets in the Quran. P. 81–141.

30. On the theory of Nazm see details in: A.B. Kudelin Medieval Arab Poetics (second half of the 8th – 9th century). Moscow, 1983. P. 153–155.

31. Ibn Taymiyya. Op. cit. P. 164–166. It is important to emphasize one more time that we are considering the prophets of Abrahamic monotheism or 'prophets of the scripture'. In other cases, according to Ibn Taymiyya one should follow the conception of hierarchy of prophets and their miracles, since the Allah has showed preference to one prophets before others (faddala ba'da al-nabiyyin 'aid b'ad), that is why only the superior (al-fadil) should be distinguished by an ability to perform actions that the inferior (al-mafdul) is unable to perform. (Ibid. P. 327–9).

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HUMANISM IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

The ideal of humanism that has been drafted and cherished in European culture for centuries, the ideal that major philosophers, writers and social thinkers agreed upon and justified, and that seemed inseparable from the very conception of man, faces a serious challenge today.

The unprecedented growth of new technologies, shattering the very foundations of the human 'life-world', these technologies escaping from human control; the global spread of the market economy, based on considerations of economic efficiency and rejecting any sentiment ('nothing personal'); exacerbation of inter-civilizational relations,

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which is expressed among other things in the growth of international terrorism; all of these can lead to the idea that today the discourse of humanism has no relation to the current reality, that it's just a kind of rhetoric that does not help understand the current situation, but leads away from this understanding. But on the other hand, modern life also has something else in store. This is the growth of social movements that appeal to human rights (being an unquestionable expression of humanism), to respect for human dignity, to freedom of self-realization and self-expression (these are the slogans proclaimed today by members of various kinds of youth movements). But it is also understanding that it is necessary to place the new technologies under special humanitarian expertise. It is, finally, the existence of a number of the so-called 'Humane societies' that publish their journals, organize conferences, and recruit scientists, philosophers and artists.

So how do you relate to the ideal of humanism? Should it be discarded or retained? If it must be discarded, what interpretation of human and inter-human relationships can replace it? If we are talking about retaining it, can we continue to cultivate this ideal unchanged or does it need modifying? In other words, how do we treat one of the oldest traditions and values of the European culture? Is it outdated in the current situation or not? And how do we treat the

ideal of humanism in the context of the modern inter-civilizational relations?

This ideal was formulated in a certain form and at a certain time. This happened during the European Renaissance. At the same time, the first humanists relied on some of the traditions of ancient philosophy. Humanism as an ideal implies valuing individual human life, recognizing the dignity and freedom of the human being, the opportunity and the need for self-improvement of man. In other words, it is faith in man and his ability, i.e. this is a secular ideal. Although the first humanists were Christian, religion from their point of view does not bind man and does not deprive him of autonomy (though many religious thinkers criticize humanism, as from their point of view it is incompatible with a religious faith; however, nowadays there is also 'Christian humanism', although most modern humanists see their humanism as being identical with atheism).

However, initially, behind the very ideal of humanism there were opportunities of interpreting it in a way, which, when put into effect, took it beyond its own scope, i.e. came into antagonism with the ideological position which they seemed to originate from. Nowadays, it has become particularly clear.

For example, such a major feature of humanism, as the value of every human life and every culture. From the standpoint of humanism all people, regardless of their abilities, talents and accomplishments are of equal dignity and have equal rights to be respected and to develop themselves. Of course, it is good if a person can improve themselves and reach heights in the process. But even the one who for certain natural, social or cultural reasons is not capable of it, deserves recognition. The one who finds themselves in a tight life situation deserves compassion. Russian classical literature is a gospel of compassion for the 'little man', a gospel preaching love for all those humiliated and insulted. And this, of course, is an internationally recognized humanism inherent in it.

Today this kind of humanism is embodied in the famous 'Declaration of Human Rights', adopted by the United Nations in 1949 and recognizing that each person has certain inalienable rights: the right for health, safety, education, freedom of expression, a decent life, etc. After 1949 a number of international organizations (in particular, the European Community) adopted documents which supplemented the list of individual and group, civil, social and cultural human rights. So it's not about what heights this or that person has achieved in his development, or what position he holds. It's not about arranging different cultures into a certain scale in terms of their level of development interpreted in one way or another – though a person has an individual identity due to the fact that he belongs to a particular culture. Every person and every culture has the right to be respected and protected.

It is all of utmost importance. There is no doubt that the adoption of the 'Declaration of Human Rights' was a major milestone in the social and cultural history of the mankind and in the history of implementation of humanistic ideals.

But this raises difficult problems.

First of all, it is necessary to pay attention to the fact that under the present circumstances, when different cultures have begun to interact closely with one another and sometimes to clash with one another (there has always been an interaction of different cultures, but today, under globali-

zation, the level of this interaction is particularly high, and the degree of interaction is of particular intensity), it becomes clear that between different rights there are uneasy relationships: exercising some of them in some cases entails violating others. For example, an individual's right for freedom of movement may come into conflict with the right of a culture to be protected – this circumstance in particular caused serious problems in today's Europe. In this case, the humanistic ideal by itself does not define a particular way of solving a life problem. And the problem is extremely acute: a person does not exist outside a culture, and the destruction of a culture is also the end of a certain type of person.

Here is another problem associated with this.

In England, France, Germany, the United States and in other countries of the Western culture there exist today sustainable communities of representatives of non-European cultures, whose ideas of human rights and humanism are quite different from the ones generally accepted in the countries of their current residence. According to the ideas of tolerance that are prevalent today (it is believed that tolerance is the realization of one of the important aspects of the humanist ideal) these values, though being different from the Western system of values, must be respected. But does this mean that in a number of cases while relying on humanistic considerations, we have to respect non-humane values?

Until recently, it was recognized that the practices of relationship between people of different cultures living together should rely on the principle of multiculturalism. One of the common interpretations of it is as follows.

A different culture should be respected, but it is impossible to understand it from the outside and to interact with it. According to this interpretation cultures are incommensurable. Different cultures are not in contact with one another, since they exist in kind of different worlds. However, there is no privileged system of beliefs and values. The only exception is the idea that all human beings regardless of race, gender and ethnicity have the same right for physical life and cultural development.

This interpretation corresponds to certain practices. People belonging to a culture that is different from the culture of their country of residence, in fact live in a kind of cultural ghetto. Formally, they have the same rights as all other citizens of this country. But in fact, they cannot exercise these rights, as they are not recognized by the dominant culture, they are not integrated into it, and are not able to get the same education as members of the dominant culture, and therefore cannot occupy a decent position in society. So all this discourse of the respect for every culture and for people belonging to them in practice appears to be hypocrisy, varnishing a most non-humane situation. Such a situation, of course, cannot satisfy cultural ghetto dwellers, and they rebel against it, revolting at the same time against the culture of their host country. Simple coexistence of different cultures does not work. In practice, each culture tries to impose the system of cultural meanings and values upon others. It is no coincidence that recently the leaders of France and Germany admitted that multiculturalism in the form in which it was practised until recently, had failed. The idea of cultural relativism and the relativistic interpretation of humanism underlying the multiculturalism interpreted in this way, turned out to be ineffective. Moreover, in reality it denies the principles of humanism.

Then how do we treat humanism today? Does it make sense in today's world of violence, cruelty, shameless rationale, the conflict of different cultural meanings and values?

It is clear that the rejection of humanism in one form or another (whether in the form of the idea of 'trans-humanism' or as attempts to impose a single system of values and meanings as a universal one) leads to the collapse of both man and mankind. Today it has become more obvious than ever.

This does not mean that the ideal of humanism does not need a modern interpretation, which takes into account the realities of today and at the same time reveals the uneasy relationship between the different components of this ideal, making it possible for the inhumane consequences to appear while the intentions seem to be rather humane.

It must be said that historically a personality cult as an integral feature of the humanistic ideal was often interpreted in the spirit of autonomy and 'the self-enclosed nature' of an individual. This has been a characteristic feature of the European culture for several centuries, which influenced the development of philosophy and the human sciences; Jürgen Habermas believes that all the European philosophy of the Modern Age can be interpreted as philosophy of individual self-consciousness. Today it has become clear how flawed and even dangerous such an interpretation is. Man should be comprehended as a being necessarily included in the system of relations with others within the social and cultural communities and not as a being existing outside the system. And these relations are maintained not only from the standpoint of the rights of an individual, i.e. in terms of what others should do for him, but also in the context of his responsibilities to others and to one or another collective community, i.e. of what he should do for others.

Incidentally, this applies to the history of interpretation of human rights. When in 1949 'The Declaration of Human Rights' was adopted, the main emphasis was placed on individual rights. This emphasis was consistent with the European tradition of interpretation of such rights. But it soon became clear that the ideas of these rights in non-European cultures differ greatly from those that formed the basis of the 'Declaration'. In many cultures of such types responsibilities of a man to the state, to the family and to the elders are emphasized. These rights derive from their responsibilities: for instance, the rights of the elders to the younger ones as a consequence of the duties performed by the former for the latter, as well as the rights of the younger ones, stemming from the duties of the elders; responsibilities of citizens to the state and the resulting right to be protected by the state (i.e. the responsibilities of the state to its subjects), etc. However, the main feature of such ideas about the rights and responsibilities is associated with a different idea of a man, of his personality, his degree of autonomy and freedom, his involvement in the social structures, an idea that is distinct from the European tradition.

What conclusion do we make out of this fact?

The point is not that the way of involvement of the individual in the social structure, typical of non-European societies, should be recognized as a universal one. And not that the duties should always prevail over individual rights. Both should be combined. The case in reality is different: the case is that we should admit the important fact that not only an individual, but also those collective (social and cul-

tural) communities to which he belongs and without which he is impossible, need protecting. Understanding of this fact was reflected when a number of supplementary clauses to the 'Declaration' were adopted in 1949, which contained the conditions of the protection of collective rights of communities (to which the individual has duties).

There should also be made new accents in understanding freedom as an integral component of the humanist ideal. Achieving freedom used to be associated with overcoming external restrictions of human activities – restrictions imposed by the natural and social environment. This led, on the one hand, to the idea of the conquest of nature, its use in the interests of man, controlling the natural processes. But the same constructive and projective setting was also applied to social processes. It was believed that the 'humanization' of public relations was connected with their rationalization, which allowed controlling processes in the society and designing new forms of human relationships and even new types of people.

Today it is obvious that this kind of interpreting man and his attitude to nature and society leads to an impasse. The idea of 'conquering nature' has led to the environmental crisis; the idea of total rationalization of inter-human relations has caused the alienation of man from the state machine.

We have to admit that the relationship with nature should be based on the model of a peculiar dialogue (the idea of co-evolution of nature and society), and that the idea of multiculturalism can be meaningful only in case the relationship between different cultures is conceived not as a mere coexistence of collective communities which do not interact with one another, but as a dialogue conducted between them.

The peculiarity of the dialogue is that as a result the different cultures and the people involved in them are not conserved, do not freeze in their existing features, but can develop, i.e. change in certain respects. Respect for the other person and for another culture is expressed in the fact that they are not just accepted as a given reality, but are included in a lively dialogue.

The dialogue involves taking into account the point of view of the other party. This does not mean that the other's position should be accepted uncritically. What it means is that a different culture, a different system of values should not necessarily be seen as something hostile; it is possible to see something that can help solve some common problems. In such a dialogue not only individuals, but also cultures can develop their own self-identity.

The dialogue between different cultures is possible and can be fruitful in the context of solving certain practical problems and in terms of understanding these problems and ways of solving them with different values and beliefs about the world taken into account. Every culture has its own perspective in its attitude to this or that problem. Comparing these prospects is possible and fruitful. At the same time the ways of solving various common problems offered by different cultural perspectives can be not just distinct, but different from each other in terms of their fruitfulness in a certain situation. Besides, this fruitfulness can be evaluated in different ways under the conditions of the changing situation.

Interpersonal and intercultural dialogue is the most important feature of modern humanism.

I also want to focus on the fact that there is certain equilibrium, though sometimes fragile, between the components of the humanistic ideal. Cultivation of one of them at the expense of others can bring us beyond humanism.

For example, the values of freedom and equality. Not so long ago we wrote about the fact that the ideal of equality is out-of-date (at the same time blaming the Soviet government for the fact that it paid too much attention to equality), that the main thing for the development of human capabilities is freedom. But freedom presupposes equality of people in certain respects. This is, first of all, equality of everyone in the eyes of the law (equal rights), equality in the moral sense (there is no 'morality of masters' and 'morality of slaves'). Finally, people can develop freely only in a society in which there are equal starting conditions for social development. If one person is born into the family of an oligarch and another person has low-income parents, it is clear that the children will have different underlying social conditions of development. The former child can go to a good school and enter a prestigious university, and then occupy a privileged position in society, but the latter, even if he is no less talented or hardworking, will face great difficulties both in learning and in life. What freedom of development can we speak about in this case? But then again, such a society cannot be considered humane.

Certainly, equality must also be interpreted in a certain way: it should not hinder freedom. If it is put into practice by levelling everybody, providing no opportunities for individual and original development, it obviously will come into conflict with freedom and will lead to inhumane and even anti-humane consequences.

This also applies to other components of the humanistic ideal.

For instance, justice may conflict with compassion (the former can be rather brutal). The value of non-violence may be in conflict with the value of protecting the country and the people – and it involves the use of force. Development of social life does not reduce the number of problems but increases it; social life becomes more complex and risky. The problems that were solved before (or seemed resolved) arise again, and often in a more acute form. We must fully understand that at any given moment and under the given circumstances, the ideal of humanism may be put into practice only partially. A moral person assumes the responsibility for the inevitable partiality of its implementation. But focus on the humanistic ideal is the only possibility to save the human being and humanity, the only opportunity to build dialogue and partnership relations between different cultures.

V. K. Mamontov¹

THE PALE OF EURO-SETTLEMENT

Off, away from Russia did fraternal Ukraine mean to go. And it finished (did it finish?) in such a heart split, led to such tragic events that it forced us to think again: what are we, people who are not lucky enough to belong geographically to Old Europe, offered as European values? And might it be a trap – cynical, mercantile, hooking us with empty illusory future?

One of the most difficult experiences of my latest trip to Latvia was the Mark Rothko museum, a painter from Daugavpils, which was called Dvinsk before the Revolution. As a child, this master of the brush lived here, then his parents moved to America. The museum occupies a huge space in the former fortress armoury; the European Union allocated almost €6 million to create this museum. In the museum, you can sit in front of a wall depicting the view of Dvinsk of the early 20th century, focus a bizarre camera mounted in front of you – and send a photo to your email from outside the pale of settlement, a bitter and sad self-portrait, as if you lived in the native country, which extruded you. In America, Rothko committed suicide at the age of 66, it was in 1970, and now his paintings, most of which represent three or four colour stripes living separately on a canvas, are traded by the descendants for \$87 million a piece.

That day it was raining, Rothko's paintings made me absolutely depressed, I went along the ramparts, summing

up the impressions. They did not go together – like stripes on Rothko's canvases, as well as many other things in Latvia. In the country, which is a member of the European Union, there live 300,000 non-citizens of the country. They are the people who conquered fascism, and yet declared to be invaders; they faithfully pay taxes, but they are deprived of a number of most important civil rights. How is it that it is going on in civilized Europe? Is it absurd? But the EU turn a blind eye to it.

Here is another example. The official authorities of the Baltic States curse the Soviet past. But the only hope of a Balt, who goes to work in Europe (and even according to official data the number of such people accounts for more than a million), is the education, which he obtained in the USSR. And the skills that he gained, if he had a chance to do so, when working at secret Soviet enterprises. Otherwise he will only be able to get a job of a dishwasher, a handyman, a waiter.

One more example. In Rezekne, a regional centre, there was built a giant concert hall with the EU money. Mayor of Rezekne Alexander Bartashevich says that residents, while the 'Titanic' was being erected (this is now the nickname of the building, which resembles a huge ship, which got as far as the Baltic land), bombarded the local authorities demanding that something more vitally important should be built with this money. However, the EU earmarked the money for the concert hall, deciding that it is more necessary than a bridge or a processing plant. Certainly, the tottering premises of former factories which used to produce milking machines and the 'condensed milk from Rezekne', which used

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to be well-known all over the Soviet Union, have been on sale for so long that there is almost no hope left that anyone will buy them. Certainly, all the things that are supposedly produced by the local machine tool works, are in fact made in China. Certainly, unemployment and depopulation are the major problems around here. But it was said that a concert hall must be built. Even if, ironically, it will be really filled only when a rock group 'DDT' comes from hostile (if you are to believe the official propaganda) Russia. This event is being looked forward to here.

Isn't it surprising that for a sum of money which is relatively small by Moscow standards you, a descendant of those whose monument is once again being 'demolished' in Latvia and has already been demolished in Estonia, you, a compatriot of non-citizens and invaders, can buy a piece of land, property and residence permit with a 'Schengen visa' into the bargain? Such trade is a considerable prerequisite of local authorities. In Jurmala, both the first and the second sea lines have been sold out to our compatriots. That's they, our big-shot and wealthy people, so believes Jānis Urbanovičs, chairman of a faction of the Latvian Saeima, uniting opposing, and therefore 'bad' Russians and 'bad' Latvians. He thinks they are to blame for the fact that relations between Russia and Latvia are so painful. 'Look, where do your millionaires go first of all, when they arrive in Latvia? Do you think they go to the 'Non-Citizens' Congress or to their ethnic compatriots? Not at all. They go to our oligarchs, to their fellows. That is their international solidarity. Both in Latvia and in Russia there are many people who are horrified by the fact that our countries can be friends. Then the intelligence services, tax inspections, the State Revenue Services should also begin to cooperate, and many will have to move out of here, because they will be bound to declare their expenses,' – such was his reply to the question asked by Russian journalists during the 'Baltic Forum', a cultural international event, which was held for the eighteenth time this year.

Not so long ago I visited Lithuania as well, and at that time I also caught myself thinking that I was not able to combine, for example, them accusing Russia of high energy prices and obediently closing the Ignalina nuclear power station at the first request from the European Union. It was the EU who paid for this expensive scheme. But the EU does not subsidise electricity.

Here too, there is a peculiar combination of tough anti-Russian policy of the authorities and the welcoming invitation to live and rest in Palanga, for example. And to invest in the economy.

And this is despite the fact that 'even V.I. Lenin believed that with the public ownership of the land, the use of the land and all kinds of small property can be a source of speculation in agricultural products and have other negative consequences. The very form of commodity-money relations sometimes creates the possibility of relations alien to socialism: for example, renting out accommodation in public houses, using public property for personal gain. Getting unreasonably high income by some part of the population generates market psychology, acquisitiveness.'

What does Lenin have to do with it, you may ask. It is just that I have quoted not somebody unknown, but Dalia Grybauskaitė, President of Lithuania. She wrote this in 1988 when she defended her thesis 'The relationship of public and private property in the functioning of private farming'

in the Academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow. Later in Lithuania the thesis was nostricated as a doctorate one. I think it was right: there, in the thesis, there are excellent scientific facts that can now explain many things in the then situation of occupied Lithuania. In particular, the president claims that an average Lithuanian engaged in the production of milk, meat and condensed milk had a bank account of 2374 roubles. Thus with the money the person could buy half of the car 'Moskvich-412'! 'Invaders' could only dream about this.

At one time we belonged to one and the same Communist Party with Dalia Grybauskaitė, so it wouldn't be worth thinking of the old times, but for the hypocrisy that you see at every step of the Baltic power. They do their best trying to wipe from memory our tough, but common past, and to plunge irrevocably into the 'bourgeois nationalism', which is denounced in many of the thesis paragraphs. In Latvia, it is proposed even to redraft the preamble to the Constitution with due account for 'nationalization'. If anyone in our country decided to redraft our preamble – 'Russia for the Russians' – the European Parliament and the PACE would pave the fascist under asphalt! And here the question is under discussion – and everyone keeps shtum. It is a domestic affair.

Such is the daily routine of the European Union. I was walking along the ramparts of Daugavpils and thinking: the museum of an artist, a posthumous millionaire with a tragic fate – it is good. But why is there such a decline in other things, as if this land was again below the line? And I got the answer at a press conference given by the same Jānis Urbanovičs: 'The European Union is primarily concerned with compliance with monetary rules. And whether we want to live in hatred or in friendship is our domestic affair. It's not even a double standard – there are no standards at all. And they give us money to construct roads or to establish funds only for the sake of them feeling comfortable when they come to us... That's all.'

Heigh-ho, I wish I could finish with a propaganda passage about a soft European invasion, but... We were told in the Baltic States that some Russian commentators pitch it strong in good faith, thus preventing our relations from getting normal and hindering the change in the situation of our compatriots. However sluggish and slow this improvement might seem, it is inescapable.

So I will say nothing about Latvia – and will return to the Ukraine, which is eager to join Europe as if ignoring the experience of the neighbouring countries. And Europe seems to take no notice of the fact that the movement is headed by those who think that the stripes by Rothko the artist are not worth a bean. By those, whose idols filled Babi Yar with corpses. And – there now – Europe is quietly eating a humble pie, and many Ukrainians just pretend that it does not exist at all, that this is just a vision, a product of propaganda. This is what Andrei Okara, a political scientist and expert on the Maidan movement said about the guerrilla fighters from the Right Sector (Pravy Sektor): 'They are nothing but an invention of the Russian propaganda.'

What do we do with it? How can we help? My personal conclusion is as follows: we should let the Ukrainian friends experience it all themselves. Drink it to the dregs. We feel pity for them, but there is no other way. We experienced it twenty years ago, didn't we? We did. No, certainly,

Julia never came in a wheelchair to us, as if she were our last hope, – with a haggard face, looking sick, after serving time in prison – just because she did not manage to lock up the one who put her behind the bars. Our gorgeous Julia is fifteen, she makes triple jumps and if she is lucky enough not to fall, she wins the Olympics. But let us be honest: our Julia had not yet been born, and we, as our neighbours now, were standing on Moscow squares, with our mouths agape. And on the platform our figure skater, who was often not quite sober, was performing a prescribed program: eliminating privileges, we will not forget the heroes, I will risk my life by lying on the railway tracks but I will become your guarantor, ‘they are just children’, and children, as you know, now host the camp.

Two cruel wars, collapse and destruction, shooting in the streets, rat packs on Tverskaya Street, a step away from losing our national identity – that is what it ended in. By no means all managed to save their human faces. Someone trying to save it shot himself dead or jumped out of the window. Someone was happy, clapping hands and writing poems: ‘I fired a projectile into Pugo’s carcass.’ Others, the most cynical and cold-blooded ones, procured capital, thus turning into reality their dream of owning a gold toilet bowl to the accompaniment of shouts about equality and justice.

And they made it! They did turn their dream into reality! First, some made it, the ones who were later made equidistant, and then others, the ones who had made the first ones equidistant. And the people, according to Zyuganov, who in the State Duma keeps cauterizing and angrily condemning, was only sliding into poverty and wheezing while storing up their proletarian hatred.

But not a bit of it. In Russia today, there is disgraceful inequality in wealth, injustice of a wormwood nature, deep corruption and the wrong Standard Time. Be that as it may. Oh, I nearly forgot to mention that the Duma cancelled lacy panties and gay pride parades. But if things were really so bad, Alex Navalny with Papa Zyuganov would have won long ago. They are suffering reverses just because over the twenty complex, contradictory and painful years, the country of Russia has really changed. It was an internal and gradual change. This is shown by comparative group of those protesting. The ones who come to protest to Bolotnaya Square with a virtual cobblestone are thin-skinned office proletariat and ladies from Rublyovka (a fashionable suburban area in Moscow) who have gorged too many fungi. And they listen to the speeches of licensed Democrats, which, if cleared from the husk, are as follows: here I am, good-looking and intelligent, so why am I not Putin? Here I am, beautiful and smart – so why am I not Golikova?

Why do people in the Ukraine take so much pleasure in attending the wide-open tasteless residences of tyrants? Because at heart they want to live in this same way. Because a complete renovation of a two-room flat imitates a mansion of a wealthy snob. As Gogol wrote, at least in the tenth fraction. Even in one hundredth! In Russia, if it is skilfully, wickedly, passionately fired up, believe me, there will be the same situation if the rich lose a sense of fear, and if officials do not switch on the sense of self-preservation. And managers of riots know what to begin with, if they are fi-

nanced, and if the government behaves in the manner of Yanukovich.

But there is something else: in the meantime, in Russia many people have twigged that to carve up and divide is vulgar and Sharikov-like behaviour. Everybody’s favourite movie is ‘The Heart of a Dog’, though if we ponder over it – how many of the cheering descendants can in good conscience claim that they descend from Preobrazhensky? Or from Bormenthal? And how many descend from Schwander? From Sharikov? Yes, this is the dawn of the bourgeois society. Of the middle-class society. Though at times it is funny. There are crowds of people wanting a TV-designer to reconstruct their country-house for him to create such a sophisticated Corbusier there that they will take pride in showing the house to their neighbours. And this is not so just because it is a freebie: people are gradually acquiring different standards! Let us take a TV programme ‘Fashion sentence’ as an example: there come quiet, nice and fat skunks, and so far none of them has ever asked a twist or a braid to be made around the head. Or to have a haircut made with not a hair out of place, like the hairstyles of the Chinese and Yanukovich. Everybody, with the approval of the merited artist Babkina, who has gobbled down a youthful husband, puts on a pencil skirt and car-coat. There is anything you can think of around, but it is certainly not famine. On all channels there are haute couture cooking programmes from morning until night – unless, of course, there are the Olympics.

It is necessary to mention the Olympics separately. They coincided with the Maidan so as to make anybody want to cry. There is death and blood, anger and despair, cynical investing money in transferring power from some ghouls to other ones. Here is investment in stadiums, in the snow, in ice, in prestige, in the happiness of victory, which spread and flooded. Not without stealing for sure. Not without cheating, not without a screw in the spine. But even if it’s only a dream of proper Russia – it is a hundred times better, it is far ahead of the dream of the Maidan with its grim black, maroon and orange styling, with a separate happiness enjoyed by the West Ukrainians without Jews and Russian Moskals. Against this background – there you go, there are Russian cosmo-heroes, suffice it to mention just the surnames: Legkov! Vylegzhanin! Chernousov! Lipnitskaya! Volosozhar! An! Dikiy! ‘Victor, go-o-o-o-o-o it!’

In this adoring the recently-converted Victors, in the pages of books flying all over the world, in the peacefully grazing cows by Chagall, in the fireworks accompanied by Tchaikovsky, in the gesture of merry Gogol (laughing through tears, of course) – there is more Europe than in the entire vulgar politicking and the Maidan’s tragic farce in Kiev. In all of these there is more Europe than in Europe itself, in the part that is shabby and cowardly enough to echo Bandera, just in order not to support Russia. And I think we will keep sticking our Russian fingers up at this Europe.

But the Crimea, which is now Russian, has proved: It is important that our fingers are stylistically different, curvaceous, looking like the ring which against all odds managed to open.

Juan Antonio March¹

THE CHALLENGE OF THE PERSISTANCE OF DIFFERENT STAGES OF COMPETITIVENESS IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION

The world is heading at high speed to become a global space where technology and discoveries spread all over the planet without delay. This is maybe the most beautiful dimension of globalization; the way any new discovery, any new application of the technology reaches the most distant parts of the planet instantly. This is extremely positive and will certainly help the people to overcome poverty and diseases in a very impressive way.

But the negative side of globalization brings certainly some shadows to the nice delivery of the positive side. This negative side is that globalization takes place in a world with different stages of development, and what is worst, with different levels of competitiveness. This creates frustration in many areas of the planet because the path of development is extremely unbalance.

This is unfortunately the challenge we have to live with. People are extremely attached to culture and culture modulates also its economic potential. As culture and civilizations have evolved in very different ways all over the planet the layer of culture acts as a break or as an accelerator in different parts of the planet. This deep dimension of the societies can not be easily changed and has a lot of impact on the level of transformation of the societies in this global world.

A very clear case of how culture can accelerate development has been China in the last two decades. In this huge country, with a population of over 1.500 Million people, per capita income has gone from \$350 in 1992 to \$6.500 in 2012. Once the barriers of a political obsolete regime have been overpassed, the absence of social blockades (gender, etc) have made it possible a fast development. In a different context we can find India. With a similar population the country has benefited of a free elected regimen since independence in 1948. Although the country is moving ahead steadily some blockades in the social mobility have jeopardized the speed of development in the society.

The lesson to be in our mind from these two experiences is that political freedom is essential but once achieved, the cultural dimension will become key to explain the potential or difficulties a country will face in its way to development.

On this context the dialogue of civilizations becomes essential. We have to modulate globalization in such a way that it does not destroy the rich differentiation among cultures but at the same time the cultural factor should not act as a blockade to development.

In my presentation I will refer to the case on how countries with the same religion become successful while others experience total disarray in the evolution of their society. A Muslim country like Indonesia is experiencing great development while many other Muslim countries in the Ma-

greb-Mashrek region are heading towards great economic difficulties. The same happens with other religions and other cultures in other regions of the world.

We leave in a world with the highest standards of living mankind has ever experienced. We must establish as a priority that economic development goes hand in hand not only with ecology in what is now accepted as "sustainable development" but also in a more advanced vision with "cultural diversity". Preservation of cultural diversity must be a new top priority in the global agenda and we are convinced that the venue of the Likhachov Conference can be an ideal forum to think deeply on this issue. I will certainly be delighted to use the open debate in the Conference to explore with other speakers the possibility to progress in the idea of harmonizing the requirements of economic competitiveness with the special conditions that cultural specificity creates in many different parts of the world.

One of the main characteristics of our era is the speed of the changes. This implies that the rise and fall of nations and civilizations happen in much shorter period of time than in all previous moments of the history of humanity. Opportunities, and dynamics of decadence, also operate very fast. Globalization acts as an amplifier of the trends and of the changes.

Globalization has brought dynamic to the whole planet but will societies in different stages of development, with different level of preparation to compete in an open world, be able to resist the everyday fastest pace of evolution? This is in my opinion a key question. On the one hand the countries and the people in general want to be part of this era of change and innovation. On the other side, the desire to benefit of the advantages of the development that globalization is bringing, implies for many to accept a radical change in their traditional life and in many cases even to move from the rural areas to the city and some times from one country to another. The social tissue is suffering in many places and the disruption of the precarious balances of traditional societies are obvious in many large areas of the world.

In fact we can explain the level of effort, the pressure that fast globalization is putting on people all over the world with an example from the sports. It is like if we had organized a marathon and we had forced, or convinced, everybody to participate. For those who are not very well prepared it is not very clear that after 10 miles of running they could continue despite their determination. The same happens for the old people that although they started running with the enthusiasm of feeling young again, they can not resist after a few miles. And in very similar situation we find the children. They want to emulate their parents and maybe will be the ones who run faster the first mile but their small lungs will make them fall exhaust after a very short time.

The one who wins the competition experiences the glory of the victory and in the globalization experiences the glory of feeling that the whole world is like his home, that there are no frontiers and no barriers to his capacity.

Under these circumstances there are many well intentioned people who claim for a tougher regulation of the

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globalization, for a certain new global government of the world. Although the idea is attractive in the theory, it becomes unrealistic in the practice, at least at this stage. Just looking at what happens in Europe you realize how difficult is to put in motion a global structure of government. Today the main thing that blocks the possibility of creating a large Europe, a new political organized space embracing the whole of the old continent from the Atlantic to the Pacific is how to structure it, how to create a political architecture that integrates everybody and develop a system of power acceptable for everybody. This is the great strength of the United States and this is the weakness of a very wealthy, cultivated, ancient space like Europe. Obviously for spaces less articulated like the Arab world or Africa the possibility of organizing efficiently their space with a superstructure of power is even more remote. Then imagine to try to do it a global scale!

It is because of that, than in my opinion the history will continue to evolve in a decentralized global way and that the best thing we can do is to prepare our local societies in the best way to resist the challenge. In sportive term I would say to prepare them to survive the marathon by participating in the best possible way and keeping good use of their energies and capacities.

So what to do?

First, I think we can not hide to societies the high degree of challenge they are facing at this momentum. It is not the time of relaxation but the hour of coming back to work, preparing for an era of constant effort.

Second, we have to work with the existing structures and obviously trying to reinforce their capacity to act and modulate the global phenomena. Organizations like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization remain crucial and we can not undermine their viability and legitimacy under the argument that they are not agile or effective enough.

Third we have to create an important third space to balance the two big ones that will govern in the next dec-

ade; US and China. This third space is "a Large Europe" from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The European Union is suffering because of a progressive loss of energy. The Population is growing too old and the weight of the Institutions is too high for the new generations. In the next decade the EU will be a clear declining power if we don't reverse the situation. At the same time Russia has not yet been able to transform the great potential it has in science into diversified economic performance. For a modern world the power of Russia could be greater inside a large and rising Europe that re-creating an specific strategic space with no capacity of great innovation as it was the case of the Soviet Union.

These three great powers should be committed to avoid great political failures in the rest of the world. Maybe they will not be able to trigger a process of global development but they should be able to neutralize any great falls. Time will be exciting. Most probably India will slowly but steadily enter into the path of becoming the fourth great power. Difficulties in the Arab world will persist and the risk of fatigue can appear in certain parts of Latin America after a series of decades of remarkable effort. The persistence of certain populism in a growing number of countries in Latin America is a symptom that should be taken into consideration very seriously.

The existence of these well structure four powers in the XXI century can act as a good guarantee that diversity will persist and that stability can be maintain. But we can not forget that it is an open model and as a result of this the mistakes of the leaders and the countries will have important drawbacks and the successes important rewards. That is why political leaders should not soften their speech and make clear to the population that social policy and preservation of cultural identities will only be possible when societies keep good records as competitive powers in the global fight. Yes, because the reality is that we live not only in a global world but also in a global fight.

Manuel F. Montes¹

DEMOCRACY, GOOD GOVERNANCE, AND THE RULE OF LAW: DO THESE APPLY TO THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SYSTEM?

Invariably, news stories of drone attacks in the northeast part of Pakistan describe these as having occurred in the "lawless" "tribal" region of Waziristan. It was as if the non-legal application of deadly force by a state is particularly justified in an area which is not only tribal, it is even lawless. This essay will explore the phenomenon of "lawlessness" in the international economic system. It will try to expound on the idea that the "tribe" of developed countries are able to inflict economic damage on developing countries without consultation, without accountability, and with impunity because of the nature of international economic rules, often grandly referred to "economic architecture."

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The approach is to evaluate whether the principles of "democracy, good governance, and the rule of law" apply to the international economic system. "Democracy, governance, and the rule of law" (hereinafter referred to as "DGR") has become a standard formulation in international agreements. This article will analyse selected features in the international economic architecture in the extent of their conformance to DGR.

**Democracy, Good Governance,
and Rule of Law as Prerequisite for Development**
Originally, the concept of the rule of law was intended to replace the rule of the individual, the rule of the powerful, and the "rule of might." The "rule of law," is highly valued – at least rhetorically – by Western countries and many former colonial powers. Donor countries (Western countries

and Japan) are the consistent proponents of the critical importance of “democracy, good governance and the rule of law.” In practice, this is often interpreted to mean that development is not attainable without the prior presence of democracy, good governance and rule of law.

Each of the three concepts in “democracy, good governance, and rule of law” is very broad in itself and subject to many interpretations in a variety of contexts. Strung together in a rhetorical triplet in the style of Roman orator Cicero, the concept has become a key to unlock donor funding and maintain global credibility in the popular press for a developing country’s government. The World Bank, an important conduit of donor funding, has engaged in a wide range of projects (judicial reform, anti-corruption, property rights, for example) in DGR (Shihata 1995) grounded in the principle that DGR is a prerequisite¹ to development.

The underlying issue that concerns this piece is Whether DGR is a property of the international economic architecture. It is a valid question because DGR is required by the donors of developing countries; does the other party – aid recipients and developing countries – have a corresponding standing to insist that DGR to be a feature in the international system, a system whose rules and procedures are determined by developed countries?

It can be argued that there is a shaky basis for requiring DGR in the international economic sphere. In the international system, “democracy” is hard to define, with vastly differing geographic, population and economic magnitudes among countries. In principle, the Westphalian system of states provides that each sovereign state enjoys the greatest scope for action and enjoys this in equal measure with other states. Proposals that countries with larger populations have larger voting weights in international institutions, for example, would run afoul of equality among states but reflect a democratic principle. Good governance is also tricky at the international system level. Under the Westphalian system, countries can agree among themselves on the limits of each others’ actions which impinge on other states but these do not usually have to conform to standard features of good governance, such as the absence of conflict of interests and accountability on the part of states for their actions if other states are adversely affected. When it comes to the rule of law, systems of law are based on systems of ethics and morality, something not well defined in the international system of states. Might makes right in such a system.

However, it is possible to appeal to the fact that moral principles and ideals were agreed upon in the founding documents of the United Nations. These principles were the basis for the agreed limitations on unilateral actions by states against one another under the UN system, though that system mainly dealt with issues of security and invasion, not the economic issues that is the main interest of this piece. Moral principles and ideals are of course also found in many preambles of treaties among states, but their universal applicability is not straightforward, since there is no hierarchy in principles which can conflict in practice.

The main justification for supporting the application of DGR at the international is that UN member states have agreed to request it that it be so. In the Monterrey Consensus (United Nations 2003, paragraph 4), countries agreed

“We commit ourselves to sound policies, good governance at all levels and the rule of law.” While democracy is missing in this formulation, the important idea is the call for good governance at all levels. It is worth noting that rule of law is not required at all levels in this formulation. However, in in the Rio+20 agreement called the “Future We Want” (United Nations 2012, paragraph 10) countries reached agreement that “democracy, good governance and the rule of law, at the national and international levels, as well as an enabling environment, are essential for sustainable development.” This new formulation now requires DGR at the international level.

It is useful to start with some basic definitions of terms.

Democracy is often defined as form of government with equal participation from all parties. There is no world government and the UN Charter does not have a definition of democracy. However, there is a discussion of “democratic deficits” in the context of governance and in the case international organizations such as the IMF (see, for example, Nye (2001), (Moravcsik (2004) and Bekkers *et al.* (2007)). For purposes of this article, the ideal of democracy will be associated with a degree (not necessarily equal) of participation and responsiveness to the interests of adversely affected parties.

Governance is associated with process of making deciding, implementing, and monitoring actions in organizations, groupings, and societies. The term is most often applied to public decision-making, including in the interface between public entities and private markets. “Good governance” is an ambiguous term for which the World Bank (1991) likes to use the definition “the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development.” Among the features commonly associated with good governance as an ideal approach to decision-making are accountability, absence of conflict-of-interest, transparency, rule of law, participatory, equitable and inclusive. The most prominent use of the term “good governance” has been to highlight government corruption.

For the rule of law, being a topic of interest to lawyers, definitions with some precision are available. The World Bank defines the rule of law as a system of law [which] assumes that a) there is a set of rules which are known in advance, b) such rules are actually in force, c) mechanisms exist to ensure the proper application of the rules and to allow for departure from them as needed according to established procedures, d) conflicts in the application of the rules can be resolved through binding decisions of an independent judicial or arbitral body, and e) there are known procedures for amending the rules when they no longer serve their purpose (Shihata, 1991).

For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency (United Nations, 2004).

¹ There is very little empirical support – even contrary evidence – for the idea that DGR is a prerequisite to development. See, for example, Khan and Jomo (2000) and Khan (2005).

Democratic deficits in international economic governance

Global economic interdependence requires instilling accountability in international governance mechanisms to the needs of development. What is missing in the current system of global governance is accountability on the part of the developed countries in regard to the negative spillovers of their policies on developing countries. The costs of these policies are borne by developing countries even if they have no influence and say in their choice. Narratives based on a belief in developing countries' self-interest in unilateral liberalization and formulations about creating "level playing field" have tended to justify diminished accountability on the part of developed countries in putting any heed to

Updating voice and representation to reflect global economic structure

One approach that has garnered enormous energy on the part of reformers is that of changing voting weights and management structures in existing international institutions. Here, even generally agreed overdue efforts have proven to be difficult. A 2010 package to double the IMF's equity capital which featured a shift of six percentage points of total quota to developing countries and substitute two of the 24 IMF directorships from European to developing countries is stalled and an obstacle to future additional reforms.

In the 2000s, there were predictions mainly from analysts (for example, Kose et al., 2008) working in Bretton Woods institutions that the developing economies had 'decoupled' from rich countries. These discussions tended to suggest a diminished vulnerability of developing countries to a potentially large financial adjustment in the wake of rapid credit expansion and macroeconomic deficits¹ in the US economy in the mid-2000s. The sharp and immediate impact on developing economies of the Lehman collapse in 2008 through trade and financial retrenchment have raised doubts on cyclical decoupling as a basis for international economic cooperation and coordination (Akyuz, 2012b). The new threat, beginning in the second half of 2013, comes from the potential reversal of capital flows away from developing countries sparked by the retreat from quantitative easing policies in the United States (Akyuz, 2013). Developing countries are well-acquainted with this drill from the reversal of capital flows after a period of capital abundance causing widespread international payments difficulties. Because developing countries are adversely impacted by purely domestic policies of developed countries, international mechanisms must guarantee sufficient voice to developing countries, as a matter of good governance, in critical international institutions such as the IMF.

Beyond cyclicity, much has been made of the changing structure of the global economy, with developing countries accounting for a greater proportion of global output and trade. In one sense, these observations have not found their way into reforms in voting weight and influence in international bodies, most particularly the Bretton Woods institutions. In another sense, these increased proportions could have been fully anticipated since higher growth rates in developing as opposed to developed countries would eventually result in their accounting for a bigger propor-

tion of global income. For some countries, such as China and India, the trend towards contributing a larger share of world output is in the direction of regaining the share they enjoyed in the 1500s before the onset of European colonization (Montes and Popov, 2011). Asian economies have not yet regained these historical shares. China accounted for around 20% of world output in 1500 and it has barely reached 10% today. The per capita incomes of the leading developing countries are still only 25% or less than the per capita incomes of developed countries.

The numbers speak to the need for enlarging the role of the population variable in designing the mechanisms for global economic governance. They insinuate that in per capita terms the gap between developing and developed countries remains wide even for the most successful countries. One argument for expanding voice for developing countries in international governance is precisely that assuring representation to those with the greatest need for convergence offsets the international community's imperfect knowledge about how to shrink the per capita development gap.

The proper question to ask is whether the global environment could have been better arranged to provide faster growth and catch-up for developing countries than has in fact happened. We know that recently there have been disturbing trends, such as the tightening of restrictions enforced through trade sanctions on access to modern technology for developing countries. Many developing countries that managed to increase their manufacturing output in previous decades have fallen back into relying on commodity exports, whose prices are volatile, and on remittance earnings. A worrying pattern is that the diversity of export products of developing countries has significantly declined since the 1980s when liberalization and deregulation policies became paramount. The final destination of most finished goods is still the developed countries.

Thoroughgoing reforms intended to address the deficiencies of international governance structures must first address the conundrum that many current arrangements violate standard norms of good governance and policy accountability. Voting weights in the Bretton Woods institutions, which, *effectively take* on the gatekeeping function for developing countries to gain access to external aid and finance, are out of kilter with the structure of the world economy. The 2008 package of voice and quota reforms, finally ratified in March 2011, provided for only a 2.7 per cent increase in voting weight for emerging and developing economies as a whole. The increase in the weights of faster growing developing countries was achieved by reducing that of less successful developing countries. There was no change in the number of seats on the board. Many experts and developing countries regard the package as inadequate (Bryant, 2008). Discussions continue on the design of the quota formula, which determines which countries are currently 'over represented' and must give up voting weight. The downward adjustment of the voting weights of European countries has been contentious.

The credibility of these institutions is undermined by the prodigious influence of developed countries in setting policy standards. For example, the IMF adjustment programmes in the Republic of Korea pointedly included measures to ease foreign investment entry in line with the interests of dominant industrial groups in the USA and Europe. In the wider context, the importance of these inter-

¹ The idea of a diminished vulnerability of developing countries assuaged fears that policy consultations by IMF staff with a member country, the United States, were inadequate to facilitate a timely and orderly adjustment in its deficits.

ests lies behind the pressures against capital-account regulations and for the liberalization trade in financial services at the multilateral level.

Accountability and representation

The rise of the G-20 as a high-level caucus of global economic decision-making to respond to the global financial crisis represents a test case of the impact of increased participation of developing countries in global processes of rule- and policy-making. The role of the G-20 is conceptually equivalent to that of the G-8 with the addition of developing country participation. As a caucus, the G-8 and G-20 do not make official decisions; these agreements only take effect when endorsed in official bodies such as the Executive Boards of the Bretton Woods institutions. As a caucus, the G-20 is meant to facilitate decisions in the existing official bodies.

Without a permanent secretariat, the G-20 has nevertheless become the locus of an expanding agenda and the target of solicited and volunteered proposals from international organizations for improving the international mechanisms. For example, development is now a G-20 agenda (ODI, 2009). The items for discussion the June 2012 G20 meeting in Mexico included sustainable development, green growth, climate change, employment and the social dimension of globalization, food security, anti-corruption, micro-credit and inclusive finance, local bond markets, multilateral trade aside from items on economic recovery and financial architecture. The Mexico meeting occurred when the Eurozone was in an existential crisis; the meeting managed to urge "Euro Area members of the G20 to take all necessary policy measures to safeguard the integrity and stability of the area, improve the functioning of financial markets and break the feedback loop between sovereigns and banks" (Mexican G20 Presidency, 2012, paragraph 6), intentions at the core self-interest of Eurozone countries. Side events around the G20 meeting included a 'B20' of business leaders from member countries and a labor ministers meeting.

Until the April 2009 London meeting, the G-20 had an initial flurry of success in coordinating expenditure and financial rescue programmes in response to the crisis. It has settled into a moveable agenda, dependent on the ambitions of its annually changing presidency. In the meantime, progress on the most urgent items – coordination for financial re-regulation and economic recovery – has stalled and reflects the political limits faced by developed country authorities. Developing country heads of state have religiously attended meetings in the exclusive grouping but have not built a reputation for espousing systemic reforms.

Thus there is much uncertainty over the G-20's potential role to push forward a reform agenda consistent with system coherence or with redressing imbalances against developing countries, even with the participation of the key developing countries. The representativeness of the developing countries – emerging MICs – in the G-20 is the subject of much dispute.

As the conceptual equivalent of the G8, G-20 extends the preference of developed countries' authorities to settle economic issues among significant economic players outside more representative venues, including the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC). The design of post-World War II global economic governance placed the consideration of these issues at the Economic and Social

Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations, on the principle that representation and accountability should go hand in hand. In recognition of this conundrum, the G-20 has paid special attention to establishing a relationship with the UN.

There have been numerous proposals for creating new bodies to overcome weaknesses in international governance, such as a Global Economic Coordination Council (GECC), supported by an International Panel of Experts proposed by the Stiglitz Commission (United Nations, 2010, p. 87). A more direct way is the reform and strengthening of existing institutions, which will require a renewed willingness on the part of dominant economic countries to use these bodies. Restoring an effective oversight of ECOSOC over agencies and mechanisms of global governance can be a clear goal in a post-2015 development agenda.

South–South and regional cooperation

As has been partly documented in the first section of this paper, the increased economic interdependence has been characterized by a pattern of uneven development. This worsening trend is sustainable neither economically nor environmentally, nor can it be feasible politically over the long-term (Vos and Montes (2014), UNCTAD (2011), and United Nations (2010).

There has been new interest in the potential of economic linkages among the developing countries and greater reliance on regional mechanisms, along the lines of the original intentions of the Generalized System of Trade Preferences (GSTP). The GSTP discussions recognised the need to embed policies to expand and diversify trade among developing countries within a framework of economic diversification and industrial development (UNCTAD, 2011, p. 88). Regional mechanisms hold the promise of better coordination among regional economies in the treatment of foreign direct investment (FDI), to avoid self-defeating competition and to facilitate complementary location of production activities, but there has been limited success in this regard. Lowering technical barriers to trade at the regional level would make trade more accessible to small- and medium-scale enterprises. Among developing countries, there are also potential in exploiting economies of scale in providing trade credits, insurance and other trade-related services, facilitating regional technological sharing among countries with relatively similar levels of development, and coordinating development of infrastructure to facilitate regional trade.

The greatest barrier to increased regional cooperation, despite many announcements to the contrary, has been overcoming a mindset privileging trade and investment linkages with the developed economies. In Africa, actions by the USA and the EU to provide trade accommodation to the region *qua region* throws a spotlight to previous local intentions to expand regional integration. As mentioned earlier, many proposals coming from outside the region have the potential to derail regional integration. MFN provisions in the EPA proposals, for example, would extend to EU countries should African countries agree to greater trade openness among themselves. Provisions that require sourcing of inputs to production from developed countries, such as textiles, reduce the scope for regional integration. In 2011, the African Union (2011) proposed that the benefits of non-reciprocal preference schemes be accorded regionally or all members of customs unions, irrespective of the development status of countries involved. The purpose is to ensure

that trade can support LDCs and their regional groupings to overcome their low manufacturing capacities. The EU, for example, applied for a waiver at the WTO to provide Moldova with non-reciprocal preferences with the rationale that Moldova being the poorest country on in Europe does not have the competitive strength to take reciprocal obligations of an FTA with the EU. A similar waiver had been made for Western Balkan countries. A South Centre background document suggests WTO compatibility of the proposal can be achieved either through a waiver or by appeal to the enabling clause.

The threatened extended period of slow growth in the developed world as a result of the global crisis increases the pressure on developing countries to find other sources of growth through increased trade within the South and regional cooperation. A reorientation of growth strategies toward increased reliance on domestic demand – as opposed to export reliance – is logically a spur to a new emphasis on expanding South–South and regional trade and investment links because the most accessible markets for genuinely developing country products are in other developing countries.

Rule of Law versus the Rule of Might and Money in International Investment Treaties

There are 3,000 or so bilateral investment treaties BITS in existence. These treaties between sovereign states have been promoted by Western governments to protect their companies investing abroad. The justification has been that courts in developing and non-Western were countries are relatively underdeveloped and “too biased, too slow and sometimes too corrupt” (CEO/TNI 2012, p. 11) to provide foreign investors a fair and independent dispute settlement system if they had conflicts with the host state. These treaties provide that these disputes would be decided by a ‘neutral’ body of legal experts in who should act independently in arbitration panels. The most prominent convener of arbitration panels for these treaties is the World Bank in which the International Center for Settlement of Investment Dispute (ICSID) is located.

The BITS system violates the governance principle of transparency. Many of the treaties are secret; this is why it is only possible to approximate in round numbers the number of treaties in existence. These treaties also have provisions that require that disputes taken up between investors and the state, including the process if dispute resolution and the any awards granted, but subject to strict secrecy.

This international system of dispute settlement (ISDS) is extremely powerful. Unlike other international mechanisms, it allows private parties to directly sue states. In the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example, only states can sue states (though often the dispute can involve an aggrieved private company). Under BITS, ISDS expose states to enormous monetary penalties to be paid to the aggrieved investor. It is estimated that number of cases being processed in 2011 was 450. “In 2009/2010, 151 investment arbitration cases involved corporations demanding at least US\$100 million from states” (CEO/TNI 2012, p. 7).

BITS provide very broad grounds for investor grievance against the state. In the first place, what is defined as “investment” in these treaties is very broad. The US model BIT treaty defines investment in the following way:

“**investment**” means every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or the assumption of risk. Forms that an investment may take include:

- (a) an enterprise;
- (b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise;
- (c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans;
- (d) futures, options, and other derivatives;
- (e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts;
- (f) intellectual property rights;
- (g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and
- (h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges

For example, trademarks can be considered an “investment” and their regulation a cause for an investor grievance. Tobacco transnational Philip Morris has brought a BITS case against Uruguay and Australia on the ground that their anti-smoking laws. The company claims that it is unable to effectively display its trademarks on cigarette packs because of compulsory large warning labels. The exercise of public health policy on the part of Australia and Uruguay is inflicting a substantial loss of market share and compensation for damages must be paid as a result. BITS create liabilities on public finances from claims by private investors that their prospective profits have been affected by the exercise of public policy. The government can go ahead and change public policy but it will have to compensate private investors for the private damages inflicted by such an exercise of public policy. Having foreign investors protected by BITS thus has a chilling effect on the policy making in the public interest.

The BITS system violates the absence of conflict-of-interest principle of good governance and rule of law. Lawyers who defend countries from damage claims in some cases can then also be chosen to the arbitrators in other cases. Conflict of interest is thus rife in the select club of arbitrators sitting as counsellors, judges, and jury over investor-initiated actions against host countries, the overwhelming majority of whom are developing countries. Because of the lucrative remuneration playing these roles afford, the community of arbitrators have strong incentive to take an expansive interpretation of treaty provisions in favor of investors. This expansive approach not only enlarges the scope of application of arbitration actions – making them attractive to private sector claimants – but also multiplies the numbers of dispute actions from which they can make money.

Arbitration awards are not subject to review even though their expansive approach has permitted arbitrators to review and negate national legislative, judicial, and even referendum decisions. One reason arbitral decisions are difficult to review is because there is no set of norms against which the review can be undertaken. Arbitral judgements involve the creation of law and standards by the arbitrators involved – in favour of investors. In actual cases we considered, we learned that the awards that have been made are large and apparently limitless in size. One award is \$2.3 billion. Even smaller amounts and the cost of hiring ex-

pensive international commercial arbitration lawyers in defending in disputes have run into millions of dollars which could have been better used to pay for essential medicines and education.

The scope for the expansive mode of operating in ISDS stems from the easily expandable interpretations of treaty commitments because of ambiguities in scope, fair and equitable treatment, expropriation, and most favoured nation treatment, among the many other elements of Bilateral Investment Treaties. All of these elements have been interpreted in arbitration proceedings in favour of their consistency with the possibility that BITs can *potentially* increasing investment inflows – whether or not such flows actually happen.

The best information we have and which we discussed in this forum indicates that investment treaties by themselves – just like other investment incentives – are not associated with increased investment. We also learned from surveys that for the most part these treaties are NOT a key factor in private investment decisions or that the existence of such treaties is an important factor in facilitating the grant or lowering of the cost of foreign investment insurance.

In practice, changes in government regulations that can be argued to reduce the “legitimate expectation” of future profits of the foreign investment have been judged in ISDS as indirect expropriation of the investment. Arbitrators have been able to rule against public policy and in favour of private interest because the investor arbitration system has been imported from the private commercial arbitration system. In the commercial arbitration system, the violation of any commitments of contracting private parties requires compensation for the other party. However, in the investment treaty system one party – the state – is not a commercial actor and must act in the public interest. When a state acts in the public interest, such as in the through environmental regulation or a health policy, a foreign investor adversely affected by the policy can sue for damages and compensation.

There have been suggestions on possible reforms and improvements to the flawed system, including possibly introducing an appeals system, establishing of regional arbitration mechanisms, introducing alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, undertaking dispute prevention policies, trying to limit the scope of the arbitration by introducing restrictions in new treaties on what kinds of issues can be subject to dispute.

We learned that all of these reform suggestions have limited impact because in the first place investment treaties are deliberately unbalanced in favor of the private foreign investor and in the second place these reforms do not overcome the inherent conflict of interest built into in the dispute system. For example, while it is possible to introduce an appeal process *qua* process, the judges in such a process would still be mainly come from the community of commercial arbitration practitioners.

The system of international investment treaties is thus an important example of “lawlessness,” conflict of interest, and lack of accountability – all of which violate DGR agreements. The BITs system has substituted the rule of law with the rule of might and money. Efforts to reform this system must be seen as an effort to restore the rule of law in an important part of the international economic architecture.

It would be wrong to look upon such reform efforts as being motivated by an aversion to foreign investment activity.

Sovereign Debt Lending and Crisis Resolution

Financial crises have been occasions or dramatic development reversals in the developing world. Avoiding these reversals will require orderly and equitable approaches to crisis resolution which the international system does not provide at present. The present system for resolving sovereign debt crisis is *ad hoc*, arbitrary, unpredictable, and imposes most of the cost on borrowers instead of being shared equitably between borrower and creditor. These approaches thus violate many elements of DGR – including transparency, accountability, and rule-of-law.

The standard approach has been fraught with controversy. IMF-led programmes involve new financial injections and public sector austerity, which are mainly intended to keep debtor countries up to date on their debt service obligations with external private debtors. These programmes insist on keeping the capital account open, even with significant capital outflows and losses in reserves. Under these programmes, the burden of adjustment falls almost exclusively on debtor countries. These programmes often require the public sector to assume the external debt obligations of the private sector (often including those of operations of foreign companies resident in the debtor country). This approach exempts external creditors from market discipline and propagates moral hazard in private financial lending activities to developing countries.

The underlying objective of crisis resolution must be to restore as quickly as possible the ability of the affected country to resume economic activities, as is the case in crisis resolution in domestic contexts. This will require the sanctioning of standstills during the period of debt-resolution negotiation and the provision of resources for critical current account needs (Akyüz, 2009a). Beyond a standstill, a growth-oriented resolution could also require restrictions on capital account flows and import restrictions during the period of debt resolution in order to conserve foreign exchange.

The absence of an orderly, non-arbitrary process of sovereign debt resolution is an important development obstacle. Countries are subjected to litigation which ties up their external economic transactions; a proper crisis-resolution mechanism will include a standstill on such litigation. There is a need to involve neutral parties in the resolution process, such as arbitration panels made up of experts, as in the WTO’s dispute settlement process, since the lead role played by the IMF in these episodes creates conflict-of-interest concerns as the IMF and its sister organisation the World Bank are themselves creditors.

Developing countries have long sought thoroughgoing reforms in the system by which countries borrow from abroad. In stark contrast to the laws that govern domestic lending, the current system is heavily tilted in favor of creditors based in the North. A first step in creating such a system could be an international agreement on a code of conduct on the part of all parties involved in the sovereign debt borrowing and lending. An agreement on such a set of norms can represent a solid step forward since it would present the moral principles for the mechanisms that will be established. These moral principles will also justify the sharing of burdens and imposition of penalties when a debt restructuring becomes unavoidable.

The key international institution for resolving sovereign debt crises is the Paris Club, which is an informal country grouping with 19 permanent members including the United States, the UK, Western European and Scandinavian countries, and Japan. The Paris Club has exercised the power to determine the terms of debt restructuring. Access to the Club is normally through the IMF. Access through the IMF and sometimes through the World Bank in itself constitutes a conflict of interest since the IMF and the World Bank are themselves creditors. The Paris Club stresses the informal nature of its existence and deems itself a “non-institution.” As an informal group, it has no official statutes and procedures. This violates the DGR principle of transparency.

The most scandalous feature of the Paris Club is that it is in effect a committee of creditors with almost absolute power to determine the resolution of sovereign debts. This approach contrasts sharply with the conventional process of bankruptcy in national contexts where a neutral party, usually a judge, decides the sharing of the burden of failed loans between creditor and debtor on the principle that both parties must be responsible. On the part of the creditor, there is a presumption that the creditor took the risk to lend to the debtor willingly and must share in part of the burden. Paris Club outcomes are rife with public moral discussions in about how debtor countries have been profligate with money borrowed from abroad and must therefore pay back, absolving lenders from any responsibility. In the case of Greece, creditors have expressed much incredulity in the popular press at the low level of tax payments and early retirement system, despite the fact that these institutional features existed openly in Greece. The bias in favor of creditors violates the DGR notions of rule of law, accountability, equity, and – to the extent that debtor countries must accept Paris Club stipulations with regard to the government budgets – democracy in the national sphere.

Efforts to overcome this system must properly begin with an international agreement on principles which can then be the basis of procedures and legal frameworks. In 2012, two prominent proposals for such principles came to being. In January 2012, as the outcome of two years of public consultation, UNCTAD proposed the Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing. For convenience, we shall subsequently refer to this publication as the “UNCTAD Principles.” In October 2012, a committee convened by the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a private association of the financial industry, proposed a set of principles called the “Report of the Joint Committee on Strengthening the Framework for Sovereign Debt Crisis Prevention and Resolution.” Subsequently, we will refer to this publication as the “IIF Principles.”

Both the UNCTAD Principles and the IIF Principles propose normative standards to guide vital aspects of debt management and debt resolution. There are sharp contrasts in substance and credence between these two Principles, which will be considered in this piece. These two set of principles are now being seen as in competition with the other, as a tale of two principles.

The IIF Principles concern themselves mainly to the situation of a sovereign debt crisis of which there have been an overwhelming number affected developing countries and the recent case of a non-developing country, Greece. These episodes, more like traumatic events, have involved the restructuring of debt. The IIF Principles draws prece-

dents from the recent Greek debt restructuring, a problem that most professional observers would consider far from resolved. The title of the IIF Principles seems to suggest that the norms are applicable to pre-crisis actions. However, the IIF Principles are confined to norms to applicable after the onset of a debt crisis and debt restructuring is unavoidable. A section entitled “Data Transparency and Policy for Crisis Prevention” might be seen to justify the title; however, the proposed standards in this section only apply to borrowers and there are no principles applicable to lenders for purpose of crisis prevention.

In contrast, the UNCTAD Principles concerns itself with the whole process of sovereign debt borrowing, from the original process of lending and debt build-up, to sovereign debt restructuring in the event of a crisis. For example, the UNCTAD Principles include a Principle that any attempt by lenders to suborn a government official to breach the duty of that official to represent and protect the public interest is wrongful.

A second difference between the two Principles is that UNCTAD principles delineate explicitly what the responsibilities of lenders are and what the corresponding responsibilities of borrowers are, while the IIF principles do not follow the explicit differentiation of roles and, as a consequence, set out the set of norms applicable to borrowers as the only players in the financial markets that need to make their behavior more responsible.

A third, and important difference, between the two principles is that the UNCTAD principles are designed to be applicable comprehensively to all sovereign debt – including not only private, but also official and multilateral lenders. The IIF Principles apply only to debt owed to private parties. If the experience of the decades of suffering by the HIPC countries provides any lessons, it is that comprehensively addressing a distressed country’s external debt problem is necessary to avoid an unduly drawn out debt resolution. The IIF Principles provide for special roles for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in debt resolution. But the IMF has also been a creditor in sovereign debt crises. By identifying special roles for the IMF, the IIF Principles in effect excludes the IMF from being subject to any moral principles in its lending operations.

In such a situation, it will be difficult to justify having the IMF share in the burden of debt crisis. When the IMF staff proposed a Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism in 2001, it also put the IMF in such a privileged position. This was one of the reasons Wall Street objected to the proposed mechanism. Now with the IIF Principles it appears that Wall Street would rather deal with the devil it knows (and still dominates implicitly through the weight of votes of developed countries in its board).

A fourth contrast between the two Principles is the extent of public comment and, more significant, official endorsement the UNCTAD Principles have received to date. The set of IIF Principles still has not benefited from consultation beyond the community of specialists in the financial industry itself. The UNCTAD Principles have also been the subject of greater stakeholder consultation, been the subject of legal analysis, and have received endorsement from developed and developing states. It is available in all six official UN languages.

The United Nations General Assembly has endorsed the UNCTAD initiative three times. After the official launch-

ing of the UNCTAD Principles in January 2012, these have been presented in many fora attended by government officials and endorsed by them. The Arab member countries of the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) examined the new draft of the Principles during the IsDB-UNCTAD Regional Consultative meeting held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 25 February 2012. The Council of Ministers of Finance of Central America, Panama and the Dominican Republic (COSEFIN) invited UNCTAD to present the Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing at its session in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic. To date, more than 60 states have participated in various consultative meetings.

The UNCTAD principles have also been the subject of academic analysis. Professor Anna Gelpern (American University Washington College of Law and Georgetown University Law Center) released a legal analysis of the UNCTAD Principles which elaborates concrete strategies for implementing them. A legal study by Matthias Goldmann, Senior Research Fellow of the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law (Heidelberg, Germany), among 12 countries and three other jurisdictions finds analyzes whether and to what extent there is a homogeneous understanding that while most of the UNCTAD Principles can be already regarded as general principles of international law, enhancing their normative and social force. The rest can be categorized as guiding, emerging or structural principles.

The acceptance of a set of proposed principles will be decided in a political process. This survey suggests that such a decision must take into account that fact that the UNCTAD Principles (2) appear to have superior policy content and are more balanced than the IIF Principles because these can apply to all types of sovereign indebtedness, (2) assigns reasonable responsibilities to both lenders and borrowers, and (3) apply to the whole debt process not just to situations of debt distress. These Principles contribute to enhance the legitimacy in the exercise of international public authority in the sovereign debt matters.

Conclusion

The three specific areas covered by the study illustrate the wide gap between notions of DGR and actual practice in the international system. There are a many other aspects that can be considered. For example, there is the matter of the impunity in regard to the damages caused and human rights violations by transnational companies. Attaining DGR at the international level will require multiple efforts at various levels. To be politically feasible, there has to be progress in each specific area, such as the three areas that this piece covered. The effort will require starting from achieving international agreement on basic principles among countries and among powerful international actors – such as transnational companies – which can then be translated into actual procedures and agreed legal frameworks.

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Miguel A. Moratinos¹

"THE ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS": A VALID AND NECESSARY INSTRUMENT

Opposed to those who defend a bipolar world at loggerheads, and all those skeptics who consider efficient and provable agreements in the international sphere a utopia, the Alliance of Civilizations reveals a road unexplored by the international community that involves the participation of civil societies, as well as local, national, interstate, regional and world institutions on all levels. Its areas of recommendation are limited to the fields of youth, education, migration and media.

The political spaces of this initiative pertaining to the United Nations open a line of dialogue, cooperation and exchange; broadened and renewed processes as required in a global and interdependent world that faces common and precise challenges as defined by the international agenda. Peace, the promotion and protection of Human Rights and democratic values, economical and social imbalances or the climate change; these are all challenges that interpellate progress and global advancement.

The Alliance of Civilizations responds to a horizon of necessary and urgent reforms in the international relations system in order to face the challenges in the first decade of a century marked by complexity and uncertainty. This United Nations project and the international community must become the answer of a civil society committed to overcoming mistrust and suspicion, both founded on erroneous and oversimplified perceptions: perceptions that disfigure modern, active and creative societies of Latin America, the Mediterranean, Africa and Asia, and that defend the supremacy and universalization of Human Rights and international legality. Assessing these considerations is not a rhetorical matter, but rather a verification of civil society's activism and the expression of the will of many nations and international organizations.

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This is the time to commit and take action with mechanisms of revision and updating initiatives, establishing fair criteria and applying collective decisions to these matters and promoting cooperation and reaching agreements as regards the international agenda's priorities. Interests and preoccupations shared by millions of citizens all over the world and who have, in the Alliance of Civilizations, an instrument to be used towards a future of knowledge, respect and cooperation; a means to "deconstruct" stereotypes and promote consensus that will serve to boost the enterprising cooperation of civil societies and emerging players.

As pointed out by former Spanish President José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, this is a means that will allow the Law and not force to stand as the pillars of the international order, for cooperation and dialogue to be the first choice among citizens equal in dignity and rights. In this manner, International Law would recover its republican dimension in the broadest sense and become a part of the Intellectual History of the United Nations.

The Alliance of Civilizations has created the necessary environment for interculturality, for a respectful dialogue between traditions and the acknowledgment of the existing diversity of roots and worldviews; for, as stated by Iranian philosopher Jahanbegloo, "today there is no conflict between cultures, the true conflict is between those who defend diversity and those who oppose it."

The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions became effective as of last March, 2007. And it defines cultural diversity as "the multiplicity of forms in which the cultures of groups and societies are expressed." It encourages respect and cultural dialogue in the broadest sense; promoting pacting and adopting effective measures to establish communication channels that will lead to understanding and thus preserve and spread the cultural patrimony of Humanity.

Cross-cultural dialogue is a means to create atmospheres of trust and face the difficulties that accompany comprehension and cooperation at an international level.

Thanks to it, the doors to diversity, respect and consideration of minorities have been opened, at the same time favoring freedom of expression and association; fields in which there is yet much to be done, as well as in the fields of autonomy, internal democracy and transparency in civil society organizations.

Currently, the idea and the facts that interrelate cultures and civilizations are commonly acknowledged. Our miscegenation nowadays is broadened with the media and supports of the digital era, as well as the concept of a spacious civilization that accepts both the local and global perspectives, civil and social uses. The Hindu Nobel prizewinner Amartya Sen criticizes those who pretend to point out fractures between civilizations, as he considers that their premises spring from extraordinarily intellectual coarseness and historical innocence.

In this sense, Edward W. Said affirmed: “cultures coexist and interact in a very productive manner...”, and he criticizes the simplistic division between “us” and “them”, “good guys” and “bad guys”, for he considers that “this leads to two corrupt suppositions: the first, that their civilization (Islam) is radically opposed to ours (the West), a thesis vaguely based on the deplorably vulgar and reductionist thesis of Samuel Huntington on the clash of civilizations; the second, the absurd idea that analyzing the political history or the nature of terror, in an attempt to define it, is the same as justifying it.”

In September of 2004, before the General Assembly of the United Nations, the President of the Spanish Government, “as a representative of a country created and enriched by cultural diversity” and afflicted by the cruelty of terrorism, suggested an Alliance of Civilizations between the Western world and the Arab and Muslim world, for “a wall has fallen” and now we must not permit “hatred and misunderstandings” to build another. During the LIX Assembly, they agreed to create a High Level Panel to carry forth this global initiative; a much needed and urgent contribution of the Spanish and Turkish governments that constitutes a priority course of action in international relations.

Strategic value

For Spain, the Alliance of Civilizations possesses great strategic value in the international sphere and also from a national standpoint, because it favors a coherent change of direction in foreign policy, and the definition and broadening of our public diplomacy. This change of course was born from the firm conviction that the strength of dialogue and the capacity to reach an agreement are the correct channels to reinforce coexistence and mutual respect, and this requires that we empower an efficient multilateralism, the defense of international legality and Human Rights.

The Euro-Mediterranean process of Barcelona and the Union for the Mediterranean have been, and are, an excellent testing ground, for they have opened the door to a course of cooperation and neighbor policies that comprehend security and terrorism, the management of migration flows, environment, commerce and tourism, culture and education; all areas in which the state and social sectors are involved. No doubt, the Euro-Mediterranean region is a space full of imbalances that we must correct in favor of equality, but we can only face new challenges from a standpoint of cooperation; and the same can be said as regards other re-

gions with great ethnic and religious diversity and of great geo-political value.

Currently, nations cannot autonomously face the challenges derived from globalization, among which can be found: the full development of political and civil rights, the aspiration to human development and quality of life rates, or climate change. Radicalism and intolerance have complicated the harmonious growth of peoples who have formerly partaken in historical episodes of respect and mutual understanding, the birthplaces of millenary civilizations and traditions. The Alliance of Civilizations intends to share the management of this legacy, restoring the value of common spaces, and involving citizens, and all levels of administration and politicians, in this look to the future.

Some Arab societies suffer great difficulties to form their youth and offer them a future full of possibilities: health, employment, social services...

Terminology

The designation of the initiative as the Alliance of Civilizations has been discussed in political, academic and scientific circles, and it has been noted that the terminological use does not necessarily imply the conceptual one. This proposal entails the idea of promoting a political consensus founded on intercultural dialogue and effective cooperation.

The name of Alliance of Civilizations is merely instrumental and does not seek, but rather avoids, any essentialist, relativist or culturalist approximation that, in general, place the emphasis on the reductionism of civil, social and political aspects. This heritage from the colonialist, Eurocentric and pro-Western discourse do not justify, in any way, inadmissible interferences in today’s world, interferences that are challenged and condemned by the global public opinion. The use of this term is centered more on its symbolic nature than in the ends.

In the modern age, nationalisms have drawn up identities that have encompassed both the individual and collective dimension. They have defined their own image as positive and narcissist and, in some cases, have directly or indirectly assimilated the criticism or disdain of their neighbors. In many cases, the European expansion and decolonization were answered by political, religious and intellectual Arab leaders, as well as in other cultures and cases, by the exploitation of beliefs as a means of resistance and political control; a practice that is not limited to Islam, but also easily appreciated in monotheist creeds that have joined for geopolitical and strategic reasons. History has recorded these facts and periods, corroborating this.

The predominance of this initiative is emphasized with the term “alliance”, understood as the express determination to reach solid compromises between international organizations, nations, governments and civil societies, in which adhesions and mutual understanding will be used to formalize a “global contract” in pro of intercultural coexistence.

The Alliance has no intention of standing in the stead of any initiative issuing from the United Nations Intellectual History, we must avoid duplicating tools and resources. The Alliance wishes to optimize results in the international community and in the global civil society as a way to handle pressing challenges as regards respect for human dignity. Likewise, this will strengthen the common denominator of shared values in the international community thereby guar-

anteering their safety and expansion; that is to say, defending a common and miscegenetic, complex and diverse identity.

