

V. A. Chereshnev¹,
V. N. Rastorguev²

PREDICTABLE UNPREDICTABILITY IN GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT: SOLIDARITY CRISIS AND NEW REQUIREMENTS FOR PROGNOSSES

The topic of yet another Likhachov Scientific Conference is closely related to our report at the 2016 Conference, dedicated to the leading trends of the global economic development.³ At that time, we named global instability, destroying the whole system of priorities for long-term development in the home and foreign policy, as one of the negative and most dangerous trends. Currently, this issue looks even more urgent with the discussion of the 2017 report to the Club of Rome as a background (we'll specially analyze this document below) and critical general world situation in 2018. Its rapid aggravation is related to numerous factors, including acute military confrontation of military blocs with destruction of the last guarantors of international security, origination of new types of mass-destruction weapons and unprecedented arms race as a background.

This is the reason why unpredictability, uncertainty and instability as well as a whole line of similar definitions regularly supplement the vocabulary of public policy and as a rule are perceived only negatively by the overwhelming majority of politicians and political analysts. Forecasts of the coming era of total global unpredictability as one of the main threats of the globalizing world are also more and more often heard and seen in the academic community and mass media, and that only intensifies panic. And that, in its turn, to a considerable extent devaluates the role of science

and analytics not only for public and international policy, but also whole sectors of sector policy, including academic and defense policies, bringing chaos into the process of taking strategic decisions.

Besides, such policy destroys the very possibility of working out long-term strategies and curtails prospects for a normal life for millions of people. This requirement is felt especially acutely when we're speaking about life horizons and plans for the future as this policy deforms the deep-lying feeling of self-identification – both traditional (family and clan, ethic and religious, professional and age-related, sociocultural and civilizational) and political – civil and ideological. It's absolutely evident that all types of identities and respective forms of human solidarity (both traditional and strictly political) are subjected to a most severe trial when running across instability of the social system and inner life, and that in its turn destabilizes all integration processes, including intra-European ones, and considerably limits the search for political and social technologies directed to strengthening the basic institutes of collective solidarity.

Jürgen Habermas, the outstanding theoretician of solidarity, in particular wrote about this trend in his work with the expressive title *Technocratic Anger. The Divided Union Gets Stuck by Solidarity Threshold*. He says with fairly good grounds that solidarity deficit is the main obstacle on the way of the European Union's sustainable development. At the same time, as N.V. Motroshilova notices when analyzing the evolution of Habermas' solidarity teachings, that "the idea of solidarity's moralization and depoliticization" are becoming, in the opinion of the German philosopher, "a big shortcoming exactly of late, when the idea of solidarity is required to be applied to not only ethical but also sociopolitical and 'pure' political sides of human actions and relations."⁴

Habermas with his German punctuality grouped into types all forms of instrumental solidarity that may be in demand in the process of social and political building, taking into account the level of the society's civilization development. But he especially singles out traditional types of solidarity that act as distinctive guarantors of stability and first of all it is "the solidarity of those who were born later with their predecessors, with all those who were injured by a human hand in their body or personal wholeness." According to his definition, "this solidarity is established and initiated only by way of remembering. The strength of memories bringing liberation should mean (like it was from Hegel to Freud) not freeing the modernity from the power of the past, but relieving the modernity of its guilt about the past" as "exactly the irrevocable image of the past turns out to be under the threat of disappearance, when the modernity appears, not capable to guess itself in this image."⁵ However,

¹ Chief Researcher at the Institute for Immunology and Physiology (the Urals Branch of the RAS), member of the Presidium of the Urals Branch of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Medicine), Professor. Author more than 900 scholarly publications, including 68 monographs: "Immunophysiology", "Alpha Fetoprotein", "Immunologic and Genetic Factors of Reproduction Function Disturbance", "Biological Laws and Human Viability. Method of Multi-Functional Regeneration Biotherapy", "Physiological and Hygienic Concept of Speleoand Co-Treatment", "Influence of drug addiction on social and economic development of society", "Social and Demographic Safety of Russia", "Demographic Policy of the Country and Health of the Nation" "Introduction to the problems of modeling and managing the dynamics of HIV infection" and others; 2 manuals for studying combined radiation damages and 1 for clinical immunology; 14 textbooks, 11 manuals, 8 methodical recommendations, 5 courses of lectures for higher educational establishments, 42 patents and 2 discoveries. President of the Russian Academic Society of Immunologists. Chief editor of the "Russian Journal of Immunology", "Bulletin of Ural Medical Academic Science". He is decorated with the Order of Friendship, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 3rd and 4th degree. He is a Laureate of the Government Award of the Russian Federation in science and technology (2006) and the award of the Government of the Russian Federation in the field of education (2012). Doctor honoris causa of SPbUHSS.

