

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF EDUCATION
ST. PETERSBURG INTELLIGENTSIA CONGRESS

ST. PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

under the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE: Vol.1
11TH INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

May 12–13, 2011

*The Conference is held in accordance with
the Decree of President of Russia V. V. Putin
'On perpetuating the memory
of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov'
No 587, dated from May 23, 2001*

*The conference, originally called 'The Days of Sci-
ence in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities
and Social Sciences' is the 19th in number
and the 11th in the status of the International
Likhachov Scientific Conference*

The project of 'The International Likhachov Scientific Conference'
was implemented in 2011 under the support
of the Interstate Foundation for Humanitarian Cooperation
of the CIS member states.



**St. Petersburg
2011**

ББК 72

Д44

Scientific editor

A. S. Zapesotsky, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation, Artist Emeritus of the Russian Federation

Editor of the English language edition

S. R. Abramov, English Chair of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), Professor

Recommended to be published by the Editorial and Publishing Council
of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences,
minutes No. 10, dated from 11.03.11

Д44 **Dialogue** of Cultures under Globalization. Vol. 1 : Proceedings of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference, May 12–13, 2011, St. Petersburg : SPbUHSS, 2011. — 200 p.
ISBN 978-5-7621-0618-4

The book is the selection from the proceedings of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference that is to take place on May 12–13, 2011, at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences in accordance with the Decree No. 587 of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin of May 23, 2001.

The authors are prominent Russian and foreign scientists, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Education: L. I. Abalkin, O. T. Bogomolov, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, M. P. Kirpichnikov, V. A. Lektorsky, V. L. Makarov, A. D. Nekipelov (Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences), N. D. Nikandrov (President of the Russian Academy of Education), M. B. Piotrowsky, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Chershnev, A. O. Chubarian and others; heads of academic institutions and research centers; heads of scholarly and social and political periodicals, famous politicians, statesmen and public officials, clerisy representatives, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. V. Lavrov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation V. Ye. Churov, Governor of St. Petersburg V. I. Matviyenko, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation G. A. Hajiyeu, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia M. V. Shmakov, senior figures of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation Yu. N. Solonin and A. K. Isayev, Deputy Ministers of the Russian Federation A. E. Busygin, G. M. Gatilov and A. L. Safonov, Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation M. A. Fedotov, Vice-Mayor of Moscow A. N. Gorbenko, Editor-in-Chief of *Moskovsky Komсомоlets* daily, Chairman of the Journalists' Union of Moscow P. N. Gusev, President of the Bar of Moscow H. M. Reznik and others.

Among the foreign guests of the Conference are representatives of 20 countries, among them ambassadors to the Russian Federation: Ambassador of Spain J. A. Mark, Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran S. M. R. Sajjadi; delegates to the UN and UNESCO: M. Scheuer, M. Y. Katagum, M. El Zahaby, K. Yao Yao; representatives of 5 foreign academies of sciences: of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts F. Unger, of the Academy of Sciences and Arts of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina L. Zuković, of the National Academy of Sciences of the Ukraine Yu. S. Shemshuchenko, of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences V. Prodanov, of the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China G. Xing; German political analyst A. Rahr, Ukrainian writer O. A. Buzina and other widely known specialists.

The speeches of the 11th Likhachov Conference participants are devoted to the urgent issues of modern age. The role of the Conference was highly estimated by President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, who has pointed out that 'today, with all the rapprochement and interpenetration of cultures it is important to preserve original traditions, languages, customs, spiritual and moral values of people – as a basis for cultural diversity of the world in the age of globalization'.

ББК 72

**DECREE OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
'ON PERPETUATING THE MEMORY
OF DMITRY SERGEYEVICH LIKHACHOV'**

Given D. S. Likhachov's outstanding contribution to the development of the home science and culture I enact:

1. the Government of the Russian Federation should:
 - establish two personal grants in honour of D. S. Likhachov at the rate of 400 roubles each for university students from the year 2001 and to define the procedure of conferring them;
 - work out the project of D. S. Likhachov's gravestone on a competitive basis together with the Government of St. Petersburg;
 - consider the issue of making a film devoted to D. S. Likhachov's life and activities.
2. the Government of St. Petersburg should:
 - name one of the streets in St. Petersburg after D. S. Likhachov;
 - consider the issue of placing a memorial plate on the building of the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Science (Pushkin's House);
 - guarantee the work on setting up D. S. Likhachov's gravestone in prescribed manner.
3. According to the suggestion from the Russian Academy of Science the Likhachov Memorial Prizes of the Russian Academy of Science should be established for Russian and foreign scientists for their outstanding contribution to the research of literature and culture of ancient Russia, and the collected writings of the late Academician should be published.
4. **According to the suggestion from St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress the International Likhachov Scientific Conference should be annually held on the Day of the Slavonic Letters and Culture.**

VLADIMIR PUTIN
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin, May 23, 2001



**GREETINGS OF PRESIDENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
DMITRY MEDVEDEV
TO THE PARTICIPANTS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

**To the participants and guests
of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends,

I am sincerely pleased to see you in St. Petersburg and to open the 10th Anniversary Likhachov Conference.

This forum traditionally brings representatives of scientific and arts communities, famous politicians, and experts from Russia and all over the world.

This year the Likhachov Conference is devoted to one of the today's key issues, establishment of global culture and preservation of national identity.

Today, with convergence and interpenetration of cultures it is important to preserve original traditions, languages, lifestyle, and spiritual and moral values of the folks as a basis of cultural diversity of the world in the time of globalization. I hope you enjoy interesting discussions and fruitful communication, and wish good luck and success to the senior pupils who are participating in the Competition 'Ideas of D. S. Likhachov and Modern Age'.

President of the Russian Federation
D. A. MEDVEDEV



**GREETINGS OF CHAIRMAN
OF THE GOVERNMENT
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
VLADIMIR PUTIN
TO THE PARTICIPANTS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

**To the participants and guests
of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends,

I am sincerely pleased to see you in St. Petersburg and open the 10th Anniversary International Likhachov Conference.

This reputable Forum is always notable for the substantial membership, comprehensive and effective work, and wide spectrum of issues to be discussed.

I am sure that the today's meeting devoted to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations should be one more step forward in promoting interconfessional and international communication to bring people closer to each other. And, certainly, again we can see so many prominent people together, among which are scientists, public figures, intellectuals, representatives of arts community, everyone who shares notions and opinions of Dmitry S. Likhachov.

I wish you good luck and all the best!

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation
V. PUTIN



**GREETINGS
FROM DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF UNESCO
IRINA BOKOVA
TO THE PARTICIPANTS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

I would like to extend my warmest greetings to the participants of the 10th International Likhachov Conference 'Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations: Establishment of Global Culture'.

I sincerely regret that I am not able to join you at the conference which is devoted to the acute challenges UNESCO is facing and which is extremely up-to-date in the International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures commemorated this year, during which UNESCO shall serve as the main promoter of the UN ideas.

St. Petersburg is the best place to hold such an event. In addition to its status of the first city of the Russian World heritage, this beautiful city, magnificent in its history and culture, is serving as a link between Russia and the whole world. St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences is one of the oldest and most prestigious educational institutions in Russia.

The great thinker Dmitry Likhachov initiated this annual conference, his life was connected with St. Petersburg and this University, he was a patriot who loved Russian culture. All his life he had demonstrated the model of openness and respect towards other cultures of all kinds. He was a great friend of my native country Bulgaria, and he possessed abundant knowledge of its culture and history.

Understanding others is the core essence of the present day. We live in the world where interdependence in all areas of human activities keeps growing. The process of globalization can reveal new opportunities to enhance relations between people, nations and cultures, but it can also arouse mistrust. Intercultural dialogue promotes awareness that, though different, we all of us share many positive values and life problems together. From this viewpoint, it is only a little step towards recognizing the fact that living in a diverse world can be a source to improve welfare.

History demonstrates that no single culture has been evolving in vacuum or in constant conflicts with other cultures. Advancements of communications that resulted from global events promoted constructive dialogue between cultures and were beneficial for all the mankind.

UNESCO was created after the World War II in order to collaborate in the work on advancing mutual knowledge and understanding between peoples, to contribute to peace and security, to promote cooperation between the nations through education, science and culture. On account of those responsibilities and our purposes in this International year, soon after my inauguration as Director-General of UNESCO in November last year, I drew a list of experts on the issues of peace and dialogue of cultures that includes thinkers and public figures in various spheres of life from all over the world. I am convinced that this expert team will help UNESCO find new ways of further mutual understanding and tolerance.

For cultural dialogue to be meaningful and fruitful, to have a lasting result, the parties concerned should take part in the process in all stages and in all cultures. It is only by cooperation that we can realize the true potential and solve the problems of peace and solidarity that guarantee stable future.

I cordially congratulate St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, its partners and hosts of the conference on having such an important event and wish its participants good luck in their discussions.

Director-General of UNESCO
Irina BOKOVA

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Information

The International Scientific Conference at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences first took place in May, 1993. It was timed to the Day of Slavonic Letters and Culture. It was initiated by academician Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov. Since then the conference has been held every year. After academician Likhachov had passed away this academic forum received the status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference from the government (by the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin 'On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov' No. 587, May 23, 2001).

The co-founders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Education, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress (founders: J. I. Alferov, D. A. Granin, A. S. Zapesotsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, D. S. Likhachov, A. P. Petrov, M. B. Piotrovsky). Since 2007 the conference has enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Traditionally, the most universal debatable challenges of the present time are put on the agenda of the conference: 'Education in terms of the new cultural type formation', 'Culture and global challenges of the world development', 'Humanitarian issues of the contemporary civilization' etc.

Every year greatest figures of Russian and foreign science, culture and art, public and political leaders take part in the conference. The following academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken part in the conference in recent years: L. I. Abalkin, A. G. Arbatov, N. P. Bekhtereva, O. T. Bogomolov, V. N. Bolshakov, Yu. S. Vasilyev, R. S. Grinberg, A. A. Guseynov, T. I. Zaslavskaya, M. P. Kirpichnikov, A. A. Kokoshin, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, I. I. Lukinov, D. S. Lvov, V. L. Makarov, V. A. Martynov, N. N. Moiseyev, A. D. Nekipelov, Yu. S. Osipov, A. M. Panchenko, N. Ya. Petrakov, V. F. Petrenko, E. I. Pivovarov, M. B. Piotrovsky, N. A. Plateh, V. M. Polterovich, E. M. Primakov, B. V. Rauschenbach, Yu. A. Ryzhov, N. N. Skatov, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Tishkov, J. T. Toshchenko, V. A. Chereshev, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov, V. L. Yanin and others. Academicians of the Russian Academy of Education who have taken part in the conference are the following: S. A. Amonashvili, V. I. Andreyev, G. M. Andreyeva, A. G. Asmolov, A. P. Beliayeva, M. N. Berulava, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, A. A. Bodalev, E. V. Bondarevskaya, G. A. Bordovsky, V. P. Borisenkov, G. N. Volkov, Yu. S. Davydov, A. V. Darinsky, E. D. Dneprov, S. F. Yegorov, V. I. Zagvyazinskiy, I. A. Zimniaya, V. G. Kineliyov, I. S. Kon, A. S. Kondratyev, V. G. Kostomarov, V. V. Krayevsky, A. A. Likhanov, G. V. Mukhamedzianova, V. S. Mukhina, V. A. Miasnikov, N. D. Nikandrov, A. M. Novikov, O. A. Omarov, A. A. Orlov, Yu. V. Senko, A. V. Usova, Yu. U. Fokht-Babushkin, G. A. Yagodin, V. Mitter (Germany) and others. Such public and state figures as A. A. Akayev, A. E. Busygin, G. A. Hajiyev, S. L. Katanandov, S. V. Lavrov, Ye. I. Makarov, V. I. Matviyenko, V. V. Miklushevsky, K. O. Romodanovsky, A. L. Safonov, A. A. Sobchak, E. S. Stroyev, V. Ye. Churov, M. V. Shmakov, A. V. Yakovenko, V. A. Yakovlev have also participated in the conference. Among the figures of culture and art who have taken part in the conference are the following: M. K. Anikushin, A. A. Voznesensky, I. O. Gorbachov, D. A. Granin, N. M. Dudinskaya, Z. Ya. Korogodsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, A. P. Petrov, M. M. Plisetskaya, M. L. Rostropovich, E. A. Riazanov, G. V. Sviridov and others.

Since 2007 in the framework of the Conference there has been held Likhachov forum of senior high-school students of Russia, which gathers winners of the All-Russian Contest of creative projects entitled 'Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity' from all over Russia and abroad.

Since 2008, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Programme of the conference 'International Dialogue of Cultures' has been implemented. Ambassadors of foreign states present their reports and give their opinions on acute challenges of present time.

Since 2010 the complex of Likhachov events has been supplemented with an All-Russian cultural-educational programme for senior high-school students entitled 'Likhachov Lessons in Petersburg'.

In 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2010, the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev and V. V. Putin, in 2008 and 2010 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin.

Every year volumes of reports, participants' presentations, proceedings of workshop discussions and round tables are published. The copies of the volumes are present in all major libraries of Russia, the CIS countries, scientific and educational centres of many countries in the world. The Proceedings of the conference are also available on a special scientific website 'Likhachov Square' (at www.lihachev.ru).

CONTENTS

Decree of President of the Russian Federation 'On Perpetuating the Memory of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov'	3
Greetings of PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Dmitry Medvedev to the participants of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference	4
Greetings of Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin to the participants of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference	5
Greetings from Director-General of UNESCO Irina Bokova to the participants of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference	6
About the International Likhachov Scientific Conference (Information)	7
L. ABALKIN , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Head of the Institute for Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, editor-in-chief of 'Issues of Economy' (Voprosy ekonomiki) journal, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i> MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CULTURES IS THE FOUNDATION FOR PROGRESS	13
P. ANCHEV , <i>editor-in-Chief of the literature and arts magazine 'Prostory' (Bulgaria), Chairman of Varna department of Bulgarian Writers' Union</i> DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND/OR SYMPHONY OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION	13
F. ASADULLIN , <i>leading researcher of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Director of Academic and Enlightenment Centre al-Wasitiyah, member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sciences (Philology)</i> THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND DIALOGUE OF CULTURES	15
Ye. ASTAKHOV , <i>Professor of the Chair of Diplomacy of Moscow University of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> THE EUROPEAN PROJECTION OF RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION	18
O. BOGOMOLOV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Advisor to the Russian Academy of Sciences, Honorary Director of the Institute for International Economic and Political Research (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Head of Department of World Economy at the State University of Management, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i> DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS IN VIEW OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS (CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM. WHAT NEXT? RUSSIA'S CASE)	20
Heinrich BONNENBERG , <i>Dr. Sc. (Engineering), member of German Society for Foreign Policy, member of German-Russian Forum</i> WORLD OF CITIZENS AND ISLAM ON THE PATH TO AN AGE OF THE PRESENT	22
N. BUROV , <i>Director of the State Memorial of St. Isaac's Cathedral, Professor at St. Petersburg State University of Culture and Arts, People's Artist of Russia</i> DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION	26
A. BUSYGIN , <i>Deputy Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Class 1 Active State Advisor of the Russian Federation</i> CULTURE AS FACTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY	28
O. BUZINA , <i>writer, journalist, historian (the Ukraine)</i> CLASH OR INTERPENETRATION: INTERACTIONS OF RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN CULTURE IN THE UKRAINE UNDER GLOBALIZATION	29
XINXIN CHANG , <i>Director of the Department at the Institute for Social Development of Party School (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), editor of 'Scientific Socialism' journal (People's Republic of China)</i> PLURALISM OF CULTURES AND HARMONIOUS WORLD IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION	33
V. CHERESHNEV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the Committee on Science and Hi-Tech (the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia), Director of the Institute for Immunology and Physiology (the Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and Head of the Middle Urals Scientific Centre of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (Yekaterinburg), Dr. Med., Professor; V. RASTORGUYEV, Professor of the Chair of Philosophy of Politics and Law at Lomonosov Moscow University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Honorary Higher Education Lecturer of the Russian Federation</i> CIVILIZATIONAL ASPECT OF MODERNIZATION AND BOUNDARIES OF COEXISTING EPOCHS	35
A. CHUBARIAN , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for World History (the Russian Academy of Sciences), President of the State Academic University for the Humanities (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i> WORLD HISTORY AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS	37
V. CHUROV , <i>Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i> NATIONAL (MULTICULTURAL) FACTOR IN AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM	38
Armand CLESSE , <i>Director of the Luxemburg Institute of European and International Research, Ph.D.</i> PREREQUISITES FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS	41

Piotr DUTKIEWICZ , <i>Director of the Institute of European, Russian, and Eurasian Research at Carlton University (Canada), Ph.D., Professor</i>	
FOUR TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POST-CRISIS SHORT-TERM SCENARIO	42
B. EIFMAN , <i>ballet director of St. Petersburg Academic State Theatre of Ballet, choreographer, People's Artist of Russia, Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i>	
THE PETERSBURG BALLET IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES.....	43
M. EL ZAHABY , <i>Permanent Delegate of the Arab Republic of Egypt to UNESCO</i>	
ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN A GLOBALISED WORLD.....	45
Souheil FARAKH , <i>Ph.D., foreign member of the Russian Academy of Education, Professor of Chair of Philosophy of the Department for Humanities at the Lebanese University</i>	
FROM DIALOGUE TO PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES, OBSTACLES, PROSPECTS	47
M. FEDOTOV , <i>Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, Secretary of Journalists' Union of Russia, LL.D., Professor, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation</i>	
'US' AND 'THEM' IN THE PRISM OF MASS MEDIA.....	50
A. FLIER , <i>professor of the Chair of Philosophy, Cultural and Political Studies at Moscow University for the Humanities, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy)</i>	
ELITIST, FOLK AND MASS CULTURE: DIALOGUE AT THE SCAFFOLD.....	52
G. GATILOV , <i>Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>	
GLOBALIZATION, DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND THE UN	54
Yu. GOLIGORSKY , <i>independent journalist, producer (Great Britain)</i>	
"A TALE TOLD BY AN IDIOT, FULL OF SOUND AND FURY, SIGNIFYING NOTHING"	56
A. GORBENKO , <i>Vice-Mayor of Moscow on media, inter-regional cooperation, sports and tourism in Moscow Government, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies)</i>	
THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN THE GLOBAL DIALOGUE OF CULTURES.....	57
A. GROMYKO , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, leading researcher at Institute for International Security Issues of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor</i>	
PEACE CULTURE AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.....	61
P. GUSEV , <i>editor-in-chief of Moskovsky Komsomolets daily, Chairman of the Journalists' Union of Moscow, Chairman of the Public Chamber Commission of the Russian Federation on communications, information policy and freedom of speech in the media, Honorary worker of culture of the Russian Federation</i>	
RUSSIAN MASS MEDIA: CAN FALLING BEHIND THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT BECOME IRREVERSIBLE?	62
A. GUSEYNOV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Chair of Ethics of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i>	
DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: THE LIMITS OF CULTUROLOGICAL ANALYSIS.....	65
G. HAJIYEV , <i>Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, LL.D., Professor, Lawyer Emeritus of the Russian Federation. Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i>	
ETHICAL ASPECTS OF LAW-GOVERNED STATE.....	68
B. ILIZAROV , <i>leading researcher of the Institute for Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor</i>	
ON CRUCIAL DIALOGUES WITH THE PAST (THE CHARM OF EVIL: FROM THE CULT OF THE LIVING TO THE CULT OF THE DEAD PERSONALITY OF STALIN)	69
A. ISAYEV , <i>Chairman of the Committee on Labour and Social Policy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Candidate of Sciences (Political Studies)</i>	
CONFLICT THEORY OF SOCIAL LABOUR RELATIONS AS THE RESOURCE FOR TRANSITION FROM THE CONFRONTATION POLICY TO THE CONCORD POLICY	74
M. Y. KATAGUM , <i>ambassador, Permanent Delegate of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to UNESCO</i>	
GLOBALIZATION AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE	75
N. KHRENOV , <i>Deputy Director for Research, Head of the Theory of Art Section at the State Institute for Art History and Criticism (Moscow), Professor of the Chair of the Humanities at Russian State University of Cinematography, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy)</i>	
THE FATE OF RUSSIA'S CIVILIZATION IDEA AT THE AGE OF GLOBAL CULTURE FORMATION	78
Walther L. KIEP , <i>public figure and statesman of the FRG, Dr.</i>	
CHANCES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE GLOBALIZED WORLD	82
M. KIRPICHNIKOV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Head of the Biology Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Head of Chair of Bioengineering, Dr. Sc. (Biology), Professor</i>	
THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND A SCHOLAR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION.....	83
G. KLEINER , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i>	
DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND CO-EVOLUTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS.....	85