The Alliance of Civilizations, as a political proposal with universal vocation, requires a debate on a “global” level, organized by international, regional, national and local institutions, both public and private, and pertaining to social, cultural, economical, religious, scientific and technological sectors. It needs to associate a political vision and will to the great contributions of the civil society and the innovation and investigation spheres to adapt to the players and sector groups.

A dialogue between citizens is essential to be able to apply the concrete recommendations that can be articulated by means of regional structures, although its dimensions may be universal and count on the legitimation, management and follow-up of the United Nations, as well as those of multilateral and national courts.

Civil societies all over the world and global public opinion show a mounting interest in increasing their knowledge, participation and cooperation to oversee diverse approaches, necessarily debated and agreed upon, as a means to take on civil responsibility in the international community. Creative, enriching and constructive experience that conforms the nucleus of the inspiration of public diplomacy, as well as the incorporation of the contexts of the activities and public experiences beyond the nations.

Consensus and the discourse of the international community can exceed the cultural iconography as a closed and unalterable construction, and pave the way for reciprocity, to the suppression of hierarchic cultures and civilizations and international law, to diversity. The possible futures are not gagged by the weapons of knowledge, but by those parties interested in cultivating the cultures of dogmatism, simplification, insecurity and fear when, in reality, “all that we should fear is fear itself”. This is the protagonist of instability and a multiplying factor as regards conflicts and regional, national and local clashes, at the same time that it arouses theocratic fundamentalisms, exalts nationalisms, ethnic and tribal confrontations and throws even more uncertainty onto the times we live in.

Terror is not the exclusive property of fanatics and criminals, of failed nations, alleged cultures, geographical regions or political orientations. It is also the seed of misery, inequality, marginalization, humiliation and the absence of a future. We must not forget that among the instigators of fear are those fanatics who “see complots and conspiracies everywhere”, as Umberto Eco pointed out.

The historical construction of the collective representations must be reviewed from a standpoint of coexistence and cooperation, and removed from atavistic revenges, emotive answers or clichés from the historic imaginary. The report by the High Level Panel opens doors to the possibilities for fluent communication between nations and cultures. To “negotiate their interests in more equal conditions and pursue common goals at the same time they maintain their own systems of beliefs and identities”.

The purpose of the Alliance of Civilizations is to update the state of relations between contemporary societies, as well as their worldviews and reciprocal perceptions; “to advance enough – as Vallespín reminds us – in our capacity of mutual understanding so as to be capable of maintaining alive the idea that, that which unites us is stronger than that which separates us.” And “therefore, aspire to an alignment

around the principles of a global “ethic” that will uphold the bases of planetary coexistence and smooth over intercultural conflicts.” In this sense, Edgar Morin calls our attention to the awareness that “we live in a community with a planetary destiny facing worldwide threats.”

Universal rights give us the bases of a civil, political and universally social citizenship that shares values, preoccupations and common interests. Consolidating these bases will translate into momentum for a multilateral coordinated action that will result in worldwide stability and harmony in which institutional structures and civil societies will be involved.

Human Rights will prevail over all other considerations and the nations will be responsible for maintaining intact their guarantees, because they integrate the diversity of approaches as regards challenges and point to possible solutions; having an impact on the challenges of human security, that interrelate social, economical, cultural, environmental and disarmament spheres.

Principles

The heritage integrated by the universal principles gathers the best of humankind’s cultural heritages and productions and, as Edward W. Said indicated, humanism has nothing to do with distancing from reality and exclusion, but rather “quite the contrary, its purpose is to submit more matter to critical scrutiny, such as the result of human activities, the human energies steered towards emancipation and illustration or, what is equally important, the erroneous misrepresentations and human interpretations of the collective past and present.”

The governing principles that guided the work of the High level Panel have as sources of inspiration the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, “whose goal is to free humankind from fear and suffering”. The rationalist and universalist traditions that uphold them are implicit in the cultures and spiritual beliefs of all ages, and have contributed to evolution and the transformation of the History of Humankind into “a history of loaning and constant mutual fertilization”. It would be long-winded to remember the contributions of East and West, of North and of South, without falling prey to simplification and ignoring the value and the accuracy of nuances and singularities.

The terms of the debate of the Alliance of Civilizations, sponsored by multilateral cooperation and civil activism, underline the need to confront old conflicts via collective decisions, the need to face the challenges arising from the imbalances provoked by an unfair, unequal and asymmetric globalization. This transforms life models and livelihoods that seek freedom and guarantees of security into the observance and application of international legality, without setting to one side (of our consciousness and Law) the need to integrate the fringes of the system.

The global civil society upholds the values brought together and protected by International Law and demands that resolutions, conventions, treaties and pacts be fulfilled. It demands effective action to be able to act communally in the event of genocides, ethnic cleansings or crimes against humanity, as well as to fulfill the goals of the Millennium Development Goals and design the Sustainable Development Goals 2015–2020. It also criticizes the social, cultural, economical, political, military, religious and media ar-

rogance, seeing them as obstacles to the fight against “the malaise in globalization” and the legitimization of the international system and its legislation. The traits that define this universal conscience do not ignore the promotion of democratic values and good governance as confronted to the “*imperium*”, arbitrariness and imposition of interests, and dominations of all kinds.

In the Alliance, democratic governance is correctly regarded as the “most efficient means so that individuals may fully develop their abilities” and be able to exercise their individual autonomy. We must not forget that democracy must come into being “in a natural way”, because its imposition would be a contradiction unto itself that would discredit it when confronted by public and private rules, as well as in its own vindications and conquests.

The Alliance of Civilizations is the answer to a model for integration in crisis, based on the principles of neutrality, abstract equality and homogeneity consecrated by the “belligerent peace or peaceful belligerence” of the Cold War. This instrument for intercultural coexistence seeks to harmonize identities and diversity with individual and inalienable rights; which would allow for progress “in the breadth and scope of rights, completing the path to the abstract universalism of political rights, and towards the specific universalism of social and cultural rights”, as demanded by the global civil society, and thereby avoiding the ruptures in communitarianism or the privatization of identities.

The principles that form the structure of the Alliance of Civilizations project are born from the conviction that global cooperation is a must for stability, security and sustainable development. Reinforcing mutual understanding and strengthening shared values is not only an achievable goal, but a wanted one, that has crystallized in recommendations and action programs that nations, international organizations and civil society may carry out for the purpose of dispelling the uncertainties that overshadow the collective future of humanity.

This future is managed by an international system in constant transformation that now counts on a new tool, the Alliance of Civilizations. This channel, that allows for the participation of civil society in all the stages of political power, including activism, national and multilateral organizations, favors the reorientation of episodes of violence and fear, as well as the resolution of conflicts. It broadens the scope of legitimation and the possibility of reaching agreements in the international sphere to more efficiently face the flows of violence that impede the advancement of global peace; because peace is either complete or not at all or, simply, it is not peace. It is a “*conditio sine qua non*” for social and economical growth, and to be able to overcome the devastating effects of fear and violence.

To reverse these destructive tendencies we need the participation of civil society, for it must share in the drive to reach agreements for association and the creation of networks of public and private organizations linked to the United Nations. The recommendations include the collaboration of the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), the European Union, the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), the OIC (Organization of the Islam Conference), the League of Arab States, the ISESCO (Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization), the UCLG (United Cities and Local Governments), and the WTO (World Tour-

ism Organization), as well as other national and international organizations, both private and public.

We could very well open the doors to other spheres such as communication, economy and politics, elements that integrate, condition and interact in the universal culture of our times. The HLP (High Level Panel) report “explores the principal means by which this action could be enacted; the analysis of key functions that are currently carried out by education, youth, migration and the media in the relations between societies, and the suggested actions that could be carried out in each of these sectors to improve these relations.”

This matter, widely debated within the framework of the Alliance of Civilizations, comprehends social, political and religious leadership, alongside public responsibility and the use of violent language, as divulged by conventional and digital media, as well as new technologies. From these debates, we can deduce the importance of exercising both individual and collective responsibility as required by a public and multidimensional (published) space that is intimately linked to the private one. We must promote “civic journalism” and “preventive journalism”, and not just because doing so will contribute to recover professional values and social preoccupations, but because it is a commitment towards the promotion of peace, Human Rights, and democratic and social values to be used as a vehicle for the resolution of crises and conflicts.

The nature of the programming and production of media reality must be based on duly reflected criteria of responsibility to postpone the discursive terminology of the persuasion to terror, rumor and provocation. Practices of reflection and responsibility applicable to all the players on the public stage, be they social, economical, political, religious or media.

Languages, as a means of verbal expression, cannot be destined to suspicion and mistrust, to the cacophony of anti-Semitism, Islam-phobia or any other kind of discrimination. They are vehicles of knowledge, respect and dialogue about beliefs, symbols and traditions of religious or secular nature. Codes that reveal growing inequalities and the widening of the gap between rich and poor that perform “an important role in feeding resentment and the erosion of global solidarity”. Inequality, something which has occupied relevant economists in recent times, is harder to fight and find a solution to than poverty.

The construction of the Alliance of Civilizations is feasible in an atmosphere of inclusive engagement of nations and regions with efficient achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (2015). It will make faster progress in a multilateral climate of peace and with solutions to historical conflicts which, such as the Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian ones, cannot be allowed to fester. These are the origins to impossible to foresee reactions of groups within all societies, in the East and the West, and in the global and multicultural global civil society. In various regions and stages there is a tendency to interrelate politics, religious beliefs, security, terrorism or energy; a breeding ground subjected to the pressure and dimensions of the media, as well as ignoring international law and political pluralism. The examples of terrorism in the Popular Republic of China or in the Russian Federation are proof of this.

Some international analysts consider that the plea in favor of the Alliance of Civilizations is the answer to the por-

tentous propagation of fanaticisms and deformed perceptions that lead to rejection. These are exploited by groups of extremists by means of stereotypes, demonizing and violence against the “other”. This worrying phenomenon affects, in the most part, excluded populations, leading to destabilization and disturbances. Alongside terrorism, we find insecurity, unemployment, corruption, censorship, repression of political and religious movements, migrations, or the absence of civic freedoms; matters that affect, in greater or lesser measure, the Eastern and the Western world, the North and the South, many regions all over the planet.

The United Nations, regional institutions, nations, experts and civil societies all coincide in pointing out that the Alliance of Civilizations can and must play a critical role in the intercultural space, as well as broadening and reinforcing areas of prosperity and universal security. Its activities will focus on the updating and growth of the programs in hand and on innovating actions propelled by the United Nations, regional organizations, nations, parliaments and governments, as well as all levels of administration and the whole of civil society, without reiterating efforts in the areas of education, youth, communication media and migration policies.

The appointment of Jorge Sampaio as the High Representative of the Alliance of Civilizations by the General Secretary of the United Nations, Ban Ki-moon, was a decisive step to implement the recommendations of the HLP and start up the various Forums: an instrument made up by international organizations and institutions, governments, the private sector and civil society, and that meets regularly to “build association agreements” and present “commitments to action”.

World cooperation as regards intercultural initiatives is provided for by the fund of the Alliance of Civilizations, within the structure of the United Nations, and which must continue receiving contributions from those countries pertaining to the Group of Friends. In many countries and administrative spheres that are democratically renewed, Boards of the Alliance have been incorporated, in town halls, communities, autonomous cities, nations and multilateral organizations such as the European Union or the Union for the Mediterranean.

Education

Internationalization of the education systems, knowledge, exchange and cultural production will progressively broaden the horizon of many young people in diverse areas around the world. Their inquisitiveness pushes them to search for alternative models to the conventional systems in order to find new identities and develop their personal autonomy without giving up on their roots and, also, the sense of belonging to a community of complex and global destiny.

Rather than pushing for new activities in education, the Alliance has recommended the adaptation and broadening of those efforts already underway and in which governments, multilateral institutions, universities, experts, politicians and communities have an active role; it encourages us to divulge “a global, intercultural education that promotes human rights”.

For these actions not to result in vain, primary and secondary education should incorporate into their curricular program adequate formation regarding other regions in

the world, their cultures and religious beliefs. UNESCO and ISESCO, alongside educational investigation centers and teachers, have the task of elaborating the teaching material and divulging it within the systems committed to academic freedom and the Alliance of Civilizations. The precedent of the Human Security Network and the “Manual on Human Rights Education” was a success, and that indicates that reaching agreements is feasible in education.

The educational strategies converge and agree to the benefits of promoting interregional exchanges of both teachers and alumni. We already have past, excellent experience with the programs of the European Union, Latin America and the Mediterranean. What is necessary are more experts to develop teaching resources in Universal History to divulge knowledge that can reinforce respect and pluralism, as well as cultural traditions and the contributions of ecumenical dialogue that amass an important humanist, rational and scientific heritage.

For these tasks, the work and discourse of the media is vital, it too must form part of the targeted study areas in the schoolroom, as happens in many parts of the world. Education regarding communication supports, information and entertainment will help create critical and peaceful perspectives, without prejudice and fear.

Girls, young women and women cannot be excluded or marginalized from the education and labor systems. Two thirds of illiteracy in the world wear a female face, and they are also more harshly affected by poverty and deprivation of rights. That is why it is critical to reinforce women’s and children’s associations to encourage “learning opportunities and the creation of employment as part of a woman’s life”, and as a way to “ease these injustices”.

The Alliance has created “revision committees of the study programs” and common interest mechanisms to review the educational systems and guarantee a “coherent application” at the same time that it recommends joining forces between the “member nations, multilateral organizations, such as the Islamic Conference Organization and the European Union”, to agree on educational programs, on the general proposed contents aimed at education and the educating communities, at the structure of the civil society, intergenerational education and permanent formation.

Continuous formation, the creation of stable employment, production’s commitment to safe and respectful work climates, these are all goals shared by union organizations, integrated into the new International Trade Union Confederation. Its leaders have formulated a call to young people to participate and become more involved in associative life and union action.

Youth

The Alliance of Civilizations is a process essentially aimed towards youth, for they are the protagonists of today and tomorrow. By means of associative networks, they have channeled their activism and their explicit appeals for the international community to correct injustices and imbalances in globalization. Many of them defend the principles of peace, dialogue and pacting. Their drive impels the transmission of Human Rights and vindicates that “another world is possible” and, fortunately, this is true.

The young rebel against the difficulties they find to access forms of human progress that deny them individual autonomy and any perspective of well-being. Many regimes in

all the hemispheres have failed when it came time to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of societies and people. They have not reached the levels of development, security and emancipation as could be expected in the XXI century, something which the youth from many regions in the world, from Latin America to Asia and, in a more intense way, in the Arab world, perceive intensely.

The Arab States, according to the “Report on Human Development” by UNDP, will have tripled its population between 1975 and 2015, and more than a third of their population is young people under the age of 15. Although the demographic growth tendency is decelerating, we must find creative and imaginative solutions to enable their full development as citizens. And, above all, new fields of employment and coherent proposals for sustainable development.

To the demographic pressure in the Arab States we must add the elevated unemployment rates, which are among the most outstanding in the world, at the same time that they belong to the group of nations that receive an important number of refugees. These perspectives lead to climates in which radicalism, even when in the form of democratic, cultural, theocratic or media formulations, quickly finds resources to seed fear, terror and destruction; fostering failed nations and areas of insecurity and instability.

Our youth wants to participate in the challenges of the future in a constructive manner and, alongside the “integrating approaches in education”, it is necessary to set up a global youth network or “Worldwide Alliance of Youth, as a mechanism for youth to contribute to the implementation of all the recommendations” encouraged by the annual forums of the Alliance. This network will have various configurations and influence the goals of the international community. Its creation will broaden the scope of the exchanges between them, and grant them more access, presence and impact on Internet.

To achieve this goal, it has been suggested we unify and integrate the goals of countries and organizations such as the European Union and the Islamic Conference. To this collective effort, we must add the contributions of civil activists and religious leaders that can formulate contributions to shed light on the uncertainties and preoccupations of youth: the citizens of the XXI century.

The suggestion to create a “Cultural Fund and Network Service” that involves public and private donors, transnational corporations that fulfill their commitments of responsibility and social engagement, is very interesting. With these resources, young entrepreneurs and creators, “artists, writers, musicians and filmmakers”, could contact managers of the cultural industry. Networks that should create national, regional and global services for youth employment and in which women are fully integrated. Their influence and participation will be decisive to accelerate these proposals and increase their effectiveness.

Girls, young women and women are the main marginalized group due to poverty and lack of education. They also unjustly bear on their backs the weight of the imbalances on the periphery of the system and they are denied opportunities. On an ambivalent course of “an uncontrolled worldwide economy – as indicated by Edgar Morin -, the tyranny of money” combines “a cruelty dating back to the beginning of times with the glacial cruelty of technical and economical calculations.”

Migration

Migrations are part of the History of Humankind; even though at the doorways of the XXI century, it has reached previously unknown proportions such as: the universalization of the migratory movements, the massive inclusion of women and minors, or the growing prominence of qualified emigration from Latin America, Africa or Asia to developed countries. In just a few years, managing migration has become one of the top priorities on the global agenda. This human and humanitarian drama, alongside the refugee one, has acquired such dimensions over the last years that it demands the urgent attention of the international community, as well as that of the issuing, transit and destiny countries.

Migrations are due to several factors, although, on many occasions, they are provoked by lack of freedoms and well-being. European society still holds close in its memory its emigrations to Europe and America, led by groups of entrepreneurs with the desire to change the conditions in which they lived. As we can read in “A Thousand and One Nights”, “the world is the home of those who do not have one”.

Political responsibility channels, in a creative way, the energies that underlie the global migratory patterns to benefit the issuing and destination societies and, in particular, the emigrants themselves. An integrated approach to design migratory policies is shared by the majority of nations that make up the international community.

The United Nations, European Union or the Conferences of Rabat and Tripoli have made clear that migrations require simultaneous attention on several dimensions and sequences. It is possible to achieve the goal of harmonizing measures and actions in a new migratory policy by means of cohering multilateral actions, increasing collaboration, as well as by the normalization and simplification of mechanisms and international procedures.

Migratory policies must also include the endogenous aspect, as a factor for development and modernization that can generate positive impact and facilitate circular migration; incorporating the Diaspora as a fundamental element in the development of their countries of origin by means of making sure emigrants and their families have access to mechanisms of economical and financial development.

The contributions of Latin America to the European Union and Spain, just to mention one noteworthy example, translate into a significant volume of remittances. According to data from the Bank of Spain, in 2007, it was over 5,000 million euros, representing almost 0.4% of the GDP; a percentage slightly higher than Spain’s official aid to development and an economical factor of the first order.

The structural political measures in migratory matters must deal with the true causes and be accompanied by effective actions on migratory flows, thereby stimulating the achievement of the Millennium Goals and other initiatives for development cooperation, as well as the integration of new citizens in the destination countries and the prosecution of the networks and mafias that traffic with human beings.

The cohesion of migratory policies and the Alliance of Civilizations’ own initiatives also provides sense to the proposal of former United Nations General Secretary, Koffi Anan, who defended the need to create a Worldwide Forum on Migration and Development. It is necessary and urgent to be able to broaden the dialogue channels and multilateral agreements concerning both challenges, and during which

we will experience the climate change according to international committees of scientists, experts and organizations.

Migrations have left their mark on the multiethnic and multicultural physiognomy of cities and towns on all the continents and, most likely, the Russian Federation is an example of this. They have also nurtured the harmonious coexistence with new citizens. The local environment, especially the urban one in developed countries, has opened its arms to diversity and multiculturalism. Their emerging associative links, formation and information, and the collaboration between the public and institutional spheres, offer data that leaves no room for doubt.

From this standpoint, the international community has, in its local organizations, its main protectors, because they are an essential part of these actions and of the Alliance of Civilizations' proposals. Cities and towns in many and varied spots in the world back and encourage the civic participation of these new citizens; a task to which civil society, the defense of equal opportunities, the fight against racism and xenophobia, and solidarity all cooperate.

As regards integration and participation, the private sector and the corporative world (local, national, regional and transnational), sensitive to the societies and territories in which they operate, have also become involved. I believe that over the next years we must strive to make sure that Corporative Social Responsibility in transnational corporations truly takes off.

The associative world, educational communities and public spaces must become formation means for the civic formation of families and new citizens. The diversity of sectors that make up civil society in towns and cities must be incorporated to the Alliance Boards on their mission to coordinate and develop their formulations. Follow-up and control, as well as the design of actions and contrasting the results of the same are the core ideas behind this structure.

As the civic contexts are heterogeneous, the standards of gathering, treatment and follow-up of information and experiences must be agreed upon to analyze intercommunity relations in harmony. Health must be measured by levels of respect towards diversity, effective integration, participation and equal opportunities. Civil society, cultural and spiritual references, and ecumenical dialogue should encourage cooperation processes and exchanges within this context. Dialogue is called upon to rid ourselves of misconstructions and encourage understanding and cooperation for human growth and the advancement of the culture of peace.

Within these actions, the university system and the investigation and innovation organizations, at all levels of Alliance management, will weave an essential and emerging network to build a discourse of scientific knowledge regarding the contributions of migration and the patrimony that multicultural societies amass. Their studies and publications will form part of the same and will be used for the purpose of divulgation to the global civil society, the player-receiver of this "global" initiative.

This dream is quickly becoming a reality, because technological change has the necessary instruments to "unite the metaphorical capacity of practically all humanity". These means are used to build socialization and identity model processes, "in perpetual movement, endlessly".

Media

In this constructive dynamic, the drive and contributions of the media are, as mentioned by writer Juan Goytisolo, "millions and millions of parabolic antennae offering images of a world that appears to be within reach, a world full of ostentatious riches and marvelous well-being in which, as an Albanian detained upon disembarking on the Italian coast said, 'they feed dogs with silver spoons.'"

The media, information and entertainment in the broadest sense, has started to view immigration as a player and consumer who, on an equal-footing, participates on the territorial stage and in the Network. Content publishing companies have in their hands the power to conciliate knowledge and entertainment, vectors that map out the future of the communication industry. It is their responsibility to make sure that divulgation is carried out in situations of mutual trust, suppressing the global society of ignorance and denouncing the absence of freedoms and inhuman conditions.

The media, in its transit towards globalization, is a battering ram against dogmatism, for the collective future also depends on the results of the fight against interests, clichés, fears, marginalization and isolation.

Communicative, group or individual expressions model our imaginary in any kind of technological format. For that reason, it is critical to defend freedom of expression and pluralism of information, at the same time balancing the power of the media with informative rigor, the right to privacy and the right to one's own image. The creation, endorsement and fulfillment of ethical codes that come, as mentioned previously, from an autonomous or regulating will, shall define the direction of this vital mission. Working on it are journalism schools and colleges, as well as associations and organizations of publishers and information professionals, research institutes and divulgation control agencies.

Media contents and the treatment of information cannot lay down conceptual relations such as immigration-conflict, intolerance-Muslim, immigrant-poor, terrorism-Islamic, or other terms of the ilk that are linked with no impartiality and increase the flourishing of prejudice, clichés and disinformation.

Disinformation or abundance of data or facts is behind the manipulation of conflicts and the creation of others. Therefore, the Alliance of Civilization is an initiative whose mission is more in force than ever, and it will have the social and political dimension that the countries and multilateral organizations want to give it while making it an instrument for coexistence, peace and progress.

V. V. Naumkin¹

NATION-STATE, CIVILISATION AND THE CRISIS OF IDENTITY

The subject matter of 'civilisation' in the context of the transformation processes taking place in the world is becoming more and more popular and interesting both for authors – researchers and political writers, and for readers. Issues of cultural and civilizational identity, the nature of the relationship between the values of different regional and cultural clusters, evolutionary paths of the nation-state in an increasingly globalizing world are becoming more acute and require scientific and theoretical evaluation.

Russia, especially in the latest years, while V.V. Putin has been in office of president, is increasingly positioning itself as a state with its peculiar civilization. This, however, does not put an end to the traditional historic struggle in our society between the native culture – 'Pochvenniki' (or 'Slavophiles') and 'Westerners', no matter what they called themselves in different times: the problem of identification choice remains relevant today. We are witnessing the process when the confrontation between supporters of conflicting concepts of the Russian identity becomes very acute, taking over TV screens, newspaper and magazine pages. Some ideologists of 'neo-pochvennichestvo' and 'patriotic nationalism', criticizing the government policy, demand that we should counter our civilization with the West, almost cut ourselves off from the world by the 'Iron Curtain'. General L.G. Ivashov, who always expresses conceptual views, proposes a project of Euro-Asian civilization union (the modern counterpart of the Slavophile project) based on the development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 'as an alternative and a balancer to the West and the transnational community'.² A member of the State Duma, a member of the Yedinaya Rossiya (the United Russia) party and a member of its political council E.A. Fedorov express views that are much more drastic. He speaks about the Russian government (though he himself occupies a high rank in the party, members of which constitute the Russian government), that it 'is controlled via the mechanisms of corruption, which is why corruption is now an unsolvable problem. It has been prohibited by the Americans to solve the problem'.³ He believes that Russia now had the dual power, 'on the one hand – protégés of the Zionist occupation administration (the Government), and on the other – President Putin, relying on the support of the nation and some reasonable people'.⁴ Liberals – 'neo-Westerners' also criticize

the government, but they are dissatisfied with a different thing. A political scientist at the Carnegie Moscow Centre L.F. Shevtsova believes that the philosophy of the Russian identity under Putin is nothing but 'a model of ruling'. This model, according to her, 'implies opposition to the Western influence both within the Russian society, and on the territory of the former Soviet Union'. This model serves as a justification of Russia's claim 'to secure the traditional moral values from the Western effiteness and degradation'.⁵

By the way, it is the thesis of the moral degradation of the West that causes the advocates of the peculiar character of the civilisation in the Islamic world to reject the Western cultural expansion. The Islamic world also builds its models of development in the conditions of acute confrontation between advocates of opposite concepts.

Is the age-old dispute between the supporters of different models of Russia's development evidence of the conflict of identity, which has not yet been eliminated in Russia, or is it a distinctive feature of the two-faced nature of its civilisation?

I note that to some extent the identification challenge is faced by all societies. As an example let us refer to the thesis of 'Eurabia'⁶ which appeared in Western Europe not so long ago. This thesis reflected the fears felt by the Europeans of the possible transformation of the European civilization under the pressure of assimilation-proof waves of migrants from the states of the Arab East and the Muslim world. Along with it, there has appeared the term 'Londonistan', reflecting a very widespread (including in Russia) belief that the British capital has become a centre of clandestine jihadist groups of all stripes. There has also appeared the theory of 'Arab-Islamic conspiracy', which aims to undermine Europe. The theory, as noted by Ali Allawi (the Iraqi minister in the recent past, now an American professor), is no less absurd than the 'Protocols of the Elders of Zion'.

Russia has not been struck by the virus of Islamophobia, as for centuries our multinational and multi-faith country has been an impressive example of coexistence, mutual cultural enrichment and respect for one another of many ethnic and religious groups within a single social organism. However, the acute conflict between the West and the Islamic world, the waves of Islamic extremism, which have affected some regions of Russia, as well as the massive and uncontrolled migration processes have still worsened the climate of relations between these groups. Supporters of the Eurasian choice who appear to be supposed to build bridges between Russia and the Islamic world (indeed, can we take the union with China seriously?), but they, as well as nationalists, who generally have a negative attitude to all the 'others', often exhibit bias to the Muslim civilization as such.

However, within this discourse, adherents of the 'neo-pochvennichestvo' tend to blame the West, and in the first place the United States, of all the ills of the world. While on air of the radio broadcasting service 'Golos Rossii' ('Voice

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² Ivashov Leonid. *Rossii nuzhen sobstvennyj geopoliticheskij projekt*. (Russia needs its own geopolitical project) Academy of geopolitical problems. July, 10, 2012.

³ *Znanie – Vlast*, № 25, June, 2012.

⁴ *Russia News Agency*, October, 25, 2013.

⁵ Shevtsova, Liliya. *Russkaja matrica: iskusstvo perevoploshhenija*. (Russian matrix: the art of transformation). Carnegie Moscow Center. November, 2013. P. 2.

⁶ In particular, it is described in detail by A. Allawi: Allawi, Ali A., *The Crisis of Islamic Civilization*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2009, p. 182–185.

of Russia') and responding to the question about the activities of Islamic terrorists in Syria, the head of the St. Petersburg branch of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, an expert on Ancient East A.L. Vassoyevich argues that 'radical Islamist groups are managed by the United States of America'¹. Overwhelmed with the high-pitched ambitions to unmask fundamentalists, the St. Petersburg professor did not only affix the blame for setting up 'Al-Qaeda' to the USA (which is only partly unreasonable), but also did a great honour to the British intelligence, saying that it (and not Sheikh Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, as we naïvely used to believe) created Wahhabism in the 18th century. By the way, let us note that in the 1920s, as evidenced by our foreign archives, Russian diplomats reacted positively to Saudi expansion. However, of course, this reaction was due not the love to Wahhabism, but due to the fact that they saw the puritanical Najd movement as a force independent from the colonialists, a force which aimed to unite Arabia within a single independent state body. In a letter to the Russian representative in Hejaz K.A. Hakimov People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR G.V. Chicherin wrote: 'Our interests in the Arab question boil down to the unification of the Arab lands into a unified whole'. Therefore, he wrote that he thought it possible for the Turkish-Wahhabi to develop a rapport (how relevant this thesis is today!) and transform 'into some Muslim movement against Western imperialism'². At first, the possibility of Ibn Saud being an 'English henchman' was left open, but still, not without a reason, Moscow saw Ibn Saud's enemy – the Sharif of Mecca Hussein – as an 'English henchman'. Later, after the Wahhabis had captured Mecca and Medina, Chicherin wrote to the Soviet ambassador in Tehran: 'One of the means of pressure on Ibn Saud is now the campaign against the Wahhabis, who are allegedly responsible for the destruction in Mecca and Medina. This campaign is currently being conducted in Muslim countries by England. In an effort to isolate Ibn Saud ... the British agents use fanaticism of the Muslim masses against the Wahhabis, to weaken Ibn Saud and get him to compromise with Hijaz and agree to the British proposals'³.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which the Soviet Union was the first to recognize, and not the United Kingdom, however, in actual fact, was not a nation-state, as it was established on a religious basis (in conjunction with tribal grounds). Another rare example of a formation of this kind after World War II was Pakistan, where the status of the official language was given not to the Punjabi language, which is spoken by the largest indigenous ethnic group, but to Urdu – the language of Muslim immigrants from India. As for Saudi Arabia, for all these years there has been a process in progress of forming the national identity based on a strange-sounding marker – 'Saudi', after the ruling clan.

Incidentally, in the 1920s, while the Soviet Union was actively building the nation in Central Asia the local leaders did not only react favourably to the appearance of a Salafi preacher nicknamed al-Shami al-Tarabulsi ('a Syrian from Tripoli'), but they also helped him to campaign against the

local Sufis⁴. This was accounted for by the fact that at that time it was the local 'traditional' Sufi sheikhs who were the main opponents for the regime in the battle for the minds of the local Muslims and Salafism or Wahhabism posed no real threat.

Over time, the situation has changed dramatically. One of the essential features of the situation in the world, especially in the last 15 years was the sharp conflict between the West and the Islamic world. The conflict in which some authors tend to see only civilizational roots, others – political ones.

We can agree that the divide between the civilizations of the West and the Islamic world is the role played by religion in society and the state and people's attitude to its role. One must bear it in mind that, first, in the midst of Western civilization there also are countries with a fairly high level of piousness, although they may be countries with a secular state system, as, for instance, in the United States. Secondly, in the Islamic world there were 'tides' of atheistic thought (especially in the 1920s, to a large extent – under the influence of the October Revolution in Russia and the Communist parties set up in the East) and there appeared regimes based on secular principles (Turkey at the times of Atatürk and his followers, Tunisia at the times of Bourguiba). The Egyptian Ismail Mazhar (1891–1962) founded a publishing house Dar al-Usool in Cairo to promote atheism. This publishing house brought out a translated work by Charles Darwin 'The Origin of Species' hated by Islamists and no less alien to them 'Why I am not a Christian' by Bertrand Russell. Another active advocate of atheism, who graduated from Moscow State University, Ismail Adham (1911–1940) for this purpose created an association first in Turkey and then in Egypt. He drowned in the Mediterranean, leaving a note in which he asked to cremate his body and not to bury him in a Muslim cemetery. Since the late 1920s and in the 1930s craving for Islam began to increase and the secular and atheistic propaganda was becoming less popular. An Egyptian intellectual and a Sorbonne graduate Muhammad Hussein Heikal (1889–1956), who began with the publication of a three-volume research about Jean-Jacques Rousseau, came to prominence after his work 'The Life of Muhammad'⁵ published in 1935, which later on became the classics. At that time Abbas Mahmoud Al-Akkad, who made the start with chanting English romantic poets, took a sudden turning for Islam. Among his disciples there was probably the most famous preacher of radical Islam Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who was executed in Egypt in the reign of G. A. Nasser. As well as his teacher, he began as a poet and a literary critic. His writings are still a source of inspiration for many of today's jihadists.

In the works of contemporary Islamic thinkers one can find a polemical discourse, quite comparable with the Russian disputes between Westerners and Pochvenniki. Mahmoud Haider, while reviewing a book by Taha Abd ar-Rahman on the spirit of 'Islamic modernity' (ruh al-Islamiya al-Hadassah) draws particular attention to his distinguishing between two categories of Islamic authors. First, it is the 'avant-garde' writers, who replace the traditional Islamic concepts with modern Western ones; instead of Shura – democracy, instead of Ummah – the state, instead

¹ *Rossii muzhno byt' gotovoj k ljubym nestandardnym reshenijam ee geopoliticheskikh partnerov* (Russia should be ready for any nonstandard decisions of its geopolitical partners). 'Golos Rossii' ('Voice of Russia'), January, 14, 2014.

² Chicherin to Hakimov, November 1, 1924. – AVPR (Archive of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, f. 0127, inventory 1, p. 1, d. 5, l. 31).

³ *Dokumenty vneshnej politiki SSSR*. (Documents of Foreign policy of the USSR) Vol. 8. Moscow, 1961, p. 61.

⁴ For detail see: Naumkin, Vitaly, *Radical Islam in Central Asia: between Pen and Rifle*. Boulder, Rowman and Littlefield, 2005, p. 40–41.

⁵ See: 'Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, *The Human Rights Tradition in Islam*. Westport, Connecticut; London, Praeger Perspectives: 2005, p. 118–119.

of usury – profit, etc. Secondly, it is their antipodes – ‘traditionalists’ who reject the concepts transferred from the West in favor of traditional concepts of Islam: not secularism (‘ilmaniyya) but knowledge of the world (al-‘ilm bi-e-dunya – an Arabic term which has a common root with the term secularism, but drawn from a saying of Prophet Muhammad, ‘You know more about your world’ – ‘Antum a ‘lyamu bi-Umur dunyakum’), not a religious war – al-harb al-diniyya but the opening (an Arabic term *fath* that is used to refer to the medieval Arab-Muslim conquest)¹. Well known is the tempestuous debate concerning the compatibility of Islamic doctrinal standards with democratic values. Islam and democracy – this topic is being actively discussed at many conferences and symposiums, meetings of religious leaders, experts and politicians. According to one view, the question itself of the possibility to combine the values of Islamic civilization with democratic principles is fundamentally wrong because it is democratic in nature and does not require any borrowing whatsoever values from other systems. Advocates of another point of view accuse Islamic societies of authoritarianism, human rights abuses and lack of freedom, etc. There are also advocates of the concept of convergence.

Here is an example in this regard concerning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. When it was being created the Arab world was represented by a known at that time Lebanese politician, Christian Charles Malik (during the Civil War of 1975–1990 he was the ‘ideological mentor’ of Lebanese Forces – right-wing Christian militia)². It was not until later that in the Islamic world there appeared a rejection of certain provisions of the Declaration, in particular, of Article 18, which guarantees freedom to choose faith and to change it, which is contrary to the basic provisions of the Sharia. As a result, within the framework of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) the Cairo Declaration of Human Rights was developed, which was adopted at the OIC Summit in Cairo in August 1990 (remember that Russia has an observer status in this organization, now called the Organization of Islamic Cooperation). It is not difficult to guess that with the adoption of the Cairo Declaration basic contradiction with the rules of Shari’ah, primarily – the provisions of Article 18- were eliminated. But how uncompromising are the concepts of human rights in Shari’ah and in most countries of the world? Overall, can we talk today about the absolute universality of any concept in this area? Can we assume that in the foreseeable future the modernization process in Islam will lead to the removal of the ban on the conversion of Muslims to another faith?

The success of this process will depend largely on what shape future relations between different cultures and civilizations will take. According to Ian N. Peters³, we can talk about three globalizational and cultural paradigms, or perspectives: about cultural differentialism or lasting differences; cultural convergence, or increasing sameness; cultural hybridization, or constant mixing. The key here is the attitude towards cultural and civilizational differences: whether globalization will lead to levelling and erasing them by way of some differences taking over others, homogenization (convergence); or whether they will, on the contrary,

be strengthened, perpetuated (differentialism underlying the theory of the ‘clash of civilizations’ of Samuel Huntington); or whether the process of their mixing (hybridization) will take place. It should be noted that the discourse based on this known yet in the 19th century concept of hybridization, was developed in the West in literature devoted to the phenomenon of migration. This discourse is an antidote of ‘essentialism’, ‘boundary fetishism’ and ‘cultural differentialism of racist and nationalist doctrines’⁴, the key notions of which are ethnicity and identity. Hybridization in a sense can be interpreted as a potential loss of both. Fetishization of cross-cultural boundaries is opposed by the thesis of their inevitable erosion. The key constructs characteristic of the concept of hybridization are mixing and syncretism. Its proponents analyze such processes as creolization, miscegenation and orientalizing of the Western society. In this context, the Muslim East here serves as the agent of hybridization.

I remember one fact that has almost been forgotten today. Ottoman sultans kept the name ‘Constantinople’, along with the Turkish ‘Istanbul’ until 1930, when binomy was abolished and the capital of Turkey became known as Istanbul exclusively. I think that the preservation of the old name was accounted for by the desire of the Ottoman sultans to transfer to themselves the greatness of the imperial Byzantine capital, show themselves the heirs of its culture. Dual identification here worked for the image of the state. To some extent, this approach can be likened to a new interpretation of the relationship between the Russian principalities and the Golden Horde, now voiced by a number of prominent Russian historians. But can we speak in this context about the civilizational rapprochement, for example, of Arabs and Jews – bearers of the two Abrahamic religions which are very close to each other in spirit? Today, such a possibility, it seems to me, is blocked by the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict and the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories. Palestinians, losing faith in the possibility of creating their own state, are increasingly turning to the idea of creating a single democratic Arab-Jewish state. However, they realize that there is no alternative to the concept of two states and the plans to set up a single state will never be brought into execution.

At the same time, this concept is supported by a number of individual Western critics of Israel, who are increasing in number, and among the U.S. Jewish community. Even the critical reaction of the Western leaders to the sharp statement made by Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan, who compared Zionism to Nazism, though not long in coming, was still relatively soft. On the contrary, it was after this when Obama forced Netanyahu to apologize for the attack on the Turkish flotilla heading for Gaza, which resulted in nine Turkish citizens killed. My attention was drawn to an article by a Philosophy professor from the University of Massachusetts at Amherst Joseph Levine, which was published in ‘The New York Times’. The author questions the usual interpretation according to which any denial of the right of Israel to exist is a manifestation of anti-Semitism. He writes: ‘My view is that it is *necessary* to question Israel’s right to exist, and that to do so does not mean to show anti-Semitism’. But he adds: ‘If we are talking about its existence *as a Jewish state*.’ According to Levine, the Jews should be unconditionally given the right to live in the land

¹ Hajder Mahmud. Ruh al’-Hadasa al’-Islamijja. Al’-Fasljjja: Iran va-l’-Arab, Iranian-Arab Affairs Quarterly, Issue 28, Year 10, Spring 2012, p. 161 f.

² Allawi, op. cit., p. 189.

³ Pieterse, Ian Nederveen. *Globalization and Culture: Global Mélange*. Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield: 2009, p. 44.

⁴ Pieterse, op. cit., p. 55, 102.

of their ancestors, but it still does not entail the right to a 'Jewish state'. Incidentally, in the 18th-19th centuries, when Jews were fighting for emancipation, breaking the ghetto walls, they considered anti-Semitism *any* denial of their right to be loyal citizens of the European state in which they lived. J. Levine urges people not to substitute the notion of a nation in its civic sense by a notion based on ethnicity (which is reminiscent of discussions held in our country today about the 'Russian nation'). A nation in the ethnic sense, as Levin emphasizes, must have a common language, culture, history and loyalty to the common territory, which makes it difficult to apply this concept to the Jews. A nation in the civic sense is united by a common citizenship and residence on the territory that has defined boundaries. However, 20% of the residents of Israel are not Jewish and the majority of world Jewry do not live in Israel. In a civic sense, one should speak of the 'State of Israel' and not of a Jewish state.

I will not cite all of Levine's arguments on this topic, which are strange for the Western discourse and irritating for those who live in Israel. I will only mention his conclusion in which he states that the depriving the non-Jewish citizens (mostly Palestinians) of a chance to join the people of Israel and enjoy full rights violates the democratic principle of equality of all its citizens'. Levine speaks about the 'inevitable conflict between the concepts of the Jewish state and a democratic state.' The author notes that not a long time ago there was a public outcry in Israel about the exclusion of ultra-orthodox parties from the ruling coalition, but no one there takes any notice of the fact that no Arab party has ever been invited to join the government. I will note that the authors of such statements in Israel are usually branded as self-hating Jews'.¹ By the way, among these are famous people such as George Soros, Woody Allen, Uri Avnery, Sandy Berger and others, criticising Israel for various aspects of its policy. This is a manifestation of the same identity crisis and of the 'siege mentality' inherent in the Israeli establishment, which is noted by many authors.

We cannot but agree with the researchers who speak of the typological similarity in the positions of the Palestinian Arabs living in Israel and Israeli *Mizrahim* – the Jews that came from the countries of Middle East and North Africa. Both consider themselves 'victims of Ashkenazi Zionism', both suffer from discrimination, which turns them – although in different ways – into misfits. According to Atalia Omer, while the Palestinian Arabs build their protest on the paradigm of human rights, 'the argument of Mizrahi Jews brings systematic inequality characteristic of Israeli 'state' to its exclusivist, ethno-republican interpretation of the 'nation'.²

The crisis of identity is inextricably linked with the stability of the modern system of nation-states. In the past few decades, as you know, a number of such countries in various regions of the world (the USSR, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Sudan) disintegrated, and new ones have emerged. The phenomenon of the Arab Spring has made some experts and politicians speak about the crisis of post-colonial con-

figuration of the Middle East,³ or the end of the Sykes-Picot created after the World War I. Historians remember how arbitrarily and hastily the French and British colonizers drew the lines of the borders between the parts of the Arab vilayets seized from the Ottoman Empire. At some international conferences whole sections were themed on 'the end of Sykes-Picot system' (for example, at the authoritative Istanbul forum in 2013). At the same forum but one year earlier a famous Turkish writer, while speaking about the causes of the Arab Spring, referred to the fact that Arab countries supposedly did not know their own national statehood and had been created 'out of the fragments of the Ottoman Empire'. However strange it might be, in this statement he ignored the fact that, for example, the extended Egyptian statehood, despite some periods of foreign domination, is, unlike Turkey, several millennia years old. Certainly, this statement reflects the neo-Osman discourse, which is quite popular in Turkey today, which, in turn, suggests that the post-imperial national statehood of Turkey is not yet deep-rooted in the minds of the Turks. I believe that the policy of Ankara with regard to the Syrian crisis was partly dictated by the fact that a certain part of the Turkish political elite tends to see Syria as 'fragment' mentioned above or, at least, as one of the components of 'strategic depth'. French analyst and ex-ambassador Jean-Paul Filiu believes that the system of post-colonial borders and state formations outlined by them has outlived itself.⁴ In the countries of Middle East such a discourse is also rather widespread. Iranian researchers Seyed Abdulali Ghava and Mohammad Gheisari claim that the very concept of a nation-state, like the ideology of nationalism, was brought to the Middle East from the West.⁵

In the words of Ian Peters, who was mentioned above, only the period from 1840 to 1960 was an era of 'nations' and 'the dark side of nation building has been the marginalization, expulsion, expropriation, oppression of foreigners, as in politics of national cleansing. Turkey (Armenians and others), Germany (Jews), Uganda (Indians), Nigeria (Ghanaians), Bulgaria (ethnic Turks), India (Muslims) are familiar cases in point... but they are only the top of the iceberg'.⁶ In the past few decades, however, the fervour of nation states has somewhat subsided, giving way to globalization, regionalism and the era of ethnicity. The role of expatriate communities is becoming generally recognized, 'national' identities are seen as mixed ones, and preservation of cultural diversity is now a universally acknowledged imperative.

Nevertheless, the attitude towards immigrants has become one of the watersheds between the advocates of different models of development proposed to Russia, and this is where the nationalists and Westerners often join their efforts in an attempt to restrict the influx of "aliens", even though the latter are our former Soviet-era compatriots. Any restriction on the movement of people means resistance to globalization and the three flows of global circulation (capital and goods; information; and people), of which only the first two cannot be stopped (economic and cultural protec-

¹ See: Siniver, Asaf, "Israeli Identities and the Politics of Threat: A Constructivist Interpretation". *Ethnopolitics*, Volume 11, Issue 1, March 2012, p. 35–36.

² Omer, Atalia, *When Peace Is Not Enough: How the Israeli Peace Camp Thinks about Religion, Nationalism, and Justice*. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press: p. 268.

³ See, for example: Ayad, Cristoph, "La fin d'un Ordre Colonial", *Le Monde*, 15 February 2013.

⁴ See: Filiu, Jean-Pierre, *The Arab Revolution – Ten Lessons from the Democratic Uprising*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

⁵ Ghava, Seyed Abdulali, Gheisari, Mohammad, "Nationalism and Nation-State Building in the Middle East", *Middle East Studies Quarterly*, 71, Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies, Vol. 19, No. 4, Winter 2013, p. 11–36.

⁶ Pieterse, op. cit., p. 34–35.

tionism is generally futile). It would be appropriate to mention Dani Rodrik's 'trilemma' of irreconcilability between hyper-globalization, democracy and national self-determination as the first notion is global in essence, the second one is characteristic of states, and the last one is national by definition.¹ In as far back as the 18th century, Ernest Renan defined 'nation' as 'an everyday plebiscite'.² The famous French philosopher obviously meant that a nation could be united and cohesive only inasmuch as the people constituting it put their faith in this.

In terms of the widely discussed topic of a high level of violence and the immediate problems associated with the problems of inter- and intra-faith, interethnic relations, the identity choice and the fates of nation-states, the keen fight emanating from the Arab Spring convulsions, I would like to note that one can find numerous examples of exasperation outside of the Arab and Muslim world as well. American researcher Christopher Hitchens writes, not without acrimony, that he cannot deny the Dalai Lama 'some charm and magnetism', but the same can be said of the British Queen, which, however, does not rule out the very criticism of hereditary monarchy. Likewise, 'the first foreign visitors to Tibet were downright appalled at the feudal domination, and hideous punishments, that kept the population in permanent serfdom to a parasitic monastic elite'.³ Hitchens also notes that there are many killers and sadists among

the advocates of seemingly peaceful religions like Hinduism and Buddhism. Indeed, such facts are widely known. He recalls that the beautiful Island of Ceylon was badly destroyed by violence and repressions sparked by a long armed conflict between Buddhists and Hindus. Even the decision of the Sinhalese Buddhists to change the island's name to Sri Lanka (which means 'Sacred island' in Sinhalese) antagonized the Hindu Tamil minority that prefers to call it in their own way – Ilam⁴. At the same time, discrimination against the Tamils cannot justify their suicide bombings, carried out mainly by women, as a means of revenge for insults.⁵

In Burma, which has changed its name to Myanmar, the Muslim minority of Rohingya (who number no more than 800,000 people) are subjected to severe persecution, despite the recently started democratization. As a result, the authorities and the Buddhist community (especially the Arakans who live side by side with the Muslims) face strong criticism across the Islamic world and even calls for jihad issued by some radical groups. In Africa, Muslims are brutally murdered by adherents of some Christian sects.

All of the abovementioned makes the inter-civilisational dialogue an undoubtedly important tool for preventing the hostility resulting from the identity crisis of ethnic and confessional groups, societies and states in the era of hyper-globalization, from developing into bloody wars.

Vasil Prodanov⁶

THE SEVEN CULTURES OF GLOBALIZED NEOLIBERAL CAPITALISM

"The Seven Cultures of Capitalism", a very popular work by Charles Hampden-Turner, Alfons Trompenaars, undertakes to analyze the world not by perceiving it as a group of opposing military-political systems but rather as a group of cultural areas, where capitalism is developing most successfully.⁷ I would also review the "seven cultures" of capitalism and not regard them from the perspective of geographical division but consider their coexistence and interaction in the globalized public sphere of the present. These are the cultures of individual success, scandal, pornification, fear, image, show and violence respectively, which are gradually coming to dominate the contents and the functions of the media and public sphere which they create. Their common denominator is that they are the best selling cultures on the capitalist market, the most sought after cul-

tural products. The public sphere functions through constant interaction of these seven cultures representing the main dimensions of the globalized cultural market.

The culture of individual success

In the globalized and competitive market environment the imposition of a set of values, objectives, and attitudes embodying the culture of individual success is of crucial importance for the mere existence of that environment. It fully legitimizes the existing reality, it explains and justifies everybody's position in the social stratification as well as the actions necessary for a change in that position. The cultural hegemony needed for the perpetuation of the globalized market environment is imposed by promoting in the public sphere the paragons and images of successful individuals, who achieved success by virtue of chance or their personal qualities. These now serve as a benchmark for the millions of others, who have not achieved as much but are aspiring to. In that way the poor, the needy and the hapless are not referencing the life style of their fellow peers but are comparing themselves to the rich and successful, and are striving for the same level of success as them – something which according to the cultural and media environment is within everyone's reach. The globalized public sphere supplies dreams, hopes and ideas that everybody has a chance of making it as long as he tries hard enough and long enough. It is full of the so called "success stories" – tales of self-made men that rose to the top in an era termed

¹ See: Rodrik, Dani, *The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2011.

² Renan, Ernest, *Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?* Paris, Ancienne Maison Michel Lévy Frères: 1882.

³ Hitchens, Christopher, *God is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything*. New York, Boston, Twelve: 2009, p. 200.

⁴ Hitchens, op. cit., p. 199.

⁵ They were trained by a separatist terrorist organization 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam'.

⁶ Corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. He is an author of more than 500 scientific publications, including 21 monographs: "Good and dzhimo", "Cognition and values", "Bioticsocial values", "Bioethics", "Civil society and global capitalism", "Violence during the modern era", "The Future of philosophy", "Sociology of Philosophy", "Theory of Bulgarian transition", etc. He is a member of the editorial boards of several scientific journals.

⁷ Hampden-Turner, Charles and Alfons Trompenaars. *The Seven Cultures of Capitalism*, London: Piatkus, 1994.

“casino capitalism” by Susan Strange over a quarter century ago. She says that “the increase in uncertainty has made inveterate, and largely involuntary, gamblers of us all”.¹ That metaphor describes contemporary market capitalism with its gigantic financial superstructure which is multiple times larger than the real economy and makes social and economic life much more uncertain and risky. Between 96% and 98% of global financial assets change hands as a result of speculative operations, aiming to buy or sell securities, or currency for profit. In that environment the profit and loss are to the largest extent a result of speculation in a virtual game of financial wheeling and dealing in which millions of people bet, buying stocks, bonds etc., with the risk of winning or losing being comparable to betting on the lottery, the horse races or gambling in a casino.

There are two general versions of the paragons of success being packaged and marketed to the public. The main version is that of the “casino society” where success is a result of chance and anybody could potentially get lucky, with no predetermined favorites. In that type of society there are countless game shows offering large cash prizes, cars and other objects, the dominant principles are those of lottery, casinos, slot machines, and reality shows where any average Joe could become rich and famous overnight. Indeed, the number of people that bank on success in life not by following the precepts of traditional Protestant ethics but by engaging in casino behavior is directly related to the process of overshadowing the real economy by the speculative one.

The second, subordinate, version of the “success story” promoted in the liberal public sphere is about individual success resulting from personal efforts and merits. This represents a traditional liberal notion from the early stages of development of capitalism, which emphasizes the relation between personal qualities, intellect and efforts, and the outcome of those in a competitive environment. In the past, when the real economy producing material goods was still dominant, that notion legitimized its existence, but nowadays it has been reduced to a secondary role. It now interacts with and reinforces the perception of success as a result of chance and luck that could befall upon anyone, and legitimizes a reality where personal efforts are not nearly enough because there are so many external, independent globalized forces impacting individual outcomes that the chances of winning or losing are as random as a roll of a dice. And in a world where everything is a result of a chance there is no one to blame or to be mad at when you end up on the losing side.

The Culture of Scandal

In the postmodern situation the liberal state is fully dependent on public opinion. It is being constantly probed by sociologists and journalists, and the state endeavors to carry out its policy in accordance with what the public thinks or needs at any given time. That makes policy very susceptible to emotions, demagoguery, PR concerns and lobbying. There are two crucial points here: firstly, reputations and moral images are being created or destroyed virtually in an instant as a result of the large number of media and communication/networking capabilities; secondly, that process happens to a large degree at random, following the natural logic of chaos theory, while the logic of competing media in

the oversaturated public sphere is that of the show, the “society of spectacle”, as Guy Debord would put it.² The spectacle however would be impossible without the “Hosanna” and “Crucify him” outcries, the drastic oscillations or information shocks. Scandals become the key instruments in this kind of shocks. They turn the violations of certain norms, the breach of the boundaries of normality, the move beyond what’s morally and legally acceptable, the shakeup of moral sensitivity of the majority of the citizens into facts and tales of the public sphere. In most cases that is done through information that impairs the image and undermines the reputation of certain public figures.

Indeed, for that reason in knowledge based societies, operating in conditions of intense competition, reputation and image become key for the success of various agents – politicians, parties, businesses, states etc. The public sphere is being actively filled with positive and negative PR of different subjects, with brands, and with “intangible capital”, and these all take part in its transformation beyond what was characteristic for it in the modern era. All that creates the conditions necessary for the rise of the “culture of scandal” phenomenon and manipulation through images that are not just actively replacing reality but are indeed an active instrument for impacting and transforming that reality.

In the USA, where the public sphere has been evolving in the most intensive manner over the last century, it is believed that the Watergate Affair and the Vietnam war are the milestones that mark the start of a new era of public sphere development, that makes scandal the main instrument necessary for it to function properly, as well as a factor of vital importance for the existence of the media.

The Culture of pornification

The development of modern public sphere in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century follows in many respects the cultural characteristics, deriving from Protestant ethics and the Victorian epoch, where sexuality is not present in the public eye but is kept entirely within the dominion of the intimate. This is a public sphere that creates the social preconditions for the Freudian scheme, where “IT” – the public taboos and external censorship repress sexuality and exile it into the subconscious. Similarly, public sphere development under socialism in its early stages follows the ascetic cultural perceptions of early modernization. Sexual biases, language and manifestations are put under the common denominator of indecency, which is acceptable at most only in informal communication.

All this begins to change in the 60ies with the rise of consumer culture and the radical leftist riots in the developed Western countries, along with the development of new communication technologies and the change of balance between public and private. What used to appear indecent, shameful, vulgar and thus unsuitable for the public sphere, has now come to permeate different parts of it, with the help of the media and mass culture.

A phenomenon emerges known as “pornification of the public sphere”. It is first identified in Jim Sleeper’s article “Behind the Deluge of Porn, a Conservative Sea-Change”, where he notes that contemporary man lives in an “Erotic empire” of sorts, peeking at him from every billboard advertising underwear, every erectile dysfunction ad, every poster for yet another erotic show at a local bar, and all dif-

¹ Strange, Susan. *Casino Capitalism*, New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986, p. 3.

² Debord, Guy. *Society of the Spectacle*, Rebel Press, 2004.

ferent sorts of images invading our lives through cable TV. *“The pornification of public spaces and narratives, an eros-burning equivalent of second-hand smoke, isn't malevolent as much as it's a mindless groping of our persons to goose profits and market share. Don't call it free speech; these sensors are beyond censors. They aren't bringing us artists' art, activists' politics, or fellow-citizens' opinions, and the only social message in there leering come-ons is this: 'Our company can bypass your brain and heart and go for your erogenous and other viscera on its way to your wallet. Nothing personal, by the way'.”*¹

That trend is based on radical changes in sexual ethics removing previous social taboos and regulators and turning that sphere entirely into a matter of personal choice and personal rights, where society should not interfere. In a world of consumer culture the naked body and erotica are among the most powerful marketing tools. Sexual deviant behavior receives special attention from the media, while public figures who demonstrate that kind of behavior become media stars. There is special attention and emphasis on details by the media in describing such phenomena as prostitution, pedophilia and various forms of sexual violence. This becomes leading news and the detailed descriptions more often than not become user guides of sorts. In the process of pornification, vulgarization and degradation of language, the boundary between decent and indecent, euphemistic and naturalistic expression of one of the same thing, related to human sexuality, gradually disappears. Sex scenes become permanent fixture in movies. Taboos are gone and the bounds between what is allowed and what is forbidden for the most part are erased.

The culture of fear

Market competition and the oversupply of cultural products lead to the imposition of a mass culture based on the sense of anxiety and fear of the audience, offering an increasing number of products centered on disasters, accidents, catastrophes. These become the favorite ingredients in movies, media and marketing productions. Different competing social groups are trying to impose their ideas through the use of fear. Politicians, media, corporations, ecological organizations incessantly broadcast warnings of impending dangers, which could not be averted unless the agenda promoted by them is followed to the letter. The PR strategies of competing parties in the public sphere are in many respects competing models of inevitable disasters that would follow if their political opponent rises to power or maintains power, and how each one of them would avert those disasters, if people give them their vote.

The fear of old age, of gaining weight and losing your looks, getting AIDS or some other disease, the fear of losing your job or losing people that are dear to you, the fear of getting robbed or losing your social status, the fear of failure, the fear of global warming, financial crises and God knows what else are the most effective sales tool for any kind of product – from facial cream and dietary supplements to steel doors and security cameras for improving the safety of your home. All this permeates the public sphere and generates a large number of phobias of various kinds, being continuously stimulated with information flowing in the public sphere. Mass manipulation through fear creates

and maintains a constant feeling of anxiety, a general susceptibility to fear unrelated to specific events, phenomena or people, which however very easily identifies with random things and finds justification in them. Fear in a lot of ways detaches an individual from his real experiences and injects negative meaning into all kinds of random occurrences.

When the media are fighting for existence sensations, shock and especially fear very quickly become the tools of choice for winning audiences. Good news have low ratings, it's bad news that really sell – corruption, inflation, scandal, murder, crime, disaster, negative trends etc., these appear on the front pages and make the headlines of TV news bulletins. That creates the “culture of fear” phenomenon, depicting a public sphere that produces risks which are disproportionately large compared to the risks of everyday life. Shock and fear are used as marketing tools for attracting attention. Various intimidation techniques are being employed – careful screening of the facts and emphasizing on those that seem the scariest; isolated social events are being generalized as representative of dominant trends; statistics are being doctored and specific social groups are being stigmatized.

The Culture of Image

The development of modern public sphere up until the 70ies is based on newspapers and radio and focuses on presenting information that is not centered around a dominant image. The media are then used as tools for relaying information and representing facts and events as they really are. In that type of public sphere the main interactions are related to the written and oral culture of the participants.

Things start to change with the rise of television, especially from the 70ies onwards, when written and oral culture gradually begin to give ground to visual culture, which is gaining dominance due to the development of electronic media. Visual culture is driven by appearance, telegenicity and photogenicity, and the image of each event becomes the main form of information delivery. In the public sphere, previously dominated by millions of listeners, the dominant role is gradually shifting towards viewers, who are able to receive information through numerous senses simultaneously. This new public sphere engages comprehensively man's main senses and appears a lot more trustworthy, creating a virtual image reality, which gradually replaces man's genuine reality, and becomes a crucial factor in the formation of behavioral norms and attitudes, through which man is supposed to perceive this new environment. Identification with media personas, perceptual illusion of taking part in events, and presence on the spot are some of the effects that develop as a result.

Digital cameras, the ever increasing number of cameras for security and observation everywhere, the ability that now millions have to photograph anything and anybody with their mobile phones, the development of second generation Internet (web 2.0), and especially photo and video sharing sites such as flickr and youtube make images the most crucial ingredient in the recipe for media production. The previous “Gutenberg Galaxy” is replaced by the culture of images, where the degree of subjectivity and emotional elements in perceptions is much higher, despite the fact that virtual environment generates a much stronger sense of reality and has a much deeper impact. Image-based informa-

¹ Sleeper, Jim. Behind the Deluge of Porn, a Conservative Sea-Change, *Salmagundi*, N.Y., January 2005, p. 118.

tion, especially when enhanced with the tools of modern technology, could construct any reality in which genuine and false, possible and desired, existent and nonexistent are much more difficult to distinguish as they appear equally trustworthy as images. Furthermore, the virtual image reality adapts to the desires and fears of consumers, which makes it appear much more reliable than the immediate empirical reality, and thus able to set the baseline attitudes for perceiving that immediate reality. That is why the possibilities for manipulation and for placing human life, perceptions and beliefs into a virtual framework are larger than ever before.

The Culture of Entertainment (show)

While the culture of fear sells a product by invoking a sense of fear, the culture of entertainment places the emphasis on selling by appealing to the hopes and desires, dreams and unrealistic expectations of men, and by making them identify with beautiful, successful winning figures or images. The adoption of 8 hour work days in the modern era and the rise of consumer capitalism have transformed traditional ethics of labor and placed consumption and its derivatives – satisfaction and entertainment – into the center of the increased leisure time. To a large extent that is driven by the rise of television and other image generation technologies, that make possible the effective combination of TV and cinema.

The public sphere is subjected to the logic of national and global markets and operates in synchronicity with consumer standards and behavior. Thus, entertainment and show become key features of the public sphere. Anything can sell as long as it generates strong sensations, entertains, amuses, helps to release tension, or can create a beautiful imaginary world with attributes missing in real life that people can interact with. In that manner, the soap opera, the rock or pop concert, the TV game show, the sitcom with laughter track over every punch line, the constant commercial breaks offering some new product or service supposed to make our lives better, become key elements of

the public sphere, and form the very powerful culture of entertainment.

The culture of violence

In contemporary capitalist societies physical violence is nominally prohibited by the existing legal and educational systems. Attempts to use it are foiled and numerous civil society organizations stand guard of these norms that are viewed as characteristic to modern civilization. Physical violence, even when its subject is a criminal or a suspect of a criminal act, is considered to be in contradiction with existing norms. Exiled from the legal world it nevertheless roams free in the virtual world, transforming into a simulacrum that impacts the real world as well.

The main mechanism for that becomes the public sphere and the media in particular, where every act of violence, even an isolated one, becomes headline-worthy not only in criminal news bulletins but in primetime media coverage. On the other hand, violence, especially when visualized through the TV screen, computer games and countless action heroes, establishes standards and patterns of behavior in the real world. Admittedly, TV violence cannot be viewed as the sole and unequivocal reason for real life violence, as it interacts with numerous other factors that affect individual behavior. The media do not cause violence directly but they amplify it, becoming a social subsystem which provides positive reinforcement for real life events. Interacting with other factors they augment their role which ultimately creates strong positive correlation between real life violence and the one in the cultural and informational sphere.¹

On one hand, the concentration of violence-related information and the show culture of violence broadcast via actions, thrillers, songs and even cartoons impact the process of socialization of the younger generation and drive them to extreme forms of violence. On the other hand, the extensive coverage of these acts of violence in the public sphere becomes an additional catalyst for the rise of the virtual culture of violence through strong positive reinforcement.

Mehdi Sanaei²

GLOBALIZATION AND MULTICULTURALISM: CHANGINGS IN CONCEPTS AND FUNDAMENTALS

In the first years after break-up of Soviet Union disputes and talks of globalization reached its top. First of all this

¹ See: Halloran, D.J. Mass Communication: Symptom or Cause of Violence?, *International Social Science Journal*, 1978, Vol. 30, N 4, p. 7; Comstock, J. The Evidence of Television Violence, Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1976; Halloran, J.D. Brown, R.L., Chaney, D.C. Television and Delinquency, Leicester University Press, 1970.

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conception has been created under the influence of disturbances, arising from break-up of Soviet Union. Nevertheless not much time has passed when first simple thoughts of becoming a single culture in the world disappeared. Seemed that the spread of technology has created a similarity but this condition could not destroy the existing differences and diversity, and create a certain kind of common culture. By other side, focus on its differences and / or effort to use force to shape this process complicated changes occurring in the world. As an example, it may be noted that efforts of some more powerful countries after break-up of two polar world led of globalization has become from only social and cultural issue to a question which has ability to attract the attention of policy-makers. Moreover, in

conjunction of Politics and Economics these differences have been increased. Economic and political crises in the world was affecting in turn the issue of migration, and also strengthened pressure on members of all minorities. Thus was formed a certain desire to cultural differences, including racial, religious and national differences. Its amplitude was changing from positive to negative value, and it's just part of their work done. This article explains the concepts of interaction of globalization and multiculturalism, and explains the place of politics, economics and technology in these processes.

Preamble

Globalization – is a concept that gives definition of process of change in the world in second half of twentieth century we have witnessed. During this period decreased the value of countries, peoples and local laws, but laws and global processes prevailed. This process had an impact on the scope of domestic policy, local economies and traditional cultures. Among these areas there is a clash with culture of globalization and influence on their value in societies under their influence. However, the relationship between globalization and culture – it is something more than mentioned above. Of course, it is not a kind of imperative. It needs to pay attention to the fact that value of Multiculturalism is arises from various aspects of globalization and includes the presence of different cultures in the world to different cultures within their societies. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to talk about sovereignty of one of the world culture. This article is trying to answer the question: what factors and processes strengthen multiculturalism in a globalized world with supposition that technology, politics and economics in conflicting processes strengthen multiculturalism?

Globalization and Culture

To enter into the debate about multiculturalism should pay attention to sources of phenomena and its connection to each other, that is a connection of globalization and culture. When people talk about globalization, it means increased importance of these factors in supranational policies of all countries and world affairs. However, this change has broader aspects. In fact, the above change also converts relationship between man and his environment. According to John Tomlinson, a movement from one limited view towards to the open view not only means moving from “local order” to “global order”, but also means a greater impact communications, transport and “interdependence” between people as a consequence. As an example, the expansion of communication and increase in transport networks in addition to possibility of establishing long-distance communication has also created a different kind of political and cultural associations. (Tomlinson, 1999, 30)

At the same time, in addition to concept of “interdependence” theorists of concept of “globalization” have focused on strengthening the state of “global interdependence.” They believe in development of existing links between different parts of the world. At the same time globalization is developing in various areas (through barter, investment, services, and communication between people, knowledge, fashion and even organized crime, etc.). Growing interdependence and manifestation of global interdependence in the world led to the growth of transnational television

channels. These channels blur boundaries created in result of separation of inhabited areas by ethnic, tribal and other grounds. If not consider globalization as “turning the world into a single homogeneous whole” and “world unity” but also as “location in the world within,” in this case we obtain globalization as a moderate aspect. (Moini, 26–27, 1382).

From one point of view, decrease of State control over its citizens is the result of globalization in sense of values. This inevitable control in economic field is observed by increasing foreign investment to international level. However, this control is not limited by this area and spread to culture area. With growth of satellite television channels, Internet and privatization of culture decreased control of culture on a part of their societies, with a high density and large quantity of the societies there were exchanging between various political and cultural messages. However, these changes do not mean the formation of single “world culture.” (Moini, 27–28, 1382).

The second consequence of globalization is increasing local and global connection. In sense that any event in one part of the world can be known throughout the world and, thus, strengthen social ties in the world. At the same time, globalization and a growing world of social relations making distant points closer to each other with such a force that any event occurring in distance has an impact on all points with great speed. Exactly if event happened at some point. (Gidenz, 3, 1377). On other hand, globalization also has a contradictory impact on existing balance between man, people and world. That is, by one side, due to presence of multinational forces changed the balance between state and people, and conversely, by another side, also broken balance between man, state and nation. Thus, by separatist tendencies, ethnocentrism and ethnic aspirations are also important for damage to national sovereignty.

According Gidenza, globalization process does not contradict rational tendencies and aspirations, and globalization itself is a contradictory phenomenon. (Giddens, 1996, 48). The process of globalization is manifested in fact that people no longer feel “differences” to respect them, they become more sensitive. Such a reaction on a part of people can have differences controversial. Therefore, no need to excessively focus on integration aspects of globalization. Since you can not see disintegration of its aspects. For example, globalization of culture could not destroy concept of boundaries in the real world, on contrary – It has contributed to many conflicts in various parts of the world to strengthen existing borders and/or creation of new boundaries. Identity in many cases received more realistic value. Now it is necessary to pay attention to fact that between globalization and culture set such a linkage. The presence of various and diverse forms of distribution differences link between culture and globalization of culture or reaction to this process can be divided into three groups:

1. Cultural compatibility: this response to globalization consists of certain passivity Metamorphoses. By this connection Culture usually inactive in front of globalization and taking new culture losing their features. Such reaction usually considered as result of economic globalization in result of hegemony of capitalist order and transnational companies.

2. Cultural particularism: it's a different kind of connection between globalization and culture, which can be regarded as a cultural particularism. Contrary to opinion of

cultural compatibility or formation of single culture, some theorists believe that cultural reaction does not give up and do not become passive in regard to the process of globalization. In most cases, culture's reaction to globalization is accompanied by resistance and tense of confrontation even, which usually manifests itself in form of distinctive elements of culture as – language, religion, ethnicity and nationality. To put in differently, process of globalization which combines various aspects of modern life, strengthens and restores cultural differences also.

3. Cultural mixing and changing: consider third type of response to globalization process called a cultural mixing and changing . You can not really see the world with intricate and diverse culture only as an arena of struggle or passivity. Process of globalization in terms of culture with presence of cultural globalization puts on the same line of culture Self-identity, as are in result – relativism, coexistence and competition. This type of reaction usually call as hybridization change and offensive. There is a belief that culture in globalization process do not disappear and do not return to their original bases. But continue their existence, mixing with each other (Golmohamadi, 82–89, 1382).

Explaining above, it may says that local life, even today, continues to play an important role in human societies. In context of globalization this condition will also continue. In book “Globalization and culture” Tamlinson ,from the words of Roland Robertson, said about the concept of globalization – Localization (Tomlinson, 1999, 2). This duality, hidden in concept of globalization. In fact, globalization occurs in different societies. However, at the same time is localization of globalization, it means that society, which penetrated into globalization, digest it internally, or, in another words – localization “digests” globalization. But its discourse have shown more in form of culture. ArzhanApadurai separates from each other every political, economic and cultural areas for globalization, and then is developing for these areas five ranges – ethnicity, technology, finance, communication and ideology. In area of ethnicity, he points to tourists, immigrants, refugees and other social groups that are “in motion.” Technology area arises from interaction between old and new technologies, development of communication technology and human interaction. Financial area shows free movement of capital beyond control of the States.

Among it the most difficult are communication and ideology. In telecommunications area, he shows ability of communication as an important factor during globalization of culture. Ideology area also has power because of ideologized element and is mated with axis “state – people”. Apadurai convinced that every person, every ethnicity, every state and society in different ways explains – what is globalization , and it is not clear how much true these definitions correspond to actual concept of “globalization”. Thus, globalization is localized to the high degree. Its shows that people and society are not in a passive position to globalization, but with a different understandings of globalization they can show its reality in various forms (Appadurai, 1990, 295–310).

Contrary to theories about purity of the message, transmitter power and passive recipient, receptive theory and determining the value of recipient convinced that globalization is not necessarily accompanied with cultural expansion producers of cultural texts and messages. First of all, text

messages are transmitted in an environment wich contain contradictory elements; secondly, recipient is not passivity in relation to them, interpreting these texts remain hostages source codes; and thirdly, in the world which converted in a part of its ideological, concepts with its pretensions to objectivity , sincerity and truthfulness in conjunction, and departure from blinkers, focusing on differences, strengthening “marginal” – is considered defining features of the new climate for dialogue, conditions to avoid destruction of political legitimacy area, and , in result, open the way to various “voices” (Moshirzade, 331–332, 1382).

