

## **TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE WORLD: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS**

The transformation of the world order is a continuous historical process, one that knows neither pauses nor stops, because the world is a “living” mechanism rooted in human psychology, evolving economic formations, the military-political interests of states and coalitions, and scientific and technological progress. It is impossible to imagine this global historical process as static.

The current transformation, in the form we are witnessing today, began with the collapse of the USSR – a central element of the world order to which humanity had grown accustomed since the Yalta Conference. That agreement had established a system of relations acceptable to all sides, with clearly defined mechanisms for restraint and resolution of even the most serious contradictions. However, with the disappearance of the world’s largest state – the Soviet Union – the Yalta agreements became an anachronism. What had been one of the most significant elements of international law at the time was relegated to the historical documents of the UN and the Security Council, losing all practical relevance and, accordingly, any binding guarantees.

As stated earlier, transformational processes do not tolerate interruptions. Today, we are witnessing their current “reformatting” and the emergence of new global arrangements.

It was only in the first year of the 1990s that the world was forced to come to terms with the end of the “Yalta” era. The world found itself disoriented, as its own transformation reverted to an impulsive appraisal of new conditions – conditions marked by a persistent tendency: a readiness for wars, supposedly leading to new forms. However, such new forms have never truly existed in human history – nor do they now.

Immediately following the dismantling of one global order – worldly “secularization”, that had resisted uncompromising ideological frameworks, the idea of *global human integration* began to take shape. This involved mutual penetration into economic and military-political systems that were often entirely unprepared for such interaction. In response to this process – completely beyond the control of political and administrative structures – a particular form of transformation was cultivated, one that quickly asserted itself as the only viable path.

This was *globalization*: the merging of all economic processes under unified management, to be followed inevitably by political agreements and, crucially, the creation of new international security systems, including military ones. It is not even worth mentioning the lofty idealism surrounding cultural, linguistic, and scientific conglomerations – fantasies that ignore the stark differences in levels of development, national identity, and religious principles among global communities. One historical certainty was to be replaced by another, devoid of practical application, detailed parameters or concrete form. Immediately, a trend of severe confrontation emerged, leading to the outbreak of numerous major and minor conflicts and the open discussion of redrawing political maps to suit the interests of the most powerful nations and their allies – be they satellites or smaller countries seeking economic gain.

Many came to view globalization as a form of national interest usurpation by dominant powers – both highly developed nations and military-political blocs. In the view of its numerous opponents, globalization as a form of transformation leads to the forced creation of administrative elites (using military, political, and police methods), who speak a single language, adhere to a single worldview, and seek to impose a non-market distribution of labor products and natural resources – regardless of national sovereignty, cultural identity, or traditional values.

It may come as a surprise to some that China is among the strongest supporters of such a global transformation (“globalization”). But this is easily

explained, despite the traditional political hypocrisy of the Chinese leadership. China has long permeated the global economy, embedding itself through both personnel and economic interests – large and small – aiming to master resources, saturate consumer markets with its products, and extract quiet fiscal gains in the form of national budget contributions (a kind of licensing fee). Engaging with individual regions is costly and provides few guarantees for the resources spent or for the stability of personnel involved. In contrast, when the rules of integration are transformed on a global scale, a massive and highly efficient economy like China's gains reliable, predictable outcomes. The balance of effort and return aligns well for China under globalization.

Is the United States a genuine proponent of globalization as a form of world transformation? And if so, what are the challenges and prospects? This is a more complex question than in the case of China, which possesses a unified ideological control and evaluation center. The U.S. lacks such centralized consensus, despite being one of the world's strongest economies. As a result, internal U.S. politics are characterized by conflict between proponents and opponents of this form of transformation. This persists even though globalization is fundamentally a corporate project of transformation, based on direct or indirect agreements among global elites.

It would be a methodological error to believe that the conflict over governance and the future of transformation (based on globalization) in the U.S. is purely one of liberals versus conservatives, Democrats versus Republicans, conflicts. Both camps support global transformation – but each envisions different challenges and prospects within it. That said, both sides now acknowledge that globalization reached its peak in the past decade and no longer meets new strategic demands. The fact that it is now supported by China – America's principal rival – only reinforces this view. Weakening globalization would create significant obstacles for China's economic and industrial expansion.