V. KVINT , <i>foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Financial Strategy Chair at Moscow School of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i> CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION	87
S. LAVROV , <i>Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN STABILITY AND SAFETY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD	89
V. LEKTORSKY , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the 'Issues of Philosophy' journal (Voprosy filosofiji), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor</i> MULTICULTURALISM AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES.....	92
A. LIKHANOV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Education, writer, Chairman of the Russian Children Fund, Director of the Research Institute for Childhood of the Russian Children Fund, Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i> CHILDHOOD AS THE WHOLE OF MANKIND'S RESPONSIBILITY	93
V. MAKAROV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor</i> ON TRANSITION FROM COLLECTIVENESS TO INDIVIDUALITY	94
Juan A. MARK , <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Spain to the Russian Federation</i> ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS: FIVE YEARS OF ADVANCEMENT	96
A. MARKOV , <i>Professor of Philosophy and Cultural Studies Chair at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Education), Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i> CIVILIZATIONAL MATRICES OF RUSSIA AND THE WEST: PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE	97
V. MATVIYENKO , <i>Governor of St. Petersburg, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> MULTINATIONAL ST. PETERSBURG: MODERN EXPERIENCE OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES	100
A. MELIKHOV , <i>writer, deputy editor-in-chief of 'Neva' literary journal (St. Petersburg), Candidate of Sciences (Physics and Mathematics)</i> THE SHARED APARTMENT OF CULTURES	101
V. MIRONOV , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Philosophy Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation</i> DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION THREATS	104
V. NAUMKIN , <i>Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor</i> THE WORLD CIVILIZATION AND MIDDLE EAST REVOLUTIONARY WHIRLPOOL.....	106
A. NEKIPELOV , <i>Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i> ON THE CONCEPTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT	108
N. NIKANDROV , <i>President of the Russian Academy of Education, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Education), Professor</i> IDEAS AND MYTHS AS MEANS OF UPBRINGING AND EDUCATION.....	109
L. PASESHNIKOVA , <i>First Vice-President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Curator of the Department of Law, Professor of the Chair of State Law</i> ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE SYSTEM OF PERSON'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS	113
V. PETRENKO , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor of General Psychology Chair at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Psychology)</i> HUMANITARIAN CULTURE AND EDUCATION: A FOUNDATION FOR PRESERVING RUSSIAN IDENTITY	115
M. PIOTROWSKY , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Arts, Director of the State Hermitage, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Chairman of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress, Chairman of the Russian Museums Union</i> TWO MUSEUMS AND TWO SQUARES	118
V. POPOV , <i>Director of the Centre for Partnership of Civilizations of the Institute for International Research at Moscow State Institute for International Relations (University) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sciences (History), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i> GLOBALIZATION AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES.....	120
Vasil PRODANOV , <i>corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor</i> DOES MULTICULTURALISM INCREASE CONFLICTS IN NATION-STATES?	123
Alexander RAHR , <i>director of the Berthold Beitz Centre at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), journalist, political analyst (Germany)</i> MODERN SITUATION IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU.....	126
H. REZNIK , <i>President of the Bar of Moscow, Chair of the Legal Profession at the Academy University for Law under the Institute for State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, LL.M., Lawyer Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i> ANTINOMIES OF A SOCIAL STATE.....	129
A. SAFONOV , <i>Deputy Minister of Healthcare and Social Development of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Class 3 Active State Advisor of the Russian Federation</i> DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES FOR THE ECONOMY AND LABOUR MARKET IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION.....	130

Reza SAJJADI , <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation</i>	
THE URGENCY OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH FOR THE SAKE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY	133
Mehdi SANAI , <i>member of Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Director of the Research Centre for Russia and Eastern Europe at the University of Tehran (Iran), Professor of the Law Institute at Tehran University, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies)</i>	
DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN GLOBALISM CONDITIONS	133
Marc SCHEUER , <i>Director of the Secretariat of Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations Organization</i>	
DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION	136
Eberhard SCHNEIDER , <i>Professor of Political Science at the University of Siegen (Germany), Ph.D.</i>	
GLOBAL CULTURE AND THE INTERNET	138
V. SCHULTZ , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Centre for Security Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i>	
CAPITALIST SOCIETY: CONFLICTS AND DEVELOPMENT	139
Yu. SHEMSHUCHENKO , <i>foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, Director of V. M. Koretsky Institute for State and Law of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, LL.D., Professor</i>	
TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BOLOGNA PROCESS.....	141
M. SHMAKOV , <i>Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, President of All-European Regional Council of Trade Unions of the International Confederation of Trade Unions, President of the General Confederation of Trade Unions, Professor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i>	
LABOUR CONFLICTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY	143
N. SHMELYOV , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Europe (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i>	
RUSSIA: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE	144
K. SHUVALOV , <i>Ambassador-at-large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Special Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on cooperation with the Alliance of Civilizations, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>	
DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: PROBLEMS OF MANAGEABILITY AND SUPRANATIONAL COORDINATION	149
A. SMIRNOV , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Director of Research of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor</i>	
IS A NON-WESTERN PHILOSOPHY POSSIBLE?	150
V. SOGRIN , <i>Head of Centre for North American Studies at the Institute for World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor at Moscow University of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, editor-in-chief of 'Social Sciences and Modernity' ('Obshchestvennyye nauki i sovremennost') journal, Dr. Sc. (History), honorary worker of higher education of the Russian Federation</i>	
THE U.S. CIVILIZATION IN THE POST-SOVIET RUSSIA'S PERCEPTION.....	152
Yu. SOLONIN , <i>Chairman of the Council of the Federation Committee for Science and Education at the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i>	
CULTURE IN THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE.....	154
V. STYOPIN , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Supervisor of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Section of Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and Law of the Department for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences</i>	
THE PROBLEM OF VALUES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES	155
M. TITARENKO , <i>academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for the Far East Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i>	
THE EURASIANIST IDEOLOGY AS PARADIGM FOR COEXISTENCE AND FLOURISHING DIVERSITY OF CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS.....	158
Mustapha TLILI , <i>Founder and Director of the New York University Centre for Dialogues, Diplomat</i>	
THE NEW MEDITERRANEAN ORDER IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION	162
J. TOSHCHENKO , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, editor-in-chief of 'Sociological Research' ('Sotsiologicheskije issledovanija') journal, Head of Sociology Department and Head of Chair of Theory and History of Sociology at the Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor</i>	
CENTAURIST CULTURE: MODERN FACES.....	164
Felix UNGER , <i>President of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg, Austria), Professor</i>	
ON GLOBAL CULTURE	170
O. VINOGRADOV , <i>choreographer, ballet director of the Russian Academy of Folk Dance, Professor of the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, People's Artist of the USSR</i>	
BALLET AS DIALOGUE OF CULTURES	170
Joerg WOLF , <i>editor-in-Chief of www.atlantic-community.org (open think tank 'Atlantic Initiative e.V') in Berlin (Germany)</i>	
THE RESET: HOW GERMANY CAN SET A NEW TONE FOR WESTERN-RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT	172
Guangcheng XING , <i>Deputy Director of the Centre for History and Geography of Border Regions of China (the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), LL.D., Professor</i>	
BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA: RUSSIA'S CHOICE.....	174

A. YAKOVENKO , <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, LL.D., Professor</i> DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONDITIONS	175
Kan YAO YAO , <i>Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Côte d'Ivoire to UNESCO</i> DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION	179
N. YAROSHCHUK , <i>Professor at Derzhavin International Slavic University, honorary worker of higher professional Education of the Russian Federation (Moscow); K. GEZALOVA gyzy</i> , <i>researcher at the Institute for Philosophy, Social Studies and Law of the Azerbaijani National Academy of Sciences</i> NATIONAL CULTURAL CHALLENGES IN EDUCATIONAL PROCESS	179
V. YERSHOV , <i>President of the Russian Academy of Justice, LL.D., Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation, honorary woker of judiciary system of the Russian Federation</i> INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW UNDER GLOBALIZATION	182
B. YUDIN , <i>corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Department of Integrated Study-of-Man Problems at the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, editor-in-chief of 'Man' ('Chelovek') journal, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor</i> TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AS MULTIPLIER OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY	184
A. ZAPESOTSKY , <i>academician and member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Education, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Head of Philosophy and Cultural Studies Chair, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia, Deputy Chairman of the Board of Rectors of St. Petersburg universities, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation and Artist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i> HISTORICAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM AS DIALOGUE OF CULTURES.....	185
V. ZAPEVALOV , <i>representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg, chair of the Editorial Board of 'Consul' ('Konsul') journal</i> THE ROLE OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN ST. PETERSBURG IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE OF CULTURES.....	189
Yu. ZOBININ , <i>Head of Chair of Literature and the Russian Language at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), Professor, honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation</i> 'WHEN NATIONS, FORGETTING FORMER STRIFE...': A RUSSIAN PROLOGUE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBALISM	190
V. ZORIN , <i>Deputy Director of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Candidate of Science (History), Professor</i> DIALOGUE OF CULTURES VS. CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: RUSSIAN REASONS	192
Ljubomir ZUKOVIĆ , <i>Vice-President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina)</i> CULTURE OF SERBS IN THE WHIRL OF HISTORICAL CHANGES.....	197

L. Abalkin¹

MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN CULTURES IS THE FOUNDATION FOR PROGRESS

Under the conditions of globalization diversity of cultures is becoming more and more expressed. According to D.S. Likhachov, it is culture that 'makes the people inhabiting certain territory, not just population but a people, a nation. The definition of culture must comprise and has always comprised religion, science, education, moral code of conduct of people and of the state.'

The notion of culture as an integral system also comprises other elements. They are: architecture and painting, old manuscripts and tombstones. As N.A. Berdyaev wrote in his book *The Philosophy of Inequality*, 'a nation is made not only of human generations, but also of church, palace and estate stones, tombstones, old manuscripts and books. To catch the will of a nation it is necessary to hear these stones, to read the smouldered pages.'

One should always think about it, especially when education is being reformed radically, when human resources for tomorrow are being prepared. Young people are supposed to take in the achievements of literature and architecture, the knowledge of the language and history of their country and of the world community. Otherwise there is no way to progress.

Globalization with its numerous tools does not only expand the diversity of cultures, but makes them easily available. It is quite easy to obtain information about them, and it is not only about the culture of great nations but also of small ones, unique in their originality and identity – in terms of their language, architecture, morals, spiritual sphere and even life expectancy.

Thus, any attempts to introduce social closure, to establish language barriers (in single countries or in a group of countries sharing a language) lead to isolationism, hinder mutual understanding between peoples. And in this way social progress is again hampered (or thrown back). The numerous examples of the recent years – the situation of Russian people in Baltic states, riots in Pakistan and India, the alarming unrest and strife in Paris resulting in arsons, revolutionary events in the North of Africa – provide us with extremely disquieting information

of the situation in the world community. The further course of events is not yet subject to analysis...

Studying the ways of social progress presupposes mutual understanding between cultures, their enrichment as a stimulus to progress. And no matter what we mean by culture there is no way to impose uniformity.

The structure of human society is quite complex and when describing or studying it we extensively use synthesizing notions. But we cannot draw any practical recommendations from them technically. They turn out to be dead-born.

Take the attitudes to the notion of democracy or democratic structure of society. We are well aware of the attempts to force or to impose (and there is no exaggeration) 'unified-for-all' democracy. They have ended in complete failure though authors of the project have not yet realized it. It is impossible to build up democracy using a uniform model for China and Japan, Sweden and France, for countries of the Islamic world and, naturally, for Russia.

The same thing can be said of the concept of progress that has different values in different civilizations. What is a beneficial in some of them, is regarded as evil and vice in others. And attempts to impose, that is to do it from the outside, are perceived as a dead-end track. Such an approach cannot be imposed upon any people. People are different, and this is the wealth of the modern world.

An unbiased analysis of the trends of the world progress shows that in the nearest five centuries (if no disaster occurs) there will remain differences between nations and civilizations. They are a product of a long historical development and do not quit the stage owing to the will of people, states or their commonwealths. With all his unique abilities, a human being is unable to create his future which is determined by megatrends of historical progress.

But what is really possible and practicable is developing mutual understanding between cultures. It is the most essential and, probably, the only correct approach on the way to prosperity of the human community.

P. Anchev²

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND/OR SYMPHONY OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Today's complex and contradictory world has no analogy in the past. It sets new challenges for philosophy, which no one has met before. Philosophers ought to analyze numerous controversial events in the life of nations on all continents to give full-fledged

and true knowledge about all the processes which either were introduced by the twenty-first century or are making the world which we call the twenty-first-century epoch. All people, all nations and countries would like to perceive these processes in their complexity and magnitude and then find the ways and measures to appropriately coexist and cooperate with each other.

Peoples have never been totally isolated from each other. And even if there had been moments when a particular nation had to live an isolated life, sooner or later a moment came when the state of isolation had to be finished. Such moments were the periods of a painful struggle – usually they were wars or conflicts.

People live together according to God's Providence, which is unique for everyone. At the same time all people are different. People are together in a sense of having similar features, thinking and acting in the same way. That was a kind of life even when people lived at a huge distance from each other and did not know much about each other as they did not have direct contacts.

However, the modern world has almost destroyed distances, overcoming them with high speed and information tech-

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Head of the Institute for Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Editor-in-Chief of 'Issues of Economy' (Voprosy ekonomiki) journal, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Author of more than 800 scholarly publications and 24 books, including: *Politicheskaya Ekonomiya i ekonomicheskaya politika* [Political Economy and Economic Politics], *Khazyaystvennyy mehanizm razvitoogo sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* [Economic Mechanism of a Developed socialist society], *Zametki o rossiyskom predprinimatelstve* [Notes on Russian Entrepreneurship], *Konechniye narodnokhozyaystvenniye rezultaty (Sushchnost', pokazateli, puti povysheniya)* [Economic Objectives (Nature, Indicators, Improving Practices)], *Novy Tip ekonomicheskogo myshleniya* [A New Type of Economic Thinking], *Rossiya: poisk samoopredeleniya* [Russia: Seeking Self-Determination]. Honorary President of the International foundation of Nikolai Kondratyev, Vice-President of Free Economic Society of Russia and International Union of Economists, Honorary professor of Tsinghua University in Beijing, member of New York Academy of Sciences, Academies of Sciences of Byelorussia and Georgia, International Academy of Economics 'Eurasia'.

² Editor-in-Chief of the literature and arts magazine 'Prostory' (Bulgaria), Chairman of Varna department of Bulgarian Writers' Union. Author of numerous scholarly publications, including books: *Tvorci i slovo, Filosofija na literaturnata istorija, Malkijat narod, Drug nachin na mislene, Smisolot na literaturnoznaniето, Ruskijat razum, Hristo Boiev kato mislitel. Hipotezi, Bulgarskata istorija po Anton Donchev* and others.

nologies as well as with the erasure of differences by means of establishing common standards in the sphere of culture and the ways of existence as such. Nowadays speaking about the nations of the world, one can say that they are close rather than separated. People are getting unified, the differences between them are becoming fewer. The nations are getting more open and starting to exchange their experience with close and distant neighbours. These processes are obvious and manifest themselves in various ways. It is a fact that the nations are in different stages of the development, some are rich, others are poor, however, there are fewer and fewer differences between them.

Do philosophers manage to see the processes of convergence? Are they able to understand them?

As far as it is known diverse sciences explore the depths of the world processes. The exploration itself starts from the description of processes and the definition of terms. Nothing can be understood and explored without being stated, without showing the borders and the scale of the subject matter. We see the world the way as the God's image and likeness – the way the Creator meant it to be. To describe this world, we select words, terms which time after time we try to make more precise, we broaden our knowledge and enrich our experience. Our speech gains new metaphors and gets rid of other ones – this is how we try to express ourselves more clearly. Difficulties of scientific cognition, especially in the sphere of the humanities are connected with the nomination of the subject of the research, the creation of terms and later with the description of the object of cognition. We do not have ready formulas and we are in search of words which we do not always find correctly due to our spiritual weakness. We do not always place these words in their proper places accurately. On a large scale, humanitarian knowledge remains relative, it is not quite true, because it cannot lead our thinking to the absolute truth.

It is due to human spiritual weakness that the humanities cannot find an exact definition of phenomena and processes. As a rule, the humanities do not formulate unambiguously the subject matter they propose to study. At the same time, spiritual weakness is the evidence of the fact that we are people. It also reveals the endless character of a scientific process.

Speaking in general terms, we state a phenomenon and a fact so that they acquire a subject matter, to make them obvious and precise, i.e. we equalize them to something certain and already familiar. We make facts more accessible for further research by comparing new facts with ones already known. Definition in itself is a concentration of obvious characteristic features in one whole. They must be put in their proper place depending on their major characteristics which we have already seen in the subject or depending on the notions which we have formed while observing the explored object.

I need this conclusion to create a ground for further summarizing. There is a question if the notion of 'dialogue of cultures' is clear and precise enough to enable us, on the basis of it, to explore a present condition of culture as such and its place in the so-called 'globalization'.

Globalization influences culture as well as culture gives response to globalization. Culture accumulates all the consequences of economic merging and unification because culture, primarily, is diversity and originality. It is not surprising that the interest in the condition of culture and its problems in various spheres is growing. It explains a dynamic development of cultural studies in recent years. One of the main issues raised by *cultural studies* is the so called 'dialogue of cultures' or 'clash of civilizations'. It is quite obvious that the whole world, nations, countries along with their cultures interact in a new way, feel the influence, are transformed while experiencing the power of new processes, and acquire new states. Today the problem is *how* to define it clearly and precisely for people to

be able to study the on-going processes in their magnitude with maximum accuracy.

The condition of present-day culture, our attempts to define the on-going processes by means of the terms of 'dialogue', 'clash' or 'interaction' reveal mechanic processes rather than essential. They demonstrate something that is outward, something that is reduced to the level of concrete and familiar in the other spheres.

The dialogue of cultures requires will and intellectual efforts from both sides. Otherwise, the dialogue will not be effective. For the dialogue to be fruitful, both partners should have a desire to take part in it. They should express something different or something that is alike, but requiring further specification by means of familiar notions and terms. Both participants should speak a common language.

The same can be said about a struggle or a cooperation when it is a must for at least one participant to show a strong will, while another partner gives a response. Tact and patience are necessary to overcome discord. The stronger participant speaks more and 'takes an advantage' of the weaker partner. The stronger develops the rules of the further existence of the parties. I am not saying that cultures do not participate in a dialogue or there are no clashes between them, still there is more of interaction between them. It is not only obvious, but also necessary and highly productive for their development and the development of the whole humanity. However, such a situation is not stable and the life of present-day cultures in the conditions of globalization does not acquire convenient form exclusively. 'Small' cultures participate in a dialogue with 'big' cultures, no matter where and how they exist. The opportunities of communication shorten distances and open a new access to the treasuries of cultures. Modern communication means bring together in a practical way and even merge small cultures with the big ones – especially it is true for the American culture. As small cultures have an element of imitation in their structure they get Americanized or Westernized quickly. If someone finds the term 'imitation' a derogative one, we can suggest calling this process '*communicating vessels*'. The American culture (as well as other big cultures) has immense resources which, along with the ability to adjoin closely to other cultures and to develop rapidly in a new sphere, flow into small cultures and gradually make them similar.

In my opinion, in this global world cultures exist primarily *in symphony*, in other words they exist in accord, and only then – *in dialogues*. It is their initial condition, and it characterizes their existence in the global world. First of all, we are talking about a global world! Each culture creates its own messages in different ways; cultures speak in a quiet or loud tone, express themselves in their traditional features appropriately according to the place that these nations take on a geopolitical stage. It does not matter whether cultures participate in an active or a less dynamic dialogue, whether they influence each other in a direct or an indirect manner. All cultures occupy their places and live their own lives – 'small' cultures are equal in rights with the rest of the cultures.

When I say that each culture occupies its place I intentionally emphasize that this place is relative and difficult to identify, since there is no *pure* or *homogeneous* culture. Culture is a complex entity consisting of various national elements whose ethnic bearers are part of a nation. It is exceptionally true for the present day when the blending of nations has become uncontrollable and impossible for a strict selection. Representatives of different nations live in one country, in one city, in one village. All of them bear their own culture. Along with it, they become part of culture of a bigger nation and part of global culture. This situation gives me reasons to state that it is hard to localize the voice of a particular national culture and purify it from the melodies and discordant notes of other cultures. It can be implemented only in the frame of a particular analysis of a

precise culture or cultures of one particular region. In general, they are relatively 'individual' – like sounds of each instrument in the orchestra. But it must be mentioned that an instrument produces different sounds in the arms of different performers (certain instruments also differ in their structure and tuning, in their timber and the character of sound). Within one orchestra these differences are not significant, still, they do exist, and only highly professional specialists detect them – only in particular situations.