² Professor of the Chair of Philosophy of Politics and Law at Lomonosov Moscow University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Honorary Higher Professional Education Lecturer of the Russian Federation. Class 3 State Advisor. Author of more than 400 scholarly publications, including 26 monographs and textbooks: "Unity and continuity of consciousness", "Conceptual research: tradition, innovation, responsibility", "Creativity and dogmatism", "The Nature of Self-Identification: Russian Culture, Slavonic World and Strategy of Continuing Education"; "The World's Wells: Russia's Environmental Doctrine: from Plans to Pilot Projects"; "Philosophy and Methodology of Political Planning" and others. Deputy Chairman of the Scientific Council of the RAS for the study and preservation of cultural and natural heritage. He is recipient of the UN Avicenna Award and Unity Award. He was awarded the Russian Federation Governmental Prize in science and technology.

³ Chereshnev V. A., Rastorguev V. N. Long-Term Development Strategy: Challenges of our Time, Global Instability and Methodology for Determination of Priorities // Contemporary Global Challenges and National Interests : the 16th International Likhachov Scientific Conference, May 19–21, 2016. St. Petersburg : SPbUHSS, 2016. P. 259–261.

⁴ Motroshilova N. V. Jürgen Habermas about the European Union Crisis and the Idea of Solidarity (2011–2013) // Philosophical Issues. 2013. No 10. P. 25.

⁵ Habermas J. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Moscow : Ves Mir, 2003. P. 26–27.

the traditional idea of solidarity as Habermas shows, referring to “the Aristotle tradition (up to Hannah Arendt),” never lost its close “connection with the political concept of the feeling of solidarity”¹ either.

If we’re speaking about deep-lying reasons for panic perception of the constantly growing instability of the universe, first of all, we should point at the capitalist society crisis and serious decline of the modern democracy institutions, which is certified by the report to the Club of Rome with the expressive title *Come on! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet* prepared by E.U. von Weizsäcker and A. Wijkman using materials of a big group of leading experts. In the opinion of the authors (that was only the second time when the report to the Club of Rome was unanimously supported by all its members), instability is a typical feature of the present times, and the problem of the society’s regeneration is that the political class of the whole world became completely dependent on investors and powerful private companies: “This indicates that the current crisis is also a *crisis of global capitalism*. Since the 1980s, capitalism has moved from furthering the economic development of countries, regions and the world towards maximizing profits, and then to a large extent profits from speculation. In addition, the capitalism unleashed since 1980 in the Anglo-Saxon world, and since 1990 worldwide, is mainly financial. This trend was supported by excessive deregulation and liberalization of the economy. In reality, it served to narrow business down to short-term gains, and often at the expense of social and ecological values.” Another destabilization factor, closely connected to the monopoly of financial capital, is “the rise of aggressive, mostly right-wing movements against globalization in OECD countries, often referred to as populism. These have become overt through Brexit and the Trump victory in the United States”. As it is emphasized in the report referring to Fareed Zakaria’s observations, “Trump is a part of a broad populist upsurge. The Edelman Trust Barometer says that 53% of the population in 28 countries believe the systems governing them are failing; only 15% deem that the systems are working.”²

It should be said that this time the report to the Club of Rome was saturated with the feelings of hopelessness and confusion (and the word “confusion” is its dominant). The authors find the exit from the dead-end in a far from unambiguous concept offered by American ecologist and economist H. Daly. The concept is built on contrasting the so-called “empty world” as if typical for the human civilization (the world of unexplored territories and excessive resources) and the “full world”. If, in Daly’s opinion, prevailing religions, political ideologies and social institutions, established and sustainable forms of thinking dominate in the first, empty world, the second, “full” world is oversaturated, filled to the brims with the products of human activities. From the point of view of advocates of this attitude, we should not live according to the “empty world” rules as in this case collapse will come quickly. The metaphor in the basis of this concept is extremely inappropriate in our opinion and corresponds to the reality only if applied to the information revolution, and only with the correction that

some hundredth of a percent of the information flow going over the brim are digested by people, turning into white noise, according to the well-known saying by A. Gore. The “empty world rules” on the basis of which traditional, multi-civilization world was built and, most important, self-reproduced, can’t be discarded, without even thinking what they are.

