

L. L. Fituni¹HERMENEUTICS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER²

Hermeneutics deals with the problems of interpreting texts not only in the usual narrow, “editorial” sense of the word (although in that sense as well), but also in the broadest philosophical sense: texts as products of lingual expression, interpretation of meanings that arise in dealing with significant human problems. In this report, the author intends to share his thoughts on interpretations of the phenomenon of the “New World Order” (NWO), which for a long time has appeared either as an ideal or as a chimera related to reorganization of the established course of life in the world community. In practice, however, history shows that all such reorganizations are invariably accompanied by cataclysms and dire consequences for many countries and peoples.

It makes sense to begin our speculations by trying to agree, at least in general terms, on what is understood as the “new world order.” Let me emphasize that we are not looking into the specific content of international reality at the arrival of the next NWO, but rather aim at highlighting the key distinctive characteristics of the latter as a generic phenomenon and an independent being, outlining the system of political relations within the entire mankind. In other words, we consider it as a recurring pattern of political, economic, and social reality in the universal history.

The very composition of the term indicates at least three key features, which in their unity generate a new quality of being for the entire humankind. The foundation of this tripartite essence is the noun “order,” i.e. *clear and precise organization of any sphere of reality*. The default assumption is that it refers to social relations – political, economic, social, or otherwise. The “world” points not only at the geographical scope of the new world order, but also that it establishes a hierarchy and rules for the interaction between various parts of the universe, including relations between countries, peoples, classes, communities, and other social groups that comprise them. Finally, the most important differentiating component in the term, the adjective “new,” is meant to signify termination of the laws and rules of the “old,” previous order, or at least their substantial modification or selective use.

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² The report was prepared within the framework of the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” under the grant of the Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education for major research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement No. 075-15-2020-783).

In the light of the above, one can infer, in a broad sense, that the entire course of the universal human history in general is a succession of declarations and collapses of undertakings interpreted by contemporaries as a “new world order”: from the ephemeral, as later turned out, monotheistic reforms of Ehnaton in ancient Egypt, to the ephemeral, as now turns out, globalist constructions of the adherents and epigones of the unipolar *New American Century*.

That which contemporaries perceive as the arrival of the *Novus ordo seclorum*, in other words, “a new order for the ages,” is often seen after one or two generations as an unfortunate disturbance, a ridiculous zigzag in the main course of history. However, it is possible that after an even longer period of history, the stigmatized zigzag will be rehabilitated and interpreted as a “bright phenomenon ahead of its time,” misunderstood and undeservedly slandered by contemporaries and their immediate descendants.

Thus, the understanding of NWO is “historical, transient, temporary, and this means that the very horizons of understanding are changeable” [2, c. 79]. Each successive generation interprets the *new world order* in its own way.

The process of understanding the new world order concept is fundamentally infinite, as the meanings attributed to it move in an endlessly expanding circle. The recurring comeback from the whole to the part and from the part to the whole alters and deepens the understanding of the part’s meaning, subjecting the whole to constant development. As H.-G. Gadamer shrewdly summarized, “formulation of the question is guided by ‘pre-understanding’”. We are talking about an established social system that has the meaning of a historically formed, scientifically unprovable norm. It is not only the subject of experiential scientific rationalization, but also its framework, in which the methodological work is “inserted.” In this case, the research solves the problem mostly by considering the hindrances in the existing social functional relationships, or also by explaining through the critique of ideology that challenges the existing dominant relations.” [1, c. 617].

The idea of a “*new world order for the ages*” has been at the core of the United States’ existence since inception. Anyone can see tangible evidence of this postulate on a dollar bill. It bears the Great Seal of the United States with the motto “*Novus ordo seclorum*.” However, appearance of the term in its modern political sense is associated with the name of the 28th President of the United States (1913–1921) Woodrow Wilson. On January 8, 1918, he presented his famous Fourteen Points, which later formed the basis of the Treaty of Versailles. Essentially, they represented a common scheme of NWO, although the term was not used there. On February 18, 1918, Wilson gave a special address to the U.S. Congress on the New *International Order* [6] and on September 9, 1919, at the University of Minnesota he first used the phrase “new order of the world” describing a world order where only democratic countries would be admitted. For autocrats, the doors will be closed. Notably, to express this thought, he used an English idiom “*to send to Coventry*,” which means “to subject someone to boycott, ostracism, cancellation”: “*The league of nations sends autocratic governments to Coventry*” [5].

As we can see, the “cancel culture” – in its ethical basis being a product of Protestant social conscience – was already inherent in the constituent texts of American presidents in those years, including their international affairs. Of course, Woodrow Wilson could not have anticipated how literally an autocrat from Germany in 1940 would take his invective of “coventrying” in regard to the democratic Britain.

However, the said German autocrat tried to impose his own interpretation of NWO, which he called in his native language, without any ambiguity, *die neue Ordnung*.