The symphony of cultures in the world is possible because each culture performs the same functions, is targeted at the same goals and develops along the same criteria, i.e. like the instruments of one orchestra, which perform the same notes of the same musical piece. They are independent, autonomous, and equal in their nature. No culture has power to dominate over another one, however, each culture can tend to acquire this power, and big cultures can even think that small cultures must follow them and accept them as a pattern. In everyday life such a situation can take place, indeed, but it is a consequence of objective conditions and not of an obligatory presumption. It does not level cultural originality, but emphasizes it. In different epochs various dominating factors introduce themselves as the main motive power or the main analytical principle. These factors tend to represent themselves as the most important and even unique ones. They perform the role of a leader (a conductor) in the entire melody of world cultures – in their symphony. The conductor is undoubtedly an important figure, although sometimes music can be performed without him, still a conductor is necessary to set the tempo, give originality to an interpretation, he marks the rhythm and solo, i.e. the conductor clearly outlines leading cultures. This situation does not exclude conflicts, controversies and even wars, because conductors change. But even when discordant notes emerge, one should not think that the symphony is broken. Sometimes there is a sound of a false note, but it does not last long.

Global culture cannot be a merely mechanic combination of all cultures in the world. It also cannot be a quintessence of particular cultures. It is so only in the consciousness of materialists and progressivists who view history as a linear development and a superstructure of one event over the other. It is

better to view history as a new creation (so far, we do not know what it is like, but we explore carefully it). It can be perceived the way Goethe formulated the notion of the 'world literature'. But as today cultures are much more connected and are in a direct contact, it is possible to create something which is not the first or the second phenomenon and even is not a collection of all the phenomena. Global culture is a result of cultures of different nations, which acquires existence and spirit. *It is a symphony, a consonance, common creation of all the participants, it is a new existence.*

No matter what the angle is from which we view culture and in what expressions we study and show it, culture, in every of its national variations, includes something common, similar, related to the rest of all cultures – although this 'common, similar and related' is hard and even impossible to extract, separate in the laboratory environment and describe by means of formulas and even the most exact of all the words which exist in every national language. However, this 'common component' exists, as in the long run a human being is created from a single progenitor, lives on the same Earth and breathes the same air. Economic, political, national, religious, racial and other differences do not divide and alienate people. They only adjust people to diverse conditions in which they live. A careful analysis of these differences will state that cultures differ only from the point of view of the language – no more. *That is the reason why I state that national cultures resemble the instruments in a big orchestra called 'global culture' which performs the same musical piece, i.e. symphony under one 'conductor'.* It is our duty to be able to hear and understand this symphony, instead of talking continuously that only particular instruments participating in a dialogue play in this orchestra, while the rest of the instruments are trying to set themselves as obedient performers of the music already performed.

If we come back to Goethe's notion of the 'world literature' and try seeing the magnitude of the on-going globalization process, try reconciling its specific features to the characteristic features of different cultures which participate in this process in an individual and equal way, we will realize that *'global or world culture' is a symphony, consonance of all cultures in the world.*

F. Asadullin¹

THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IN ISLAM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION AND DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Islamic intellectual potential that has been influenced by moral, academic and cultural traditions that belong to different times is based on a huge layer of all-human knowledge. Aspiration to gain it has always been considered a sort of religious valour in Islam. Naturally, faith and knowledge in Islamic theological heritage are often treated as synonymous concepts mutually stimulating a move towards each other. However, it is a rich intellectual heritage of Islam, sometimes ignored or just forgotten in the mass consciousness, especially Western, that

¹ Leading researcher of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Candidate of Science (Philology). Director of Academic and Enlightenment Centre al-Wasitiyah, sheikh. Member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation. Honoured Culture Worker of the Republic of Tatarstan. Author of over 100 scholarly publications on the issues of development of Arab culture, history of Islam, Muslim religious doctrine and inter-confessional relations, including: *Islam in Moscow* (Islam v Moskve), *Outline of the History of Libyan Literature of the 19th–20th centuries* (Ocherk istoriji livijskoj literatury, XIX–XX vekov), *Muslim Moscow* (Moskva musul'manskaja), *Russia's Main Mosque* (Glavnaja mechet' Rossii), *Muslim Religious Organizations and Associations of the Russian Federation* (Musul'manskije dukhovnyje organizatsiji i objedinenija Rossijskoj Federatsiji). Head of public research committee of Russian Muftis Council. Mr. Asadullin is Laureate of S.F. Oldenburg Award. He is decorated with the medal of the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 2nd degree.

nowadays needs, on the one hand, a rising tide of interest, like the one that could be traced, for example, in Russian Islamic studies at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (classical works by I. Krachkovsky and V. Bartold are the most conspicuous example), and, on the other hand, it needs a rising tide of popularity among those Muslims who quite often reduce Islam to ceremonial formalities or to clarification of dogmatic subtleties.

In this respect it would be relevant to recall that as long ago as in the Umayyad Caliphate one of the most prominent Muslim encyclopaedist scholars Al-Biruni (died in 1048) pointed at well-marked differences of faith among the well-educated intellectually advanced élite ('khassa' in Arabic) and the uneducated mob ('ammah'). To my mind, the similar structural division is typical not only of Muslims, but of human society in general and of other religious traditions, where the numerator in the ratio of 'khassa'/'ammah' is much larger than the denominator, just like in the times of Biruni. Very similar ideas can be found in the works of a typical man of European 'khassa' of the 16th century, English philosopher F. Ba-

con, who correctly considered that 'little science estranges man from God. Much science leads to Him.' It quite often happens for the Arab Muslim 'ammah' that only formal signs are criteria of Islam: circumcision, abstention from alcohol and pork, wearing beard and turban (skull cap), which is not sufficient for the condition called 'abundance of faith'. This is the reason why some Muslim ulama of 'Al-Azhar' on detecting this gap call the present-day condition of the Muslim world 'the second Jahiliyya', that is 'the Age of Ignorance', in which Arabs had remained until adopting Islam in the early 7th century and due to certain reasons, discussed below, have found themselves in the early 21st century.

The main reference points and the most important elements of intellectual culture of Islam can be found in Koran that is called 'the guide for the people of intellect'. Koran has a lot of examples appealing to the concept of 'intellect', 'reason' ('aql' in Arabic). Koran contains 49 instances where the word 'aql' and its derivatives are used in various contexts. The well-known hadith, the saying of the prophet Muhammad, has the main intellectual concept of Islam 'whosoever has no reason has no faith'. One of the most prominent scholars of Islamic theology imam Al-Ghazali (died in 1111) compared intellect with 'a spark of light from God' and he emphasized that there was no contradiction between reason and faith. The educated stratum of 'the people of knowledge' – 'rasihuna fil' ilmi' (Koran 3:8) has gained a very important social status in Islam. It is no coincidence that in the medieval Arab community there was a popular belief that 'monarchs are rulers of people, and scholars are rulers of monarchs' (cf.: Plato in *The Republic* claims that kings and rulers really and truly become philosophers, and philosophers become kings). A contemporary of al-Biruni, famous theologian al-Mawardi (died in 1058), speaking of the main virtues of man, laid emphasis on the following: 'Al aql asl ad-Din', 'Intellect is the basis of religion'.

Interpreted under the influence of antique philosophical thoughts, Islamic theological knowledge created a fundamental methodology that led scholars to the area of their activities: physics, astronomy, medicine, politics or mathematics. In those areas they could specify concepts and principles established and adopted on the ground of Koran and Islamic theology.

The first Arab philosopher Al-Kindi (died about 870) who spoke Greek tended to reconcile contradictory trends of Greek philosophical schools with the religious doctrine of Islam. Ideas of Aristotle, Plato and Galen, enthusiastically adopted by Arabs, quite often served as a catalyst to draw forward various areas of Arabic science: geography, mathematics, astronomy, music theory, mineral studies and so on. Religious ideas of the Muslim élite were very sensitive in their respond to Socrates' philosophy that stated: virtue is identical to knowledge (he considered reason to be the main virtue, and genuine wisdom was in accepting one's own ignorance: 'The only thing I know is that I know nothing'), or ideas of Plato and his student Aristotle who made attempts to prove that the world had been created by the Demiurge (Creator), the only one God. All those ideas were in concord with the fundamental principles of Islam, and first of all, with the idea of strict monotheism. It is noteworthy that ideas of Plato and Aristotle about the only one God, through later Arabic translations, made the basis of Christian dogmata and formed a peculiar prologue to the New Testament.

In the 10th–13th centuries the Islamic world, Byzantium and Western Europe were at an approximately equal level of civilization development. It is a well-known fact that in the era of foundation of first European universities (in Bologna, Naples, Paris and others) Europeans borrowed a lot from the Muslim system of education, in the 12th–13th centuries Europe started an active campaign to translate Muslim scientific works, and that allowed the European civilization, on the one hand, to foreground the lore of Ancient Greece through those translations further on, on the new spin of history, and on the other

hand, through the work of such scholars as Cartesius, Spinoza, Bacon (Roger and Francis) Europe was able to get acquainted with the ideas of Ibn Sina (Avicenna), Ibn Rushd (Averroes), al-Farabi, al-Ghazali, al-Arabi, Ibn Khaldoun and others. Today it is beyond dispute that the works of Ibn Rushd, the main popularizer of Aristotle's heritage, influenced a lot one of the founders of religious philosophy of Catholicism Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), ideas of Cartesius (1596–1650), his principle of **methodological doubt** 'cogito ergo sum' ('I think, therefore I am'), and even the sublime metaphysical system of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804).

It can be stated that the supreme achievement of Arab Muslim school of thought in the epoch of its flourishing in the Middle Ages was Muslim rationalism whose basic concept ideas were in high demand in the 19th century.

Later, starting from the 15th century, regress of Islamic intellectual culture began, which was, first of all, caused by a new attitude towards science that in Arab Muslim world was now treated as only scholastic knowledge based on the blind Shariah following and rejection of ijthad, an independent thought, as a form of intellectual Islam. Under the influence of speculative theology there came a multi-centenarian period of isolation and cockish insularity that stopped the flow of new scientific ideas and discoveries. 'The gates of ijthad (that is of creative and liberal attitude to one's own heritage) closed.' The only sphere where 'scientific exchange' could be traced, though only in a unilateral form, was a military one, concerning the navy constructions, fortifications, and weapons. According to the precise words phrased by the prime minister of Malaysia Mahathir Mohammad at the summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 2003: 'Then in the late Middle Ages the new 'interpreters' of Islam came, who began to treat science only as Islamic theology.'¹ Science became a servant of theology, or better to say, scholasticism. Teaching algebra, geometry, astronomy that had lost their stimulus of independent development was determined by the needs of the cult ceremonies: calculating the time of prayers and festivals, drawing astronomical tables of eclipses of the moon and the sun, together with lunar calendars and horoscopes. Industrial revolution only touched Muslims marginally and peculiarly, they, actually, slept it away.

Only at the turn of 19th–20th centuries the efforts of prominent figures of Arab Muslim school of theological thought such as Mufti of Egypt Muhammad Abduh (died in 1904), Indian poet and philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1873–1938) and Tartar reformist scholar Musa Bigiyev (1873–1949) encouraged the attempt to rehabilitate science and, at the same time, to intellectually modernize a stagnant Islamic tradition. It became possible, on the one hand, thanks to the restoration of the original concept of Islam as a religion of dynamic activities and a proactive approach to life (an example from the Koran was given: 'Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change it themselves with their own souls.' 7:78). On the other hand, it happened due to a direct influence and further adoption of advances of the Western civilization that was appreciated by both Abduh who lived in Paris in the 1880s and Iqbal who studied first in Cambridge (the Trinity College) and later at Munich University. As for Bigiyev, he was closely involved in the Russian national cultural community and was the type of a Russian Muslim who could quote from both suhars of Koran and from 'Eugene Oegin'. Undoubtedly, this feature made their range of vision more unbound and flexible, and, by means of a new and flexible interpretation of the Shariah law, it allowed them to create a legal space for modernization of both the Muslim doctrine itself and of other spheres of public life. For instance, Abduh has the credit of voicing the ideas revolutionary for his time and circle. Outlining that Islam is the only religion based on reasoning and appealing to human

¹ 'Islam Minbar', No. 10, 2003, p. 3.

intellect, he could state in his fatwas: 'The prayer of the ignorant is not worthwhile,' or he could prove that construction of schools in colonial Egypt was more important than construction of mosques. Indisputably, those statements were based on the traditions of Muslim rationalism established as long ago as in the Middle Ages and closely connected with the philosophy of René Descartes (Cartesius) whose ideas were most often addressed by the Arab school of thought of the new times.

Further advances in the field of emancipation of Muslim religious thought were made by Iqbal whose view of the world had been formed under the influence of various ideological schools of Europe, first of all, the heritage of Goethe, Kant and Hegel. He might be the first Muslim intellectual who attempted to explain to the West the universal nature of Islamic dogma on the basis of fundamental principles of Koran. It was an attempt to find a balance between the living faith and modern perception of the world. In his most significant work *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, published posthumously in 1962 in Lahore, he consistently developed the idea of Islam as 'the religion of the world' and stated that 'Islamic ideal is to provide peace at whatever cost' referring to a well-known hadith 'Better forty years of tyranny than one day of fitna (riots, anarchy)'.

These are some quotes from his book: 'During the last five hundred years religious thought in Islam has been practically stationary. There was a time when European thought received inspiration from the world of Islam. The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for the European culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the most important phases of the culture of Islam. (...) During all the centuries of our intellectual stupor Europe was seriously thinking on the great problems in which the philosophers and scientists of Islam were so keenly interested. Since the Middle Ages, when the schools of Muslim theology were completed, infinite advance has taken place in the domain of human thought and experience. The extension of man's power over Nature has given him a new faith and a fresh sense of superiority over the forces that constitute his environment. New points of view have been suggested, old problems have been re-stated in the light of this fresh experience, and new problems have arisen. With the advance of scientific thought even our concept of intelligibility is undergoing a change. Einstein's theory has brought a new vision of the universe and suggests new ways of looking at the problems common to both religion and philosophy. No wonder then that the younger generation of Muslims in Asia and Africa demand a *fresh orientation of their faith* (italics added).'¹ The guides of a fresh orientation became a new generation of Muslim intellectuals who opened their 'window to Europe', just like Russia in the times of Peter the Great, though they were a century late.

The 20th century became a shock for Islam. Colonial dependence on the West, on the one hand, deformed Islamic

self-consciousness of millions of common Muslim people and gave rise to many complexes of inability and inferiority, and on the other hand, it greatly stimulated intellectual progress and new interpretations of common Islamic heritage. In the sphere of the view of the world interaction between the intellectual élite of Arab Muslim countries and the West takes form of contamination of a broad circle of European philosophical, social and natural-science concepts, through which such figures of national cultures as, for example, the Nobel prize winner in Literature, Egyptian Naguib Mahfouz (1911–2006), attempted to formulate, comprehend and analyze their own national problems, including the problem of relations between science and religion. It is the problem of artistic comprehension of the balance between science and theology in social life that the best works of Naguib Mahfouz were devoted to: 'Bayn al-qasrayn' ('Palace Walk') (1956) and 'Awlaadu Haaratena' ('Children of Gabalawi') (1963), in which he tried to withdraw contradictions between them making science an heir to religion. The history of social and scientific life in Arab Muslim world in the 20th – early 21st centuries is constant attempts to justify and defend, if necessary, intellectual pluralism that ranges from Islamization of the present-day world (Hasan Banna, al-Maududi, at-Turabi) to modernization of Islam (Fareed Zakaria, Mohammed Arkoun, Murad Hofmann, Roger Garaudy, Rafael Khakimov). In Arab scientific and, in a broader sense, intellectual thought this problem is often interpreted in terms of preserving 'asallah' (authenticity including the religious one) in the struggle with 'hadassah' (innovations of the surrounding world). Moreover, depending on their open-mindedness and broad intellectual horizon, faithful Muslims can interpret 'asallah' both as an exclusion of any alien cultural, especially, religious agents and impacts (bidgat) and as an acquisition of their origins, if it concerns the spiritual affinity of followers of Islam and 'the People of the Book' – Jews and Christians, based on a common Abrahamic tradition. The most forward-looking position seems to be the one of Muslim intellectuals who tend to combine harmoniously their faith with the world around them in terms of a free choice of every person, where reason rather than violence dominates: 'Let there be no compulsion in religion' (2:257) and 'Invite all to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching' (15:126). 'If a free person longs for education and sciences, looks forward to the progress of society, it is quite acceptable both for Western and Islamic cultures,' states a modern Tartar scholar Rafael Khakim.

In the age of globalization, when the interconnection of ethnic religious traditions grows and, at the same time, the global conflict of interests between states and groups of states can be traced, as well as lack of proportion in the development between the rich 'North' and the poor 'South', it is important, to my mind, to re-consider the established stereotypes and traditions, and through it consciously head off to a new world system, where principles of a new worldview can be worked out on the basis of social consensus, with a manifest spiritual dimension.

¹ Iqbal Muhammad. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Translated from English, preface by M. Stepanyants. Moscow, Oriental Literature Publishing House, 2002, p. 30–31.

Ye. Astakhov¹

THE EUROPEAN PROJECTION OF RUSSIAN CIVILIZATION

In the conditions of the systemic world crisis, the definition of possible parameters for interaction among civilizations is acquiring special significance.

In the 21st century, it has become fashionable to talk about the dialogue of civilizations. This seems to be a 'politically correct' manifestation of 'tolerance' towards other cultures, faiths, and points of view. In international practice, however, the dialogue of cultures often turns into a monologue, an aspiration to export one's own standards.

From 'Eurocentrism', or, one might say, 'Atlantism', there is a coercive export of democracy and Western values. The West is for the unification of 'culture and life', for the globalization of the world on the basis of its own approaches. The fact that they are not values for other cultures is not taken into consideration. This is not the messianic blindness of Western culture. It is cold geopolitical calculation, the struggle for minds, territories, and resources. In this policy, an explicit monologue of one civilization attempting to impose its will on others can be seen.

These are the basic elements of this monologue:

– the absence of reliable information and disinclination to have it;

– a disdainful attitude towards other civilizations;

the arrogance of contemporary colonialism, building illusions of one's own superiority.

The concept of a Western 'universal civilization' is foisted on the whole world by the political leadership of the Euro-Atlantic bloc, by political science scholars, and by the media. Regrettably, the voices of some of our own 'Westerners', for whom the West is progress and the East, regression, can be heard in this chorus. However, in the conditions of a global systemic crisis, an understanding is growing of the economic force of China, India, and other 'rising' countries. By the estimates of a number of American experts, the productivity of work in many Asian countries is higher than in the United States and Western Europe. By 2050, Asia will possess a share of 57 per cent of world production.

The claims of former world leaders to a higher civilizational status no longer rest on its former foundation. There are signs of a washing-out of the economic dominance of the 'first club', which is on its way towards losing the GDP contest in the medium term. In connection with this, the emphasis will shift to hard sciences and innovative technologies. However, in these spheres, too, advances are possible for China, India, Brazil, Russia, and a number of other countries.

Civilization includes not only material factors. We can see that in many countries, the former moral values are becoming secondary, and political conceptions are beginning to play the role of 'ethical surrogates'.

In medias res, Western civilization is a culture of money. It is founded on materialistic philosophy, the priority of technological development, and mass consumption. It is therefore proposed to the rest of the world to catch up with the Anglo-Saxon model, with the aim of attaining, in the future, a single global civilization. All of this is exported to Russia and to the East. Certain results of this export are already visible in our country and a number of others. However, in a fundamental respect, the opportunities for this kind of export are limited. The East has its own philosophy and values. And on Russian soil,

¹ Professor of the Chair of Diplomacy of Moscow University of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Author of a number of scholarly publications on diplomacy and politics, including a monograph *Macro- and Microeconomic Diplomacy: Supporting National Business* (Makro- i mikroekonomicheskaia diplomatija: soprovozhdenie natsional'nogo biznesa) and a number of scholarly articles. Many of Mr. Astakhov's scholarly works have been published abroad.

it was always difficult to cultivate radical liberalism, although its supporters are present and are a part of our élite.

After another breakdown of the political-economic model in the 1990s, there is a great deal of talk in Russia now about 'eternal Russian questions': where to go and what to do.