Up to this point it became clear that process of globalization there is a possibility of resistance and increased tensions, as well as mixing of cultures. Thus, we return to original point. Is there was one world culture? If Ulf Gunnars still says: “At the moment there is one world culture. However, it is best to make sure about the meanings of this statement ... There is no single absolute and full meaning of this statement. The occurrence of such is not possible. However, the world has turned to social networks and between different regions moves the flow of values, as well as movement of people and goods” (Hannerz, 1990, 237).

Globalization and Multiculturalism in collaboration with technology

Probably, it possible to say that globalization is most indebted to technology. Technology has had a profound impact on all areas of present life, and this effect is more likely to impact on evolution of media. Media culture in addition to influence politics and economy (Rajai, 115, 1382). However, their effect is considered to culture. In this sense , technology, communication, media and culture are connected to each other. Herald Innes says, that Western civilization is deeply influenced by communications (Rajai, 116, 1382). Globalization and communication interconnected deeply. Marshal Maklohan establishes relationship between media and globalization by mixing two concepts through intermediary communications and global village. In fact, many researchers have examined connection between globalization and media. Most theorists believe that there is no globalization from practical point of view of scientific media and communications. Terhi Rantanen extract role of media and communication in globalization because of their explaintion of the process of globalization through time and space there are world's economic, political, cultural and social connections in form of corresponding processes. (Rantanen, 2005, 4–8). Terry Flow says that media play a central role in globalization for three reasons. Firstly, a lot of Media operate globally compared with previous period. Secondly, global communications infrastructure facilitates global information flows. Thirdly, global media play one of main role in how we see the events, taking place in various locations around the world and developing congenial socio-political blocks (Movius, 2010, 8).

Destruction of time and space occurs through electronic media, and this process led to formation of new manifestations like affiliate journalism, online society and transnational organized activities through online channels. ICT revolution has changed a shape of media environment and led to creation of new media, such as local news channels based on digital technologies (Movius, 2010, 9). At the same time, we see that all these prerequisites leading to globalization, not hither to led to formation of single

world culture, and intensified manifestations of multiculturalism even.

At the same time, relationship of globalization and multiculturalism is a complex connection. In context of multiculturalism people belongs to many and different cultures, and cultural differences exist in extent to which they occur between different states, as well as within countries between different districts, ethnic groups, towns and villages (King, 1990, 409). In reality, global flows of thoughts, ideas, ways of life, and people especially has changed in many societies in direction to presence of different cultures, coexistence and cultural mix. However, one of the most explicit examples of coexistence and cultural mix is life of individuals and groups who is leaving their homeland, place of birth and live in new territories for various reasons. These people, though forced to make concessions and coexist with new cultures, but they kept a memory of their belonging to homeland. In fact, they are not completely mixed with culture of their new society and not quarrelling with culture of society, reviving primary culture. In fact, these people learn to live, at least, under conditions of two cultures (Hall, 1996, 310).

There are many examples of the existence of multiculturalism and cultural mix that explain possibility of cultural pluralism. Today, the immensity of social institutions and cultural landmarks transformed many urban, local, national and regional social groups in an arena where there are different cultures, and transnational and trans regional migration has made inevitable coexistence and cultural mix in major cities all around the world (Albrow, 2000, 119–122). At the same time, this process is necessary to pay attention to the next point – if migration process takes place only at level of one nationality, ethnicity, religious groups, and similar cases, the situation is complicated by interaction within society and between cultural groups. But if migration occurs due to different groups, the process will have peaceful coexistence.

From other side, because of innovation of the world's Internet channels unlike previous civilizations that arose in a particular geographical area of the world, new civilization covered the whole world and humanity involved in it. Aggravation of globalization has increased pressure on connection between their units and generators made this relationship more complicated and confusing. Many people expects that the result would be the same. If in particular process use throughout English language, and assume that everyone can speak it, it does not mean that world would be homogeneous. Become a whole new world, with same quantity of cultures in it, and perhaps even more. Because the culture – it's not just a question of democracy, science and investment, but also the question of literature, customs, morals, education, upbringing, family structure. Globalization does not change radically, and does not destroy the state of humanity, which every culture gives its special response.

Perhaps, explaining the value of technology can be reached such a result as in process of globalization technology would be as a method of action. Another words, using of technology is forming a mentality that globalization supposedly developed and increased its desire to ignore boundaries and change in a single world culture. In any case, this point of view greatly simplifies a matter of subject. Desire to use new technologies, especially in com-

munication area, blurs boundaries and distances though its value, but according to confines, a single culture in the world has not become dominant, as well caused of opposite effect in some cases.

Globalization and Multiculturalism: action of economics and politics

Globalization as having a prevalence in economic and political areas, like covered in this article, is the act of economics and politics to find out manifestation of multiculturalism and in this sense the core consideration is one of the cultural reactions in connection to globalization, which has same most cultural particularism. Its particularity manifested primarily in ethnocentrism, nationalism and religious phenomena. Of course, ethnic and national particularism is too veiled and interrelated. Now we can point to ethnic particularism. Sociologists have described Twentieth century ethnic and racial identity as historical view of backwardness and disorderliness against communism and/or liberal-democratic institutions, mixed and disappears (Esman, 1999, 260). However, changes and developments of late Twentieth century proved fallacy of those forecasts. So, World has entered to Third millennium of Christian era with circumstances in which was faced many movements and ethnic rivalries that have spread to areas of undeveloped societies in Africa and Asia, and the world's progress, which seemed determined to questions of nationalism and ethnic separatism, faced with tension and violence on basis of ethnocentrism. Statistics show that many countries in the world are multinational, where is living two or more social ethnic groups. These social groups compete through peaceful or violent ways to reach the levers of power in order to obtain independence, autonomy and/or assimilation to have better position in society.

From historical point of view, nationalism has over 200 years and it can be one of the most powerful force in the world today. This phenomenon, as well as dominance of ethnocentrism ideologies of Marxism, liberalism and modernization theory was manifested like in a processes of changings, improvement and renewal of society is gradually dissolved and disappeared. In a while Anthony Smith, an outstanding theorist of nationalism, said that separatist movements in Canada, Scotland, Britain, Spain and other parts of West discredits common assumptions about renewal and democracy. Smith also believes that oppression and ethnic nationalist movements in Eastern Europe, Russia, Middle East, Indian subcontinent and other parts again put nationalism in center of world issues (Hutchinson, 1994, 10–11). Gidenz consider recent rise of nationalism within local nationalist movements, he believes that nationalism is a product of new features have been created by globalization for reproduction of local identity (Giddens, 1998, 31–32). Some works also speaks about third wave or a third kind of nationalism that emerged after Cold War as although has similarities with previous forms of nationalism but also are different from it. In previous forms of nationalism, emphasis on political, national movements, they exhibit some layers of internationalism were liberal and anti-imperialist currents. Modern nationalism is anti liberal, chauvinistic and monopolistic features. In other words, third wave of nationalism is based on establishment of identity and difference disconnections (Holton, 1998, 136). All these points suggest that last decade of Twentieth century

were accompanied by progressive emergence and spread of cultural particularism.

Another issue of cultural particularism is religious fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism is not limited to any great world religion and geographical point of view but also extremely diverse. Of course, there are variety of principles and features of fundamentalism, but some elements are more or less can be found in all movements of religious fundamentalism. In general we can say that fundamentalism is a kind of social and religious reaction to abstract dangers imposed by globalization, it doesn't accept it and at the same time offer examples of ideal society in his vision.

With these explanations now is possible to re-look at strengthening of multiculturalism. As was increased globalization process in economy as foreign direct investment and / or creation of monetary and financial markets, but in material realms it is also present. For example, the labor force has formed world market, compared to previous migration intensified and become more complex. Based on this, some people call this age "the age of migration" (Sutcliffe, 1998, 325). In general, migration takes place with different objectives. However, an important part of it is related to globalization, migration, pursuing economic goals. This kind of migration can be seen primarily in industrial and oil countries around Persian Gulf. While the quantity of migrants in other developing countries has not increased significantly. In any case, economic globalization consists of a worldwide movement of goods, services, information and labor, increasing quantity of migrants in the world should be regarded as part of this process. Indicator of greater transparency of political boundaries are the national economy. The fact, this part of economy, though associated with multiculturalism, is not how complicated. In general, there are all workers in many ethnic or religious groups. As indicated above, presence of widespread movement of globalization, for many reasons have been noted in preceding pages, in many cases there was a cultural mixing and / or cultural particularism, and it is also covered in scopes of religious fundamentalism. On other hand, in these countries over time for economic reasons reveal another reaction particularism which had nationalistic approaches and politically also more inclined to right-wing extremism. Important factor of political and economic problems is presence in these countries, migrants and minorities in such countries were protests, even accompanied by violence and terror. This situation is particularly in industrialized countries, where most strongly manifested many differences between migrants and indigenous people of these countries in several areas, such as simultaneous differences in religion, ethnicity, etc. As part of this policy issue emerged in some European countries in form of gain aspirations radical right. Even in country as Norway have been cases associated with violence and terror. In such cases by limiting immigration laws politicians may also inflame this thread. Of course, the reaction in this form is not much, and its difference reaction affect to migrants. Reaction to these aspirations will be cultural resistance to maximum of its shape and desire to preserve all the conditions of multiculturalism in the middle of its form. At the same time, it more put a question on globalization and associated integration processes and puts the stamp of approval to these conditions – durability of two reactions – cultural particularism and multiculturalism.

Issues

This study is primarily trying to find an explanation of situation when we have witnessed of multiculturalism in recent decades of Twentieth century and the beginning of Twenty First century. Thus, considering of many influential factors in manifestation of multiculturalism we examined the effect of technologies factor, as well as politics and economics influence to the process of globalization reaching multiculturalism. What can be obtained from studying of globalization and multiculturalism within this scope shows that in the first phase technologies are enhancing factor in process of globalization, but nevertheless, this factor can not be considered a specific accelerator of creation the world culture, a culture that has not been manifested till present day. On the contrary, this value in conjunction with the value in conditions of globalization, which have been mentioned above, has become a factor strengthening multiculturalism. This manifestation of mild forms finalized as a response to globalization of culture, which is a cultural metamorphosis and unnecessary resistance on it. In addition, during economic and political crises in the world all minorities have been under the pressure and its continued their reaction. Thus, appeared a certain desire for cultural differences of race, religion or nationality, whose amplitude varies from positive to negative, in general, it had an impact on process of globalization. Influence at present there is on such a level when is impossible to say certainty that globalization is a factor in formation of single world culture and it is evident even within a fully developed society. Therefore, passing time and destructing of formed optimistic views, another consideration of multiculturalism is not something unusual for today.

Thus, from the beginning of the spread of globalization in major theories, determining this value, and the values associated with it has been changed radically. Metamorphosis and resistance, which formed two common reactions to globalization and conquered literature of this phenomenon, encountered manifestation called multiculturalism, which also arose from concept of globalization. Thus, it is indisputable that globalization process is tied to fact how people create culture, traditions and their local identity within scope of comprehensive examples of globalization. The process of globalization in destruction of sources and opportunities revives its traditional identity, as well as creating new sources and ,thus, everyone can use opportunities and sources for reconstruction of their national identity. Identity created in such a way is contrary identity created in a traditional society, is very fluid, and flyuidnost of the social life prevents crucifixion and closes the pass to fundamentalism and, ultimately, with persistence of such conditions and opportunities can think globally and live locally scale.

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DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND RATIONALITY

'Dialogue of Cultures', which has been so much talked about over the previous few decades and which is the main subject of our Conference is primarily a dialogue of rationalities. Probably not too surprising is the statement that the participants of the dialogue – for it to be a dialogue, and not two parallel monologues – should at least understand what ideas are expressed by the interlocutor. 'To understand' does not mean 'to accept', 'to share' or 'to justify'. These meanings inherent in the word 'understand' are certainly important; however, the direct meaning of the word 'understand' is even more important. When we talk to another person, it is important for us to understand his words, to make sure that we do not read our own meanings in them, or at least that we have not distorted them radically by this reading. But it becomes even more important when we carry on a dialogue with another culture. Because a dialogue with another culture is not necessarily an exchange of remarks with a bearer of another culture. This may be reading texts created by a different culture; viewing architectural monuments when we wander around a city in a different country; our perception and evaluation of statements made by public figures, representing the culture, etc. In all these cases we do not respond to a man – bearer of this culture (and sometimes we have no chance to answer), and thus we are deprived of the opportunity to check how well we understood our partner in a dialogue. However, a dialogue with another culture is still carried on, as this perception just seems to be one-sided: in fact we respond as we form our attitude to another culture, which predetermines our behaviour in relation to its bearers.

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In such cases of a dialogue with another culture, which can be called cases of indirect dialogue, the adequacy of understanding is particularly important. Indeed, in such cases we cannot ask clarifying questions, we cannot check out the reaction of the interlocutor, whether we interpret his words correctly.

That is why a dialogue with another culture cannot be successful without understanding the rationality of this culture. This is especially important when it is a case of a culture, in which we do not have the experience of living. For example, of the Arab-Muslim culture – the one that, by and large, sets the contours of what is usually called the 'Islamic world'. With all its diversity and even motley nature there are, nevertheless, some leading 'drive lines', which determine, at least in general terms, its rationality. These reflections are an attempt to outline the contours of this rationality, to outline what can be called the episteme of the Arab-Muslim culture.

It is quite natural to start talking about rationality with the notion of truth. The interpretation of truth, which is characteristic for the Arab-Islamic culture, was clearly demonstrated long ago in the Quran. Here there are widely used both pairs of terms, which were later used to denote the opposition of the faithful, the correct and the incorrect, the false. These are the terms with the roots *h-k-k* and *s-d-k* on the one side, and *b-t-l* and *k-z-b* on the other. Between these two types of opposition there is a significant difference.

The first type of the opposition between the true and the false is expressed as an opposition between *haqq* and *batil*. The term *haqq* expresses the truth as an indispensable unavoidable realization, as something taken as a matter of fact, as something that cannot help but exist. This unavoidable nature has a distinct ontological shade: it is about the truth, which is *approved*. The opposite *batil* refers to the false as to the unstable, to something that is not able to last as if it were to break into pieces unable to reveal its fixedness.

Such interpretation of the true and the false is directly related to the *efficacy*, i.e. to the ability of the actor to manifest and approve his effectiveness, his ability to carry out the action and show its result. The central Quranic theme is the theme of the truth (*haqq*) as a genuine effectiveness of the true (*haqq*) God, whose action will certainly be realized and will take effect, whereas the false (*batil*) actors (other gods and other beings) are powerless in the face of this true actor. Therefore, the results they promised disperse like an illusion, as they are devoid of any firmness and stability.

This interpretation found its clearest expression in such Quranic ayahs as: ‘God is truth, and that which they call upon other than Him is falsehood’ (31:30, 22:62); ‘Rather, We dash the truth upon falsehood, and it destroys it, and thereupon it departs’ (21:18); ‘Truth has come, and falsehood has departed. Indeed is falsehood ever bound to depart’ (17:81); ‘The truth has come, and falsehood can neither begin nor repeat’ (34:49). Everywhere here the ‘truth’ is expressed with the Arabic word *al-haqq*, and the ‘falsehood’ – with *al-batil*.

Thus, the opposition of truth and falsehood as *haqq* and *batil* is the opposition of effectiveness of a genuine actor and an illusory, unreal actor, who merely poses as a genuine one. And the truth here means the accomplishment of the action, its approval. Not only in the Quranic context, but also for the whole Arab-Muslim culture such truth is truth *par excellence*, truth as such, the original truth. Approved by the actor, it is *primary*.

Such an understanding of truth is directly related to what a modern Moroccan philosopher M. A. Al-Jaberi called ‘the Arab mind’ (*aql ‘arabi*), i.e. the episteme characteristic of the Arab-Islamic culture: formed in the age of Jahiliyyah, it remains unchanged to this day. This episteme involves considering things not as substances, which are explained by their ideal (formal) nature, but as results of an action, as its ‘objectification’. This quite naturally implies such a focus of a look which behind the external manifestation of the result finds a hidden actor, establishing a connection between them that is expressed in the action.

The second type of the opposition between the true and the false presupposes the existence of the truth that has already been approved and this opposition is based on the fact whether certain statements or actions expressing attitude to the truth in different forms *agree* or *disagree* with the truth. Words with roots *s-d-k* and *k-z-b*, mostly verbs of the second pattern and their derivatives, meaning the focus of an action on an object, are very frequently used in the Quran and express respectively consent, confirmation or disagreement, rejection of the previously approved truth. For instance, quite typical are ayahs of the following kind: ‘Believe in what I have sent down confirming (*musaddikan*) that which is with you, and be not the first to disbelieve in it’ (2:41); ‘When there came to them a Book from Allah confirming (*mussadik*) that which was with them...’ (2:89); ‘And those who disbelieve and deny Our signs (*kazzabu bi ‘ayati na*) ...’ (2:39, 22:57); ‘The eminent among his people who disbelieved and denied (*kazzabu*) the meeting of the Hereafter...’ (23:33). Actions such as *tasdik* (confirmation of the truth, acceptance of something as true) or *takzib* (the statement of the false nature) are possible only as *secondary* ones in relation to the *initially approved* truth-*haqq*, because they *confirm* (but do not *state*) the truth or *reject* (but do not *disprove*) it.

These intuitions, revealing the episteme that was formed as early as at the pre-Islamic stage of development, which were clearly fixed in the Quran, due to the victory of the Islamic worldview have become a part of the general fund of the Arab-Muslim culture and the peoples that are the bearers of this culture. Up to the present stage the Quran in the Islamic world has been serving as a peculiar primer and a textbook in primary education (*Kuttab*): it was used to learn to read and write, this is why educated people knew its text very well or remembered it by heart. The fundamental intuitions reflected in the text of the Quran could not but penetrate into the consciousness of non-Arab peoples, where they were fixed more or less successfully, not providing uniformity (it was still a long way off), but at least providing the compatibility of cultural and ideological coordinates on the vast lands of the Islamic world. Quran, and then the Islamic literature of various genres, which appeared around it, served as a kind of a conductor of the episteme aiming at an ‘active’ (procedural) comprehension of the world, i.e. interpreting it as a result of a creating, establishing the truth action exercised by an agent.

At the classical stage of the Arab-Islamic culture, these intuitions gained momentum. The terms with the roots *s-d-k* and *k-z-b* were also involved in the theory of knowledge in Aristotelian logic, actively working in the field of rational knowledge and meaning a true or a false statement (respectively *kavl sadik* and the *kavl kazib*), that is, one which coincides with the true state of affairs or does not coincide with it. The truth of things itself was denoted with the use of the root *h-k-k*, for example, *haqqiqa* ‘verity’, *haqq* ‘truth’. The secondary-established truth (root *s-d-k*), thus, appeared to be referred to the sphere of rational knowledge and became accessible for work with rational methods. This truth is in no way ‘wrong’ or ‘defective’; it can only be described as secondary in relation to the primarily-approved truth (root *h-k-k*), since its establishment results from collation with the actual state of things, which is primarily approved as a result of an action of a corresponding agent.

The rationalization of this ‘active’ or procedural paradigm was carried out by Mutazilites – the first Arab-Muslim philosophers. Their understanding of the world is almost entirely confined to its explanation as a result of an action: the theory of action in their philosophy occupies the same place as the theory of ideas does in the philosophy of Plato or in Aristotle’s theory of substantial forms.

A broad ‘translation movement’, which led to an acquaintance with the legacy of ancient philosophy, first of all peripatetic and neoplatonic philosophy, resulted in the emergence of falsafah (Arabic *falsafah* ‘philosophy’), focused on philosophizing along the lines of Greek models. Mutazilism was gradually displaced from the sphere of philosophy, being unable to resist the double pressure: on the one hand, the pressure was made by a very simply and explicitly, clearly expounded and didactically honed, complete Greek wisdom, which contrasted with the complicated views of Mutazilites, who were far from unity and were eternally quarreling with one another. And on the other hand the pressure was made by the mature doctrinal thought that had taken shape (Asharizm and Maturidizm), which offered a simplified presentation of the Islamic doctrine understood by the masses, in contrast to the intellectual, refined and elite interpretations of Mutazilites.

While Mutazilism was displaced, the falsafah occupied a dominant position on the philosophical arena. Along with it came a different worldview which rested on the substantively-oriented episteme of antiquity. The success of falsafah was different in different regions of the Islamic world, and generally (though not exclusively), the school earned the sympathy of representatives of non-Arab peoples, first of all the Iranians. For some time the procedural and action episteme lost the dominant position in the field of philosophy, while retaining it completely in a number of sciences (law, philology, etc.), which are beginning to be classified as 'own' Islamic, unlike the borrowed 'Greek' sciences (mathematics, astronomy, etc.) and falsafah. However, as early as in the views of Ibn Sina, the greatest representative of falsafah, there takes place an original, albeit incomplete, rehabilitation of the procedural and action episteme. This is evident in his theory of causality which reduces the Aristotelian fourfold system of causes to a single system – action; in the theory of intuition (*hads*) developed by him, which aims at a direct grasp of authenticity of things, as opposed to the discursive logic that only establishes a correspondence between the statement and the state of things; so that the First Agent becomes accessible for the intuition – the one that is fundamentally beyond the logical knowledge and at the same time is responsible for the authenticity of all things, being the only source of efficiency and causality; finally, in his famous division of quiddity and existence and the theory of 'possible' (*mumkin*), according to which the thing exists as such and is possible, getting nothing but its existence from the agent.

The emphasis on direct knowledge, grasping the authenticity, truth – *haqq* of things is clearly visible in Islamic mysticism (Sufism), which becomes philosophically mature later than others. Both in philosophical Sufism and Ishrakism (Philosophy of Illumination) the direct and indirect knowledge does not become subject to hierarchy, but rather are interpreted as being mutually complementary. At that, this discursive, rational and logical knowledge is also regarded as having its own independent value and as a means of presentation and verifying the truth grasped directly (intuitively or through a revelation); here the truth – *haqq*, which directly reveals the authenticity of a thing as it was originally established by the agent, is checked in the course of a procedure of *tasdik* – its rational and discursive justification.

Thus, the procedural and action episteme requiring considering the agent as the ultimate justification, and associated with it interpretation of truth as something directly-approved (terms *haqq*, *haqqiqa*), on the one hand, and as a discursively ascertainable (term *tasdik*) one, on the other, determined such principal features of thinking inherent in the Arab-Islamic culture as an idea of the possibility of harmonizing the direct and indirect knowledge (intuition and logic, the divine revelation and rational philosophizing, law established by God and its development in the rational activity of doctors of law, the sacredness of Muhammad's prophetic mission and a purely human nature of his personality, the divine justification of Muhammad's leadership role and a lack of sacred justification of the power of his successors, etc.) and the desire to understand the world *procedurally*, as a result of the action.

The notion of 'episteme' embraces unconscious tendencies, which root in the subconscious and specify the most

general lines of the comprehension of the world. These tendencies have their own, well-defined semantic logic. Logic imposes *requirements* that act as primary and fundamental *grounds of rationality* which are not further funded. The grounds of rationality is the most general description of what makes us accept without hesitation these or those theses as something taken for granted (for example, the ones equal to a third are equal) or absurd ones (the existence of the consequence without a cause). The grounds of rationality, thus determine the course of reasoning and evidence, acting as *criteria* allowing us to separate the rational and acceptable from the irrational and therefore unacceptable in the space of the mind.

Understanding the internal conceptual logic that determines the structure of the process-oriented view, lets us find out why this view puts forward rather specific requirements for what is considered rational, sensible and reasonable. This is primarily a direct link between the one acting and the one being subject to action, expressed in a process (action). The Arabic language provides a very convenient language environment to a process-oriented thinking; in this language environment the three categories *fa'il* (active) *maf'ul* (undergoing) and *fi'l* (process) are part of the formative paradigm of any verb. In this language environment there is organic ontology which presupposes a genuine, independent status both of the active and the undergoing (i.e. substances), and of the *process* itself. The process here is not reduced to accidents of the agent, as it happens in substantively-oriented semantic environment but it is endowed with its own ontological status – an independent one, although different from the ontological status of its two sides (the acting and the undergoing sides).

In the Aristotelian system of ten categories the process cannot be displayed in this way as it is comprehended in the process-oriented environment. Aristotle has such categories are 'act' and 'undergo' that can be correlated at best with the active and passive sides of the process, but not with the process itself. This is no coincidence: the substantively-oriented view does not confer a special ontological status to the process, a status that would be different from the status of its active or passive parties; the process here is not interpreted as something third, independent, just like its active and undergoing parties. Here lies one of the irreducible differences between the two ways of comprehension of the world, the substantively-oriented and the process-oriented ones.

The mind and its criteria determining what is considered rationally proven and justified, and what needs further study, is defined by the basic features of the episteme. Reliance on the procedural – action episteme had its consequences reflected in the understanding of what is a reasonable justification and what direction the rationalization of the outlook, given by the Quran, will take.

This rationalization, carried out by the Mutazilites, which led to the emergence of philosophy in the Arab-Muslim world, proceeded from the idea of an agent as of a purposeful, *volitional* source of the action. The will is accepted as a necessary condition of a genuine agent without which a true agent is unthinkable. Targeting as a manifestation of the will can be carried out, from the point of view of the Mutazilites, by God or man: only they can be understood as genuine agents responsible for the origination and change of the world and everything found in it.

This means that for a genuine actor there cannot appear a question of free will: the will is a *condition* for the action, without which an agent is unthinkable. That is why in the initial development period of the development of reflection, for the Mutazilites who recognize man as an authentic agent, the question of free will is not raised. The statement of free will must be distinguished from the provisions of autonomy of an agent, i.e. of his self-power, in other words – of having all the conditions of a full-fledged action. Choice is not yet an action: the action episteme involves posing the question of whether an agent is able not just to have, but to *carry out* his will – as his will is certainly free. The question, in other words, does not consist in making a choice; the question is to implement this choice, to make it true – practically, i.e. through acting. The question is whether a man as an agent has the ability to *approve* (let us remember the truth – *haqq*, established by an agent) his action and its result.

If every process occurring in the world (the sunrise and the sunset, the moonrise and the moonset, the falling rain, plant growth, birth of children, the actions and interactions of people), to be explained requires tracing to an agent, it becomes clear that not all processes, and not even most of them can be traced to a man. Seeing God as an agent of action and changes occurring in the world, is required by the procedural – action episteme and is not evidence (as is often misinterpreted by those not realizing this principle feature of the Arab-Muslim worldview) of ‘fideism’ and rejection of a rational explanation.

On the contrary, such a position is the first and necessary step towards the rationalization of beliefs about the world as a result of actions carried out by the agent. For the rationalization to really occur, it is necessary to take another step. This step is to understand that the result of the action is *inevitable*, as one not dependent on anything other than the internal laws of the action. Someone (let it be God or man), regarded as just one, or, as Arab-Muslim thinkers put it, as ‘self’ (*zat*), is of no genuine interest within the process – action episteme. Self as such, as a certain substance does not carry out any action and cannot be held responsible either for the world structure, or for its changes. But if considered as ‘active’ (*fa’il*), i.e. as an agent it produces the result of an action (*maf’ul*, ad verbum ‘done’), the relationship between which must be understood as a process taking place in the world and explaining its structure or change.

Rationalization involves finding *congruity to law*, a certain stability of the world. While the substantively-oriented Greek thinking sees the basis of this stability in substantiality, linking an arbitrary action with instability and the inability to appropriately calculate, the process-oriented thinking sees the stability of the world as a stability of the *link* between an agent and the result of the action (*fa’il* ‘doing’ and *maf’ul* ‘done’). This stable link, expressed by actions themselves (*fi’l* ‘doing’), allows one to *naturally* move from the agent to the result or, alternatively, from the result to the agent who is responsible for it.

Let us note that this transition is natural, and therefore does not depend on any arbitrary factors: provided that the result is *necessarily* connected with the agent of the action, a sustainable and independent from any arbitrary factors interpretation of the world can be achieved in the context of the process-action episteme. It is in recognition of this *necessary link* where here is the decisive vital

factor that separates the rational explanation from the irrational one.

The Mutazilites were the first in the Islamic thought to fight for rationality. They also became thinkers who consistently recognized such a necessary link. This range of problems became most acute when the question of the divine attributes was discussed: these discussions are important not to understand *what God is like* (when he would be considered substantively), but to address the question of how his *action* is performed, the action explaining – in a procedural perspective of thinking – a natural order of the world. It was at this point that the dogmatic idea of Islam (Ash’arizm and Maturidizm) fundamentally broke away from the rational philosophizing of the Mutazilites, preferring irrational statement of the absence of the necessary link between the action attributes of God and their results. And it is this necessary link that was fatefully restored in the philosophical Sufism – a trend of the Arab-Muslim philosophy after Mutazilism, which gave a *holistic* (rather than fragmented) explanation of the world order based on procedural and action view and appropriate in the context of the episteme. At that, this explanation entailed a principal revision of the ideas of the relationship between eternity and time and a man’s place in the world order.

While the first line of the rationalization in the philosophy of the Mutazilites was a statement of the natural and stable link between an agent and the result of his action, the second line was the maximum possible extension of the autonomy of man as a genuine agent. This entailed cutting the absolute power of God, but also – much more importantly – the absolute priority given to the ethical requirements for a man who was conceived as sovereign and in no way limited agent, so as an agent he was fully able to determine his own destiny and life choice, and he was fully responsible for it. This item later became another point where the dogmatic doctrinal thought that preferred to cut back the autonomy of human action to the extent of its complete negation (this view had gained almost universal effect by the end of the Classical period), went to an uncompromising break with the Mutazilism. And in this was the point where philosophical Sufism made a decisive contribution to the centuries-old debate about the relationship between man and God as agents, putting forward a decision that was unexpected but linked to the integrated system and necessary within its framework.

Another focus of the struggle for rationalism was the statement made by the Mutazilites of a rational nature of the provisions of the Law and, therefore, the fundamental ability of the ordinary human mind to formulate these provisions. The Mutazilites issued a serious challenge to their opponents, who argued that the Law cannot be independently discovered by the human mind, and therefore is in need of a revelation and can be brought only by a messenger. The Mutazilites negated this statement saying that if the Law-giver prescribes and prohibits actions basing on their nature, and this nature can be grasped by the human mind, the Law in principle could be formulated independently by a person who has never heard about Islam and Muhammad.

If we draw a line from the origin of the theoretical discourse in Early Islam (the Kharijites, Shi’ites, Mutazilites, etc.) until the end of its Classic era, it will be a line gradually narrowing the rationalism and increasing the credibility not only of fundamental texts of Islam (the Quran and Sun-

nah), but of the *tradition (taqlid)* of considering the issues of the doctrine and law, when views of the scholars of the past are taken at face value without checking their rational, and moreover their textual validity (i.e. the validity of the Quran and Sunnah). This is what expresses the intellectual atmosphere of the traditionalist stage of development of the Arab-Muslim culture: the rejection of the action rationalism, most clearly declared by the Mutazilites, and the

reliance on the authority of preceding generations of scientists without any verification of the provisions put forward by them. The decline in the creative impulse of the Arab-Muslim culture at the turn of the Classic and Traditionalist stages coincided with the maximum rejection of this culture of rationalism, which was so clearly manifested at the dawn of the Classic stage of its development and which ensured its prosperity.

V. A. Tishkov¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND NEW STRATEGIES OF NATIONAL POLICY

In modern Russia there are heated ideological debates over the so-called issue of interethnic relations and a clash between different political strategies. Today there exist two positions that come into conflict with each other quite irrationally. One can be called the 'Russian project', advocated by a part of the political class, intellectuals and people at large, including some young people. The current Russian project is based on the concept of 'the tragedy of a great nation' that went through dismemberment and humiliation when the USSR collapsed, which is in a state of extinction and which lacks a proper status in the state structure and representation in the governance of the country and its resources. Advocates of the Russian project stand for ethnic Russians, who make up 80% of the population, being stated in the country's Constitution, for granting the Russians the status of titular nation, for declaring Russia to be the national state of the Russian people. One of the threadbare arguments in favour of this project is the interpretation that 'we are all Russian', as in the outside world we are all still called Russian. In its various versions the project of the Russian ethnic nationalism is specified both in the form of a nation-building relying on 'monocultural' (i.e. Russian) basis, and in the form of restoring the empire with the 'Russian power' and the reunification of the currently separated Russian people. Irredentism is inherent not only in the imperial, but also in the liberal and conservative scenario of the Russian project. M. Remizov, for example, promotes the slogan 'There are many countries but there is only one nation' as opposed to the slogan of the social advertising issued by the Russian Ministry of Regional Development 'There are many nations but only one country'.

We call the second project the project of Russia. This project is based on the recognition of the traditional ethnic and religious complexity of the country's population and the Russian people as a multi-ethnic civic nation. This project supports the ethnic and cultural development of the Russian ethnic nations and aims to assert the all-Russian national identity and to ensure the unity of the Russian nation. This project also has different versions: one of them

offers to consider the Russian Federation to be an established nation-state;² the other develops a civilizational approach, according to which Russia is not a nation-state, but a state-civilization. As for the fact that we are called 'Russian' in the outside world, if in the name of the country the Russian Federation the first word does not mean 'Russian', but refers to Russia, it means, at least, that the noun 'Russian' can and even should be translated as 'a citizen of Russia'. Such is the historical and ideological background of the ethno-political situation in Russia. To what extent does it relate to the social reality?

The ethno-cultural image of the Russians

The population of the Russian Federation, as well as that of other major countries in the world, has a complex ethnic composition, which has existed since the beginning of the Russian state, and which has become even more complex over the previous 20 years, despite the loss of a large territory and almost half of the population of the former USSR. This complexity was recorded in the National Population Census of 2002 and 2010, when there was recorded a significant increase in the number of ethnic groups (nations, nationalities) in the country: 158 in 2002 (compared to 128 in 1989) and 193 in 2010. The latest population census of 2010 is peculiar not only for the total number of nations living in Russia, but also for the internal dynamics of the largest ethnic groups, which account for over 96% of the total population. And, certainly, the most pressing question is the number of ethnic Russians as the dominant nation not only in terms of population, but also in terms of culture and language.

Note that while recording the number of large nations in the course of the census, a dramatic mistake occurred. This mistake had been laid by amendments to the law on the census, adopted shortly before the census. To facilitate the work of census takers, to make conducting the census cheaper, to prepare and conduct a census in the year that ends in zero (such is the UN recommendation to facilitate global population censuses), the amended law this time officially allowed getting data not only by direct questioning, but also by using data from administrative sources. This indulgence reduced the desire of the census organizers 'to reach everyone', to make preliminary and control rounds of the population, which had always been done in the previous censuses.

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² Tishkov V. A. *Rossiiskij narod: istorija i smysl nacional'nogo samosoznaniya*. [The nation of Russia: History and Meaning of the National Identity]. M.: Nauka, 2013.

The result was that about 5.6 million people (compared to 1.5 million in 2002) were made a census of according to the data of passport offices and of other sources without visiting the population. But now the administrative data do not contain information about the ethnic background and the mother tongue (as well as some other data important for every census, for example, the sources of income). The difference between the two censuses of the number of persons without their ethnic background notice amounted to almost 4 million, which is almost 3% of the total population made a census of. Of these 4 million 80% are more than likely to be Russian, i.e. the number of Russians who were not made a census of was no less than 3 million people. In this case, the total number of Russians in Russia is not 111 million, but 114 million, i.e. the decline compared to the previous census is less than 2 million people over the 8-year period between censuses.

Similarly, small but significant for the population dynamics additions can be made to other major nations, where this error in the census is expressed in significant numbers. But we must note that the readiness and wish to participate in the census and to record their nationality is significantly higher among non-Russian nations (perhaps with the exception of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Jews), and the procedure of 'addition' offered by us is most likely to be unnecessary. Nevertheless, this addition can also be made, besides Russians, for other more urbanized groups living outside the republics.

Thus, the 2010 Census showed that the top twenty most numerous Russian nationalities remained almost unchanged (Table 1). 80% of the population are still Russians, and there is little reason to assert that in Russia there is a certain (and moreover planned by the government) process of replacing the Russians by representatives of other nationalities. This statement, which is widespread among Russian nationalists, is based either on the household mythology, or on the evaluations of the demographic situation of the early 1990s. In the early 1990s there was a strong decline in the population for various reasons (declining birth rates during the 'shock therapy'; doubled mortality rate among alcoholics after cancelling the anti-alcohol campaign and the state monopoly on the production and sale of alcohol; emigration of the Russians abroad; reduction in the rate of Russification due to the growing ethnic identity of non-Russian population).

Table 1

Population of Russia by the most numerous ethnic categories

	Millions of people		% to those who recorded their ethnic background	
	2002	2010	2002	2010
<i>Total population</i>	145.17	142.86		
<i>Including that with the ethnic background notice</i>	143.71	137.23	100.0	100.0
The Russians	115.89	111.02	80.64	80.90
The Tatars	5.55	5.31	3.87	3.87
The Ukrainians	2.94	1.93	2.05	1.41
The Bashkir	1.67	1.58	1.16	1.15
The Chuvash	1.64	1.44	1.14	1.05
The Chechen	1.36	1.43	0.95	1.04
The Armenians	1.13	1.18	0.79	0.86
The Avar	0.81	0.91	0.57	0.66

	Millions of people		% to those who recorded their ethnic background	
	2002	2010	2002	2010
The Mordovians	0.84	0.74	0.59	0.54
The Kazakhs	0.65	0.65	0.46	0.47
The Azerbaijani	0.62	0.60	0.43	0.44
The Dargins	0.51	0.59	0.35	0.43
The Udmurt	0.64	0.55	0.44	0.40
The Mari	0.60	0.55	0.42	0.40
The Ossetians	0.51	0.53	0.36	0.39
The Belarusians	0.81	0.52	0.56	0.38
The Kabardians	0.52	0.52	0.36	0.38
The Kumyks	0.42	0.50	0.29	0.37
The Yakuts	0.44	0.48	0.31	0.35
The Lezgins	0.41	0.47	0.29	0.35
The Buryats	0.45	0.46	0.31	0.34
The Ingush	0.41	0.44	0.29	0.32
Other nationalities	4.85	4.81	3.40	3.51
<i>Made a census of without the record of the ethnic background, based on the data from administrative sources</i>	1.46	5.63	-	-

In the 2000s, some of these factors reduced their impact, but there remained problems of alcoholization, an extremely high death rate among male population, low birth rate and, in addition, there was a factor of reduced rate of immigration of the Russians to Russia (the government program promoting the resettlement of compatriots had not yet ensured the influx of Russians to be as high as in the period between censuses). Thus, we estimate the demographic situation among the Russians as a crisis (but not a disastrous!) one with a moderately optimistic perspective. In our opinion, reducing high death rate from alcoholism, drugs, smoking, traffic accidents and neglect of health is quite possible at a relatively low cost and in a relatively short time. Replenishment of the Russian population at the expense of other sources is also possible, in particular by increasing the birth rate, by encouraging the resettlement of all those willing to move to Russia, by descendants of mixed marriages voluntarily choosing the Russian ethnic background. The latter, of course, reduces the size of other ethnic communities, but it is a voluntary choice, which is most often made in favour of the dominant culture. Such was the historical situation in Russia and it still is in other countries.

In the top ten following the Russians the first five nations preserved their order, despite the fact that the number of the Russian Ukrainians decreased by almost one million people (!) without any noticeable relocation to Ukraine. And the next five changed: the Avars (the largest group in Dagestan) swapped with the Mordovians to their advantage, the Kazakhs rose from the last position, surpassing the Belarusians, while the Belarusians dropped out of the top ten, having been replaced by the Azerbaijanis. *The general trend of the main part of the non-Russian population is as follows: there is an increase in the number and share of those who belong to, relatively speaking, the Turkic-Islamic cultural traditions, and a decline in the number and share of those who belong to the Finno-Ugric and Slavic, Christian cultural tradition.* All other ethnic groups within the Rus-

sian people account for 3.5% and virtually have no impact on the general demographic situation.

Each of the major regions of Russia has its own peculiarities in terms of the ethnic composition of the population. There are the so-called Russian regions where ethnic Russians make up the vast majority of the population (90–95% of the population in some areas of central Russia and the Urals). There are regions where historically representatives of major Russian nations live together (e.g. the Russians, the Tatars, the Bashkir, the Chuvash, the Mordovians in the Volga region). There are regions with very diverse ethnic composition, such as the North Caucasus, where there live more than 40 indigenous peoples of varying sizes: ranging from one million people (the Avars and the Chechens) to a few hundred people (small mountain peoples of Dagestan). We can say that in Russia there are no mono-ethnic regions, but there are regions largely populated by representatives of a particular nationality. This applies to almost all of the population of the Russian republics, i.e. most Russian Yakuts, Chuvash, Tatar, Bashkir, Udmurt, Kalmyks, Buryats, Ossetians, Chechens, Ingush, Kabardian, etc. reside in the respective republics. But this does not mean that the so-called titular (eponymous, i.e. the ones that gave the name) groups make up the majority of the population in their 'own' republics. There are no more than ten republics of this kind – with a titular majority: Chuvashia, Tyva, Tatarstan, Kalmykia, Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, North Ossetia, and Karachay-Cherkessia. In other republics the majority of the population are Russian, along with representatives of other 'non-titular' nationalities.

The general demographic trend for ethno-territorial autonomies of Russia is the prevailing growth of the titular population or, at least, an increase in its share. The most disturbing trend in terms of the all-Russian interests and modernization development of the republics is a decline in the total number and share of the Russian population in the republics. This results from a low birth rate and from the Russian population leaving the republics due to the lack of stability, security, local nationalism and indirect discrimination. The process became particularly notable when the Russians left the republics of the North Caucasus, which are growing more and more mono-ethnic. Another general trend of the ethnic demography is a growth of immigrants from foreign countries, especially from the former Soviet Union, China and Vietnam. For 20 years, Russia has received at least 10 million workers on a permanent basis, and annually in the country there are approximately 10 million migrants among the so-called migrant labourers, i.e. temporary labour migrants. The latter figure, in our opinion, is almost twice overstated, but there is no exact migration statistics in the country. This circumstance, as well as domestic phobias and political considerations generate the myths about migration – of the dominance of migrants in major Russian cities, of an increased crime rate among migrants, of their occupying the labour market to the detriment of the local population. There is no doubt that migrant phobia has become a part of the mass consciousness of the Russians, an element of political strategy and a necessary component of a profitable use of labour from a single employer to public and private industrial structures.

There is no doubt that mass immigration to Russia, which is virtually uncontrolled and is accompanied by huge

bureaucracy and corruption, and by over-profits gained by employers, contains certain risks, including the risks of changing the historical proportions of the population and the way of life. Many migrants settle in Russia, bring their families and become Russian citizens. Certainly, part of the migrants cause competition in the labour market and in the field of entrepreneurship. But on the whole, these risks are obviously exaggerated, deliberately articulated by politicians, especially during election campaigns. These statements are supported by those who use migrant labour and expose them to over-exploitation or direct deception.

As for the actual change in the ethnic composition of the population under the influence of immigration from other countries, we can see only the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis ranking among the 23 major peoples of Russia, but they are historically original population of our country and in the Soviet Union, they also were part of the largest peoples. The representatives of Central Asia, as well as of China and Vietnam who have grown in number over the previous 20 years, or small groups of people of African origin, which have appeared in Russia for the first time, constitute less than 2% in the population of Russia. In recent years, this growth has slowed due to tighter immigration control and decline in the overall economic activity in the country.

And yet, our main finding concerning the outcome of the ethno-demographic development of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union is that the ethnic Russians have not only retained the place of the dominant nation, but after the annexation of the Crimea, their share among the people of Russia has even increased slightly (80.6% in 1989 and 80, 9% in 2014). There is no reason to make a prediction about the dramatic (by dozens of millions) reduction in the number of the Russians or replacement of Russian representatives by other nationalities of Russia. Note that this myth about the extinction of Russia, created by both domestic and foreign experts and politicians, did substantial harm to its image as a country. Moreover, after the collapse of the Soviet Union eight out of the 15 post-Soviet states have lost equally and Ukraine, in the overall numerical expression, has lost much more population than Russia. But nobody set up a keen for the 'extinction' of these countries, apparently protecting their international prestige, or for some other reasons. Anyway, for Russia this is a lesson of treating demography carelessly and improperly, including its ethnic features. *It is necessary to introduce a more adequate picture of the development of the country and of its future as one of the largest countries of the world in terms of the number of its population and the diversity of its ethnic composition to creating positive strategies of the national development.* And concerning this criterion Russia has the ability to maintain the position in the top ten countries of the world.

The dynamics of the post-Soviet identity

In recent years the collective identities of the Russians have changed. In the 1990s the people did not perceive the new Russia as their homeland and the centre as the epitome of supreme power. This 'negative identity' was recorded in many sociological studies of that time¹. In the 2000s, there was a noticeable shift from the Soviet to the Russian national identity; the regional and ethnic form of the collective identity came into conflict with the all-Rus-

¹ See, for example: Gudkov L. *Negativnaja identichnost'*. [Negative Identity] Articles of 1997–2002. M.: NLO, 2004.

sian form. This transition was dependent on many factors, among which was the retreat of the Soviet from the collective memory of a new generation of citizens, the weakening of the radical forms of ethnic nationalism, purposeful efforts of some part of the expert community and the higher authorities aimed at asserting the idea of the civic Russian nation¹. Below, we present some results of studies into the Russian identity, which support the conclusion that there has taken place a significant shift in favour of 'belonging to Russia' compared to other collective identities among Russians. However, these results are not too optimistic, although they are mobile and the data from a survey conducted among young people in the autumn of 2013, and the latest polls after the annexation of the Crimea suggest growing nationwide patriotism among the population and in all regions of the country.

In 2010 during a nationwide poll we asked 'What is your concept of 'Homeland'?' The answer to this question largely reflects how close the sense of belonging to the Russian nation may be for a respondent. The results were far from unambiguous. It was possible to give multiple answers to this item of the questionnaire. The most common answers were as follows: 'Homeland is the country of Russia' (49%) and 'Homeland is the place where I was born' (46%). This displayed the polarity of opinions and complementary judgments. Both answers were given at the same time by only about 18% of respondents. Those who believe the homeland to be a particular locality, and not the country, make up almost a third of respondents.

By regions, the picture looks even less clear. There are some areas where respondents think their homeland to be the place of their birth. This was stated by almost half of the respondents in Grozny (48%) and a similar share of respondents in Yakutsk (43%). In these cities there was the smallest number of those who believe their homeland to be Russia: in Grozny – 14.3%, in Yakutsk – 17.1%. A more detailed analysis of responses given by Grozny residents shows that mostly local Russians and a part of the Ingush consider their homeland to be Russia, whereas among Chechens this share is only 11%. This distribution of responses is largely due to the military conflict that occurred in the republic. The situation is remarkable in Yakutsk. In this city, only 23% of the Russians and 15% of the Yakuts named Russia as their homeland, while the majority said that the homeland is primarily a place where they were born. Here it should be noted that for the residents of Yakutsk as well as for those of Magadan and the Far East, the concept of 'Russia', 'the continent' often means only the central regions of the country, which are located far away and which live in a different way and in different conditions. Incidentally, a similar vision of 'America is inherent in the ideas of Alaskans, Hawaiians and even California residents.

The second group of regions is characterized by the fact that approximately one third of respondents believe their homeland to be the place where they were born, and not Russia, and less than a half of the respondents identified their homeland as the whole country. These cities are Gorno-Altai, Balakovo, Omsk, Syktyvkar, Surgut,

Yekaterinburg, Arkhangelsk. Moreover, while the response rate 'Homeland is Russia' in this group is more than 40%, in Surgut it is peculiar for its significantly reduced value (32%).

The third group consists of the regions in which the share of respondents who do not recognize the state as a homeland, does not exceed a quarter, and those who consider their homeland to be Russia account for more than a half. These results were obtained in a survey of residents in Orenburg, Tula, Pyatigorsk, and Moscow. The intermediate position between the second and third groups is occupied by Khabarovsk, where there is a small share of those who believe their only homeland to be the place where they were born (26%), and the number of those who called Russia their homeland does not exceed half of the respondents (49.5%) (Table 2).

Table 2

Distribution of answers to the question about the concept of 'Homeland' (%)

Place of the survey	Homeland is nothing but the place where you were born	Homeland is Russia (along with other possible answers)
Moscow	24.3	51.9
Tula	23.3	52.8
Arkhangelsk	30.4	49.9
Syktyvkar	31.9	44.3
Pyatigorsk	22.3	52.6
Grozny	48.4	14.3
Orenburg	25.9	56.5
Balakovo	35.1	41.6
Yekaterinburg	30.8	47.4
Surgut	30.9	32.2
Omsk	34.8	44.1
Gorno-Altai	35.3	46.4
Yakutsk	43.4	17.1
Khabarovsk	26.2	49.5

Thus, in some regions, among the population a sense of regionalism dominates over the feelings of belonging to the state. But such regions are a minority. However, the situation when, along with the dominance of the idea of belonging to Russia, a large number of people in the region disagree with the idea (one-third of respondents), is rather widespread. This situation requires a strategy that is based on the fact that the local (regional) identity does not contradict or weaken the Russian identity, that love for the small Homeland does not deny the existence of love for the big Homeland. Conversely, the local patriotism and identity accompany and even amplify the Russian identity.

The idea of homeland is closely connected with the extent to which the citizens of Russia feel that they belong to Russia. This is a more direct question about the commitment of the respondents to their state. The question, to what extent do you feel your belonging to Russia, was answered in different ways. 45% said that they feel it strongly. But 12% said that do not have a feeling like this at all, 13% did not give a definite answer, while others (30%) stated that it arises 'only in some situations'. The last three categories together account for more than a half of the respondents, which suggests a relatively low level of civic consciousness (Table 3).

¹ See my overview of the Soviet ethnic policy in the book: *Jetnicheskij i religioznyj faktory v formirovanii i jevoljucii rossijskoj gosudarstvennosti*. [Ethnic and Religious Factors in Formation and Evolution of the Russian Nation-Building]. Ed. by T. Ju. Krasovitskaya, V. A. Tishkov. M., 2012. p. 380–444.

Distribution of answers to the question of the sense of belonging to Russia (%)

Table 3

	I feel my belonging strongly	The sense of belonging arises in some situations	I do not feel any belonging	No answer
Pyatigorsk	53	32	6	9
Orenburg	51	32	5	12
Tula	48	34	6	12
Arkhangelsk	47	37	6	10
Syktvykar	47	29	9	15
Moscow	46	27	14	12
Yekaterinburg	45	36	6	13
Surgut	45	37	8	11
Khabarovsk	44	29	8	18
Gorno-Altai	44	32	10	15
Omsk	42	34	7	17
Balakovo	40	32	13	15
Yakutsk	24	40	20	16
Grozny	21	39	17	24
<i>On the whole</i>	45	30	12	13

Let us compare the data from different regions. The greatest number of respondents who said that they strongly feel a sense of belonging to Russia, was recorded in Pyatigorsk (53%) and Orenburg (51%), the same cities showed the lowest percentage of those who do not feel such belonging at all. The situation is significantly different in Yakutsk and Grozny. In these cities, less than a quarter of those surveyed said that they feel belonging to Russia to a great extent, and a slightly smaller share stated that they do not have a sense like this at all. The data from Moscow are of a certain interest. According to these data, the share of respondents who stated their strong sense of belonging to Russia is just a little higher than the average share of such responses all over Russia. The share of those who pointed out the situational sense of belonging to the country turned out to be below average, and the share of those who do not feel belonging to Russia is above average. Moreover, among the residents of Moscow polled there was a very small proportion of persons who are not citizens of the Russian Federation. The resulting distribution of responses in Moscow partly is due to the motives of social protest. Among those residents of Moscow who do not feel belonging to their state, there were many elderly people.

To anticipate the possible misinterpretation, we note that the results do not reflect the picture of loyalty or disloyalty of citizens to their state. However, these answers give an idea about the readiness of the population to hold a public debate about belonging to the Russian nation. If we take into account that 75% of respondents consider themselves to some extent involved in Russia, it means that they are ready to participate in the discussion mentioned above. By the way, *the vast audience of Russian sports fans during the Sochi Olympics demonstrated their sense of belonging to Russia better and brighter than any polls.*

Strategy instead of the concept

According to the ethnic monitoring conducted by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, from 2008 in Russia there was recorded an increase in the level of proneness to conflict, although

for a number of years before the situation had been better. This level of proneness to conflict lasted until 2013. Tensions and conflicts arose where an unfavourable socio-economic situation coupled with poor management, and when politicians and public activists used ethnic and religious factors to achieve power and their own well-being. All this prompted the Russian government to amend the Conception of the State National Policy, which had been in effect since 1996. On the day of inauguration of May 7, 2012, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree 'On ensuring inter-ethnic concord', aimed at harmonizing inter-ethnic relations, strengthen the unity of the multinational people of the Russian Federation and to provide the conditions for its full development. Within the Council on Inter-Ethnic Relations set up by Putin, the National Policy Strategy of the Russian Federation was developed and adopted by the presidential decree in December 2012. It is supposed to be in effect until 2025.

The strategy is based on the idea of forming a single political nation and of preserving the ethnic and cultural diversity of the nationalities of Russia. This is reflected in the formulation of the objectives of the state national policy: (a) strengthening nationwide civic consciousness and the spiritual community of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation (the Russian nation); (b) preservation and development of ethnic and cultural diversity of the peoples of Russia; (c) harmonization of ethnic and inter-ethnic relations; (d) ensuring equality of human rights and freedoms of each citizen, regardless of race, nationality, language, religion, and other circumstances; (e) social and cultural adaptation and integration of migrants.

The effectiveness of national policies depends not only on how interested the government and society in general are in maintaining the ethnic identity and in protecting the interests of the peoples living in the country, but also on the fruitfulness of the measures taken to strengthen the unity of the multi – ethnic people. That is on how effectively the identity of Russia will be combined with the ethnic Russianness, Tatariness, Bashkiriness, Yakutness, etc. The data from the recent studies suggest that the idea of the all-Russian civic nation is not imposed from above, but reflects the mass ideas. While in 2004 the ethnic identity prevailed over the identity of Russia and only 31% of respondents felt a strong connection with Russian citizens, by 2011 the Russian identity had become the most common one among the majority of the population and a sense of connection with the country as a whole had grown stronger¹.

In the 2000s, people began to get used to the new outlines of the country and its place in the global community. Criticising the Soviet past, and then 'the dashing 90s' gave way to understanding that it is necessary to soberly estimate the past and to form a balanced approach to historical memory. Today, the majority of the population are people who consider themselves citizens of Russia and do not lose their ethnic identity. However, the discussion in the media space shows that not everybody perceives the proposed strategy calmly. Often the concept of 'the nation of Russia' is given a different meaning, a different sense: it is compared with the Soviet people, or it is considered that it is designed to replace the ethno-cultural community. Approximately half

¹ See: Drobizheva L. M. *Jemichnost' v social'no-politicheskom prostranstve Rossijskoj Federacii*. [Ethnicity in the Social and Political Space of the Russian Federation] M., 2013.

of the Russians polled in 2010 believed that 'in the conditions of Russia a single nation cannot arise' (38%) or it will take decades to form a single nation (Table 4).

Table 4

Answers to the question 'Are citizens of the Russian Federation the nation of Russia?' (%)

	Yes	It will take a few years	It will take decades	A single nation cannot arise	No answer
Syktvykar	31	7	8	36	19
Yekaterinburg	29	6	12	40	13
Orenburg	26	8	13	39	14
Balakovo	26	5	11	36	22
Tula	26	5	16	40	14
Gorno-Altaysk	25	4	9	45	17
Arkhangelsk	24	17	15	30	13
Surgut	23	6	12	32	27
Omsk	23	6	12	40	18
Moscow	22	9	16	38	16
Khabarovsk	22	6	14	34	24
Pyatigorsk	16	11	17	41	15
Yakutsk	11	9	25	37	18

	Yes	It will take a few years	It will take decades	A single nation cannot arise	No answer
Grozny	10	9	13	41	26
On the whole	23	8	15	38	17

Sociological studies suggest that a significant part of the population (24–41%) observe aggravation of interethnic relations every year (in 2010 – 32%). An increase in ethnic tensions is noted by the representatives of all age groups, but it is more likely to be noticed by people who are university-educated (36%). Acuteness of perception increases with the size of the settlement, reaching a peak in Moscow and St. Petersburg, where the worsening is recorded by 53% of respondents¹. *The overall conclusion is that the growing Russian identity steadily combined with the ethnic identity integrates people, but it does not relieve irritation and in some cases hostility towards members of other ethnic groups, which often results from the dissatisfaction with the existing system of resource allocation, solidarity against injustice, inequality, corruption and lawlessness.* It takes effort on the part of both the society, and the government for citizens to see Russia as their common home in their day-to-day activities.

P. P. Tolochko²

GLOBALIZATION IN A EURO-AMERICAN WAY AND THE COLLAPSE OF THE TRADITIONAL WORLD ORDER

The world development is surprisingly contradictory. It only seems that globalization dominates. In fact, it is accompanied by disintegration as well. And the latter, though it may seem paradoxical, is determined by the former. A good example of what has been said can be the so-called new Europe. Uniting in a single community, and, actually, creating a new kind of empire, it is simultaneously shattered into a growing number of countries. Only the former Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia provided nine sovereign nation-states.

And there is no guarantee that the process of segregation will stop, in particular, owing to the countries of the old Europe, where the cultural and political separatism is manifested more and more clearly. The Flemish express a wish for the self-determination in Belgium, the Basques and the

Catalans in Spain,³ the Scots and the Northern Irish in the UK, the Corsicans in France, the Northern Italians in Italy. Greenland feels a burden of dependence on Denmark, while Bavaria insists on a fiscal independence from Berlin.

Similar processes occur in the former Soviet republics, where, by the instrumentality of the West, fifteen countries were formed in the place of one. Moreover, the process of division has not come to an end yet. In Russia the North Caucasus suddenly began to revolt, Abkhazia and South Ossetia separated from Georgia, Kyrgyzstan faced confrontation between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbek communities, Armenia and Azerbaijan were at war over Karabakh, Transnistria seceded Moldova. In Ukraine, the issue of the Crimean Tatars, who demand the restoration of their statehood, is growing more and more acute.

Naturally, interethnic and intercultural contradictions are not a novelty in history. They have always existed. And their causes are not novel either. The causes lie along the lines of: uneven economic development of the regions, inequitable distribution of income, lack of equal access to public administration, language and religious discrimination, etc.

The novelty here is, perhaps, the scale of the phenomenon, enhanced by globalization. The latter determines not only the technological progress and regional political consolidation, but also the global economic crisis, and separatism, too. Germany, France or the UK are burdened by the fact that they have to subsidize the budgets of Greece, Por-

¹ Tishkov V. A. *Rossiiskij narod*. [The People of Russia]. P. 642.

² Director of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Academician of NAS of Ukraine, a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. He is an author of more than 300 scientific publications, including 25 books: "Історична топографія стародавнього Києва" ("Historical topography of ancient Kiev"), "Ancient Kiev", "Old Russian feudal city", "Історичні портрети" ("Historical Portraits"), "Літописи Київської Русі" ("Chronicles of Kievan Russia"), "Володимир Святий – Ярослав Мудрий" ("Vladimir the Saint – Yaroslav the Wise"), "Від Русі до України" ("From Russia to Ukraine"), "Old Russian Nationality: imaginary or real", etc. He is a chairman of the Ukrainian society for the protection of monuments of History and Culture, a member of the European Academia (London), a corresponding member of the Central German Institute of Archaeology, a member of the International Union of Slavic archeology. He is a winner of the State Award of the USSR in the field of science and technology, the State Award of Ukraine, the award of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine after M. S. Grushevskiy. He was awarded with the Order of Prince Yaroslav the Wise of the 5th, 4th, 3rd degrees, the order of "Badge of Honor".

³ Catalanian Parliament adopted a declaration proclaiming its territory a 'sovereign entity'.

tugal and Cyprus, while the latter, in their turn, are protesting against the fact that rich countries carry a socially unjust policy of austerity towards them. And, as they say, there is no peace under the European olives.

The union that has recently demonstrated successful integration is currently facing a difficult choice of its future.¹ The old model has exhausted itself and many people in Europe are talking about a possible break of the European Community, a full or partial withdrawal of some countries from the Euro zone. Perhaps this will not happen tomorrow, but this perspective is not a long-term one.

In his time, Russian philosopher I.A. Ilyin, concerned with the problem of collision of peoples, came to the conclusion that the resolution of this issue is quite possible if the international community develops a system of legal regulation of international relations.² In the 1930s such a legal mechanism did not exist and it could seem that it might become a guarantee of absence of international, and, consequently, intercultural conflicts. Later this mechanism emerged. The Charter of the United Nations recognized the right of self-determination for all nations. It has become one of the fundamental principles of the international law, however, contrary to the hopes, it did not exclude collision of peoples, but rather made them even more frequent, unfortunately, the military collisions included. We can say that a new cause of conflict was added to the traditional ones, namely a severe contradiction between the desires for self-determination and the impossibility or difficulty of achieving it.

The point is that this right was not accompanied by clear rules of application. Besides, in real life, it often appeared to be dependent on the will of the powerful nations. For example, the NATO and the United States decided that the Albanians of Kosovo have the right to self-determination, and so it happened. The similar role in the self-determination of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was played by Russia. However none of those self-determinations received mutual recognition. Russia believes that the Albanians who moved to the historic land of Serbia do not have the legal right to establish their own state. The NATO and the United States, even without any good reasoning, have the same claim against Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Of course those self-determinations were not recognized by Serbia and Georgia, which means that tensions have been created between them and newly-seceded public entities for the rest of their lives. Apparently, the patronage of the leading world powers over the new states will continue, because they cannot protect their sovereignty without it.

It is noteworthy that the civilized West (together with the USA) is so vigorously defending the right of peoples to self-determination in various regions of the world, but does not show the same enthusiasm towards their own community. Until now, there has been no occasion when any Western country allowed its national minority the right to self-determination. But some of them have been seeking for this right for decades and even centuries, including through an armed struggle (the Basques in Spain, the Northern Irish in the UK).

The West does not show solidarity with international law when it comes to self-determination of national minori-

ties in the ally-states, either. For example, the West did not raise its voice to support the Kurds in Turkey, who account for almost 20% of the population and fight for political and cultural sovereignty. Lately, they have been claiming only autonomy, but even this moderate desire of the Kurds finds no sympathy in liberal Europe.

In all stated above there is no condemnation of European leaders who are not willing to support the separatist sentiment in their countries. They are doing the right thing. Objectively, they act for the sake of all their peoples, not only minorities, whose cultural and political elites want to gain independence at any cost. This right, though sanctified with high authority of the UN, is not unconditional. Its implementation almost always involves a violation of the traditional world order, political and economic stability in the country and the region. And, besides, it sharply contradicts the interests of the titular ethnic groups who have made major contributions to the formation of the country and, therefore, should have a voice in determining its future destiny.

Speaking of the 2014 referendum on the independence of Scotland, which used to be a sovereign state until 1707, British Prime Minister David Cameron said that for the sake of not only the British, but the Scots, too, it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the country. No one can gain anything from its separation. José Manuel Barroso, talking about the referendum on the self-determination of Catalonia meant practically the same. Daring to take such a step, said this senior European official, Catalonia should be aware that it could never become a member of the EU without the consent of Spain.

These words are as true as gold. However, for some reason, they are articulated, only when it comes to their own integrity. They could not be heard when the liberal Europe and the USA were ravisly breaking Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, in the first case, by military forces. But, objectively, no one won anything from these separations. Neither people, who suddenly gained their sovereign statehood and who did not always know what to do with it, nor the world community as a whole. The collapse of Yugoslavia detonated a long military conflict in the Balkans, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union the world witnessed endless wars triggered by the United States and the NATO, who for some reason appropriated the right to play the role of world policeman.

The conclusion of the above-said is that the international community nowadays requires not the implementation of the right of peoples to self-determination, but rather the implementation of the Helsinki agreement on the inviolability of frontiers. The West, obsessed with the collapse of the socialist community, rejected this agreement, but, as history shows, it led to nothing beneficial. The world has not become more stable, on the contrary, more and more it is immersing in chaos. According to political analysts, it is a controlled chaos, but it is far from being real. It is made under control, but develops further without any.

Another disturbing and potentially explosive consequence of globalization is a new form of 'the great migration of peoples'. Declaring itself as a citadel of democracy and freedom, and trying to impose these humanist values on other people, the West provoked unheard-of migration flows. At some stage, it brought some dividends. Badly in need of 'unskilled' labour, the Europeans received it from Asian and African countries. The consequences of the 'open

¹ As the social studies show, the rich countries do not support the further expansion of the EU, while the poor are supporters of its expansion.

² Ivan Ilyin. *The Way of Spiritual Renewal*. AST publishing house. 2003. P. 263.

doors' policy only became clear when the number of migrant reached tens of millions, who started to assert their rights to cultural sovereignty. Leaders of major European countries have started talking about the crisis of multiculturalism, though they did not identify the problem very correctly. In fact, they had in mind another issue, namely disillusionment in the ability of the Western civilization to civilize and assimilate immigrants.

As far as multiculturalism is concerned, Western Europe does not experience a crisis of multiculturalism, rather it becomes more and more deeply rooted. Moreover, multiculturalism is the more successful, the more actively the Europeans are trying to spread their values among other nations. Globalization is not a one-way street. It is difficult to say how successful the European project will be in the Muslim world, but there is no doubt that the Muslim project in Europe seems very promising today. It results from a large scale of migration, which is akin to the non-military conquest of Europe.

Essentially, the West repeats the fate of globalizers of all time, who were ultimately destroyed by the globalized nations. A particularly striking example of this tendency is the Roman Empire that collapsed under the pressure of the refined barbarians.

A typical feature of emigration from Africa and Asia is not only their commitment to their cultural values, of course, there is nothing wrong in it, but their perfect unwillingness to accept the values of their new country of residence. Immigrants continue their traditional way of life even in the alien environment. Besides they create closed communities, the so-called cultural enclaves that are actively and often aggressively assert their civilizational sovereignty.

Is the West aware of how potentially dangerous its Islamization is? It seems that it is not fully aware of it. When a Catholic priest in one of the major European countries was asked whether he saw the conflict between Christianity and Islam, he replied negatively. According to him, it could be rather the conflict of cultural identities. But it amounts to the same thing. Both identities are based on the traditions of Christianity and Islam.

It is politicians and statesmen who are concerned with the new European realities. Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd spoke of them most frankly. Addressing the migrants, he said: 'If you are unhappy here, go away. We did not force you to come here. You wanted to be here, therefore, accept the country that hosted you.' Dutch politician Geert Wilders, making parallels between Islam and fascism, believes that all Islamists should be removed from the country, who 'do not wish to integrate'. Mary Le Pen, Chairman of the National Front, has similar views, she believes that France should 'restore border controls, make the programme of social benefits less attractive for immigrants and deport illegal migrants'. In 2010, she compared the mass prayers of Muslims in the streets with Nazi occupation. German Prime Minister Angela Merkel, and earlier President Nicolas Sarkozy of France were more politically courteous, but they also claimed the creation of alien cultural enclaves inadmissible in their countries.

Sometimes you can hear that Europe is growing old and cannot do without the flow of labour force from the outside, and therefore it will have to take migrants. However, there are also quite convincing expert estimates that migration

from the countries of the Muslim East, as well as from the 'black' Africa, does not bring any benefit to the economy of the West. It turns out that the majority of migrants leave their countries not because they have lost there jobs or have been harassed by dictatorial regimes, but because in Europe they can live comfortably without working, receiving social welfare allowance. When an unemployed African was asked by a Swedish journalist why he had left warm Italy and moved to cold Sweden, the former replied: 'Because in Sweden social standards for migrants are higher.'

Russia has already faced the problem of uncontrolled migration. After the collapse of the USSR and the liberalization of the Russian regime, millions of Vietnamese, Chinese, Central Asians rushed to earn money there. And just like in Europe, the loyalty of the Russian authorities to migrants can be explained by an acute shortage of manpower, especially in the construction sector and agriculture. At first, no one saw any threat in migrant flows. But over the time, the situation has changed. Suddenly the whole sale market in Moscow and other major cities became under their control. They also organized clandestine production, and the fraud products under the brands of the worldwide companies flooded the Russian market. Municipal cabbings also appeared to be in their hands. Moreover, these activities of migrants are sheltered by their ethnic criminal groups.

Realizing the severity of the invasion of migrants from the East, Russia finally began to restore the order. However, there is no knowing whether it will cope with this difficult task. In the West, the real measures to tighten immigration policy, despite the statements of the leaders of some countries, were never taken.

Although more attention has been paid to the source of intra-European migration. And I must say that it turned out to be quite extensive and more promising for old Europe. As a result of the collapse of the socialist countries and the Soviet Union, firstly, the so-called iron curtain collapsed, behind which were the Eastern European countries, and secondly, most of their economies collapsed too. Gaining freedom, but losing their jobs and livelihoods, the citizens of these countries aspired to their benefactors. Luckily there are no internal borders in the EU and the residents can choose any new country for living. Eastern Europeans have taken full advantage of this opportunity, which resulted in the fact that nearly all these countries suffered significant population losses.

An evident symbol of intra-European migration trends has recently become a virtual Polish plumber, who became the star of advertising in the Western media. Now, apparently, the hour has come for a Ukrainian plumber. There are good reasons why Brussels is so persistently trying to make Ukraine sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The political and economic elite of Ukraine are under unprecedented pressure. The main obvious purpose is to alienate Ukraine and Russia, to prevent new reborn of imperial integrity in the post-Soviet space. The West for some reason believes that without Ukraine, such a revival is impossible.

Along with this, the European Community is interested in receiving millions of cheap Ukrainian workers and smart brains too, as well as a market for their goods. Time will show if Ukraine will benefit from it, but the West is not definitely concerned with this circumstance. I think that the Ukrainian political and economic elite are well aware of it. But they have long been integrated with the West by their

money de facto and signing the Agreement, the elite expected to legalize their status de jure.¹

There is no information whether the migrant flow from Eastern Europe is treated as an alternative to the Arab-Muslim migration, but objectively it is, of course, much more favourable to the European Community. Firstly, immigrants from Eastern Europe are more educated than immigrants from Asia and Africa. Secondly, and more importantly, they do not pose any threat to Europe in terms of multiculturalism. Eastern Europeans are easily integrated into the Western European life, including a cultural one. And, of course, they do not create a hazard to changes in ethno-national and cultural identity of those countries where they migrate for permanent residence.

In the worst-case scenario, the first generation of them will retain the dual cultural loyalty that is natural to people of the Christian civilized community. At best they will inject fresh blood into the senescent liberal societies of the West, whose values contradict the common sense, and are also in clear contradiction to God's Providence. This refers to, in particular, the 'homosexual revolutions' that the European Democrats are particularly proud of, and the rest of the world is called upon to follow their example. The result of these 'revolutions' was the legalization of same-sex marriages and allowing such families to adopt children. But where to take these children from? In Europe, where a traditional family has from 1.2 to 1.4 children there are practically no children left. After legalization of the same-sex families there number will be even less.

All the above-mentioned described the consequences of the so-called soft globalization for the European civilization, by means of the so-called colour revolutions. But alongside with the soft globalization, a tough, hard one occurs. And according to Western adherents of freedom and democracy, it is performed for the sake of the 'oppressed' peoples. Not finding such in any country, especially the one with large reserves of energy or located in a strategically important region, American and European strategists bring down full force of their military machine on it. In this way, 'freedom and democracy' were subsequently imposed on the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya. Syria is still waiting its turn, the Peace Nobel laureate U.S. President Barack Obama decided to democratize it by using the missile strike. It is noteworthy that this time he did not even veil his deci-

sion with some euphemisms. He frankly and plainly said: 'A missile strike on Syria is dictated by the national interests of the United States.'

Almost in all cases such 'democratization' is accompanied by a lot of blood. Even if the NATO countries and the United States were really sincere in their intentions to bring happiness to people of the countries listed above, and to bless them with liberty and democracy, it would be the gravest crime against humanity to pay such a high price for it. The dictators (Milosevic, Hussein, Gaddafi, Sadat, Assad), as Western propaganda relentlessly assures the world community, are guilty of murdering thousands of innocent victims. But the democratic leaders of the USA and the NATO are guilty of murdering much more victims. And if we add completely destroyed economy, society disrupted to the condition of civil and religious wars, destruction of cultural monuments, plundered museums, it will present a fairly complete and, unfortunately, not a happy picture of the civilizing efforts of the Americans and their European accomplices.