At the 1945 Yalta Conference, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill discussed plans for a postwar world order. However, the bipolarity that developed after the war prevented the victors from establishing a unified NWO on the planet. Each of the superpowers interpreted the ideal meanings of NWO in its own way. However, the established bipolarity itself can be considered a specific, higher-level new form of world order, which has existed for almost 45 years.

After the 1989 Malta summit, both Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush saw the era following the end of the Cold War as the NWO. However, their interpretations of the phenomenon were not the same. Gorbachev used the actual words “new world order,” while Bush Sr. spoke of the same descriptively as “a world quite different from the one we’ve known” [7]. Gorbachev, fascinated by the ideas of world brotherhood, nevertheless favored the construction of a “pan-European home” in which decisions regarding NWO would be made collegially. But Bush and his successor Clinton viewed NWO through the prism of unambiguous and unquestionable American leadership.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be considered the starting point for establishing another NWO. From the last decades of the 20th century to the present day, the dominant world order has changed at least three times: the collapse of the bipolar system, the establishment of unipolarity with undisputed hegemony of the United States, the possible emergence of a multipolar system. As for the arrangement and real prospects of the latter, no clear view or unequivocal opinion exists thus far. The current stage in shaping of the model of international relations is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and instability.

The successive change of these cycles has made speculations concerning the ongoing tectonic shifts in the world economy and the established world order a constant truism of the last thirty years.

As the unipolar world began to erode in the 2000s, and vague but gradually more visible contours of global polycentricity began to appear in the haze of neo-liberal fundamentalism, the toolkit of prophetic clichés about fateful changes and their irreversibility started to grow. After the 2008–2010 crisis, the NWO cliché started to lose popularity to the substitute phrase “The world will never be the same again,” although for 10 years after the global crisis conceived in the U.S., no radical changes occurred [3, c. 5–6].

In 2020, with the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, it was reiterated that “humankind has now entered a different reality.” By 2022 the states of the world, despite the enormous costs and significant human losses, had nearly recovered from the shock of the first two years of the crisis and began to build *models and rules of existence in the “new normal”* [4, c. 5], that is, internationally, NWO.

Changes on a global scale have already occurred. As we have stressed in previous publications, in the first two months of the pandemic, most governments have effectively carried out operations to restrict many of the previously unquestioned freedoms of citizens: entire sectors of the economy (international air travel, tourism, etc.) have been shut down. Quality of life of large swaths of the population has declined radically, whereas the cycle of life and behavioral order in developed countries (less so in developing countries) have become subject to strict regulation on a voluntary basis. Without resorting to the difficult procedure provided for by national laws, almost all states used instructions from representatives of the executive power (often not the top level) to de facto transfer the leading economies of the world producing more than 80% of the gross world product to mobilization mode [4, c. 5–6]. At the same time, industries not adapted to function in such a mode (tourism, small business, etc.) fell into a coma, if not died. The fragmentation and parcellarization of national societies have reached proportions unprecedented in modern history. Inter-country, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations are under tremendous strain, which opens a window of opportunity for the active use of the “divide and conquer” principle by forces interested in it [4, c. 6].

While not aiming at assessment of ultimate effectiveness of these governmental measures, it is important to be aware of how significant they are, even after their expiration (in about two years), for the evolution of state power, sentiments and interactions in the society, and future international relations. Russia in its present state and situation is fully exposed to general world processes.

Scientists and politicians agree that “*the pandemic and the global economic downturn made it impossible to develop globalization in the same vein as in the 1990s and 2010s*” [Ibid]. And here’s why.

The term “globalization” is known to refer to two closely related but essentially different phenomena: a) the ongoing process of global generalization and internationalization of economic life, regardless of the will of people; b) the political and economic project to use this objective process in the interests of the dominant (leading) groups of the world financial and economic oligarchy. The United States was the global leader of the “project” and its nation-state inspirer and driver for many years; it created world alliances in its interests and formed new, complementary centers of economic power that ensured its dominance. States and alternative centers of influence that did not fit into this scheme were to be eliminated or relegated to the role of outcast from the world community, doomed to a miserable existence [Ibid].

As we know, *this pattern of globalization has failed* because it has created competitors for the U.S., such as China and, to a lesser extent, other countries with rising influence, recently classified as “developing,” “collapsed,” or “backward.” Within the oligarchic elites of the West, there was a growing disagreement between the part which gave priority to the global hegemony of the United States, and the part for which the national shell of the dominant oligarchic group was secondary to its group (class) interests [Ibid].

Both parts were nevertheless interested in restarting globalization in the updated situation under the new program code. The first part wanted to replace “globalization 1.0” with an updated version of the U.S. model of

world domination in the paradigm of the unconditional “power of American imperialism” of the mid-20th century – nullifying the results of the rise of China, India, Brazil and the weakening of the EU, Canada and several other players. The second part allowed for some redistribution of the balance of power in global hegemony at the expense of the share of the EU, Russia and a number of other actors, ensured by a more rigid domination of collective supranational structures formed primarily by this same part of the global oligarchy [Ibid].