Russia, undoubtedly, is a European country, but as a whole it does not fit into Europe. The other, and at that greater, part of it, is located in Asia. This is where its civilizational, geopolitical, and economic interests come from. Obviously, global process also affect Russia, but Russia was always difficult to integrate into the process of globalization. It is hardly worth plunging into a historical polemic about the exceptional character of the 'Russian path'. Along with this, to better understand intercivilizational measures of Russia in the present day, it is beneficial to bear several factors of its formation in mind.

Expansion in time and space was genetically inherent to the Russian nation. This is how the history of the establishment of the Russian state proceeded. In the 20th century, complicated and sometimes dramatic pages of our history played their role in this expansion. Waves of emigration at different times in the 19th and 20th centuries, in the periods of revolutionary cataclysms, humanitarian catastrophes of the Second World War led to a spatial, essentially planetary scale of the displacement of millions of people. However, not only millions, but tens of millions found themselves outside the limits of their Motherland after the disintegration of the USSR.

As a result of all these tectonic processes, a 'Russian world' formed, which goes far beyond the borders of Russia and in a number of cases, outside the limits of Russian ethnicity.

These are people who associate themselves with Russia, with Russian culture. To feel part of Russia, is in the first place a question of personal choice, of spiritual self-determination. The Russian-language community, along with the citizens of Russia, now occupies fifth place in the world.

The subject of Russian diasporas in the post-Soviet space demands a separate examination. As a result of the disintegration of the USSR, and not by their own will, at that, more than 25 million people found themselves outside of Russia. This is a geopolitical catastrophe with no analogy in the world history. This Russian people, without abandoning their homeland, turned into emigrants literally on the day after the signing of the Belovezh Accords (on the establishment of the CIS) in 1991. They are now simultaneously a Russian diaspora and ethnic minorities in new countries.

This question arises: What policy should be followed with regard to these people? This question not only concerns Russia, but is also being examined closely in the European Union.

The polemics on this matter are quite contradictory. Until recent years, the 'Belovezh' approach was maintained by a part of the Russian élite. These people were purportedly a part of the population of the sovereign states, and responsibility for their rights and fate lay with the leadership of the new countries.

This kind of approach is also taken by the leadership of the newly formed states. This gives them the opportunity to complete their strategic tasks without difficulty: the strengthening of statehood, most importantly by securing 'in perpetuity' of the former lines of administrative division of past Soviet Republics as the new national borders, the forcible spreading of the 'titular' language to everyone, including the Russian-speaking population, the informational blockade, the limitation of the influence of the Orthodox Church, and most importantly, of the Moscow patriarchy.

On a practical level, solving the problems of the Russian-speaking population in the post-Soviet space is not simple,

even in the cases where there is a corresponding political will in positions of authority.

Take, for example, the subject of mismatch of intentionally fixed borders of the Russian Federation within the former USSR and the current, real scope of the spread of Russian culture, Russian language, and the Russian-speaking population and Russian ethnic self-awareness.

In recent years, there have been attempts on the part of the Russian leadership to hinder the policy of assimilating the Russian-speaking diasporas in the near abroad. However, this does not go beyond exhortation.

There are several reasons for this policy. Here, we will only take note of the fact that in the Russian political élite there are fears of being reproached for 'neo-imperialism', of using diasporas as a 'fifth column'.

In principle, this question is an internal matter for Russia, although its external projection is plainly obvious.

This external projection is especially graphically visible in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan. The position of Russian-language diasporas in these countries demands attention from the corresponding organs of the European Union. The EU always closely tracks everything that happens in the post-Soviet space, even the fates of different people in the sphere of human rights. So the question emerges: why is there no similar attention paid to the position of millions of people of the Russian diaspora, whose rights are being infringed by all criteria accepted in the European Union with regard to the democratic freedoms and the subject area of the defence of rights. In connection with this, all manner of questions emerge regarding double standards dictated by political motives. All of these aspects are clear and close to many countries of the EU. The European Union itself is now encountering the acute problem of the multicultural adaptation of different ethnic groups. One does not simply walk away from these problems, they cannot simply go unnoticed. What is more, these problems are getting more intense. They will undoubtedly have a negative influence on the European continent.

The content of the relations between the EU and Russia is exceptionally complicated. Here there are inter-civilizational, geopolitical, economic, and many other factors. However, it is important to isolate one element.

What do Russians want from the European Union? Ordinary people 'from the street' want the following:

- to go to all countries of the EU without visas;
- to study at European universities;
- to engage freely in business;
- to make contacts with all spheres of human activity.

In contrast to several countries and ethnic groups, Russians do not intend to become part of the 'undesirable immigration' which in recent times is increasingly worrying 'old Europe'. If some Russian person wants to live in Western Europe, he can do this legally, by acquiring real estate or some other form of property.

In Europe, there is, as yet, no freedom of movement for Russia. (Our country does have such freedom with a number of Latin American countries.) So it happens that we can go to distant continents without visas, but not to our near neighbours. This creates the impression that in Europe, a new 'Berlin Wall' is rising.

And how do the ruling Russian élites regard the European Union?

The European Union, for Russia, is a natural political partner, even possibly an ally.

The EU is an important economic partner. A large part of Russian exports go to European countries. The strongest mutual interests are in the energy sector.

Russia is interested in scientific-technological cooperation.

These are the three main factors. There are still the spheres of scientific-academic and cultural connections, and tourism.

European culture and European values are close to Russian people. For many centuries in the Russian Empire, Eurocentrism was distinctly visible. This is also inherent to the current political, especially economic, élite.

The aspiration for cooperation with the countries of the EU is obvious, but this cooperation must be equal in rights. Russia is a country of enormous space. Geography also conditions geopolitics. Russia's interests lie in the West, the East, and the South.

We must emphasize this again: Russia is ready for cooperation with the European Union in any sphere, but only in the kind of cooperation in which equality of rights is observed, with regard for the concerns and interests of both countries. The enormity of Russia is a condition for the multidirectionality of its external politics, but European civilization is closer and more understandable to us. From this, the logical conclusion is that we must use all opportunities for adjusting strategic cooperation.

We must, therefore, avoid head-on conflicts. Dialogue and polemics should continue, but without feeding the illusion that we will achieve essential successes in them. The obvious usefulness of such dialogue is not to intensify confrontations and thereby reinforce the position of the West, which would only win in such a confrontation. This is visible in the NATO policy towards the post-Soviet space, surrounding Russia all along the perimeter of its borders. The possibility of a direct struggle for Russian resources, even the use of force, should not be excluded.

In determining the possible scope of interaction between cultures, a consideration of the following elements is desirable:

- The imperatives of globalization and the dependence of states demand inter-civilizational dialogue. However, the price of international concord cannot be the rejection of independence in national and foreign policy;

- There is an opinion about the necessity for a spiritual-moral base of universal solidarity. One can agree with this, but it does not follow that one must give oneself up to illusions: human nature has remained as it always was. This is also confirmed by the sad experience of Gorbachev: his sermons were stimulated in words, but in action they were used against him personally as well as against our country;

- The search for a common moral denominator has always existed in world religions. Today, its role is hampered by the cynicism of 'double standards', dictated by geopolitical and bloc interests;

- In the 21st century, the security of states is indivisible. However, the aspiration to achieve 'absolute' security to the detriment of others' security (anti-missile defence, new kinds of weapons of mass destruction) must be examined;

- The thesis that modern inter-civilizational problems cannot be solved by force seems incontrovertible. However, in real policy, this solution is not to be excluded.

We will repeat: We must continue the policy of dialogue with the West, but the success of this dialogue will depend on the two main factors: (1) the growth of Russia's strength internally; (2) the development of cooperation with China, India, Brazil, and other future leaders of the world-structure.

With all the uncertainty of global processes, a long-term forecast in relation to Russia in the inter-civilizational scheme of things seems positive. Russia will not vanish in global civilization because it is too large for the appetites of geopolitical predators.

O. Bogomolov¹

DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS IN VIEW OF THE GLOBAL CRISIS (CRISIS OF NEOLIBERALISM. WHAT NEXT? RUSSIA'S CASE)

The global economic crisis is another proof of imminent profound changes in the world order. They affect economic sphere that is entering a stage of transition to new forms of regulation and yet another technological set-up, in which information, nano- and biotechnology acquire utmost importance. In manufacture, three-dimension printing of parts is of revolutionary importance. Significant shifts in social structure are on the way, with its new models arising, production and culture globalizing, a different configuration of world civilizations forming.

The unipolar world in which the U.S. had hegemony is giving way to a multipolar one, which demands for equality, respect for mutual interests and concord between a greater number of countries. America's political standing has tarnished. The global crisis has revealed flaws of modern capitalism, largely tailored in accordance with the canons of neoliberal ideology, professed and advocated by America. Imperfections have been clearly exposed not only in financial, monetary and credit policy, foreign exchange, which is especially evident, not only in production and trade, but also in the functioning of Western democracies. Revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya against their authoritarian and pseudo-democratic regimes that stirred up the neighbouring Muslim nations are very characteristic for coming changes. In various regions of the planet symptoms of spiritual, social and moral crises are accumulating. This gives reason to doubt the conformity of the world's dominant ideology and political practice to the challenges of the 21st century.

Way back in the 1940s prominent sociologist Pitirim Sorokin, in his landmark work *The Social and Cultural Dynamics*, stated the growing crisis of civilization, which is primarily manifested in culture, mentality and social relations. Today human thinking and way of life are also exposed to it. Humankind is now experiencing a transition to a new world-view and to a new way of living. According to Ervin László, the process of social evolution on our planet has approached a crucial phase of macro-shift. This is accompanied by social and cultural disarray. Some people adhere to the established beliefs and values, while more and more people are in deep thought of alternatives.² Many politicians, scholars and civil society groups are involved in search of ways to overcome destructive aspects of the macro-shift in progress and face the challenges of a new age. However, it is obvious that the advancement of scientific and political thought and public opinion is not keeping up with the events. Inertia force is still great.

In their efforts to find a way out of the crisis, Russian authorities stake on innovations in science and technology regarding them as a powerful leverage to raise labour productivity and living standards of the population. No doubt, these are necessary. Yet, can we count of them? A lot depends here on

a favourable state of the social milieu, moral and humanitarian components relevant for the development of ours as well as other civilizations rather than on efforts in scientific, technological and economic spheres. These aspects of social being are in no lesser need of modernization.

Nowadays it is generally accepted that people, their culture, education, knowledge, skills, health, state of mind are essential for the human progress. So it is often suggested that strategic top-priority investments be not only and not so much those into vanguard technology as those into man. The integrity of the society, people's confidence in the fair and sustainable social system, their trust in authorities, adherence to universal moral values are no less important for the achievement of projected goals. This is what is called the social capital, and its increment is becoming a guarantee of all successful economic endeavours.

In short, many people are growing aware of the need to design a new social and economic model. This transition may start with revising former ideological postulates, followed by spiritual rebirth and renewal of human communities. So, intellectual contacts and exchange of experience between representatives of different civilizations can help find the right solutions. There is even initial interesting and instructive evidence of the search that has already started.

One of the issues of *The Economist* journal, for example, featured the picture of a volume of *Modern Economic Theory* on its cover, with a caption in bold type below: 'What went wrong with it and how the crisis is changing it'. In this issue, it is argued that macroeconomics, which studies the functioning of national economy as a whole and such universal processes and phenomena as inflation, unemployment, economic growth and the like, 'are subject to *justifiable* and *serious* re-examination'.³ Seeing such statements in this liberal edition is really startling, it is a sensation almost impossible to foresee some time ago. Paul Krugman, 2008 Nobel Prize winner in economics, argues that much of the past thirty years of macroeconomics was 'spectacularly useless at best, and positively harmful at worst'. Another Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stiglitz acknowledges 'the failure of scientific theory and fundamental drawbacks of the American model of capitalism'.⁴ UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) chimes in with its report of 'The Global Economic Crisis: System Failures and Multilateral Remedies'⁵ and admits that 'market fundamentalism (...) over the last twenty years dramatically flunked the exam'. The report links system transformations to increasing regulating role of the government. *The Economist* puts it even more bluntly: 'The world is witnessing the rise of a new economic hybrid, which could be named 'state capitalism'.⁶ According to the journal, Chinese model of 'state capitalism' is an impressive example of it. The same issue is discussed in Ian Bremmer's *The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between State and Corporations*.⁷ Stefan Halper deliberates the topic in his *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Mode May Dominate the Twenty-First Century*. Both authors believe that many countries from Latin America to the Middle East follow suit of China.

³ *The Economist*, July 28, 2009.

⁴ Freefall: America, Free Markets and the Sinking of the World Economy. Joseph Stiglitz, Norton, 2009, p. 361.

⁵ The Global Economic Crisis: System Failures and Multilateral Remedies. UN, New York, 2009. p. III.

⁶ *The Economist*, January 23rd–29th, 2010, p. 22.

⁷ Bremmer I. The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between State and Corporations.

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Advisor to the Russian Academy of Sciences, Honorary Director of the Institute for International Economic and Political Research (the Russian Academy of Science), Head of Department of World Economy at the State University of Management, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. He was elected Deputy of the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR in 1989 and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia in 1993. Author of over 600 publications including the books *Reforms from American and Russian Scholars' Viewpoints* (Reformy glazami amerikanskikh i rossiyskikh uchonykh); *Reforms in the Mirror of International Comparisons* (Reformy v zerkale mezhdunarodnykh sravnenij); *My Chronicle of the Transition Period* (Moya letopis' perekhodnogo vremeni); *Thoughts Over the Erstwhile and Essential* (Razdum'ya o bylom i nasuschnom); *World Economy in the Globalization Period* (Mirovaya ekonomika v vek globalizatsiji); *Non-Economic Facets of Economics: Unknown Mutual Influence* (Nejekonomiceskije grani ekonomiki: nepoznannoje vzaimovlijanije) and others. O. T. Bogomolov is decorated with the Order of October Revolution, the Order of the Red Banner (twice), the Order of Badge of Honour, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th and the 3rd degree.

² László E. Macro-shift. Moscow, p. 26.

China is indeed looking for a model of post-reform development, but calls it a socialist harmonious society. Europeans, Scandinavians in particular, are practising what is called a model of a welfare state, in Germany it goes under the name of a socially-oriented market economy. In Europe these new visions and concepts have already taken root and have largely paid off; yet, liberals admit their temporary character and predict near return to the former understanding of the market economy model.

If the global crisis invites those in America and Europe who are prone to reflection to rethink conventional postulates of so-called 'mainstream' of social thought. Then obviously Russia should not be an exception either. It is yet to draw on the lessons of the crisis and to define strategic guidelines.

As it is known, we have been guided in our economic reforms by Yegor Gaidar, Anatoly Chubais and other mock-reformers, who were advised from the overseas and aimed at the macro-economy of the American cut. It brought the country to a deadlock. Compared to 1990, GDP in 2010 remained almost at the same level, industrial output fell by a quarter, and agricultural products decreased by 40 per cent. That is why *reassessment of ultraliberal recipes, in my opinion, is one of the most important inferences that may help overcome hardships of the crisis and open the prospect for sustained economic growth.*

The question of the role of the state is, of course, central of the upcoming rethinking. The architects of the Russian reforms called for the withdrawal of the government from the economy and did not tolerate any rebuttal. The most powerful tool for changes – the state mechanism of management and maintenance of order – has proved to be dysfunctional, inefficient, corroded with corruption, devoid of the immune system which could help eliminate vices and indemnify it against gross mistakes. It is obvious that it needs recovery and improvement. The more so because our private business has greatly discredited itself by its insatiable thirst for profit, social irresponsibility, immorality, neglect of national interests and the rule of law, grown together with criminality. Can it become a leading force in the modernization of the country? Rather unlikely.

Some fairly convincing evidence proves the fact that our country does not properly address the challenges of the post-industrial stage. The constitutional definition of Russia as a social state has no real ground, and scientific findings in this regard have not been officially recognized. The population lacks the most important landmark, namely, it is not clear into what social system the present reforms will drag the country and what it will bring to the people. What form of democracy will be best for us? Political and economic structure of the American model can not strike root on the Russian soil. Lack of a clear perspective, of faith in the future cannot but affect the spiritual climate and mood of our nation.

Any modern state (not only Russia, but also a Western one) takes upon itself certain responsibilities to prevent and overcome the failures of market mechanisms, both in monetary and financial sector, which is evident, and in other spheres. Talking about Russia, a number of pressing challenges needs to be addressed by the state. Among the priorities are: bridging dangerously widening pecuniary gap, struggle against ruinous inflation, massive outflow of capital and brain drain, rampant crime and corruption, and high level of unemployment.

As regards social polarization of the population, a statement in the report of the International Monetary Fund *World Socio-Economic Outlook: Remodelling the World Development*¹ is quite telling. It says: 'The main lesson of post-communist transformation certainly lies in the fact that state institutions are of crucial importance. Market not supported by a strong state leads to the replacement of an irresponsible state

authority with unregulated private enrichment, causing, thus, economic and social decline.'

The world experience shows an increasing participation of the state in redistribution of generated revenue. Over the past century the share of the state budget in the distribution of GDP increased in most developed countries from 10 or 20 to 50 per cent or more. This is largely due to an increase in government expenditure on education, welfare, science, pensions and other social transfers. The developed world seems to have realized that it is only the state that is able to oppose surging social stratification of the population, to ensure equal access of people to public wealth and thus to promote the consolidation and stability of the society.

To achieve this, the state must be trustworthy and effective, it must articulate and defend the interests of all strata of the people, and democratic mechanisms must be fair and efficient. What is required is communication between the authorities and the civil society, the separation of legislative, executive and judicial powers, democratic procedures used to form and change management.

State involvement is also extremely important in terms of restoring social justice in the Russian society which, unfortunately, the authorities do not seriously take into account. Here is a typical example: recent research shows that 20 per cent of low-income population in fact carries tax burden twice as heavy as that of 20 per cent of the high-income population. Besides, despite all the economic and social grounds, employees' salaries for the most part are really arbitrary and unfair, and many skilled workers and employees are unreasonably underpaid in Russia.

An average pay varies depending on the level of development of different market systems. But the proportions of the pay in regard to labour complexity, its intensity and qualifications required is fairly similar. As a rule, scientists, designers, surgeons and teachers are paid much more than workers, average civil employees or managers. In Russia, these proportions may be reversed and differ greatly from those worldwide. Many socially needed careers and types of skilled labour fall into the category of the low-paid. This leads to disastrous results, creates great divide and tension in the society, spurs crime and corruption. And, of course, it harmfully affects the productivity of labour.

It is absolutely unacceptable to ignore the principle of social justice in politics and economics, not to mention the official propaganda. The nation experiences a large-scale poverty and poor consumption on the part of millions of citizens. It would seem, frugality and modesty should be encouraged. Our media, especially TV, however, glamorize in every way and justify flippant luxury and extravagance of the Russian *nouveaux riches*. Laymen's lives have no attraction for them. Authorities do not provide an example of frugality and modesty either. Meanwhile, the World Bank report 'Justice and Development' states: 'With a high level of economic inequality, economic institutions and social conditions consistently serve the interests of more powerful groups. Such inequitable institutions can cause economic losses... Public services are provided preferably to the wealthy, while talents of middle and poorer groups remain unclaimed. Society as a whole then becomes less effective and opportunities for innovations and investments are missed.'² This is confirmed by the Russian reality. The crisis entailed more considerable decrease in production and consumption in Russia than in most countries of the world, while the number of billionaires, according to *Forbes*, increased by 70 per cent. In 2010 Russia won the third place in the world with the number of billionaires. Meanwhile the increasing inequality is not the last cause of global crisis and unrests in several countries.

¹ World Economic Outlook Supporting Studies IMF. 2010, p. 35.

² The World Bank. Report on the World Development 2006: Justice and Development, p. 2.

Social justice is an immortal moral law, an essential part of the religious consciousness of believers. Healthy moral climate and a sustainable economy in the society are impossible without its observance. Patriarch Cyril of Moscow and All Russia wrote: 'An economic system based only on the lust for wealth, on the indifference to man's destiny, on the contempt for moral standards, lacks stability and can collapse at any moment, burying people's lives under its ruins. Immoral economy is inefficient, in fact – it is nonviable and dangerous.'¹

In Russia, an average income of the poorest who constitute ten per cent of the population is 30 times as low as an average income of the ten per cent of the richest, in Moscow it is even 50 times as low, while in the EU, the gap is about 7 to 10 times, and in the United States it is about 15 times. Unprecedented income inequality and the impotence of the Russian state in bringing it down to the European level have negative consequences for the economic growth and the demographic situation in the country. Statistical analysis shows that if Russia had had the European proportion of inequality, the growth rate of GDP in Russia could have increased by 30–50 per cent in 2000–07 and with annual 10 per cent increase in real incomes of the general population, the nation would have overcome its depopulation process. To improve the situation it is necessary to quit the flat-rate tax plan and substitute it with a progressive income scale, as well as to take various other measures to support the poor. The USA is able to keep the inequality between the utmost ten percent of the population as low as by 15 times, which would be up to 68 times otherwise. Should the U.S. give up the progressive taxation on citizens' income, the country would suffer the collapse.