The events of the 'Arab Spring', in fact, clearly confirmed the validity of Huntington's idea of the clash of civilizations, in this case, of Christian and Muslim. In response to the forceful imposition of European values on to the Arab world, it is growing more radical, Christian clergymen are executed, Christian churches and sacred places are destroyed on their territories. Monstrous terrorist attacks, one of which shook the USA and the whole world, also result from it. It is possible that defiantly aggressive behaviour of Muslims in Europe is to a large extent caused by their desire to avenge for the shattered dignity of their families.

In fear for their lives, Europeans have to escape from the countries 'liberated' from the tyranny of dictators, which does not promote the establishment of values of freedom and democracy. Usually the enlightened authoritarianism is replaced there by religious fundamentalism.

Formally, the USA and the NATO always triumphed in military campaigns unleashed in various regions of the world. In fact, their victories eventually turned out to be 'pyrrhic'. Paraphrasing the famous English commander of the nineteenth century, who said after winning a major battle in the Crimea, that another such victory would leave Britain with no army, we can say: A few more 'Arab Springs' and the West may become the East, in civilization-terms, of course.

¹ Le Pen, National Front leader in France, stated that 'Ukraine can develop without the EU'. A European project, in her view, has failed, and now everyone wishes to leave it.

Wang Hongji¹

THOUGHTS ABOUT READING IN ST. PETERSBURG

I am grateful to have been invited to the conference this year, not only because of the chance to learn something new from Russian and foreign scientists, politicians, writers and other professionals, but also because Russia is a reminiscent of my childhood homeland. This is not the first time I have come to St. Petersburg, and every time I step on this land, my heart feels exceptionally warm. Why? Because the works of Russian literature, read in my youth, left a deep impression in my heart.

1

When twenty years ago, I was going to Italy, flying over the dividing line between Europe and Asia, beneath the plane wing I was looking for the Ural mountains, then the Volga, St. Petersburg, but could not see anything, there was an immense white vista, which, nevertheless, reminded me of my childhood and adolescence. No matter how long has passed since then, and what people may think of it, I still remember the words from the book by Ostrovsky *How the Steel Was Tempered* that 'when you are racing at the coalface and taking part in the fight, do you think that the sun will not shine to you or that life is not beautiful?'

When I was over fifteen, my country launched a campaign of sending the educated youth to the villages, and I was among those young people. At that time I could not imagine whether my life would be meaningful or full of regret, but the above-mentioned phrase helped me cope with sorrows. Love relationships of Pavka, Tonya and Rita allowed me to enjoy the grace of peasant girls and feel the beauty of love without hesitation, it was an amazing feeling.

As far back as in the fourth century BC among my people there was a man celebrating peasant life, and his book *The Nine Songs* proves it. The name of this great man is Qu Yuan. He emotionally and passionately expressed his ideals and dreams, doubts, questions, love, all these were reflected in his poetry inspired by his life, illuminated by the light of his outstanding character. A thousand years after Qu Yuan, in the time of Tang Dynasty, Du Fu's poetry reached the same heights. As far as the typical features of his works are concerned, I would emphasize that Li Bai wrote about 'freedom', while Du Fu about the 'hardships': because the poetry of Li Bai was free, like clouds in the sky, and reflected the free spirit of the Tang Dynasty time, while Du Fu solemnly introduced misery and unhappiness in the literature. During the Song Dynasty time, the famous poet Su Dongpo praised the Tang writer and thinker Han Yu: 'He revived the literature, which had been in decline for eight generations.' I thought that in the period of Tang Dynasty prosperity and division into the rich and the poor was quite evident, as is said in the poem by Du Fu:

The gates of the rich smell of meat and wines,
And the roads are paved with the bones of the frozen.

Describing that time, Su Dongpo would say that the souls of men seemed to get drowned in the water, from

¹ Writer, Deputy Chairman of the Committee on Essay Writing of the China Writers' Association (Beijing).

which Han Yu rescued them. I was shocked to understand the power of literature. But I realized all this being an adult.

When I turned from a child to an adolescent, Pushkin's poems, works by Tolstoy, Gorky, Chekhov, Sholokhov, as well as the novels *The Forty First*, *The Story of Zoya and Shura*, *The Unsent Letter*, *Dawns Are Quiet Here* gave me the feeling of what 'literature' really is. The lives of the young people of these works, the stories of love magically gave me an amazing sense of intimacy with the province woods, forest paths, golden leaves, meadows on the banks of rivers and lakes, shining surface of the water. Yes, it is the power of literature! While reading, sunlight and bad weather, sleet, flames of a bonfire and ruined huts became vivid and real. Having read these works, you can hear the song of the peasants in straw hats and experience deep feelings to an aged mother who has nourished generations of young people ... In my heart I have always been grateful to Russian (and Soviet) literature for bringing me up, and I was even dreaming that once I would go to the Volga to take a boat trip.

Over twenty years ago, when I first flew over the Ural Mountains, the Soviet Union had no longer existed, but I firmly believed that people, who lived on this land, had created a great culture that would remain forever in their souls. Nowadays, as in the international scientific Likhachov Conference, I see more clearly the power that propagates the great culture to the next generation.

How can I describe what I saw and felt? I can say that much: when ten years ago I was listening to music in the Golden Hall of Vienna, I was mostly touched by the applause surging up and dying away as the tide. And then I realized that Vienna had earned the reputation as the capital of music not because there were a lot of great musicians, but thanks to many listeners who can enjoy the music.

In the autumn of 2005, when I first visited Russia, I was amazed to learn that in St. Petersburg there are 264 museums, 45 art galleries, over 2,000 libraries, more than 80 theatres with more than 100 companies! Would there have been so many libraries and theatres without a huge number of readers?

Taking my pictures on the background of the monuments to Pushkin, Dostoevsky, I was thinking that literature, art and ideological component of any country would have withered without so many readers. When people's interest in literature and art is superseded with the desire for material goods, the cultural education degrades, which is much worse than a widespread economic decline.

2

I read the works of D. Likhachov, the founder of this conference, with great respect. His monumental work, *Reflections on Russia*, published just before his death, attracted our attention. He urged to treat the great cultural heritage of Russia carefully, and pointed out that the culture was sorely dying. Likhachov argued about the need to preserve the culture of the nation, its language, literature, music and other historical traditions, as well as cultural facilities such as museums, archives and libraries, and only then Russia could be called a mighty county.

In his *Reflections on Russia* D. Likhachov wrote: 'No other people in the world are evaluated so controversially as Russians.' I think that Russia and China are similar in this respect.

D. Likhachov paid great attention to the history and culture. The Chinese Confucius consolidated the ancient Chinese culture, gathered literary monuments, lost during the period of Chunqiu war (Springs and Autumns) and added comments to them. Among them were the works of the Xia Dynasty, dating back more than four thousand years. In the Han period Emperor Wudi had Confucius teachings collected in five major books under the title 'Five Canons (the Five Classics)', which became the main textbook for classical education in China for the next two thousand years. We can say that it is the world oldest textbook and teaching materials in the history of education. Confucius was, undoubtedly, a man who had a most significant impact on the Chinese culture. The Italian preacher Matteo Ricci, who arrived in China at the end of the Ming Dynasty, was the first to tell about him to the Western world. He translated *The Analects* into Latin, and in 1687 the book was published in Paris. In the eyes of the Europeans Confucius was as famous as the Greek philosophers Socrates and Plato. However, since the early 20th century until the present time Confucius has been debated about. Europeans review and criticize the heritage of the past, too, but they never attack Socrates and Plato, while the Chinese have sharply criticized the great thinker and educator Confucius, and they are not just trying to topple him from the pedestal, but are also talking about the inferiority and rottenness of the whole historical national culture, about the 'natural corruption' of the Chinese nation.

D. Likhachov would argue that many scientists know too little about the history of Russia, but they still criticize the current situation and give arbitrary forecasts. In my opinion, it is a positive trait that the Russians do not talk about the bad nature of their own nation. Likhachov believed that without knowledge and understanding of history one can not be sure in the future. How can we understand Russian history? He claimed the necessity to study the characteristics of history and culture, which is impossible without a deep immersion into reading.

Those who do not read, have no history. And can history be unimportant for any of the citizens? If a person does not know the history of his ancestors, he has no spiritual home.

3

Participation in this conference, understanding the views of Likhachov and his influence on such events is what we should pay attention to, and what we could learn from.

In China writing system has been used longer than any other in the world, my country is the birthplace of paper and printing, so we have the richest in the world collection of literary texts and the most ancient tradition of reading. And how did it happen that China is now one of the countries where books are read the least? D. Likhachov spoke of a 'disastrous decline' of Russian culture, and these words prompted me to look at the situation in China, which in this respect is similar to Russian.

It is a well-known fact that Jews are fond of reading. After they had lost their home two thousand years ago, they replaced it with books. Their wisdom and achievements are admired all over the world. Some say that Harvard has now more than a hundred libraries, and even the dining

room there is called 'a reading room where you can eat'. And even more amazing is the statement that each of people hurrying on the campus is like a walking library themselves. A Japanese wrote a book called *Society with a low IQ*, which states that in China at every corner there are massage parlours, but no bookstores. And from this the author concludes that China is the classic 'society with low IQ' and cannot develop in the future. What feelings do my compatriots have about such an 'international situation'?

The habit of reading should be brought up in a person since childhood. In China, the education, aimed at exams, leads to the fact that many of children for a long time have not developed an interest in reading. Teachers and parents constantly repeat: 'Do your homework!' And no one asks: 'What book are you reading now?' It's hard to imagine what kind of future awaits the nation with no habit of reading. But I know for sure and I have been grieving over the fact that the main defect of my country is the education system focused only on the exam, it catastrophically strangles the future of China, and the damage from it is much greater than the harm of the official corruption.

Naturally, in China there are decent people who are trying to overcome the current situation in education. An outstanding example is Mr Zhu Yongxin, who did not serve any office in the education system. I admire and fully support his view: 'The history of man's spiritual development is the history of what he reads. The spiritual level of a nation depends on the level of people's erudition. A school that does not teach reading can not give a real education.'

The history of mankind has witnessed a lot of spiritual rises, which could only be achieved by reading and meditating. Since my youth, I have remembered the words by Gorky: 'The book is the most powerful tool for further development of the spiritual forces of mankind.' Now I think it should be interpreted as the necessity to read books, passing knowledge from generation to generation, so that humanity would continue to evolve. Without aspiration to go further, souls degrade. Physically healthy new generation may become spiritually disabled. If we talk about an individual person, I think that reading is a chance to open and explore independently the ability of the soul to house a whole world. If you can not read and do not want to read, our world will be too small.

D. Likhachov in his *Reflections on Russia* repeatedly stated that we should not reject anything of the great cultural heritage, but protect and respect the history, keep in touch with the past without worshipping it. This is a deep thought.

I have repeatedly emphasized that reading requires a feeling, not only a critical position. Feelings can lift the veil from history. Without feeling the world can not really become transparent. Due to feelings, we can see struggle in defeat, purity in the mud, perfect in the ugly, respect in humiliation. We should respect, protect and multiply the heritage. Reading and continuation of the history of ancestors can not be compared with the process of taking sugar cane to the mill, grinding it, separating the sugar from the cake, then leaving the sugar and disposing of the cake. The history of mankind was created in the union of light and darkness. We need a complete rather than a quartered history. History shines when it is cherished. One can rise only if he fell down.

Pondering about reading in St. Petersburg, I thought that homeland is not just a territory, it is the history of how

the nation's ancestors got established on the land, how they have been developing up to this point, as well as the combination of territorial, humanitarian and spiritual components formed in the course of history. A real homeland is culture, if it declines, it will weaken the nation. And only through reading can we become true heirs of the culture of our ancestors.

In conclusion, I would like to quote the words of the Secretary-General of CPC Central Committee, Chairman Xi Jinping. Chairman Xi is extremely serious about the culture and

history of China, he has repeatedly called upon the officials to read books and study history. On August 19, 2013 at a regular important meeting Chairman Xi spoke of four points, which should be explained: historical traditions, cultural heritage and the situation in different countries vary from each other; Chinese culture has accumulated the deepest spiritual aspirations of the Chinese nation; an outstanding traditional culture is a great advantage of the Chinese nation; socialism with Chinese characteristics is rooted in the Chinese culture. I deeply believe that this is good news for China.

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POPULATION HETEROGENEITY AND FISCAL FEDERALISM POLICY⁴

Conflict of heterogeneous communities and fiscal federalism

One of the discouraging facts of the modern world is the increasing number of internal conflicts in a state, despite the scientific and technological progress and the growth of global wealth. In 1950, the worldwide total number of conflicts involving the military forces totalled less than 10, while in 2009 this number increased up to 27. [18] Currently there exist separatist movements almost all over the world, in Africa, Asia, Europe, North and South America. In many ways they result from both peaceful and forceful changes of the world political map, which, since the end of World War II, have led to a significant increase in the number of independent states in the world.

At the same time the number of internal conflicts of interest is rising, especially of those relating to the policy of inter-regional redistribution of income and increasing regional autonomy. During the period from 1950 to 2006, according to [19], 31 of 42 studied democratic countries undertook 393 reforms affecting the power of regional authorities, and in 86% of cases those reforms dealt with increasing regional autonomy. At the same time, the demand from certain regions or groups for a greater autonomy has not been met by the central authorities in many cases. [4]

It is usually assumed that the policy of fiscal federalism generally contributes to the resolution of internal conflicts that arise for various reasons, but mainly are as-

sociated with the historical heterogeneity of the state's population. Therefore, in this paper we shall look into the relationship between the emerging conflicts and the fiscal federalism policy in terms of two oppositely directed forces: the centrifugal force, determined by the degree of social heterogeneity, and the centripetal force, determined by economies of scale. [3] As pointed out by Barro [5], 'we treat the optimal size of the jurisdiction as a condition for balance: in a large country it is easier to distribute the cost of public goods production among the taxpayers, but it is more difficult to meet the needs of heterogeneous population.' However, the optimal size of jurisdiction does not present a final solution to the problems, as the inter-regional redistribution of income can lead to additional stimuli to separation. [14]

Experts in the field of political economics suppose that practical application of the federalist principles can reduce the costs of heterogeneity by providing a greater autonomy, which may improve the quality of public goods [15, 21], increase interregional competition [29] and provide more opportunities for the redistribution of power.

On the other hand, a greater autonomy has its own costs. From [8], researchers point out that decentralization in terms of federalism can enhance regional misbalance. Thus, from the standpoint of researchers of fiscal federalism policy, the balance of interests can be reached by satisfying regional demand and transferring them a part of authority, but this transfer is followed by separatist movements.

Empirical testing of the impact of fiscal federalism policy on reducing or, on the contrary, increasing internal conflicts, gives ambiguous results. The historical events under consideration and their interpretation are different for different authors both in terms of the basic concepts (what is considered a conflict, what policy can be interpreted as increased autonomy, etc.) and in terms of methods and approaches to the analysis of the facts and statistics.

In [6, 12, 13, 16, 22, 28] there are examples of the successful application of the fiscal federalism policy that allowed to reduce or even eliminate the tendency towards a conflict. The study [2] on the separatist conflicts in the territory of Pakistan, India, Nigeria and the former Yugosla-

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via shows that the tax redistribution and transfers allow to extinguish the existing conflicts. Analysis of conflict on the island of Java (Indonesia) demonstrates [24] a decrease in the confrontation after fiscal decentralization was applied, but only in areas with relatively high incomes.

The authors of [9, 10, 20, 25, 26, 27] have an opposite opinion. The study [2] argues that fiscal decentralization does not contribute to a better meeting of local preferences in a heterogeneous society; the study [17] demonstrates the ambiguous impact of fiscal federalism policy on manifestation of nationalist tendencies. The study [7] shows that the decentralization of administration helps to reduce and prevent conflicts, however it creates pre-requisites for regional separation with the increasing power of regional political elites.

Given the variety of available views on conflict and fiscal federalism in the scientific literature, we shall proceed to the formal description of these processes.

Description of the theoretical model

Let's consider a country consisting of a 'centre' and several 'peripheral' regions, each distinguished by both a number of residents, and ethno-linguistic structure of the population. We shall assume that for each peripheral region we can quantify the value of ethno-linguistic differences from the central region.

The central region, whose main goal is to maintain the integrity of the country, has two available tools to stand against the separation of regions. The first is a direct increase in the transfers flow to the troubled region, the policy of providing transfers does not have to be the same for all regions. The second tool is more complex to implement, it is a combination of political and economic activities that reduce the potential benefits of separating the region, but these activities do not have instant (short-term) impact on the amount of public goods provided. Let's consider these tools in more details.

If the centre provides the region with some transfers flow, the region can use these transfers in two ways: production of public goods and establishing independent institutions. Using the concept of a representative agent, for each region we can calculate the benefits function that takes into account the structure of the ethno-linguistic region and that reflects the influence of the above-mentioned two components of the transfers flow on the benefits received by the population of this peripheral region. If the benefits fall below a certain reserve level, the region in question prefers to separate, and the centre is eager to 'let it go'.

In addition to direct account for the above-stated function of benefits received by the population of the region, it is also necessary to formalize possible alternative motives and benefits of sovereignty. Unlike public goods, investment in the creation of independent institutions does not bring instant benefits, and their creation can be treated as some additional burden by the residents of the region, which is expressed by the ratio of the two components of the transfers flow. This attitude may be interpreted as an indicator of additional (non-economic) motivation of the population of the region to separate from the centre.

Separation of the region bears high risks of building an independent, but a disabled state. Greater investment in the creation of independent institutions can reduce these risks, that is why for each region we can define a threshold

value, above which the threat of separation can be considered as real.

The second fiscal federalism policy instrument is investment without an immediate feedback, it can be implemented in different ways. For example, the centre can transfer to the region some assets that can not be used immediately, but that allow the region to create a permanent source of income in future. We can talk here about programs of population resettlement to other regions, or, visa versa, transfer a part of administrative authority to the regional level, thus reducing the benefits of separation. Formally, the centre can use these investments to reduce the reserve (minimal) level of benefits, reaching of which results in separation.

Thus, the challenge of optimizing the well-being of the country in view of anticipating threats of regional separation is to maximize the total benefits of all regions by forming a system of transfers for each region, given the possible uses of these transfers within each region.

Introducing formal functions and parameters, imposing standard assumption of monotonicity and convexity of the functions, is easy to obtain the following results from the model described:

(1) growth of transfers leads both to an increase in production of public goods in the regions and to the strengthening of independent institutions, which may be undesirable from the centre's point of view;

(2) the share of transfers, directed by the region for the development of 'local' institutions increases with the growth of ethno-linguistic regional differences from the centre, it endogenously determines the 'threshold of separation' from the centre;

(3) the amount of the centre's investment in all regions, as a function of the optimal size of transfers and investments in the above-mentioned second policy tool can be considered as one of the variants of the diversity index presented in [11];

(4) The total centre's investments in the region increase with the growth of ethno-linguistic diversity, but as they increase further, the monetary component of transfers may be reduced due to the compensatory growth of non-monetary impact of the centre on the regions.

This model matches the original ideas about the balance between the economies of scale in production of public goods and conflicts associated with a wide variety of preferences. Growth of transfers from the centre to the regions inevitably encourages the regions to strengthen their local institutions, which reduces the monetary impact on maintaining the integrity of the country. The endogenization of threshold values of monetary and non-monetary stimuli for separation, proposed by this model, allows us to get an additional leverage when not only 'demand' but also 'offer' for independence is regulated. The latter permits to enhance the integrity of the state by means of investment in non-monetary stimuli, including deferred revenue flows, management of migration in the region, strengthening of the political power of the region and other alternatives.

Hypotheses of empirical research

In the above-presented model the issue of direct confrontation in certain regions was not considered. Given that in many studies (including those cited above) the idea of the evaluation of the conflict of interest is usually limited to the evaluation of the facts of civil confrontation, we shall at-

tempt to interpret accurately the pre-requisites for the empirical evaluation of the theoretical model proposed above. In concord with the interpretation adopted in the literature, claiming that the amount of resources 'wasted' by the parties in the conflict in order to tip the scales in their favour, is positively correlated with the number of collisions between the parties in the conflict, we do not intend to model this dependence explicitly. On the other hand, we believe that the policy is focused on (de)stabilization of the situation, if additional resources applied by the centre increase (or respectively, reduce) the amount of 'wasted' resources for resolution of the conflict between the parties.

Using various degrees of ethnic differences in order to assess the costs of heterogeneity of the population, we can formulate the following basic hypotheses arising from the model stated above:

A. Ethnic separation (fractionalization) increases the possibility of conflict.

B. For an ethnically homogeneous country the increase of transfers reduces the possibility of conflict.

C. With increase in ethnic separation, the effect of transfers' impact on the conflict resolution weakens and can become negative.

D. We can assume that there is a nonlinear dependence of the effect of transfers (increase followed by decrease) on the degree of society fractionalization in terms of ethnic characteristic.

The results of the econometric estimates

In this paper we used the data presented in [23] (available online in the journal *American Economic Review*). The initial sample contains data for 138 countries on five-year periods from 1960 to 1999. The need to use data on transfers, taken from the reports of the organization 'Economic Freedom of the World', resulted in reduction of the sample to 57 countries over the period 1970 to 1999, for which complete data required in our model is available.

The dependence variable is the 'emergence of civil conflict', its values are taken from data provided by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo.

The main variable is the share of transfers in the state budget. The value of this variable varies both across countries and over time. Given that the available data on civil conflicts is aggregated in five-year periods, we supplement this information with the data on transfers for the first year of each five-year period.

In this paper the study [23] is enhanced by various assessment methods of ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity. In particular, to build the regression we used: the index of ethno-linguistic fractionalization, Greenberg index, index of peripheral heterogeneity, Reynal Querol polarization index, Esteban – Ray index.

As control variables we also used: the logarithm of GDP per capita for each initial year of the five-year period; logarithm of the population for each year of the initial year of five-year period; share of exported commodities; presence of mountainous territory (share per total area of the country); fictional variable representing nonadjacent states; Democracy Development Index, available from. [1]

Conflict is described by a binary value, which is determined by a latent variable that has a logistic distribution. The created log-it model links the civil conflict to one of the selected degrees of ethnic or linguistic heterogeneity, share

of transfers and other (control) variables. In some variants of the model we also introduced summands, reflecting possible nonlinear effect of transfers on the ethnic polarization.

Alongside with the basic econometric model generally corresponding with [23], we proposed an alternative variant, reflecting a possible allowance for a time dependence of regression error.

The obtained results of the econometric estimation generally confirm the hypotheses formulated. Transfers negatively correlate with the occurrence of conflicts; while ethnic heterogeneity, in contrast, reveals a positive relationship with it. Applied heterogeneity indices have positive coefficients, but vary in statistical significance. Insignificance of ethno-linguistic fractionalization index and Reynal Querol polarization index, in which the linguistic terms are used, may indicate the apparent need to consider the factor of linguistic diversity in the description of ethnic separation costs.

For countries without ethnic heterogeneity, the factor of transfers' influence loses its statistical significance, though it remains negative. Accounting for non-linear effect of transfers allows us to fix the non-monotonic nature of their impact, predicted by the theoretical model: upon increasing social heterogeneity, the transfers first moderate the conflict, but then contribute to its strengthening.

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Jerzy J. Wiatr¹

CULTURAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSFORMATION²

Few books have had such a great impact on the theory of politics in general, and on the theory of democracy in particular, as the Civic Culture study published in 1963 as the result of comparative study of political cultures in five democracies (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Mexico, United Kingdom and the United States of America) ³. The conceptual framework of the study departed radically from the institutional approach and focused on the role of political cultures – systems of values and modes of behavior, which, formed by history, influence the ways in which nations act in politics.

Particularly important has been the interpretation of the democratic political culture – the *civic culture* in Almond's terminology. “*The Civic Culture* model – wrote Almond several years later – drew...the ‘rationality-activist model’ of democratic citizenship, the model that required that all citizens be involved in politics, and that their participation be informed, analytic and rational. *The Civic Culture* argued that the rationality-activist model of democratic citizenship was *one* component of the civic culture, but not the sole one. Indeed by itself this participant-rationalist model of citizenship could not logically sustain a *stable* democratic government. Only when combined in some sense with its opposites of passivity, trust, and deference to authority and competence was a viable, stable democracy possible”⁴

Such approach has been important for evaluating conditions of democratic stability in the old democratic states. It has been argued, however, that it also helped in the interpretation of the political differences between what was then the community of socialist states and influenced the way in which politics was studied there⁵. One of the most important consequences of such approach was the realization that the then existing communist states, while similar in their institutional structures, differed substantially in their respective political cultures. Several studies of communist political systems published in the West during the “cold war” drew heavily from the political culture model for explaining the way in which these systems operated.⁶

The collapse of the European communist systems confronted the political scientists with new theoretical challenges. Originally, our attention was focused on the process of departure from the dictatorial regimes, but soon the crucial point of analysis switched to the results of political change. Where and under what conditions democratic systems replaced the dictatorial ones? What makes young democracy stable? There were various ways of answering these questions.

Twenty-five years of post-communist transformation is a sufficiently long period of time to allow us to formulate theoretical interpretations of these processes. Originally, many scholars tended to put the emphasis on socio-economic factors. Adam Przeworski, the Polish-born American political scientist, in several of his studies published in late 1980s or early 1990s emphasized the importance of the level of economic growth as the main factor which determines the outcome of democratization. In his interpretation, countries where the GNP per capita reaches the \$6000 level tend to be safe for democracy (no coup d'état overthrowing

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² Paper presented for the 14th International Likhachov Conference, St. Petersburg, May 15–16, 2014.

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⁶ The review of such studies has been presented by the British political scientist Archie H. Brown (*Soviet Politics and Political Science*, London 1974: Macmillan, p. 89–104).

democratic government happens in countries, which have reached this level of economic growth.¹

While this argument has some value, it does not explain great differences between countries of similar level of economic affluence. The less economically developed post-communist states (particularly Central Asia and the Caucasus, but also some countries of the Balkans) offer an interesting field for comparisons. While it is true that in the most developed post-communist countries the consolidation of democracy progressed smoothly, the opposite is not equally true. Some economically poor countries performed reasonably well, sometimes even better than relatively more affluent ones. Moldova and Montenegro are interesting examples.

Important as economic conditions are, they do not explain differences between states in transition fully. The American political scientists Fred W. Riggs suggested an institutional explanation. In his two comparative papers he argued that the success of young democracy is more likely if the parliamentary, rather than presidential, constitutional system is adopted², the position which I have supported quoting the experience of early democratization in Poland.³

Samuel P. Huntington in his well-known book *The Third Wave* suggested the approach, which constitutes an important alternative to both the socio-economic and the institutional approaches.⁴ He has stressed the correlation between cultural background and the prospects for democracy in the formerly dictatorial regimes. Western Christianity, according to this concept offered greater chance for democratic consolidation than Eastern Christianity (Orthodoxy) and Islam formed the least favorable cultural background.

Historical evidence supports Huntingtonian interpretation only partly. It is true that democratic transformation went smoothly and democratic regimes have been consolidated in the Central European post-communist countries, which in Huntington's terminology belong to the "Western civilization" (The Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). The only exception has been Croatia, where an authoritarian regime functioned until 2000, and which fulfilled the EU conditions for membership only in 2012. It is also true that no post-communist state where Islam is the dominant religion became a democracy.

The case of Eastern Christian civilization is by far more complex. Some post-communist countries put by Huntington in this category (Bulgaria, Romania) are now members of the EU and, even if not perfectly democratic, are considered to be democratic enough to fulfill conditions for membership. Serbia has been defined as "fully free" by the Freedom House.

Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are the most interesting cases for comparative analysis. All belong to the "Eastern

Christian civilization" in Huntingtonian terminology and all have similar problems in their development from communism to democracy. The most common negative element is the depth of conflict between the government and the opposition, as demonstrated recently by the Ukrainian crisis. Neither of these countries has been defined as fully consolidated democracy by the Freedom House, but they are not (probably with the exception of Belarus) dictatorial regimes. The most adequate definition for their regimes is the concept of "delegative democracy" introduced in 1991 by the Argentinean political scientist, former President of the International Political Science Association Guillermo O'Donnell⁵. In such regimes opposition and contested election exist and rulers are elected by basically free and honest election, but citizens' rights and freedom are not fully protected.

Is this because of the religious tradition of the Orthodox Church, as Huntington believed? The cases of Bulgaria, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania and Serbia indicate that it is not simple.

My alternative, but also cultural, interpretation (originally presented in my book on post-communist Europe⁶ focuses on four historical factors which explain the way in which political cultures in East Central Europe differ from those of Russia and of other former Soviet republics (except the ones which had been incorporated to the USSR during the Second World War and which in many ways are similar to the East Central European states).⁷

The first factor relates to the length of time during which the communist systems existed. In the former Russian empire the communist system had been established one full generation earlier than in the non-Soviet communist states. By the time the communist systems were coming to their end, the pre-communist past was no longer a part of the life experience even of the older generations of Soviet citizens, but it was still very much alive in the memories of the older generation of Poles, Hungarians and Czechs.

The second factor refers to the pre-communist past. The majority of East central European states differed from the former Soviet republics in their pre-communist past, all of them having had at least some experience with democracy prior to the establishment of the communist regime. Memories of the past explain why the political cultures of East Central European states, while less democratic than those in Western Europe, have been considerably more democratic than the political cultures of Russia and of the other states which had been parts of the Russian empire.

The third difference concerns the pattern of establishment of the communist rule. In Russia, communists came to power on their own – by exploiting the dissatisfaction from the war and skillfully organizing the new state in such an astute way that they were able to defeat their once-powerful adversaries. In east Central Europe, with the exception of Yugoslavia, communist regimes were imposed on the unwilling population by the overwhelming might of the victorious Soviet Union with the passive acceptance of the Western powers. Being imposed upon from without,

⁵ Guillermo O'Donnell, *Delegative Democracy*, Chicago 1991: East-South Systems Transformations: Working Paper 21.

⁶ Jerzy J. Wiatr, *Europa pokomunistyczna: przemiany państw i społeczeństw po 1989 roku*, Warszawa 2006: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.

⁷ Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Democratizations in Central Europe: Comparative Perspectives", in: Jose V. Cipur, ed., *Democratizations: Comparisons, Confrontations, and Contrasts*, Cambridge Mass. and London 2008: The MIT Press, p. 146–147.

¹ Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market. Political and economic reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge 1991: Cambridge University Press; Adam Przeworski et al., *Sustainable Democracy*, Cambridge 1995: Cambridge University Press.

² Fred W. Riggs, "The survival of presidentialism in America: Paraconstitutional practices", *International Political Science Review*, vol. 9, 1988, no. 4, p. 247–278; Fred W. Riggs, "Presidentialism versus parliamentarism: Implications for representativeness and legitimacy", *International Political Science Review*, vol. 18, 1997, no. 3, p. 253–278.

³ Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Executive-legislative relations in crisis: Poland's experience 1989–1993" in: Arend Lijphart and Carlos Waisman, *Institutional Design in New Democracies: eastern Europe and Latin America*, Boulder 1996: Westview, p. 103–115.

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*, Norman and London 1991: University of Oklahoma Press.

but disposing of a very weak popular base within, the newly established communist regimes of East Central Europe (particularly those in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland) was forced to make numerous concessions.

The fourth factor was the relatively short duration of the fully totalitarian, Stalinist, stage of the communist system in East Central Europe (1948–1956) compared to the much longer fully totalitarian stage of the communist regime in the USSR (1929–1956).

History has left its marks on the political cultures of the formerly communist states. The Russian political scientist Fiodor M. Burlatskij, when arguing in favor of the “presidential republic” pointed to the old Russian tradition of trust in the strong leader rather than in institution.¹ It is almost universally accepted now, that the prospects of democracy and its forms depend to a very large extent on the political culture, formed by history – both old and recent. The political culture approach made us sensitive to the role history plays in contemporary politics. Our values and modes of behavior have been shaped by historical experience.

Historical heritage, however, does not preclude democratic changes, even if it makes them more or less likely. Political culture approach should not be interpreted as a version of Hegelian determinism. In politics nothing is inevitable, even if some outcomes are more likely than other. A lot depends on the quality of political leadership, on its willingness to move in the right direction. The events taking place in formerly communist states provide us with rich evidence of the importance of leadership. Leaders, however, do not operate in the cultural vacuum. They themselves are products of national political cultures and have to operate within the context of culturally defined political climate. It also must be understood that the nation-specific model of democracy depends on the historical and cultural traditions of a nation. It would be preposterous to assume that all nations of the world would (and should) adopt the Western model of democracy. Such concepts, often presented under the disguise of “universal democratic values”, can only lead to misunderstanding of the nature of democratic processes, which take place in countries of distinctly different cultural background.

A. V. Yakovenko²

TRADITIONAL VALUES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

Historic experience demonstrates that traditions are not merely a means to uphold moral standards of society, pass on its values from generations to generations and, thus, ensure social cohesion. These values also provide a common denominator for different cultures and world religions. The growing role of religion and religious consciousness in the modern world is commonly recognized. At the same time, much prejudice against religion prevails in the European secular society. Dr Larry Siedentop, Professor of Keble College, Oxford, recently wrote in *Financial Times*, “We should acknowledge the religious sources of liberal secularism. That would strengthen the west, making it better able to shape the conversation of mankind”. The American philosopher and political scientist Francis Fukuyama wrote on the anniversary of Nietzsche several years ago that the western political thought is yet to overcome its denial of the equality of human dignity, which lies at the heart of Christianity.

I would like to quote former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright who wrote in her 2006 memoir *“The Mighty and the Almighty: Reflections on America, God, and World Affairs”* that “[those who live in Islamic countries] concern themselves with transcendent issues of history, identity and

faith. To be heard, the rest of us must address matters equally profound.” Thus, the issue of traditional values is at the heart of both domestic development and international relations.

President Putin spoke about the importance of traditional values in his annual message to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation in 2013. This subject was profoundly addressed by the UK Prime-Minister in his speech on the 400th anniversary of the King James Bible (the Authorized Version) in 2012.

It is in this spirit that on 21 February 2014 the Mission of Rossotrudnichestvo in the UK supported by the Russian Embassy in London hosted a Symposium dedicated to this subject. It was initiated and chaired by the Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk, Chairman of the Department of External Church Relations and a permanent member of the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate of Moscow, and Archbishop of London Richard Chartres, Bishop of London, one of the leading patriarchs of the Anglican Church and an ex officio member of the House of Lords. Lord Green, former Minister of State for Trade and Investment and a member of the St Paul’s Cathedral clergy, Anatoly Torkunov, Rector of MGIMO and a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Ben Quash, Professor of Christianity and the Arts at King’s College London, Dr James Walters, Chaplain at the London School of Economics, Alexander Agadjanian, Professor of the Russian State University for the Humanities, Antonio Mennini, Apostolic Nuncio to Great Britain (who for many years had been posted to Russia) made their speeches at the conference. The Symposium was attended by over 50 representatives of different religions, academic circles, diplomatic missions and NGOs.

Quite a few interesting ideas were expressed at the debate. Moreover, the discussion revealed significant similarities in the analysis of the problem and peculiarities of its

¹ Fiodor M. Burlatskij, *O politicheskoy nauke*, Moskwa 2013: Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Uniwiersiteta, p. 304.

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manifestation in European society and elsewhere. Particular attention should be given to the following aspects of this “brainstorm”.

It is known that the present global crisis has exposed considerable drawbacks of social evolution, including the growth of inequality, loss of future prospects for the youth and weakening of national identity fundamental for social cohesion. In this regard, it was mentioned that markets *per se*, due to their randomness, are not suited for addressing long-term social challenges. Moreover, it should be remembered that there is a moral aspect to the notion of value, in spite of it being an economic category. For this reason, urgent economic challenges require a genuinely collective approach.

Another equally important message is that the spread of the internet has a negative impact on direct personal contact, which is dangerous, for it fails to fulfill such objectives of interpersonal communication as confidence building and creation of moral duty of one person to another. In this context, it is worthwhile to cite the conclusions of the Rt Rev Rowan Williams made from studying the works of Fyodor Dostoyevsky (*Dostoyevsky: Language, Faith, and Fiction*, 2008). Among the fundamental ideas set forth in Dostoyevsky’s writings he distinguishes the idea that personal communication has crucial importance and is, in fact, an indispensable condition for personal growth. Absence of such communication or “silence” are the antidote, as they are a sure sign of personal degradation, spiritual, and then physical death. I believe that, in a time of big questions, we should give it a thought.

Equally destructive for society are automatization and anonimization of labour, which used to have a largely individual character before the Industrial Revolution: in pursuit of higher efficiency they reduce labour to generic functions. This, in its turn, implies disposability of workers and dis-

regards their individual qualities, that is, they are not perceived as unique personalities.

It was also noted that specialization of higher education further intensified a tendency, which dates back to the Age of the Enlightenment, towards eroding the principle of the universality of knowledge containing elements of moral and spiritual growth – in isolation from these, pure science is no less able to “produce monsters” than “sleep of reason”.

In a competitive culture primarily fostered by the private sector and the spread of outsourcing in the system of state service, even the work of public servants, long viewed as service to the common good, is turning into a commodity. Obviously, the idea of service to the cause of people is alien to private companies, whose main purpose is profit-making.

In general, the current crisis and other phenomena of modern life, including the escalation of inter-civilizational conflicts, point at traditional values and their indispensability as a moral foundation of society. Indeed, one often hears, as it relates to the fate of liberal capitalism, that the much talked-about “Protestant ethics” has “worn out”, which implies that, as it wore out, the whole edifice collapsed. Incidentally, this is a conclusion made by political scientists, not philosophers or theologians, but simply people struggling to understand the causes of the current crisis, which can be justifiably categorized as a systemic crisis of Western society. I am sure that its lessons are of universal value, including for Russia.

Judging by the feedback of the participants, such symposium is viewed as a long-felt need, a primary aspect of civil society contacts promoting better understanding between nations and search of new ways to resolve common tasks, including such a relevant one as prevention of radicalization in its modern forms.

A. S. Zapesotsky¹

RUSSIA IN THE EURASIAN AREA. THOUGHTS ABOUT THE PAST AND THE FUTURE (On the Modern Theory and Practice of Eurasianism)

I

Today the topic of Eurasianism has both theoretical and practical importance. It is directly linked to the key issue for modern Russia: what the further development of the country should be focused on.

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Author of over 2000 scholarly publications. Member of editorial boards of journals ‘Literary Education’ (*Literaturnaja Uchoba*), ‘Philosophy and Culture’ (*Filosofiya i Kul’tura*), ‘Issues of Cultural Studies’ (*Voprosy Kulturologiji*), ‘Quest’ (*Poisk*), ‘Partnership of Civilizations’, ‘Simurg’ (Azerbaijan).

Decorated with the Order of Friendship, medals ‘For rescuing a drowning man’ and ‘In memory of the tercentenary of Saint Petersburg’. Holder of ‘K.D. Ushinsky medal’, the Gold medal of the Russian Academy of Education, Leo Tolstoy Gold Medal of the International Association of writers and essayists (Paris). Decorated with a Diploma of the Ministry of Culture of

On the one hand, our society criticizes more and more sharply the ultraliberal ideology of bureaucratic machinery, which means a blind, mindless copying of Western mechanisms of socio-economic life, the failure of reforms based on this ideology is more and more obvious almost all spheres of life.

On the other hand, the processes of globalization and global competition does not allow even a country as vast as Russia, to act by itself, forcing it to look for allies in a multi-polar world.

In this respect, the policy of the country’s leaders is quite clearly targeted at realizing the potential of the Cus-

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toms Union and Common Economic Space with Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus as members, with the prospect members such as Armenia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, etc. At this stage, the main issue is to enhance the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and labour. Vladimir Putin rightly pointed out: '...regional integration, which the whole world follows, is the most effective means to make full use of internal resources for growth, competitiveness in world markets, and, undoubtedly, we have discussed that a lot of times, together we are stronger, it is easier for us to respond to global challenges'. [1] Judging from these ideas, the country has embarked on the creation of the Eurasian Union.

It is obvious that economic integration is impossible without strengthening cultural fundamentals. The Eurasian Union will require not only unified industrial standards, but also the legal structure, principles of management and accounting, education, standards in tourism, etc. Creation of a new vast market with more than 165 million consumers is creation of an appropriate cultural space. In this regard, Vladimir Putin calls all of us to treat this integration project not as 'a superficial bureaucratic game, but as a living organism'. He considers 'myriads of civilizational and spiritual threads that unite our peoples' to be a particular advantage. [2] This approach clearly manifests a desire to use the positive experience in building the European Union.

In this regard, we should pay attention to the fact that the European Union originated 40 years ago as the European Coal and Steel Community. And nowadays it is based on common approaches to life, common principles, ideas and values.

It is noteworthy that speaking about the strategic planning of the Eurasian integration, Academician Sergei Glazyev marks the need for a generally accepted ideology that defines a vision of common future: 'While global crisis is raging and monstrous economic and social consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the world socialist system are still well remembered, the simple idea of survival and consolidation of the economic potential for improving competitiveness serves as this ideology. In future, it has to evolve based on common spiritual heritage of peoples and absorbing the modern paradigm of sustainable development, the goals of improving the quality of public life, the principles of common responsibility of the states involved in the integration for the sake of the future of the humanity'. [3] This implies the challenge 'of the new ideological model'.

It is remarkable that prominent economist Glazyev sees the concept of 'European integration process' as a circum-spect philosophical and political trend: 'After the collapse of the Russian Empire, it has been actively promoted by our philosophers, who had to emigrate, and a whole lot of works, ranging from Prince Trubetskoy, were devoted to the evaluation of what might happen in the post-Soviet era. The general idea was that there would be a Eurasian union, distinct from the Russian Empire, whose basis was Orthodoxy, and the Soviet Union, that was based on communist ideology. The difference is that in the progress towards the Eurasian union all civilizational diversity will be preserved, with full equality of participants'. [4]

Of course, the issue of civilizational diversity requires analysis by scholars of philosophy, culture, ethnology and other branches of the humanities. This life itself, the prac-

tical needs of the country are bringing us back to the long-standing dispute between the 'Slavophiles', Eurasians and 'Westerners'.

II

St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences has long been engaged in this issue in terms of looking for modern approaches to the dialogue between cultures. In 2007, the 'Moscow' magazine published the our article 'Likhachov and Gumilev: dispute on Eurasianism' [5], which seems relevant to refer to in the context of current interest to the problems of Eurasianism. L.N. Gumilev was, by his own definition, the last 'Eurasian', while D.S. Likhachov is steadily associated with the latest Russian 'Westernism'.

In the historical and cultural sense, these two outstanding figures of the humanities turn out to be on the opposite sides of the barricades. 'Now the idea of the so-called Eurasianism has become trendy – as Dmitry Likhachov wrote – ...Deprived of their national idea, some Russian thinkers and expats were tempted with an easy solution of complicated and tragic challenges in Russian history, having proclaimed Russia as a special body, a special territory, mainly focused onto the East, Asia, rather than West. It was therefore concluded that European laws are not made for Russia, and Western norms and values do not suit it'. [6, p. 358–359] 'In fact, Russia is not Eurasia. <...> Russia is undoubtedly Europe in religion and culture'. [7, p. 384]

L.N. Gumilev was no less categorical, indicating to 'eastern' (namely, 'Mongolian', 'Horde') origin of Russian culture and statehood, 'revival of Mongolian traditions, traditions of Genghis Khan in Moscow': '...The Tsars of Moscow <...> initiated the process of uniting Russian lands around Moscow, guided by the new principles, borrowed from the Mongols, so far unfamiliar to Russia, such principles of organizing the state as: religious tolerance, loyalty to duties, reliance on the service class. <...> Traditions of a union with the Steppe were viable and fruitful ones, they manifested themselves in the political practice of the Moscow State in the 16th–17th centuries, when all of the former Golden Horde's territory became a part of the Russian state. The Mongols, Buryats, Tatars, Kazakhs had been joining the ranks of Russian troops for centuries and alongside with the Russian defended their common Fatherland, which has been called Russia since the 15th century'. [8, s. 315] L.N. Gumilev indicates further on that the role of Western Europe in the Russian history was mostly destructive: 'Russia, or rather its north-eastern region, which became a part of the Mongol ulus, was rescued from the Catholic expansion, and kept its culture and ethnic identity. The fate of the south-western Red Rus was different. Once under the rule of Lithuania, and later of Catholic Rzeczpospolita, it has lost everything: culture, political independence, and the right to respect'. [8, p. 313]

Eurasianism searched for and found the answer to their question about Russia's way, and this answer did not match either the Westernist or the Slavophile tradition. The main idea of this trend was the claim: 'The Russians and peoples inhabiting Russia are neither Europeans nor Asians'. [9, p. 43] 'National substrate of the state which was formerly called the Russian Empire and which is now called the Soviet Union,' Prince N.S. Trubetskoy (1890–1938) wrote, 'can only be the conglomerate of all peoples of this country,

that shall be considered as a special multinational European nation, and as such it has special nationalism. We call this nation Eurasian, and its territory is Eurasia... [10, p. 17]

As a result, even before L.N. Gumilev, the Eurasians developed a special position expressed in the Manifesto of 1927, which stated: 'Russia is a special world. The fate of that world in its major and important trends takes its course aside from the destinies of western nations (Europe), and southern and eastern ones (Asia). This special world should be called Eurasia. Peoples and population inhabiting this world are capable of achieving such a degree of mutual understanding and fraternal coexistence that are difficult to achieve for the peoples of Europe and Asia'. [10, p. 17] Moreover, the efforts of the Russian intelligentsia, who have been trying to associate themselves with Europe for two centuries, as N.S. Trubetskoy claimed in 1920 ('Europe and Humanity' [11]), were one of the main reasons for the turmoil of 1917, and death of the 'old' Russia.

Referring to almost 'hypnotic myth of universal character of European civilization', Trubetskoy appealed to 'get rid of the repulsive yoke of the Roman- Germanic nation' and become aware that culture of the West is just another one among many others, equal in their cultural value. [12, p. 258] As far as the peoples of Eurasia are concerned, after Trubetskoy, (who created the so-called theory of linguistic union), they have a common 'Turan' psychological type, combining the Ugro-Finns, Turkic, Mongolian, Manchu and Samoyed peoples by common Russian national character features.

From Gumilev's viewpoint, the real problem for Russia was not contacts with the West, but rather in what 'ethnic status' Russia initiated these contacts (and, consequently, in what 'ethnic status' the 'European super-ethnos' on the whole and a specific contact object in particular were at that time).

That's why back in the days when the concept of 'universal values' was being developed through the efforts of Mikhail Gorbachev and his associates, the scholar wrote: 'All discussions about the priority of universal values are naive, but not harmless <...> For the glory of universal values all mankind has to merge in a single hyper-ethnos <...> But even if we imagine humanity merging in hyper-ethnos as a fait accompli, the prevailing set of values will be that of a particular super-ethnos rather than universal values. Intrusion into an alien super-ethnos always involves rejection of your own ethnic dominance <...> The cost of entry into the civilization will become the dominance of Western norms of behaviour. Will it be easier if these systems of values are wrongly called universal... [13, p. 189–190]

Substantial ideas of Gumilev have been confirmed nowadays by the destiny of deserters, the Baltic countries, that bought the membership in the European Union by the cost of sovereignty loss, and also by the loss of new youth generations, who almost entirely left for the West in search for 'a better life', by the degradation of cultural identity and national cultures.

L.N. Gumilev argues that a clear understanding of ethnic 'features' of the people at a particular moment of their historical existence will enable a deep politician to build a wise course of action even in the hopeless stage of ethnic 'obscurisation', in the moment of the ethnos collapse. An example here is the 'genius of Alexander Nevsky', whose merit was 'preserving by his forward-looking policy the

nascent Russia in its incubation ethno-genesis phase, figuratively speaking, 'from conception to birth'. [14, p. 544] The scholar very vividly describes the tragic dilemma of the Prince: who to choose as an ally: the Horde against the West or vice versa?

The real meaning of Gumilev's Eurasian concept for us today means that the modern Russia has a political choice: how and with whom to unite in the present conditions of globalization. And all estimations, inherent for historiography of the 18th–19th centuries, be it recognition of 'backwardness' of Russia by the Westerners or, conversely, claims of its 'advantages' over the West by the Slavophiles are left aside by L. N. Gumilev as an obsolete issue.

For Likhachov, Russia is certainly part of Europe, because they belong to a single cultural system. In contrast to Gumilev's Eurasian 'Russian ethnogenesis' he offers his own, definitely a European one, that is, common with European nations, 'Russian cultural genesis', brilliantly outlined in 'The Culture of Russia in the Time of Andrei Rublev and Epiphanius the Wise' (this fragment has a particular value, it is quoted in full here): 'The 14th century – the Pre-Renaissance age – is a century of intensive combinations of national cultures elements throughout Europe. ... In Russia by the 14th–15th centuries Russian national culture had been established. National elements of individual cultures, emerged almost simultaneously across Europe, got a real support in forming their own national Russian state. That is why national identity of Russian culture of the 14th–15th centuries was very clearly expressed. The Russian language as a common language of communication got stronger. Russian literature was subordinated to the idea of the state establishment. Russian architecture manifested typical national identity. Spread of historical knowledge and interest to national history had grown immensely. Combination of national cultures' elements across Europe is closely linked to cultural phenomena, forerunning the splendid culture of the Renaissance'. [15, p. 96–97]

This concept of cultural unity of Europe and Russia serves as the basis for Likhachov's idea of Russia as an integral part of Europe: 'In its own culture, Russia has had very little oriental features. There is nothing Eastern in our painting. Although Russian literature does contain several borrowed eastern themes, oddly enough, they were borrowed from Europe – from the West or South of Europe. It is noteworthy that even Pushkin's 'universal man' borrows motives of Hafiz or Koran from Western sources. Russia has never known any 'renegades' typical of Serbia and Bulgaria (and existing even in Poland and Hungary), i.e. the indigenous ethnic group who converted to Islam. <...> For this great culture to exist and develop, the society should have high cultural awareness, and moreover, cultural environment, the environment, which has not only the national cultural values, but also universal values belonging to all mankind. Such cultural sphere, concept sphere, is most clearly manifested in the European, or rather in West European culture <...> European culture is the universal culture. And we, the bearers of Russian culture, must belong to universal culture through European culture'. [6, p. 360]

Likhachov believes that Christianity is the basis for European culture, primarily because it has brought a personal principle to European culture. D.S. Likhachov directly claims Christianity as morally superior to all other religions, as the only one, 'in which God is a person'

[16, p. 365], that is able to understand and suffer. The second aspect of European culture that gives the reason for Likhachov to claim its superiority is universalism, i.e. sensitivity to other cultures. And one more 'European principle', which Academician Likhachov insists on as 'universal', is the principle of freedom, especially internal freedom, freedom of creative self-expression. Here his position diverges most of all from the one of the Eurasians, as the Eurasians demanded restriction of personal freedom for the sake of strengthening the state.

In general, 'Eurocentric' pathos of D.S. Likhachov turns out to be 'culture-centric' pathos, congenial even to such critics of the West as the 'peasantist' Dostoevsky or, if we turn to a later time, A.A. Zinoviev: 'Western European culture has developed as a culture of the highest intellectual, moral and professional level, and with a sophisticated and extremely subtle aesthetic taste. Its creators were outstanding talents and geniuses. This culture has played an unprecedented role in the education and moral perfection of humanity. It is aristocratic and elitist as it has never submitted to the plebs under duress or voluntarily, but rather elevated the masses to the highest intellectual, moral and aesthetic level of their time'. [17, p. 315] Hardly anyone of the Eurasians, ranging from N.S. Trubetskoy to L.N. Gumilev, could seriously deny such a characteristic.

In the pro-European position of D.S. Likhachov another very important motive should be noted, which seems to be totally ignored both by the classical Eurasianism of the 1920s and by the Eurasian modernism represented by L.N. Gumilev, that is university education. Although it was brought to Europe by the Arabs, it is in Europe that it developed and reached heights unprecedented in other civilizations.

Thus, if 'Eurasianism' ideas of Gumilev argue that Russia has a political choice, the 'Westernism' of Likhachov proves that it has no cultural choice. The European choice was made as long back as in Ancient Rus and cannot be changed as an essential feature of national culture.

Which is right: Gumilev or Likhachov? Today, it turns out that both are right. And none of them alone.

It is difficult to say how deeply Vladimir Putin sought to understand the details of the historical and cultural dispute between Westerners and Eurasians, but he has found his own answer to this dispute, and a very interesting one: 'The Eurasian Union will be based on universal principles of integration as an integral part of Greater Europe, united by common values of freedom, democracy and market laws'. And further on: 'Thus, the membership in the Eurasian Union ... will allow each of its members to integrate into Europe faster and on a stronger position'. [2]

That is, Vladimir Putin sees Greater Europe as a mega-institution that includes the European Union and the Eurasian Union. And creation of Greater Europe should be performed primarily through the creation of the strong Eurasian Union. This approach should be called innovative, constructive and very promising from a practical point of view.

III

Let us note that Vladimir Putin proposed a concept entirely different from, say, the idea of the famous American cultural studies scholar Samuel Huntington, who separated Western Europe from Russia, Ukraine and Belarus, treating the latter as a special 'Slavic' type of civilization.

I must also say that this idea of Europe arouses nowadays a serious interest in the European Union, although many powerful forces are operating in favour of other models of building Greater Europe. The European Union in recent years has enhanced its activities on the former Soviet Union territory as an alternative force that seeks to gain control over the countries, the former Soviet Republics, by disuniting them, spreading confrontation between them. [18–20]

Anyway, it seems that comprehension of the Eurasia phenomenon in terms of contemporary knowledge has become an important task of national humanities. Experts in philosophy, culture, history, ethnology, political science, religious studies and other branches of knowledge should concentrate their efforts not on continuing dispute between the 'Eurasianism' and 'Westernism', but on identifying opportunities for the synthesis of these two approaches for the future development of Russia and its aspiration forward.

Nowadays the world community provides a new context to complete the old debate. Principally important factors are globalization, modernization, fundamental changes of capitalism that occur while the humanity is entering its sixth stage of technological structure and development of information society. Convergence theory prevails even in such a seemingly irreconcilable dispute as a confrontation between socialism and capitalism.

Vladimir Putin proposed the concept of adoption of European values in Eurasia through the Eurasian integration, and this concept has a fundamental basis. The fact is that, unlike the European Union, countries of the Eurasian Economic Space have not yet completed the process of modernization, the transition from traditionalism to the anthropogenic society. The core essence of this process is vividly described by Academician V.S. Styopin. [21, p. 99]

In this regard, to consider the experience of the Republic of Korea is noteworthy. Contrary to the claims of modern Western theorists about the unambiguous link between strengthening liberal values and economic progress, the economic upturn of that country was not associated with democracy, but occurred in the conditions of a totalitarian regime, the military dictatorship. And it resulted from the sound governmental policy. However, this policy was not developed in one day.

Since the early 80s of the 19th century Koreans have created two trends of public life, similar to Russian 'Slavophiles' and 'Westerners', 'yusen' and 'kehva'. Advocates of yusen, a variety of Confucianism, opposed the reforms. They believed that the native, traditional culture of Korea has priority above everything else, that the West is pestiferous, that they should stick to protecting their culture from alien influences. They fought against supporters of kehva, modernization of Korea. Some thought that the way to national might leads through development of national economy by means of national capital and applying western methods, while others demanded awakening of national consciousness by sticking to their cultural roots.

The period of Japanese colonial rule interrupted these disputes from 1910 to 1945. Once in power, the country's first president, Syngman Rhee promised to turn Korea into a melting pot, where the teachings of Confucius and Christ would merge together. But he faced difficulty in determining national values. From 1948 to 1960 the state policy in the field of culture was focused on Western models,

on accelerated penetration into Western culture. Progress was made in material base of cultural and art institutions, in training of cultural workers, in development of various professional associations of intellectuals, also mechanisms of rigid state control over all aspects of social and economic life were developed. However, there were also negative trends in the country: it was flooded with low-grade mass culture of the West, the traditional national culture declined.

Park Chung-hee, who came to power in 1960, was convinced that excessive worship of alien culture caused an irreparable harm to the nation, that Western values could be introduced to Korea only through the filters of its own national-cultural experience. He based the solution of economic problems on Korean historical heritage and strengthened national ethics. 'Park Chung-hee's Line' meant radical modernization of the economics based on traditional values of the Korean people. This line was implemented by means of a dictatorship.

In 1966, the country adopted a number of important regulations limiting the negative impact of alien cultural values through cinema, advertising, etc. On the other hand, at the same time the state adopted a series of material and moral measures aimed at promoting folk art and crafts. The new things in the country life began to develop in a reasonable balance with the fundamental traditional values.

President Chun Doo-hwan, who came to lead the country in 1979, continued this line. Further economic growth and enrichment of citizens were subordinate to traditional Confucian ethics: the cult of debt, family, worship of the ancestors, filial piety, obedience to the state and the boss, and others, all these values combined with the use of real technological achievements of the West and export-oriented economy, formed the basis for outstanding prosperity of the Republic of Korea. Economic success was accompanied by the growth of national consciousness of Koreans. Maturity of the society was rising. In 1988 the country held democratic elections. Moral renewal and progress in culture paved the way for freedom of expression and creativity, for further rise of the creative intelligentsia.

No less didactic is experience of how the former pro-Soviet countries adopted Western values, who lost their sovereignty in the corridors of Brussels bureaucracy. For example, the Baltic countries have become a zone of catastrophic decline in industry, labour displacement, economic and cultural decline. In the European Union their role is the role of occupied countries.

In general, the 'West' makes a very unusual geopolitical structure of the post-war order. Creation of united Europe was performed under the political control of the military Anglo-Saxon bloc (the U.S. and the UK), where the UK plays the role of a junior partner. At the same time the cultural development of the West has two divergent trends. One of them is creation of common culture of the European Union, the other is transformation of the U.S. and the EU towards multiculturalism. The U.S. influence in the life of Europe is slowly decreasing, but NATO keeps playing a very significant role in the consolidation of the West. This military bloc is a public technical tool, a kind of 'tip of the iceberg' in the mighty structure of relationships, which the United States still apply to control the European Union nearly 70 years after the end of World War II.

It is a well-known fact that 'the West' as an American project does not provide either equality of member coun-

tries of the European Union, or independence of the EU. This design contains 4 'floors'. Upstairs are England and the United States. Below is 'old Europe': France, Germany, Italy, etc. More downwards are the new EU members, playing the role of donors in a number of cases, despite obvious infusions from the EU budget. And finally, at the bottom, 'in the basement' is the zone of the EU non-members, where environment of instability is deliberately cultivated. The way as it is in the modern Ukraine. This design is not built on the basis of cultural similarities or differences, but rather takes them into account. Its basis is a vision of the world as a kind of chessboard, where different pieces have their own properties and are capable of forming a more or less favourable configuration for the key players.

In this situation, the creation of the European Union gives all its members a unique opportunity to preserve their national and cultural identity and the breaking economic growth in the context of globalization.

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In our post-modern world the word ‘great’ seems exaggerated and amplified, but in St. Petersburg, in this historic city, the word ‘great’ is not a meaningless term, for there is much to fill it with. As far as I am concerned, only one name is enough.

Mandelstam

I wish I knew Russian, his mother tongue, and then I would be able to recite his poems in my heart, as he is my personal deity. St. Petersburg... Here he spent the most important period in his life, childhood and university years... Here he joined the Acmeists. It was in this city where his genius and his misfortune started sprouting. ‘I’ve returned to my city, familiar to tears, To veins, swollen glands of childhood years.’ This is the poem ‘Leningrad’, in which the poet addresses the city by its old name: ‘Petersburg, I still do not yet want to die! You have my phone numbers, please give them a try, Petersburg, I still have an address that boasts Surroundings filled with the voices of ghosts’.

Realizing that soon I’ll be standing on Nevsky Prospect, and imagining that there is no time, as though I were in the same space with Mandelstam, I felt as in an incredible dream. The fact that I can speak about Mandelstam here is a godsend for me. Please, believe me, these are not just a guest’s polite words. Mandelstam is my favourite poet. This man, who suffered for his lyre, gives me an endless, insane and anxious aesthetic pleasure.

Brodsky said: ‘Mandelstam is a poet of form in the best sense of the word.’ When Nabokov read a sublimely beautiful poem by Mandelstam, he felt an invincible shame: when I, a scribbler, am called a writer, I feel like a child with a folded paper airplane in comparison with rocket scientists, and lose confidence in myself. I will probably never find enough words of praise, besides we are in completely different leagues. ‘It is an honour that the most brilliant poet does not dare to dream about...’ are the words of Mandelstam, and he deserved this honour, his prudent genius ‘multiplied the phenomenon tenfold’. He created stanzas with an architecturally perfect structure, it is impossible to predict the flight of his images, he seemed to reinvent poetry itself, measuring out tiny portions on small chemical scales.

I even think that no glory could match his dreams. I have read some of the works of Russian literature, Mandelstam is not the very first vein of gold ore in the Russian literature, but once starting to develop this vein, I realized

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Zhou Xiaofeng¹

YEARNING FOR THE WORLD CULTURE

that a single nugget from this vein, a little less than my heart or my fist, has enough power to slay me outright.

Mandelstam was translated by such prominent poets of their time as Bei Dao, Huang Qian Zhang and Wang Jiaxing. It is difficult to understand how it happened that, on the one hand, his poems shine like unique gems, and on the other hand, in the translation they do not lose their might; just as the most precious and at the same time a very simple grain of wheat can be crushed, ground, chewed, but its tiny fibres will anyway become fragrant bread. In China there are many of his ardent admirers, and in this endless sea of readers I am just a small grain of sand. Mandelstam himself wrote about it better than I can: ‘O, Night: from the Ocean’s pit, A shellfish – pearl-less and unheeded – I have been tossed at your feet.’ These muddled words cannot describe my seething, but at the same time, paltry feelings.

I know that the main theme of this forum should be analyzed from the global position, but I would still like to speak about the ‘dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations’, about this historical and geographical concept, from a particular point of view – in terms of Mandelstam’s poetry.

In many poems by Mandelstam we can read geographical names. Petersburg. Moscow. Rome. Jerusalem. Greece. He was born in Poland, he constantly travelled to Finland and the Baltic states as a child, later he studied literature and philosophy in France and Germany. He fluently spoke French, German, English, Italian, Greek and Armenian. His lyre was tuned in with the global echo until he became its greatest bard. Globalization takes place not only in the present materialistic reality, we can say that virtually every outstanding work was written on the basis of cultural values of human civilization.

Brodsky once said: ‘Sometimes with a single word, only one rhyme, the poet manages to be where no one has dared to tread before, and even further, perhaps, than he would have wished’. As for Mandelstam, Brodsky described him thus: ‘Perhaps more than anyone else in this century, he was a poet of civilization.’ Indeed, Mandelstam worked against extremely extensive background; the blood that ran in his veins had absorbed not only the murmur of the Volga and the Seine, but the dissolved salts of the Baltic sea and the Mediterranean. Therefore, in answer to a question, ‘What is Acmeism?’ Mandelstam said, ‘It is yearning for the world culture.’

Literary activity begins as singing in the choir, if one is diligent enough, showing his talent, he can stand out and become a soloist. Mandelstam was raised by the global civilization, his own style had such a great power and origi-

nality that I cannot even find its sources; Akhmatova said: 'Mandelstam has no teacher. That's what it is worth thinking about. I do not know such a fact in the world poetry.'

Unfortunately, like Prometheus stealing fire, accused and punished for love, Mandelstam, this angel full of love and energy, lived a life of hardship. He did not have a permanent residence, and finally he died, worn out in exile, even the place of his grave is unknown. He died when he was not even 47 years old, but he looked an old man. Under the burden of adversity Mandelstam's bones creaked like an old cart, but no matter how heavy the burden was, a melodious song escaped his chest. The poem that Mandelstam wrote in 1936, is painful to me: 'My borrowed dust should not go back to the earth like a mealy white butterfly. This thinking body should turn to a street, to a nation – this charred, vertebral body that has realized its own length.'

He was so dazzling that we did not even realize the moment when we lost him, a moment when he sank into hopeless darkness. How can we express respect and gratitude to Nadezhda, the widow of the poet? It was she who in poverty and wanderings could nevertheless save precious works of Mandelstam for us, and gave them new life. A tiny

head of this weary woman, like a pit of a fruit, could revive a gloomy, but still majestic and steadfast spring of Russian history. The distant light of the Silver Age has not faded under a layer of dust, or from the constant cleaning; on the contrary, the accumulated wisdom of time has given its shine even a greater brightness.

Many years later, a line from Mandelstam's poem, like a butterfly's wing, causes a storm in the heart of a distant Chinese reader, and it can be repeated in any part of the world. Reading is memory, a solemn ceremony in the cemetery of world culture, where ghosts whisper their consolation into our ear like secrets.

He is buried somewhere in an unknown place as precious ore deposits. His monumental name is hidden in the cleft of the historical memory, and it cannot be retrieved even years later; when we look back at that epoch, separated by time, everything looks as if sunk into the abyss, like a reflection of heaven, like a tombstone of a deceased angel. The name of Osip Emilievich Mandelstam evokes awe and admiration... his heart beats forever over there, and here he is like a sound, penetrated into our speech and in our lives.

Plenary session DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS

May 15, 2014

Theater and Concert Hall after A. P. Petrov of SPbUHSS

CHAIRPERSONS:

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- M. B. Piotrovsky *Director of the State Hermitage Museum, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc (History), Professor, Chairman of the Congress of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia*
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SPEAKERS:

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- A. O. Chubarian *Director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*
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- Yu. S. Goligorsky *Freelance journalist and film producer (UK)*
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- Jerzy J. Wiatr *Minister of National Education of Poland (1996–1997), deputy to the Polish Parliament (Sejm) (1991–2001), Dr. Sc. (Sociology), Professor*

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear colleagues, let me welcome all of you, members of Likhachov's International Scientific Readings.

I recall you that Readings in the state status are held today in the 14th time. The history of their holding dated back in 1993, when they were thought and started on the initiative of the academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov as Days of Science in the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Science. Dmitry Likhachov was among the first authors, speakers of Readings. Till his death he closely watched their program, materials, results, and gave his advice. And it is quite natural that after Dmitry Sergeevich's death, Daniil Alexandrovich Granin and we appealed to the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to implement a number of measures to perpetuate the memory of our outstanding contemporary. And I must say that this is a very unusual case when the Decree dedicated to some extreme events, not military action or disaster, but quite peaceful issue about perpetuating the memory of the academician Likhachov, was signed by the President within three days. As a result, since 2001, we have been holding Days of Science in the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences as Likhachov's International Readings.

I am pleased to note that for the last 5–7 years this room cannot accommodate those who wish. Tomorrow, when we work with you in the sessions of our Readings, there will be about 750 people gathering in this room. These are senior students and their teachers from Russia and other countries who are the members of the creative competition of school scientific papers dedicated scientific and moral heritage of Dmitry Likhachov. Thus, according to a long tradition, these days Likhachov's International Readings gather together about a thousand and a half people.

Of course, I, being the rector, would like to welcome here the scientists of world-class, outstanding thinkers, social activists, cultural workers and artists, practitioners, representatives of our founders – unions. I think there are about 80% of those present in this room who are the members of the Russian trade unions, that I, being the leader of the trade union of the university, am very pleased. I would like to express a special welcome to our foreign guests. By tradition, each year, representatives of other 20–30 states take part in Readings. We appreciate your attention to our conference so much and we are happy, that despite the difficult foreign policy situation, this year is no exception in this sense. Today, the representatives of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, the representatives of scientific community in Poland, the representatives of the scientific world of the European Union, the United States, Asia, and so on are present here. I will not speak for all countries, regions and continents. All of this suggests that we are doing here really important thing, perhaps, the thing of a planetary scale, important for people all over the world. And, in this sense, we are undoubtedly continuing traditions laid down by Dmitry Likhachov.

Of course, after the death of Dmitry Sergeevich, throughout the history of the Readings, since 2000, we have had a number of sections devoted directly to his legacy. But I think that it is important to inherit the spirit. And, in this connection, I would like to say about the logic of Dmitry Likhachov's creativity. You know that the entire fate and the whole scientific biography of Dmitry Likhachov are closely connected with the study of the problems of medieval stud-

ies, Russian literature of the Middle Ages. From university days Dmitry Sergeevich has been engaged in these scientific problems, and all his life and work are related to Pushkin House in this direction. And it is not by chance now Pushkin's House holds philological conference dedicated to the memory of Dmitry Likhachov. They are coincided to his birthday and holds, if I'm not mistaken, once two years. We, at the initiative of the academician Likhachov, spend here Days of Science coinciding to the Day of Slavic Writing and Culture, the Day of Saints Cyril and Methodius, outstanding educators, creators of the alphabet that we use.

So, gradually in the course of his philological activity, Dmitry Sergeevich felt the need to set specific scientific results obtained at Pushkin House, in a much broader cultural context. At first it was related to the needs of the historical dating of these or those artifacts, manuscripts, because that Likhachov studied, as a rule, did not have a copyright, that is, it was not known who wrote this or that manuscript. Then there was a question of time identification of any literature resources of Russian culture. You know how difficult question it is now, how many disputes and discussions, even around "The Lay of Igor's Campaign" there were and so on. So, Likhachov was not always able to immediately find out where the original record was, where its census, later versions, manuscripts written many years later were. And he was forced to compare the data of the excavations of archaeologists with the data of numismatists, historians, and others, thus, leaving for a wider scientific context. But the time came when the academician Likhachov, solving specific scientific problems, became increasingly active in the field of culture as a whole: the problems of St. Petersburg architecture, gardens, the problems of how the ancient Russian architecture evolved, for example, in the architecture of St. Petersburg. And at our University on May 19, 1993 on his dedication to Honorary Doctors, Dmitry Sergeevich delivered a lecture "St. Petersburg in the history of Russian culture", in which he noted that St. Petersburg is "the most Russian among Russian and the most European among European cities". This is not the philology already.

Analyzing now the creative activity of Likhachov, in this century, we can confidently call him as one of the greatest cultural specialists. He is the creator of innovative, original, colorful and fruitful ideas of the theory of culture. Today, journalists asked me before the beginning of our meeting: "Is Likhachov our past, present or future?" I can answer that Likhachov is a representative of that great Russian fundamental science, which is created by the Russian Academy of Sciences. This fundamental science is and should be the basis of construction and further social and state development of our country. I think Likhachov is our past, our present, and our future. In this regard, we can assume that we are all here successors of Dmitry Likhachov's work.

I thank you for your attention and invite Mikhail Borisovich Piotrovsky to microphone. I must say that on behalf of Likhachov and Granin in 1999, I officially registered the Congress of Petersburg intelligentsia, which now is headed by this man. I give the floor to Mikhail Borisovich.

M. B. PIOTROVSKY¹: — During our last meeting, I talked about the fact that what a situation was that

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intellectuals could be very popular again. They are really popular again and again is very necessary to Russia, and the lesson of Dmitry Sergeevich is also important here. He could dynamically react very well to those changes that took place in the culture. The world is changing – it's okay, but the culture is changing, some of reaction is changing, and understanding of some things is associated with the cultural dialogue. I would like to give a few examples from my current scope – museum. Recently in Paris at Grand Palais another exhibition from a series of the monument was opened. There are the largest exhibition in Paris held there. This exhibition is Emilia and Ilya Kabakov's called "Strange City". These are very interesting and important artists, the only Russian artists who are now among the top ten in the world – I do not say – the dearest and all the rest. And, although, for many years they have already been living in the United States, but they always stay Russian in their hearts, in some sense, they are a kind of symbol of Russia.

I must say that our today's event can also be seen in this context. But more importantly – a kind of evolution of what was going on. Today Kabakov is making, relatively speaking, the aesthetics of Soviet life, communal apartments, and so on. When he lived in Russia, the creativity in the Soviet Union was seen as a kind of anti-Soviet propaganda – everything was so bad in the country, it was a kind of criticism of reality. But gradually, by the time he had already become to create in the West and operate the same artistic language about, it all became more seen as something in common and it became to bring people pleasure, as a kind of nostalgia for that world from which he came. It is so implicit, but unconditional. In a sense, it is that nostalgia that we experience, but it is so, I would say, more aesthetic and intelligent. In general, everything turned into some kind of global aesthetic reflection of the essence, meaning of life, based on the same artistic language that was created in our country during the twentieth century. This is completely expected, normal and right turn with interesting aspects.