The report to the Club of Rome is saturated with not only pessimism but also unclear skepticism in relation to traditional norms and values of the so-called “empty world”, though exactly science and arts, politics and religion as well as other specialized fields and sectors of human activities have their own multi-millennia history and internal logic of establishment. And each of these fields is becoming a component of global and national cultural heritage, the property of next generations thanks to the established forms of internal and external regulations, including political (respective mechanisms of state sector policy) and legal. At the same time, sustainable and non-sustainable, transient and everlasting, i.e. invariant characteristics of the very activity are differently revealed depending on the temporal horizon, in which we are viewing them.

D.S. Likhachov spoke very deeply about this phenomenon as a general cultural governing law: “Sure, it’s impossible to foresee appearance of a genius literary work. But it is possible to foresee to a certain extent a genius scientific discovery. Scientific discoveries are made at a certain level of knowledge and technology. Because of that, originations of similar discoveries and inventions at the same time in different countries, by different scholars are not accidental. <...> From this point of view, let’s again come back to the issue of far-off future predictability and unpredictability of the nearest future. The matter is that addressing the nearest future, we should see it in large scales and deal, first of all, with individual phenomena. <...> Addressing the far-off future, we’re dealing with typical, wide-spread, mass phenomena, with general contours...”³

Really, if we’re limited by short-term and middle-term temporal perspectives or, to be more exact, retrospectives, only certain events get into the field of view, and if we’re speaking about a long-term perspective, big event series, including cyclic, and casual relations between historically significant events that can be rationally reconstructed, get there.⁴ If we’re speaking about really long-term horizons, to be more exact, meta-historical time, the picture will be changed considerably, when even really historically important events go to the background.

In the first case, evolutionary, sustainable development processes become accessible for us as well as succession divides, originating as a result of a conflict of interests of various social or ethnic groups and individuals (the human factor of history – in the positive and negative sense of the term). Naturally, the main actors of the activity come to the foreground – significant figures from the political and military elite, outstanding thinkers and creators, rulers of the human mind and souls. Fateful events, predetermining the course of history, are connected with their names. In the second case, during the “periods of big activities”, meta-

¹ Habermas J. Op. cit. P. 354.

² Weizsäcker E. U. von., Wijkman A. *Come On! Capitalism, Short-termism, Population and the Destruction of the Planet: A Report to the Club of Rome*. N. Y. : Springer Science + Business Media LLC, 2018. P. 5.

³ Likhachov D. S. *The Future of Literature as a Subject for Studies: (Notes and Thoughts)* // *Novy Mir*. 1969. No 9. P. 168–167.

⁴ We had an opportunity to describe in detail the issues related to classification of events, including “dooming” and cyclic // *Civilization Development of Russia: Heritage, Potential, Development* : Collective monograph / eds. V. A. Chereshev, V. N. Rastorguev. Moscow, 2018.

historical processes come to the foreground, when we're shown, according to the exact definition by Michel Foucault, not only historical realities and event series but also the *teleology of the mind*. In his opinion, this certifies "the return to the philosophy of history, to the ideas of great world eras, to divisions into periods that would proceed from the 'destiny of civilizations'"¹, that does not allow to bring the issue down to a "simple linear scheme".

Here, private and group interests are seen already as much less significant than the *teleological aspect* of establishing various fields of specialized activities. Now, the central place in the analytics is taken by functional differences existing between science and arts as fields where either focusing on discovering of the already existing (scientific field), or focusing on invention of the new that did not exist before (arts) dominate (according to the well-known Kant's classification). At the same time, Kant includes technology and inventing activities in the field of arts together with fine arts. Consequently, a wide field is singled out together with these singled out (for the purpose of discussion) fields, where "discovery" and "invention" are the key functions. The regulative function spreading to all fields of activities dominates in this wide field. This is religious conscience, morals and right, in which state interests are expressed.

Hegel in his *Philosophy of Right* paid attention to the functional kinship of these regulating fields. He understood the right maximally widely, including, first of all, the "unlimited absolute right of the world spirit" into this idea. He wrote in particular: "The right is something sacred in general, sacred only because it is the present being of the absolute idea, self-conscious freedom. Formalism of the right (and then also formalism of the obligation) originates out of the difference between development stages of the idea of freedom. Each stage of the ideas of freedom development has its own right, as it is the present being of freedom in one of its definitions. When they speak about opposition of morality, ethics, on the one hand, and the *right* on the other hand, only the first formal right of an abstract individual is understood under the right. Morality, ethics, state interest, – each of them individually is a special right as each of these forms is a definition and the present being of *freedom*. The *collision* between them may take place only inasmuch as all of them are on the same line and are the right."²

Coming back to the appraisal of the strictly pessimistic picture of the future presented in the report to the Club of Rome, it should be said that the political concept of sustainable development has not exhausted its potential, notwithstanding numerous contradictions related to its status and mechanisms of acceptance by the international community as one of their basic political doctrines and its reflection in the field of theoretical thought (numerous competing academic and pseudoscientific concepts under the same name). Detailed analysis of this aspect of the sustainable development concept's functioning is presented in the monograph *The Sustainable Development Concept in the Context of Political Processes of the 21st Century*.³

¹ Foucault M. *The Archeology of Knowledge*. Kiev : Nika-Center, 1996. P. 11.