During the two decades the Russian government is unable to counter capital flight and brain drain. Moreover, it encourages unjustified and premature liberalization in this area. According to various estimates, capital outflow from the country reached from 1 to 2 trillion dollars during the years of perestroika and market reforms. One can dispute the accuracy of the estimates, but in any case the numbers are certain to stupefy. We suffered enormous losses of skilled workers, engineers and scientists who moved not only abroad but also migrated internally turning to trade and small business occupations. And this is primarily due to the lack of demand in scientists, their unjustifiably low salaries, lay-off of highly skilled workers and employees because of liquidation and underuse of numerous

enterprises. It makes one wonder how we managed to survive that bloodletting.

The Russian state economic and financial authorities are losing their fight against inflation, too. The latter has not so much to do with excess money in circulation, as with increasing costs of production and sales of goods, as well as undervalued rouble, which leads to higher prices for imports, especially for consumer goods. Unreasonable mark-up on the part of self-interested businesses, civil servants' corruption, extortion by organized crime, rising taxes and tariffs add to the inflated prices. Therefore, pure monetary means to combat the inflation are not sufficient. Much depends on the confidence of population and business in the economic and legal systems, in the effectiveness of the fight with corruption and criminality. All these determines the degree of inflation expectations. Unfortunately, these things are often neglected.

Under the global crisis, lower prices and impending deflation usually follow the inflation in developed countries. In 2009 the retail price index in leading Western countries had a negative value of –0.1 per cent, with that in the U.S. being –0.3 per cent, in Japan –1.4 per cent and in Switzerland –0.5 per cent as compared to 2008. Russia experienced 'stagflation' then, its GDP dropped by over 8 per cent, consumer prices increased by 12 per cent and consumer goods basket of the poor and the medium-income population risen by 20 to 25 per cent. The state and businesses disburdened expenses caused by the crisis upon the mass market consumers. That narrowed the domestic market. In such situations, the Western states often resorted to different kinds of state control over the prices of key commodities and over the companies' profits. Russia is also trying to make first discreet steps in this direction.

Our country will be unable to meet the abovementioned challenges unless the economic policies are corrected and the state management quality improved. Current measures taken to overcome the severe crisis will hardly be able to facilitate sustainable progress, if we fail to determine strategic priorities, not only and not so much in the economy, but in the spiritual and social spheres as well, and that is what many Western leaders are doing today. The government policy should focus on welfare, science, culture, education and upbringing of the younger generation. It is the way to a renewed society, enhanced morals, and economic prosperity. We would really like the contacts and interaction between civilizations to pave this way.

Heinrich Bonnenberg²

WORLD OF CITIZENS AND ISLAM ON THE PATH TO AN AGE OF THE PRESENT

People have to come to a conflict-free and productive coexistence of the two values structures that define the world. Approximately 80 % of the world's population live according to the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS and approximately 20 % live according to the value system of ISLAM. Both value

systems strive to ensure human dignity, even though the countries of both groups respect human rights in different ways. The coexistence of these two value systems has been severely disrupted since September 11, 2001. Mutual phobias have since then emerged.

First of all EUROPE must overcome these phobias, in order to secure the strength needed for the increasingly intense competition with CHINA, INDIA and both NORTH and SOUTH AMERICA. Both the economic and cultural region of EUROPE is meant by the use of the term EUROPE. This region includes the European Union, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the successor states of former Yugoslavia and various other countries, but not Turkey. The European cultural and economic region stretches from Gibraltar and Iceland in the West to Russia's Chukotka in the East, thus from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.

At the moment this EUROPE has around 740 million inhabitants 7 % of which are Muslim. Out of 740 million inhab-

¹ Non-economic Dimensions of Economy: Unknown Interdependence. 2010, p. 113.

² Statesman and public figure, eminent organizer of industrial production in the FRG, Dr. Sc. (Engineering). Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the Board of directors of Lausitz and Central German Mining Administration Company 'Northern Power Plants'. Since the 1990s Mr. Bonnenberg has been Head and Executive Authorized Representative of the German State Property Fund. Since 1995 he has been Chairman of the Supervisory Board and the Board of Directors of 'Northern Power Plants' company. Mr. Bonnenberg took part in preparing the agreement on the Baltic gas pipeline (Russia-Germany). Member of 'German Society for Foreign Policy', 'German-Russian Forum', 'German-Ukrainian Forum', 'Association of German Engineers', 'German-Arab Friendship Society'. Mr. Bonnenberg is on the board of trustees of a number of universities in Western Europe and the USA. Author of a number of publications, including: *German Transformation in the East. Germany: Achievements and Problems*. Mr. Bonnenberg is decorated with the highest Order of the Federal Republic of Germany – the Order for Services to the Fatherland.

itants, 500 million live in the European Union, approximately 4 % of which are Muslim (the majority have foreign ancestral ties); 140 million live in the Russian Federation, approximately 18 % are Muslim (with only Russian ancestral ties); 25 million live in the states of former Yugoslavia of which approximately 26 % are Muslim (with predominantly regional ancestral ties). The countries with the largest Muslim populations within the European Union are Bulgaria, which has a Muslim population of approximately 12 % (with mainly Bulgarian ancestral ties), France which has a Muslim population of 9 %, Germany with 7 % and the Netherlands with 5.7 % (here the Muslim population is almost exclusively from migrant background).

Allow me to present the following observations:

1. We live in the age of the PRESENT. Microchips, containers and the power of flight embody this age of the PRESENT. Microchips make information accessible to every place on earth simultaneously. Goods and people in every place on earth are brought closer together thanks to containers and the power of flight.

2. A value system encompassing the whole of humanity will arise in the age of the PRESENT. It will be advanced through science and through the exchange of ideas, goods and cultures. I will refer to his value system as WORLD CONSCIENCE. It will be the duty of this WORLD CONSCIENCE value system to preserve and increase the social capital of humanity, the dignity of all people and their education and prosperity. It will also be the duty of such a value system to prevent the emergence of capital elite of globalization. In order to ensure the highest possible peace in the future, in a world with likely more than 9 billion inhabitants, it is absolutely necessary, that the gap between rich and poor is overcome. In particular, education and prosperity for all can help to ensure that potential conflicts between countries, but also within countries, do not emerge and may even be reduced. Education and Prosperity are a necessity. To make the development of this new value system of WORLD CONSCIENCE a reality, a peaceful consensus between the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and ISLAM must be found.

3. The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS developed for some five hundred years in Europe with the inclusion of the fundamental values of the Greek world (freedom, truth, beauty), the Roman world (the state, law), the Jewish world (the Ten Commandments), the Celtic, Germanic and Slavic worlds (the election of the king, monogamy), Christianity (original sin, charity, mercy), Arab culture (encyclopaedia, exact sciences) and of Islam (the imparting of Arabic and Greek education).

The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS is characterized by humanism (tolerance, freedom of conscience, the state's monopoly on the use of force), enlightenment (rationality, mechanical world view, the separation of powers, freedom of thought, freedom of religion), Marxism (labour and capital, free development of the individual), pluralism (ideas, diversity, consensus) a social free market economy (competition, welfare policy), a scientific worldview (creative coincidence) as well as by the protection of nature, animals, and the environment. This system is equally defined by experience of horrific experiments throughout history (colonialism, National Socialism, Bolshevism) which abused people through unbelievable atrocities like the Holocaust. The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS is based on the desire for scientific truth and encompasses the regulations developed by people for a modern and productive coexistence. The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS does not prescribe any religion.

The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS stands for 'Freedom creates dignity'. It is characterised by its ability to continually start anew and unleashing creativity above all in the fields of natural science, technology, the economy and social solidarity; this has led to great successes, primarily for ed-

ucation and prosperity. An inherent trait of the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS is its ability to continue to develop.

The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS is anchored in the constitutions of Europe, of North and South America, of China, India, Japan, Australia, Turkey and of many other countries, though with significant differences from country to country, including the consideration for individual rights. There are clear differences in the constitutions of countries which follow the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS and this is due to the differing histories and cultures of the countries in question. The Swiss Confederation with its referendum and the People's Republic of China with its non-elected one party system may be given as examples of this.

4. The value system of ISLAM is identical to the world religion ISLAM. ISLAM stands for the unity of God as a merciful Lord and for the good in people without original sin. The approximate meaning of the Arabic word ISLAM is 'the obtainment of peace through submission to the will of Allah'. The word Muslim which derives from the word ISLAM means 'someone who achieves peace through his submission to the will of Allah'. It is the duty of ISLAM to protect Muslims from the bad in their fellow man. Guidelines show Muslims how to live a life agreeable to God and above all in view of judgment day in the afterlife, whereby the only direct and truly certain path to paradise is through martyrdom in the name of God. The Koran, Sunnah and Sharia, are the foundations of Islam.

The Koran is the pure word of God. The original Koran was handed down to mankind by the Prophet Muhammad 1400 years ago in the Arabic language making the divine secrets accessible to them. The Koran is the final revelation of God's word and was valid even before its creation. The acceptance of new scientific and sociological findings as well as the findings of the age of the PRESENT are possible from case to case through allegorical interpretations of the Koran.

The Sunnah records traditions. The preservation of these traditions allows Muslims to lead their lives in accordance with God. This life follows the example, words and actions of the Prophet Muhammad who was sent by God. The Sharia is an additional interpretation of the Koran and Sunnah, prescribing the guidelines for coexistence, which protect people from bad influences and ensure a life pleasing to God and the peaceful coexistence of people. Sharia is a consensus reached around 1000 years ago by Muslim communities and scholars and is considered to be God-given. Sharia is a legal structure which oversees the entire lives of Muslims with its religious duties, regulations of rituals, legal regulations, especially those concerning marriage-, inheritance-, and criminal-law. Sharia does not state in which form of government the values system ISLAM should be valid. It only stipulates that Sharia law must be enforced in places where Muslims live. Sharia is not a codified law. The introduction of Sharia as a legal system means the introduction of at least parts of Islamic Sharia law. The ethics of ISLAM consist of two parts: creed and deontology. Creed and the performance of duties are simultaneously personal and social actions. There are five pillars of deontology: testimony of faith, five daily obligatory prayers (on Fridays in a mosque), obligatory charity, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and the pilgrimage to Mecca.

The value system of ISLAM stands for 'Truth creates dignity'. The veneration given to the Prophet Muhammad in the lives of Muslims is part of this dignity. Muhammad was sent by God and is considered the ideal for a just head of state and social reformer. The value system of ISLAM is a value system based on the universalities prescribed by Allah which can be interpreted but not changed by man. The value system of ISLAM is the foundation of life above all in the Middle East, North Africa, on the Indian subcontinent, in Indonesia and other countries in Africa and Asia.

ISLAM is made up of two main branches, Sunni and Shi'ite, as well as numerous special communities which often argue about the best ways to live life according to God. 57 countries with noteworthy Muslim populations are united in the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC). There are clear differences in the constitutions of countries which follow the value system of ISLAM. In particular they differ in the extent to which Sharia is part of the legal system and how the leadership of the respective countries is legitimized. These differences are influenced by the history and culture of the various countries. The following pose as examples: the considerably secular Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Indonesia with its syncretic form of Islam, the constitutional monarchy of Morocco which has adopted parts of Islamic Sharia law and the inherited Wahhabite monarchy of Saudi Arabia where Islamic Sharia law has been adopted in its entirety.

5. To prevent destructive and bloody conflicts which go against the dignity of mankind, it is critical that the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS and the value system of ISLAM peacefully create the common value system of WORLD CONSCIENCE with mutual respect, recognizing that both value systems respect the dignity of mankind. In order to achieve this, both value systems need to declare what they understand by dignity of people in the age of the PRESENT. An age where the global population size is predicted to rise above nine billion and where people are closely connected by microchips, containers and the power of flight.

6. The first important steps on the path to a value system of WORLD CONSCIENCE are:

6.1 *The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights* from 1948 which in fact only acts as a suggestion and thus does not legally bind the 192 member states of the UN. Many conventions and contracts which have been agreed upon however subsequently stem from this declaration.

6.2 *The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)* from 1966 legally binds those member states of the UN who signed and ratified it. This covenant legally guarantees basic human rights: the equality of men and women to exercise these rights determined in this covenant, the inherent right to life, the right to not be tortured or enslaved, the right to personal freedom and safety, the right to be cautioned, the right to be tried in front of a judge, the right to move freely, the right to equality before the law, the guarantee of basic standards in criminal law, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, the right to peaceful assembly, the right of men and women to marry at marriageable age and start a family and the guarantee of numerous rights designed especially for children. The UN covenant prohibits the discrimination against ethnic-, religious- and linguistic minorities. 174 states signed this UN covenant, including 37 Islamic states such as the Arab Republic of Egypt (with reference to Islamic Sharia Law), the Republic of Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Iraq, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Republic of Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (not yet ratified), the Republic of Indonesia, the countries of central Asia and the Maghreb states.

The following Islamic states did not sign the covenant: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, Malaysia, the Republic of Singapore, and the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam. The Catholic state Vatican City also did not sign the covenant.

6.3 *The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)* from 1966, which legally binds those member states of the UN who have signed and ratified it, partly with additional declarations. This UN covenant legally guarantees among others: equality between men and women, the prohibition of forced marriages, the right to work, the freedom of occupation, the right to pay, reasonable pay, reasonable sub-

sistence through work, the right to safe working conditions, the right to form unions, social security and social insurance, the right to maternity leave, protection from the economic and social exploitation of children and the youth, the right to the best possible physical and mental health, education, the right to take part in cultural life, the right to participate in scientific progress and its applications as well as the right to freedom of research.

These rights apply equally to everyone; they are free from discrimination according to race, skin colour, sex, language, religion, political and other views, ancestry, means, birth place and any other criteria. 160 states signed this UN covenant including Islamic states such as: the Arab Republic of Egypt (with reference to Islamic Sharia Law), the Republic of Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Republic of Iraq, the Republic of Yemen, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Indonesia, the central Asian states and the Maghreb states. The following Islamic states did not sign the covenant: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman, Malaysia, the Republic of Singapore, and the Sultanate of Brunei Darussalam. The Catholic state Vatican City also did not sign the covenant.

6.4 *A Multitude of United Nations conventions* which regulate individual human rights legally bind those member states of the UN having signed and ratified them.

6.5 *The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights*, which oversees the global human rights situation and promotes its implementation and observance,

6.6 *The UN Human Rights Council* which may decide to send observers to monitor the human rights situation in member states and

6.7 *Regional human rights agreements* in Europe, in Asia and in North and South

America.

These and other conventions set very high goals, the achievement of which will require a lot of commitment, insight and honesty. Of course, there are still significant shortcomings in the implementation. But even the communication of objectives is an important step to help humankind, to live in prosperous peace with the soon 9 billion inhabitants of Earth. It is worth while to make as much of the conventions as possible a reality.

7. *The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)* has existed since 4 November 1950 in Europe. The member states of the COUNCIL OF EUROPE are obliged to sign the ECHR and as such are obliged to implement it in their own legal systems. Thus the European Convention on Human Rights applies to each and every citizen who lives in a member state of the COUNCIL OF EUROPE.

Special mention is given to Article 14, the 'ban on discrimination': the beneficial use of the rights outlined in this convention are to be guaranteed without discrimination on the grounds of sex, race, skin colour, language, religion, political or other views, national and social origin, membership to minority groups, means, birth or other criteria.

The COUNCIL OF EUROPE is currently made up of 47 members. They are:

7.1 The founding member of the COUNCIL OF EUROPE (1949) Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and

7.2 The other members of the COUNCIL OF EUROPE (in order of their admission) Turkey, Greece, Germany, Iceland, Austria, Cyprus, Switzerland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Finland, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Andorra, Albania, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Ukraine, Croatia, Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Serbia, Monaco and Montenegro.

There are many countries with significant Muslim populations among the countries of the COUNCIL OF EUROPE: Turkey (99 % Muslim taking into account that everyone who does not officially register themselves as 'not Muslim' is counted as Muslim; a democratic, secular state since 1928), Azerbaijan (99 % Muslim; democratic, secular state according to the accepted constitution of 1995), Albania (60 % Muslim; secular republic according to accepted constitution of 1998), Bosnia and Herzegovina (44 % Muslim; democratic, syncretistic state according to Dayton Agreement of 1995).

The European Court of Human Rights was created in order to supervise acts of legislation, adjudication and administration in all member states. All 47 member states of the EUROPEAN COUNCIL joined the European Court of Human Rights.

Belarus and Catholic state Vatican City are not members of the EUROPEAN COUNCIL. They did not sign the European Convention on Human Rights and nor did they join the European Court of Human Rights.

8. The *Cairo declaration of 'Human Rights in Islam'* of 1990 is a regrettable regression for the value system of WORLD CONSCIENCE. In particular the Republic of Sudan, the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia criticised the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights because of its lack, in their opinion, of inclusiveness with reference to cultural and religious values of non-western countries. They demanded human rights which could be realised without a 'breach of Islamic Law'. The mixing of human rights and Sharia law by the Cairo Declaration is problematic. The very vague wording and the clause stating that human rights have to be compatible with Sharia law, not only qualifies but even calls into question the human rights to life and physical integrity, freedom of speech and religion (including the right to change religion) and the equality of the sexes.

The Cairo Declaration was signed by 45 Foreign Ministers of the 57 nations that make up the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC). It is designed to be a member states guideline for human rights. It is not internationally binding and is mostly irrelevant within most OIC countries' national legislation. It is gratifying to see increasing efforts being made to adapt the foundations of the value system ISLAM to modern human rights, through interpretations of the Koran, Sunnah and Sharia, which include the equal rights defined in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Covenant on Social and Economic Rights and have also been recognized by many Islamic countries.

Without a doubt, the political, legal, social and cultural differences which will have to be bridged on the way to a value system of WORLD CONSCIENCE are enormous. These developments are of utmost importance for the future of humankind and are reflected in the **Arab Charter on Human Rights** which was ratified by the Council of the League of Arab States in 1994, and in its revised form of 2004.

In its preamble the Arab Charter on Human Rights explicitly refers to and accepts the principles of the United Nations' Charter and the United Nations' Declaration of Human Rights as well as the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the UN Covenant on Social and Economic Rights. It attempts to build a bridge as it confirms the 'Cairo Declaration of Human Rights'.

9. In the continued harmonisation of the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and of ISLAM it is important to differentiate between:

9.1 Countries with predominantly Islamic populations such as Saudi Arabia, the Maghreb states, but also Turkey and Central Asian countries,

9.2 Countries with partly Islamic populations with local ancestry such as Russian and Bulgaria,

9.3 Countries with partly Islamic populations without local ancestry such as France, Germany and the Netherlands. Each of these groups and each country therein have their peculiarities rooted in their history and culture. Each group, each country will deal differently with the challenge of harmonising the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and of ISLAM with the value system of WORLD CONSCIENCE and they will make individual progress.

10. Countries within EUROPE with an Islamic population belong to the countries with only partly Islamic populations. To make these countries, and therefore EUROPE, from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, ready for the future, it is vital to promote the harmonization of the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and of ISLAM in EUROPE, and in particular for the competition with CHINA, INDIA and NORTH AND SOUTH AMERICA. It is important that Islamic fellow citizens acknowledge that the overwhelming majority of people in Europe live in the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS and live within the meaning of the aforementioned covenants and conventions on human rights and that this value system therefore takes precedence. It is equally important though that those non-Islamic citizens in EUROPE accept Islamic fellow citizens as equals.

It is important to note:

10.1 The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS stands for education and prosperity. Thus it is only right to open up these opportunities to Islamic fellow citizens but also to expect Islamic citizens to be open to these opportunities.

10.2 The value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS emphasises that the citizen is primarily responsible for his own welfare but also contributes to prosperity in society through work and engagement. Thus it is only right to give Islamic fellow citizens equality in the labour market.

10.3 The value system of ISLAM stipulates that Muslims have the opportunity to put their creed into practice and fulfil their religious duties. This has to be respected by the exponents of the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS. They must refrain from insults on the Prophet Muhammad as they destroy the dignity of the Islamic fellow citizen and foster mistrust and discord.

10.4 The mutual understanding of people living in the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and of ISLAM should be promoted in everyday life through private contacts, celebrations, through cultural initiatives, through the economy but also in the scientific-academic arena.