Grand Palais is a large hall, where the Kabakovs built a strange town, all white like towns of the south of the Sahara which were admired by Corbusier. There are pavilions there in which there are mysterious towns and mysterious art. There are pavilions resembling space stations. That is, two or three pavilions are devoted to a bygone civilization. There is a pavilion dedicated to the angel to which actually all this cosmic aims. All this is a semi way of life moving into deep philosophy. In fact, it all turns out to be a monument, perhaps, the most important thing that Russia gave the world in the twentieth century – our cosmic philosophy, art space and space exploration. This is the line that was fully born in Russia: philosophy of Fyodorov, Tsiolkovsky, cosmism in art, poetry and painting, and space exploration as a very particular phenomenon. It all together turns out to be as thoughts and at the same time a hymn that Russia suddenly contri-

buted in the art world. It seems to be all the same, the same dialogue, but this is a dialogue which changes its meaning.

And this year we are going to spend the Festival of Contemporary Art "Manifesto" in St. Petersburg, now there is a preparation but with a great scandal. In the world there are several prestigious festivals of contemporary art. The most prestigious festival is Venice Biennale, the second one is "Documenta" in Kassel and the third – "Manifesto", that is the festival of contemporary art travelling around Europe. First it had to come from Europe and be perceived as a kind of a dialogue of Europe and Russia in the field of contemporary art in the field of classical art. All this will take place in the Hermitage. And now it turns out that in the present situation it is becoming much more serious meaning – it becomes reasoning about the territory of art, about the sacredness of this area, about how we must keep the territory of culture and art, and protect it from external influences, or rather from using in solution of external problems.

This year it has turned out quite differently, as it is usual. We are preparing the festival, no special considerations about what will be there, and there are no problems with it. Most of the problems are associated with trying to boycott. At first, there were attempts from the part of the gay community that we, in general, stopped. Then, in connection with the political events around Ukraine we were also appealed not to participate in "Manifesto". We were able to move away both those and other attempts to boycott through a simple argument: when it is referred to art, it cannot be used with either one side or the other one. On the one hand, we have censorship which is provided with so many laws that it is not necessary to have any censorship, just everything has to be within the law. On the other hand, in order to prevent attempts to use politically provocative art events, we must give a lead and declare a manifesto that there is a area of art which has its own laws. And these laws, neither from the right nor from the left, should be broken on this area. This is a sacred area, where a viewer is invited to, but this area does not fall to the level of the audience, but, on the contrary, raises it to itself.

Culture has its own laws which differ from the others. Dmitry Likhachov told about it. We are trying unsuccessfully, so to speak, to make our Declaration of the Rights of Culture in the official texts. We are always answered that only humans have the rights and culture cannot have them, as well as everything else. But gradually we all together in different areas are trying to prove that culture has the rights, there are special characteristics that may not coincide with either any political declarations, human rights, the rights of nature, or the rights of the nation. They are special, and it creates the special world, a sacred area. On every sacred area, there are important events, on the sacred area there is the world, on the sacred area we come to agree. The area of art and the area of culture today are a great bridge, on which dialogues take place, and if many other bridges, so to speak, can be unsteady, so our bridge must always exist. I think that is the main covenant of Dmitry Sergeevich to all of us. The dialogue of cultures in the broadest sense should occur, and it, maybe that is now the most important thing, needs some protection and care about it.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you, Mikhail Borisovich. I give the floor to Professor Valery Alexandrovich Chereshnev.

Author of over 250 research works; including the books: *Historical legends of the Koran, Koranic legends, Supermuseum in the time of the ruin of the Empire (museum as a evolutionary factor), Muslim Arts: between China and Europe, Legend of the As'ade al Kamil, the King of the Himjara Kingdom, South Arabia in the Early Middle Ages. Establishment of the medieval society*, etc. A member of the Council for Culture and Arts under the President of the Russian Federation, a member of the Council on Science under the President of the Russian Federation. The Chairman of the Union of Russian Museums, chief editor of the journal "The Christian East". He was awarded with the Order of Honour, "The Order for Services to the Fatherland" of the third and fourth degrees, as well as with numerous foreign decorations. He is the Laureate of the award of the President of the Russian Federation in the field of culture and art. Honorary citizen of St. Petersburg.

V. A. CHERESHNEV¹: — First of all, let me thank Alexander Sergeevich Zapesotsky for this initiative because it is thanks to his efforts, the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences has really turned into a veritable Mecca of human knowledge, and not only in our country but also far beyond its outside.

I would like to say a few words about what humanities knowledge is certainly a very important part of the life of our society. But I would like to say not about the contribution of the humanities but about the contribution of scientists of natural section in the humanities, because they always put great, important problems. And just a few strokes in the historical aspect, since Russia was the founder, the founder of the phenomenon about which is now said to have applied to Russia itself from the West. I want to say that Peter I was an “inventor” of brain drain. He was the first who thought when he was in communication with Leibniz for 25 years how to create the Academy of Sciences in Russia, the university and the high school with her, on what basis in a backward, serfdom country land it could be done without having specialists. Because the rich gentlefolks began to send their children abroad – for example, the son of Catherine Dashkova and many others studied in England, Germany, and Switzerland, where future intellectuals and the future ruling elite were brought up.

Alexei Razumovsky, the favorite of Elizabeth, specialy sent his younger brother Kirill at the age of 14 first to France and then to Germany. The boy mastered five languages for four years, received knowledge, and returning, at the age 18 he was appointed as the president of the St. Petersburg Imperial Academy of Sciences. He remained in that position for 52 years. That is how issues were solved, and therefore the first 11 elected academicians were foreigners. And for all the 18th century there were 84 foreigners and 28 domestic experts working in the Academy that formed the basis of the conflict, which was resolved later, in the 19th century. Peter I, founding the Academy, the University and the gymnasium, wrote: “I have a feeling that the Russians will ever, and maybe even during our lifetime, shame all the enlightened nations of their success in sciences, tireless in works and the greatness of solid and loud glory”.

When Mikhail Vasilievich Lomonosov returned from Germany in 1741, he became an academician, headed the gymnasium and the office for many years, and later in his life he was the rector of the university. At that time there

¹ Chairman of the Committee on Science and Hi-Tech (the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia), Director of the Institute for Immunology and Physiology (the Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences), Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Med., Professor. Author of two scientific discoveries, 29 inventions, more than 500 scholarly publications, including 28 monographs: *Pathophysiology* (Patofiziologija); *Immunophysiology* (Immunofiziologija); *Alpha-fetoprotein* (Al'fabetoprotein); *Immunologic and Genetic Factors of Reproductive Malfunction* (Immunologicheskiye i geneticheskiye faktory narusheniya reproduktivnoj funkciji); *Biological Laws and Human Viability: Method of Multifunctional Rehabilitation Biotherapy* (Biologicheskiye zakony i zhiznesposobnost' cheloveka: metod mnogofunkcional'noj vosstanovitel'noj bioterapiji); *Socio-Demographic Security of Russia* (Social'no-demograficheskaja bezopasnost' Rossiji); *Demographic Policy of the Country and the Nation's Health* (Demograficheskaja politika strany i zdorovje natsiji) and some others. Editor-in-Chief of 'Russian Journal of Immunology' (Rossijskij immunologicheskij zhurnal), 'Bulletin of the Urals Academic Medical Science' (Vestnik Ural'skoj medicinskoj akademicheskoy nauki), Bulletin of the Urals Branch of RAS 'Science. Society. Individual', 'Immunology of Ural'. He is decorated with the Order of Friendship, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 3rd and 4th degree. He is a Laureate of the Government Award of the Russian Federation in science and technology and the award of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of education. Honorary doctor of SPbUHSS.

was a dilemma: where to get the students? To his arrival there were 3 students on 17 academicians. Rich grandees still send their children abroad, and serfs could not send their children to learn, even at home. Therefore, in 1766 the university was closed, in 1805 the gymnasium was closed, but the Academy survived. Lomonosov, as a humanist in this respect, was his idea. He wrote at the time, in serf Russia, being the rector: “That student is more honorable who understands more. And whose son he is, in fact there is no matter”. Humanities and Philosophy were removed from the Academy. In 1783, under Catherine II, there were two great events: the foundation of Sevastopol and the opening of the Russian Academy (to create a dictionary of the Russian language). 58 years later, in 1841, the Academy joined the Imperial St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences.

Who was the chief director of humanitarian problems in the emancipation of women? Nikolai Ivanovich Pirogov is a world-known surgeon. In the West, women fought for their rights themselves, in Russia men fought for women's rights. It was continued by Botkin, Pavlov, Mechnikov. Nobel laureate Ilya Ilyich Mechnikov, already being in Paris, where he had been working for 28 years, said that “... naturalists must not eat, phagocytose each other but assist and cooperate like phagocytes and antibodies”. And our first Nobel Prize winner Ivan Petrovich Pavlov in 1904, when receiving it, said: “Thank science! It not only fills life with interest and joy, but gives support and self-esteem”. And 25 years later, in 1929, the first Five-Year Plan started. The Academy of Sciences was pushed into the background, the All-Union Association of Workers of science and technology was created to promote the building of socialism in the Soviet Union, along with the socialist and then communist academy. The Academy of Sciences still stood and would be developed. But in the period of that chaos on December 25, 1929 at the Academy of Sciences at University embankment, 5, the celebration was held dedicated the 100th anniversary from the birth of Ivan Mikhailovich Sechenov, where all the leaders of the new government were present. Pavlov gave a speech there. During the presentation, he suddenly stopped to talk and turned to the portrait of Sechenov: “Oh, high, so strict shadow to yourself! How you would suffer if you were between us now in a living human society. We live under the yoke of the most brutal principle: the power, the state – everything – private life – nothing. But on such principles, gentlemen, that civilized state will not be built, generally anything cannot be built, in spite of any “Dneprostoy” and “Volkhovstroy”. The authorities, of course, had to respond, the curve gradually became straight, and from 1930 to 1941, funding for the Academy of Sciences was increased by 25 times.

And to conclude my speech, I want with the words of one prominent scientist Alexey Alexevich Ukhtomsky being the citizen of Petersburg, Petrograd, Leningrad, who did not leave blockade Leningrad and died there on August 31, 1942. He wrote: “The whole tragic element of human existence is that none of us, whether you are an academician, a raider or a student, there is no portable momentary criterion of truth. And often in the wrongness of our actions we assure only when it has the wrong impression on our skin. After all, how often is that from a distance it seems a crying baby, it turns out to be a longing crocodile nearby. But we and you are not passive observers, we are active participants in the life and our behavior is work”.

So, I want to appeal for everyone to this. Referring to the portrait of Dmitry Likhachov, I want to say that this luminary of science, who I was able to see and hear, and at the meetings of the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences, and at the general meetings of the Academy, used universal respect and reverence. He completely belongs to the category of the great people of the world, about whom Leo Tolstoy wrote: "The great citizens of the world should not have the date of death, the date of birth only, because they are leaving us not in the past but in the future, and they are leaving only in order to stay forever". Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov was such a person.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Valery Alexandrovich. Dear colleagues, there are representatives of various branches of scientific knowledge and activities gathering together here. I must say that at the international level and at the level of the United Nations, problematics of a dialogue of cultures was first most clearly represented by Spain, Turkey and several Arab countries. Within the development of this problematics, including it in the field of view of the international community, a special role played Spain and its prime minister, who is in this room. This man has been the Prime Minister of Spain for seven years (from 2004 to 2011). This is our Honorary Doctor Mr. Miguel Angel Moratinos.

M. A. MORATINOS: — A few years ago I had the honor of being awarded with the title of Honorary Doctor of the University. And during the ceremony of presentation the gown and diploma to me, I realized that it was great obligation and responsibility to share the spirit of the University, giving knowledge of the social sciences and humanities. This is a high spirit of Dmitry Likhachov, which is impregnated with this room. And now, we have been gathering here for 14 years to discuss his ideas, establish a dialogue between cultures. Ten years ago, the European Government had an important initiative and submitted it to all members of the European Union. It happened long ago, but it seems that it was just yesterday. But we are here not to talk about the past, but in order to discuss the present and think about the future. Today we see and hear how science and technology make discoveries that change the world, and we face with a new order of international relations and world order as a whole. Thus, we can master these new discoveries in economics, engineering, communications, and information technologies.

Unfortunately, our political leaders, diplomats, who work at the international level, do not understand that the world has changed already. And we know, and you, the students, know, and your professors know that the world is not the same already. But some leaders are going to convince us about the same as usual, and we need to look back and go back to the old spirit of the Cold War, or even to some cold peace, we call it so, for the old order. The world has changed and we have to discuss it. Why have we gathered for? Have we gathered in order to promote new ideas, new initiatives or to use traditional methods to solve the problems that we know by heart? A hundred years ago we fought the First World War and again repeated the mistakes during the World War II. And do we have to decide now how we will continue to introduce changes: only through conflicts, bloodshed and wars, or otherwise, through science, new in-

itiatives and ideas? That is what we are here at the portrait of Mr. Likhachov.

We should follow this spirit, apply the principles of international democratic order, consider our differences in culture and use it to benefit. We must have the tools of the new world and the ability to use them in order to resolve disputable issues. We live in the 21st century, but now, things are happening that do not put in my head. For example, there were recent events in Africa, where more than 200 Nigerian girls were kidnapped and taken to an unknown direction. We only know that it is connected with religious fanaticism. This civilization cannot cultivate respect, tolerance, patience in the dialogue. We cannot let that happen.

At this conference, we must come to the conclusion that all of us gathered here should take the initiative and call on the international community to the integration and consolidation. We, Russian and Spanish diplomacy, can lay the foundations for the construction of a new civilization. Ten years ago we started this project, we had the courage to start the initiative, and now it is not just an initiative, it is our duty. We all have gathered together at these Readings to think about the future, the old has already gone. We must think about the future, because the students who are sitting here, are worthy of a better life. We must understand that we do not deserve to have again been plunged into the dark ages of history.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Mr. Moratinos. I invite academician Valery Aleksandrovich Tishkov to the tribune.

V. A. TISHKOV: — We do not know which way the world is going to in terms of cultural evolution – more and more in the direction of cultural complexity, or towards unification. Likely process is under way both this and that in material terms. According to modern gadgets, according to the way how to dress, live, on what a person moves, today it is difficult to determine in what culture he lives, in what tradition he acts, what language a citizen of our country, or even a man of peace speaks. And at the same time, we see, that the differences in the culture as a whole, mean not less than the resources. There was the famous debate, even two books were published. One book was called "Culture counts, resources decide", and then there was another book published "Resources count, but culture decide". And we do see, as a number of societies, states, with rich resources, have not been able to use them for the welfare of their citizens, to ensure stable and happy communities. In this regard, we conclude that the world will preserve its cultural diversity, we will never be the same. Just as it is difficult to imagine a forest or a field of the same type of trees or grass. If we become the same, it will be social entropy, the death of humanity. We cease to be interested in each other, cease to develop, and then stop the dialogue and stop the process of mutual enrichment values, economic and spiritual experience, and so on. Therefore, cultural complexity of modern nations and states is increasing.

The world does not have particularly large monocultural state communities, modern nations, it does not matter whether it is Russia, or it is Ukraine, whether it is a small country like Jamaica on the currency of which writes: "From many one people". I'm not talking about such giants as India, China, Indonesia and so on. And a number

of very important issues rise for us, experts in the field of the humanities. How are these cultural complex societies equipped? Where is the formula for the most effective management, security, harmony and civil peace and at the same time satisfaction of the rights, requests that are associated with the ownership of a person to one or another particular culture? Whether it is a nation-wide, national culture, or whether it is particularistic ethnic tradition, or whether it is a commitment to modern mass global culture. These three streams are mixed today and cross-pollinate each other.

Some state communities are trying to build some monocultural states, calling them national ones according to the old Soviet wrong, by the way, tradition in understanding what nation-states are as monocultural states where ethnic boundaries should coincide with the public administrative ones. These societies face with crisis and sometimes experience the collapse or decay, and our neighbor Ukraine has been showing this sad example recently. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, it seemed to us that there were 15 states formed: 14 of them are national, and only Russia is not fully self-determined and decides to make the federation, but sooner or later it will go to the second round of disintegration. In fact, it was even vice versa in some way. It is federated devices of large and complex states which ensure the integrity, it is some kind of vaccination against separatism. And the attempt to impose an ethno-nationalist form of government, downplay, and sometimes look down and discriminate against people of other cultures, other languages or traditions, sooner or later it leads to a crisis.

10–20 years pass, and people understand that if they pay taxes and more than half people living in the nation's capital, say in Riga, speak Russian, but they are sent tax declarations in Latvian, then sooner or later they will stop filling these declarations and require that the authorities and bureaucracy speak the language of their culture, but not vice versa. Citizens would not have to learn the language of bureaucracy. It seems to me that we do not quite understand these simple things. We must be here more flexible and understand that as far as realizing, as far as political self-organization, self-determination as to the individual and group level, these questions are arisen in the world today. There is a mass of any declarations: about minority rights, about self-determination, about civil rights. We, being the international community, have not developed any single criteria for the entire world, in particular the issue related with the preservation of the sovereignty of modern states and at the same time with the problem of self-determination.

By studying these questions for the last 20–30 years, I came to the conclusion that the most complete and deep formula of self-determination is not the isolation or the creation of some state with one monoculture, and the right to participate as much as possible in a broader socio-political process of people of particular culture, tradition language. That is, it is primarily internal self-determination in the wider community. In this respect, those countries that carry out both policy of government, and the policy of tolerance and support of cultural diversity, win, develop and ensure peace and stability.

Internal self-determination has two different forms. Our country has gone through both ones. The first form is ethno-territorial autonomy, that is, compact communities with their identity and cultural specific character insist and receive the right on a special status within the state as a unit

of large federation or confederation, there are different options: from Canada and Spain to China. The second form is extraterritorial national cultural autonomy for communities, citizens of different states, who live dispersed within a large country, but also need to preserve their language and culture. And, it is a reality. It's not just federalism, which we inherited from the Soviet Union, it is a worldwide practice. And I'm sure (for 20 years I told about it), that official bilingualism and federalism is what will save, provide the unity of Ukraine in the future, and not only Ukraine, and possibly Latvia, Moldova and Kazakhstan, where sooner or later the question will be arisen. Today, for Ukraine it is a very serious problem.

Cultural differences were more important than the many things that we had thought before, or which we had believed in. Once again, that, unfortunately, the experience of recent years shows that there are no common principles that define who has the right to ethno-territorial or extraterritorial internal self-determination. Experience in Chechnya shows that a community that has more resources on the side, that is better organized, has great, so to say, the degree of political organization, and it was able to secure external support. That community that has proven its own selfness, legitimacy and ability to govern itself and organize its society, and can get the right for self-determination. Unfortunately, external factors and geopolitical barriers often overpower. Although, it is not too long.

And the last thing I would like to say: not necessarily deep, so-called civilizational differences can become a cause of tension of conflicts, sometimes small cultural differences can cause major conflicts. When we hear some emotional sayings such as: "We are fraternal peoples who have never fought, we will never be at loggerheads", to this saying we should apply cautiously enough. We saw how, in fact, one folk speaking the same Serbo-Croatian language, was split into five states and arranged a severe internal conflict with mass casualties. Therefore, even small cultural differences deserve respect and attention. And we as professionals must be on guard here and provide the dialogue of cultures and interaction, rather than their rivalry and conflict.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear colleagues, since 2007 Likhachov's International Readings have been held with the official support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. I would like to give the floor to his representative Gennady Mikhailovich Gatilov.

G. M. GATILOV: — I am very glad to participate in the Likhachov's International Scientific Readings once again. Over the last years, the forum has been strengthened, has taken a worthy place among the major international platforms of its profile and become, in fact, in a constructive discussion platform on issues of dialogue between cultures and civilizations. And this, in the present moment, is very essential. We are operating on a national, inter-governmental level, but in our work we are relying on the opinion of civil society, academia, and therefore what is said within Likhachov's Readings, help in the development of our line, our approaches to international problems. And their number, as you know well, is increasing, and many of them are getting very strong. Our goal is to establish a non-confrontational exchange of views and ideas, and as a result to realize the

processes that take place in the modern world. They suggest that the competition is growing between value systems and development models of different states and their associations. We believe that non – alternative approach is a collective one to solving the existing problems. There is no unipolar world, it has changed, and now the situation is not the same when some countries may impose on others with their *modus operandi*, their principles and their vision of the world. And when we have an understanding of what we need to act together, then we are able to find solutions to the acute conflict problems in different situations.

As an example, I can call our partnership with Western colleagues on important issues, such as chemical disarmament of Syria. This is a difficult problem, but we managed to get out, including the Americans, to a common understanding of the importance of its decision. Together we started an international conference on Syria. The point is moving difficult, however, it is starting and we hope that this movement will be continued. We are working together to resolve the Iranian nuclear problem and on a range of other issues. Thus, when there is a general awareness of the importance of these problems and the need for their collective solution, we manage to reach common ground with our partners. But when attempts are made to solve some problems unilaterally, it leads to politicization, confrontation, it is expressed in the absence of desire to consider the opinions of partners and their interests, and then all of these problems are only exacerbated.

Because of this, the need of effective search of answers to global challenges becomes imperative for the modern period of international relations, which in turn, makes more urgent the task of development of not only classical interstate politics, but also parliamentary, social, economic and cultural diplomacy. And, of course, a better return could bring efforts to promote interfaith dialogue. Incidentally, we are working on it, trying to actively raise the issue within the framework of UNESCO with a view of using it as a platform in preventing a clash of civilizations and the emergence of various forms of extremism. Unfortunately, there are other examples where we are not fully able to do it. Here is one of them: for many years within the United Nations we have been initiating draft resolutions on the inadmissibility of the glorification of Nazism. And from time to time, each for their own reasons, our Western colleagues either abstain or refuse to support it. And all this ultimately leads to the fact that fascism is lifting up its head, examples of which we all have seen in recent times.

I do not want to say that refusal to support this resolution is directly related to the phenomena that occur in Ukraine, but still it must be admitted that to a certain extent, it is considered by Ukrainian fascist circles as the support and the opportunity to continue what they are doing, acting more active. Therefore, the conclusion is that the Western countries, rejecting our initiative, in fact, condone such phenomena. Hence is the growth of intolerance, anti-Semitism mood, and so on. Recent research, conducted by the NGO "Anti-Defamation League", documented the alarming showings of prevalence in the world of such trends. And in this view there are counties leading in this respect, they are Western and Eastern Europe, which looks certainly depressing. International platforms have been created in order to bring people together and work together to find answers to the challenges of globalization.

There is another example: UNESCO, it seems to be a non-politicized organization, which aims to deal with the humanitarian, scientific and cultural issues, develop, through the cultural dimension, the dialogue between the states on the non-politicized basis. At the same time, we realize that during recent time attempts to politicize the work of the organization are made, and, instead of doing what it is necessary under the statute, there are politicized resolution introduced in it, for example, for the same Crimean Ukrainian theme, which is clearly not doing a power of good to the development of cooperation within the international platform. So I want to emphasize once again that when there is a desire to work together, seek dialogue forms, develop cooperation, then we have concrete results. If it does not, then, unfortunately, we see failures in our cooperation.

I think that Likhachov's Readings and other similar forums, where there are the free exchange of ideas, the dialogue on culture issues, development of civilizational relations, contribute to the fact that there is a basis for transferring these ideas on the interstate level. Therefore, in the world the platform of Likhachov's International Scientific Readings is appreciated and supported and it is viewed as a smithy of intellectual ideas to solve common problems of the present on the basis of dialogue and partnership.

I wish fruitful discussion to all the participants and guests of Likhachov's Readings. I hope that as a result of the exchange of views there will be concrete suggestions which we will take into account in our practical work.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear colleagues, the Organizing Committee of Readings has received many greetings from the authorities, the scientific community and international bodies. We got a telegram, in particular, from the Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation V. R. Medinsky, from the chairman of the State Duma of the Russian Federation S. E. Naryshkin. I am going to read a few lines in order to clarify the overall tone: "In Russia and abroad the name of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov has become the personification of deep moral principles of our nation. "Cultural cooperation, dialogue and mutual understanding ... are the key to justice and democracy, a condition preventing international and interethnic conflicts, violence and wars." Academician Likhachov wrote". It is cited by Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev in his telegram.

Here is another greeting: "Ideas of Likhachov are relevant than ever in the present situation, when the dialogue of cultures is developing, new forms of partnership of civilization are intensified and taken. These are very complicated and ambiguous processes in their nature and results, the understanding of which is largely due to the work of Dmitry Likhachov and his followers". That was me who quoted the greeting of UNESCO Director General Ms Irina Bokova. On behalf of our Readings, I would like to thank all those who sent us these greetings. Thank you.

I cannot help saying a few words about our next speaker. He is an outstanding historian who has been studying history of Europe of the twentieth century, with whom yesterday we spoke about whether there can be a unified, single history textbook in Russia. Of course, there are a lot of books and monographs on the history, and can there be a single textbook? And in our discussions, many said that there must be plenty of textbooks. And I think that

there may be only single textbook if the authoring team is headed by our Honorary Doctor, Academician Alexander Oganovich Chubarian.

A. O. CHUBARIAN: — We are witnessing now with “boom” of historical knowledge, and, both in our country and around the world. I just cannot remember such a period when history would be given to such a kind of attention and it would occupy the minds of most of the population. In this sense, we really need in the heritage of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, who talked a lot about not only the dialogue of cultures and civilizations, but also about the culture of the dialogue. And, probably, it is now one of the main directions in the world history. Alexander Sergeevich is now reminding about the work at the textbook. I did it on behalf of the President for the last six months and I must tell you that I received altogether more than a thousand letters with the proposals and estimation of history from all over Russia. They were different suggesting that the interest to this issue is very large. In different countries, there are international and national projects now called “Historical Memory”. And discussions sometimes take a very acute character.

In our country, as in the middle of the 19th century, the opposition to understand Russian or Russ identity has been revived, which sometimes takes a very acute form. We came back to disputes regarding the ideas of the ancient Russian state. We have quite active and often uncompromising debates about our country’s history in the twentieth century: what Soviet society is, how to assess the Soviet system. There have been different approaches to the Russian Revolution of 1917. I think that arguments will continue to grow as far as approaching 2017, the 100th anniversary of the revolution of 1917. In the former Soviet republics, now independent states, there are hot discussions about their history, especially during the period when they were a part of Russia and the Soviet Union. This happens both in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. I am not speaking about the Baltic States. Now it is still one of the hottest issues: it is tragic events in Ukraine.

The same thing is happening in other countries. In Germany, my colleagues are actively speaking about the fact that the younger generation does not want to live with a constant sense of guilt, so now there is an idea widespread there that Germany was not only a criminal, but also a victim of the Nazis. In France, the government tried to eliminate from textbooks mentioning of French colonialism. In Italy, there is some very clear intention to change the conceptual attitude to Mussolini. In Eastern Europe, arguments that are related to Russia take acute forms.

During the preparation of the textbook, we are faced with the special position of our colleagues from Tatarstan. They now express an opinion as to this part of our federal state. We have had many conversations with the leaders of the historical science of Tatarstan in Kazan. And I invited their Vice President in history, the humanities to Moscow. They have their own point of view on the origin of the ancient Russian state. They make a lot of suggestions about the role of nomadic world in the history of our country. Naturally, they have their own evaluation about the Tatar-Mongol yoke, we refused of the wording in the concept of a new textbook, quite actively discussing. This also applies to the other components of our country.

And in this respect, of course, the problem of culture of the dialogue, culture of disputes acquires great importance today. History, as it turned out, could be a factor in the consolidation of the nation, the world, but it can also be a factor of split, the fact that we often see. Contradictions are deepened, sometimes these little historical reminiscences are the cause of rather severe formulas entering the political limelight. Again there is a question of indoctrination, politicizing history, government intervention in the evaluation of historical events, which occurs in many countries. In this case international parliamentary organizations were included, that was not there before. They accept the resolution on the evaluation of historical events.

I think that in this quite acute situation, which, of course, you need not dramatize, the heritage of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov acquires a special meaning and significance for us. My colleagues have already talked about it here, but I want to repeat again. The very idea of a dialogue and the idea of culture of a dialogue were characterized by Dmitry Sergeevich, as a scientist and as a person and citizen. Many people in this room knew, saw and communicated with him. I also met him quite often and much. He was a man of high moral principles, who showed the best qualities of a modern man, inspired with both culture and the idea of citizenship. And he is a foregoer for us of not only the dialogue of cultures, but also culture of a dialogue.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you, Alexander Oganovich. I invite one of the leaders of the Chinese Union of writers Wang Hongji to the podium.

WANG HONGJI: — With a sense of gratitude, I came to Russia in order to take part in Likhachov’s Scientific Readings. For me it is not only an opportunity to learn at Russian and foreign scientists, but also to visit Russia, because it reminds me my childhood home. It is not my first visit to St. Petersburg, and every time when I step onto this land, I realize that I feel only warm feelings. Why? Because the works of Pushkin, Tolstoy, and other great Russian poets and writers writing about love, nature, beautiful poems, have created only these feelings in my mind. They are brought with the proximity to beautiful nature and magnificent landscapes. This is the power of literature. Bad weather, mud, rustic broken-backed houses are filled with colors, and it creates a very vivid impression in the works. I feel very deep feelings, I am just fascinated by Russian literature. In my heart I have always been grateful it for the fact that I was brought up on its works, because Russian literature is exceptional.

I think that China and Russia have very similar fate in some way. China has some great culture, too. Outstanding Chinese scientists, philosophers have created and nurtured Chinese literature for centuries. Educational science of China was established by Confucius, the great Chinese teacher. But from the 2nd century BC to the present, Chinese literature and philosophy are linked forever with the fate of people living in China. Of course, we understand that nowadays literature of the past and modern literature are of great importance for the present, for the education of the educated youth. Now there is a situation that young people in China reads very little, they are not interested in ancient and modern literature.

I want to note that, exploring Russian literature in his works, Dmitry Likhachov said that it is necessary to deal carefully with the great cultural heritage of Russia, he mentioned that culture is slowly beginning to die now. And it is very tragic. In his work "Thoughts about Russia" Likhachov wrote: "...no other nation in the world is not rated so differently as the Russians". And I think that China and Russia are very similar in this. China has great ancient history, special literary monuments. But now it has become a country where people read very little. Dmitry Likhachov believed that the habit of reading is brought up from childhood. This is the basis of education. This method of learning is very important. The main reason for the fact that China reads little now, that there is a special system of education there. Since ancient times, education in China has been based on the fact that students memorized works of ancient classics, and now it is necessary to change the education system. This is very important because it will ensure the future of our young people, its rich culture, help it to get some knowledge on culture and history.

I remember the works of Gorky and other Russian writers. It is necessary to constantly read books and improve the knowledge to acquire spiritual and cultural values. If you do not read and have no desire to read, then the world will be very small and narrow. Dmitry Likhachov said that the great cultural heritage, a collection of literary works were great works which we need to learn and retain. And we have to feel special reverent attitude to these literary works. If we do not have the desire and intention to become acquainted with these monuments, then we will have no interest in the modern world, we will not be able to understand the events that are happening now, and we will be deprived of wonderful future. The history of civilization and the history of the world is universal history. And it is necessary to protect and study it. In St. Petersburg, thinking about reading, I thought that the homeland is not just the area where I was born and grew up, but also the history of how our ancestors mastered the land. And, also, it is the history of a humanitarian, spiritual component of our nation. Motherland is the culture, and it will not decline as long as it does not weaken itself.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you, Mr. Hongji. I give the floor to Professor Vladimir Evgenievich Churov.

V. Ye. CHUROV: — The first thing I would like to say that the previous speakers have already made it clear that talking about the dialogue of cultures as a separate process is not necessary. The dialogue of cultures is closely linked to economic and military-political cooperation and does not exist apart from them. Second, it is also clear that the history does not exist as a separate social institution, and it is a necessary tool for the evaluation of current events and selection of the best path to the future. And from it there is a simple conclusion: the objective history allows estimating the present and choosing really the best way to the future. Nonobjective history does not allow doing it, so I think that smart statesmen should take care of the support of the objective study of history. Third, studying military history, including anniversaries of this year: the 200th anniversary of the occupation of Paris, the 100th anniversary of the First World War, the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Sevastopol and something like that, it can be concluded that the

war has the war of culture as its component. War can also be considered as a dialogue.

Here is the most obvious example. The official name of the First World War is the Great War for civilization. This name is coined on winning medals of all of the state – winners. The Great War for civilization was a war of cultures, respectively. Professor Tishkov has already said that sometimes small cultural differences are essential in the wars. After the main goal is to win, the second goal of the warring parties has always been and is an attempt to create a false image of the culture of the enemy, that is, significantly to increase a small cultural difference. And including during the Great War for civilization it was necessary to imagine the Germans and Austro-Hungarians as devil incarnates because uncivilized peoples must be defeated by civilized ones. This trend is always manifested in regard to Russia, it is enough to remember what a corrupted image of Russian culture was created by Napoleon's propagandists, what a false image of Russian culture was created by our enemies during the Crimean War. And it is very important to understand that the war of cultures at the end of the actual military actions, unfortunately, can be continued.

100 years later after the completion of the Crimean War, the British, shooting a film about the tragic death of the Light Brigade at Balaclava, thought for a long time how to justify the fact what in general the British wanted in the Crimea. And they did not come up with anything better than to entrust responsibility on the "Russian princes" for mass murders of peaceful English women and children in India. Here is such finish of the cultural wars.

Naturally, the dialogue of cultures has not only external but also internal value. Driving somehow along Kutuzovskiy Avenue in Moscow, I saw three cars of the same yellow color following one after the other. The first car was a taxi, cheap "Ford", the third car was also a taxi, cheap "Hyundai". Both of them were bright yellow color, it copies a New York taxi. And between these cars there was expensive "Ferrari" of the same color. I told the driver, "Look, what taxis are going around Moscow". He answered, "Ferrari is probably not a taxi". So, can there be a dialogue between yellow "Ferrari" and yellow taxis? This question is for the following Likhachov's Readings.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you, Vladimir Evgenievich. As you know, dear ladies and gentlemen, at our University in 2008 on the initiative of our founder, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and the personal support of Vladimir Putin, there was the conflict faculty created. Our next speaker presents both our founders and a major research center on conflict problems that works in this faculty. This is a deputy chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia Evgeny Makarov.

E. I. MAKAROV¹: — Let me welcome you on behalf of the founder of St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences – the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia. Every time when I go up on this scene,

¹ Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, the scientific director of the Center for monitoring and analysis of social and labor conflicts in SPbUHSS. Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of St. Petersburg and Leningrad region (1991–2000). Deputy (2000–2004), assistant (2004–2012) of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the North-West Federal District. An author of several publications on trade union issues, including: "Labour relations and trade unions". Active State Advisor of the 2nd class.

from the position of our economic, utilitarian organization I am trying to find that current agenda, which can be dedicated today, maybe, tomorrow Likhachov's Readings. And how amazing is it, despite the fact that the organization that I represent? – utilitarian, every time we find a lot of topics and issues on which we would like to hear quite clear and specific ideas, recommendations in order to make our lives better from a reputable scientific community. As you know, we are trying to protect interests of ordinary people living in the Russian Federation and abroad. And when I went up on this scene, I tried mentally outlining the dynamics of development of the agenda of Likhachov's Readings.

This may seem unnatural, but every year for the last 10 years, the number of problematic issues that we are discussing is not decreasing but increasing. And if you look at the events of the last few months, we will realize that the tension increases, not only in quantity but also in quality, rigidity of questioning. What is the reason? Here I, as a representative of leadership of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, absolutely agree with the outstanding modern sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein, who confirms that reasons of conflict are in the collapse of liberal ideas, philosophy born by it and models created on this basis. But, maybe, we have difference in our views, it is what Wallerstein believes that liberalism will die as a feeble old man, and quietly leave behind not the best memories. And I see that this old man is struggling in agony, trying to drag us into that past about which respected Ex Prime Minister of Spain spoke. Liberalism existing for more than 200 years is trying to drag us to the Middle Ages, where Ukraine was today in some part. He wants to raise the dead of Chauvinism and Nazism from the grave, bring to life completely unacceptable models of future development in today's world, based on the dominance of one idea and one country imposed under the sound of pseudoliberal "mantras".

For the professional unions it is absolutely unacceptable for the reason that we are an organization not only utilitarian and economic, but also extremely conservative. People, we serve, do not want changes, leading to the deterioration of the situation for themselves, their families and children, whatever "sauce" it would not be served. In the future they do not want to see the country, which is going down in the past, over and over again repeating the mistakes of the past centuries. They expect that their voice will be heard not only by those who make "big politics", but listen to it. So, I wish all the participants of Likhachov's Readings fruitful work and continuing search of (in which we continuously are) answers to fundamental and today's questions. Search of better future for us and especially for our children. We have no right to let out, beyond the current decade, the solution of the problem of liberalism replacement to new, viable ideology meeting interests not only of the "golden billion", but also the population of Russia, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Evgeny Ivanovich. Prominent Russian philosopher Abdusalam Abdulkherimovich Huseynov is invited on the tribune of Likhachov's Readings.

A. A. GUSEINOV¹: — Dear colleagues and friends, Likhachov's Readings has a lot of different aspects. One

¹ Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the RAS, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor. An author of over 500 scientific publications, including books:

of them is the fact that it is a public forum inscribed in the cultural life of St. Petersburg, the country. In the scientific part, Likhachov's Readings are related to the dialogue of cultures. It is a place where representatives of different areas of knowledge and different forms of culture are both scientists and practitioners, they consider and develop the overall concept. And the one who follow the results of the forum work, realize that this concept is enriched and developed. Today, I would like to focus on just one point, on one issue, which requires a theoretical thought and as far as I can tell, in options of understanding the dialogue of cultures discussed by us, the answer on which has not been found yet. This issue seemed to me very relevant, and now, after a speech of Professor Churov, I am just sure. By his paradoxical statement that the war is a dialogue of cultures in some way, he made a very simple idea: differences of cultures are the basis for the conflict and for the dialogue. What it is spoken about.

Here, as we speak from the tribune of Likhachov's Readings in this beautiful academic auditorium, we come together to make ends meet, the dialogue is possible. But in the street, when, for example, indigenous people and migrants meet each other, where dialogue is impossible. When the West and Russia meet around the well-known problems – the dialogue is impossible. The idea mentioned by Professor Churov, of course, is a challenge to those who still adhere to the concept of the dialogue among cultures. What is the meaning of the idea of the dialogue? The matter is not to remove cultural differences and bring them to any single base, but to legitimize these differences in order to recognize them as a benefit, and, moreover, to justify and offer the differences of cultures as the most productive form of existence and development of culture in general. That is, the idea of diversity and variety of cultures is the basic idea of the very concept of the dialogue of cultures.

Therefore, it is necessary to make such clarification to the theory of the dialogue among cultures, give an understanding that would ground diversity as the norm, adequate means of existence and development of culture. And to make it so that it is impossible to start the war and others conflicts like war. And if you look at the diversity of cultures on the part of any one culture, it is impossible to understand and to justify it, we will divide it into ours and theirs. And "ours – theirs" is a form of group confrontation of people, their struggle, inter – destruction, and so on known from the beginning of time. Hence, there must be some other point of view, a different point of reference: transcultural, overcultural, neutral towards those cultures that must interact between each other with essential way. There must be a point of view, which rises above this diversity of cultures and serves as a basis to approve it. And it seems to me that there is no answer to the question in our conceptions.

And here, by the way, there are a number of strange things, when, say, even prominent supporters of the idea of tolerance, the dialogue of cultures suddenly go astray

"The social nature of morality", "The Golden Rule of morality", "Great moralists", "Language and conscience", "Philosophy, morality, politics", "Ancient Ethics", "Negative ethics", "The great prophets and thinkers. Moral teachings from Moses to the present day". Managing editor of the yearbook "Ethical Thought", the journal "Social Science" (in English), the member of the editorial boards of the journals "Philosophical Sciences", "Problems of Philosophy". Vice-president of the Russian Philosophical Society. Laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation in the field of science and technology. Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS.

at some point. I guess they are for the dialogue of cultures, but the bombing in Yugoslavia is justified, the Palestinians are believed to be as others, they are removed out of the brackets, and so on. That is, in theory, there is no answer to this question. And I think when we talk about the dialogue of cultures in the globalizing world (and, in fact, our topic sounds like that), we restrict ourselves with the first part of the fact that we talk about the dialogue, focus our attention on it, but we pay little attention to the second part to the fact that it is the dialogue of cultures in the modern, globalized world. That is, in a world that becomes unique. And if the world becomes unique, it belongs to all people who live in it, who live on the Earth. Here, someone has said that electronic gadgets and many other objects of our everyday life are the same in all parts of the world, the world is becoming unique from a technological point of view. And from a financial point of view, with dollars in your pocket, you can travel everywhere. The Internet is also everywhere. We can say that the world is unique, as it is covered by all these things. But it is possible to look at it the other way: the world is covered, filled with the same things – dollars, the Internet, and many other things, which is the way of our life, because it is unique. That is, the initial recognition of human unity precedes the actual unity, which is realized in the process of globalization. And we must find some streams of thought to include this point in our theoretical scheme.

Philosophers, who were the first cognizing the world of human laws, customs, norms – that was later called and is now called the culture – identifying as a particular reality, were the Greek sophists. They identified this world and said that there was a special reality, the world of culture. And they opposed this world of culture to the natural world. The world, with which a man is concerned and in which he is involved, was divided into two qualitatively different areas: nature and culture. But the sophists not just recorded the difference. Their stream of thought was this: the nature in terms of the value is above the culture. Why? Because the nature unites – it is the same for everybody, and the culture is different, then it divides. It seems to me that this enlightenment of philosophers now becomes a historical fact. Natural unity of people in a globalizing world – this is, if you like, a cultural phenomenon on its own, a historical reality.

We need to realize and theoretically fix this fact. I think that it can be done if we combine the idea of the dialogue of cultures and in general the idea of cultural diversity with the idea of non-violence by specifying it as an idea of original and unconditional value of a man as a man to all sorts of cultural differences. One conservative thinking and nationalist-oriented thinker said: I met a Frenchman, a Russian, thanks to the books I know about the existence of the Persians, but I have never met or heard of the existence of a man in general. This is true, but only a human can become a Frenchman, a Russian, a Persian, but other natural creatures cannot be them. Of course, the culture forms a human – it is a fact. But then, a human forms the culture. And even more relief and obvious truth is in today's world that cultural clearness of people is not some frozen form, it is changing all the time. And a human does not only master with various identities given to him, but he is constantly developing his own identity. And this is even more proof that the culture itself is formed by a human. We must acknowledge the inherent value of a human as a basis that creates

the culture. And if we acknowledge the intrinsic value of a person, we acknowledge his right to have that cultural form, which he prefers. Thus, we initially give the diversity and cultural differences. And I think if we put together these two things – the theory of non-violence, refusal of violence and the dialogue of cultures, we would be able significantly to advance our concept of the dialogue of cultures.

Another point, which is very important to include the idea of a transnational unity in our concept, is associated with varying forms of “ownership” of the planet, resettlement and people living on it. Until now, we – and in our cultural images, and in fact – have the ruling principle, when certain groups of people are assigned for specific territories, that is, the territory is divided between ethnic groups, nations and civilizations. The planet is divided between cultures. And now there is another process. This is a migration process, which now cannot be stopped, whoever and whatever says or does. We notice that a lot of migrants come in Russia, and a lot of problems come with them (real and imaginary), but we do not care much about how much people leave Russia and continue leaving. And no one knows yet if these flows compare which of them will outweigh. Of course, we need to learn to comprehend this new reality in some way.

And here I would like to appeal to the idea of a well-known contemporary sociologist and a very wise man Zygmunt Bauman: “Maybe, we should put away from the metaphor of ground and move on to the metaphor of an anchor”. This means when a person goes somewhere, he just drops an anchor somewhere else. If he leaves, he does not change the homeland, so to speak, he does not leave the ground. And now, instead of a human – peasant with a horse, attached to particular land, we have a man – sailor, traveler who sails about the ocean and can drop an anchor here and there. In any case, this idea deserves the attention and respect. In short, we need to specify and enrich our understanding of the dialogue of cultures so that out of cultural differences and varieties in any way cannot be deduced dividing people into friends and foes.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Abudalam Abdulkerimovich. I would like to invite our outstanding colleague, the scientist of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Professor Peter Petrovich Tolochko to the tribune. In these difficult times, we appreciate his presence very much.

P. P. TOLOCHKO: — Dear colleagues! Preparing for the next Likhachov's Readings, I have made a small discovery for myself. It is in the fact that humanity is not able to create a consistent model of their own social life. At the time, the outstanding Russian philosopher Nikolai Ilyin saw the cause of the collision of peoples in the absence of a law that would clearly regulate the system of international relations. Subsequently, there was such a law. It was taken by the United Nations, but collisions were much more. And, mainly because it was proclaimed as the inalienable right of peoples to self-determination.

There has never been a lack of wishing people to self-determination, and this process has always been accompanied by social crises. In addition, the realization of this right often depends not on the will of the people, but on powerful people. For example, the United States and NATO decided

Kosovo to become a separate state, which is what happened. In turn, Abkhazia and South Ossetia received similar support from Russia.

Recently I have read an interview with the British Prime Minister David Cameron, troubled with upcoming plebiscite of Scotland about State Sovereignty. According to it, Scotland's secession out of the UK is undesirable because it does not benefit either the Scots or English. J. M. Barroso said something similar about a possible secession of Catalonia out of Spain. As they say, they are golden words. It is a pity that they are said only when they are about the integrity of the own countries. They could not be heard when Europe and the United States were destroying the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia with gusto, fervently defending the right of their peoples to self-determination.

But except for the right to self-determination, the UN also proclaimed the principle of the inviolability of borders, which was confirmed at the famous Helsinki meeting in 1975. In essence, these two "rights" are in irreconcilable differences.

There is another principle of international relations: non-intervention of one state in the internal affairs of another. But it is also broken down all the time. I can show it on the example of events taking place in Ukraine. There is no doubt that they are inspired by the United States and the countries belonging to NATO. The evidence for this is a direct participation of senior officials of these countries in the Maidan actions. From the tribune of "revolutionary" Maidan, they called people to assert their rights for democracy and freedom. Especially, they supported Western Ukraine, which actually came out from the submission of the central government.

In one of the publications I wrote that it was a dangerous precedent. If today submission is possible for Western Ukraine, tomorrow it will be possible for the Southeast. Which is what happened. And then the Western protectors of Ukraine raised a real rumpus, "It is unacceptable that in the south-east there are armed groups. This threatens the integrity of the country". In the armed nationalist detachments of the "Right sector" they saw no danger and even encouraged them to seize power by force, but they saw it in the south-east militias, requiring cultural and economic federalization.

The reasons of the rebellion in the south-east are largely determined with fears of the population to lose their cultural and historical identity. This area is Russian-speaking. It became a part of Ukraine under the formation of the Soviet Union only in 1922. When, after the insurrection, new government announced a ban on using the Russian language, they expressed their strong protest in Donetsk and Luhansk.

At first, it was not extended further than federalization. I have been sharing the idea of such a state structure for a long time. It is the most optimal in terms of a polyethnic and multicultural society. I was accused of Russophile, playing into the hands of future dissolution of Ukraine. Of course, it is unfair. And if Maidan's authority of Ukraine had met requirements of the population living in the south-east, I am sure, Ukraine would suffer from the tragedy of war and dissolution.

I was closely familiar with D. S. Likhachov, in some way I consider him my teacher. Shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, he said: "Well, let the Baltic states and other republics leave, but Russia, Ukraine and Belarus

should stay together because they have a common cultural root, come from one of the ancient people".

Unfortunately, it has not been so. Based on current realities, it can be said that Ukraine has already been detached from the East Slavic mainland. This detach is being committed brutal and bloody. No one knows what will be the end of the rebellion in the south-east of Ukraine. Also, the Carpathians have their one claims to the Ukrainian unitarity, where a significant percentage of the population is Hungarian, as well as in Bukovina, which the Romanians consider their land.

This is the result of American globalization of the world in the Ukraine. Yet there was no example where the American intervention would be ended in peace and prosperity. On the contrary, everywhere is raging civil war and the dissolution of states, and even hundreds of thousands of refugees. It seems that the international community has much to ponder.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Peter Petrovich. I would like to give the floor to the Honorary Doctor of our University Gadis Abdullaevich Hajiyeu.

G. A. HAJIYEV¹: — I would like to begin my speech by thanking Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, because he was not only a theoretician and the greatest philologist. I am struck by one thing – a man who was involved in the Russian culture, Russian philology of the Middle Ages, what he was thinking about, what ideas he transmitted to people. Maybe not everyone knows that every year here in this hall the Festival of Eastern poetry is held, there are students from China, India, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, and Azerbaijan gathering here and they read poems in their native language. This festival is held on the initiative of Dmitry Likhachov, it was his idea. This is what is called a dialogue in a purely practical version. And those young people, who are sitting in the hall and listening to poems in different languages, actively participate in this dialogue. Listening to the speakers today, I have caught myself thinking that invisibly at almost all of my colleagues who stood on this tribune, there was reflection and philosophical understanding of the tragic events that have occurred so suddenly this year. And I, also, probably, will speak mainly about it, I will try to answer these questions in the language of the constitutional right. I want to say about the right of the Russian people to be themselves.

I think that this right results from the first statement of our Constitution. The preamble begins with the statement that the multinational Russian people are united with a common destiny on their own land. What is the meaning of this very deep concept, the concept of a common destiny of the multinational people? Digressing a little, I would say that this means that the neighbors are not chosen. It so happened

¹ The judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Doctor of Law, Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation. He is an author of over 200 scientific papers, including monographs and textbooks: "The protection of fundamental economical rights and freedoms of entrepreneurs abroad and in the Russian Federation: the experience of a comparative analysis", "Entrepreneur – taxpayer – state: the legal positions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation", "The constitutional principles of market economics", "Constitutional economics" and others. The chairman of the Editorial Board of the journal "Comparative Constitutional Review", a member of the editorial boards of five academic journals. The member of the Presidential Council for the Development of Civil Legislation. He was awarded with the honorary Diploma of the President of the Russian Federation. Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS.

that we live with our neighbors, and we will not have the other ones. We should never forget that they are neighbors, God has given them to us. With regard to the common destiny of the people, of course, it is not genetic research, not studying the composition of our blood, although, maybe, genetics would give us very interesting results about who we really are. I think the more common destiny as a constitutional concept is the result of the dialogue of cultures in historical perspective. I am risking talking about it in the presence of distinguished historians, but individuality of Russia is that there has never been true colonialism here. It was very interesting neighborhood, sometimes in the form of non-peaceful, but it is always the interaction of cultures. As a result of this interaction, we have such complex cultural traditions.

To some extent the fact that we have retained cultural, ethnic enclaves in our great country, affects our traditions. “Mores”, the Romans said, putting a very deep sense in it, including the traditions of statehood. These traditions of statehood play a positive role in something, I do not deny that there are, perhaps, some positive and negative points. It is necessary to explore all of these. In my view, the historical traditions of Russian statehood suppose the right of the people to be themselves and are based on this law. What does this mean as a purely legal category? I think that the Russian people have the right to nonuniversalized being, such being as a kind of energy of resistance when external forces try to deprive the people of this nonuniversalized being. That is, there is certain energy of resistance, and we feel it. We see it when, for example, the State Duma discusses the issue about the establishment of some limit, the limit on the show of American films. It is as if the echoes of people’s right to be themselves.

And I think that there is a very intense philosophical dialogue about cultural relativism which is conducting invisibly. This is a monochromatic view about the world, in my opinion, the dogmatic idea of what human rights are at their maximum universalized version. This, in my view, is that in the philosophical tradition is called the tradition of thinking of realism but not nominalism, and this tradition of thinking leads to the fact that some people, countries have a completely unreasonable idea that they are carriers of the legal truth. They believe that their views are the only possible ones, and should be shared by all other nations, otherwise these nations need to be declared uncivilized. This is a deeply mistaken view, monochromatic look when a very unhappy person sees the world in black and white, without distinction of all colors of this world. And I think this is the main mistake of our colleagues. I would like us to talk using these terms, including our theoretical opponents, who, unfortunately, still keep Markozian slogan. They tell us: “Be realistic, demand impossible”. But we must understand that it is better to be realistic and not demand the impossible.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Gadis Abdullaevich. I would like to invite Mr. Valur Ingimundarson from Iceland.

VALUR INGIMUNDARSON: — I am very glad to have the opportunity to speak here today on the subject of geopolitics in the beautiful city of St. Petersburg, which, in my opinion, is very close to us, northerners. I would like to talk about the interaction between international and trans-

national processes. Regions have often acted as a model of international cooperation, organization, or, conversely, as places of conflicts of great states. Let’s look at the opportunities available in a close relationship and the confrontation with the natural conditions of the northern areas of the Arctic, which have often been the subject of conflict and territorial disputes between different states. And, as Allan Cochrane said that these potential conflicts were often rooted in the deep processes of the location of the regions. On today’s speeches about the Arctic are influenced by what Foucault called the ideology of the third question. With the help of various types of captures, passes from hand to hand, the Arctic region was seen as something which is the object of rivalry and heritage of now vanishing paradigm of historical discourse in the social, political and public sphere, as a subject of the claims of various states.

Considering the Arctic as an object of strategic focus of the states because of the riches of natural resources and the desire to possess them, we build our discourse to the problems of earlier times, when the great states were trying to fight for natural resources even in the imperialist era, and we treat to the Arctic as well as to the African continent at that time. Now it involves even military discourses and practices. Very often, the states located above the Arctic Circle and having formed the Arctic Council, try to get away from the hostility in the dialogue, which could be not so long ago. Now those States that are on the coast of the Arctic Ocean – Russia, the United States, Canada, Greenland, Iceland – play a much more important role in solving questions of the region than any other country. But the possibility of that the Arctic riches and resources were mastered by not only the coastal states, but also other countries that could be involved in their production, draws our attention to a rather ambivalent historical discourse. Foucault rightly said that for this region can be used all forms of the dialogue, including historical ones. Currently geopolitical aspirations can lead to the fact that we will be back to understand popular in the 19th century, to neo-colonialism in the Arctic region.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Mr. Ingimundarson. I would like to give the floor to academician Alexander Borisovich Kudelin.

A. B. KUDELIN: — First of all, I would like to mention the words of gratitude that in my presence were said by Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov addressing them to the academician Nikolai Iosifovich Conrad. It was long ago at the memorial evening devoted to our outstanding orientalist in the Library of Foreign Literature in Moscow.

Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, whose contribution to the issues discussed was very large, was not thereby Ivan, not remembering his relatives. The fact is that the dialogue of cultures and the study of this problematics have long history. Nikolai Iosifovich Conrad, once wrote a book “East and West”, which Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov told about at the memorable evening, from his part, largely contributed to the fact that the contribution and activity of academician Likhachov in this field were duly appreciated in our society and our science, too. Let’s recall now only about one important fact, which was devoted a lot of time by our outstanding scientists. Nikolai Iosifovich Conrad, followed by Dmitry Likhachov, have put a lot of efforts in the

publication of the series “Literary Monuments”, practically implementing, in particular, theoretical principles of studying the dialogue of cultures and historical comparison of literatures of the East and the West.

It is actually great work, because just talking about the dialogue of cultures is one thing, but creating the monuments of culture of different nations of the world is quite another. And this is done through traditions laid down by the founder of the series, academician Sergey Ivanovich Vavilov and the scientists who participated in this work. These merits are great and undeniable. It is very important to understand and today academician A. A. Guseinov said that the dialogue of cultures in different contexts acquires different features. The dialogue of cultures, as N. I. Conrad wrote in his time, was begun with mutual rapprochement of cultures. We often discuss the question: “Is it possible to do the dialogue of cultures?” The dialogue of cultures is always possible, even if they do not understand each other, but at least they meet. And when academician N. I. Conrad gave good examples of how the Japanese mastered the Russian culture and literature in the Japanese way.

Today we have heard a lot of important, good things, but we have not heard any practical proposals, and I would like to pay one such proposal to Alexander Sergeevich. I think it would be useful to do, if possible, a series of outstanding works on the dialogue of cultures, because the dialogue of cultures was not started not 14 years ago at Likhachov’s Readings, but much earlier. I recall at least Pushkin speech of Dostoevsky, who spoke about the universal sympathy of the Russian soul in Pushkin’s creative activity. All this has been involved into the dialogue of cultures very well. At the time we celebrated the 200th anniversary of Pushkin’s birthday. But we have somehow forgotten at this moment that at the same time we could celebrate the 250th anniversary of Goethe’s birthday who in his “West-Eastern sofa” raised the same issues as Pushkin did in his works. This is a very interesting material from which a lot of good projects could be done.

As for the dialogue of cultures, the Russian tradition, and not only the Russian one, a huge number of works could be published that would show how much the dialogue of cultures in the context of globalization differs from the dialogue of cultures that occurred in the 17th century. And the dialogue has always been: and in the 17th century, and even in the ancient world, and today academician A. A. Guseinov told about it. You can find a lot of good works at this theme. I think it would be great to make such a useful thing. And if academician A. A. Guseinov agreed to head this series, it would be wonderful and it would be a great contribution to study bringing people closer together.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Alexander Borisovich. I invite to the tribune, the outstanding mathematician and economist Valery Leonidovich Makarov.

V. L. MAKAROV¹: — Professor Churov was not afraid to mention the word “war” in relation to our discus-

¹ Director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the RAS, Dean of the Faculty of Economics of the State Academic University for the Humanity Sciences, Director of the High School of Public Administration of Lomonosov Moscow State University, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, Professor. An author of over 300 scientific publications, including: “Mathematical theory of economic dynamics and balance”, “Valuation of intangible assets

sion. In fact, this is a very serious thing. I would like to say not just about the war but about the information war, or more exactly about information wars. “Information wars” is a term that appeared a long time ago, but recently we are constantly living exactly in the system of information wars. Someone, perhaps, did not feel it, but many are experiencing it for themselves. There are people who, for example, justify that the Soviet Union was dissolved not because of falling the price of oil, or because of some other reason, but because it actually lost in the information war. Because the West in the mass media looked like a paradise, the Soviet Union is something like hell. That was an end that the Union was dissolved. It is clear that there is a certain sense in it.

Nowadays, information wars are being enriched with new weapon. In a conventional war, a number of any weapons are constantly growing. It is the same in the information war: there is the Internet, and so on. And so we need to know how to fight in this new environment. Unfortunately, it must be admitted, this is my personal opinion, but in the information war Russia is losing the West. If you listen to what they say to common people in America and in Europe, and what they say in Russia, they are very different things. And then it is necessary to know how to fight in the information war. We are fighting worse, we must admit it. And because of it there are a lot of negative events happening.

Why have I decided to say about it here, during our Readings, which are devoted to the dialogue of cultures? I think that every time in the sphere of culture, necessary weapons can be found, and if we use it wisely, then we will also win. This partly contradicts the fact that professor Churov said. But there is the concept of “people’s diplomacy”, which is that if we communicate with each other more likely, it will help us to avoid the information war. If we widely apply culture, its concepts and methods, of course, we will start to win. This will occur for many reasons. Not because our art exhibitions will be held there, and not because, say, Matsuev, Gergiev, Netrebko, our great people, will travel around the world. But in general, if our culture appears everywhere and we find ways with the help of which we will be able to implement it in the minds of people, there will be no information opposition.

And now, it is the most important what they speak about in the world that the second Cold War has begun. We lost the first Cold War, and now the second one has begun. This is also something similar to these information wars. My personal opinion as a person, who is not a professional in these issues, is that we have a chance not to lose in the information war, if we attract our great Russian culture.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Valery Leonidovich. I would like to give the floor to our colleague from London, well-known journalist Yuri Samuilovich Goligorsky.

Yu. S. GOLIGORSKY: — Listening to the previous speaker, I have realized that I prepared for today’s meeting

and intellectual property” (co-author), “Science and High Technologies of Russia at the turn of the third millennium”, “Russian in a globalizing world. Modernization of the Russian economics”. Chief Editor of the journal “Economics and Mathematical Methods”. Member of editorial boards and editorial boards of the journals: “Economics of Planning”, “Social Sciences”, “Cybernetics and Systems Analysis”, “Economics of Contemporary Russia”, “Scientology”, “Optimization” and others. Laureate of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the other.

very bad, I would rather get ready better, because two days ago I was in a completely different world, where what is described here right now in such burning terms, is considered in a very different way. I can remember one of the postulates of Zen's teachings: conversation is excessive use, silence is fraud. There is steep trail passing on the other side of silence and speech. I use this postulate like a journalist and a producer. I use it from the point of view that every word that we, journalists, give out on the air, must be balanced, thoughtful and absolutely accurate. Our main principle is much like the principle of doctors – don't harm. And if we adhere to this principle, then, of course, many problems will be overcome.

When I was flying here, I began talking with my neighbor in the plane, and he asked, "You are going there and, of course, will you discuss Ukraine?" I said, "Yes". – "Tell me, please, are you for us or for them?" I answered, "You know, as a journalist, I am not for us or for them. As a professional, I have to be above the fight, I must see the problem, tell my readers, listeners and viewers only what I can see, only the facts that I have been able to establish, and under no circumstances to give them any my personal assessment". We must, and it is one of the rules of Western journalism, clearly distinguish between news, commentary and opinion. Unfortunately, for the last two days, when the TV is always on in my room and I watch the news from the south-east of Ukraine, I cannot boast that I associate myself with my Russian colleagues in light of what is happening there. I have a certain share of criticism in regards of my colleagues, but, nevertheless, we still speak different languages. And this is, of course, a huge problem. Recently in Russia, if my memory serves me, the law on obscene words has been introduced. It seems to me that now, in this situation it is incredibly important to prohibit not only obscene words, but also emotionally charged language in light of certain events. Word becomes a material force, it takes so much power and it is able to cause such harm due to its emotional coloring, which we do not even suspect.

During the Soviet times, there was a "moral code of a builder of communism". We all are about of one generation, and you all remember it. A little later, during the post-soviet time, one of the authors of this moral code, the famous Soviet, Russian journalist Fyodor Burlatsky admitted that these are 10 Commandments and Sermon on the Mount modified in hurry. Maybe, now we have a sense not to reinvent the wheel and go back to the 10 Commandments and the Sermon on the Mount in all what we do, in all our professional work. And, maybe, there is a sense to remember the old biblical truth: the other is right because he is the other.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Yuri Samuilovich. I invite to the tribune the professor of economics, Shlomo Weber.

SHLOMO WEBER: — First of all, I would like to say that I fully agree with the thesis of academician Tishkov: he told a lot of ideas that I was going to sound. So, I am going focus on other points, namely, I am considering the economic aspect of diversity and development. I am interested in diversity all my life. I dropped a lot of anchors, as it has already been mentioned here, in different countries, and so, for already many years my interest in diversity has been the

main focus of my research. To begin with, that the starting point of empirical research of diversity was the Atlas of the world, which was made up in the Institute of Ethnography after N. Miklukho – Maclay of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and published in August 1964. It had an enormous influence on both practical and theoretical study of diversity throughout the world. In the United States, this atlas of the world began to be used in 1967, and for almost 50 years, it has been referred to by many researchers. As I have already told in my speech, I would like to focus on the economic side of the diversity, touch the dialogue of cultures and consider the problem not from an external point of view, but start with an internal analysis of the country. Russia is known to be a dissimilar country. In our center, we consider the problem of dissimilarity, diversity from different points of view. These are religious, linguistic, economic, historical, geographical, and genetic aspects of diversity. Our studies are classified as interdisciplinary, so I am particularly pleased to be here today at Likhachov's Readings among colleagues and like-minded people... Russia is a country, probably, the most difficult one from a geographical point of view, the regions in it are very different from each other at many parameters. Then the question arises: "How do we strengthen the regions, or, at least, help their development, if we understand that people are different and they live in different places, and think differently and even speak different languages?"

This problem is, on the one hand, of course, philosophical, but, in fact, this problem is an economic one. Perhaps, at the University of Humanities and Social Sciences, it would be very interesting to conduct research of such a question: what will happen if we do not include people for reasons of economic or ethnic differences in the creative process of economic development? Then, large segments of the population will simply fall out of this process. If all the resources are not used – both human and economic ones – the progress will be difficult. Moreover, this issue is relevant not only for Russia but also for many other countries, because if large groups of people are excluded from the development process of the country for several reasons – wars, differences or simply unwillingness to understand one another, such development does not make sense from economical point of view. Let me explain with an obvious example. We talk a lot about globalization, it is known to bring the world together. Of course, globalization unites the world, but at the same time separates it. On the one hand, we live in the global world, but on the other hand, large groups of people are on the side of progress. And when the whole social layers do not take part in the creation, the development process cannot be called successful from the economic point of view.

I completely agree with the choice of linguistic policy in the various regions of the former Soviet Union, as, say, in Moldova, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. For what reason? The reason is the same: if large groups of people are not involved in the main processes of development due to differences in language, culture or religion, then it is not necessary to expect positive changes. Therefore, I think that this issue can really be addressed to trade unions and offer them the role of defender of the rights of various groups of the population. The role of trade unions and the state is to create a political environment and conditions to be included all segments of the population in the processes of creation.

Then the response will be more effective and understanding between different social groups will be improved.

In conclusion, I want to go back to two opposite sides of the process of globalization. Divergent processes of globalization ultimately increase people's willingness to defend their interests, interests of even their small groups and their worldview. Therefore, in order to move forward, of course, we must take into account the differences between social groups and regions about aspects that I have already mentioned: cultural, economic, geographic, and others. However, taking into account differences and diversity of society, we must understand that regional development in such a large country as Russia, should be balanced, otherwise it will be difficult to move forward. Thus, from the point of view of studying the diversity, the first important point is how to measure diversity, and the second one is how to use this diversity for the benefit of the creative process. We are doing it in our research, and I think that it is absolutely necessary for the development of the country.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Mr. Weber. I invite to the tribune one of the world's leading experts in the dialogue of cultures, Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin.

V. V. NAUMKIN: — One of the first experiences of the dialogue of cultures, in which I had to take part, was long ago, when I was a student and studied in Egypt, in Cairo. Making another trip about the hinterland of Egypt (it should be noted that it was very different Egypt, not the one who is now seen by tourists), I met one interesting person, a hermit-Sufi. He climbed a tree, built there something like a nest and lived there for several years. He secluded himself that way, although it is a bit different from secluding of Russian elders hermit, who lived in caves. I was struck by this man. (Although evil tongues said that at night he went down and he was brought for food there.) The first time I saw a man who lives in a different world, first I experienced extraordinary sense of entering a dialogue with such a man living in a different civilization, in a different society, and I understood him. Being prepared as an Arabist, an expert on the Arab world, I had no difficulty in communicating with people of that culture, but communication with the hermit, I was struck with the dialogue.

I want to extend a bridge from there into the modern world and say that, maybe, today not people of different civilizations and cultures need the dialogue, but those who are within one culture, one religion, one civilization. They seem to understand each other less than ever, and we can see it today.

One Arab medieval thinker said: "God gave brain to the Europeans, arms to the Chinese, the language to the Arabs". Indeed, the Arabic language, literature, poetry are wonderful, the Arabs are very proud of them. I sometimes think that God gave brain, language and culture to us, which no one else has, we are proud of our culture, literature and poetry. The only thing that the Russian has a bad one – it is hands.

If we go back to the peculiarities of culture, academician Chubarian spoke about historical memory, which, in my opinion, is now becoming a material force. I sometimes ask my students, "How many generations of your ancestors can every one of you call?" Thus, I check genealogical

memory of our youth. Some of them call three, four generations – and that is all. In the Middle East, where I had to live for a long time, and now I am continuing to visit it, people can call many generations of their ancestors. Vladimir Evgenievich Churov, who was there, amazed me that he knows his genealogy. It is sad that today our young people know few generations of their ancestors. This is a feature of the civilization. I think it is important today to strengthen historical memory, the fact that we are starting to return it, take care of where we live, where we grew up.

In my paper, presented at Likhachov's Readings, there are some opinions about a serious crisis, elements of crisis in the identification of people. Experts believe that the identity crisis has struck the whole world today, not only the patients, "failed", as we say, of the society, but also the global system as a whole. We are talking about a crisis of nations and states: this phenomenon today sharpens the issue of the dialogue among civilizations.

Not by chance that we are keeping coming back to the topic about Ukraine, where today there is a serious split. We have reasons to say that we are not understood, it is necessary to pay special attention to the care about our interests, about that this crisis has not led to more stringent defending our right to exist, the development of statehood and civilization. The crisis phenomena in the system of nations and states, and in general, the identity crisis, when people try to define who we are, where we are going, and also, with whom we have to be connected, whom we have to be guided to now. Today, everywhere – in the West and in the East – there is some confusion of thoughts, everywhere in the globalizing world, today people are asking who we are, what will happen next, with whom to make friends.

Although, there are other points of view. Some people suggest that there is not any globalization, today particularization is happening, we are separating from each other. Globalization involves the free flow of ideas, people, and financial flows. Concerning people, this exchange seems to be unlimited. But today there are more obstacles for free movement of people, the migration problem becomes very acute. Where is the freedom of movement, which we refer to as an element of globalization? If we talk about financial flows, there also come into force a lot of restrictions. Today we see sanction policy that has an integral feature of globalization, which also testifies to the fact that globalization and its positive effects are attacked. It is also not okay in the area of freedom of information (this is something that is hard to stop). Information which is used in the interests of disinformation is clearly contrary to the positive aspects of globalization, we are talking about.

It is necessary to establish a dialogue and public discussion of complex problems that we face today in an unpredictable world, all our forecasts are inaccurate, and often wrong. Other way to solve our problems does not exist.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Vitaly Vyacheslavovich. I give the floor to Professor Jerzy Wiatr from Poland.

JERZY WIATR: — First of all I would like to thank the Rector and the University of Humanities and Social Sciences for the invitation to Likhachov's Readings. In case of complications of international relations, an international cultural dialogue between nations is an important way

to compromise. I represent the European High School of Law and Management in Warsaw, which was established 17 years ago by the Association of Polish Lawyers and is a major education independent non-governmental centre of lawyers. It operates not only in Poland but also in other EU countries, has offices in London and research centers in other places. On January 23, 2014 the Senate of the European High School of Law and Administration decided to confer a title to Alexander Sergeevich Zapesotsky as an Honorary Professor in recognition of his contribution in strengthening the scientific and cultural cooperation.

Alexander Sergeevich, it is a great honor for me personally to tell you about it and hand in a relevant document to you.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear colleagues, it is a great honor for me. I am touched with the fact that my works are known and appreciated in Poland so much. Our university is going to conclude a cooperation agreement with this great university of Warsaw. This fact has personal meaning for me. My family is related to Ukraine and partly with Poland. My father and grandfather graduated from the same law faculty in the University of Kiev, but when my grandfather graduated from it, this university was named after St. Vladimir, and when my father graduated from it, it was called Kiev State University. My father was born in a small village on the border of Belarus and Poland, there occurs the surname Zapesotsky. It seems to me that today I has got a little closer to the place where my father was born and which is connected with my family.

In today's difficult circumstances, we need to think about what we, people, who identify themselves as intellectuals and are characterized with high education considering themselves as people of culture, must do everything to ensure our peoples in Europe and around the world not to quarrel, but make friends, hold together scientific symposia, conferences, research, and make works. It is better to attend scientific conferences and meet at each other's work than to organize information and real wars.

I invite to the tribune the outstanding Russian jurist, Nikolai Semenovich Bondar.

N. S. BONDAR¹: — Dear colleagues, the first question is: what is one of the fundamental objectives of the dialogue of cultures? Probably one of these important goals can and should be the achievement of a balance of values. Legal, constitutional culture occupies an important place in the cultural space – national and international.

As for the dialogue of legal cultures, the unique legal, formally juridical expression is a concentrated one, but pri-

¹ The judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, the Head of municipal law and environmental legislation of the Southern Federal University, the Doctor of Law, Professor, Honored Scientist of Russia, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation. The author of over 300 scientific publications, including books: "The power and freedom in the balance of constitutional justice: protection of human rights by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation"; "Constitutionalization of socio-economic development of the Russian state (in the context of the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation)"; "Local government and constitutional justice: constitutionalization of municipal democracy in Russia"; "The constitutional value of electoral rights of citizens of Russia"; "Judicial Constitutionalism in Russia in light of the constitutional justice"; "Axiology of judicial constitutionalism: constitutional values in theory and practice of constitutional justice" and others. The author-founder of a permanent series of publications "Library of judicial constitutionalism". He was awarded with the Medal of Honor, the medal "For Services to the Motherland" of the second degree, Diploma of the President of the Russian Federation, departmental and regional government awards.

marily it is a sociocultural phenomenon, as the constitution. It is in the constitution, modern constitutionalism that there is a summary of the dialogue of legal cultures of modernity.