² Hegel G. W. F. *Philosophy of Right // Works*. Moscow-Leningrad : Sotsekgiz, 1934. P. 55.

³ Chereshnev V. A., Rastorguev V. N. N. Moiseyev's Dilemma: Sustainable Development Concept – Utopia or Strategy? // *The Sustainable Development Concept in the Context of Political Processes of the 21st Century* : collective monograph / ed. A. I. Kostin. Moscow : MSU, 2018.

The matter is that the political concept is approved basing on completely different principles as compared with scientific theories. Political concepts are approved not by scholars but politicians basing on respective procedures. The expert community is really invited at certain stages, this community includes the "first-level" experts (experts providing conclusions, for example, about legal compliance of worked out documents with the acting national law and international law, a possibility of their provision with resources and finances, etc.) as well as representatives of science, public, prominent figures in the field of culture. But as a rule, they do not take part in the most important stages when decisions are taken. And it's well-known that politicians are guided by different thoughts and ideas, dictated by national, corporate, lobbyist or other interests having no relation to science, by the feeling of party or group solidarity and, finally, strengthening their own "sustainability" in the system. At the same time, the participants of the process sometimes have to sacrifice logic and the system of theoretical foundations for coordinating variously focused interests. Actually, this fact is the reason of indignation among scholars who clearly see defects in the foundation and logic and because of that strive to "correct the concept", offering their variants and being sincerely surprised that they are not heard.

As M. Weber said in his famous address to young students *Science as a Vocation* (100 years passed since its publication), "In the field of science only he who is devoted solely to the work at hand has 'personality'. <...> In the field of science, however, the man who makes himself the impresario of the subject to which he should be devoted, and steps upon the stage and seeks to legitimate himself through 'experience', asking: How can I prove that I am something other than a mere 'specialist' and how can I manage to say something in form or in content that nobody else has ever said? – such a man is no 'personality'. Today such conduct is a crowd phenomenon, and it always makes a petty impression and debases the one who is thus concerned. Instead of this, the inner devotion to the task, and that alone, should lift the scientist to the height and dignity of the subject he pretends to serve."⁴ In Weber's opinion, this supertask and the duty of science was and still is "looking for truth". Exactly because of that he thought that there is no place for politics in lecture-rooms: students in lecture-rooms should not engage in politics. <...> However, a teacher should not engage in politics in a lecture-room either. First of all, if he researches the field of politics as a scientist.⁵

As a conclusion, we'd like to say that panic in the world public policy is connected with its being closed to a large extent. Only at first sight, it's becoming more and more open and democratic, though this openness is most often demonstrative and sometimes it is real propaganda. Surely, such openness does not spread to special fields of activities that are referred to "political kitchen" and in particular many fields of political planning – both strategic and operating. Such division is as conditional as the divide between the public and non-public fields as strategic problems as a rule saturate exactly operating plans where targets and means, causes and consequences can easily change places. The general picture is aggravated by the fact that we're

⁴ Weber M. *Selected Works*. Moscow : Progress, 1990. P. 711.

⁵ Ibid. P. 721.

viewing coupling of mutually excluding trends exactly in this field – from strengthening the planned basis in states’ and inter-state unions’ activities to their full self-removal from synchronized planning in different temporal horizons and various specialized sectors of policy that questions the development sustainability.

According to A. Toffler – one of the few well-known theoreticians who tried to understand the scales of the catastrophe named state non-planning in his book with the expressive title *Future Shock*, – we hear intensifying calls to anti-planning or non-planning. <...> Lack of planning is glorified. Stating that planning imposes values on the future, anti-planners overlook the fact that non-planning also does that, often with much worse consequences. <...> If we want to prevent future shock or control the population numbers, prevent pollution or weaken arms race, we can’t allow global decisions to be taken inattentively, irrationally, unplanned. To let this situation from under control means collective suicide.¹

They write and speak about the “strategy of non-planning” reluctantly in Russia as it is impossible to strike out the era of great planned construction from history when the country nearly fully destroyed to its foundations became equal to industrial giants before the war and after the great sacrificial war it was restored and accumulated fantastic potential – industrial and military, scientific and human. And that happened to a big extent thanks to the art of analytics built in the process of systemic middle- and long-term planning as well as brilliantly adjusted system of control based on the multi-level state expert examination.