10.5 It should be jointly investigated to what extent parts of Islamic Sharia Law can be harmonized with codified law in EUROPE.

This central question of integration should be addressed by scientists on Law and Islam from universities in EUROPE, if possible in close cooperation between Germany and Russia. To enhance mutual understanding between the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and of ISLAM, new Islamic Study Centres have just been created in Tübingen and Münster/Osnabrück in Germany in addition to existing university faculties. Imams (the leaders of Islamic prayer) are trained in these new centres in Tübingen and Münster/Osnabrück in compliance with the German Constitution, which is binding for all citizens living in Germany, and which, according to article 79, can only be changed democratically with the consent of two thirds of votes in the constitutional bodies, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat – the upper and lower houses of the German parliament, respectively.

10.6 It is wrong to reduce the debate between the value systems of WORLD OF CITIZENS and of ISLAM to a debate between churches and ISLAM. Churches are only part of the value system of WORLD OF CITIZENS and not representative of it.

This is particularly true of the Catholic Church, which is an undemocratic elective monarchy with dogmatic *ex cathedra* definitions, papal infallibility, infallibility of church teachings, limited transparency and celibacy. It is a pity, the Catholic state Vatican City has never ratified any important human rights declarations.

Russia and Germany have been, and still are, of great importance for the development of the WORLD OF CITIZENS

value system. May both countries contribute to the development of the WORLD CONSCIENCE values system. It would be nice, if the academic youth of the two countries would address this task together.

Berlin, with its for European standards big Muslim population (roughly 10 %) and its multicultural 'brand', would be a good object of study.

N. Burov¹

IALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

Dialogue of cultures as a natural property of civilizational development has existed for many millennia. However, due to the globalization of the world economy and its spiritual life, it has acquired particular significance.

The 21st-century engineering and technologies give an opportunity to cross the borders in different spheres of economy, transport, communication and spiritual life. Information, money and goods are travelling from country to country; labour migration has increased, there are more families now who educate their children in the countries with highly developed economies.

In the first place, globalization relies on informational technologies. They are focused not on a particular territory or country, but on the user who is connected to other users through a network. In fact, the members of informational society make up a global subject world. It shares cosmopolitan values and contributes to the erosion of national frontiers.

The global informatization of society helps to overcome alienation of a separate human being from the life of the world community. It also speeds up the creation of the communication and information environment that relies on the human personality who has all necessary skills to extract, save, efficiently use and disseminate information, and also generate new knowledge.

The modern stage of civilizational development demonstrates transnationalization in culture. Its is characterized by:

- new, relevant to the 21st century integration trends, value-and-meaning content in the cross-cultural dialogue;
- setting up of a new transnational culture, characterized by commonality and mobility which are transformed into national cultures;
- expansion of the informational base for the dialogue of cultures through the creation of media spaces and virtualization of the cultural environment;
- incorporation of new forms for the intercultural dialogue and expansion of the international exchange of cultural values;
- making of a new level of personality culture, providing an individual adaptability to the dialogue of cultures and to the cultural events and processes world-wide.

Together with its positive impact on science, economy, technological progress and dissemination of information, the negative effects of globalization as a world-wide phenomenon are obvious. It attacks the very base of national cultures, undermines national and cultural traditions of the peoples in the world, often

popularizes and promotes the patterns of spiritual life, which are not always the best. Naturally, it demands that the state and civil society use all resources to protect their national heritage. The established contradiction does not imply a withdrawal of cultural values exchange; it is not prejudiced against the dialogue of cultures and the reasons to introduce Russia as widely as possible to the best cultural specimens of the West and the East. But, definitely, there should be a firewall to prevent the flow of films and electronic storage media that popularize violence, nationalism or sexual perversions. Moreover, in the context of globalization the whole system of education should foster a selective attitude towards the Internet and other information sources that, together with genuine values, promote the ideas and conceptions alien to the humanistic traditions.

The overwhelming influence of electronic mass media has brought about a standardized lifestyle and the unification of cultures. In this context national folklore and cultural traditions become the most affordable and efficient tool to preserve the national identity, to prevent the loss of spiritual identity and the loss of its face. And the major mission for educational institutions, libraries, museums, theatres and entertaining agencies, cultural and leisure establishments comes to the exposure, support and popularization of national folklore and traditions.

The dialogue of secular and religious cultures is a significant factor in the preservation of national cultural heritage.

There is no doubt that the church and the state are both concerned about the wellbeing of their country and the spiritual growth and development of their society. But secular and religious target settings may considerably differ.

It is primarily connected with political changes, which bring about the changes of religious consciousness, the change of religions, and victimization of people who remain faithful to the church. Throughout the history of civilization, these things resulted in situations when the significance of religious buildings was reconsidered; they were hardly being used for religious purposes and sometimes were even destroyed. The consequences of such power shift that predetermines the change of religion can be seen in Spain, where the symbols of Christianity and Islam overlap in functioning churches and museums. It demonstrates that suras of the Koran and Christian hymns and psalms could be heard here in different epochs.

The influence of the church and its religious buildings grows considerably at the turning points in history, when institutions of statehood grow weaker. This was the very case with the USA and Europe in the economic recession of the 1930s and in Europe after World War II. The Vatican's growing influence projected through Christian Democratic Parties' taking over the structures of power. The influence of the Russian Orthodox Church and Islam was rapidly growing in the 1990s in Russia, when it was going through a deep political and economic crisis, and above all, the crisis of ideology, which followed the collapse of the USSR and the disillusionment with the imminent triumph of communism.

The Church is an essentially conservative institution; but the civilizational development determines its step-by-step re-

¹ Director of the State Memorial of St. Isaac's Cathedral, Professor at St. Petersburg State University of Culture and Arts. Prof. Burov is People's Artist of Russia. Chairman of St. Petersburg Public Council. Member of the Union of Theatre Workers, the Union of Museums of Russia. Prof. Burov was President of St. Petersburg department of the Union of Theatre Workers (2001–05), Chairman of the Committee for Culture in St. Petersburg (2005–08). Prof. Burov has acted in the following films: *Special Agent (Agent osobogo naznacheniya)*, *Circular Stairs (Vintovaya lestnitsa)*, *Truth for Plato (Istina dlja Platona)*, *Ljon'ka Pantelejev's Life and Death (Zhizn' i smert' Ljon'ki Pantelejeva)*, *Master and Margarita (Master i Margarita)*, *The Foe's Image (Obraz vraga)*, *Friend-Or-Foe (Svoj — chuzhoj)* and some others. Prof. Burov is decorated with the Order of Honour, the Order of St. Prince Vladimir Equal to Apostles of the 3rd degree of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Order of Merit of the Republic of Poland; he is Honorary Worker of culture of the Republic of Poland.

newal. At the same time, the more active the renovation of activities by the religious confessions goes, the more parishioners they get in the temples. At the beginning of the 21st century the Lutheran Church was growing most rapidly in Europe, because it became more attractive for the youth, and improved its techniques to influence the congregation – including modern music concerts, poetry soirées etc.

Any religion, through the creation of cult objects, including religious buildings, was concerned about its impact on the human emotional domain. It basically means that it was performing the main function of art, which was, in its turn, based on religious concepts. Antique art is the most impressive example. The temples of Ancient Greece and Rome were architectural structures with artworks of diverse genres.

As early as that the state was striving for the dialogue with the church; it was also a safeguard for religious buildings that were used as national treasure houses at the same time. This trend is common for all state religions, including Ancient Egypt, Asia, Africa and the pre-Columbian America. It was the state that was taking care of the accumulated treasures – of their protection, registration, storage, visitor access etc. With such coordinated practices of religion and the state the legal base is provided by the authority of religion. But the growth of power makes the secular state a legal and de facto safeguard for the preservation of religious buildings – the situation that can be observed today.

Museumification of monuments that are religious buildings encounters certain difficulties. Thus, the church and the state have quite complicated, changing with time and not always identical views on the ways and means to provide for the preservation of such monuments. Such situation is very explicit in the countries where the level of art culture is traditionally high. For instance, in Italy, the state keeps blaming the church for the poor preservation of the entrusted cultural values (especially of those used in daily religious ceremonies), on the one hand. While, on the other hand, the church rebukes the state for the inadequate care of religious treasures. It is a persistent opposition: due to different factors, the balance of these forces, opinions and view keeps changing all the time. The strong authority of the state is trying to make the power of the clergy its subordinate. If the power of the state is quite feeble, the church tries to get all the buildings and religious buildings it owns under its jurisdiction.

At the same time, the state and the church, knowing how important it is to preserve these monuments, search for a constructive dialogue and try to find reasonable models of such cooperation. Practice shows that museumification of unique historical and cultural riches, including enormous religious sites is the most efficient method to preserve them. Synergetic collaboration between the museum and the church has become a major condition for the preservation of masterpieces of religious art, and for their use in education – moral and aesthetic, and historical and patriotic. The museum complex St. Isaac's Cathedral is not the only museum institution that, together with the church, is searching, and finding, efficient ways to preserve the heritage of the ancestors. In this respect much has been done by the State Tretyakov Gallery, the State Museum of Moscow Kremlin, the museum institutions and Orthodox Dioceses of the central regions of Russia, of Smolensk and Vologda regions and also of other regions with the vast infrastructure of religious constructions. The project 'Spiritual Revival of the Pskov region' deserves support and dissemination of its experience. The project is based on the collaboration of the museum institutions in the Pskov Region, the Holy Dormition Pskov-Caves Monastery and other secular and religious institutions. This

programme has incited a tremendous inflow of visitors, and, what is more, it has also helped to involve tens of thousands of schoolchildren, students, pensioners and representatives from other social groups into the activities for the preservation and restoration of the Christian Orthodox treasures.

Museums in Veliky Novgorod, in the Urals, Siberia and the north-western territories of Russia have considerably widened the museumification of historical, cultural and natural environment, including folk art, decorative arts, festive rituals and other spiritual and creative activities that have survived through times.

The original integration of Tatarstan's museums with the two major confessions in the republic – Muslim and Orthodox – is of special interest for the development of museum activities. The republic's National Museum bears the title of 'State United Museum'. It displays a truly harmonious picture of the past and the present-day history, of the ethnographic features of Tatars, Russians and other peoples of the Volga Region, of common and specific traits of people who practise Islam and Orthodox Christianity. Visitors tend to linger by the photos of Russians who are building the mosque, which is the biggest in Europe, and by the photos of Tatars in their national dresses, who are decorating an orthodox monastery. Museum experts organize guided tours to churches and mosques, where they explain the importance of each religious art, demonstrate the benefits of the intercultural dialogue among the peoples of Tatarstan, promote the traditions of festive rituals of the Christian Orthodox and Islamic cultures.

The Republic of Tatarstan is notable for its high degree of culture in international and inter-confessional relations, political and national tolerance. Naturally, it results from the list of factors, in which cooperation between the church and the museum is one of the most important.

Such cooperation contributed to the preservation and restoration of such monuments of Russian history and culture as Solovetsky and St. Cyril-Belozersky historical, cultural and natural reserve museums, 'Alexander Sloboda', 'Novodevichy Convent', Ferapontov Monastery, the Museum of Dionysius's Frescos, 'New Jerusalem (Novy Jerusalem)' History, Architecture and Art Museum, Zvenigorod Historical, Architectural and Art Museum, Sergiyev Posad State History and Art Museum-Preserve.

However, nowadays the relations between the Church and museums are not unambiguous in different regions of Russia. Here and there administrations of museum institutions want to totally withdraw the right of the church to conduct worship services. In other events, the Orthodox Diocese, with no opportunities to keep a religious architectural monument and provide for the preservation of its treasures, tries to get museum experts out, thus actually dooming a monument to destruction.

Religious art is determined by a particular religion. But a museum exhibition raises such art to the universal human level, disseminating its moral and ethical influence on both a follower of any confession and on an atheist. Meeting the human needs to perceive the spiritual world of different ages, religious art museums, being an organic element of the contemporary culture, ensure a succession in cultural and historical development, and provide for moral and aesthetic education of the youth by the means of art.

The logic of social development caused the need to overcome a more than 70-year-long confrontation with the Russian Orthodox Church. The very essence of the religious art museums is about dialogues, a harmonious alliance with the Church, and joined efforts of the museum and spiritual leaders to address common tasks of moral and aesthetic, historical and patriotic education of people.

A. Busygin¹

CULTURE AS FACTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY

There is every ground to positively maintain that after all there comes the realization of the importance of preserving and developing traditions of humanism and patriotism, of the necessity to consolidate Russian society on the basis of cultural and moral values to ensure national security. If society lacks a system of values – culture in a broad sense – there are no prospects for the development of effective economy, and the way to modernizing all spheres of life is blocked.

If society lacks culture as a system of moral values, even toughest punitive actions will not make it possible to fight corruption. It is pertinent to remember it, as more and more attention is being paid to striving against this evil, though signs of its eradication are not yet apparent.

In many recent publications there is a detailed description of the alarming situation that has formed in Russian society in the spheres of spirituality and culture. The consequences of it are also specified. Rejection of the Soviet ideology entailed rejecting the culture of that period. Traditional folk culture proved to be virtually supplanted by imitations of western pop-culture. The number of centres of cultural activities was reduced. About one third of club centres of cultural and leisure activities, which to a great degree determined the cultural space of little towns and villages, was closed down. Those that have been left have to charge fees for their services, which, because of low incomes of provincial citizens, are not strongly sought for. The so-called 'trade unions culture' has disappeared – a vast infrastructure which in the Soviet times used to ensure millions of children and adults' involvement in cultural and leisure activities. Certainly, as Lyudmila Ulitskaya keenly remarked in her splendid latest novel *The Green Pavilion*, in the Soviet period 'literary and cultural public catering used to evoke despair'. Indeed, this 'public catering' was stale, flat, often stultifying and ridiculous for intelligent people, but it, at least, could not poison anybody.

And what causes particular anxiety is that strategic interests of the state have been replaced by short-term gains of private actors. In culture, it has taken place, first of all, in such spheres as film distribution and exhibition, TV and radio broadcasting and book publishing industry.

Efforts made by state bodies, political parties and public organizations aimed at changing the situation in the sphere of culture are obviously insufficient. Work of Russia's traditional religious confessions plays a positive role but it fails to cope with the problems. It is necessary to implement coordinated work of all institutions engaged in the matter with civil society institutions, including religious organizations. We need a set of measures, we need a strategy of forming a new system of ideals and moral values based on national traditions.

What seems to be most important? Without going into theoretical discourse I would like to dwell on practical steps that it is reasonable to take in the first place.

It is urgent to plan events that would allow the citizens of Russia to realize more clearly than today their belonging to the number of citizens of the state of Russia and to the All-Russian community. The trouble is that today inhabitants of the Caucasus, for instance, do not even share All-Caucasian identity, let alone All-Russian. This feeling is also weakened among inhabitants of the Far East, Kaliningrad Oblast. What else can be said if it is cheaper for an inhabitant of Vladivostok to fly to Moscow changing the plane at Seoul than by a direct flight of

Aeroflot? We need an integral complex of purposeful measures involving mass media and, first of all, television, concert tours, film production and other things for all Russian people to feel and realize their all-Russian identity.

Heavy capital investments in the infrastructure of the sphere of culture are expected. There are now corresponding orders of the President of the country and the Head of Government. They concern theatres, museums, libraries, archives, restoration of historical and cultural monuments. They must be specified and corrected. I would like to emphasize: insufficient financing of projects in the sphere of culture throws Russia back into the past, leads into nowhere.

It is extremely important to pay particular attention to film production and distribution. Data of sociological surveys show that the only really mass means of giving town dwellers access to culture is cinema-going. The chain of cinemas in the countryside is still underdeveloped and it must be taken into account when working out the plan for priority measures.

Today the opportunities of cinema to strongly affect consolidation of Russia's moral values and spiritual togetherness are virtually made no use of. If we imagine that all Russian films are good and contribute to moral upbringing (though it is not the case), their share in film distribution is very small: about one fourth. Foreign films constitute three fourths of film distribution – first of all action films, criminal dramas, comedies and other entertaining genres.

The dominance of foreign films is also found in the sphere of the so-called auteur cinematography. These, as a rule, are serious films intended for a prepared interested viewer and demonstrated in no more than 30 cinemas. Here the situation is as follows: in the film distribution year of 2009 a total of 323 Russian films were released, of which 104 can be attributed to auteur cinematography. At that, 21 Russian auteur films and 83 foreign ones were shown. That is, Russian films constituted just one fifth!

But the worst situation is with children's films. The share of Russian children's films in terms of gross revenue and the number of releases was only 8 per cent last year. The other 92 per cent were foreign films. 3 Russian and 33 foreign children's films were shown.

We need protectionist measures to defend Russian cinematography. It is often proposed to implement quotas on showing foreign films. But there are a lot of examples in the foreign countries' experience that setting quotas proves to be ineffective.

We need measures to support showing national films in cinemas.

The Ministry of Culture of Russia has looked into proposals to subsidize cinemas showing national films. Among them these subsidies are allocated with a view to one digital copy of a film showed by a cinema and compensation of interest rates on bank loans issued for constructing cinemas.

Imposing a specific tax on distribution of foreign films is impossible according to the tax legislation in effect, which stipulates no mechanism for special-purpose fees. But it is possible to finance the national film industry at the expense of allocations. Such could become allocations made by TV channels of 2 to 2.5 per cent of gross advertising revenue. At that, TV channels could allocate part of those contributions to their own film production, and place the other part at the disposal of an authorized body. Other allocations from film distributors are also possible – at the rate of 3 per cent of their gross revenue.

We dramatically lack cinemas, especially in the countryside, but the problem of creating Russian films and distributing them is even acuter than the issue of developing a cinema chain.

¹ Deputy Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Class 1 Active State Advisor of the Russian Federation. Author of monographs and articles on economics, issues of federalism, civil service, including books *On the Role of Culture in the Development of Modern Russian Society* (O roli kultury v razvii sovremennogo rossijskogo obshchestva) (2008) and others. A.E. Busygin is decorated with the Order of Honour.

Television today is as important as cinema. It is, probably, even more important, as television absolutely dominates the leisure structure of the country's inhabitants both in terms of the amount of time spent watching TV programmes and the number of people taking their seats in front of TV screens. According to some data, the size of average daily TV audience ranges from 75 per cent to 80 per cent of the population.

Contrary to the Soviet times television in our country no longer performs the function of popularizing cultural achievements. It has been much discussed lately. I'll make just one example: 55 per cent of Russian people first learn about Moscow Kremlin museums at school, 34 per cent from relatives and friends, and only 6 per cent from mass media, first of all television.

Modern television wields great power. We can open new theatres, build new museums, organize symphony orchestras and folk ensembles, but if our television remains as it is there is precious little that will change in the sphere of cultural and moral values preservation and development.

Now on to book publishing and printed mass media. Russia still remains a 'reading country'. But issue of books, brochures, magazines and newspapers has cardinally changed since 1992, and not in favour of world and Russian literary masterpieces and high-quality print mass media. The product mix of published books is broadening continuously. At the same time the number of printed copies has fallen. At that, the lion's share of printed copies is the produce which seems impossible to rate among the values of culture.

The circulation and issue of newspapers and magazines have increased manifold. But their cultural significance has also fallen drastically. As a result, fiction (including that of pseudo-quality) is read by 30 per cent of Russian people, and popular science literature by 10 per cent.

So, the plan for urgent measures must include measures aimed at increasing the role of book publishing and printed mass media in the matter of preserving and developing cultural and moral values. We need state support for publications which familiarize readers with the best works of Russia's multiethnic and multilingual literature.

Goethe remarked that the Italians are a nation created by music. Similarly we can state that we are a nation created by literature.

In this context we cannot but pay attention to the fact that over the last 30 years the number of classes allocated for studying literature in senior school has been almost halved. This situation must be radically changed.

Particular attention in the plans of measures on cultural and moral values consolidation must be paid to the Russian language and other languages of the peoples of Russia.

Speaking about Russia's national security we should proceed from the strict principle according to which every language on the territory of the Russian Federation is Russia's national heritage.

In our country a serious problem is emerging: the number of children without their native language is growing. These children for some reasons did not gain real knowledge of their native language and learned the state language by fits and starts. Under the increasing migration flow this threat is constantly growing.

There are few positive examples of opposing this phenomenon. For children of the indigenous peoples of the North, there are lessons of their native language which is often spoken by nobody either in the family or outside. But teaching the native language broadens a child's horizons and promotes formation of national self-consciousness and does not hinder simultaneous formation of civic self-consciousness.

In the coming period it is necessary to enhance the training of Russian language teachers. The professional level of teachers is falling. The trouble is also that the Russian language at school has lately been reduced to the level of a language having no history. This is why it is so important to provide children and youth with knowledge on the history of Russian culture which is inseparable from the history of the Russian language and other languages of peoples of Russia.