If we talk about global principle trends, so, they are associated with the dialogue and conflict and, perhaps, with attempts to intervene one legal system, in particular, the Anglo-Saxon one, and on the other hand, the Roman-Germanic legal system.

If you look historically at the emergence of such unique, social and cultural phenomena as the constitution, it is possible to note an interesting fact. Chronologically, overseas and on the European continent at about the same time, at least within a decade (this is a moment according to historical terms), there was a constitution as a formal legal document, the Basic Law. The development of the Constitution happened and is happening in a continuous dialogue between the two legal families. Here I am unable to elaborate on this interesting process, which is ultimately linked to the understanding of the constitutional values of modernity, searching their balance in conditions of the controversial, disputed, modern world, including the show of aggression.

Reconciliation and the balance can be found primarily through the legal Bible, that is the Constitution. One of the researchers of constitutionalism is our colleague, the chairman of the Constitutional Court of Armenia, G. Harutyunyan, actively working with archives, he wrote in one of his works that in 1837 in Armenia there was the work dedicated on the problems of the constitution, where the constitution was referred to as the phenomenon of God, manifested not through the letter of the constitution, but through its spirit: for the letter of the constitution is a destiny of the legislator, but the spirit of the Constitution is what is the result of people's creativity and then what is framed in the state-legal juridical form through the political, state power.

By the way, the proof of it can be found in the 17th verse of John's Gospel, where it is said that the law was given by Moses, the grace and truth came from Jesus Christ. This law is a formally legal characteristic, the constitution, and the grace and truth is the spirit of the constitution. And the spirit of the constitution is not subject to the legislator, to a large extent the spirit of the constitution is subject to judiciary, because it has the ability through the constitutional justice to invade such spiritual characteristics of the constitution as values, principles, definitions, declarations and so on, what defines the spirit itself. And in this respect the constitution is a socio-cultural phenomenon, and not because there are recorded with a high still including provisions that have moral and ethical values, and so on.

I am outlining three points. Firstly, the very origin of the constitution has the socio-cultural beginning; secondly, the constitution reflects the socio-cultural portrait, this is a legal portrait in a socio-cultural reflection of the society and the state; thirdly, the constitution through legal mechanisms provides fastening means, ways to overcome the contradictions, achieve a balance between those values, the action of those principles that are defined by the spirit of this document, but not the letter.

Thus, the language of the dialogue of legal cultures is primarily a judicial language, law constitutional through constitutional justice. The result of the dialogue of cultures in this respect has been the fact that not only in the United States, the Constitution of the United States Constitution is recognized. The Constitution of the Russian Federation is

also living constitutionalism, its strength is determined not with what was written in 1993 but what is happening today. If we estimated it according to 1993, then we would have to come to the conclusion that we lived under the constitution of the twentieth century, but in fact, we are living under the constitution of the 19th century.

It is also important to note one more thing: the Constitution, except that it is a product of the dialogue of cultures, is the formal legal document, a socio-cultural phenomenon, moral and ethical category, but also the aesthetic category, which involves the assessment of these phenomena through the concept of beauty: a beautiful theory is correct.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Nikolai Semenovich. I invite our guest whose father was directly involved in the creation of the United Nations, professor Anatoly Andreevich Gromyko.

A. A. GROMYKO: — Dear colleagues, I am pleased to speak here, the platform of the University, Likhachov's International Readings is now, perhaps, the most powerful Russian place of international plan for humanities. I congratulate the staff of the University and its principals to ensure that you hold not just interesting conferences, but also publish results, works of your University is widely known not only in Russia but also abroad.

At the plenary session, the Ukrainian colleague mentioned that the force in the world politics has not been canceled. Force in politics is really present, as the force has been present in people's lives from the beginning of time, even in a primitive society there was a struggle for fire, maces, clubs were the main means to get it and save. Then appeared bows and arrows, and then, if we shorten the way, nuclear weapons. By the way, this is one of the main features of Russia as a great power, that is why, we will never have the fate of Ukraine, which I deeply sympathize. I hope that the Ukrainian people will be able to preserve the unity and their state, the power of the state has always guarded it against external enemies. By the way, everyone has wanted to be friends with the Soviet Union.

For 16 years I have studied Africa, I was the director of the Institute of Africa, visited many countries of this continent. Not once I was convinced how bad we know the outside world and how many friends we have in Africa. Friendship is soft power. But the power can be tough, especially military power. The power can also be clever and even wise. In regard to clever and wise power, we, scientists, have the goal to explain its problems. Now I am examining the role of power in the world politics, how science can help Russia's foreign policy and diplomacy.

Personification of wise power is the results of the Second World War, in which the crucial role was played by the Soviet people. Now they are trying to belittle the role of the Soviet people, soldiers and officers in this victory. But if it had not been the Soviet Union, our people and the Soviet army, I think, the present of the humanity would be terrible.

There is sometimes used the expression such as "dark past" from which it is difficult to learn anything good. It seems to me that it is not so. The collective intelligence of mankind has accumulated a lot of good in the past, including the word loyalty. Queen Elizabeth I, known with fact that she sent Mary Stuart on the scaffold, once said the

following words: "The Word of the Queen is stronger than the vow of an ordinary person". It seems to me that the word of the head of the state, ministers should be solid, as a vow. If we have been promised a new social program, let it be performed. It also concerns obligations that our country has taken upon itself.

On May 9, we celebrate not only a military victory and the capture of Berlin, but also celebrate Victory Day, after which there was the formation of the world order established with the consent of such historical figures as Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin, he ruled the Soviet country then. This trio of leaders with the help of diplomacy in Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta and San Francisco at the conference took the statute, under which there was a new world order established. If we dismiss purposes and principles of the United Nations so easily, so, one day Russia will be asked to give the Kaliningrad region back, saying, "It is Prussia, Kant was buried here".

Our achievement is that the order was established, which has already been protecting Europe from the new world war. Is this a bad result? Of course, there were tragedies, too, in particular, there was bombing of Yugoslavia mentioned here. But, in whole, the world has been able to avoid the third world war. Look at the preamble of the UN Charter – it is a great text: to save the world from a new war is the goal of the United Nations, all the anti-Hitler coalition. And we have to unfortunate that the current political leadership in some countries outside of Russia, our partners, as we call them, are moving away from these goals. Either wars will destroy people, or we will destroy wars and cope with uncreated threats.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Anatoly Andreevich. I invite to the platform the Doctor of Economics from Switzerland, Manuel Montes.

MANUEL F. MONTES: — I am honored to speak today on this forum, I am grateful to the University for the invitation to take part in it.

People often use the terms "democracy", "sensible governance" and "rule of law". And I am speaking not against them but against the way they are now being used in the international economy.

These three terms are standard for the economics of the last 30 years, they are used as the basis of economic relations and the condition for receiving outside assistance, particularly in connection with the division between the north and the south, the east and the west. They become an obstacle to the conclusion of international agreements. Developing countries insist that democracy, sensible governance and the rule of law should be considered at the international level, because those who give assistance must understand how they exist. I believe that at this level, these three concepts do not exist at all.

The above three categories depend on the values of different cultures, but they are not quite correctly used, because they do not coincide with the views of a number of western powers. Their use in the West is characterized with the deficiency, as the democracy involves many factors that are not fitted into this concept. In addition, there are double standards: western countries do not always apply those standards performance of which they require at the international level and, therefore, the democracy and the rule of

law, which they have been saying for many years, have not been achieved yet.

We need to discuss why the West uses these three terms not like the other countries.

The community is governed by two basic concepts. In the West, the individual, the individual is seen as the foundation of the community, it is believed that a person should not be oppressed, he should be free in the community. In some countries of the East it is reflected that an individual is the basis of community, at the same time, the exact opposite idea is emphasized that an individual can exist without the community and the community should not be in the service at the individual.

Traditional use of these terms is generally accepted in the capitalist society pursuing profit-taking aims. The role of the individual in different countries may vary depending on which side we look at the problems arising between the society and international organizations.

Here is an example. The International Monetary Fund limits its intervention, depending on the democratic deficit in one country or another. For example, the four largest countries, the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India and China – are now producing 24% of GDP, and the four largest European countries – only 13%. Nevertheless, in the IMF the four major countries of South Africa can get only 3% of votes, and the countries of Western Europe – 17.4%. This situation has been remaining for the last 15 years. In January 2014, it was decided to reform the IMF, but it is unlikely to be realized in the near future.

Thus, the concepts of “democracy”, “sensible governance” and “the rule of law” are not always fairly used and cannot determine the economic relations between the West and the East.

I thank the organizers of this conference, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Academy of Sciences for the fact that they have provided me such a wonderful platform for my dialogue.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Mr. Montes. I give the floor to Mr. Georgios Kasoulides, the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Republic of Cyprus in the Russian Federation.

GEORGIOS KASOULIDES¹: — First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to the organizers of this conference, as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, which invited me to take part in this conference. I want to confess that I came here not to make a speech. But, nevertheless, having listened to speeches, I, as a diplomat and a citizen of the small republic, thought and I can say the following.

Cyprus lies at the crossing of three continents, at the crossing of cultures, there are a huge number of monuments from different civilizations remained there. Cyprus has always been a strategic base, which was sometimes occupied by various states. So, Cyprus has learned to live in the zone of conflicts and be tolerant to different cultures, religions and lifestyles. It was not until the external force invaded and everything was ruined. Over the last 40 years, we have been aware that we are the center of one of the largest “frozen” conflicts. In addition, as a diplomat,

¹ Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cyprus in the Russian Federation.

I have witnessed major historical changes that hardly anyone had to see for his life.

I witnessed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, I was in New York when there were the events of 11 September 2001 and new relations of civilizations were laid. I was in the Middle East, when there was a famous incident with the cartoons. I was in Moscow during the Ukrainian crisis. What have I learned during these crises? Sometimes the situation is tragic, and sometimes even funny. For example, during the second Iranian war, the company “Air France” refused to join the airline alliance. During the second Iraq war, the Americans refused to call French toasts French ones because of the offence at the French, and called them “freedom toast”. I was kicked out of the restaurant when I dared order the French toast. Often understanding of such comic situations takes a long time and looks even hopeless.

I agree with a number of my colleagues: all people want peace, harmony, simple human life. As an example, I can name two communities in Cyprus already separated for 40 years. Ten years ago, there were some changes in geopolitics, and everyone was waiting for the worst. But nothing happened. People returned to normal life and continued to live trying to peace and happiness. Over the last 10 years on the island there has not been a single case of violence recorded. When people are left alone, they will find a way to live together in peace. On the Greek and Turkish parts of Cyprus, people live peacefully side by side.

Several speakers have already said that we need more to respect the spirit but not the letter of international instruments. For the last four years, we can see how these principles can be manipulated in order to manipulate the UN in our own interests, subordinating everything to political expediency than to do something that would prevent an imminent catastrophe. “Frozen conflicts” will not always stay that way, and they can “melt away”. But in order to meet the aspirations of the people, we must understand these simple truths.

For the first time in a long time I have had the opportunity to quietly listen to what people are saying about the Ukrainian crisis. This is the most important event in recent times. What have I realized? Conferences like this, especially now, during a serious international crisis, is very important. And the matter is not in Ukraine at all. After all, there is the Middle East and North Africa. When people, governments do not listen to each other, such conferences give us the opportunity to look to the future and think that this is the only way to keep the world from the madness.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Mr. Kasoulides. I give the floor to professor Vladimir Vasilievich Mironov.

V. V. MIRONOV²: — It is true, when we talk about the dialogue of cultures, we should not forget the most

² Dean of the Faculty of Philosophy, Head of the ontology and epistemology of Lomonosov Moscow State University, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, Honorary Worker of Higher Professional Education of the Russian Federation. An author of scientific publications, including: “Samples of science in modern culture and philosophy”, “Philosophy and the metamorphosis of culture”; “Communication space as a factor of transformation of contemporary culture and philosophy”, “University lectures on metaphysics” (co-author), “Ontology and epistemology” (co-author), “Philosophy: a textbook for high schools” (co-author), “Principles of managerial decision-making in the federal executive bodies (training manual for civil servants)” and others. Chairman of the doctoral dissertation council in philosophy at Lomonosov

important: in any case, the dialogue takes place between local systems, each of which has its own meaning and significance. In essence, they are always in a complex relationship. On the one hand, cultures in this dialogue are always crossed, on the other hand, Y. M. Lotman once said that when cultures are crossed, interest is not in something that is crossed, but in something that is not crossed, because it is a condition of knowledge of other cultures. Therefore, the culture is in a difficult situation, there are a number of dichotomies inside these cultures. Abdusalam Abdulkerimovich told about one of them today, this is dichotomy “us and them”, which can take on different colors. It can delimit cultures from each other, and may contribute to an understanding of cultures of each other. Indeed, cultures are conducting a complex dialogue.

At the moment we are immersing, and this idea has been voiced today, in something united, that is sometimes called the global culture, and I call as global communication space where there is a transformation of local cultures and something new is realized. In fact, all this is not as offended as it seems to be, because the transformation cannot be carried out at the level of abstract cultures, real cultures are involved in it. In the media space that is created in the form of a certain information “bag”, in which cultures are immersed, the country dominates that dominates in the scientific and technical terms. And we know this country very well, we have already discussed it. This means that the media space and its open spaces dictate to this country, starting with behavior stereotypes, familiar smile, familiar behavior when people meet with each other and ending with behavior stereotypes in a more general sense.

Let's consider the legal system, which today is also mentioned about. Gadis Abdullaevich has recently released the work “Anthology of law”, which we discussed in one of the discussions. When the culture is transformed, a situation arises when this transformation is implicitly. That is a certain culture acts as a donor, cultures are “infected” with these viruses. We sometimes talk about Americanization, not because we like or do not like America. Today, we realize that children do not really know who Baba Yaga is, but they know Mickey Mouse.

We do not notice how the culture begins to be transformed from the inside. It is curious that one of the carriers of the virus within the culture is the right. The right, which dominates, is foisted by the country, leading or calling itself as a leader in the up-to-date world, and it starts to affect other systems of the right. As a result, there is a conflict between international and national rights – it is a serious philosophical problem. National legal systems (Anglo-Saxon, Roman, German-Austrian models) always reflect the specifics of their own culture, no matter how it lined up, in any case, it always focuses on the national system, because it is designed for a person, reflects the person's life in this culture. In order to implement this right, the mentality should be taken into account. It is difficult to make the Russian cross the street under the green light, no matter what right is dominant.

Moscow State University in the field of “Ontology and epistemology”, “Logic”, “Philosophy of Science and Technology”. Vice-president of the Russian Philosophical Society. Chief Editor of the journal “Moscow University Bulletin” (Ser. 7. “Philosophy”), a member of the editorial boards of the journals “Problems of Philosophy”, “Bulletin of the Russian Philosophical Society”, “Philosophy of Science”. He was awarded with the order “For Services to the Motherland” of the second and the first degree.

For a long time, the international right has been the actual result of agreements between the subjects of the law. Nevertheless, even in this mild form of community, legal standards and parameters could significantly differ from the legal practice. In particular culture, there was a part which if not dominated but has always been significant that one, which we conventionally call the national part of the legal system. Often, these factors lie at the root of the foundation of law, the justification of which is still one of the most difficult tasks.

Modern models that exist or are constructed in international law are attempts to create (and today this fact has already been mentioned) rights on the basis of the constitution. There is a conflict – how to create a constitutional right. What is it: the result of an abstract model or a set of other models? The answer is simple and sad enough: the model is taken from the country or conglomerate of countries that are declared as a certain civilizational leader. The United States is declared the leader, so when today Europeans are proud to say that they are Europeans, they should realize that some time later they will have to call themselves Americans. In this sense, the American model of right plays, using the already given metaphor, a certain role of cultural virus by modifying legal systems.

The basis for these processes is the formation of a transnational market, which includes all of the country, the world is becoming united. Nevertheless, this does not happen by itself, but as a result of active pressure of leading countries (through cultural, legal stereotypes and others). As a result, positive nature of economic integration is overemphasized, on the basis of which denies the identity of the national priorities of the state, and so on. Moreover, within the framework of this approach, there are winners appeared: those countries who are lucky enough, they have managed to get into the passing train of globalization. And those countries that are not lucky, have either to run after the train, or to adapt to the system. As a result, leading countries cannot understand who has the right to teach other countries, including armed intervention.

Today, at the plenary session, we heard speeches about the law and God, with which I agree. I remember the brilliant work of Kant “Dispute of faculties”. It was not clear why physicians teamed up with philosophers, and lawyers who, had to unite with philosophers, teamed up with theologians. It happened because that it is not clear how to fundamentalize the right. If there is God, then the foundation is in God. But here there is a debate as this foundation holds.

Today, there is a dramatic expansion of legal sources of international law due to the fact that there is a group of civilized nations. This causes serious protests, particularly in Europe. There has recently been a discussion held on the basis of the Constitutional Court. The chairman of the Constitutional Court of Austria harshly criticized the attempt to create the European constitution, and pointed out that it was based on doubts about the democratic decision-making. For example, decisions are taken by the Austrian people, and then it turns out that the international law takes precedence over the decisions that are taken by the Austrian people. What to do? If earlier, the right did not interfere at the individual level, but now a number of standards allow the international law to do so. Such conflicts arise, which are perceived ambiguously, including in Europe, where the

first attempt to create the single Constitution has been taken. This is a serious thing, but it was not realized.

There is a serious problem arising here: the value of philosophy, end-to-end problems of philosophy and law, or what we sometimes call the philosophy of law, is extremely increased. Because without an understanding of the foundation, in which direction it will be developed, and the dialogue of cultures will be changed, too.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Vladimir Vasilievich. I give the floor to the Honorary Doctor of our University, Henry Markovich Reznik.

H. M. REZNIK¹: — Prominent Russian writer Mikhail Mikhailovich Zoschenko once said: “Life is a harsh thing, it is not for intellectuals”. I mention it because I heard here the word “intellectual” which is dear to me. In general, it is difficult to find any words that would have mostly one meaning: positive or negative.

There are, as I think, the elite of intellectuals and scientists present here. Regardless of whether they work at schools or at research institutes, there are people gathering here who, I believe, are committed to core values that are shared by intellectuals, especially scientists – intellectuals, they are committed to the truth, the facts. When does the truth appear in science? When there is a certain subject that can be studied, and, based on research procedures, stated.

There appeared a great journalist Yuri Goligorsky who said that journalists in any situation should clearly delimit messages, information, facts which they establish from comments. So, scholars should do in science: delimit the facts that are amenable to study, honestly claim that these facts exist, when they are sure of it. They should honestly report that some evidence has been found that confirms these facts, but they are not sufficient for categorical confirmations that it is the version only.

Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov was right when he said: “Many things, both in life, politics and in science, depend on the case. We should not believe in any common factors that are mandatory to work the way out”. But in science there is a level called science studies. These are the exact specific facts that are established. There is a level of common factors here. This is a much more complex level for understanding, but especially attractive to try to assess whether there is a common factor in our lives or everything is subjected to chance.

I thought about if any changes happen (I do not want to use the word “progress” because it is estimative) in a certain direction. As for me, they are seen to me as progressive ones, but someone sees on the contrary. What changes have occurred in the life of mankind in the humanitarian sphere?

¹ President of the Chamber of Lawyers of Moscow, professor of chair of legal services in the Moscow State Law Academy named after O. E. Kutafin, candidate of sciences (Law), Honoured Lawyer of Russia. Author of more than 300 publications on the theory of law, criminal law and procedure, criminology, including monographs: ‘The internal belief in the evaluation of evidence’, ‘When liability comes’, ‘The constitutional right to be protected’, ‘Honour. Dignity. Business reputation: disputes involving the media’, etc. A member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. Vice-President of the International Union (Association) of lawyers. Member of the Council on the issues of improving justice under the President of the Russian Federation. He was awarded with the Gold Medal of F. N. Plevako, a sign of public recognition the ‘Symbol of Freedom’ of the Union of Journalists of Russia. Doctor *honoris causa* of SPbUHSS.

Over the last 6–7 centuries there were two trends revealed. The first one is all great personification of the individual, freedom and dignity. Over the last centuries, personality is more exempted from the limitations, certain external rules that would be instructed to it how to behave, from the limitations of power, collective formations. And this process, as we know, is not running smoothly, that we are watching now about the trend of recognition of homosexual marriage in the West. It occurs not in all countries, only in one or two, where same-sex partners are allowed to adopt children. Now, there is a mess around the bearded woman Conchita Wurst. We are talking about the fact that freedom of the individual is becoming a more widely accepted value.

The second trend is the expulsion of violence from the life of states, the political and social life, simply from people’s lives. Violence has gone out of the world of work, respectively, slave labor is now prosecuted under law, despised, and prohibited. Violence has gone out of the scope of justice: it is forbidden to use violence to the suspected and accused (by the way, just 150 years ago). Violence has gone out of the sphere of family, bringing up children. And again, this does not occur smoothly. For example, in Russia now the genetic code begins to be asserted, respectively, it is forbidden to prohibit parents physically punish their child, say, whip him. And recently, it was the norm. At last, the violence is going out of international life. In general, when there is aggression, it is not estimated positively, it is always covered with the need to interrupt the genocide, to protect human rights. In other words, at the level of values that we call the priority of human rights is recognized, I think, around the world. And in general, it is not just vain wishes.

There was the UN Charter, the Declaration of Human Rights (French, 1789), the Declaration of Human Rights, Covenants on Human Rights mentioned at the plenary session. What is most interesting, they were signed by non-democratic countries: the Soviet Union, which was a totalitarian, repressive state at that time, the countries of Asia. That is, at the level of values, it has already been enshrined in the rights which were contained in the international instruments. But there is a discussion about this issue.

Mikhail Mikhailovich Zoschenko was right in something. Life is complicated, contradictory, often paradoxical. Sometimes there are situations in which certain political interests distort the overall picture and do not allow linear, straight going this way, without resorting to time constraints. Moreover, it also happens when the intellectual wants to use the power in his own political interests.

What is happening now? This is Bacchanalia of absolute lies, distortion of the facts that we are watching on our television, and the Ukrainians – on their own. This is paroxysm, hysterics, in which representatives of the journalistic community writhe. What can we, intellectuals, do in this case? There is intolerance. How to describe it? Some say about the invasion, capture, others say about the reunion. I call it neutral: connection with Crimea. One person has used the right for freedom of expression. What started? Look at what is happening now with the imposition of jingoism to us, which is as follows: my country is right because it is mine. I suppose we should not forget the words of Chaadaev: “I have not learned to love his homeland with my eyes closed... I prefer to castigate my homeland, aggrive it... but not to deceive it”.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Henry Markovich. I call to the tribune Juan Antonio Mark, the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom Spain in Russia in 2008-2011.

JUAN A. MARCH: — Alexander Sergeevich, thank you very much for inviting me to speak at this forum and share my observations with young people. As one of our ministers said, we must think about the future, and the future is in the hands of the younger generation, which is present here. I recommend reading the fantastic book of Marcel Proust “In Search of Lost Time” to future generations. It describes the end of the 19th century – the World War I – and what changes take place in 1914. The author writes about that during five years, when there was no war, life expectancy was 40-45 years. The generation that did not know the war, the young Frenchmen, went to the First World War and had to fight, it was just like a party for them where everyone wanted to show his might, and three years later, each of them said that it was a nightmare, a disaster. This historical moment of sense of omnipotence was transformed into a global catastrophe for everyone. I would like us to treat this way to all the speeches that are trying to awaken our heroism.

It is the 21st century now, and it is possible to achieve prosperity for everybody. The difference between the present and the past century is that the intellectual abilities of each person increased, it is a treasure that we should cherish in any situation.

At the conference called “The dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations”, the key question is how to combine the high speed of the global world with different levels of development, the potential of competition. In the global world, competitiveness will be a key indicator. Those, who are able to compete with the others, will come of best. And those, who cannot do it, sink to the bottom quickly. Globalization acts as an intensive of trend of raise or fall. Globalization is like a marathon. We invited everyone to participate in the marathon race. But many of them are old or very young, or not ready. After a while, the old countries lose power and fall, and those, who are younger, are tired quickly. But there are those who think that it is necessary to reorganize and regulate so that everyone can run at the same speed. Unfortunately, this often occurs in reality.

Since ancient times, the European Union is a community with a common culture. But someone decided that it can be organized better so that Europe can work as one community. Reorganization of old Europe was called public architecture. The success of the United States promoted it. Americans created a large country, including 51 states, 300 million people. In Europe, we tried to do the same, the Chairman of the European Commission was appointed, Mr. Europe. But no one thought about how to rule individual states.

What should we do if it is not possible to rule with diversity in a global way? Politicians have to say to a new generation that now is a problematic time, because you need to make efforts. There is no time to relax and rest on the laurels. Opportunities exist for everyone. In addition, there are different traps and snares on the way. You have to live in difficult times where there will be many opportunities, but you can have a huge disappointment. It is also important, in my opinion, to keep the existing European global institutions such as the UN and the WTO, and try to improve

them. Every time when we try to create a less structured organization, it is broken during the first crisis. For example, G7 showed its failure during the crisis, and the G21 cannot be controlled.

For 20 years we have been living in the world where there is a system of checks and balances. At least, we can neutralize what others might do. In the near future, China and the United States will be on two poles. For 20 years China has risen from 200 to 6300 dollars of GDP per capita. But there is also Russia and the European Union. The main challenge on the agenda between Europe and Russia is to try to overcome the small differences that exist between our ancient civilizations, and try to create another new center of power.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much. I give the floor to Vitaly Tovievich Tretyakov, the known Russian journalist.

V. T. TRETYAKOV¹: — My report is called “In any dialogue there is always a winner”. In this regard, and the fact that has been repeatedly sounded in the room, I would like to share a number of doubts about the ability, possibility and necessity of what is called the dialogue in general and the dialogue of cultures in particular. First of all, we have different interpretation of the words “dialogue” and “culture”. As well as there is different interpretation of the words “dialogue” and “culture” made by Merkel, Putin, Obama, Turchinov, Yatsenyuk and Yanukovich. Only in Ukraine, there are many interpretations of the word “dialogue”. It is reported that in Ukraine there has been a national dialogue begun, in particular, P. P. Talochko told about what was happening there. All the formalities are observed. There is a national dialogue, but for the national round table there were not invited those with whom did not disagree. All former presidents of Ukraine, except for Yanukovich, are discussing something with each other.

Today, when I hear the expression “road map”, I realize that there will not be anything good of what the road map is made up. Firstly, there is a Russian, rather bureaucratic phrase “work plan” for a certain period. His replacement on the road map is a special misting or unconscious self-misting. I am afraid that the dialogue of cultures is increasingly, sometimes speculative, and sometimes unintentionally, is interpreted as a recipe for all life occasions.

Firstly, who will eventually win in the dialogue of mass and high culture? Secondly, can the dialogue be conducted between mass and high cultures? Thirdly, do we need this dialogue then? I do not answer questions, but only put a few additional questions to the fact that there has already been shown.

I am going to touch the subject that sounded from this tribune. Do we need such a dialogue of cultures? For

¹ Dean of the High School (Department) of Television of the Lomonosov Moscow State University. Author and presenter of the programme “What is to do?” (“Chto de lat?”) (TV “Culture” (“Kultura”) Channel). Author of a number of journalistic, scientific and educational works, including the following books: Russian Politics and Politicians in Health and Disease: Glimpse of Events of Russian Life, 1990–2000 (Russkaya politika i politiki v norme i patologii: Vzglyad na sobytiya rossiyskoy zhizni 1990–2000), Do We Need Putin After 2008? (Nuzhen li nam Putin posle 2008 goda?), How to Become a Famous Journalist: A Course of Lectures on Theory and Practice of Modern Journalism (Kak stat znamenitym zhurnalistom: kurs lektsiy po teorii i praktike sovremennoy russkoy zhurnalistiki). Laureate of TEFI Award, of the “Golden Pen” award of the Union of Journalists of Russia, he is decorated with the Golden Badge of Honour “Public Acknowledgement”.

example, in the dialogue of natural culture of relations between the sexes, although, there have always been hermaphrodites.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Friendship is winning there.

V. T. TRETYAKOV: — And the gay culture is. Do we need such a dialogue? Who will win finally? Maybe, do we need to weigh and evaluate the result? Maybe, is it not necessary to conduct this dialogue, if the winner is such one? Or something which is even more hermaphroditic than hermaphrodites themselves. I just put the questions.

Or another question: what have advances in medicine been led to? To the fact that today in most civilized part of mankind, I mean Western European countries (in Europe there is less civilized area – before the Urals), traditions are being revived, they are described as medieval horrors. Uncivilized people who lived in the Iron Age, brought old men to the forest not to feed them, and there they were eaten by wolves or they died themselves. We were told that it was bad. Now in this most civilized part of the most civilized part, the most civilized people are holding a discussion on whether to administer euthanasia to an 80-90 year-old man or old woman. This has been possible as a result of medical advances. That is a question of life and death, which with the help of medicine, was tried to postpone as much as possible in favor of life, now has been transformed into a question of whether or not to kill the old man, because he is suffering. Maybe, is it not necessary to have such medical progress? I am just putting questions.

Now they want to use euthanasia on children, too. The decision has already been taken and euthanasia may be used on children who suffer from pain of incurable diseases. But, maybe, then there is no need to go against nature with medical art and stimulate the beginning of life of helpless fetus, so that 14 years later, to take decision about the rescued to kill because he suffer from pain so much.

Recently in St. Petersburg Chingiz Aitmatov, being dead, gathered the conference on the theme of cultures of the world. This was the theme of his journalistic, philosophical works, of many conferences that he held. I made a speech “Culture of war”, where the obvious facts known even to a non – historian, a common man, who read something, studied, showed that, in a strange way, human history was more similar to history of wars, progress was more similar technically to the improvement, firstly, of murder weapons. Until now, the best minds have been working on their development. That is, there is a whole culture of murder, murder weapons ...

I expressed a simple idea of a usual person, that, maybe, history of mankind is history of wars and short intervals between them for the preparation of the next war. If so, there must be another approach. We must fight with it not only with the statements that there is a certain culture of peace, which is quite common spread and it is generally characteristic of the man, and two or three politicians do not infringe it. Chingiz Torekulovich thought about it, he liked my speech. Anyway, it looked like a kind of dissent against the background of what the rest talked about.

I suggest all present to think once again on the fact whether all cultures need to be discussed, whether all of them deserve to be joined the discussion with.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Vitaly Tovievich. I give the floor to Professor Andrei Vadimovich Smirnov.

A. V. SMIRNOV: — We have heard a lot of reports: brilliant fireworks. But that’s what I think: is it a dialogue or a series of monologues? The question is rhetorical, because the answer is obvious: a series of monologues. And let’s imagine that every person is a culture. It is not difficult to do, because each of us is the world. When a person dies, the whole world dies, too. Colleagues, we are now standing on the same rostrum before the same audience. Even the reason for our speeches is the same. Is it easy for us to turn a series of our monologues into the dialogue? If we approach this issue from that point of view that was justified by academician Huseynov: “us – them”, so, the speech of each is “his” monologue, but are the other monologues “their” or “our”? What does it mean? I think that the step forward can be done, if we understand what is different between the dialogue and the two monologues. People who talk to each other, or mass media empire, for example, Russian, Ukrainian, Western, talk to each other. Is it a dialogue or a few monologues that are spread in the same space, around the same axis? What is the difference one from another? The question is, on the one hand, theoretical, on the other hand, it is directly related to what we talked about. If this is not a dialogue, but a number of monologues, which different people or cultural communities have at the same time, so, such monologues easily grow, first in the war of words, and then in a military confrontation. And the distance from the “dialogue” to military action is very short.

What is the difference between a true dialogue and the two monologues on the same topic? In my opinion, there is the only one difference. In the current dialogue, each party understands what the other is saying. Without pretending and not trying to defeat the other, although, it would like to confirm “its truth”, but, above all, it is trying to understand. How to achieve this? If we pay attention to the second part of the word “dialogue”, which is conformable to the word “logic”, then, perhaps, we will somehow get closer to the answer. A dialogue can be true, when we evaluate the words of the speaker not through the prism of our world view but understand his logic, realize the justification for his statements. When it comes to cultures, a dialogue involves understanding the logic of another culture. Today we often utter the word “dialogue”, “the dialogue of cultures”. But are there another cultures present in it after the dialogue? Abdusalam Abdulkерimovich raised the question: how can that aspect be found that would allow looking at other cultures not like at “foreign” ones but like “the same cultures”? This point of view will be the point of view of the logic of culture. If we try to understand the structure of the logic of different cultures, you realize that a different culture is a “culture, too”. It is not ours, not “own” for us, but not an “alien” one that is not rejected. In this field, there will be a lot of work. First of all, philosophers will have to work hard, because the belief in the universality of logic, in the uniqueness of rationality is a long-standing philosophical belief. Perhaps, colleagues will want to argue with me because of this belief. But it has already been put in doubt and rejected for many times by the philosophers and logicians in the 20th

century. The possibility of plurality of logics can be considered as proved.

There are many of my colleagues – arabists among those present, so I would like to appeal to the arsenal of bright, rich Arabic culture. In the 13th century in the Arab world lived an outstanding scholar Ibn Arabi, he is still recognized in the Islamic world as the greatest thinker representing Sufism, that is Islamic mysticism. Its title is the Greatest Sufi sheikh. He made a number of theses, which can be taken as a motto for forums like ours. Ibn Arabi offered the following formula: any religion is true, but only if it does not deny the validity of any other religion. Think about it: the recognition of the truth of any other religion is a condition for the truth of your own one, so it is impossible to put in doubt no other religion without making your own false. This formula rests on the solid foundation of Ibn Arabi's teachings, which, of course, cannot be developed here. Let us apply this formula to the culture: any logic of the culture is true, but only as long as it does not deny the truth and legality of logics of other cultures. This approach will provide a state where a different culture, without losing its identity, will not be perceived as a foreign or alien one, but as a necessary condition of my own culture. Thank you very much.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much. Now I give the floor to the professor, Grigory Borisovich Kleiner.

G. B. KLEINER¹: — Thank you very much, Alexander Sergeevich. Dear colleagues, what is the attractive feature of our conference? Why do we want to come here? Probably, because here we are looking for answers that cannot be found within individual disciplines on the economic issues that do not have the answers within the economy; political ones which cannot be answered by political science, and cultural ones which do not have an answer within cultural studies. The combination of these three areas – economics, politics and culture, it seems to me, is the face of our conference. I would like to combine it with what is happening today. Lenin wrote that politics was a concentrated expression of economics. Looking at what is happening in the economical world today, particularly, known sanctions, we can see that the economics, on the contrary, is an expression of politics, and politics sometimes is in conflict with economical interests.

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But the worst thing is that there is a certain consolidation of economics and politics. As different features, combined in a manner not once mentioned today by Conchitta Wurst, a consolidation of economics and politics seems to be a negative thing of today's world. These are independent areas, they need to be developed according to their own laws and exist not like parts of the surface of the Möbius strip, where one flows into the other, but like two separate, though related, fields. But who can provide a balance between them, independence under connectedness? We are looking for the answer in the third area, which is included in our configuration – in culture. Of course, the features of national or other cultures can play a differentiating role, and sometimes lead to unpleasant consequences in the form of military conflicts. But still, it seems to me, the main importance of culture in the sense in which it was understood by Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov, is combination that does not allow politicians and economists to take decisions against the interests of the person. This is the main role of culture in the modern world, especially in view of what is happening beyond the borders of our country, and within it. It is today the culture has a special task. I think that our conference is to try to solve these problems and realize the historical, dare I say it, the mission of culture.

Four names, in my opinion, are the basis of the compound of the economics, politics and culture. Adam Smith actually introduced the concept of an economical man and represented the combination between the interests of a man and society in the form of an invisible hand of the market. It is economics, based on the business projects of the individual, which, being realized, lead to an increase in the welfare of society. The second one on this way is Thorstein Veblen, who spoke about an evolving man. The basis of his theory is process understanding of economics. The third man, who proposed new understanding of the world, is academician Vernadsky, who took the world on a cosmic scale, where the technosphere, the biosphere, sociosphere and so on are merged into a single noosphere. Finally, the fourth name, which, as it seems to me, in a sense, crowns this pyramid, although, these cycles and these concepts will be repeated. So, the fourth one is Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov. If a person from the Vernadsky's concept is the closest to, as I think, a religious man, for whom the main thing is not to win the competition, but the communication with the whole world, including embodied in the relationship with God, then, in contrast of it, the Likhachov's person is real, earth, integrating not only the European but Asian civilization, not only economics and politics, but also all the sides on earth life. That's the kind of person that integrates culture, economics and politics, should be the object of our study. Long live the Likhachov's person. Thank you for your attention.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much. Professor Jean Terentievich Toshchenko.

J. T. TOSHCHENKO²: — First of all, I would like to draw colleagues' attention to the fact that the theme of our

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conference implies not only the dialogue between peoples and social groups. It is also a dialogue between the past and the present, and to a certain extent, the future. It is a misunderstanding, unwillingness to respect, consider and upgrade the culture formed in the previous stage, and compare it with the present, is often a source of confrontation and conflicts.

There is the second point. Most colleagues, who have spoken here, have spoken mainly about the problems of spiritual culture. But a physical, economic culture – the culture of production, labor plays a huge role in our lives. One of my old friends, the director of the aircraft manufacturing plant, which is now being rebuilt, is trying to solve a very complex problem. There are finances, there is the material base and the other necessary components, except for one thing: there is no relevant personnel. Engineers and highly skilled workers either changed their profession or retired or even died. And he is at a loss: “Who is going to solve the tasks?”

My colleagues and I have recently completed a unique study on the economical consciousness and behavior. We compared the last years of the Soviet power and the years of 2012–2013. In contrast to the relatively monolithic view to socialist economics in the Soviet times, today the opinions are strongly differentiated. There are ideas presented, mutually exclusive, and each one has supporters, proving his right to exist. These ideas are largely the cause of political battles. In particular, the question has been asked: “How do you assess Russia’s economical reforms? Is it the right direction of the development of the country?” Approximately, 40% said “yes”, another 40% – “no”, 20% were undecided. Is it possible to announce in this situation that one of them is wrong? I think that both of them can cause a lot of arguments in support of their point of view. Therefore, it is necessary to consider these questions in a somewhat different sense.

I do not quite agree with the respected professor Reznick, who said that violence in society is being reduced. I believe (and our data confirm it) that violence is not going away, it just takes more subtle forms, including in the world

Social Planning in the USSR (Sotsialnoye planirovaniye v SSSR), *Social Projecting* (Sotsialnoye proektirovaniye), *Paradoxical Man* (Paradoksalny chelovek), *Three Distinctive Faces of Power* (Tri osobennykh lika vlasti), *Ethnocracy: History and Modernity* (Sociological essays) (Etnokratiya: istoriya i sovremennost (sotsiologicheskiye ocherki), *Sociology of Labour: Attempt at New Understanding* (Sotsiologiya truda: opyt novogo pochteniya), *Theocracy: Phantom or Reality?* (Teokratiya: fantom ili realnost?), *Centaur-Problem* (Attempt of Philosophical and Sociological Analysis) (Kentavr-problema (opyt filosofskogo i sotsiologicheskogo analiza)) and others, as well as the course books *Sociology* (Sotsiologiya), *Sociology of Labour* (Sotsiologiya truda), *Sociology of Management* (Sotsiologiya upravleniya), *Political Sociology* (Politicheskaya sotsiologiya). Editor and member of the team of authors of the thematic reference dictionary *Thesaurus of Sociology* (Tezaurus sotsiologii), of the biobibliographical dictionary *Sociologists of Russia and of the CIS member countries* (Sotsiologi Rossii i stran SNG). He was the editor of 14 editions that were devoted to studying the issues of intelligentsia in modern Russia, among which are: ‘Intelligentsia and Power’ (‘Intelligentsiya i vlast’), ‘Intelligentsia in the World of Modern Communications’ (‘Intelligentsiya v mire sovremennykh kommunikatsiy’), ‘Intelligentsia in the Ethnoconfessional World’ (‘Intelligentsiya v etnokontsionalnom mire’), ‘Old and New Intelligentsia: Common and Special Features’ (‘Staraya’ i ‘novaya’ intelligentsiya: obscheye i osobennoye’) and others.

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of work. At least, our study showed that people are afraid of unemployment much more significantly than ever. Salaries and the general situation at the enterprises leave much to be desired. To the question: “If you become to work better, will your work be stimulated?” answers have almost been unchanged compared to the Soviet period. Only one parameter has noticeably been changed: now people have more free in choice and have more possibility to purchase a variety of products. In this regard, there is a question: Was it necessary to subject the country to such shocks as a result of this, to be limited with one positive change – the availability of goods on sale?

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Jean Terentievich. Professor Victor Fyodorovich Petrenko.

V. F. PETRENKO¹: — I am going to touch some psychological aspects of the dialogue of cultures. Everyone knows the sayings of Martin Heidegger: “The language is the house of being” and Ludwig Wittgenstein: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world”. Whole semantic areas drop out of consciousness, if some meaning is blocked. That is, the language is a means of building the world. In this regard, I would like to emphasize one of the basic contradictions. When we talk about the victory in the dialogue, we mean that there is one concrete truth – an objective reality. However, this is an outdated view: there is an objective reality, and we approach it all the time in our knowledge, get some hard facts in the experiments, interpret them, and so on. However, Einstein pointed out that there were no facts outside the theory. Depending on the theory, the language, constructs created by us, we emphasize certain parts of the world and are able to perceive them. Thus, different languages are nothing more than hypothesis (let’s remember the theory of linguistic relativity of Sapir-Whorf), different models of the world. They have varying degrees of truth, or it should be recognized that the truth is plural.

In fact, the truth is quite an archaic concept. A man builds models of the world in his mind, which can be varying degrees of completeness, heuristic, even beauty and ethics. This is clearly seen, for example, in quantum physics.

Therefore, the dialogue of cultures does not provide for the victory of any of the participants of the communication. It is focused on understanding the different position, which can also be exciting, adequate and heuristic. Buddhists say that denying of the great truth is also the great truth. I agree with my colleague Smirnov, who wrote remarkable works on Arabic, Buddhist and other logics. Different languages can construct several different models of the world and different cultures can engage in dialogue, cooperation, and other competitive relationships. Carl von Clausewitz once said, the country, which is unable to feed its own army, will feed the other one. Also, the country, which does not cultivate its humanitarian institutions, will disappear dissolving

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into other cultures. And today's reduction of humanitarian institutions, the possible closure of the Institute of Art, taking facilities from the Roerich's Centre, the Institute of Philosophy, speak about narrowing of the humanitarian component of our science and knowledge.

In psychology, we often use the reconstruction of the image of the world of other person or other social, ethnic, cultural and religious groups. This is so-called psychosemantics associated with the construction of multi-dimensional semantic spaces, where along the axes of these spaces as the basic categories there are categories of consciousness that we identify as characteristic for representatives of this culture, and objects are defined as coordinates of a point inside this semantic space. For example, we conducted studies of political parties beginning since 1989, when it became possible. One of the interesting results was the increase in cognitive complexity, dimension of these semantic spaces, complexity of political consciousness. We can build such semantic spaces in a variety of areas – religion, art. Consciousness of each individual is heterogeneous. A person can be cognitively difficult in football or politics, but cognitively simple in perception of abstract painting.

In terms of a dialogue, a question of a single history textbook that considered by academician Chubarian is interesting. In principle, the confirmation of a clear position leads to the formation of “one-dimensional” person who is able to perceive the world only with one position. But let us recall the theory of the polyphonic novel of Dostoevsky developed by Bakhtin. In one text, there are speeches from the position of Dmitry Karamazov, Fyodor Karamazov, Alyosha Karamazov, the Grand Inquisitor, and so on. So, multi-dimensionality is present in the same text.

And at last. Many psychological techniques teach people to rise to positions of others. Jung has a beautiful image: a human consciousness is as a mangrove grove. On the surface we see a lot of trees, but in the ground they grow together with roots. There is empathy, compassion, cooperation at the level of unconscious. And there are many techniques, such as contemplation in meditation or psycho training that allow a person to eliminate the subject-object opposition underlying in performance of “us – them”, and learn to empathize with other people and cultures, including at the level of unconscious. In my opinion, one of the most important tasks at the moment is the introduction in the popular culture such work practices with unconscious, which are set to a mutual understanding and empathy, and a sense of understanding of the other person. Thank you very much.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much, Viktor Fyodorovich. The plenary session is being concluded by professor Nikolai Andreevich Khrenov. Please, come on.

N. A. KHRENOV¹: — In my speech, I would like to continue the theme begun by professor Churov and taken

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up by academician Huseynov: the theme of war. In fact, the philosophy has never avoided it. I recall you that when a century ago the First World War began, many philosophers spoke about this issue many times. Alfred Weber wrote that in the early twentieth century, the world was close to unity more than ever. But the disaster occurred. Intensive processes of globalization today are stimulating the question of finding the unity of humanity, but the danger of war is still remaining. It is said that World War II is the second act of the First One. Yes, it is very difficult to imagine the twentieth century without these two wars. Perhaps, that is why, the humanities have given birth to the concept of a dialogue as a means of survival, including between civilizations. It so happened that after the philosophical and scientific revolution of the 18th century – the emergence of the spirit of modernity – there was a chain reaction of revolutions. The 19th century was the century of revolutions and the 20th century was the century of bloody world wars. Were they the result of revolutions and the spirit of modernity? The world has become impatient, and the logic of evolution seemed to be hopelessly outdated. Over time, the negative side of modernity has become to be understood. Social update with the help of revolutions was the result in the destruction of culture.

The crisis of perception of the world of modernity should be monitored not from the appearance of the famous book of M. Horkheimer and Adorno “Dialectics of Education” in 1947, when the downside of modernity was first realized. Perhaps, the collapse of modernity occurred precisely during the Second World War. At the same time there were illusions of Russians buried, the expression of which, as a consequence of modernity, was the revolution of 1917. It seems that the war demonstrates the denial of any dialogue. It cancels the dialogue. It transfers dialogical relations between nations into the opposition of forces. The force becomes crucial. Professor Tolochko told about it here. Who has more power, he is able to impose a monologue, subdue and suppress other nation, make the defeated be dependent, deny himself, stop being himself. It can reach barbarous forms when only an enemy can be seen in an opponent that must be killed.

Till the 20th century, when the technology of conduct of a war did not have time to reach such heights, yet, there was the possibility to see the equal for himself in the enemy. Meanwhile, it is known from history that the outstanding military leaders often paid tribute to the courage and military prowess of their opponents. Echoes of this tradition, albeit in a highly deformed form are observed in the 20th century. Even Hitler once could, leaving unflattering characteristics of Churchill and Roosevelt, give positive characteristics to Stalin. In his essays on the psychology of war, Berdyaev wrote: “It is more moral to take responsibility for the evil of war, but not to put all of it on the other. It is too

Images of the Great Gap. Cinema in the Context of Cultural Cycles Succession (Obrazy velikogo razryva. Kino v kontekste smeny kul'turnykh tsiklov); *Socio-Psychological Aspects of Interaction between Art and Audience* (Sotsial'no-psikhologicheskie aspekty vzaimodejstvija iskusstva i publiky); *Audience in the History of Culture. The Phenomenon of Audience in the Context of Mass Psychology* (Publika v istoriji kul'tury. Fenomen publiky v raketse psikhologii mass); *Social Psychology of Art: The Age of Transition* (Sotsial'naja psikhologija iskusstva: perekhodnaja epokha) and some others. Professor Khrenov is Chairman of the Commission for Interdisciplinary Study of Artistic Activity under the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences ‘History of World Culture’, member of the Union of Filmmakers of Russia, Member of the Union of Theatre Figures of Russia.

moral and wrong to consider yourself better than the other, but to see the villain in the other and on this basis to justify your fight with him. In a duel, there must be some respect for the opponent with whom you could not live together in the world. It should be so in the fight of the peoples”.

The image of the war as a competition is used in the literature. We find it at both Tolstoy and Grossman, who described the feelings of Stalin after the Battle of Stalingrad. As long as the perception of the enemy as equal, in the element of war there are elements of a game in a high philosophical sense, and, also, culture. With regard to inter-state conflicts, from this tribune, today there has been criticism of their solution with a position of strength. However, professor Gromyko, in his report, tried to rehabilitate the force. However, it is important that he means clever and even wise force under this word: not to use, for any reason, tanks and missiles, but first to have a strong army as to ensure peace in own country, and, if necessary, to protect friendly and people needed in help. Actually, the modern American empire works this way. So, not to frighten with tanks and missiles, but let them out only in critical situations, when it is impossible to do without them anymore, and all other means have been exhausted.

And yet, as we talk about culture, to the fore here comes not strength, but, as it may seem strange, gaming instinct. Look how gloomy and cruel thing took place in Ukraine – killing people in Odessa. They were cut into pieces when they, escaping from suffocating feeling, jumped down from upper floors. Bacchanalia of cruelty! It is not a computer game. Apparently, young drugged cutthroats confused living people with figures on the screen. Perhaps, this is a consequence of craze of computer games. McLuhan also warned that new powerful technologies have the same effect as the explosion of an atomic bomb. When he published his book, this idea was hard to understand. Yes, there was a release of barbarism. Of course, before the tragedy that had taken place in Odessa, it was still possible to doubt whether it was fascism. It could have thought that the propaganda was overdone. But Odessa insisted on this opinion. And fascism was here and there. Divergence is only in scales. But the great always starts the small. And everything was started with a noble indignation of the people through the rotten corrupt state.

In general, the roots of the war lie in peace time, in the pursuit of wealth. Paradoxicalist Dostoevsky said about it very well. I am sure that only when the war saves its game start, it is possible to ascertain the presence both culture and a dialogue. Adjustment for the total destruction of the enemy returns to prehistory. This splash has occurred in Ukraine. In the early twentieth century, Russian philosophers following after Friedrich Nietzsche’s forecasts (he predicted, “there will be wars, which have not still been on the earth”) will write about the future return to barbarism. They do not have the experience of the First World War yet. It seems that true decline into barbarism is wars of the twentieth century. And, yet, it is impossible to take the courage to prove that World War II was the way out beyond the limits of axial time and ejection of barbarism, at least, from the part of a Russian person, Russian soldier. But, Leo Tolstoy offered us to look at the war from the point of view of an ordinary soldier. Everyone knows the discussion not ceasing till now: who played a crucial role in achieving victory in the Second World War? Many people, then, and some-

one now call Stalin, recalling an episode from the movie M. Chiaureli “The Fall of Berlin”, in which the generalissimo gets off the plane arrived from Moscow to Berlin in a white uniform coat. But it seems that today no one doubts that the winner is, above all, the nation, the Russian nation. This conclusion cannot be debated.

And, yet, I believe that in this case, such an important factor, as a culture is forgotten about. As for the nation, it is, of course, also the creator and guardian of culture. When we have to talk about the culture in connection with the war, this question is usually reduced to destruction during armed clashes of culture monuments. Thus, during the First World War, Chartres Cathedral was destroyed. But the problem to the relation of the war and culture is not finished with the theme of destruction of historical monuments. It is amazing: the culture is such a light substance that is difficult to finally determine. Its essence escapes. In our country, there has been even the whole science to clarify this issue. It seems still not be clarified, and, perhaps, for this reason that since some time there has been victimization for it. It is in vain. We are always in a hurry. We cannot wait. Meanwhile, the definition of culture and its purpose appear clear only in extreme situations, such as the war, in particular. The purpose of culture is precisely that people survive in extreme situations.

The Second World War was an experience of Russian culture, even more than the First One. An experience to strength. I have already noted that the theme of “War and Culture” has become urgent since the beginning of the First World War. In 1914, I. Sytin even published a series of publications under this title in which there were such thinkers as E. Troubetzkoy, N. Berdyaev, I. Ilyin, S. Bulgakov, V. Ern and others published.

Still, the war does not exclude the dialogue, as it does not exclude the culture. It makes the dialogue difficult only in a short period of time. After all, the dialogue between civilizations does not occur in short periods of time. The Second World War is a moment in history, if we understand it as history of civilizations. The dialogue has been developed over the centuries, in a large historical time, and above all, on the level of mentalities. I want to stop on the mental factor. Each civilization has its own mentality. As the German historian Troeltsch said that it was a very light substance. The carrier of one mentality is hard to understand another one. Civilizations never fully understand each other. Today, we feel it like never before. In the case of Ukraine, there is a lack of understanding from the part of the West. A monologue is imposed to us. But the dialogue must still be maintained. During historical times it is permanent.

It is curious that the way out beyond the dialogue can be foreseen. Indeed, the fact that, for example, occurred in the twentieth century with Russia and Germany, there was predicted in the nineteenth century. Return to barbarism in the twentieth century was predicted by not only Nietzsche. Thus, M. Bakunin gave a more specific forecast: the inevitable clash between Russia and Germany. He proceeded from different types of mentality. Moreover, from the mentality of those peoples who could pretend to leadership in the world history. We must not forget that M. Bakunin made his prediction in a situation of ascension of Germany. When you read “Speeches to the German Nation” by Fichte (and they are a vivid document of the ideas of modernity), one can see that there is not only Russian, but also

the German idea. Based on the program of re-creation of humanity proclaimed with modernity, Fichte saw that vanguard in the Germans with which this rebuilding will be started. Purpose of the human race, according to Fichte, is that the nation should do itself by what originally it is. Such self-creation should begin initially in any particular nation. Of course, as a philosopher is convinced, it starts with the Germans, but then it should be extended to all mankind. So, the fates of mankind were put in dependence on the Germans. The imperial foundation was remained to be brought under this idea.

We have left far away from this historical situation. Today, other countries are already claiming the role of the vanguard in the world history. But it is instructive what happened in that time in Germany. When that very ordinary man, a man of mass who is described by Ortega y Gasset, the idea of Fichte had a different interpretation. For example, in the work "German Culture and War" historian A. Dzhivelegov touching appearance of the First World War, wrote: "He (the German. – N. K.), taught humbly bearing everything, made to feel his own strength; he became arrogant. He, accustomed to constantly suffer from reproach, was made the winner. He, recently worshipping the culture of France, was brought in a triumph through a defeated country: he was filled with the faith in the German genius and the German star". Psychology of fascist was matured, it had only to appear. It was institutionalized, the imperial foundation was put under it, and it was fully manifested in the clash with the Slavic world in the two world wars. There was a problem of "us" and "them" formulated today on this tribune by academician Huseynov. As part of the leadership, Russia and Germany turned out to be antagonists, according to M. Bakunin. Russia is associated with anarchy, the desire for freedom, and Germany seems a bastion of conservative attitudes, that is not altogether untrue. As M. Bakunin proved, only determined non-state Slavic people can be an antagonist of Germany. In contrast to the Germans, the aggressive nation, the Slavs are mostly peaceful farmers. Warlike spirit is alien to them as well as the spirit of nationhood, carriers of which, in his opinion, the Slavs cannot be. If the first pulse of the Germans is to strengthen statehood in their own country and distribute state imperative throughout the West, the Slavs inherent rejection of the state and the pursuit of free-communal peasant world. In the Slavic mentality there is the desire for total freedom and human brotherhood on the ruins of all existing states. I would like to emphasize this Bakunin's thought. He noted one very important feature of the Russian mentality – the desire for common human brotherhood.

What is this feature? At what time was it formed? Is it essential for only Russian or for even some other nations? Answers to these questions are no longer satisfied with mentality. It is a question of culture. Mentality is a psychological aspect of culture. M. Bakunin drew attention to one feature of an entire cultural tradition. It certainly has a place, but does not exhaust the entire tradition. When we try to comprehend this tradition, then we realize the unilateral withdrawal of M. Bakunin. Identification of this tradition suggests that fraternal feeling involves not only anti-state settings, but also the state imperative. And it is not so much the western but Byzantine tradition. It seems that A. Toynbee perceptively captures the activity of the Byzantine tradition in Russia, not only in the Mid-

dle Ages. He sees it even in settings of Russian Marxism. The fact that Russian in the Middle Ages called themselves the Third Rome, picking up the baton from the Byzantine Empire, is known to everybody. But this fact is hardly to be comprehended till the end – for the reason that mentality in its civilized manifestation has not been the object of attention for a long time. Full understanding of the mental complex of the Russian arose in the Middle Ages, it turns out to be uncomfortable in the present situation. After all, this does not correspond to liberal imperatives. It can lead to keen relations between Russia and the West in the period of active assimilation of liberal values in Russia. It is inconvenient now and it has been inconvenient throughout the twentieth century, although, the Russian really wanted to overcome it, as evidenced by the age of thaw and the Gorbachev's reforms. Maybe, it determines that misunderstanding of Russia by the West, which we now feel in the history of Ukraine. It may seem that in this case we are talking about dissimilarity not between cultures but between states. But the fact is that the political culture is a particular manifestation of the general culture.

Stating the imperial beginning, we have in mind the culture, too. Taking the baton from Byzantium, erecting the Third Rome, Russian voluntarily, according to the logic of this baton, took responsibility for the fate of other nations: it is no matter whether they needed it or not. Such is the logic caught by the Russian baton. This responsibility required enormous efforts and, of course, self-discipline, concentration of all spiritual and physical forces, as well as, that is sadly, restrictions of freedom. Later, this led to the fact that the values of liberalization, no matter how tempting they might be, were unable to develop. Perhaps, it is this restriction of freedom can explain the fact that the Russian, contrary to the assertion of M. Bakunin, were able to build a strong state, or rather, one of the most powerful empires of the world, although it would seem, voluntarily taken psychological burden of the Russian does not correspond to that. But such was the logic of history regardless of any ideas. Maybe, that is because such statehood in its Byzantine form, which was expressed by Stalin, unraveling the second part of Russian mentality, was erected, the Russian were able to defend themselves and to survive during World War II. In any case, there is such a point of view expressed in the literature, despite the criticism of Stalin. As evidenced by A. Solzhenitsyn, Stalin realized that during the war the people accomplished feats in order not to defend the Bolshevik ideology and the ideas of communism. People save lives, their history and culture. Therefore, film images of heroic ancestors began to appear in literature. History has been rehabilitated. In the people's mind there was the heroic myth revived, without which there is no patriotism. The myth is as a component of culture. The myth, in which the present has not been separated from the heroic past. So, the war was transformed into a sacred ritual. And this determines a lot.

But let's back to the Byzantine tradition. Since Rome was the second empire, that is the fate of the Russian: Russia should be an empire, too. It seemed that such a stronghold guaranteed the realization of the problem – the responsibility for fates of the world. This is the messianism. It cannot be denied. Empire was seen as a pledge of strength and stability not only of the Russian universe, but also of the entire universe. In this case, the culture and the power are

the power of the wise! And they have been combined. So is the mental formula of Russian culture.

Thus, there is a protean beginning in the Russian mentality. Depending on historical circumstances, this mentality is able to be developed in different ways: as an attempt to destroy the state, and as the need to strengthen it. This is a feature of the Russian civilization formed in this civilized culture. This feature does not have an adequate understanding of, and it is absolutely not perceived as a cultural feature. This is not surprising. The wars of the twentieth century are conceptualized exclusively within the boundaries of political history, but not within the boundaries of the history of civilizations, taking place within large periods. Meanwhile, only a comparison of events, occurring at different times, reveals the timeless, repetitive mental features. In this case, the history of culture is not some sort of special, separate from the history of the state. The history of the state is private cultural history, its development, so that it cannot be brought together to the settings of only ruling elite. Responsibility, having fallen on the shoulders of the Russian, is not only implemented by the ruling elite, but also accepted voluntarily by everybody. It allows suggesting that for the Russian mentality such responsibility becomes significant.

Taking on their shoulders the responsibility for the fate of not only their country but also around the world, could the Russian always carry it out in the real history? Sometimes it works, but it does not work more often. Nevertheless, in Russian history, in people's mind only those events are significant that support this idea of responsibility for the fate of the entire world. For Russian people, the Second World War was a highly exceptional event, having mental, cultural, and planetary sense. This event goes beyond the secularized history, being perceived in the sacred aura. Therefore, the art is constantly drawn to it, more and more turning into entertainment during our time.

The Second World War did not confirm the idea of M. Bakunin about anarchism and anti – statehood of the Russian. The Second World War is not collision of anarchist – people with statist – people. The fact of the matter is that in an emergency situation Russian people demonstrated themselves as statists no less than the Germans.

There are a few words about the continuation of the dialogue that threaten to escalate into a war between civilizations in our own time. In case of Ukraine, we are convinced that, with the desire of Russia to keep a dialogue with the West, a real problem of misunderstanding is still remaining. The idea of modernity learnt by the West during the age of Enlightenment is still playing a crucial role in the misunderstanding and differences in the assessment of events. Modernism, as you know, is based on the ideas of reason, the need to destroy seemingly outdated states and bring them into line with the attitudes of mind. Mind in the West is liberal and market. The importance of culture for the life of the community began to be realized too late. Meaning of culture in the age of Enlightenment, that is modernism, has just started to be opened by individual thinkers like Herder. Modernism is based on the mind, but not on the culture.

Today, America is the most consistent conductor of ideas of the 18th century. This is not surprising. There is no history at this country, there is no centuries-old culture, so it is lightly focused on the destruction of the states with the help of “orange revolution”. The problem, however, is only in the fact that, culture is being destroyed together with the state tradition. Therefore, instead of mind and the order after such revolutions in countries with centuries-old culture there is no triumph of mind, but there is chaos and bloodshed. We can see all this today. Meaning of the Second World War in history, understood as the history of civilizations and permanent dialogue between them, is in the fact that it has demonstrated the activity of culture. A significant role in it is played with not only the technological factor. It is important to keep in mind the ability of culture to stimulate that tradition, which seemed to have time to go into the past, and to survive in extreme situations. Here are the lessons which are taught by the history of world wars in the twentieth century.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you very much. Dear colleagues, tomorrow the work of our forum is going to continue in the sections. I am inviting everyone to take active part in it.

Round Table

THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS: THE MAKING OF GLOBAL CULTURE

May 16, 2014
Conference room of the hotel "Radisson SAS"

SHAIRPERSONS:

- G. M. Gatilov *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*
- Miguel A. Moratinos *Minister of Foreign Affairs the Kingdom of Spain (2004–2010), Honorary Doctor of St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences*
- V. V. Naumkin *Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor*
- A. O. Chubarian *Director of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*

SPEAKERS:

- F. A. Asadullin *Deputy Chairman of the European Russian Spiritual Governance for Muslims, leading researcher of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Candidate of Science (Philology)*
- V. A. Chereshnev *Chairman of the Committee of the State Duma of the Russian Federation on Science and High Technology, Director of the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the RAS, Doctor of Medical Science, Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*
- Yu. S. Goligorsky *Freelance journalist and film producer (UK)*
- A. A. Gromyko *Professor Faculty of World Politics at the Lomonosov Moscow State University, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History)*
- P. O. Il'insky *Biologist, poet, writer, lecturer at Boston University (USA)*
- G. Kasoulides *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of Cyprus in the Russian Federation*
- E. V. Kharitonova *Senior researcher at the Institute of African Studies of the RAS, Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor*
- F. T. Mamedov *Professor of the Department of History in the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Dr. Sc. (History)*
- V. K. Mamontov *Journalist, Director General of the "Govorit Moskva" (Moscow Speaking) radio broadcasting station, President of the editorial office of the Izvestia (News) newspaper*
- Juan Antonio March *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Spain in the Russian Federation (2008–2011)*
- Manuel F. Montes *Senior Advisor on Finance and Development, The South Centre (Geneva, Switzerland), Doctor of Economics*
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Shlomo Weber	<i>Scientific director of the Laboratory for Studies of Social Relations and Diverse Society at the Russian Economic School, Professor of Economics at Southern Methodist University (Dallas, USA), Ph.D. (Mathematical Economics)</i>
Jerzy J. Wiatr	<i>Minister of National Education of Poland (1996–1997), deputy to the Polish Parliament (Sejm) (1991–2001), Dr. Sc. (Sociology), Professor</i>
A. S. Zapesotsky	<i>President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation, Artist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i>
Zhang Yiwu	<i>Professor in the Department of Chinese Literature of Peking University (China)</i>

G. M. GATILOV: — Dear colleagues, we are here today to continue our discussion of the issues, which we began yesterday during the Plenary Meeting, where we made a good foundation for today's dialogue. Yesterday you told a lot of interesting ideas, suggestions, opinions as to how we will continue to hold the dialogue of cultures and civilizations. It is especially important during such a critical time for the development of global processes. Before we start our discussion on the topic, I would like to give the floor to Alexander Zapesotsky.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear friends, I would like to welcome you once again on behalf of the Organizing Committee of Readings and wish you success in the work, and, also, thank you for that you have gathered together here. I hope that our collaboration will further strengthen the dialogue of cultures. Thank you very much.

G. M. GATILOV: — After parting words of Alexander Sergeevich, I think we can set to practice work. In the course of our discussion I would like to hear some specific proposals and suggestions regarding the further development of the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations. I think that the term "the making of global culture" in the scope of partnership of civilizations should be understood some general categories common to most cultural and civilizational traditions.

Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov spoke about culture as a certain integral phenomenon, sacred field or special space with inherent integral elements: science, education and religion, ethical and moral norms of human behavior. Such a holistic vision contributes to greater harmony, building relationships and balanced interaction between all partici-

pants in the dialogue of cultures, which is based on principles of justice, ethics and morality. Of course, attitude of the parties to the dialogue is crucial. We told a lot about this yesterday during the plenary meeting.

We discussed that the dialogue of cultures and the partnership of civilizations are directly related to those political processes that are taking place in modern society. Therefore, it is important to listen to each other, understand each other's positions and make necessary conclusions. Often, these positions may not be the same, and opinions of the parties can be different, but it makes it even more necessary to establish a dialogue. If among the participants in the dialogue develops such an atmosphere and there is willingness to compromise, then the opportunity to come to a consensus will significantly be increased. So, I think it is very important to use all the areas for the development of these processes, not only intergovernmental, interstate negotiations. Today, the role of civil society, non-governmental organizations, and religious organizations has been increased. Of course, Likhachov's International Readings take their place among participants. Returning to the religious aspect of this dialogue, I believe that it is necessary as actively as possible to join in representatives of major religions to the dialogue. I think that their participation would avoid distortions that took place at the recent conference "Dialogue of Civilizations" in Bahrain, where some participants argued that Christian civilization has been burdened with crisis conflicts since the Crusader times and Byzantine. Moreover, the current crisis in Ukraine is also a result of the confrontation between Orthodoxy and Catholicism.

It seems to me that this problem is much wider, and it most likely is an artificial juxtaposition of these elements, but it is important that there will be calls for the creation of

one humanistic civilization on the basis of religious tolerance and respect of cultural diversity that resonates with issues discussed by us. At this point I want to finish and give the floor to Mr. Moratinos.

M. A. MORATINOS: — Yesterday we started a discussion about the importance of the dialogue of civilizations. Of course, the dialogue among civilizations is necessary. There is no other way to find a solution to any problem. But what concrete results in social and political spheres have we achieved? We can continue to operate in the dialogue concept, but there will not be any results. In this regard, I would like to make concrete proposals. The dialogue of civilizations should be conducted at two levels. The first level is a level of maintenance work and prevention. It is necessary to do everything possible that cultural differences in any part of the world be overcome, so preventive measures are needed.

In addition, we must begin to put forward proposals and ideas for those occasions when crises do happen, we need to have some tools to decide these conflicts. Diversity of cultures is not only an expression of cultures and different views on life, the world, culture and history. Cultural diversity is one of the most important security problems in the world. There is cultural diversity at the root of each of the conflicts, contradictions and crises. For example, today, Sunnis and Shiites are fighting each other in Syria. This cultural diversity has led to a conflict between Russia and Ukraine, where everyone is fighting for his cultural values. Philosophers and writers can give us a lot of advice on this subject, but politicians must deal with cultural diversity as with a problem, as with threat to peace and security. We need to develop a mechanism to ensure that cultural diversity would not lead to real problems in the field of security in the 21st century.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Mr. Moratinos, for your brilliant speech. And now I give the floor to Mr. Jerzy Wiatr.

JERZY WIATR: — I am going to continue the subject raised by Mr. Moratinos. I would like to emphasize the differences between the three fundamental types of international conflicts. The first type is in the difference of national interests. The second one is in the conflict of ideology. And the third one is that Samuel Huntington called the clash of civilizations, that is, the difference in cultures. The first type of conflicts is quite easy to solve. If two parties have different interests, it is usually possible to reach a compromise. If these are territorial disputes, we can hold the dividing line somewhere in the middle between them.

As for ideology, it is related to culture. One of the two competing ideologies will dominate in the world. And in this sense, there is no possibility of compromise. As for the clash of civilizations or cultures, the conflict is in the history of countries and different peoples. In this case, the source of a potential conflict is that each of cultures consists of a set of values, and they can vary greatly.

For example, if we now compare what is happening in the field of human rights, we can see differences between liberal Western understanding and understanding of human rights in other parts of the world. Is there any space for compromise? Let's take homosexuals as an example. In this

regard, modern cultures have different ways. I do not see any possibility for compromise. I think that the potential for the dialogue is that it is necessary to discuss and try to understand why those, the others, are different from us, and so, maybe, we can slightly change our value systems. On the other hand, why are values of the others different from ours in some reasons?

We can reject the idea of imposing our values to others, and it sometimes looks like weakness or relativism. But, in my opinion, it is not weakness, but recognition that people and cultures differ from each other. I believe in some set of values, but I understand that people in other parts of the world may have different sets of values. I do not want to borrow these values from them, but I can learn to respect them. Eventually, there will be disagreement with mutual respect. The dialogue is useful only if it leads to a better understanding, but does not try to persuade others to reject their values and take mine. Rather, it is necessary to explain what I believe in, what values are important to me, and I want to understand what they believe in. They must respect my way of thinking, and I will respect theirs. This can lead to a better, more friendly and peaceful way of life in the world.

G. M. GATILOV: — I thank Mr. Jerzy Wiatr for his speech. In my opinion, it is right, from my point of view, that he has suggested that we really need to listen to each other and understand the other party's positions, no matter what they may be. But I also agree with the fact that it is impossible to impose values on others values which are confessed by one of the parties. Because, otherwise, it causes an imbalance and is counterproductive. For example, there is a problem of sexual minorities already mentioned here. Yes, we can understand it, we accept it, but when on international areas, we are imposed it as a core value, we cannot agree with it. I give the floor to Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin.

V. V. NAUMKIN: — I believe that this is the correct formulation of the question, when the problem of attitude to sexual minorities as almost a measure of human rights is imposed to our country on international platforms – this is unacceptable. Despite the fact that negative attitudes towards minorities in our country are always exaggerated by western partners. Although, we have imposed restrictions only on propaganda headed to young people. In principle, no one will put into prison for it. But I want to argue with our Polish friend and my colleague. Where is there a red line passing what is acceptable and what is unacceptable? This is the first.

The second is those double standards which are being followed by our western and not only western colleagues who profess liberal values, today they are facing a crisis. Let me show one example. There are countries that our partners are very “compressing” for existing and non-existing disorders and interfere with life in accordance with the rules laid down in the civilizational paradigm. On the other hand, if we look at the countries which are politically advantageous and convenient for our partners, no claim is presented.

Not so long ago in Saudi Arabia, an Egyptian doctor made a mistake in delivering a baby at a woman from the ruling family. For which he was sentenced to 15 years

in prison and a thousand and a half lashes: 100 lashes per 15 years. Or in the Sudan a woman was sentenced to 100 lashes for what she married a Christian, and she mustn't do that by law. It is considered to be adultery and is punished in this way.

I give these examples because anyone would never put pressure on Saudi Arabia and countries cooperating with it in the Middle East, as many of them depend on its oil. Here are the rules that exist and are acceptable for liberal governments and western society, because it is unprofitable. Therefore, the matter is not in civilization, but in politics. Politics affects these conflicts and those seemingly incompatible values, which are accepted in some cases, while in other ones they are seen as totally unacceptable, again due to the desire to reduce the influence of a country, to reduce its potential to isolate it, as it is in this case, in relation to Russia.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Vitaly Vyacheslavovich. I would now like to give the floor to our colleague from the United States, Shlomo Weber.

SHLOMO WEBER: — I would like to add something. We are talking about different conflicts. And why do conflicts arise? There are different reasons called here: national interests, the war of civilizations, and so on. But one moment was lost: it is a struggle for economic resources. Most of the conflicts are precisely for this reason.