Accordingly, it is increasingly claimed that President Donald Trump is an “anti-globalist,” committed to redirecting the center of gravity for future economic development away from globalism and back to U.S. national territory. His aggressive trade tariffs and sanctions against the EU, Canada, China, and even Sri Lanka serve as evidence of this stance. Even the mere mention of an economic bloc like BRICS introducing national currencies into its economic space provoked Trump’s anger. He demonstrated this briefly and in entirely unambiguous terms. This is not the only indication of how, under his leadership, the United States envisions the prospects of global transformation. Trump’s announced 90-day “pause” (excluding China) represents a forceful proposal for the world to choose a new transformation path – one led and dictated by the United States.

The internal personnel purge in Washington, beyond its official justifications, was aimed at consolidating a unified vision for the transformation of the world over the foreseeable future – both ideologically and practically.

The emergence of Elon Musk behind Trump is, in a sense, a key marker of a new form of global transformation from the perspective of proponents of the world’s strongest economy – the United States – in contrast to the interests and assessments of China and, of course, Russia, as well as those of the developed European countries (the United Kingdom and the EU).

So, what does this “world of the strong” foresee as the methodology for transforming economies, now that globalization has nearly run its course without even reaching maturity?

The answer is plainly visible. It recently manifested in the clash of two mighty forces – Chinese and American (read: Elon Musk) – around the issue of Artificial Intelligence (AI). According to the leading global powers, AI is to become the principal, undeniable engine of global transformation – with all its potential benefits and inevitable challenges.

The human factor, long championed by globalization as a core condition for success, is being cast aside. In its place, a technocratic, technotronic model of

global governance is rising – one devoid of compassion or empathy, because such concepts have no digital equivalent and thus cannot serve as corrective mechanisms for AI.

In contemporary academic circles, there is persistent talk that in recent years globalism has been hindering the development of AI by all means at its disposal, recognizing that even the most superficial digital calculation would lead to its collapse – as well as to the downfall of that segment of the elite which fails to secure a reliable place in the “scientific,” or more precisely, digital expansion of all managerial, industrial, and resource positions. The resulting digital transformation is poised to sharply reduce the number of global elites, replacing traditional values with digital equivalents, whose protection and maintenance will become a new hyper-profitable industry. This ushers in an era dominated by powerful special services – not based on brute force, but on scientific and technical expertise. This applies to armed forces, military-industrial complexes, and the emergence of new legal governing and control forms. The familiar rhetoric of democracy and liberalism is being forcefully displaced by a harshly conservative outlook on all forms of governance. This is not a regional issue – it is an international one, requiring in-depth study well beyond the scope of this paper.

Russia, as a vast region – virtually a planet within a planet – remains, as ever, a critical political and economic actor in shaping the new world transformation. No global settlement is possible without consideration of Russia’s strategic interests. The main issue considered by both Russia’s allies and its adversaries is the question of the consumption of its national resources and its geopolitical position. Global and long-term agreements with Russia extend far beyond bilateral or trilateral negotiations and encompass the interests of both economic superpowers and those states permanently relegated to the status of satellites or dependents.

Thus, the major powers will be engaged – often not as allies – in a protracted process of shaping the next world transformation, with all its attendant challenges and opportunities. Personal or emotional considerations have no place here; this is an objective historical process, inseparably tied to the role of a “cold-blooded” AI and its technogenic future, the center of its control and management, as well as to the enduring humanitarian and cultural traditions of civilization. These are not vague platitudes, but essential components of a new global order – just as they were of the old one, dating back to ancient times. This is the nature of historical progress: it directly reflects the technical – especially military and scientific – capabilities of its era.

To this must be added the mounting interests of major powers in exploring and exploiting the North and South Poles – regions that until recently were absent from political discourse for obvious reasons. These areas will also become vital elements of the new global transformation. Donald Trump’s provocative claims and thinly veiled aspirations regarding Canada and Greenland further highlight the significance of the “northern issue” – next to which even major European conflicts appear merely regional in scope. These are the levers of a great and pressing question: who will lead the newly transformed world, and who will control the vast northern resources of our planet?

The world now stands at the fault line of a fundamental conflict of interests – and at the cusp of the methods chosen to resolve it.