Support of Russian and other languages, enhancement of teacher training requires efforts, including financial investments, but all of them will be repaid a hundredfold. In other countries they fully understand it. An example: 1500 specialists work on a new edition of Oxford English Dictionary in the UK, and only 12 people work on a new edition of the Big Academic Dictionary of the Russian Language at the Institute for Linguistic Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Only 2500 copies of this dictionary are published. This is not the fault of the Russian Academy of Sciences, but its misfortune: such is the rate of financing.

Modern Russian society is entering a new developmental stage, the stage of information society. Transition to this new stage presupposes the elevation of the role of culture and the growth of intelligence level of the country's population.

In this context we should note the rise in the state's responsibility in providing citizens with access to culture for the purpose of spiritual and moral elevation of man. The state cannot but manage the information flows circulating in society and the means for a person to get involved in them.

The modern state cannot just fully shift the management of producing and distributing material benefits on market players. It becomes even more evident that the state must play the key role in managing information production and distribution (and this is nothing else but managing production and distribution of material benefits).

This is why the state policy in the sphere of preservation and development of cultural and moral values, consolidation of spiritual unity of people of Russia becomes an important factor of national security.

O. Buzina¹

CLASH OR INTERPENETRATION: INTERACTIONS OF RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN CULTURE IN THE UKRAINE UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Only the lazy failed to say a word about the necessity of developing and supporting the national culture in the Ukraine over

the previous twenty years. But at that nobody can say exactly: what can be regarded as 'truly Ukrainian' culture today? Representatives of the inconsiderable in number but noisy stratum of the so-called 'real Ukrainian intelligentsia' believe that Ukrainian authorities are supposed to keep building culture for 25 hours a day following their recipes.

These militant 'enlighteners' think that the most important element of Ukrainian culture is its language. Naturally, they advocate radical monolingualism. In their views, the more people

¹ Writer, journalist, historian (the Ukraine).

Modern Ukrainian writer who writes in two languages – Russian and Ukrainian. He worked for various Kiev periodicals: the newspaper 'Kievskiy Vedomosti', 2000; journals 'Drug Chitatelya', ('The Reader's Friend'), 'Lider' ('The Leader'), 'Natali', 'Ego', 'XXL'. He is a columnist and keeps his own blog in the newspaper 'Segodnya' ('Today'); presents the TV program 'Teen-Liga' ('Teen-League') on the channel 'Inter' (Kiev).

Author of many books, newspaper and journal articles among them 'Taras Shevchenko, the Vampire' and 'The Secret Ukrainian-Russian History'.

will speak, read, sing, watch and listen *only* in Ukrainian, the sooner the heyday of Ukrainian culture will come.

But this group of Ukrainian culture-builders faces a serious problem preventing them from achieving this 'paradise on earth' – the Russian language, which at least half of citizens of the Ukraine consider their native tongue, and which is understood by all to a man – that is, even by those who hate it. This is why adherents of monolingualism insist on getting rid completely of the Russian language and Russian culture in the Ukraine. Or on restricting its functioning only to be used by people who officially named themselves 'Russian' in the course of the population census. All those who registered as 'Ukrainians' must not only speak Ukrainian but think in this language and even dream only in 'the state tongue'.

A most impressive advocate of these views was ex-President Viktor Yushchenko who became an 'ex' exclusively due to his obsession with issues of language, culture and history. The electors did not appreciate his work for the good cause of nationalistic culture and sent him off the Presidential chair so that he could busy himself with his favourite occupation – beekeeping at the apiary.

All fighters for Ukrainian culture and language like to refer to the experience of 'genuine' and 'correct' European countries. Among such are all western neighbours of the Ukraine – Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. In these countries there is only one language and one national culture. But there exist incorrect countries in Europe. A professional fighter for Ukrainian culture is afraid to even mention them. Among such incorrect, in the Ukraine's view, countries are Belgium, Finland and Switzerland. Why? These countries have neither a single state language nor a uniform national culture. And they are fine, keep on living – they are not planning to disappear from the world map. And all inhabitants of Ireland are supposed to just drown themselves of grief in the Atlantic, as their native Celtic language is spoken by few if any. Inhabitants of St. Patrick's country still use the language of their former invaders and oppressors – the English. And they have no intention of getting rid of it – such irresponsible people! But the English language in Ireland does not at all mean there is no Irish culture independent from English culture!

In countries of Latin America nobody is going to substitute Spanish for their local language. Even current Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Evo Morales of Bolivia, both partly of American Indian origin, never give a hint of overcoming 'Hispanization' and creating the Venezuelan or Bolivian languages on the basis of local Indian tribal dialects. And in Canada they have never created their own 'Canadian' language – mixed English-French dialect with some Iroquois which is spoken by Fenimore Cooper's characters. On the contrary, this country has acknowledged the historical realities of bilingualism. The example of Finland, where for the sake of inhabitants of the Aland Islands Swedish has been made the second state language – just to make the citizens feel comfortable in the country, – is claimed to be an unprecedented heresy among the Ukrainian-speaking patriots. In their views, the Ukrainian state exists to Ukrainize all of its citizens. This is why the true patriots of the Ukraine like to cite Italian writer and politician Ferdinando Martini, who said in 1896: 'Italy has been created, now we are to create Italians.' Though the celebration of the 150th anniversary of reunification of Italy in March of this 2011 year did not evoke stormy enthusiasm, if anything just the opposite – thinking out loud why after all this time they have failed to create the united unitary Italy.

Then, what national and cultural unification can we expect in the Ukraine, which has been relatively independent for only just 20 years? In the country, which is situated on the crossroads of three great civilizations – European (Western-Christian), East European (the Orthodox) and Muslim (Islamic), it is hard to expect culture to be unified according to one singu-

lar pattern. It is surprising that this country even exists and includes at least two cultures – Russian and Ukrainian. These cultures are in quaint interaction, and I will try to outline it in their historical dynamics.

Ukrainian (bilingual culture) and Russian culture originate from Kievan Rus'. Russian culture common for East Slavic peoples resulted from Christianization of Ancient Rus' and the Rusiches according to the Eastern Orthodox rite from Constantinople. Working on chronicles, enlightenment and baptism went alongside and were quite superficial. A few educated people from this conglomerate of East Slavic and Finno-Ugric tribes left us their chronicles which we can use to make judgements about the history of Rus' of that period. But it is impossible to consider Kievan Rus' to be an exclusively ancient Ukrainian state, as the historical school of Mikhail Grushevsky requires. It is tantamount to proclaiming the Roman Empire an Ancient Italian state basing on the fact that its history took place on the territory of present-day Italy. In this case such ideas sound absurd but in the Ukraine these fairy tales are taught to children at school.

But let us come back to Ancient Rus'. If we speak about geography, not only the Crimea but also two thirds of current South and East Ukraine which then belonged to the nomadic Polovtsians were parts of Rus' even in its best times. These were nomadic peoples – but Mongol-Tatars from the Eurasian Steppe who drew a line under the Kievan period of Ancient Rus' in 1240.

After the decline of Kiev it was Vladimir, and then Moscow, which preserved, to a great extent, ancient Russian cultural traditions. To these cities moved the population, mostly cultured, from Kiev, Chernigov and Galich. Besides the Metropolitan of All Rus', libraries were moved and icon painters went to live there. This is why bylina of 'Kievan cycle' about epical heroes and epic Prince Vladimir were preserved in the North of Rus' (today's Russia), but there are none of them on the territory of today's Ukraine. This is why most literary monuments of Kievan Rus' survived only due to copyists from Muscovite Rus', which is despised so much by the Ukrainian nationalists. And the *Tale of Igor's Campaign* would not have survived had it not been for a single copy preserved by miracle in a monastery in the environs of Yaroslavl. After it who could say at least one kind word about the masterpiece of 'ancient Ukrainian literature'?

Even after Kievan Rus' had disintegrated and its western part had been captured by the Poles and Lithuanians, all those inhabiting its territories were still called Russians, and the land itself retained the name it had had before disintegration. 'Russia is possessed now by three sovereigns,' German diplomat of the 17th century Sigismund Herberstein wrote. 'Its biggest part belongs to the Grand Duke of Moscow, the second is the Grand Duke of Lithuania, and the third is the king of Poland who now reigns over both Poland and Lithuania.' We can also read in his notes: 'Muscovy, which is the head of Russia.' And a contemporary of False Dmitry I, French mercenary Jacques Margerit who visited Moscow at the beginning of the 17th century gave his explanation for the origin of the word 'Muscovites': 'Russians are called Muscovites by name of their main city, and it is as senseless as to call the French Parisians.'

Polish colonization of the Ukraine in the 1st half of the 17th century was accompanied by mass relocation of minor Polish gentry who swarmed over the newly-set up settlements. This character type of a minor Polish gentleman with a sabre, coat of arms and arrogance is finely depicted in the novel by Henryk Sienkiewicz *With Fire and Sword* and shown in the film of the same title directed by Jerzy Hoffman. It was this type of people who led to the appearance of what we today call the Ukrainian language. It appeared in a simple way: the local Orthodox peasants had to find a way of communicating with such 'bosses', so more and more Polonisms came to their

language. As a noble gentleman will not learn ‘a language of serfs’, it is not decent for a gentleman.

As a result in the modern Ukrainian language up to 40 per cent of common word stock are words of Polish origin. Though it is impossible to consider them absolutely alien – the Polish language has preserved quite a lot of words from the period of Common Slavic unity, but those who speak only Russian cannot understand them. Besides, the Polish language – and through it Ukrainian – acquired many Latinisms connected with the universal Catholic education of Polish gentry. But the process of Polonization of the modern Ukrainian language is still going on – its ‘reformers’ bring in any words, only for them not to sound Russian.

The war of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with Cossacks and peasants against the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, which started in 1648, finished with the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, when the hetman asked for the patronage of ‘his Majesty the Tsar Aleksey Mikhailovich of Russia’. Then the period of the Great Ruin ensued, as a result of which the Left-Bank Ukraine and the city of Kiev once and for all became autonomous Little Russia or the Hetmanate. And the Right-Bank Ukraine, devastated by wars, remained a part of Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth and the process of populating its territory began anew. This division, which lasted for over 100 years, led to the fact there have formed two cultures in the Ukraine – on Russian and anti-Russian (Polish) basis, whose opposition is still going on and is often aggravated.

In the Left-Bank Ukraine (Hetmanate) education, religion and language were almost fully integrated – as it is said now – into an all-Empire cultural space. Graduates from Kiev Academy founded Slavonic–Greek–Latin Academy in Moscow in 1687. And the contribution of Little Russian clergy headed by Feofan Prokopovich to church reforms of Peter the First is just invaluable. As a result of this interpenetration, Hetman of Little Russia Cyril Razumovsky headed the Imperial Academy of Sciences from 1746 to 1798. What oppression of Little Russian nobles from Cossack Hetmanate can we speak about? Any educated person from Little Russia had a choice at that time – to stay in the home land and develop culture there or busy themselves with building culture on an all-Empire scale in Petersburg or where the monarch would send.

We can give an example of Ivan Kotlyarevsky, the author of comic *Virgil's Aeneid*, who is considered the founder of the modern Ukrainian literary language. Or of his fellow-countryman Nikolai Gogol who decided to go further and became a classic of the Russian literature, but knew the Ukrainian language brilliantly and collected the local folklore. They are natives of Poltava, both are noblemen, whose ancestors came from Cossacks who supported Khmelnytsky. It can be said that they and people like them formed the part of Ukrainian culture which is not hostile to Russian culture. And the folk version of their language is the today's mixed Russian–Ukrainian dialect which is used in his songs by Verka Serduchka – Andrei Danilko by documents, who is also a native of Poltava, by the way. And this mixed Russian–Ukrainian dialect today arouses ferocious hatred of ‘conscientious’ Ukrainians by its similarity to Russian!

An absolutely opposite situation was formed in the Right-Bank Ukraine in the 18th century. All the educational system there was controlled by the numerous Polish gentry. After divisions of Poland the situation did not change very much – the Polish gentry did not disappear and went on busying themselves with their favourite occupation – anti-Russian propaganda.

Very few people had even heard the word ‘Ukrainian’ before 1917. It was a small modernist project organized by a small initiative group of intellectuals. It acted in the so-called Great Ukraine (Kiev, Poltava) and on the territory of Austria-Hungary in Lvov where there existed a branch headed by

Mikhail Grushevsky. But at that the apostles of Ukrainization complained about the irresponsibility of inhabitants of Little Russia who did not want to become Ukrainians because they were too close to the Russians. Those close relations were to be severed at any cost.

Only the Soviet power was able to really create the Ukrainians within its policy of Ukrainization in the 1920s. The policy of ‘localization’ of national outlying districts was proclaimed at the 12th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in April 1923. It was necessary to fill the newly-created USSR with real content for every republic to have its own culture ‘national in its form and socialist in its content’. And then it started – everybody who did not want to relinquish their Little Russian identification was blamed for persistent ‘White Guardism’, and criticizing and sneering at Ukrainization, at the new spelling and literature were considered ‘counter-revolutionary superpower chauvinism’. Executive positions in the Ukrainian SSR, even in Donbas and Odessa were allocated only to people who could speak Ukrainian at least to some extent or had a certificate providing documentary evidence that they finished a state course of ‘Ukrainization’. The printed forms of diplomas of this course said: ‘Ukrainization will unite the city and the village’ and ‘Knowledge of the Ukrainian language is only the first step to total Ukrainization’. It was a peculiar reply to those who considered that Ukrainian culture is mostly the culture of the village and in the city there is supposed to be Russian culture. ‘Undermining the linkup between the city and the village in the state of proletariat which has won’ – then it was too serious a crime, so nobody expressed protests aloud. But the large-scale appearance of Ukrainians could only be provided for by the campaign against illiteracy in the 1920s in Ukrainian. This campaign against illiteracy was accompanied by complaints – what native language is it if we do not know it and do not speak it, but we are made to learn it. The logical finale of this ‘policy’ ensued in 1933 when the peak of Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR and the events named ‘Holodomor’ (Killing by Hunger) concurred.

After 1933 in the Ukrainian SSR there began a rollback from the policy of Ukrainization, which resulted in the appearance of Russian and Ukrainian secondary schools which differed very little in their curriculum. As a result, everybody who studied at schools of the Ukrainian SSR obtained the opportunity to know both Ukrainian and state Russian culture. In the 1960s the type of educational and cultural policy which existed up to the collapse of the USSR, was finally shaped. It was marked by the freedom of choice of the language of tuition, but at school all pupils studied the Ukrainian language and literature, except military men's children who did not get a credit for this course (if they did not want to). But the local representatives of culture who wrote only in Ukrainian were to the extremes irritated by the fact that a viewer and a reader got the freedom of choice.

Such ‘creators’ blamed nothing but the Russian language and culture torturing conscientious Ukrainians at school, in higher educational institutions and in mass media for the unpopularity of the Ukrainian culture. So the deliverance from the Russian language would automatically lead to an unprecedented blossoming of the Ukrainian culture – these are about the thoughts which sprang to minds of activists of the People's Movement of the Ukraine (Rukh) in the late 1980s–1990s.

In 1991 the Ukraine proclaimed Independence. And there started a cultural policy whose slogan was formulated yet in the 1920s by publicist and writer Mykola Khvylovy (born as Fitylyov): ‘Off from Moscow! Give us Europe!’ Former members of the Writers' Union of the Ukrainian SSR and workers from humanitarian institutions who turned into nationalists overnight began doing crash work eradicating the ‘predominance of the Russian language’ by way of administrative methods. They also began giving every support to any cultural movement in

the Ukrainian language notwithstanding the degree of its popularity. Ukrainian diaspora of the USA and Canada who had been advancing a slogan of 'fight with consequences of Russification' also joined with the idea of creating super-modern and even post-modern Ukrainian culture. American and European foundations began funding various cultural projects aimed at developing 'anti-Russian' segment of the Ukrainian culture. Grant-devouring Ukrainian anti-Russian culture blossomed out in all its glory in the major mass media of the Ukraine!

But in the Ukraine in the early 1990s, besides the 'forced Ukrainization', the legislation proclaimed complete freedom of economic and cultural activities. In other words, people received the opportunity to vote with their money for the necessary cultural project they had personal interest in. It was expected that an inhabitant of the Ukraine who had cast off his chains of 'cultural imperialism' would just shower the 'true creators' of Ukrainian-language culture with money. But the results were just the opposite – the Russian-language cultural products which passed on to self-repayment basis – the press, pop-music, TV – steadily ousted their Ukrainian analogues from the market.

Besides, almost any cultural product made in Russia automatically found its audience in the Ukraine, which could not be said about a Ukrainian cultural product in Russia. But for the state support of publishing industry and assignment of quotas for the market of audio-visual products in e-mass media, the degree of spread of Ukrainian culture in the Ukraine would be much lower than today. 'The accursed closeness of languages and peoples' which was complained about by Ukrainian public figures in the 20th century became apparent again in all its glory.

At the age of globalization and trans-boundary information flow it turned out to be impossible to block access to information or cultural products using administrative methods. Ban on all Russian was what Ukrainian authorities in Yushchenko's times tried to do convulsively, but their policy resulted only in complete discredit of Ukrainian-language (Russophobic) nationalistic culture and its activists. The failure of state policy of banning information also becomes apparent in the development of the Ukrainian segment of the Internet. The data of 2005–10 are indicative of the fact that about 80 per cent of

UA.net sites use Russian, about 12 to 14 per cent are bilingual, and the Ukrainian language accounts for around 5 per cent of sites, and this proportion has not changed over the previous 5 years, though over this period the number of Internet users in the Ukraine has grown from 2 million to 8 million people.

Let us see publishing industry as an example, which is close to me as a writer. We will not focus on print media – on the whole they are Russian-language. But the situation with book publishing took an interesting turn. The statistics provided annually by the Ukrainian Book Chamber in its report clearly indicates that in the 2000s there took place stabilization of the market of printed matter in the Ukraine. In 2005–08 the number of published literature varied around 55 million copies. For instance, on average in the pre-crisis year (2008) the overall number of printed copies of books and brochures published by the Ukraine's publishing houses was 52.12 million copies. Of them 22.5 million were in Russian, and 32.6 million copies were in Ukrainian. And the population of the Ukraine was then 46.5 million people, that is there were published on average 1.2 books per person. Compared to Russia and Poland where 4 published books are the share of one inhabitant, and the European result is 8 copies per person, 1.2 books seems to be a modest result.

What are the main causes of the situation which has formed in the printing market of the Ukraine? Here we find out that in fact the number of books sold in the Ukraine has been rising, while the number of copies published by Ukrainian publishing houses has been falling. Despite the tax concessions for publishers, which were introduced yet in 1997, and which seem to be regularly extended by Verkhovna Rada (the Supreme Council of the Ukraine) most of printed matter is still brought from the Russian Federation – almost 60–70 per cent of the market. Having these tax concessions allows print shops and publishing houses of the Ukraine to withstand the pressure of their competitors. However, the customer demand dictates the choice of goods in the market, and in this market Ukrainian-language self-sufficient editions have little chance of success. Their basic segment of demand is textbooks, publications of regulatory acts, official information of government bodies and other forms of government order.

**Current data of book publication in the Ukraine in 2011
(from the site of Ivan Fyodorov Ukrainian Book Chamber)**

Types of publications	2010		2010 (as of 14.03)		2011 (as of 14.03)			
	Number of publications, printed titles	Number of copies, thousands of copies	Number of publications, printed titles	Number of copies, thousands of copies	Number of publications, printed titles	In percentage to the number of publications (data of 14.03.2010)	Number of copies, thousands of copies	In percentage to the overall number of copies (data of 14.03.2010)
Books and brochures, including:	22557	45058.3	2477	5274.7	2214	89.4	4002.9	75.9
<i>In the Ukrainian language</i>	14852	24704.4	1641	2420.0	1446	88.1	2035.8	84.1
<i>In the Russian language</i>	5554	17972.8	668	2611.0	479	71.7	1692.2	64.8
Author's abstracts of dissertations	7328	750.6	1240	130.2	880	71.0	90.2	69.3

Translator Irina Slavinskaya's publication in the blog on the Internet portal 'Ukrainian Truth' speaks volumes about the current situation of Ukrainian-language publishing industry. The publication was entitled 'The Murder of B...' (of a book) and it was published on the 16th March 2011. In it she shares information with readers about the real demand for what is translated into Ukrainian on commissions from international

charity organizations. For instance, during the round table meeting of Ukrainian language translators on the 15th March 2011 a representative of 'Renaissance' foundation (Soros foundation) Taras Liuty claimed that there had been achieved no results over the 10 years of this foundation's support given to publishing houses dealing with translation of intellectual literature into Ukrainian. It means that the demand of such trans-

lated European literature in the Ukraine has not grown even if its publication is subsidized. Another participant of this round table meeting (Diana Klochko) confirmed these words maintaining that 'it takes 5 years to sell such books published in the number 3 thousand copies'. And it is logical – the necessary book will be translated into Russian and published in Moscow much faster than in Kiev.