One of the examples is the tragedy of Africa after the colonial period, when the struggle for resources and the war between the various ethnic groups led to the total collapse of some African countries. It should be noted that there are advantages and disadvantages in it. Because, if countries or groups fight for economic resources, the opportunity to work together and even hopes for prosperity lie in it. We can criticize the European Union for the politics that it is holding. Nevertheless, 60 years of European integration has shown that the economic prosperity of its members is one of the elements of peaceful existence.

This is not the only example. Let's take the ASEAN as an example. It is an example of cooperation among Asian countries, which actually was very productive for the economic development and the prevention of various conflicts. Or let's take the Mercosur in Latin America, where the joint economic projects helped to reduce the number of conflicts. I live in Texas, which is one of the main participants in the NAFTA – the Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada and Mexico, and I can say from my own experience that the economic cooperation has led to the prosperity of Texas, Mexico and Canada. Based on the above I want to summarize: it is impossible to talk about conflicts, without taking into account the economic factor, which not only helps to prevent them, but also the prosperity and development of participants of the conflict.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much. Please, Mr. Fuad Mamedov.

F. T. MAMEDOV¹: — I agree with the speakers: there are both approaches to be present. Firstly, from the view-

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point of harmonization of cultures, and, secondly, from the viewpoint of harmonization of interests. Of course, reaching mutual understanding requires harmonization. On the one hand, it is necessary to develop certain identities based on universal human interests, the basic values of the culture. This is very important. Why? Because the culture is the true criterion of the value of a man, regardless of nationality, religion, place of birth.

Culture is the foundation of everything, personal culture, spiritual one. I mean, of course, the totality of cultures of the mind and the culture of feelings that, I think, might help in solving problems of the dialogue of cultures. They wrote about it very much, but real results are insufficient, because we almost do not think about specific arrangements.

Today I would like to talk about it. It is necessary to develop universal ethical principles and workable models of cooperation and partnership. And here an important role is played by the social environment in different countries, which, in their turn, are very dependent on politics. So, my suggestion is to declare the decade of development of global culture within which is proposed to organize a permanent active travelling international lecture entitled "Culture will save the world". Its purpose will be to promote the implementation of international programs and projects focused on acculturation and inculturation of people, so that the basic human values, rather than national, would be the basis for mutual understanding and cooperation. Secondly, I propose to conduct international television cultural bridges that also will help to solve this problem.

And finally, thirdly, it is necessary to think about the development of the international program of transition from *homo sapiens* type to *homo cultures* type. The fact that *homo sapiens* type, to which we all place ourselves, today embodies the culture of savagery, the culture of barbarism, the culture of feudalism, and the culture of industrial civilization, including the culture of humanism. Therefore, we need to transfer all of this into a humanitarian basis, because there is no other way. Perhaps, the development of an international program and respective national projects in each country could help rapprochement and greater understanding. Perhaps, within the frameworks of this program, it could also be considered about creating the International Council of global culture for coordinating efforts of cultural specialists, political scientists, sociologists, economists, lawyers and even religious leaders in order to develop high standards of spiritual, intellectual and ethical culture. Because ignorance is evil and poverty, and culture is primarily knowledge, development and prosperity.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Mr. Mamedov, for the interesting suggestions. I agree with you, but I would like to note that now we are holding cross-years of cultures in Russia and many countries. It is really bringing peoples together, creates the platform on which the dialogue can be conducted. Moreover, even now, when we are experiencing quite acute phase of relations with western society and the state. There are the fundamental works among them: "Cultural Studies: Theory and History", "Cultural studies as a way for efficient living", "Culture of Management. The experience of foreign countries", "Umar" and "Intelligence" which are noted with awards. The President of the Association of Azerbaijani culture. The President of the Society of culturalologists of Azerbaijan. Chief editor of the International cultural journal "Simurg".

partners, as for cultural relations which are less susceptible to negative processes. So, I absolutely agree with you that we need to continue to develop such a cultural platform. By the way, there are appropriate forums for it both in the framework of UNESCO and other international organizations, on bilateral basis. Vladimir Victorovich Sogrin, come here, please.

V. V. SOGRIN¹: — Dear colleagues, I am expanding the context of our discussion. At the Plenary meeting we spoke about information wars. It was suggested that Russia should try to win it, and there are all possibilities for it. This goal is, in my view, incompatible with the idea of the dialogue among civilizations. I also felt one-sided criticism: the West is accused of double standards, as if there are not any double standards from our part.

If one party is to overcome double standards, and the other one is not, the productive dialogue is unlikely to be succeeded. I will reveal some of the obstacles to development of the dialogue. I do not want information wars to be conducted, and any party in these wars to win, whether Russian or American party. Let's consider a concrete dialogue between two very different civilizations: the United States and Russia. Within the framework of information wars, anti – Americanism is used from the part of Russia, and russophobia is used from the part of the United States. Anti-Americanism is a negative mythological image of the United States of America, and russophobia is a negative mythological image of Russia.

A special discipline, imagology, is used for studying images of other countries. For it, the main methodological paradigm is a pair “us and them”, in other words, each of them judges the other to the best of his ability, to the best of his own qualities. This is very dangerous for the dialogue. Both russophobia and anti-Americanism include two of the same methods that are the basis of information wars. I believe that, from the point of view of the intelligentsia, intellectuals, it is important to pay attention to these two methods, because if we are going to use them, there will no dialogue. The first method is Manichaeism, that is, each party divides the world into two forces: a good and evil. On the Russian part, and in the framework of anti-Americanism, Russia is a good, but America is evil. From the part of the United States, Manichean approach is in the fact that America is a good, and Russia is evil.

The second approach is conspiracy. Each part sees intrigues of the opposing party unacceptable for its events: Moscow to the hand of “Washington regional committee” and Washington – “the hand of Moscow”. During the Cold War, Washington attributed Moscow intrigues to changes unacceptable for it in the third world (Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, Cuba, Nicaragua, and so on.), denying internal causes of radical changes. Today, Washington explains

the resistance of Donbass and Lugansk exclusively with provocations of Moscow. But Moscow also ignores internal reasons of unwanted changes for it, say, in Georgia and Ukraine, and sees only the intrigues of Washington, ignoring the fact that both states willingly abandoned the alliance with Moscow and chose the United States as “an empire by invitation”.

Let's consider the example of Ukraine. Yesterday I heard a remark from the Ukrainian colleague that in 1991 the United States wanted the collapse of the Soviet Union and organized it. This is a typical explanation of all the post-Soviet conspiracy theorists. In fact, the facts show otherwise: in autumn of 1991, the President George W. Bush, speaking in the Verkhovna Rada, said that he was categorically against the secession of Ukraine from the Soviet Union, as the national interests of the United States are threatened the collapse of a great nuclear power. But the members of the party “Rukh”, which then prevailed in the Verkhovna Rada, said that it was the politics of double standards and asserted: “You were separated from England in 1776, and we want to be separated from Russia”. That is, the United States was for the preservation of the Soviet Union, and Ukraine was against, and it voluntarily withdrew from the Soviet Union, from the very beginning by making anti-Russian, pro-western choice.

In 1992, the United States unilaterally declared that they won the Cold War and began to use its end to their own interests. Then, they suffered many defeats, because the idea of the unipolar world is untenable, this was particularly evident during the presidency of George W. Bush. But in one case, in the former Soviet Union, they were very successful, because the former Warsaw Pact countries and the six Soviet republics wanted to get out of the Russian civilized space and enter the American imperial space. They thought that they could achieve a better life, and Ukraine was among these states. You know, we criticize the United States for what it has allocated \$ 5 billion for the organization of subversive activities in Ukraine. But Mr. Zhirinovskiy in the State Duma said that Russia had allocated \$ 60 billion for all sorts of benefits and support for Ukraine. The question arises: why did \$ 5 billion win over \$ 60 billion? Facts should be exempt from the Manichean and conspiracy approaches. It is necessary to objectively assess the situation: it is the only way we can create a solid platform for an objective assessment of world events, and only this fact, but not information wars, is the basis of fruitful dialogue between civilizations.

Often in our country the position is expressed that everybody who does not share the anti-American position is “the fifth column”. I believe that in our country there is no “the fifth column”. One just loves Russia blindly and others – rationally, and such concepts as “the fifth column” must be removed from the dialogue of cultures.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Vladimir Victorovich, there were a lot of interesting and perhaps controversial judgments. I give the floor to Professor Zhang Yiwu.

ZHANG YIWU²: — Meetings like this are also often held in Beijing, where we discuss similar problems

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² Professor of the Department of Chinese Literature of Peking University (China). Board member of the China Association of modern literature.

(position towards the West and cultural exchange between the two countries) and many others. Although, the discussion is held in a different language, discussion topics are very similar. It seems to me, the subject of those discussions concludes two important general questions.

The first question is that Russia, as well as China, is affected by impact and pressure from the West. This impact is quite mixed and ambiguous. Therefore, China faces the same problems as Russia does. There are different ways to solve these problems, similar in different countries: the first approach is a common way of dealing with difficult situations, and the second one is specific.

The second question is understanding. It is important to try to reach an understanding with the help of the dialogue of cultures, understand other cultures.

Currently, with the rapid economic growth, the Chinese have faced with a situation where it is necessary to declare their position in relation to the West. A more difficult task is to find ways to work without coming into confrontation with the West and at the same time avoiding the full commitment to the West. On one hand, it is important to maintain their interests. On the other hand, understanding and cultural exchange are very important.

Cultural exchange is really very important. In my opinion, it should have two basic forms. Firstly, it is holding such meetings as today's, the exchange of views in the meetings. Secondly, it is an exchange at the level of popular culture, for example, the interchange between representatives of youth pop culture. Thus, the American television series "House of Cards" is currently very popular in China, thanks to it, the Chinese can get more information about the United States.

Chinese TV series are also becoming popular in different countries. In particular, the Chinese TV series are in great demand in Vietnam. Despite the recent conflict between China and Vietnam, Chinese films are continuing to win the audience. In fact, cultural exchange, of course, affects the political interests of different countries. TV series are one of the forms of the spread of influence.

In addition, it is important to have understanding. In China, there is a traditional approach to this issue: it should be empathetic to another person, imagine yourself in the place of another, that is, think from the perspective of other people, respect not only your own, but someone else's opinion. This is one of the ways to resolve the conflict. Another way to resolve the conflict is let everyone openly and boldly express different points of view, so that through a similar clash of opinion to reach an understanding. These two methods may be applied to solve many issues.

G. M. GATILOV: — I thank professor Zhang Yiwu for his view on the issue, it is very interesting for us. I give the floor to Peter Tolochko.

P. P. TOLOCHKO: — V. V. Sogrin opposed the Ukrainian representative who was not named by name, who, for some reason, decided that the United States helped to destroy the Soviet Union. According to his opinion, they

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did not want it. A view of it is fed with the myth that the Americans are guilty in everything. If so! Unfortunately, this is not just a myth, but harsh reality. The US President Bill Clinton and the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher told about it to the world. Bill Clinton said, having loosened the ideological foundations of the Soviet Union, we were able to remove, from the bloodless war for world domination, the state, the former main competitor of America, and, in the Houston speech in November 1991, Margaret Thatcher explained that the West has always taken action to weaken the economy of the USSR and the creation of its domestic difficulties.

Unfortunately, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Americans did not stop their interference in the affairs of the region. Now, Ukraine has become their victim. Having organized the coup, the United States and the West detonated interethnic and intercultural confrontation, which was culminated in the civil war in the south-east of Ukraine. That is not mythology, but a reality. The United States did not like Ukraine, which had an equal relationship with Russia and the West. It was forced to decide in favor of the West, which could not cause internal social and spiritual crisis in it.

Unfortunately, at scientific conferences, and even at the well-established forum as Likhachov's Readings, it is impossible to solve such problems. Culture cannot exclude the clash of interests of countries and regions. And, nevertheless, the intellectuals have to say about this reality to make it a little less cruel. To transfer it into the mythology and stereotypes of public opinion is to indulge in self-deception.

V. V. SOGRIN: — I absolutely agree with you, but I want to clarify: America was invited to Ukraine. Remember Kuchma, Yushchenko, and the current leaders.

P. P. TOLOCHKO: — You know, if someone comes with a gun to you, then you just have to invite. I will not continue to debate, but I believe that politics and economics rule the world. We must proceed from the realities and find solutions to these problems.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Peter Petrovich. The Ukraine's problem, of course, is many-sided and complicated. It is clear that we cannot solve it here, but still it is very useful to listen to each other. I give the floor to Manuel Montes.

MANUEL F. MONTES: — As an economist, I agree with what has been said here. I wonder: is it possible to remove the conflict of civilizations with the help of economic growth? Let's take Greece as an example. Extremist sentiment in Greek society increased solely due to economic failures. Therefore, I think the world leaders at the international level should as soon as possible ensure economic growth, social protection, financial interests of different countries and segments of the population, like the programs that were implemented in Poland, Spain, and Portugal. And extremism is a result from the loss of future prospects of young people. A bright example is the split of Yugoslavia, which led to violence, conflict, clash of civilizations.

I do not think that one of ideologies lost the Cold War. Moreover, even in the West due to the crisis now there is some talk about the benefits of left-wing ideology. I un-

derstand that this is not the solution of the problem, but in terms of economic problems, of course, ideologies begin to collide with a new force. Therefore, we need such international obligations, such systems of relations that could respond to economical problems in various countries, improving the welfare of people and eliminating the clashes and conflicts.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much. Now I give the floor to Elena Vladimirovna Kharitonova.

E. V. KHARITONOVA¹: — I represent the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. This organization allows us to study the real stuff, easily extrapolated to the events and phenomena in different regions of the world. My report deals with two events that have occurred during this period in Africa. The first event is the death of Mandela and all activities related it, as well as the ideology of national reconciliation, which he realized as an alternative civilization in Africa. The second event is the twentieth anniversary of the genocide in Rwanda, which was accompanied by the event “Quick Ibuka”, which has the translation as “I forgive, but I remember”.

I would like to make a few points. Each conflict has: the first is the subject of interest, and the second is players, concerned parties. I agree with Mr. Weber, that at the heart of most conflicts are economical interests, battles for resources with what, by the way, combined those countries that have these resources. Both the African region and Russia, in this sense, have a lot in common, which is expressed in aphoristic saying “The enemy of the fox is its tail”. In the battle for resources there are different means used, including ethnic and ideological conflicts, sectarian and religious wars. But very often we underestimate the role of the subjective factor in the events that we watch in history and in our reality.

I think that those who say that the economics and culture are two different things are right, too. I would like to change the focus and talk about the role of culture, the cultural factor in the battles for resources. At the Plenary meeting there was an idea that the condition of the dialogue is understanding to each other by the parties. But I want to remind you that understanding is a condition of the dialogue. We see a huge number of examples where cultural understanding is the method of manipulation and the ability to effectively manage one side against the other.

I can give ethnological science of colonial character as an example. Extrapolating to the present, I can say that sovietology is the same history as the ethnography of colonial times. Therefore, understanding the culture is no guarantee of the dialogue. You can understand and pretend that you do not understand. You can create the illusion of understand-

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ing. I am returning to the genocide in Rwanda. The Tutsis were called cockroaches and the Hutus, who killed the Tutsis, killed not people, they killed cockroaches.

The same thing is happening in Ukraine, when they kill not people, patriots, or Russians, but kill Colorado potato beetles. It is a direct analogy of what is happening in the modern history of Ukraine, with what was happening in Africa. We see a huge number of examples that getting the moral right to kill, to invade, to put to death, to occupy is accompanied by the destruction of culture and history. This was in Iraq, too, the same thing happened in Mali, and it is happening everywhere. There is cleaning of cultural monuments, depersonification of a victim, deprivation of subjectivity of potential or actual victims that then it was not a pity to destroy it. It is in this context, I propose to consider the events where the culture, the dialogue, and the battle for resources are combined.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Elena Vladimirovna. I give the floor to Peter Olegovich Il'insky.

P. O. IL'INSKY²: — We live in a very difficult time: between Russia and the West there is a serious conflict and almost complete lack of understanding, and the mutual one. I will tell about this from the Russian part, but not from the west. It seems to me that for Russia is now more important than for the West to take some steps, it should be done within the next few years or decades. Today the fundamental question of this misunderstanding has already been told: “And why did they go there?” It is because the western civilization can't help going. As Athenians' contemporaries could not stand them, because it was the most powerful civilization and they were everywhere, often to the detriment of themselves, by the way. Here is the same. This is a normal process for the West, because it is the most powerful civilization in the history of mankind.

Russia, in my opinion, should study the West more as it is doomed to live in the neighborhood. It should know your neighbor well, and now we know it not very well. We need to understand our history of relations with the West and tell the West about ourselves, because the West is not obliged to understand Russia – Russia should explain itself. If we cannot explain, then we must leave it to the mass media. I watch Russian and English-language mass media simultaneously. This, of course, is “a plague on both your houses”.

One great English writer once said that now we have now newspapers instead of history. So, we have the mass media instead of history now. What does this mean? We are told the end of history. We are not told either beginning or the process, we do not know about it anything. In the words of the same writer, “when we read about the death of General Banksy, it follows from this that he had ever been born”. Recently, the majority of people living in the West have learned that a certain country is falling to ruin, the mass media told about this a few weeks ago. And suddenly people learnt that there had been a whole country, which had once formed somewhere, although, they do not know exactly where, and so on. And it needs to be changed,

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especially from the Russian part, to eliminate this disadvantage of knowledge.

The West has been examining Russia for 500 years, 2 or 3 works are written about Russia every century, for the last 200 years there have been a few thousand special works written. Russia wrote two conceptual, in my opinion, works about the West: Danilevsky – in the 19th century and Zinoviev – in the 20th century. Moreover, they are not very well known in Russia.

West must be studied better. We must study it at two levels: individual and societal. Firstly, we should still personally communicate with another culture: travel, go back, to look at yourself, at the others. Here is an example. Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoyevsky came to Europe for the first time, watched how people lived there, and wrote his first articles about the West. And it turned out that he saw that there was surveillance: everybody was spied at this democratic West. It turns out to be the cold technological civilization there. It turns out that the sex industry is present in London (what a horror!). And in general, everything is wrong there and they have wrong Christianity.

And he wrote about it, in many ways, as we understand, it was unfair. But, on the other hand, during the same trip he looked at Russia through different eyes, which gave rise a lot of subtle thoughts about his homeland at our author. But most important thing is that during this internal dialogue with the West, he came up with the idea of superpersonality, about a man who would sacrifice himself for the sake of others. Thus, the novel “The Idiot” was born, it is one of the greatest works of the world literature, which explains something about Russian not only to themselves, but to the world. Hardly had anyone explained it better than Dostoevsky. Ask the western people to name the most prominent representatives of Russian culture, and most likely they will be Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Tchaikovsky – that all. Maybe, later they will remember someone else, but the most important are those ones. So, we must experience a foreign culture on a personal, individual level. By the way, “The Idiot” was written mainly in Switzerland and Italy, in Florence ...

Secondly, at the community level, Russia has to explain to itself how it has lived next door to the West for 500 years, and tell about it to the West. The West, as I said, is the most powerful civilization in the history of mankind. Once it was more technologically perfect than the others in the 15th century, it won almost the whole world. Today, there are representatives of countries which are present here who some time ago were European semi-colonies: China, Japan, Thailand, but even they are the exception, because at any given time the rest of the world was the western colony. And Russian has never been even a semi-colony, because developed a way to fight with the West. It was not a very nice system, but its opponent was special: the most powerful in the history of mankind. Therefore, there was a vertical of power, service class formed; Russia began to borrow military technology; hire specialists in military affairs; expand the territory as far as possible – so that if captured, they might not reach Moscow.

For more than 200 years, this system has worked greatly, and the successful end was in 1814 when it finally won. And then suddenly the West found on its borders another civilization comparable to its own. Then, these civilized anti-Russian stereotypes were born that have still been existing, it is the famous russophobia of 1830-1840. But then

began the Crimean War, and the system did not work for some reason. The Crimean War is the defeat, a new attempt of reforms is the defeat again. Then an attempt to reform the Soviet system failed again, and again defeated. You see, the system worked great for more than 200 years, and then failed. And if now, for the fourth time, it will try to do it again – to borrow only military technology and push the boundaries, to build a rigid vertical of power, it will not work, it will be necessary to learn something else.

I think it is necessary to borrow from the West what he does best of all – internal social technology. For 500 years, the European society has had a tremendous way of development. Therefore, there is an inverse link between the society and the state, there is the liberation of a creative person. A western man knows that if he is 19–20 years old, he has some talent, so, he has a high chance to become a rich, serious, respected member of the society in his forties – fifties. The Russian 20-year-old man who has some talent has no such certainty, it should appear. Until we happen borrowing public technology, their transfer to the Russian land, there will not be any respect and understanding with the West. It depends only on Russia that the West would take it as an independent, but not unfriendly selfhood and neighbor. It is not necessary to conflict but to collaborate.

G. M. GATILOV: — It is an interesting and non-standard perspective, worthy of thinking. Thank you very much. I give the floor to Yuri Samuilovich Goligorsky, an independent journalist and producer from the UK.

Yu. S. GOLIGORSKY: — I am glad that J. Bush’s speech in the Verkhovna Rada in Kiev has been remembered here. Sometimes I felt like I was the only one who remembers it, because I was at that meeting. There was the impression that he had not asked then, but begged to sign the Union Treaty. Not because he was so fond of the Soviet Union, but because he was afraid of its collapse, as they thought so, into 15 nuclear elements. Then it turned out that only into four...

There were a few topics announced here that I would like to touch. I’ll start with Russophobia in the West. I have been living in London for 40 years and know it very well. Try to find tickets for the Bolshoi Theatre, Matsuev, Bashmet who come every year to London, and you can determine the level of Russophobia in London. Ask an intelligent Briton, who Anton Chekhov is, and he will tell you that he is a national English playwright – this is the only way he is perceived because there are not less two Chekhov’s plays staged in London every year. In London, plays of Trifonov and other contemporary Russian authors are being staged. Try to get through the crowd during the celebration of Maslennitsa in Trafalgar Square, and you will determine the level of Russophobia in the UK. And, perhaps, as the apogee – six months ago there were serious negotiations conducted about that Rosatom will build a nuclear power station in the UK. Kiriienko was moving, and it was discussed at the highest level. It is about the Russophobia.

Further, it was said that Margaret Thatcher was gloating over the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thatcher, if my memory serves me, made a bet on the collapse of the communist system, but not on the collapse of the USSR. You mistakenly equate it. But, obviously, she increasingly looked at things, because the communist system was not only the So-

viet Union. The Soviet Union stood at the head, but there was also Eastern Europe, that's why Brzezinski and others were involved in it.

Then, it was said that there was some common Western opinion and the Western press. Indeed, there is such a thing as the Western press, but there is no such concept as consensus in the Western press. Not because we are so smart, white and fluffy, but because if we blow the same tune, we will never sell any of our newspaper, radio or television broadcast.

We have to give a variety of opinions. Our press and media should be such polyphony as Bach's fugues, otherwise we will not sell anything. We have different readers, they have different tastes, opinions, different ideas and concepts, and perception of the environment. Here is an example. You said, Peter Petrovich, that Yanukovich was overseen by the CIA and Biden. And our press has written about it. Yes, CIA came, Biden came, but it was also written that came Sergey Orestovich Beseda, the Colonel General of the FSB, who also oversaw Yanukovich. But the fact that there was some writing about it and we know about it. Of course, it is very important that the Western press and the media write – they equally cover every aspect of the conflict that we understand. But the main issue raised by the Western press in regard to Ukraine: can the state with the population of 46 million people make their own decisions, or will it always do their bidding of either Moscow or Washington “regional committees”? In raising this question the Western press is absolutely unanimous.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much. I give the floor to the Ambassador of Spain in the Russian Federation.

J. A. MARCH: — I find the proposal of Mr. Manuel Montes very interesting, further to analyze the relationship between civilization and economics. I think that today is a key issue. So far, we have talked about global competition, about how civilizations prepare their members to the fact that in the open economics there is a chance to be defeated and lost. For example, about 15 years ago in the textile industry, we set quotas on textile imports from Turkey and Egypt, but then at some moment we decided to try to open a free market. And soon Turkey, Morocco and Egypt exhausted their ability to compete with China, which immediately took all positions.

Looking at such interactions of the civilization and economics, it is possible to understand that the problem of competition on a global scale is very serious. For example, the Arabic culture integrates women into the economics with great difficulty, 50% of the population is not integrated. How does it affect the ability of global competition? This is a very important issue and it should seriously be considered.

European civilization is great, with more than 2,000 years of history, but we also have to think about the future and also need to learn to compete. The problem is that our civilization is old, so it is in the process of dissolution, besides we are not smart enough. I think that Russia has the enormous potential, in this sense: a lot of smart young people who have good knowledge in physics and mathematics. But here's what worries me. Chubais once said: “In Russia, we are sending money to science very well, but we cannot turn science into money”. Analyzing the global economics,

we find Russian enterprises mainly in the fields of oil and energy. But there are almost no major Russian companies in the food industry and architecture. So it may be worthwhile to stop thinking about the past and living in the past, and think about how to be able to work in the future, organizing thousands of successful businesses in other industries.

Perhaps, what I am about to say, may seem politically incorrect, but, in my opinion, Europe, at least its western part, is historically very closely linked with Russia. Together, we could make a huge space – 800 million people. And we can use the fact that we are offered: a close relationship, as it happens in the United States. We could arrange the same space, as in the United States, on the territory of Russia. I think that the Russians should unite with Europe. In Europe, everyone is convinced that Russia is a 100% European country. America plays with Asia. But the future of Russia is still close to Europe. And we could then consider the proposal of Mr. Moratinos about conflict prevention, about how to take proportionate measures in the European space. It was a pretty decent proposal.

G. M. GATILOV: — The floor is given to Anatoly Andreevich Gromyko.

A. A. GROMYKO: — In 1930, when Einstein explained his theory of relativity to the world, many people thought that it can help to explain something in politics. But one day, when one of the students asked Einstein a question of whether it is possible to do so, he replied: no, it isn't, because politics is more difficult than physics. Perhaps, this is a fictional story, but I would like to emphasize that everybody who is speaking here, wants to achieve some general truth in the approach to a particular problem. In my opinion, the truths, when we begin to compare them and try to combine, are incompatible, so instead of one truth we must look for a proper solution. At one time, so the best solution was the adoption of the veto, i.e. unanimity of the great powers in the Security Council.

This veto was fought for very aggressively by our diplomacy. I remember the stories of my father, that during one of the crucial meeting with President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the most prominent American president, after Roosevelt became to hesitate, he said that the unanimity rule for us was Stalingrad, it was impossible to retreat further. And then Roosevelt relented. In the end, at the Yalta Conference, a veto was agreed. Then, in San Francisco President Harry Truman tried to abolish it. He convinced the State Secretary, Stetinius, that they should try to change the UN Charter and not to let the right of unanimity of the great powers be taken. The attack was repulsed, when my father said that in such a case, the Soviet Union will not be able to work in the United Nations.

The Charter of the United Nations in international relations in the second half of the twentieth century played a very important role, it was a kind of anchor that held these relations in the boiling sea. This is a useful Charter and, from my point of view, the UN was hard to create and it will be difficult to break. But if the UN is destroyed, the other planetary democratic organization where everyone has the right to vote, even a small country does, cannot be set up. I say this because not so long ago, the United States representative in the UN, Bolton, appointed by G. Bush, said: “There is no such organizations as the United Nations

anymore..." Well, let's assume that it was just not a very smart statement.

The second issue I would like to touch is about Russophobia and anti-Americanism. Such phenomena are present in political life – both in the United States and in the Soviet Union it was, and now in Russia, of course, there are elements of anti-Americanism. However, in my opinion, this is a very minor part of the sentiment in our society, and also both in American and in English. In England, they respect Soviet, and now, as they like to say, Russian culture. My son, Alex, an anglicist, regularly travels to England to attend Maslenitsa and he is a representative of the Russian public there. Russophobe sentiment in the West, of course, is present, but it is not decisive. For example, I had to meet with G. Bush and the Kennedy brothers, and with many other prominent American leaders. I agree with those who constantly remind us that if we have a dialogue, it is necessary to take into account the national interests of other countries. And we would like here in Russia our Western partners, often friends, to take into account that Russia cannot allow the emergence of NATO on the border with our central regions. It will be suicidal for Russia. I do not know what we will do to ensure that NATO will not appear in Ukraine, but if I could work my will, I would never let it in. And the matter is not in some phobia, but that we cannot allow the Americans to put their missiles near our borders. At the time we put them in Cuba, remember how much noise there was. Then I worked in England and thought if I would be killed with the Soviet nuclear weapons in England. Taking into account national interests of each other is very important. Obviously, we have russophobia and anti-Americanism in some degree, journalists love so much to sharpen the subject. And as for the people? I lived in America for 13 years, in England for almost 5 years and when I went to lectures and communicated with ordinary British, the Americans out in the sticks, I noticed russophobia nowhere. Yes, they cared about our behavior. All this was discussed, but I did not feel russophobia.

I do not think as it was stated that the improvement of the relationship depends on Russia. Improvement is a two-way traffic. Name me at least one action of the current official Washington, which would take into account Russia's national interests in any region of the world. We did a lot of conciliatory steps, up to leave Central Europe. We left without getting anything in return. And as a result now we have the USA's intention to organize missile bases by our side. Russian people will never agree with it.

It was said here that Russia owes to everybody. We do not owe to anybody, so the United States does. Dangerous politics is carried out, and note how it is done: the United States now has 400 thousand soldiers in 100 countries, that is, the old system of encircling the Soviet Union with military bases is retained. It is absolutely unclear that Washington is doing in Ukraine.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Anatoly Andreevich, for your interesting thoughts. The only thing is that I would like to make a comment about the name of the Organization of the United Nations. If it is renamed to the "states", it will sound like "Organization of United States". I do not think I would agree with the others.

Now, I ask to give the floor to Valery Aleksandrovich Cheresheva.

V. A. CHERESHNEV: — Dear colleagues, I would like to start with an interesting story. In St. Petersburg, on English embankment there is a memorial plate indicating that, in the years of 1850–1853, Bismarck worked as an ambassador, the future Grand Chancellor. He studied the Russian language and before travelling to Russia he practiced it here. In his memoirs, he wrote that he understands Russians, but cannot understand Russians, who say one word – "nothing". The Russian word "*nothing*". He goes outside, there is rain or something else. He asks, "What is the weather like today?" There is an answer: *nothing*, it is OK there, there is not much rain. He comes to the market (and he lived on the embankment, and there where is the Palace of Labor now, there was a small market), asks: "Is there meat here?" There is an answer: "Yes, there is". He asks: "How is the meat?" There is an answer: "*Nothing*". What is it? Whatever you ask, the answer is "*nothing*". Three years later, in autumn, in October, he left Russia. The carriage came up, the wheel creaked. And he said to the coachman: "Something is wrong". – "Yes, it is all right, sir, nothing, we'll go". As soon as we left Petersburg, there was the first ravine, snow. The wheel, of course, was broken and the carriage was overturned. And there he was lying with his friend bloodied with broken glass. The door opened, and this powerful coachman bothered him, "Are you alive, sir?" – "Yes, I'm alive... I have told you so". – "*Nothing*, sir, *nothing*. You are alive". Bismarck says, "Here outside Petersburg, among this mud along the autumn road, I realized the meaning of the Russian word "*nothing*". The whole world does not understand. The whole nation lives". "*Nothing*" is a word-optimist, a word – comforter, a word of the dialogue, which all leads to a common denominator. Returning to Germany, he took out a silver knob from the cane, with which he wanted to hit the coachman, and asked to make a ring, on which was engraved in the Russian letters: "*Nothing*". Bismarck told that when there were particularly noisy battles in the government, he looked at this ring and it calmed him. And he called, "Do not make any sudden movements against Russia – it will not work, and the answer will be surprising and often inadequate".

Well, now I am digressing into the subject. We are talking about the dialogue of cultures, and important parts of the culture are the science and education. By 1960–1965, two scientific superpowers had been formed: the United States and the Soviet Union. Space exploration and nuclear project were clear indicators of this. And it was balanced. Of course, I agree with Peter Il'insky that our Russian civilization has always been behind the West. I do not want to draw parallels, but I recall Tolstoy, who said that, it would seem, because we all understand what is what. Let good people gather together, they are always the majority, and give a lesson to this little lesser evil. But evil is always active, always insisted, always with a good genetic memory, and until it has reached its goals, even in harm of generations, it does not exhaust its dominant of the functional system of this orientation. Therefore, there are aggressive nationalist and fascist movements appeared. In 1961, when I lived in the Urals, in Solikamsk, and studied in the 9th grade, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev announced an amnesty and prisoners were released 2–3 years earlier. I remember well how the columns of Germans were sent through Moscow by train to Germany. And I remember when thousands of Bandera men (40–50-year-old men) left the Ural and re-

turned to Western Ukraine. I knew that there was Bandera movement after the war, gangs, which were fought with, but what such an amount! Besides Solikamsk, there was also Siberia, there were more than 100 thousand people.

Today we are discussing the reform of the Academy of Sciences. And the minister, justifying it, says, "Where is today's advanced science? In the West. And where is it developing in the West? In universities. We will strive to universities". And university funding since 2004 has been rising sharply, and the Academy of Sciences – only 5–7%. But we have a question: "Excuse me, but what country is in the second place now?" – "China". – "And is there also science at the universities of China?" – "No, at the Academy". "And Whom did they copy in 1949?" – "The Academy of Sciences of the USSR". Why do we ignore the positive experience of our country, which followed our way, and put the West aside?

Let's try to find out where it is from. I remember when in 1990 I was just elected as a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences, there was just a collapse of the Soviet Union, western experts came to Russia and said: "We have analyzed everything, we are here to help you, colleagues". – "Of course, we are listening". – "Your education is too theorized. You think, there are concepts, theories. Why? There is a rational, practical working man needed. It is less of it, and it is more practical skills. Why do you have so many mathematics lessons per week – it is a theory that they all will become mathematicians? Why are there so many lessons of literature and Russian? Do you bring up followers of Romanticism?" And so on. Next, we analyzed: "The Academy of Sciences is the consequences of the totalitarian regime. Look, each institution is a mailbox. And you?" – "And we have democracy, we have a professor at the universities and all the students and graduate students come through him. And they work in laboratories. You have some schools which are ephemeral – it is the dead season. And it is very simple at our universities: you have defended a dissertation and you are free, express yourself, show what you're worth". It sounds as if nothing.

And look what has begun. Since 1991, in Science and Education there is a clear concept of backwardness. That is, capitalism is unequal, of course, there are developed countries, there are underdeveloped ones. There is a "Big Eight", there is "Twenty" and so on. Russia is attributed to developing countries – peripheral capitalism. And at once there have been advisers: why do you have the whole spectrum of science? Why do you have 8–10 directions, which are developed by the UN and UNESCO in particular? Just two or three. Focus on the most relevant – that's the main. We reply: "But there is Switzerland but there is Russia. If we focus on a single technology, we will be in South Korea. Yes, electronics is high-tech, but what about everything else? But everything else is nothing". How can Russia focus on one thing? Across the spectrum – and work a lot! Only when we work so much, we are protected. We work on a system of our security, and, therefore, we do not need such advice. What do they try to do from Russia? A developing country. And look, they have done it for 20 years.

Colleagues are discussing why high-tech production is not developing, and because the concept is different, unfortunately. We have become a commodity – dependent countries, as all developing countries. After all, to build alternative energy, for example, hydrogen one, it is necessary to

have 3000 micronutrients. In Russia today, you can get a 1000–1200, the rest shall be delivered from the West. Manganese is in Ukraine, uranium is in Kazakhstan, our own deposits have not been developed yet, in addition, it is a huge cost. Moreover, there is an agreement with UNESCO, and the UN is promoting it – northern territories without joint review must not be developed. Let's suppose, now we have to begin to develop a new field, set the oil rig, but until all the representatives of all counties visit it, look that it's safe in order not to repeat the scenario of Gulf of Mexico, works will not be started, that is, requirements are the highest. We somehow came to understanding that such requirements are justified. Let's remember, in 2004, the Deputy of Fursenko, Livanov, began the reform of the Academy of Sciences. He got the frozen mitt back. In 2006 – the second frozen mitt back. Livanov was fired for having failed to find a relationship with the Academy of Sciences. And suddenly Livanov was appointed as the Minister of Education and Science of the Russian Federation without the consent of the Academy of Sciences. That is, the person who was the executor of those reforms in the Academy of Sciences, now is the head of the Ministry. And in each of his speech he said: "At last, the Academy has become the club of scientists". And there are institutions come out from the Academy. This is absolutely a deliberate step. Who advised? Everybody refuses from the authorship.

In 1991–1992, all application institutes were privatized. Minsredmash and the related were closed, as a result there were 900 institutions left out of 6500. All application institutions are banks and offices now. So, this is the reform of applied science. And then there is a question for the Academy of Sciences: where is practical implementation?

Now I am studying the history of the Academy of Sciences and convinced that numerous attempts of disbandment were taken: and during the time of the Minister Uvarov, and after the October Revolution. The role and importance of the Academy, oddly enough, was estimated by Stalin, who ordered to remove the Academy from Petersburg to Moscow in 1934 and start to cooperate. As a result, from 1931 to 1941, funding for the Academy of Sciences was increased in 25 times, there were 150 institutions established, there were 200 new positions allocated, and so on.

Now all the sciences are wanted to transfer in the universities. Why? Because so are in America. But there is no Academy of Sciences in America, actually, it's a social club, whose members gather together and pay \$ 100 a year, receive three issues of the magazine and three meetings with tea. What is the Academy of Sciences? For what do we call us? We are all developing historically different. But still, I think, finishing my speech, that "nothing" means OK.

G. M. GATILOV: — The floor is given to Alexander Oganovich Chubaryan.

A. O. CHUBARIAN: — The problem that we are discussing, is very complicated, complex, it has been talked about for many years and at different levels. The world community has not accepted the idea of Huntington, nevertheless, there is a certain grain of truth there. I would like to note that the problem of the dialogue of civilizations has always been, is and will be, as there are objective values and historical contradictions that it is hardly possible to eliminate. I have studied the history of the creation of

the European Union and I can say that the founding fathers thought about it a little different than it turned out in reality. Today, virtually no country, which is a member of the European Union, is ready to sacrifice its cultural and national traditions for the sake of common economic interests and coordinate of some political action. In this system of the contradictions, there is one key concept: images, the idea of some nations about the other ones. Here there are talks about Russophobia, but it has deep historical roots. Let us recall the reign of Alexander I, when it seemed that a new era in relations with Russia began, but appeared the Count de Custine with his theory and for many years there was russophobia again revived. Stereotypes, developed 200 years ago, are very tenacious and do not go away from the subconscious, they are easy to revive. It turned out during the Second World War, they could be muted or even dropped, but in general these differences are very strong.

In addition, there are national interests, which have already been mentioned about. When Henry Kissinger in his doctoral thesis formulated some approaches to Europe in the 19th century, he appealed to the European balance and said that there were still objective contradictions of interests of Britain, for example, France and Germany. For example, if they see in London that Berlin is too "flirting" with Moscow, orientations are beginning to change. It is the same in other countries. In addition to the national interests, there is a geopolitical space that has been expanded very much in recent years and become lightly managed, because it involved different countries and continents, such as Asia with China and India, which also creates significant complexity.

The next thing that I would like to say about is the today's world. The Cold War is gone, but its legacy has remained. What do I mean? For many years, decades there has been a bipolar world maintained. Countries that are central to this world, are accustomed to live according to certain laws, and all the rest of the world is accustomed to live under these laws. Therefore, resuscitation of this legacy of the past is very tenacious. At the Institute of World History we have the center for the study of the Cold War, now we are getting ready to print a large book where we write about that the Cold War was a confrontation, but it had certain constraints. It never turned into a major "hot" war, because it had its own rules, everyone knew his place in this system. It was a dangerous system, but it did not go beyond its limits. So I think during times of strained relations, humanity must learn to find such constraints, limits.

And the last thing I would like to note is an increased, to a great extent, influence of the mass media. They can facilitate understanding, but, also, they can significantly spoil the whole picture. I respect for our colleague from London very much, who said that English newspapers should write objectively about one, another, and the third, but today it is difficult for Russian representatives to publish articles in the newspapers of Western Europe. Because they have their own stereotypes about Russia and they are placed only those articles that they are chosen themselves. Of course, there is the independent Internet from which you can get much more information, but we must always keep in mind that all independent sources of information profess commercial interests. Therefore, no matter what we say, the mass media have a huge impact on minds and aspirations of people. I have very good friends in Europe, and they feel well about Russia, but they are poorly informed. Informa-

tion is obtained mainly from the mass media of their countries and from nowhere else. People are not well informed. This also applies both to the western side and to Russia, we also have little information. But overall, I emphasize, the world lives under the great influence of the mass media, activating stereotypes about which I spoke in the beginning. Therefore, it seems to me that it is very important the point of overcoming psychological barriers and greater public awareness of what is happening.

Yu. S. GOLIGORSKY: — I would like to say very briefly, just one sentence. I think you are absolutely right. And I'll tell you why. Unfortunately, very often my colleagues instead of publishing Chubaryan and, of course, you, Mr. Chereshev, publish Dmitry Kiselev. And that's bad, I agree with your criticism. But "The Guardian" prefers Dmitry Kiselev for some unknown reason.

G. M. GATILOV: — We have another guest, the ambassador of Cyprus in the Russian Federation, Mr. Kasoulides. I would like to give the floor to him.

G. KASOULIDES: — I feel very humble and find myself not at my place among such distinguished scientists. I believe that humanity is trying to stability. But, unfortunately, as the Greek philosopher Heraclitus said, "everything flows, everything changes". And humanity, in my opinion, is doomed to move through violence, through the struggle for economic resources for living space. These ideas are deeply rooted in human nature. Perhaps, over time, culture and civilization will coexist peacefully, but still conflicts crawl to the surface and any discord between ideas and civilizations becomes a way of life. And in the 21st century conflicts are not over yet. We see that now the war has been going on without taking prisoners, without open conflicts, such as in the Middle East, but as collateral damage in it, Christian communities in the East are suffering. In Europe there were glorious years, when it seemed that the European Union would be a unifying factor for the entire continent collecting all the diverse cultures under one roof. Unfortunately, a couple of years ago, euro crisis, and now the Ukrainian crisis, showed that these expectations were not met.

In moments of crisis the dialogue is very important. As Mr. Moratinos said, at the clash of civilizations the dialogue is required, and there is a great mistake that these discussions are conducted by only scientists and researchers. The dialogue is a very good opportunity to stop the crisis in the bud. We missed such a chance with Ukraine, because we listened to our own arguments, but not to the arguments of the other hand. Stereotypes, inveterate enmity and suspicion poison our lives, but I strongly believe that it will still manage to settle the dispute, and I agree with my Spanish colleague that now it is necessary to strive for greater Europe. This should be an example of keeping the crisis, as well as it occurred with the use of chemical agents in Syria, when through the efforts of diplomats, the conflict was eliminated and now chemical poisonous agents are being destroyed there. It was the success of Russia's foreign politics as well. Therefore, in my opinion, the first and most important rule is never to stop negotiations. We must look for secret forces, inflating the conflict, which certainly will be not ideological, historical or cultural, but, of course, economical. And

you should try to make sure that no one will manipulate these forces and trends. Only dialogue will save during the crisis. And I prefer hot debates in this room to disputes in the street or on the battlefield.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. I give the floor to the Minister Mr. Miguel Moratinos.

M. A. MORATINOS: — It was very interesting to me to listen to this passionate and very informative debate. But I would like to be subjected to some criticism that we have heard today. I think you should agree with me that we have a little West-centric. Every time we say that we are in a big global world, there are our colleagues from China, the representatives of the Philippines, and Africa present here.

The father of our colleagues Gromyko conferred with the Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, they determined the fate of the 20th century. But the world order has changed, now is 2014. We do not need to apply to the past and apply approaches of the past to the present day. Do you want to win the information war? I openly say: you want the bipolar world and the return of the Cold War. Is it better to overcome its legacy? Is it better to suggest new tools, new platforms, new vision for the future, new ideas? Otherwise, there will be crises like the one that now has broken out in Ukraine. And again we will not be able to develop effective solutions.

Indeed, what should we do in Ukraine? The tragedy is that for the last 10 years, either Europe, Russia, or the Americans had to do something. Why don't we have a collective platform? We have a global world, global immigration, changes in global climate. We have a global Islamic radicalism in Africa, for example, in the Central Asian republics. We have Iran.

But we must prevent global famine in Ukraine. Russia will enhance its military presence in the Crimea, its military base in the Crimea: it is clearly that it must protect itself, too. And we have to defend our common friend. Let's change these traditions: it is better to be united and try to solve the security problems in, at least, one region. Cultural dialogue must use new tools to facilitate the understanding and resolution of conflicts in the today's world.

Our Committee may call upon the UN and to someone else, if it deems it necessary that scientists will try to develop some kind of a new concept – certainly new. We always look to the past, and now is 2014. Around us there are young people, new means of communication, new economics, which should completely change our outlook on life. I think we can succeed. Let's not break the old system until the solution is found. Cultural diversity must necessarily be taken into account in the reform of the UN.

The right of veto has been mentioned here. Maybe, now is it time to change the Security Council and its regulations, and elect a new secretary – general of the UN, to use some new influences? You criticize the States, so do I, but please do not make mistakes that the Americans do, because you always want to win. You want to get the same effect as they do, or even more.

While I was a minister, I travelled more 10 million miles around the world. And I can say that the world has changed. Of course, Europe is important, but Europe and Russia, together, are even more important. Questions of

war and peace must be solved not only by us. Africa, Latin America, and Asia: all these countries have the right to vote and choose. We have great opportunities, there are people that have the experience, knowledge, and history. As Mr. Mamedov said, we need to define the values that we are guided, and thus we must contribute to the diversity of cultures without enmity between them. The European Union has such an idea: unity through diversity.

G. M. GATILOV: — I want to give the floor to Vladimir Konstantinovich Mamontov.

V. K. MAMONTOV: — Dear colleagues, Vitaly Tovtovich Tretyakov and I represent journalists who have repeatedly been mentioned here in different contexts. We are talking today about the dialogue. I hear that journalists always sharpen and kindle in the dialogue. Maybe, but let's be honest. We are participating in the meeting. When do we suddenly wake up and listen carefully? When feelings and genuine interest break through good reasoning about the need and the consolidation of all sorts of morality. When you sharpen. When you feel the heat, while the dialogue is important and useful. You will say to yourself, how useful it is to you, but to me, as a journalist, useful is this part of the dialogue.

In the Balanchine's ballet "Jewels", which we watched at the Mariinsky yesterday, the last part "Diamonds" was fine, it was good reasoning and good opening. But the excitement and poignancy is in "Rubies" by Stravinsky. Sense of something new, forward movement, and breakthrough in the choreography and in the music... For me, at least, "Rubies" is the main interior part. I would like to keep it in our dialogue.

Why is the dialogue held for? How important or necessary is it, especially the dialogue of civilizations? Not only the main points are important, but our involuntary or voluntary stylistic turns and slips in speech. For example, when a person says "your Kuchma", he shuts itself off from an entire piece of our shared history: Russian, Ukrainian, world. But why?

If we want to understand something deeply, we cannot fence ourselves off what we were told by the Ukrainian academician, eminent archaeologist Peter Tolochko, we should keep in mind. Today we have also talked about how a person can be associated with the Colorado potato beetles and cockroaches, if you do not want to conduct a dialogue with him. This is a story about how at first a person or the country is gradually withdrawn from the ranks of those with whom you can talk, transfer into the category of almost insects, and then they do not mind. And we constantly observe this interesting "dialogue" and watch it on TV and in life, especially in the case of Ukraine.

I made a special trip to the Ukraine more than once, in order to see what is really going on. For me, this is an extremely important point. I want to understand myself, because I do not trust many participants in the dialogue. I do not believe in their objectivity.

The colleague from the UK in his remarkable speech said that there was no russophobia, and cited Maslenitsa in Trafalgar Square as an example. I attended this event. Firstly, there are almost 500 thousand of our compatriots living there, and many of them come because Maslenitsa is very important for them. There are a number of British,

who come to have a look and eat free pancakes. In general, it is fun, there is no russophobia, if judging by these criteria.

And we have no anti-Americanism. Our bookshelves from the Soviet times are full of multi-volume Faulkner in a black cover. And don't we have Holden Caulfield in our heart, if we talk about the fact that Chekhov is in England? When Steve Jobs died, all our young people cried, I'm sorry but the older generation didn't sob so, when Stalin died.

Responding to Mr. Chubaryan, our colleague from the UK said, "Do you know why "The Guardian" did not publish your article? Because he published an article of Dima Kiselev". And everybody thinks how bad it was! It turns out that Dmitry Kiselev took Chubaryan's place on the pages of "The Guardian"! At first, Putin is guilty in everything, then Kiselev is. Go, Mr. Chubarian, to Kiselev and negotiate with him, who of you will be published at "The Guardian". Is it really a serious dialogue? Is it an objective assessment of the status quo? Let these subtleties of dialogue also be noticed, learnt, not to be false, as people who gathered here are intelligent, trained, and then the dialogue will be significant and important. And it will promote it as Stravinsky promoted his music ahead after Tchaikovsky, not canceling it.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thank you very much. Andrei Vadimovich Smirnov, please.

A. V. SMIRNOV: — Analyzing everything that has been said today, I thought that some categorical rigor here would be useful to us, because we are talking about the dialogue of cultures, about the interaction of cultures. But in which conditions is this dialogue occurring and at which position is a culture that engages in dialogue? I am grateful to Professor Il'insky for what he referred to a book Nikolai Yakovlevich Danilevsky "Russia and Europe". There is an interesting scheme, interesting theorizing given there. Danilevsky talks about three different positions, in which there may be cultures interacting. The first of them is colonization, when one culture is physically on the territory of the other. In this case, the colonization do not necessarily occur by transferring the culture media. To be colonized by America, the Americans do not necessarily come here. This may occur otherwise.

For example, in the 9th century in Cordoba, Alvar Paul, one of the Christian authors, the friend of the bishop of Cordoba, wrote with undisguised pain that in Spain there was not one Christian young man, understanding in sciences, who could read religious texts in Latin. They all know Arabic better than the Arabs, he complained, they all wear Arab clothes, they spend enormous sums of money on something to fill their library with books in Arabic, and when you talk to them about the beauty of the Scriptures, they laugh and say that they cannot find anything any useful in Christian books.

This, of course, is the colonization of the inside. But the power of the West was that it was able to move to other levels of interaction. The next level, Danilevsky speaks about, is a vaccination. Such biological metaphor. When you have some wild tree, it is grafted with a more cultural twig. This cultural twig gives very good, tasty fruits. But it gives them by the forces of the mother tree, and does not allow it to develop.

For 200 years mentioned by Professor Il'insky, we have been in Russia in a state of this vaccine, and now we are still here. When we talk about the dialogue, we have the false impression that the dialogue is between equal partners. It's nothing like that. Inequality has many dimensions, but the most important is fundamental: who vaccinated to whom?

The third level of interaction between cultures, Danilevsky speaks about, when a different culture and its achievements are a breeding ground for your own culture, for your own tree. Again, the biological metaphor. So, the power of the West, when it made a breakthrough in the 15th century, is that it was able to rise to this third stage. Will other cultures do this? Will they grow their own tree? This does not mean that you have to chop off the grafted branches, but you need to do something very difficult to achieve this.

Next. Distinction between two categories: "universal" and "all mankind", which Danilevsky introduced, unfortunately, attracted little attention. The category of "universal" corresponds to that condition, when the world culture, global culture (and our section is called "Making of a global culture") is going to the second of the three directions described by Danilevsky. That is, when a certain cultural branch is grafted to all cultures. Say, all the trees in the world are grafted so that they begin to bring only pears – this is the spread of one culture to the whole world. Or we decide that, roses are the most beautiful flower of all of flowers, and the rest of flowers will not go with each other in a bouquet. The category of "all mankind" is when each culture does not ignore the achievements of other cultures, but can make something of their own, unique in this world bouquet. And in this case, a bunch of the world civilization is composed not of roses alone, but of different flowers. I think the idea of Danilevsky deserves attention and can be claimed, when we talk about how to ensure equality of cultures, the preservation of their cultural "self" with the unconditional interaction enhanced in the context of globalization. And it is important for Russia, because Russia, in a sense, is the whole world. Christian and Islamic cultures are native to Russia. Muslims are not aliens, not migrants. So, we need to ensure equality and interaction of cultures, to create a cultural space that Russia will not be broken or split along these lines (and there have been attempts to create such a split, as we know, but they have not just worked so far). For our country, if it can do it, it will be the implementation of the civilizational project that can attract the attention of other countries.

G. M. GATILOV: — I give the floor to Farid Abdulovich Asadullin.

F. A. ASADULLIN: — Issues and problems that we are discussing today are indeed highly complex and complicated. When we talk about the effects of one on the other, there are immediately a number of issues rising, as the idea of a neighbor can be close to me in spirit, in culture, mentality. Today they have talked about whether Russia is the part of the West or the part of a culturally and geographically more extensive territory.

Danilevsky, by the way, said in one of his works, that there is no West. There is the western peninsula of Eurasia. And it seems to me, in this evaluation there is a lot of historical truth. Because Russia is really a synthetic forma-

tion, where a variety of cultural traditions, Eurasian peoples have contributed to the appearance of that civilization, which it now found and finds. Russia is clearly closely within only one culture and civilization of the West. This is indisputable.

I want to focus on two points that were raised in previous speeches. Recently there was “Eurovision”, and you all know that the winner was the “bearded woman”, Conchita Wurst. The next day I was at university, and this question was the subject of attention of teachers first, and then the students. Students immediately spoke: “Gay culture is rushing”.

I do not know how this evaluation expresses the feeling of all young people and whether it is possible to take seriously for such a choice of “enlightened” Europe. In my opinion, this is bad taste. People of my generation probably wonder where European culture is moving, if it is its conscious choice? Shocking? But, on the other hand, we remember that Igor Stravinsky has in his opera “The Rake’s adventures” (this was in the 1950s) a certain image of a woman with a beard – a Turkish woman. There it is “read” as a whim of the artist, his eccentricity. In the case of Conchita Wurst, the sense is deep different and not as harmless as it seems.

The well-known American political scientist Fareed Zakaria about 10 years ago in one of his works wrote this sacramental phrase: “The twentieth century was the century of the West, the 21st century will be century of the others”. The wordplay: the west – the rest. Indeed, trying to assess what trends are now prevailed in international development, you realize that the world train is becoming the world of Confucianism, and partly the Muslim world. I say this because so many Muslim intellectuals today are living far beyond those areas where grew generations of their ancestors in France, Spain, Belgium. These are people who have found their home away from Cairo or Damascus, and they behave to the world of traditional Islamic culture very conditionally. It is in every sense of Muslims in the West, the Western culture. They take not the last place in the establishment of particular European country.

Vitaly Tretyakov argues that dialogue always has a winner, I share his opinion. Even today, our discussion leads to the idea. The winner will be the side that will be able to understand and, if necessary, take the approach of his opponents. This will be a hybridized version of the “winner”, a synthetic winner, his globalized version.

P. P. TOLOCHKO: — I liked the thesis of Mr. Moratinos very much, that we should not remain in the past and think of new categories and imperatives. And so it seemed that we’re stuck here, and they are already thinking of new categories. You tell me, NATO is a new imperative, a new category of international politics?

M. A. MORATINOS: — No.

E. V. KHARITONOVA: — I would like to wish our European comrades in a modern context to think more about their own sovereignty.

G. M. GATILOV: — Thanks for the comments. My resume will be brief. Firstly, I think that there has been a very productive discussion. There were different views, both theoretical and concrete proposals on how to further develop the culture of the dialogue, the dialogue of civilizations, as

well as a number of other, related issues. We must admit that the dialogue of civilizations and cultural issues, and science, and everything to do with them, anyway, are closed on politics. This idea is clearly sounded in many speeches. Therefore, as much as we want, but the degree of development of this dialogue will still depend on the political and inter-state relations in the world. They will develop successfully, hence, intercultural dialogue will go better.

On the other hand, even if in the inter-state relations, in relations between the countries there are crises of political, military character, and the like that, all the same, the platform for the development and discussion of issues of culture, dialogue and partnership of civilizations remains. I noticed that during the discussion there were such thematic issues as the economic component of this process, the need to take into account cultural diversity, to avoid double standards. We were very pleased that we have gone beyond the discussion of European-American Affairs and talked about Africa, where there are many of their own problems, not least the simple, and sometimes, much more complex than those that we experience. There, other people, the mentality and other culture and the potential do not allow in many cases to cooperate as much as they would like. Therefore, Africans rely heavily on developed countries: America, the States of Europe, China, guided by them.

The role of science and culture is very important, and there are always the national interests present here. It is only natural that our discussion was largely focused on the situation prevailing in Ukraine. And then, there is a question: what the split is – civilizational or cultural. It seems there is community, but there is a problem and how to solve it, we do not know.

We have spoken very much about the role of the mass media. Of course, it is high, and everybody recognizes it. The potential that the Western mass media have, undoubtedly surpasses ours. The greater their responsibility. Frankly, from the Western mass media we would like to see a more balanced coverage of the situation. I agree with Professor Chubaryan that, apparently, Western readers cannot learn much of what is happening in Ukraine, and around it. To some extent, the reason for this is that the media in the West is now largely ideological.

Let’s recall the recent past. When American journalists tried to report objectively on the Iranian events, they were simply dismissed. And we all know about it. “The Guardian” is refusing to publish an article of Chubaryan. But at the same time there is also a sufficient proportion of the objective correspondents, journalists, and we cannot help accepting it. Just today there was a message saying that the journalist of “The Guardian” published a book about Snowden, it is clear what he will face. But an objective report of the information to the readers creates an opening for rapprochement of nations, cultures, for engaging in dialogue. And I would like the media to play the role of a bridge between peoples in our country and in yours. I understand that it is difficult, there are certain constraints, but still the media’s role in this regard is unique.

I would like especially to thank all our foreign guests who have been present at Likhachov’s Readings for their active participation. We heard a lot from you. Your vision is very important for us and, of course, in the future we expect on the closest possible cooperation with you about these and many other issues.

Thank everybody very much!

Round Table

BUILDING OF GREATER EUROPE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

May 20, 2014

Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences (SPbUHSS)

DISCUSSANTS:

President

Aleksandr Zapesotsky *corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, rector of Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences*

Leader

Juan Antonio March Pujol, *Spanish Ambassador to Russia (2008–2011)*

General speakers:

Igor Ivanov *Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (1998–2004)*

Aleksey Meshkov *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation*

Miguel Ángel Moratinos Cuyaubé *Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Spain (2004–2010), Honorary Doctor of Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences*

Dominique de Villepin *Prime Minister of the French Republic (2005–2007), Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic (2002–2004)*

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — First, I would like to say a few words about today's meeting. This meeting is a continuation of two of our interconnected undertakings. One of them is Likhachev's International Scientific Conferences which, as you know, we started in 1993 together with Dmitry Likhachev. During the last 10 years, these Conferences have been dedicated to the issues of the dialogue of cultures. Every year in May, a dialogue between the most well-known personalities: scientists, thinkers, statesmen and public figures from around the world is held in this room. In this sense, today's meeting continues this tradition. However, the format of Likhachev's Scientific Conferences is publications, reports and very short oral presentations, and today personalities of such magnitude are invited here that we certainly would like to give them a lot more time. This way, in fact, the format of the discussion is defined. Today's meeting is also a continuation of the initiative our University has taken a year ago, along with Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona). We met there in almost the same composition as it is today, and had a discussion on Greater Europe. The result of that meeting was a brochure in four languages. In today's conversation, we will continue to discuss this topic.

Now, let me present some positions of our University concerning the dialogue of cultures, partnership of civilizations and building of Greater Europe. I must say that public attention is drawn to actual, sharp politi-

cal events, especially if they occur elsewhere in Europe: government transformations, coup d'état, shooting or other extraordinary phenomena. That is, to draw people's attention to any event, it is necessary to reveal a trouble or something extremely unusual. Nevertheless, we are living here in Russia and asking ourselves the following questions: "Generally speaking, what's happening in the world? Are any extraordinary events an incident or regularity? Where does the situation in Europe move?" Look, just a few years ago, any war in our part of the globe seemed quite an exceptional event, maybe even an accidental occurrence, caused by no course of historical development. Maybe it was just an error of some political leader.

In Russia we believed and still believe that the war in Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam Hussein's regime was a huge mistake. Be this person ever so unpleasant to us, today we understand perfectly (as well as then, at the beginning of this war), that Iraq was not ready for democracy and the war would bring any good neither to this region, nor to the world community. Many people thought that this was an exception. Speaking about the disintegration of Yugoslavia, we figured that these were untypical occurrences caused by internal conflict radicalization. We knew, of course, that there were some countries supplying weapons, financing armed opposition and so on, but still it seemed to us that this was an exception too. A few years passed, and when we look at the world map, we, the

people who were willing to build Greater Europe from Gibraltar to the Bering Strait, what do we see? We see Western Europe and the European Union. And what do we see around Western Europe? We see Tunisia and Libya, where great order was imposed after the elimination of Muammar Gaddafi. Are we delighted? Did these countries finally receive the true democracy, and was the order restored? Oh, yes, that disgusting Gaddafi, who set up his tents in European capitals and other world capitals prior to military operations in Libya, is no more present. So, are people in the country happy now? And what is Western Europe experiencing now?

Next one is Egypt, where the population had a very complicated life several years ago, where people had to live on two dollars per day. "But what has improved in their lives by now?" we ask each other. What has improved in Syria and how did the events that occurred there influence the lives of ordinary people and life in Europe? Has the situation in the Middle East become generally calmer? Has the relationship between Israel and the Arab states become better? Are there any improvements in Turkey's public relations? Let us look a little further away from Europe. What can you say about Iran? Let us look at the events in the Caucasus. Has the peace come there? Did, for example, Azerbaijan and Armenia agree on how to overcome the contradictions? "No, – shall we say – peace and friendship didn't come". We are not encouraged by the events in Georgia and they do not correspond to our ideas of humanism at all. Let us consider Kosovo. Of course, we understand that it is "a great gift" to the European Union. I think that Western Europe has still not tasted in full all the delights of what is happening there and will happen next. Kosovo today is "a hotbed of civilization" which alone is worth any problems observed throughout Yugoslavia prior to its disintegration.

Now Ukraine, where the regrettable events occur, can be added to the list. We see that an extremely conflict and tense area has formed around Europe for some past 5 to 7 years. And unfortunately, the epicenter of this tension is now almost at our borders, within the regions inhabited by our brothers. There live not just people who speak the same language, they are our relatives. Someone more, someone less, but all of us are tied to 45 million Ukrainians with family ties. Therefore, the situation keeps us on the extreme alert. Within a few years, the situation in Europe has changed radically. However, I must say that all Russians consider themselves Europeans. And the Russian science today believes that Russia is one of two branches of the Christian civilization. One branch of Christianity comes from Rome and is associated with Western Europe. Another branch comes from Byzantium, and Russia, most of Ukraine and Belarus are associated with the development of this independent, full-blooded and branch of Christian civilization.

Today there are many conversations about a great influence of the Mongol yoke in the past. It influenced us, of course. Exactly the same way as, for example, Spain was heavily influenced by Arab culture, Italy by the culture of Africa, the UK by the culture of the East, particularly India. I think that the cultural destiny of London is something very similar to the destiny of Saint Petersburg, a powerful center associated with the oriental culture, ori-

ental studies, etc. Russia is a part of European culture, just as Spain, Italy and Great Britain are. Many scholars before me, including Dmitry Likhachev, talked about it and competently justified it. The West believes that in 1991 it defeated Russia. For us, this point of view is not acceptable, we never thought so. We thought that we want to improve our social and economic formation, and probably should move towards universal values. We tried not to surrender to the West, but to be close to it to continue to build the world together.

We tried to do what (it seemed to us) the inhabitants of Eastern Europe would like to see: to unite with the Western Europe. For example, East Germany, while uniting with West Germany, was not thinking and did not expect it would be in a position it is today. But combining its two parts, Germany failed to create a single mentality, image and lifestyle. That is, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germany did not become a full part of the whole Germany. I mean not the political dimension, but the manner, lifestyle, business activity and more. We tried to integrate with the West, but we did not want to become a raw materials appendage, vassals and especially slaves. We were not trying to become a dependent state or simply "dissolve" in some larger community. We wanted to save ourselves, our culture, our country and work together with other countries. Today many Russian people believe that it has not turned out, that we had been deceived, that we reasonably feel disappointed. Moreover, we must now look towards China, to establish cooperation with Asia, etc. Personally, I think that despite all the difficulties and unpleasant consequences of the past 20 years, we must continue building a united Europe. We must seek the cooperation, overcoming the action of the forces that are now trying to break Europe by creating tensions.

At the same time we need to consider the following factors. Factor one: we cannot accept the Western model of a society and economic relations as an ideal for Russia. Here is one of the lessons of the past 20 years: the world should work in line with the convergence, i.e. combining achievements of liberal ideology and socialist ideology. Each country should take the best for themselves both from capitalism and from socialism. But at the same time one criterion must be considered: the best that is taken must comply with the national mentality, culture, history and traditions of the country. In general, we need to act like China which does not copy blindly achievements of the West, but which explores it creatively and applies new knowledge according to its own culture, traditions and the situation in the country. That is, we must recognize today that China comes out of socialism in a more correct and rational way than our country does. Of course, this does not mean that we should go the Chinese way. We must learn from China to look for our own way.

The second factor is also very important and we must consider it: capitalism is no longer what we imagine. It is one of the most important changes of the era. Capitalism has ceased to be a free market system and productive forces game. We live in the information era. This means that information systems, means of communication and mass media reveal an enormous value and influence, often much more than the material world. The feature of the modern capitalism is that meanings are created in our

minds. That is the crucial difference between our era and all the previous ones. This means that people think the way they are inspired by mass media. We need to consider all these changes.

Hereon I conclude my presentation, and I give the floor to Mr. Juan Antonio March Pujol.

JUAN ANTONIO MARCH PUJOL: — Hello. Well, Thank you very much, Aleksandr Sergeevich, for hosting such an interesting conference here and giving us an opportunity to continue the debate we started in Barcelona one year ago in this partnership between University of Saint Petersburg and Pompeu Fabra University of Barcelona. Today the idea is that each of the speakers will deliver his vision on the future of Europe, of the future of the common relations between the European Union and Russia, maybe creating a new unique space in the future. Each one will talk for about fifteen to twenty minutes, and what we would like very much is to have after that a very open debate with you, because we think that the future is in the hands of the new generation who should think on the future in a very creative way. So here you have speakers who have had great historical responsibilities in the two extreme countries of this big space that is Europe ; Spain and Russia. And we also have a very eminent speaker from the centre of Europe; France. So this interactive debate between the new generations and experienced politicians, we think, can be very interesting.

One thing I would recommend to you is to be very creative, because the future changes very quickly. I remember that three years ago I had a “tête à tête” meeting with Gorbachev, and he said to me “You know Ambassador, you never know how things are going to evolve. When I was in Bonn three months before the fall of the Berlin wall, I had a press-conference with Chancellor Kohl, and one journalist asked if I thought that one day Germany could be a single nation again, if the reunification of Germany could be possible. I said that I really thought that this would be possible but not during this present generation, maybe in the next. And then Chancellor Kohl stopped me, stopped everybody, took the microphone, and said “You know, Mr. Gorbachev is a very good friend of Germany, he understands our country, but I do not want to mislead the Germans on this point. I want to say that there is no possibility of having a new unified Germany before at least three generations”. Well, three months later the Berlin wall was over and one year and a half later the reunification of Germany was on the tracks, and everything was absolutely different”. So, the idea I want to convey to you is that now we have a situation when you have the European Union and Russia, but maybe we could think about a new future and it could become sooner real than expected. We would really like you cherish new ideas and proposals on that.

So, let us start our conference. The first speaker will be the previous Prime Minister of France, Mr. Dominique de Villepin. After him it will be the present Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, who is in charge of relations with Europe, Mr. Alexey Meshkov. The third will be the previous Spanish Foreign Affairs Minister, Sr. Miguel Angel Moratinos, and to conclude I will give the floor to the previous Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Mr Igor Ivanov. After the round of speeches I will give the floor to the Audience

for open questions, and at the end rector Aleksandr Zapestskiy will make the summary and will close the session.

So I will introduce you in first place, Mr. Dominique de Villepin. We could say, he is on one side a universal man. This starts from the very beginning, as he was born not in France but in Rabat, Marocco. During his career as diplomat, he was posted in many different, but important countries, like the United States and India, and then he held all the important positions in the French administration. He was Secretary-General of the Presidency of the Republic, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of the Interior, Prime Minister, representative of France in the conference for a new Constitution of Europe. He played a great role in the debate of the Security Council on the illegality of the Irak War. He supported the need to presser international ruke of law as it was essential. He opposed the US intervention in Irak on the grounds that it was not the right thing to do. So, I think that he has had all the experience, all the knowledge, and at the same time he is someone very devoted to culture and literature: he has published more than nineteen books, and one that is extremely focused on our subject as it is called “The European man”. Mr Villepin, you have the floor. We are eager to know your thoughts about the future, to be captive by your vision.

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN¹: — Excellencies, dear friends. We are in a decisive week for Europe. We are going to have in the next days three important events. The first one is going to take place here in Saint Petersburg, it's going to be the Economic Forum, and it will be the opportunity to see what is the type of relationship that we may have between the big world companies, the European companies and here, the economic leadership. Next Sunday we will have a presidential election in Ukraine, in a divided Ukraine, it's going to be a very important moment, with the hope that the election of a legitimate president will be a step forward to launch a strong and inclusive national dialogue. Next Sunday, and this will be the third important event of the week, we will have also an election day for 400 million European voters. This is the second biggest democratic election in the world after the Indian election that took place a couple of days ago. That means that we are in the middle of important moments, because we are in a time of accumulating crisis and brutal events, the media coverage reduced them to the incoherent pieces of a jigsaw, it's like a puzzle: one minute for the crisis in Ukraine, one minute for the crisis of the euro, and one minute for Syria, so we go from one problem to another without having the possibility of understanding what are the real challenges of the world. I think it is our responsibility here and today to try to have a broader picture of the current crisis.

There is a first fact we are witnessing, a regional European crisis, the whole neighborhood of Europe is set on fire, as the rector has said. Look at North Africa: Algeria has been going through a rough time of contestation during the last presidential election of Abdelaziz Bouteflika; Libya is divided and has no real government, we even saw yesterday

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what looks like a putsch; Egypt is in the middle of civil disorders today represented by the condemnation to death of hundreds of Muslim Brothers, and if we look at the Middle East, it's the same: Syria is in ruins, Aleppo is under bombing every day, the Syrians are starving, and living in a real hell; Iraq is divided, weak and submitted to the daily violence of the terrorist attacks; Turkey has been confronted to political trouble during all the past years, to corruption charges against important cabinet members, to mass demonstrations in Istanbul. Look at Eastern Europe: Ukraine is on the brim of civil war and partition, and Transnistria is in state of alert. It seems we are living again the terrible cycle of the Yugoslavian wars, but this time the whole Europe and the whole future of Europe is concerned.

The second fact is that before all we are witnessing a crisis of values much more than a crisis of interests. There is a conflict of values between Europe and its neighborhood, because Europe polarizes the neighbor societies. Europe creates a strong attraction towards a part of these societies, mostly the young urban and connected populations of these different countries, the people you will find on the different center places of Europe, like on place Tahrir in Egypt, on Taksim and on Maidan in Ukraine. Europe also creates a strong rejection among other parts of these societies: the more traditional Russia, for example, which is called very often in the EU "the TV Russia" in opposition to "the Internet Russia", but you find the same in the populations of countries like Egypt, turning towards the Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafi, because they reject the moral decadence they think exists in Europe. There is a line between the sensibilities that you see in many of these recent polemics, concerning, for example, the trial of Pussy Riot, concerning homosexuality, concerning freedom of speech. It's the line between, on one side, a liberal European conception based on individual freedom and, on the other side, a more conservative society where social order is valued. We should not take this debate lightly and paint it in black or white.

There is also a doubt about the identity within the neighboring countries. This doubt can take a form of resentment against Western Europe, because there is often a feeling of humiliation and sometimes a feeling of revenge, because all these neighboring countries do share a complicated history with Western Europe. Look how in North Africa every interference of European countries quickly reminds of the times and crimes of colonization however good the intentions were.