As V.V. Putin said at the session of the State Council in 2006, when we only started turning to long-term planning, “copying the work models of the Soviet Gosplan (State Planning Committee) in the market economy environment is not expedient and impossible, however, drawing up plans and programs is fairly compatible with market economy.”² Exactly this turn (11 well-known Presidential Orders that “determined the indicators of development, time-limits, personal responsibility”) allowed, as Putin summed up the results of the work done at the State Council session in 2017, to solve the most difficult tasks related to security and defense, which changed the alignment of forces on the international scene. That was told already with demonstration of achievements in the Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly in 2018.

As we see, the emphasis in strategic planning is made on managerial methods for strategic development of certain segments of sector policy. And that is not accidental: when we’re speaking about the openness of policies, we mean, first of all, not sector but public policy. It is exactly this policy, no matter how paradoxically it may sound, that always has been and still is the most closed field of political life. It happens because deep-lying and often differently focused group interests are in its basis, these interests include social group and class interests, party and personal, strategic and market interests, eluding politicians themselves and requiring constant readiness for struggle and compromises from them. And sector policy, which at first sight looks

absolutely closed, really is transparent for experts because understanding its targets and functions requires due qualifications. It is closed only to laymen and in contrast to public policy, it can be measured fairly precisely, for example, from the point of view of efficiency or inefficiency of some or the other decisions. This is the reason why it is opened to those initiated except certain areas, and that is usually explained by commercial or state secrets.

There should be no place for “two-layer” projects if applied to any sector policy, and intrigues and provocations either. In any case, they pale into insignificance as objective criteria are included, with safety and security appraisal, resources consumption appraisal, etc. The main requirement in public policy is not efficiency, which most often can’t be either confirmed or rejected, but effectiveness of another kind – staking on the effect made by politicians and their actions, which is also important of course.

Exactly because of that the work of experts and expert examinations in the “non-public” field acquire a completely different character, not accessible for the mass conscience, completely focused on the troubles and upheavals of public policy – foreign and home, where a completely different attitude both to analytics and expert examination is formed as well as to analysts and experts themselves. Here the phenomenon of participation in political life plays its role. It originates in case of many people, really included in political campaigns carried out by various parties and movements, including oppositional. All that creates the outward appearance of accessibility of knowledge about plans and aims, “power technologies” and power institutions’ functioning at national and even “supranational” levels. Such illusions appear both in case of common people and public politicians themselves, whose competence as a rule does not include requirements for professional competence in a certain field of knowledge (e.g. there are even no minimum education requirements for deputies in many countries). This well-known and irremovable paradox of democracy is perceived as a given, and that in its turn considerably reduces the critique of thinking.

The issue of real functions and types of expert and analytical activities is made more complicated by the fact that public policy stands on three whales. The first one is the “classical” form of planning, within which projects also serve the “showcase” for lobbying interests of real political actors. Here the emphasis on wholeness and sustainability is evident. The second “whale” is intrigues, i.e. the same interests but already not camouflaged with projects but presented, so to say, naked. Here we run across a wide range of destabilization methods – from “parallel” political planning to “other planning” (external planning) that do not catch the eye immediately. These intrigues-interests in case of the main “players” are naturally connected with fighting for power and resources or participation in power, and they are different interests for the public, electors, they have been defined by the formula “bread and circuses” since old times. The third “whale” is provocations, where sometimes everything is staked on destructive destabilization of the system. However, provocations also include provocations “in the good sense” of the word – for example, provocation without which it is impossible to feel the society’s reaction to some or the other reforms. However, a provocation the aim of which can be destruction of the foundations of the state system itself is referred to them as well. And that, as

¹ Toffler A. *Future Shock*: Translated from the English. Moscow : AST, 2002. P. 492.

² Putin V. V. Speech at the State Council session “On Mechanisms of Federal and Regional Executive Bodies’ Interaction When Working out Complex Socioeconomic Development Programs for the Regions.” July 21, 2006. See: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/35972>.

you see, are not homogeneous phenomena requiring different appraisals – political, moral and legal.

As a result, political analytics and expert examination are viewed as activities available for nearly everyone, and principal differences between the analyst's work and the expert's work completely vanish from the field of view. It is not accidental that representatives of the academic

community are less and less mentioned among those who are called that, but the so-called media persons are mentioned more and more often. Journalists and reviewers, commentators made popular by e-media dominate among them, but as it was already said, they do not participate directly either in preparation and especially taking political decisions.