The pandemic created a window of opportunity for both of these groups. On the one hand, the outbreak of coronavirus infection has greatly increased the state’s governing role, showing the vital importance of returning the industries scattered across the world over the years of the past globalization model to their own sovereign territory and jurisdiction.

On the other hand, failures of governments to stop the pandemic, the inability of virtually all Western democracies to effectively confront the virus at the national level (the difference being that some did “badly” and some “extremely badly”), the inability to defend the highest “European value” they proclaimed – human life – have dealt the nation-state an irreparable blow. The official policy of the authorities of some Western countries – to save the young while leaving the old to die – has seriously undermined the moral and ethical foundations of the institution of the family, already severely eroded in recent decades [3, p. 10]. Extreme disruption of social ties through the introduced mechanism of self-isolation, the concept “everyone saves himself by separating from society” created the preconditions for rejecting “ineffective state intervention” and convinced many people in the latter’s poor performance. “This has formed the necessary environment for bringing *communities of competent non-state actors of supra-sovereign level* to the forefront in the post-pandemic future” [Ibid, c. 11].

Sharp aggravation of the crisis of the political system in the United States in the second half of 2020 led to (perhaps temporary) victory of the “ultra-globalists,” who, on the one hand, advocated for rigid consolidation of the West, and on the other hand, stiffened the approaches to Russia and China. Despite all costs, the victors managed to consolidate the “collective West” around the revived propagandist ideological slogan of NWO-1918 “Democracies against authoritarian regimes,” and in military material terms – around the NATO bloc and its sub-products in other regions of the planet (AUKUS and others). By the end of 2021, the change in the dynamics of the existing world order is actually long overdue. The world, having finally overcome the “zigzag of history,” in its typical contradictions returned to the beginning of the twentieth century and froze in anticipation of a new Sarajevo...

As shown above, “new world orders” are usually born as a result of irreversible changes in the global balance of power, the undermining of the planetary positions of the old hegemonies and progressive ascent of new candidates to this role. This is not a linear process. In some cases (as was in the late 1980s and early 1990s) the old hegemonic powers are able to re-establish their position by seizing and absorbing new, previously inaccessible resources. Thus, at the end of the Cold War, the collective West was able to regain its historical dynamism for a time, thanks to the fact that,

on its own terms, it obtained the full potential of the former socialist countries for its disposal. This allowed it to extend its hegemony for nearly 30 more years. However, by the mid-2010s, the easily accessible part of this reserve, whose consumption did not cost much, was practically “digested.” What remained was the “hard-to-develop” segments of the world economy in the former Soviet Union and particularly backward areas of the developing world. In addition, as noted above, the mid-term horizon promised inevitable confrontation with China and possibly with some of the other large and populous ascendant economies.

Redivision of the world, followed by the introduction of another NWO, was just as inevitable. It was decided to play the Ukrainian card by the spring of 2022 as a final solution of the aforementioned problem, and perhaps Russia was seen as a weak link in this global balance of power.

For Russia, deployment of such a scenario signaled the need to actually abandon the orientation to the West, albeit somewhat weakened, but still retained since the Gorbachev era. It was a mistake and a fateful negligence to naively hope that the West would want to take care of the vast area of the former Soviet Union and its large population (today about 400 million people in total) and help this part of the world achieve the same level of prosperity and well-being that its citizens have.

The deindustrialization that has taken place, the parcellarization of territory, the unbundling and separation of economic entities, the liquidation of most of the system-forming advanced manufacturing sites and entire industries, along with the collapse of vocational education and training, the declining quality of general education (not to mention moral upbringing) have led to the fact that by the time of confrontation with the West, Russia is forced to solve a host of problems that could otherwise be non-existent or not so grave.

The crisis of the world order that broke out in late winter this year created the need to renew the entire ecosystem of economic and political relations in the internal and external contours of the Russian statehood. There is a clear need to strengthen both contours, to form new or updated approaches and, most importantly, incentives (either positive or negative) to improve relations with foreign states. We need to overcome the situation where Russia is expected to give something to someone all the time, relying at best on assurances of eternal friendship and “strategic partnership.” The partner should have a very clear understanding of its resulting losses in the case of neglect of our country’s interests. At the same time, it is clear that in the overall range of “persuasive arguments,” the power arguments will be the last resort.

Today’s urgent task is to overcome *pain points* at the external and internal contours. At the external contour, such points are those countries which experience the enemy’s undisguised pressure because they want to preserve and further develop relations with Russia, and are unwilling to join the boycotts and sanctions of the hegemonic powers. The most vulnerable point on the internal contour seems to be the lack of understanding by a significant part of the population that Russia’s success in building a new world order and its place in it depend directly on the size and quality of each citizen’s personal contribution to the collective efforts of the entire country. A proper place in the emerging new world order will allow Russia to stop being an exploit-

ed and robbed semi-periphery, required to follow the externally established rules, and to join the ranks of equal system-forming actors of the world order, defining the essence of its development.

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