Look how in Russia the events in Ukraine are quickly misinterpreted in the light of the tragic history with fascists supposed to try to regain the ground as in 1941. This doubt can take the form of a need of symbols to overcome the hardships of a lagging economy and of unemployment. It fuels nationalism, it fuels militarism and it fuels authoritarianism. There is also on all sides a crisis of diplomatic values. It's a time of double standards that make all speeches pointless. It's true that the Western countries have applied double standards: they wish humanitarian interference and regime change in some countries, welcoming all revolutionary movements, and in other countries they call for the respect of legality and sovereignty against interference of other powers. But the emerging countries, among which also Russia, do the same: in Libya and in Syria interference is intolerable, but in other countries it could be admitted when it comes to defend certain populations.

The third fact we must point out is that it is a confrontation of powerlessness. Europe has obviously become a void of power in the last years. Europe is divided, that's a fact. It's true economically, with very divergent economic and social systems, we are facing three main economic blocks: a competitive export-driven Northern Europe, an economy of the South with lagging competitiveness of labor cost and mainly specialized in domestic services, and a fast growing Eastern European model, in particular in Poland, based on the attraction of outsourcing of industrial activities with western decision-centers.

Europe is also divided politically, where Europe has proven incapable of speaking up with any voice in any of the recent crises. In Libya, in Syria, in Mali France, Great Britain and Germany never had the same positions. Concerning the questions in Eastern Europe, you have a very particular sensibility in the new member-states of the EU, in particular, in Poland. Third element: Europe is too passive. The European diplomacy has no teeth, because it doesn't believe in real politics, but only in moral superiority and in sanctions. The European diplomacy also has no tongue, because the high representative is not yet able to speak up for all Europeans. The European diplomacy at last has no hands, because most tools remain in the hands of the member-states and most of the security effort is done under the umbrella of NATO. Europe is blocked, because it can't see itself as it is.

There is the democratic Europe many dream of: it's a dream of a federal parliamentary state with the commission, and the government, and the court of justice of the EU as a supreme court; but that's not the Europe that really exists, which is a Europe of delegated powers of democratic member-states. That's why we should focus on if we want a more democratic Europe. We are facing also a crisis of power, which is happening in some emerging countries, where the wish for respect is in contradiction with the reality of power. This leads to negative power: the capacity to say "No", but never to say "Yes". This leads to a destructive power, because there is no strength enough to maintain together what is falling apart, like Ukraine, for example. So, what conclusions can we draw from these facts? What can we do to change things and to find new solutions?

The first conclusion I want to put forward is that we must take the lessons of ten years of use of force. Use of force, this is my belief, is never the solution. For twenty years many have thought it was possible to impose democracy on countries that were not democratic or not democratic enough. First it was tried to impose democracy through treaties and a formal set of institutional procedures, rules. It was the case in particular in Africa and in Eastern Europe after the breakup of the Soviet Union. But after a few years it became evident in many countries that democracy is more of a spirit and a social balance than a simple set of procedures. Then it was tried to impose democracy through force, thinking that changing a regime allowed to change a society at the same time. This was the error that was made in Iraq in 2003, this was again the error made in Libya in 2011. Now it is believed we can impose democracy through influence. But if this is not accompanied by a real cooperation, it leads only to frustrations and to disappointments. That's what we have witnessed particularly with the Arab Spring. The truth is, the Western democracies have now acquired a militaristic turn of mind: many think that every diplomatic problem has a military solution. It was the case in Libya in 2011,

this was the case also in Mali in 2012, and it was the case with Syria, when an intervention was wished and planned for 2013. But force is never a solution, it can only be a last resort solution. We have to give all its space to diplomacy again, because force always creates an equivalent force in reaction. It's almost a physical principle. That's how by fighting terrorism only with weapons you give the terrorism even greater strength. It is a vicious cycle, because force always destroys social and cultural balances, and it can only lead to the radicalization of religious or ethnic identities. Because force without international legitimacy always leads to the abuse of power.

The second conclusion concerning the neighborhood conflicts is that we need dialogue. You settle conflicts of interests through compromises, but conflicts of values, you need to settle them with dialogue. Dialogue means using diplomacy to its whole extent through conferences, high level meetings, and not only phone calls or communiqués about moral sanctions. We need initiatives again. And I'm convinced, we need a meeting of the Weimar Triangle with President Putin to show that on both sides today there is a possibility of dialogue. The Weimar Triangle includes France, Germany and Poland. I'm convinced also that we will need another international conference like the last Geneva conference, even if the results of this conference were quite disappointing. But, before all, we need a contact group with the main countries interested to initiate the process of dialogue, because we need task force, working groups, able to implement decisions and follow up on negotiations. Dialogue means pragmatism. You can discuss anything if you intend to remain deaf to all propositions, or if you put many preconditions to dialogue. Unfortunately, that's what is happening on the European side today. We have to see the positive signals from the other side, and not meet them with immediate distrust. In this regard we shall listen better to the proposition of the Russian diplomacy instead of rebuffing them at once. Dialogue means also common principles. The first principle we should apply for diplomacy is legality. We have to believe in a common international law that will allow us to settle conflicts peacefully: the rule of non-violation of international borders, the rule of self-determination of the people, the rule of sovereignty and non-interference in another state's affair.

The second principle is stability. We could build today a reference model for common crisis solution and stabilization of weak and divided states that could be applied in other parts of the world. We have, as I said, to organize an international conference on the future of Ukraine in order to build a long-term and step-by-step process with concrete actions on all sides. This means an agreement and a permanent organization for the economic and financial stabilization of Ukraine. This means a tool to have a political monitoring of Ukraine. We have to use the international tools to support the diplomatic dialogue and to have the approbation of the United Nations on all the way towards the crisis solution. We have to implicate all the stakeholders of our multipolar world. I think in particular that China has a crucial role to play as a mediator.

The third principle is responsibility. No party in this crisis would benefit from the Ukrainian state failing. Civil wars are always uncontrollable and uncontainable. That's why we have to put the halt to the violence as a first and urgent necessity through ceasefires. That's why we have to support a process of inclusive national dialogue. That's why we have to

think in terms of guarantees for all implicated parties. There are legitimate concerns in Ukraine and Russia about the respect of linguistic minorities. There could be guarantees in the constitutional process to grant a large regional autonomy. There are also concerns of security for Russia with the prospect if Ukraine joins NATO to have NATO troops at its very borders. There is no point in escalating towards a large-scale conflict. We have to guarantee the security of Ukraine and the security of Russia. This will mean acknowledging the neutrality of the Ukrainian state on a constitutional basis, as it had been done for Austria and Finland in the past. There are legitimate concerns in Europe about the unity and integrity of Ukraine, in particular after what happened in Ukraine. That's why the constitutional process should lead to the guarantee of one single Ukrainian state.

The third and last conclusion concerning the future of Europe: Europe is not the problem, the absence of Europe is the problem, and thus Europe is the solution. We need a stronger Europe. A stronger Europe is a coherent Europe. The first key of integration is political. We need to have a stronger Franco-German relationship, as it is considered rightly as the engine of Europe. The second key is economic: it's the euro, the crisis of the euro has revealed the necessity of a more integrated euro zone, because you can't have a single money without social transfers or mobility of workers. Unless you want all young jobless Greeks and Spanish living in Germany, you have to invent common tools to harmonize the economic conjuncture in all countries. This means a budget of the euro zone, an economic and financial governance, this means also the harmonization of fiscal and social standards. A stronger Europe is an independent Europe, and this means strategic independence, and, for that, Europe needs a working common defense mechanism. The first reason is because this region has become dangerous again, and the expenses for defense have dropped considerably in the last year. The second reason is because the dependency on the US and NATO can be at times both counterproductive and dangerous, as shown with the United States track record on communication interception. This means commercial independence also, while we are discussing the treaty, the Transatlantic treaty between Europe and the United States. Excellencies, dear friends, not only do we need a stronger Europe, but also a greater Europe. And for that it will be important to create a new architecture for a greater Europe, today none of the existing tools is sufficient. The OSCE is useful, but it is an organization coming from the cold war, which is not always adapted to the needs of today. The Council of Europe has weakened over the year, and that's why, I believe, we should need a pan-European conference between the heads of states and maybe with a representation of national parliaments. This pan-European conference will include countries coming from the EU, Turkey, Russia and Northern Africa.

This greater Europe will create the dynamism that we need. How can we compete with the EU only with 450,000,000 people, with more than a billion in China or India? In this bigger Europe, greater Europe we will have 800,000,000 people, 800,000,000 consumers, producers that might be able to create much stronger dynamism. Russia needs Europe for its growth, for its jobs, for its industrial development. No country can live on its own in an autarky. Europe needs its neighbors for its competitiveness, because these neighbors, Northern Africa, Eastern Europe

are its first clients, because these neighbors contribute to the value-creation of European companies. Neither Europe, nor Russia will find a place in globalization, if they don't find it together. We have a common future: Europe, Eastern Europe, Russia, based on a common culture and a common history. We have a common interest based on our interdependencies for the economy, for energy and for security. We just need to find the right tune, the right dialogue, the right trust that might be able to make each of us able to work together. Thank you very much.

JUAN ANTONIO MARCH PUJOL: — Thank you very much, Mr. de Villepin for such a rich speech, full of ideas and proposals for the future. I give now the floor to Vice Minister Meshkov. He was previously the ambassador of the Russian Federation in Italy and he is now the responsible of addressing this very important dossier for Russia that is the relationship with the European Union. Vice Minister, you have the floor.

ALEKSEY MESHKOV¹: — Dear Aleksandr Sergeevich, ladies and gentlemen, first of all, to equate myself with the participants of our today's discussion, I would like to speak in my private capacity that will give me the opportunity to speak more flexibly. The events of the past year demonstrated that traditional approaches to European security and cooperation reveal tangible failures. This is most evident in the context of the EU policy of Eastern Partnership and, as a consequence, the Ukrainian crisis.

Of course, the origins of modern radicalization in Europe are complex. They are rooted in the unresolved main problem: what world order we want to see in the future and what it really is. Many of today's problems lie in a prolonged transition from the old world order of the Cold War model to the 21st century model.

The theory of the end of our civilization, as well as the theory of unipolarity, gave rise to the confidence in the exclusivity of only one model of interstate relations formation and internal content of individual countries, the Western model. And to achieve that, figuratively speaking, "civilizing purpose" no holds are barred, even if they do not correspond with international principles and regulations. Military forces substitute the force of law in increasing frequency. We all know the examples: aggression against Yugoslavia, wars in Iraq and Libya, the Syrian crisis. The list goes on. And all these operations were based on a similar scheme: objectionable government was subjected to internal and external erosion, then there was a specially planned provocation, an occasion, like, for example, Racak in Yugoslavia or the notorious tube with uranium in Iraq, and as a consequence, a military intervention: victims, vast destructions, etc.

The recurrence of such scenarios is not a surprise, but at the same time it causes rejection in most of the international community which has led to the emergence of trend in favor of a multipolar world formation, the basis of which should be placed on the principles of equal security for everybody,

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on strict adherence to the Charter of the United Nations Organization and international law as such, and finally, on the creation of favorable conditions of individual countries and peoples welfare growth.

Unfortunately, not all had in mind these developments. Again, there were all sorts of theories of color revolutions and controlled chaos, based on renewed enthusiasm to fit all under one rank and ensure strict obedience to carriers of "ultimate truth". The foundation of a nascent fair world system was again under pressure of tectonic faults.

To our great disappointment, this process did not pass by Europe. And here it projected in different directions.

On the one hand, NATO and the EU expanded rapidly, often in defiance of elementary logic. If in case of the alliance there was a leading center which tried to control all the processes alone, the very structure of the EU did not allow to act quickly, consistently and effectively. Moreover, we should not forget about the deep economic crisis that had hit Europe. Hence, the rise of euroscepticism in the EU countries, and faulty delegation of building, or rather detuning the Union's relations with Russia to representatives of those states that had their own agendas, as a rule, different from the interests of other partners. How can we logically explain then that the policy of Eastern Partnership designed to build bridges between East and West Europe degenerated into building a new political and economic Berlin Wall, but along the Russian border? And this policy provoked the Ukrainian crisis that has made the situation in Europe explosive and already put this country on the brink of civil war.

Having said this, a natural question arises whether it makes sense today to discuss prospects of building Greater Europe? I am convinced that it does, and the relevance of such a conversation is only growing.

We should not go on the bit of those forces that for one reason or another want to get our continent back into the era of confrontation. Moreover, I am confident that they will fail: too much experience of Russia working together with its European partners in the political, economic and humanitarian fields is already accumulated.

In any case, the idea of sustainable construction of the model of Greater Europe expanded in future is really up to date. The leading role in this work is intended to be taken up by the OSCE and the Helsinki Plus 40 process developed under its auspices, the purpose of which is precisely to launch a comprehensive process of building Greater Europe. In the political sphere, we could think about how to transform our common historical roots into our common future which would be comfortable for all Europeans and all the way from the Atlantic to Vladivostok.

The OSCE Permanent Council must regain its original function, working out joint decisions that would integrate and advance best practices in the formation of the pan-European space of prosperity and democracy. Cooperation and the ability to listen to one's partners must take place of ideologized skirmishes. Mutual respect should replace mutual alienation. This kind of a dialogue must be inclusive, rather than the constantly inculcated culture of imposing one group's opinion on other European partners. After all, one way or another European countries face similar challenges related to continuing democratization, the fight against corruption, terrorism and drug trafficking. Russia and its European partners have largely overlapping ideas on a number of

important international issues, including Iran and the Middle East. NATO always drifting towards a military solution of the problems, and active steps to create the European missile defense clearly showed that we are still far from implementing the principle of indivisibility of security, and the obligation not to strengthen one's security at the expense of others' remain on paper only. There is already a tendency of making use of the Ukrainian crisis in order to reform the entire European security system following the Atlantic patterns. How else can we evaluate the NATO military buildup along the borders of Russia, including the redeployment of so-called "dual-capable" aircrafts to Baltic airfields?

What is especially frustrating is that the verification mechanisms worked out so hard are so costly, and unbiased conclusions of military observers are substituted with political activism.

However, the Russian proposal for a European Security Treaty remains in force, and its early adoption would be in the interests of the overwhelming majority of European states. I should mention at the outset that its adoption would make sense if it is a legally binding document. Frankly speaking, we are tired in Russia of how willingly our Western partners dispense with their political commitments. Much will also depend on the political will of Washington and NATO, who actually ceased contact with Russia, including cooperation in the areas such as the fight against transnational crime, terrorism, piracy and drug trafficking. It seems that such a decision will be greeted with enthusiasm in the world of criminal circles.

In the context of the current geopolitical situation, the Russian Federation continues to consider the Council of Europe as one of the key structures of the Euro-Atlantic space, capable of making a significant contribution to the construction of Greater Europe without borderlines. This is due to the fact that the existing system of division of labor of international organizations in Europe presupposes that the Council of Europe is responsible for humanitarian issues in accordance with the Charter, and it was there that the bulk of European conventions and other agreements and legal acts has been created (today there are 216). All of them, as opposed to political OSCE documents, are legally binding and thus constitute a common legal space of the continent.

We expect all bodies, institutions and monitoring bodies of the Council of Europe, in particular the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, to be more active in fruitfully fighting extremism, aggressive nationalism, anti-Semitism, racial and religious intolerance. We also expect a greater impact of the Council of Europe convention instruments primarily the Convention against Torture Committee and the International Advisory Group under the auspices of the Council of Europe to investigate offenses in Ukraine since November 2013, including cruel murder of dozens of innocent people in the Trade Union House in Odessa, May 2, 2014.

It is difficult even to think about Greater Europe without strategic partnership between Russia and the European Union. I must admit that in the late 1990s and in 2000s a lot has been done in this respect. This includes the existing Partnership and cooperation agreement, and also the ambitious goal of creating four common spaces: the economic space; the space of freedom, security and justice; the space on external security; and the space on research and education, including cultural aspects. Finally, there was a

promising new partnership for modernization. The turnover of commodities was actively growing, and reached \$417.5 billion.

Great expectations have been associated with the beginning of work on a new basic agreement and visa-free travel for citizens of Russia and the EU.

As we all know, such cooperation of such extent could not suddenly stumble on the Ukrainian crisis and immediately slide into sanctions and political hysteria.

Problems were brewing undercurrent. Chief among them is that after a wave of EU enlargement the original essence of the partnership was lost: the willingness to understand your partner, his equal rights. We heard more and more often that Russia owed something to somebody. Europe firmly set a course for pushing its interests and standards. I cannot recall a recent case when the European Union as a whole would support Russia on any controversial issue. Probably, we are not perfect either, but Europe never saw that Russia was right, and this is too much.

What to do then? We can divide further: Europe will meet the even tighter embrace of Washington, and we will head to the East. Who might benefit from this? In Europe, certainly no one will. So what shall we do?

There is only one way out: give up the double standards, forget about one's own exclusiveness and infallibility, and build our common Greater Europe pragmatically and persistently. This is the essence of the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin to create a common economic and humanitarian space in Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok by 2020. And this process must be inclusive, involving all countries in Europe, regardless of their affiliation to different integration associations. By the way, it is high time we stopped playing integration nihilism. If we preach the sovereign equality of all states, why do we reject other integration associations? Naturally, I am referring to the interaction of the EU with the Customs Union, and also NATO and the CSTO.

In the end, it has been almost 15 years since the time when, under the auspices of the OSCE, the Platform for Cooperative Security was created, and it was thought as a platform for coordination meetings between heads of various European and Eurasian structures.

Therefore, it is still possible to build Greater Europe? I think we can, but only together, considering the legitimate interests of the partners. And these are not simple lamentations, as the growth of skepticism among the European public towards the project of the European Union has the same nature as the Russian approaches. If they do not hear you, do not take into account your basic interests, impose on you a philosophy of life all too often alien to you, one can hardly count on your unconditional support.

We must work together to find unifying approaches, to build and not to discard already accumulated potential of cooperation, and then we will succeed.

JUAN ANTONIO MARCH PUJOL: — Thank you very much, Vice Minister Meshkov for your very futuristic presentation in the sense that we have to act quickly and that we have full ideas how we have to proceed. I will give now the floor to the previous Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain, Miguel Ángel Moratinos. He is one of the most prestigious specialist in the Middle East; he was at the origin of the peace conference in Madrid in 1991, he was re-

sponsible in the Foreign Affairs Ministry for Arab issues for more than ten years, ambassador in Israel and the special envoy of the European Union to the Middle East for nearly six years. He has been the longest-lasting Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Spanish democracy, being in the job for nearly seven years. And he has always been a great friend of Russia, supporting the idea to create a common space with the EU. When he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, he transformed the visa regime of Spain with Russia expanding the multiple visa to most of the applicants, and by transforming it, he moved other countries to do the same. His objective was a non-visa relationship between Russia and the European Union. He thinks that mobility of the people is the key of the union of the countries, and he proposed to eliminate visas from the European Union towards Russian citizens, and Russia towards the European citizens. Well, this is a European question that is on debate, but he decided to transform the normal regime of visas into a multiple entry visa for Russians into Spain, so when he started as Foreign Affairs Minister, there were only 200,000 Russians visiting Spain, and at the end of his mandate there were more than 1,500,000. Because of the Spanish new initiative, the Italians followed, the French followed, the Portuguese followed, the Greek followed, and he made a great step to favour the easy movement of Russian fellows toward the European Union. Minister Moratinos, the floor is now for you.

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — Good afternoon, dear students!

Let me speak unfortunately in English although it is not my perfect language, but anyhow. It is a global language, everything is global today, so we have this global language in the passion. In the old Spain we had Arabic as the global language, now we have English. So let me start by inviting all of you to come to Spain thanks to the visa regime, so come, to enjoy the Spanish hospitality, enjoy the Spanish weather. Even in Saint Petersburg we have Spanish weather today, you know, it's quite hot, I see the students with, how do you say, fans, abanicos, and I hope, director, next time you'll have to prepare for the audience and conference, especially the temperature to cope with the Spanish style weather. But let me thanks the Rector Aleksandr Zapesotskiy for his vision and engagement to repeat the meeting we had in Barcelona just one year ago with minister Ivanov, former Prime Minister of France, Mr. Villepin, and the two rectors. We hadn't our friends from the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry at that time but today it has been possible. You know, when you organize a conference, a meeting, a round table, it's very easy to organize the first one but it is difficult to ensure the continuity. Most complicated is to guarantee the follow-up. And you, Rector Zapesotskiy, you have guaranteed the follow-up inviting all of us to come to Saint Petersburg. And the second reason to congratulate the Rector is because he has also guarantee that what we have discussed will remain.

Sometimes we talk, you listen, some of you take notes, but sometimes the words fly, and after one week, or two weeks, or one month, or one year you forget about what you heard. Maybe in three months you will say what a really interesting conference Mr. Villepin has given to us. But I cannot remember how was his proposal about a pan-European Conference. So in order to avoid that, the Rector has published a fantastic book with fantastic words and

it is there, so I really encourage you to take this book and make the publicity for the Rector, so the publishing house of the university can have some financial support, yes, and at the same time, you will see his effort deserves recognition. I'm serious. I really encourage you to read this book, because one year ago is practically nothing, but one year ago the three main personalities that we are here we were already insisting on the need of a New Large Europe because we were already concerned about the future between the European Union and Russia. Well, of course, not a single of us had a single idea or it even came to our minds that we would have a big crisis one year after, and some of you will say "Well, it happens always like that: politicians, diplomats, they always are a disaster, because they never prevent, they never imagine what is going to happen". But if you go deep into the discussion, into the debates that are reflected in this book, you will discover that already some ideas some proposals, the urgency to move forward between Russia and the European Union, and the need to act together was mentioned once and again by us.

So, today we have a new reality: we have this Ukrainian crisis, and maybe this Ukrainian crisis can accelerate what we were trying to produce together, the friends of Russia in Europe and the friends of Europe in Russia, to create together this new architecture that Mr. Villepin has mentioned in his speech. Let me try to be brief in my presentation although I will repeat a little bit what I said previously in Barcelona, because you were not there and I'm not sure you are going to read the book. I think, one of the main problems of the Russian-European relationship is due to the structural nature, the perverse dialectics I would say, of how the relationship between Russia and Europe is conceived. Let me explain myself. For Europeans Russia is at the same time a neighbor with borders, and at the same time it is a big player on the international arena, let's say, a superpower. So the relationship that Europeans try to project to Russia sometimes is as normal neighborhood relationship, and sometimes we look to Russia to see how Russia is playing in the big decisions on the international arena. And unfortunately we use to say that you choose your friends, but you don't choose your neighbors. Russia has not chosen all the neighbors in the Eastern part of Europe, and Europe has as a neighbor of Russia the former counties that belonged to the so called, Warsaw Pact, Communist block or whatever.

And, unfortunately, I have to be very blunt and very clear: paradoxically, these countries that are the neighbors and that should take care of having the best relations with Russia, they are the ones who put more difficulties when you want to reinforce the European Union policy towards Russia. When we were in the Council of Europe, the Baltics, the Czechs, the Polish, the people who speak practically your language, all of them tried to reinforce caution by saying "well, let's be cautious with Russia, let's have some second thought about Russia, let's put our conditions about Russia", and then the Southern part, the so called old Europe: France, Spain, Italy, Portugal — "we are pro-Russia, trying to build together an intense relationship with Russia". So the paradox is that the neighbors that should be the ones who really should engage in promoting and reinforcing the relationship with Russia are the ones who are putting hardest obstacles with the Russia's relation with the European Union. And at the same time, we have this Russia playing the big role of superpower.

And so, Europeans want to depart from this, you know, club of selected countries or entities that can decide the future of humanity, and when Russia succeeded thanks to its diplomacy, to dismantle the chemical armament of Syria, everybody was surprised “Why Russia is back in the main negotiation processes?” When Russia is trying to really have an important role in the Iranian negotiation with the West, having an important role mediating in order to find a solution, we, Europeans, say “Well, what is Russia doing in this important area, where only the United States and China are playing”. So, there is a kind of jealousy, envy of the Europeans to see Russia be a big power as we, the Europeans, have not the capacity to play in the same division. So, this dialectic, be neighbors, and be a player with a bigger role as global actor is what really in the end makes the relationship extremely complex. In order to increase this complexity we come across with this Ukrainian crisis, and we come with this Ukrainian crisis to reveal again and to resuscitate again, you know, what we all consider was something of history, of the past; the spirit, the ghost, the soul of the Cold War. This ghost is back, but is back not only in the United States. The Cold War is not back only in the NATO headquarters; it’s also back in your country, in your minds, in your mentality, and that’s what you should not allow even in Europe.

The stereotype of Europeans when they address the issue of Russia, is many times that the new Russian Federation is the second version of the Soviet Union more or less. Let me put that bluntly. There are politicians who rule the Russian Federation and are former members of the KGB. You read the Spanish or European papers and you are flooded with news on the Russian mafia. They rarely report good news. They portray Russia as if it was the old Russia, the country of the Red army. They have in their mentality, in the Western world, and most particularly in the United States this ghost and spirit of the Cold War. And you, Russians, with all my respect, you fell in the trap. Instead of resisting or abandoning this new philosophy of having a new Cold War, you respond with the same mentality: “russophobia”, “they don’t like us”, “we are always the losers”, “the imperialism”, “the West is against”, “Europeans don’t understand us”... And you repeat, and you resent, and you respond with the same mentality than those who want to restore the Cold War. So that’s the real tragedy of today’s relationship between the European Union and Russia. So, we are not here to go back to history. We are not here to recall the common mistakes or the different mistakes that we, Europeans have made, Russia has made, or others have made. We are here to look to the future with the young generation like the moderator, Ambassador Juan Antonio March, has really called up on you. We come here at the momentum a big crisis exist: Ukraine. Ukraine that, if we would be able to be in a diplomatic laboratory, would be the perfect case to be as a country what the French call “le trait d’union”, it is to say, the link between Russia and Europe. But instead of being the link, instead of being, you know, the place where you meet together and we work together, the others have converted Ukraine in the battlefield between Russia and Europe. Why we should ask Ukraine to choose between Russia and Europe? Why we should not be able to create a common agenda that will benefit Ukrainians and Europeans, and Russia? Why we don’t have enough creativity, imagination, elusion to create a country that can benefit from the economic and technological innovation aspect of Europe and benefit of the economy and

university research of Russia? Why we should have this tremendous decision to divide and to try to attract for us or for them Ukraine? So that is what is going on in Ukraine. So, we have to find a solution.

Dominique de Villepin put some realistic proposals on the table 1: the contact group, to have this political-level meeting that could really have a different way; because let me be very frank with all of you: the future depends on us. What Europeans want to be in the future and what Russians want to be in the future depend on us. Do you want to be in conflict with each other, between Russians and Europeans? Or do you want to have a common line of prosperity and future, making together the new horizon of liberty and freedom, and prosperity? So we have really to take a bold decision. It’s not going to be easy. We should establish some confidence-building measures to recover the trust, because, we have to say, the trust is lost due to the lack of good relationship, bad action made by everybody. I don’t want to point out neither Russians, nor Europeans, nor others, nor Ukrainians: a common collective failure has happened about how to deal with the future of Ukraine. So this collective failure should now call upon us in order to rebuild a new relationship between the European Union and Russia. And we can do that. We can do it if we have a strong will.

Well, I remember that in the previous years of the European Union. When Finland joined the European Union, we used this term “Finlandization”. Well, why you don’t have for Ukraine “Ukrainization”? Let’s put Ukraine as a specific case, where both Russia and the European Union decide to develop together and benefit. It can be done. Of course, Ukraine has, you know, all the right to join some economic agreement, or some trade agreement, with the European Union, but also it can benefit from other economic and trade area with the Russian Federation. Why we don’t find some common sense decision about the security challenge? I had for some time discussed these ideas of how the Navy base in Crimea could be a joint base between Europeans, NATO and Russia. Why we have to have a base in order to defend ourselves? Is Europe your enemy? Are the NATO countries your enemy? What kind of enemy? Or we want to be friends? We are already partners, but we are not allies, why you don’t create an Alliance? And if we create an alliance, we don’t need military bases, targeting our guns against us. Why you don’t make a joint base? With joint maneuvers, joint exercises? Why do you have to maintain the Cold War’s ghost and spirit in your minds? Is this what really refrain Europe and Russia to build together?

My dear friends, I think we are on the flexion point. Dominique de Villepin says we have a week of importance and signification. But we need really to look on the next month and years. What Europeans want to do together with Russia and vice-versa, what Russia wants to do with the European Union, and that has to be done. It has to be done because “the others” (inverted commas), they would prefer that both we will be confronting each other, so don’t allow them to win: let’s win together! And let’s win together with new ideas, new proposals, new initiatives. I remember reading here in Saint Petersburg the biography of Fiodor Dostoyevskiy, the great Russian-European novelist. For me Dostoyevskiy is part of my life. I’m a European, I’m Spanish, but Dostoyevskiy was part of my first reading. Dostoyevskiy was confronted in his life with this conflict of the two schools of thought at that time in

Russia: the classic traditionalist Russian that wants to become everything like a traditional Russian, and the people who were very much impressed by the modernization of Europe. And he decided to go to Europe to avoid this backward influence of traditional Russia. And he went to Europe. He didn't like Europe. He went to France, he went to Germany, he went to England. He didn't like, because there was a deep crisis. And he returned to Saint Petersburg, and he decided to look for his own way, his own way to write and to express his ideas. That's what we should do together, to forget about the others, the other actors, and to look together to new roles, new ways and to bring together a new Europe, and this new Europe belongs to all of us. Thank you very much!

JUAN ANTONIO MARCH PUJOL: — Thank you very much, Mr. Moratinos for your very clear vision on how transforming difficulties into opportunities and crises into victories. Now I will give the floor to Mr. Igor Ivanov. He was Minister of the Foreign of the Russian Federation from 1998 to 2004. He created many new, let's say, directions for foreign policy in Russia, establishing relationship with the Council of Europe, developing relationships with the European Union. He is extremely appreciated in Spain; he was ambassador for a very long time in Spain, and before he was in the embassy in Madrid as councillor. He has the highest decoration in Spain, Isabella Catolica as a very clear proof of how much Spain appreciates his task in the country, his friendship with Europe. Mr. Ivanov, you have the floor.

IGOR IVANOV': — Dear Aleksandr Sergeevich, dear members of our meeting! I am particularly pleased to speak to a young audience. I want to believe that you will live in this very Greater Europe which we are discussing today, in prosperous, stable Europe that you will be able to travel freely, choose your place of residence, place of work, where you will be free to build your future. However, it does not happen by itself. We will have to fight for this Europe which we believe in to overcome the difficulties that we face.

When last year upon the initiative of Aleksandr Zape-sotskiy and the Rector of Barcelona Pompeu Fabra University we started our project dedicated to Greater Europe, we probably felt more optimistic than today, within the Ukrainian crisis. This does not mean that the very idea of Greater Europe has lost its attractiveness and value, of course not. However, faced with the Ukrainian crisis, we saw how difficult this task is, how many problems we have to solve today and in the future, in order to make Europe our true common home, where all the people would feel comfortable, safe and would have the opportunity to build their future.

It is my belief that Europe will never be as it was before the Ukrainian crisis. The crisis revealed many problem issues which, for various reasons, were omitted or postponed until things go better. Many people, including myself, pre-

¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (1998–2004), the Secretary of the Russian Security Council (2004–2007), the President of the Russian Council on Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, corresponding member of Russian Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Professor, honored official of the Diplomatic Service of the Russian Federation. He is an author of "New Russian Diplomacy: Ten years of foreign policy of new Russia", "Russia's foreign policy at the present stage" and "Russia's foreign policy and Peace" and others. He was awarded with the orders "For Merit to the Fatherland of the 4th degree", "Badge of Honor", the Order of Friendship (Vietnam), the Order of Saint Blessed Prince Vladimir of the 2nd degree (ROC).

sumed that despite all the objective contradictions between Russia, Europe and the United States (speaking about Euro-Atlantic security, we cannot ignore the role and the place of the United States), all of us, Russia, Europe and the United States, have at the same time a lot of incentives sensitizing us to cooperation and collaboration.

We presumed that Russia, Europe and the United States must be objectively interested in stabilizing the international political system. Moreover, Russia, Europe and the United States must be also interested in interacting in order to build a more stable global economic system, especially amidst the global economic crisis burst in 2008-2009.

We all presumed that taking into account the interest of inherent security, Russia, European countries and the United States should be interested in stagnation overcoming in the sphere of arms control and should resume negotiations on disarmament and arms reduction, especially in the sphere of mass destruction weapon. We presumed that Russia, the United States and Europe should take into account their own interests and join forces in fighting and resistance to modern threats and challenges of the 21st century. It was not a fantasy: we based our ideas on reality.

Here in Saint Petersburg we held a unique summit of Russia and the European Union in 2003 which was attended by the heads of all European states, including the heads of ten countries yet joining the European Union. Here we, the leaders of European states, including the president of Russia, optimistically scheduled and discussed plans of Greater Europe building. Russia-NATO summit took place in 2002 in Rome. It was attended by the leaders of all the NATO countries and the president of Russia. We signed the declaration on the establishment of the NATO- Russia Council and spoke about building our common security system. In 2005 in Moscow, we jointly celebrated the 60th anniversary of the Victory in the World War II. This event gathered all the leaders of the European states, except the three presidents of the Baltic States. Together with the Russian president, we talked about how to prevent another tragedy in the world and in our continent. All this was quite recently, 10 years ago.

So what has happened during that time, making us rolling back today and speaking about a new Cold War again? Something has happened, not only in Europe but also in our relationship, something has been worked out wrong, some mistakes have been admitted that led to today's conversations about the Cold War and other potential conflicts. At once there appeared specialists (or those who call themselves specialists) predicting horrible scenarios of development. The Cold War is not the worst scenario. It's a clash of civilizations, world chaos, etc. It seems to me that even in difficult situations we must not give in to emotions, but we need to calmly analyze what has happened, preferably basing our analysis on evidence and research, including the Ukrainian crisis into our analysis. We, the European states, Russia and the United States, should draw the right conclusions from this crisis. Where have we made mistakes? How to make sure that these mistakes do not affect our relationship?

An extremely difficult situation in international relations, especially in the Euro-Atlantic space, is forming today. After the Cold War, it is, probably, the first serious test for all the leading nations of the world. However, I think it would be a rash to say that the consequences of

the Ukrainian crisis have already been predetermined, including the consequences for Greater Europe. These consequences will be determined by a combination of many factors, primarily the ability or inability of the leading participants of the Ukrainian events to draw correct conclusions, to learn Ukrainian lessons and to determine the optimal strategy for the future.

In this connection, I would like to share with you some of my thoughts concerning the lessons of the Ukrainian crisis which could be equally important for Russia, the European states and the United States.

The first conclusion is that the crisis over Ukraine should not be presented as some kind of unexpected failure of world politics or as an isolated phenomenon opposite to the main trends in the development of international relations in recent decades. In fact, the Ukrainian crisis has always had its own background, growing over the past two decades after the Cold War. All of us have witnessed the process of NATO expansion to the East, NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, the military invasion of Iraq, the unilateral withdrawal of the United States from the agreement on missile defense, as well as the recent events in Libya and Syria. This list, unfortunately, goes on. It clearly reveals the whole chain of steps of the West in which each step somehow undermined the foundations of international law and the role of the UN Security Council, reduced opportunities for multilateral action, justified the use of military force, as mentioned by Mr. de Villepin.

I want you to understand me correctly; I am not trying to shift all the responsibility for these processes to the Western states. We must be self-critical, and, probably, Russia did not do everything in order to avoid such a scenario. In particular, from my point of view, we were not able to overcome the arrogant attitude towards the former Soviet republics which, like Russia, have become sovereign states and demanded (and demand now) to honor their sovereignty. I could list more lessons, but unfortunately, the format of our meeting and time do not allow for this. Moreover, I think that we will have to do this job seriously in the future.

Nevertheless, we are facing a difficult task of strengthening international security mechanisms and starting to form a new world order together, an order that meets the realities of the 21st century.

The second conclusion is that the Ukrainian crisis has demonstrated the fragility and unreliability of the existing institutions of the Euro-Atlantic security. This was stated by Mr. Meshkov, so I will not dwell on all the institutions in detail, but I will say that I totally agree with the fact that the Euro-Atlantic space created a large number of institutions in the postwar period in Europe which at that time meant a step forward. However, for various reasons they do not work, they are not effective today as shown by the Ukrainian crisis.

For example, consider NATO-Russia Council. When we created it in May 2002, all the heads of NATO states and Russia signed a joint document which committed us to the following: "The Council will work on the basis of a continuous political dialogue on security issues among its members with a view to early identification of emerging problems, determination of optimal common approaches and the conduct of joint actions". None of this has been implemented either during the Caucasus crisis in 2008,

or now in the case of Ukraine. Conversely, once a crisis occurs, the work of NATO-Russia Council "froze" upon the initiative of our Western partners. I could cite other examples.

All of this suggests the urgent need to address the strengthening of mutual security in the Euro-Atlantic space. Cooperation in this area should be based on the principles of equal and indivisible security. On this account, there is a large number of suggestions on how to do it. This is the initiative of Russia on European security, as mentioned by Mr. Medvedev, the initiative of non-governmental organizations. A large group of professionals (former military leaders, politicians, diplomats from the United States and European countries) has prepared a series of proposals on how they imagined the creation and formation of a new Euro-Atlantic security. However, to make this work, the political will and decisions at the highest political level are required from all the states of the Euro-Atlantic security. This way the Helsinki process began in the midst of the Cold War. The results were remarkable. What we need now is a political decision at the highest level in order to develop an effective process of forming a new Euro-Atlantic security system.

We must learn another lesson from the Ukrainian crisis. The Ukrainian crisis showed that the gulf of mistrust that separates Russia and the West, unfortunately, became no less and, perhaps, even grew over the past 20 years after the Cold War. Old ideas and fears proved to be extremely tenacious. Due to this, the events in Ukraine are considered by many people in the West and in Russia as a zero-sum game. Cold War-style rhetoric is onwards and upwards and the hawks from both sides are forming public opinion in our countries. All this suggests that we cannot expect that distrust, mutual suspicion, prejudice inherited from the Cold War will disappear by themselves, without consistent, purposeful effort, both in the West and in Russia. It is not enough to say that we are not understood by the West, this is not an argument. Therefore, we must do so to be understood. We must solve together how to do it. We can do it only through dialogue, consistent work with our partners (we have many partners and friends in the West, not only Mr. de Villepin and Mr. Moratinos; they are a lot more and they are willing to listen and to understand).

Russia needs Europe just as Europe needs Russia. This is not a whim of politicians, but dictates of the present time. However, as I said, we must struggle for this relationship. Only ignorant people can say that Russia can easily shift from West to East. Russia's interests are supported by a balanced foreign policy. By the way, this is what is written in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, signed by the president of Russia: Russia's foreign policy should be multidirectional. In addition to this, the more successful our relations in the West are the more successful will be our foreign policy in the East. Unilateral policy is always less effective.

I began my presentation with Ukraine and I would like to finish it also with the Ukrainian theme. The Ukrainian crisis separated today's Russia and the West, but this very crisis can become the very starting point for building Greater Europe which we believe in and which we will work for, if together we find the right solution that will help stabilize the situation in Ukraine.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Mr. March, I request the opportunity to say a few words to the students and ask a few questions to the participants, in other words to start our discussion. First, I want to thank the students for their patience. Difficulties pursue our dialogue since the days of Barcelona. Pompeu Fabra University is a stunning modern university which can increase the authority of any country and any city. But when we arrived at this University, we could not get into the lecture hall, as well as the students, because there appeared a few hooligans (30 to 40 people) who introduced themselves as Barcelona Student Union, shouted insults and blocked the entrance. Pompeu Fabra University students were outraged by this fact and called the police, but it took 40 minutes to get to work on our program. I then thought that such scenes were impossible in Saint Petersburg, but now I suppose that it is theoretically possible.

I am grateful to the audience for their attention to our issue. Today we have tackled problems much more complex than those that are usually discussed in university lecture halls when lecturers speak especially for students, as our guests talk both with you and with the international community. Here you can see a number of representatives of international news agencies. Today we are having a serious conversation that goes beyond this lecture hall.

Let us begin with the question addressed to all participants. I would like Mr. Moratinos and Mr. de Villepin to answer, because I have some idea concerning the response of the Russian participants: *Can we consider Conchita Wurst and her victory at the Eurovision Song Contest a symbol of modern European culture and modern development of European culture?* Let us put aside the question of Conchita Wurst's voice and melodies, and talk about a bearded woman elected number one (with glee in some countries).

In Russia thanks to literature, quite all the undergraduate schoolchildren think that France is a liberal and bias-free country, where love reigns. From the works of French classics, we learn that there are many cafes in Paris, where beautiful girls sit and eat cakes. Spain was the homeland of the Inquisition and puritanism. There exist specific cultural traditions. I would like to hear the representatives of the Western European countries with different culture and history.

Mr. Villepin, can we consider Conchita Wurst a symbol of modern Europe or a cultural symbol, in your opinion?

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN: — Well, as a matter of fact, I think, it can be seen as a symbol of the freedom of speech. Certainly not as a symbol of the European Union. And I think, that needs a little explanation. We are in societies that are puzzles, troubled with a lot of difficulties. People may have different ideas, they will face common challenges: unemployment, social difficulties, stress, which is part of modern lives everywhere in globalization, and the question is: how far should we go in allowing people to express themselves the way they are? And as a matter of fact, concerning possibilities of respecting opinions, respecting differences, whether we are talking about what we should call straight people or homosexuals, we are living in very liberal societies. That tells about the freedom of the society, that doesn't say anything about the values that we cherish. Everyone may have his own opinion, everyone may have his thinking about the order of society, but

no one should impose to the society rules that may forbid this freedom of expression.

So, what is interesting in this case is why this lady or this man, this bearded lady or this bearded man, I don't know, why did he win? Was he the best singer? I'm not sure. I'm not sure she was... he was the best singer, I'm not sure he was the most beautiful singer in competition, but what I'm sure is that it was a way for the people who voted for him to express their own freedom. It was the capacity, let's say, to play. Of course, when you have one person like that in a competition, it's fun to try to push him as far as possible. That doesn't mean that people would like to be like him, would like to think that he should be the one on the top of the cover of the magazines, but that means they considered at one point that it was fun to show to the other people of Europe that he could be, maybe not a symbol, but an emblem and expression at one moment of this freedom of expression, so it has nothing to do with politics, it has nothing to do with the symbolic aspect of our society, but it has a lot to do with how we can laugh about ourselves, how we can criticize ourselves and how deep is in our culture the feeling that an individual can take its own destiny in his hands. So just freedom.

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — Well, I think, Mr. Villepin has explained perfectly. I didn't vote for him or her. But I fully agree with Dominique that it's a total question of individuality or freedom of individual that his wish to sing in a women's dress with a beard or being a man converted into a woman is up to the individual, and that, I think, the Western society, the European society, has come to this conclusion. I was part of a government, the first European government that agreed to introduce the gay wedding, the gay marriage. Mr. Zapatero was the first prime minister in Europe who decided to do this. And I'm proud even if I'm Catholic. Well I respect gays, but I have my own personal life.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Mr. Ivanov, please.

IGOR IVANOV: — It so happened that I was in Geneva. I returned after the meeting and went to the room where my colleagues awaited me. At that very time, the contest was broadcast on TV, and Conchita was singing. I was not aware what country she represented; I did not know if it was a man or a woman. She had a beautiful voice. Therefore, I said, "I like the performance so much! Perhaps this will be the winner". I think the previous comments politicized this topic too much. After all, it is a vocal competition, right? Probably, someone sang better or worse. But it seems to me that the winner was primarily determined by the vocal characteristics, and not by any other ones.

For example, we watch the Paralympic Games, although they involve people with disabilities. Nevertheless, the audience at the Paralympic Games is no smaller than at the Olympic Games. Of course, you can bring any issue under the political platform, and then we shall be watching all from a political standpoint. If I had participated in the vote maybe I would have voted for the representative of Austria. But not because she was a woman with a beard, but because I liked the way this song was performed. That is my approach.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you. Now, to finish this the least serious part of our meeting, I will ask one question. Who in this room voted Conchita Wurst with open eyes? Raise your hand, please. One. Thank you, I understand the opinion of the audience.

IGOR IVANOV: — We are two.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — No, you voted with your eyes closed, and our colleague voted with open eyes. This is public opinion in Russia. I supposed something like that. Now, let me move on to matters that are more serious. Mr. Villepin, I am going to ask you one question which may not seem a pleasant one to the representatives of Western Europe. Nevertheless, the question is connected with the views of many Russian scientists who analyze the situation in Western Europe.

For us the dialogue with Western Europe on the construction of a united Europe is very important. However, to what extent is Western Europe independent in this dialogue? The point here is not that it is difficult to develop a common view within Europe. It seems to us that Western Europe and its key countries are prone to very strong transatlantic influence. Historians of our University reminded me that when Russia, Germany and France together opposed the invasion of Iraq, both Germany and France quickly changed the nation's leadership. And our specialists monitoring elections find that it happened with the help of external involvement.

For example, when Schroeder jostled with Merkel, and the difference in votes was about 1%, the external forces bet on Merkel. It was connected with phone-tapping: it is not for getting information on Merkel's or Schroeder's private life that they do it. Similar things took place during the elections won by Nicolas Sarkozy.

Moreover, our experts on elections in Western Europe believe that the most powerful and independent candidates for the role of the EU countries key leaders are eliminated as far as on the distant approaches to election by means of a number of specific actions, and I am not going to discuss them now. To what extent can Russia discuss the future of Europe at the official political level today? This is a question for Mr. Villepin.

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN: — I think that... it is possible, it is feasible to have independent partners in the EU for Russia, and most of all it is necessary. And, I think, the reference that you made, Mr. Rector, to the historical times of the Iraqi war, is very good, because at that time three countries were working together in Europe: Germany, France and Russia. These three countries were the basis of a troika working to try to avoid a military intervention in Iraq. And, as a matter of fact, these three countries were facing the United States, but not only the United States, they were facing many European countries: the UK, of course, Spain at that time, Italy, and many others, Eastern countries.

So the question is, how can we have again the possibility of these European countries working together with Russia, and that is very important to understand. The key issue is how to resume dialogue. To resume dialogue between Russia and the European Union needs first trust. You cannot have a real dialogue with a country without having trust. The choice for Russia today is to show signs of willingness

of dialogue, direct dialogue with some European countries, and I believe that there are two countries that are better placed, maybe then others, to start this dialogue. Of course, for historical reasons, Germany. And the second country is France. For historical reasons, because these countries, they have a specific history with Russia, and they have a special commitment to work for peace on the continent. But in order to have this dialogue succeeding, we must have signs, steps that Russia is willing to go forward. One of the problems we are facing in the European Union very often when we look to Russia is that we have the feeling that the Russian leadership is more talking to its own public opinion than to the EU, more talking to its conservative and nationalist public opinion than to the other peoples of Europe.

So the question today, before we talk about a dialogue between our countries and Russia, is how much is it possible today to have an independent dialogue, knowing that we have nationalist forces very strong in Russia, and populist forces getting stronger and stronger in the EU? And we are going to see, I'm afraid, next week on Sunday a strong vote for rightist parties in the European Union. So we have to understand that the dialogue might be more and more difficult, while we are waiting. There is an urgent need to understand on both sides, and I'm saying that on the side of France, Germany, other European countries and Russia, that time is limited, because the more we wait, the more our leaders are not the one who are deciding, but just following their public opinion, following the nationalist forces. So we need to have leaders able to go for dialogue. That means, able to go for a strong risk, which is going to listen to what the other person has to say. In order to have a constructive dialogue, we need to be sure that we are talking the same language, that's why I believe that for a good dialogue you need secrecy. You cannot have a real dialogue when you talk openly with another country listening to you, because, if you do so, you are going to freeze your capacity of speech, because you don't speak for the other person, you speak for the public opinions, so you don't discuss really. You don't have any latitude, strategic latitude of discussion, a real discussion is never on the open. A real discussion has to be secret, because you may be able to change your opinion, and, if you are going to change your opinion, you don't want anybody to be there and tell you "Oh, but you are changing your position". Changing your position, that's part of the diplomatic life, it has to be done with secrecy, with time and with real strong perspective. That's why we need first direct dialogue, dialogue with Russia, Germany and France, then dialogue between Russia and the troika, including Poland, than a more formal and bigger dialogue between Russia and the EU, and progressively we might end up with an international conference, but we should start with a smaller engine.

The smaller engine, as very often Igor Ivanov says, has to be a contact group, because within a contact group you may have only the countries that are willing to work forward. In the contact group in the case of Ukraine we may have the United States, we may have the UK, we may have France, Germany, Poland. These countries should work together to go forward with Russia and find solutions. So, you see, a working diplomacy has to use all the tools of diplomacy. But a good diplomacy is not a diplomacy that only stands up in front of the media, stands up on TV, makes decoration, because the more you make decoration, the more

you have your hands tied. And to have your hands tied in front of other nations, in front of your public opinion, that is not going to allow you to move as diplomacy needs you, commands you. So, yes, we can have a dialogue, but we must go step by step from a direct dialogue between countries to a stronger and bigger dialogue transformed in a regional or an international conference.

Evgeniy VALYANSKY, *II grade, the Faculty of Arts*: — Today we discussed the opening of borders with Europe. To what extent are they really waiting for us, Russians, in Europe? Will Europe be able to ease up and raise the Russian people to its level? Or will we be perceived as a subservient and second-class citizens?

ALEKSEY MESHKOV: — I will try to answer this question. Russian people have never been second-class in Europe. Incidentally, the year before last Russian tourists left 8 billion Euros in Europe. They are waiting for us with money. In relation to the current events, the European Union really froze its work on agreements on visa-free regime which had been actually agreed from our side. We have the agreement on simplification of visa formalities collecting dust on the shelves for a year and a half. Besides, it was designed primarily for the benefit of students. And not only for Russian students: students from Europe could also visit Russia. I do not understand why, instead of dialogue Mr. de Villepin is speaking about, they tear these humanitarian connections. But we must give proper respect to our Spanish, French, Italian and Greek counterparts who are increasing the opportunities for issuing visas. I am convinced that the sooner we achieve a visa-free regime the greater the understanding will be. And people need to work where they are interested to.

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — I want to add something about visas. Remember this total paradox. In the Soviet times, during the time of the Soviet Union, the West, Europe, called for the Helsinki act, and we were pressing the Soviet Russia to open the borders to let everybody to come to Europe. Now that the Soviet Union has collapsed, and we have a democratic Russia, a new regime, the Europeans established the visa regime. So what do I want to say? The visa regime is an old instrument of diplomacy. As our friend has said: Why do you need the visa? – To control your borders. – And why do you want to control the borders, when there is no threat to security, no security concern. There is not even illegal immigration. Illegal immigration is not coming from Russia to Europe. Immigrant are coming from Africa, West Africa, North Africa, Asia. But people are not looking for jobs and employment in Europe from Russia, there is no problem of illegal immigration. Number one. Number two: terrorists. They don't need visas. They know how to make fake passports. You have seen some terrorists making queue in the border security? No. So, the visa itself, from my modest point of view, it's an old instrument of diplomacy. Today you have new technology you can control, you can protect yourself by other means. So if I am back in the government of Spain, I will abolish visas with Russia, because there is no need for visas between Russia and Europe. That is an old instrument that hasn't any good impact on security or illegal immigration

and block the development a intense relationship among our populations.

Evgeniy KAYSAROV, *Deputy Head of the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies in Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ph.D. in Historical Sciences, Associate Professor*: — My question is addressed to Mr. Moratinos. Thank you for a brilliant emotional speech. I appeal to your thesis, “We need to join in the fight against the forces plunging us into confrontation”. I would like to know how you characterize them. What are these forces and why are they winning at the moment? Judging by the present conflicts, whom should we cooperate against?

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — Well, I think, at this stage there has been some people, some sectors in Ukraine, that have had new fascist or new populist attitudes and have tried to put Europeans and Russians against. There has been also some sector in the West having the same target. I do not share the conspiracy theory, but there are some elements that should be considered with caution. Some think that if Europeans have difficulties with Russia, then we will suffer together for the future. So, I think, you understand and I understand, so I don't have to be more explicit.

Anton KLYUCHNIKOV, *I grade, the Faculty of Arts*: — If our newspapers are true, things are not in the best way in Europe now. Allegedly, in the context of sanctions they are divided into two camps: the countries of the North and the West which favor sanctions, and the countries of the South, particularly the Balkan Peninsula, which oppose sanctions. Moreover, if the article in Der Spiegel newspaper is also true, the North Atlantic structure NATO is close to disintegration due to the recent exam (let us call it so) which revealed that it would not be able to protect its neighbors in the Baltic States, if Russia allegedly attacks them. To what extent is all this true, and what do your newspapers write?

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN: — Well, there are many questions in the question, but the point is first: should we trust the media? I would be very cautious about this. You'd better make yourself your own idea than to believe that everything that is written or shown on TV is exact. My opinion is that you should not in any case believe everything that is written or shown on TV. So, about the capacity of NATO to defend its members, I would not encourage you to insist on this point, because they are very capable to defend its members. I've been against France going back into NATO, so I'm not a NATO fan, but unfortunately they have strong capacities, and I don't think it is the best way to solve any problem in the world, whether in Europe or outside Europe, so we'd better not think about the use of force in our own continent, because it is not the answer. And it's not going to solve anything. And I'm afraid that if we pursue in this process of distrust and non-dialogue, we are going to face more suffering in the region. It is the case in Ukraine: people have more and more daily problems in Ukraine.

People will suffer here in Russia, because of the economic sanctions, and people will suffer also for the economic consequences in the European Union, so there only will be losers. I think we should all understand that. Here,

on this continent, if we follow up with this kind of policy, we will all lose: Ukraine, Russia, the European Union. And the winners might be China and the United States, far away. So we'd better take our destiny in our own hands. And the solution is not to believe one is stronger than the other, because this is for games. The solution is dialogue, diplomatic work and perspective. The Russian people needs to know what kind of partnership it can have with the EU, and the EU must know what should be the type of rule we should have in common with Russia to work together to the benefit, to the common benefit of Russia and the European Union. So, I don't think that the game that the media are playing: tension, more tension, and all kinds of information that is not confirmed coming from the ground is a real, honest game. It is a dangerous game, and we should better all together find a way for pushing the dialogue, pushing solutions, and not pushing to more tension and maybe war.

ALEKSEY MESHKOV: — Every day I follow the information the Russian press writes on international affairs. As a rule, its information is on the whole objective and represents the facts. And today, these days, two correspondents of *Life News* were thrown into prison in Ukraine. Their sole purpose was to show online what is really happening there. I can watch a Ukrainian TV channel at work, so I have something to compare. I think now we have to maintain our journalistic community and, above all, of course, to ask for more and more real open information, whether we like it or not.

Olga STAVTSEVA, *Associate Professor of Philosophy and Cultural Studies in Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, Ph.D.:* — Dear diplomats and politicians. I teach philosophy and I want to ask a question from the cultural sphere. Traditionally Russians perceive Europe as the bearer of European values. But now active migration flows bring Islamic culture and oriental cults. Furthermore, hedonism and consumerism corrode Christian values of Europeans. I wanted to ask: to what extent will Europe keep its European identity in the future? Not even religious identity, but the identity of the Christian culture?

Today we talked about the importance of Dostoevsky, about his contribution to the humanity development. How can cooperation within Greater Europe formation be associated with the development of cultural values?

Today much has been said about the military bases, treaties, international alliances. Is our cooperation strengthening possible on the basis of Christian values, the values of Christian culture?

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — Well, I really appreciate that you bring a cultural issue to this debate, because it is true. I think it was Malreaux (you can correct me, Dominique) that said that the twentieth century will be the century of the culture, or will not be a century. I would say quoting, paraphrasing Malreaux, I would say the twenty-first century will be multicultural, or will not be. What I want to say is that we are moving to a new multiethnic society. I agree with you that the cultural diversity is a great, great, challenge for the social creation of any society, and that even in Ukraine, or in this part of the world, between Russia and the European Union, you'll find some cultural

divisions. But in today's world, in the twenty-first century you cannot imagine the future of Europe based in only one pillar made by the so-called Christian civilization or Christian cultural base. I think that the richness of the twenty-first century is that you add different types of culture in order to enrich the global world. But you have to create as the logo of the European Union unity within diversity, you have to respect other cultures, and other communities, and other religions, and other civilizations, but you have to maintain your own values for sure, but you have to be prepared to work and to live in a multicultural world. There will not be a single world, there will not be an exclusive world, we have to add, like this great Lebanese-French writer Amin Maalouf that added several identities. You know, my dear friend, I was born in Madrid, so I feel myself like "madrileño", but I also feel that I'm Spanish, and I feel very proud to be Spanish, so I add my identity of madrileño to Spanish, then I love the Mediterranean, so I love to be also considered to have Mediterranean identity, so I add this to my identity, and then I have my European dimension, and I add my identity as European, and I have a very good and strong relation with Russian culture, so I add my identity with Russia and the international world. So, this accumulative identity is what we have to support as it enriches each other. Of course, I'm a Christian, I am Catholic, I have my own special feelings, but I'm also very happy to add a part of my life, of my experience with different types of identities. So, I add, I don't exclude. I include the new world, and that's on what we should work in the near future, because the world, we may like it or not, will be multicultural.

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN: — I think it is very important to understand this concept of multicultural or diversity of culture, because it's a strand in the new world of globalization. The more a country is facing difficulties, economic difficulties, social difficulties, security difficulties, the more it's going to withdraw on its own conservative forces. It's going to shrink. And the more a country is fierce of its own culture, feels secure, the more it will open its own society to other cultures and to other societies, and that's why we have seen historically that some countries have undergone persecution of minorities, because they were feeling themselves very bad, and they were feeling that the other minorities were taking the space, taking the resources they were needing, so if we want to be strong in globalization, we should integrate the culture of others, and the more we want to look toward the world, the more we should try to think and to know the thinking of others, the attitude of others. And we should remember that historically Europe has a long tradition of Islam. Marocco has known, of course, this strong influence of the two cultures, but the country like Spain was very much influenced by Islam, the country like France was very much influenced by Islam, so it's part of our poetry, it's part of our culture, of our references. And we should not consider that we have to take out these different influences to get only the pure culture of Europe. No, Europe is diversity, it's all these influences, all together.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — I would like to draw attention to the fact that the question raised by my colleague now becomes a big drama. I want to draw attention to the beating and the expulsion of Christians from

Egypt, to the tragic situation of Christians in Syria. These events are full of drama, and here we need to see the whole world in its entirety, including such undesirable manifestations. Heir apparent of the United Kingdom takes the oath during his inauguration, and there are such words: *I swear to be a defender of the faith*. This refers to the faith dominant in the UK. So the future heir apparent is going to replace one word: he plans to use the plural form of the word *faith* in his future speech that is to protect different religions. From a humanitarian point of view, it is wonderful. But despite this it would be undesirable to see Christians becoming a persecuted sect as in pagan times of the Ancient World. We need to build a dialogue of cultures very carefully and thoughtfully.

V. V. GORSHKOVA, *Dean of the Faculty of Culture, Head of the Department of Social Psychology in Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences, Doctor of Education, Professor*: — Dear Sirs, I have a small question to you. Some political analysts believe that in politics, especially in international politics, there cannot be friends and even opponents, but can only be competitors and possibly hidden enemies. First, do you agree with this opinion? How can a parity dialogue be held in such circumstances, understanding the problem this way?

IGOR IVANOV: — I believe that one does not exclude the other.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — This is in the spirit of Conchita Wurst.

IGOR IVANOV: — We are acquainted with Mr. Moratinos, if I'm not mistaken, since 1975. I met Mr. Villepin later, but we continue to maintain a great relationship. This does not mean that in the course of our professional activity we shared all the points of view. But as professionals we always treated each other with respect, openly expressed our positions, never deceived each other, never dissembled anything, never tried to place each other in a difficult position to achieve opportunistic benefits without regard to the long term.

The first matter concerned Iraq. Mr. de Villepin, Mr. Fischer and I worked together on this conflict. Each of us was guided primarily by national interests, the interests of Russia, France and Germany, but we tried to take into account the interests of the other side too. This accounting of mutual interest, of course, implies mutual respect, both human and professional. When you speak with a professional, when you trust this person, knowing that he will not go to any actions that may be indecent or obscene, then you can build professional cooperation.

It was not so easy to come to an understanding, and not so easy then to convince our leaders, our presidents that it had been the right decision which incorporated both national interests and our common interests. We spoke about trust. What does trust constitute of? If you look at the documents signed with Bush administration in due time, you will find they include many beautiful words that we were not enemies but almost strategic partners. However, trust consists of concrete actions, specific relationships between people. This forms not only professional confidence, but also personal relations. For example, I am very proud that many

years later, we continue to be friends. I am confident that our friendship will continue for many years.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — I have a few notes. If I may, I will read them. "In the twentieth century, Europe was hit hard by fascism. Why is Western Europe calmly watching its revival today?" Maybe Mr. Villepin could answer?

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN: — Well, Europe is very much concerned by populism and extremism. I'm not sure that the word "fascism" is adapted to what we are knowing in the European Union. But "extremism", "populism", yes. This has very much to do with social and economic reasons. When you have societies that have more than twenty-percent unemployment in certain parts of the population (this is the case in France for the young people, 20%, in the case of Spain it might be near 50%), you have always a reaction, which is a conservative reaction of anger and people disliking any kind of order, which is not able to satisfy their needs, their common needs. But this is a very strong concern today from all parts of the political spectrum, whether we are talking about the leftist party, or the rightist party, everybody is concerned by that. That's why the priority today in Europe is trying to find some common answers for the economic and social challenges, even if it is difficult, because the growth in Europe is not strong enough, but we are very much focusing attention on this kind of issues in order to respond to the need of the communities and in order to answer to the aspirations of the members of our country. But basically, the fundamental reason for this distrust and this growing populism is the lack of economic and social answers.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear colleagues, I have some more questions, but the time-limit has already been exhausted and I beg to answer the remaining questions as brief as possible. Here is a question for Mr. Meshkov: in your opinion, does Western Europe understand that the Ukrainian conflict weakens Russia and the European Union and is beneficial for the United States? What do you think?

ALEKSEY MESHKOV: — Briefly: someone understands and someone does not.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you. A question for Mr. Moratinos: the Islamic world today is experiencing demographic growth and religious revival. Is this a threat to the welfare of Europe?

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — I want to add one more comment. You are absolutely right, the main cause is the social economic crisis, and the incapacity of political leaders to give effective answers and to give response to the demands and aspirations of society. I think that it is deeper than that. I think the traditional democratic representative system of the Western European Union is under a big crisis. If you look to the whole spectrum in different countries in Europe, you will see that the main political parties are in crisis. Well, it is true that Chancellor Merkel is the shining star in European politics, the new lady Bismarck, we would say. But she has been elected

only with 32% of the vote. Next Sunday you will see the two main parties in France, the two main parties in Spain, social-democrats and central-right, they will reach, maybe, 23–26% as the maximum. So there is a big crisis of the society towards the traditional political parties. People don't trust them anymore. They do not like the way they use our votes. People want to have an option in order to solve the problems. So, if the political parties don't respond to their aspirations and their needs, they prefer to go for this new movement of populism, of new conservatism, that, well, maybe will be a disaster but is still quite unknown. These populist parties use the same language, the same slogans, the same stereotypes, and people are trapped by these new slogans, so that is the danger. That's what happens in France, in Italy, and some in Austria. So we will see how this evolution continues, and, I think that if traditional parties want to survive they have to be totally renovated. They cannot continue with the same apparatus, with the same philosophy, with the same approach, the same narrative. They have to change the way they present their proposals, their projects. I think, the economic and social crisis is the reason to start with, but then the mechanism of the political parties, the traditional instrument of politics in Europe, are under revision, and this is what we should try to reform in order to adapt to the new circumstances.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Since Mr. Moratinos is a major specialist in the sphere of the Islamic world, I would like to hear his answer to the question whether the Islamic world is a threat to Europe?

DOMINIQUE DE VILLEPIN: — It is something that has to be addressed. There is a strong need for integrating this factor into our governments. Very often you will see a strong concern in our societies about the growing part of Islamism, but we have to make a difference whether we are talking about Islam as a religion, or whether we are talking about Islamism and radical Islam, we are not talking about the same things. Of course, anybody has the possibility of choosing his own religion, this is something that is part of our communities, part of our countries, and in France, as well as in Europe we are very much in favor of secularism, respecting the religion of each member. Of course, talking about Islamism and radical Islam is something else. It has to be addressed, when religion is used for violent purposes. It has to be fought against.

And there is growing concern about our societies, about our politics in order to address this situation, for example, we are taking strong measures for the more radical groups or persons that are leaving Europe to fight in Syria, and then want to come back to fight in Europe. We are doing very strong and important work to address this kind of issue, but we have to do it with a certain mentality. One way would be to address this kind of issue with a very conservative approach, trying to tackle not only the Islamist, but also the Muslims. We should not do that. We should really separate the two issues, be respectful to any member of the Muslim community, and don't create an aggregation between Islam and Islamism, they are two different issues. One has to be fought when it represents violence and terrorism, and one has to be respected as a component of our societies and treated as such.

MIGUEL ÁNGEL MORATINOS: — Of course, we are in Russia, we are in Saint Petersburg, we are talking about Russia and Europe, we are talking about our concern. But when we address Islam, we should first have as first approach that the Arab world and Islam as a whole is under extraordinary revision by their own. We have to defend our society, our values, our *modus vivendi*, but the main concern will be how the Arabs and the Muslims themselves are ready to take by themselves what some call “the modernization of Islam”, not “the Islamization of modernity”. So, if everybody is in favor of modernization of Islam, like we, the Catholics, the Christians, in the history of religions, we have succeeded to do, and to give to the social what to is of the society then progress could happen. In Islam it's much more complex, because we have the community, the *Ummah*, and everything is integrated. But that has to change. They need deep changes.

You have seen how the Arab Spring has failed with the Muslim Brotherhood, and how they are now, (their) own societies in Egypt, in Tunisia, in Morocco, in Algeria in a very fragile situation. In Syria, they are also trying to find their way to protect themselves. To have a coexistence living together with different approaches, so that's number one. Be aware that Islam and the Arab world is in a total revolution today, and we should try to accompany them in this new face of their history. As a consequence of that, we should be extremely cautious when we address the Islamic and the Muslim relationship. As Dominique de Villepin said very clearly, we have to differentiate between Islam as a religion, and then the radical Islam or politicization of Islam, or the political dimension of Islam. That is a different issue. But what we should not do is to create amalgams and to demonize the Islamic or the Islamic religion of the community of Muslims. We should be more careful not to create enemies and work for a understanding between cultures and communities. So that is what we should be our main concern. We have not to use Islam as a threat, we have not say that Islam is our enemy, we should not say that an Islamic person is a terrorist, a drug dealer or a kind of fanatic believer. No, we should respect them, and at the same time they should respect us, but we should try to avoid by all means to demonize whatever comes from Islam or the Muslim world.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you. I have many notes, but in the end, I will ask two questions. The first question is for Mr. Ivanov (in Russia, he is considered to be one of the leading specialists in the sphere of Western Europe). Many humanists in Russia and in Western Europe talk about a systemic crisis of liberalism both in the economy, and in the spiritual and moral sphere. If so, then can the outlines and the prospects for a new ideology be traced in Western Europe and is Europe still able to bear a healthy, strong, intellectual elite pushing new ideas? Or will it defend other old ideas?

IGOR IVANOV: — You know, it's a philosophical question. I think my colleagues, Mr. de Villepin and Mr. Moratinos, have already spoken about the evolution in politics, in political system, among political parties and leaders. It is also taking place in the sphere of ideology, so, of course, when it comes from the diplomatic point of view, it is necessary to build a new world order. It must be established on certain principles that must be produced collec-

tively. I think that the dialogue, the interaction of European states and Russia will help to develop principles that would not separate us, would not oppose us, but would allow us to cooperate successfully preserving our national identity, our culture and our beliefs. I think we are now at a certain critical stage. Every century, probably, begins with such a profound rethinking of both political and ideological principles, and the 21st century is not an exception. I think all of us are in the process of profound evolution, and I hope we can find approaches that will help us build Greater Europe and successfully solve the problems our countries face.

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Thank you. The last question is for Mr. March who is considered a symbol of a European intellectual at our University and in Russia. European Parliament elections begin, and the polls show the growing popularity of the Rights. Does it mean that Europe is turning towards the Nazi ideology?

JUAN ANTONIO MARCH PUJOL: — Well, thank you very much, Rector for your question. We have among us today very eminent politicians, who would be able to answer this much better than me, but my personal opinion is that in the end in many important countries of Europe the traditional parties will continue to survive. I think that, as Mr. Villepin has said, when there is crisis, if the order does not deliver prosperity, there is a movement of the people against this order. The election to the European Parliament has been seen by the people as not so important as a national election, because they see the Parliament in Europe as still a not very effective and powerful body, so it can be used by many populations to express discomfort, to express disagreement with the present situation politically in many countries, but I think, that in the end people know that Europe is the future, and we have a structure, a society maybe with two big options, one based on the individual, the other more based on the social cohesion, but I think, these two parties will continue to be very important. And, thank you very much for your nice words.

ALEKSEY MESHKOV: — I want to add that the opportunity to build Greater Europe is achievable, but in order to get it we should know the history to use positive and even negative experience... According to recent research, the culture of winemaking came to Europe from the Crimea and the Caucasus. Europe did not have grape-vines, it was brought by Greeks. At the same time, there is a dispute: who brought vodka to Russia, the Genoese or the Venetians? (Well, of course, not vodka, but the culture of distillation.) That is, even such seemingly bizarre examples show how common is the history of our continent.

JUAN ANTONIO MARCH PUJOL: — Thank you very much, the rector. I think that the Universities started in the modern era, before we had monasteries. But it was when the civil societies became a little bit powerful, they decided to invent the place for the knowledge. And universities have played for a long-long time, a very important role in creating new thinking. Nowadays we have particular forums, like the Davos forum, we have a kind of ad hoc forums. I think, Rector Aleksandr Sergueyevich, you have been very successful in placing again in the University a very central important debate for the future of our people, for connecting the young people with the thinkers with experience and

responsibility, and we very much hope that this new generation will be the great defenders of prosperity, peace, development, other key issues, other than macho attitudes like “I’m going to show my strength” etcetera, that just belong to the past, because the future is only connected with intelligence and prosperity. Thank you very much!

ALEKSANDR ZAPESOTSKY: — Dear friends, if I may, I will say a few final words as the host. I note that we are not always able to assess what is said aloud to us. And that is why I encourage the students to pick up the brochure which will be released on the results of this meeting: there are so many brilliant ideas in it, and I would like to focus attention on them, but they are really too many. I will show you one small *brilliant*. The speech of each of our guests was full of many such *brilliant*s.

Here is an example to which, I am 100% sure, you did not pay attention at all. This is when one of our guests talked about the language policy of Finland. We know that in Ukraine with half of the Russian population people are not allowed to speak Russian, and the same problems exist in the Baltic States. I suppose that not all the attendants studied the history of Finland, so let us remember that for many years, even centuries it was under pressure from Sweden. You can even say more: Finland was practically enslaved by Sweden. And what did the Finns do after they gained their independence? They proclaimed Swedish second official language. If you take a map of the world you will see that all the settlements, geographical names in Finland are written in two languages: Finnish and Swedish. Now I ask you how many ethnic Swedes live in Finland today? According to my information, there are 6% of them there. Colleagues from the first row are saying that there are 2%. In any case, there are less than 10%. And this is enough to make Swedish the second state language in Finland. When the issues are solved this way, so many conflicts can be removed.

You are entering the adulthood; you are just starting to engage into research. Maybe it seemed to you that some of today’s speeches were dull. It is difficult to catch the new theses, but they were a lot today. I wish for all the students who are present here to do it. As a rector I have the feeling of a huge debt of universities, both Russian and European, when it comes to dialogue and its construction. Now we are holding the second meeting with Pompeu Fabra University. I would like such meetings to take place in the future. We should think about how to attract universities of Germany and Italy, how to attract major political leaders of other European countries that have a significant voice in the construction of world politics. Let us work together, because, in my point of view, this format is very important. It is not only a dialogue of prominent politicians with the population of our countries through the mass media, but also the dialogue of people who know a lot about this world with people who are just entering this world. Thus, I understand very well that for people who spoke today the present is not as important as the future. Not their own future as much as the future of the world in which young people are going to live.

I want to thank our wonderful guests, Pompeu Fabra University, which made great efforts to organize this meeting. Unfortunately, the Rector of Pompeu Fabra University was unable to attend today. I thank our audience which carried on this conversation with such interest: it is a sign of the high level of our students and professors. Thank you.

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
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