In this context candidates for the role of 'regents of the Ukraine's dreams', Galician post-modernists of literature offer absolutely ridiculous projects aimed at saving Ukrainian language literature. Their offers to separate the Crimea and Donbas from the Ukraine are quite seriously discussed in mass media of the Ukraine. In their views, only by cutting the deadwood of 'irresponsible Russian-speaking regions' will we be able to build the correct Ukrainian-speaking Ukraine on the remnants of the Ukraine.

Such 'cultural-separatist' ideas became especially popular last year when Viktor Yanukovich became the leader of the Ukraine, and the staff brought to government bodies in Yushchenko's time then chosen on the principle of their 'consciousness' and 'Ukraine-oriented thinking' began to be ousted. To hear people, who 5 years ago in all mass media shouted about the unity and conciliar nature of the Ukraine and the sacrosanctity of its culture, language and literature, set up such claims – that is worth a lot! And what do they have to do if in the open contest they lost the competition of ideas and texts and they are about to lose the fight for minds in the Ukraine!? This is why they take to flight to 'literary ghetto', and then 'go to the underground' where a close circle of 'true get-together creators' will appreciate their works. However, the committee which hands out the annual Shevchenko prize whose laureates are 'incredibly far from the people' has turned into a similar 'cultural ghetto'.

Now the Ukraine's authorities are trying to relax the 'legislative' pressure of 'bans' on the Russian language but they come in for hysterical criticism on the part of 'grant-devourers' who are actively feigning 'tide of public discontent' in mass media and the Internet. The Ukrainian Minister of Education Dmitry Tabachnik is preparing a package of bills and orders to extend the use of the Russian language in the sphere of education. One of the immediate measures is conducting the general

testing in Russian for all school-leavers who want to complete their tests in Russian in spring this year (2011). Besides, it is planned that parents should be allowed to choose the language of school tuition filing the necessary number of written requests to open Russian language classes at school. By orders from the Ministry of Education higher educational institutions will be allowed to open courses and disciplines with Russian language tuition if their students will.

But the main initiative in developing the Russian language must be taken by regions. For example, the Mayor and the City Council of Odessa are planning to conduct a survey among parents about the language of tuition and to form a net of classes and schools in autumn 2011 taking into account the results of this survey. By spring 2011 all actions in court had been won and the project of developing the Russian language in educational institutions of the region had been approved. Besides, people can file appeals to government bodies and receive replies in Russian if they want to. This is an example of a real, but not a decorative extension of citizens' rights. But for it to be realized, citizens of the Ukraine must unite into their real, and not 'grant-devouring' civil society, be active in upholding their rights and lobbying their cultural and language interests.

In the modern Ukraine there are contradictions between Ukrainian-speaking and Russian-speaking citizens. In the conditions of globalization it has become possible both to aggravate this conflict by anti-market methods of targeted inflowing of the Ukrainian-language segment of culture and to ease it with the help of purely market mechanisms, which the Russian-language segment of the Ukraine's culture has adopted itself to quite successfully. Only time will tell who will win, but lately even the commissioners of grant-devouring matter in the Ukrainian language are disappointed at the results of policy conducted by them. A work of culture is a product like the one in any other sphere. It is impossible to impose it by force, without damaging a consumer's brain as well as it is impossible to make one wear tight shoes. Heights in cultural landscape should not be levelled by excavator like Scythian barrows; they should be made use of to the advantage of modern man's humanitarian needs. Otherwise, instead of a picturesque view we will see a bare flat culture desert.

Xinxin Chang¹

PLURALISM OF CULTURES AND HARMONIOUS WORLD IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

In international society, pluralism of cultures objectively exists beyond any ideologies, which compose the colorful international community. Respect to the pluralism is the important culture foundation to safeguard harmonious world. Any attempt to replace international culture's pluralism by one culture style by means of great economic and military strength, will destroy the basis of harmonious world. Chinese former President Jiang Zemin indicated, 'We believe, the world is rich and colorful. Sufficient respect should be given to diversity and differentia of various nations, religions and cultures, which should advocate compatibility instead of discrimination, communion instead of exclusion, negotiation instead of confrontation, coexisting instead of confliction. Positive function of all kinds of cultures should be exerted on the basis of mutual respect, equally treated, seeking common points while reserving difference, so as to advance ceaseless development of human society and collective progress of countries and people all over the world. Of all ages, there have

¹ Director of the Department at the Institute for Social Development of Party School (Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), editor of 'Scientific Socialism' journal (People's Republic of China).

been mutual discrimination, exclusion, confrontation, and conflicts between different nations and countries with different religion or belief, which bring severe damage and disaster to related countries and people. Also many regions even the whole world have been affected of stabilization, welfare and development. Such bitter lessons should be commonly remembered by international community.'

As respect to other culture, the Chinese government has summarized the principles of China's foreign policy and international strategy in the new concept of a 'Harmonious World'.

To promote a harmonious world, China must adhere to a path of peaceful development, and such a harmonious world is also a prerequisite for China's realization of peaceful development. But the harmonious world will not automatically come true by itself; it needs the joint efforts of people all over the world.

China's concept of promoting the building of a harmonious world is just the logical extension of its domestic strategy.

Only by constructing an internally harmonious society and realizing economic prosperity and political stability can we promote the building of a harmonious world effectively.

On the other hand, the harmony of the international community can provide the external conditions for a country's harmonious development.

Since 1978, China has made economic development its focus. But China is still a developing country that has solved basic needs of subsistence for its people, and it must still focus on economic development, enhancing comprehensive national strength and improving people's material and cultural living standard.

Only in a peaceful international environment, can a country realize all-round development of foreign economic relations, and make use of its own comparative advantages in the international economy to achieve the national economy's rapid growth.

As a responsible great power that is focused on economic development, improving people's material and cultural living standards, and building a harmonious society, China will remain committed to creating a peaceful international environment for itself.

On May 28, 2003, when making a speech in Moscow, Chinese President Hu Jintao elaborated the basic views on promoting the establishment of a fair and rational international political and economic order, that is:

- We should promote democratization of international relations.
- We should maintain and respect the diversity of the world.
- We should establish a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation.
- We should promote a balanced development of the global economy.
- We should respect and play the important role of the United Nations and its Security Council.

Historically, China has been a peaceful nation, and the tradition of Chinese political culture has the qualities of peace.

In the history of China, most of the heroes are famous for defending against the aggression of foreigners, not for external expansion.

In modern times, China suffered the aggression of imperialism and colonialism, and this painful experience has made Chinese people treasure independence, equality and freedom, and also hate any form of aggression and expansionism.

This historical tradition and the national psychology have had a deep influence on China's foreign policy.

With the trend towards multi-polarity, direct confrontation between the major powers becomes less likely.

The momentum of world integration continues to develop; and the interdependence of nations and the integration of interests are deepening.

All these trends offer a realistic basis to build a harmonious world. The harmonious world we advocate is in tune with today's global trends promoting peace, development and cooperation.

How to build a harmonious world? It won't come into being automatically, and depends on people's efforts and cooperation.

In politics, we should concentrate on promoting mutual respect, expanding consensus and getting along with all other countries.

We should also promote the reform of the United Nations, maintaining the authority of the United Nations.

In addition, we need to advocate the adherence to international law and universally recognized rules of international relations, respecting all country's rights to choose their own social systems and development paths, fostering the democratization of international relations.

In the economy, we should commit ourselves to the deepening cooperation, common development and mutual benefit.

In security, we ought to concentrate on deepening mutual trust, strengthening dialogue and improving cooperation with every other country, upholding multilateralism and achieving common security.

We should also establish a fair and effective collective security mechanism in order to avoid conflict and war.

Neighboring regions are the first important zones to our country's interests. Thus we should give more prominence to handling these neighboring areas and gradually turn those areas into a long-lasting and universally prosperous zone of harmony.

As we promote the process of building a harmonious world, we must continue to strenuously oppose acts that threaten our sovereignty, security and developmental interests and that damage all other countries' common interests.

V. Chereshev¹,
V. Rastorguyev²

CIVILIZATIONAL ASPECT OF MODERNIZATION AND BOUNDARIES OF COEXISTING EPOCHS

Modernization is a process which affects the main nerve of the universal civilizational world order as it is nothing but an attempt to overcome time boundaries, dividing not just epochs in their linear, 'formational' or 'wave' interpretation (as certain landmarks or stages in universal civilizational progress), but *coexisting epochs* where local civilizational worlds stay. The point is not only a change in technological ways though it is in this sphere where overcoming the existing split becomes a factor of global disintegration and, consequently, the permanent source of demodernization processes that take place with accelerating integration and aggravated competition of leading countries and interstate alliances in the background, but the divergence of 'age' characteristics of existing civilizations.

The point is that all local civilizations (or, to use N. Danilevsky's definition, cultural-historical types) are valuable in themselves and this is why they are dedicated to eternity. As D.S. Likhachov stated in this respect in his appearance in 'Philosophical debates' TV show, every type of culture is invaluable and 'in the world there exists a great number of eternities and every eternity is in incommensurability with another'.³ This approach is not conflicting with historical interpretation of evolution and interaction between civilizations, which presupposes determination of dynamics and direction (in the teleological sense of the word) of their formation and development.

The 'age' of local civilizations is a metaphor originating from theories which liken the multicivilizational world to processes of interaction and competition between living organisms (the so-called 'organismic' approach). Theories of such kind obtained 'the second wind' in our time to a great extent due to the inevitable 'ecologization of culture' and, in particular, 'ecologization of science'. This trend, which was paid much attention to by D. S. Likhachov in his time (his article 'Ecology

of Culture' became widely known; it caused great and productive debate in the late 70s), is quite explainable.

First, social systems indeed have a lot in common with ecological systems, which allows not only to speak of 'ecology of culture' or 'ecology of scientific knowledge' without violating the requirements of scientific correctness, but it makes it possible to justifiably extrapolate a number of efficient conceptual schemes and methods.

Second, environmental threats do not take into consideration our ideas of sovereign territories or social hierarchies, do not recognize interstate or intercivilizational borders. This approach used while assessing civilizational and social risks rests upon the tremendous mass of knowledge about 'environmental factors' (just the same as the geographical determinism with all its drawbacks and inexhaustible heuristic potential), which reveal many of the consistent patterns of the emergence and dynamics of development, the degree of competitiveness or the causes of fall of certain civilizations.

Third, only from the position of holistic study of functioning of socio-natural systems can we approach assessing modernization risks, as the strategy of modernization should start with environmental modernization – initial and advancing. Otherwise, the cost of modernization will not only make all investments unremunerative but it will lead to an inevitable (but not necessarily predictable) disaster – local in its origin but difficult to localize in terms of its consequences in the medium- and long-term view.

In this context it would be more appropriate to speak not only about mutual influence of social and natural factors and of corresponding risks but also of the evolution of *social and natural systems*. Of no less importance is the question of gradual harmonization of methods that tend to be used for studying local civilizations and methodology that is used and developed while carrying out large-scale social and environmental research projects, among which particularly worthy of attention is, to our mind, the long-term project of international Northern Social and Environmental Congress. One of the themes dominating this project is study of specific features of the establishment and formation of Russian civilization in the context of civilizational evolution of other northern and subarctic regions. This approach is doubly efficient as it is the only one which allows today to adequately assess the exorbitant risks of the impending modernization of the Russian North – environmental, social and ethno-cultural, political and military, to outline scientifically grounded modernization strategy of Northern countries, which would provide stable and relatively risk-free progress.

Thus, systemic modernization (modernization affecting all spheres of vital activity in one state or another or in a region – politics, culture and industry) is nothing but an attempt to 'break through the time barrier'. This attempt can be demanded by the necessity to overcome 'civilization fading away' or the wish to borrow 'civilizational energy' from ascending cultures thus entering the programmed modernity. It can be initiated 'from below' – for instance, from new generations of 'barbarous' peoples (thus societies that do not belong to the number of countries considering themselves bearers of 'universal civilization' are defined).

New generations and mostly young people starting their adult life fail to find a decent social niche for themselves but for a number of reasons they do not see the true nature of their countries' reluctant self-isolation though this self-isolation

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, Chairman of the Committee on Science and Hi-Tech (the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of Russia), Director of the Institute for Immunology and Physiology (the Urals Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and Head of the Middle Urals Scientific Centre of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences (Yekaterinburg), Dr. Med., Professor. Author of two scientific discoveries, 29 inventions, more than 500 scholarly publications, including 28 monographs: *Pathophysiology* (Patofiziologija); *Immunophysiology* (Immunofiziologija); *Alpha-fetoprotein* (Al'fafetoprotein); *Immunologic and Genetic Factors of Reproductive Malfunction* (Immunologicheskie i geneticheskie faktory narusheniya reproduktivnoj funktsii); *Biological Laws and Human Viability: Method of Multifunctional Rehabilitation Biotherapy* (Biologicheskie zakony i zhiznesposobnost' cheloveka: metod mnogofunkcional'noj vosstanovitel'noj bioterapiji); *Socio-Demographic Security of Russia* (Social'no-demograficheskaja bezopasnost' Rossiji); *Demographic Policy of the Country and the Nation's Health* (Demograficheskaja politika strany i zdorovje natsiji) and some others. Editor-in-Chief of 'Russian Journal of Immunology' (Rossijskij immunologicheskij zhurnal), 'Bulletin of the Urals Academic Medical Science' (Vestnik Ural'skoj medicinskoj akademicheskoy nauki). He is decorated with the Order of Friendship, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th degree. He is a Laureate of the Government Award of the Russian Federation in science and technology.

² Professor of the Chair of Philosophy of Politics and Law at Lomonosov Moscow University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Honorary Higher Education Lecturer of the Russian Federation, Class 3 State Advisor. Author of more than 400 scholarly publications, including 20 monographs and textbooks: *Unity and Continuity of Consciousness* (Edinstvo i prejemstvennost' soznaniya); *Conceptual Search: Traditions, Innovations, Responsibility* (Konceptual'nyj poisk: traditsiji, novatorstvo, otvetstvennost'); *Creativity and Dogmatism* (Tvorchestvo i dogmatizm); *The Nature of Self-Identification: Russian Culture, Slavonic World and Strategy of Continuing Education* (Priroda samoidentifikatsiji: russkaja kul'tura, slavjanskij mir i strategija nepreryvnogo obrazovaniya); *The World's Wells: Russia's Environmental Doctrine: from Plans to Pilot Projects* (Kolodtsy mira. Ekologicheskaja doktrina Rossii: ot zamysla k pilotnym proektam); *Philosophy and Methodology of Political Planning* (Filosofija i metodologija politicheskogo planirovaniya) and some others. Deputy Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences for the study and preservation of cultural and natural heritage. Deputy Editor-in-Chief of 'Platform of Russian Thought' (Tribuna russkoj mysli) journal. V. N. Rastorguyev is recipient of the UN Avicenna Award and Unity Award. He was awarded the Russian Federation Government Prize in science and technology.

³ 'Voprosy filosofii' journal, 1990, No. 4, p. 3.

is caused by the global demodernizational trend mentioned above. In its turn, it is connected with aggravating social inequality on the universal and national level with unavoidable environmental dead-ends and with the fact that the modernization breakthrough of 'successful' states was carried out due to the forced appropriation (by the right of force) and 'wasting' of the lion's share of the planet's strategic natural and human resources.

This internal link is not usually apparent for mass consciousness, the fact which is facilitated, strange though it may seem, by international projects aimed at promoting development of backward regions. This action is the back of their effectiveness. The same function is also performed by unified educational standards with an optional 'regional component' (the result of the spread of unified educational systems providing for cultural exchange and opening up world labour markets) and, certainly, essential projects of the humanitarian aid.

But the main factor camouflaging the nature of global demodernization is an extremely high level of corruption in outcast regions, which tends to be authorized as it performs two interdependent functions. On the one hand, corrupted regimes guarantee the uncompetitiveness of donor countries in the foreseeable future, and on the other hand in case of political instability they 'lay the blame' on inner 'irritants' which explain in the simplest and most intelligible way the emergence and aggravation of regional and national problems. This circumstance eliminates the problem of imperfection and inequity of the world system of sharing and redistribution of resources.

The effect continues for some time because ascending generations wish to enter the circle of 'successful generations' at any cost as they themselves are strongly attracted to goals and age subcultures that do not know borders. The only barrier on this path, in their opinion cultivated by modern transnational mass media, is 'stagnant' and corrupted political regimes usurping power in their countries. So, reality is mixed with political illusions, which serves both as a detonating factor and as a key factor of 'controllable chaos' – destabilization or stabilization, when political modernization is offered as a panacea; the bearer of it may become some opposition forces relying on some external support. Attempts to minimize risks of 'youth revolutions' in North Africa and preceding experiments with undulating change of regimes within the frame of 'domino effect strategy' can serve as a striking illustration for this tendency.

There is also another way of stimulating modernization projects: they can be initiated or supported not 'from below' but 'from above'. One of the reasons for such selective modernization in 'backward' regions is the situation when it is profitable for leading states to integrate in the long-term view this or that community separated from an 'out-of-date political body' ('constructing nations' and creating new independent states), or a certain country in the world system of labour division. No less typical is the modernization energy coming as it is 'from one side', because it is generated by interterritorial dependence of countries or their competitiveness, interpenetration of cultures or interregional cooperation.

Modernity, interpreted as a project or a programme (programmed modernity) is either a set of exemplary patterns or guidelines – speculative, ideologically grounded or imposed by those who do not need substantiation or legalization. An exem-

plary pattern is not only the experience of preceding modernizations (there are too many differences of technological and political character), but rather the experience of the countries that managed to join the 'club of the select few' and to hold their leadership, and those rapidly developing regions whose potential makes it possible for them to compete with leading countries in a medium- and long-term view.

Modernizing breakthrough presupposes, in fact, the change of 'time zones' of the Earth, which divide human civilization. These borders are more stable than national boundaries. They separate successful but not stable enough 'western world' from competitors (ascending China which has preserved its civilizational identity, and a number of other civilizations or countries) and, what is more, from outcast countries among which today the 'post-Soviet territory' is reckoned with its unlimited but ultimately 'ruined' resource and human potential. Not so long ago this territory was called the Russian civilization.

The question is: to what modernization strategy will present-day Russia be devoted in this context? At that, it is vital to understand if Russian modernization will be oriented to reconstruction of the historically established civilization with the highest possible intensification of centripetal trends of the former Soviet Union or to its complete fading away. Such fading away can be intensified as a result of a successful (the question of the cost of success in this case remains open) technological break-away of one of the most developed, artificially separated but not deprived of strategic resources territory (the Russian Federation) from obvious outsiders.

Among such outsiders are some of the former regions of the united country which before its collapse used to possess a particular advantage over competitors in world markets as in the 20th century it was reconstructed according to a unified modernization scheme (regions as assembly shops). Unfortunately, this competitive edge providing mutually profitable labour division and partially reproduced in the EU became almost the main hindrance to the development in the 'modern' period. Development of integration processes could withdraw the ugliest forms of archaization of certain 'peripheral' territories, but it is hindered by lack of resources which are in demand in Europe, lack of time and powerful inertia of centrifugal forces.

Under these circumstances it is very difficult to determine a long-term strategy as we have to transfer political planning and strategic forecasting to regime of alternative scenario projecting under the global strategic instability. But the more difficult a task is, the more interesting is the theoretical comprehension from the position of civilizational approach taking into account its methodological and, which is no less important, peacemaking potential. Though the civilizational approach having become a politicking tool can destroy even centuries-old power balance of political and civilizational stage of history. On the one hand, this approach allows to see the steady principle of links between peoples in the unstable world, to fall outside the limits of flagrant ideologizing and politicization characteristic of the traditional assessment of relations between countries and systems. On the other hand, the civilizational approach itself became long ago a tool for geopolitical planning and projecting as a result of which civilizations themselves are more and more often regarded as projects, either already executed or planned.

WORLD HISTORY AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS

In world history, culture always has a high-priority place. It runs through different epochs and events. Whether we speak about political or economical, social or international history we always single out the aspect of culture. Certainly, culture problems gain particular importance in spiritual sphere. Ideological processes and intellectual life, history of literature and art are to a great extent culture development.

Such a multifaceted and wide spread of culture was one of the reasons for the fact that there is a great number of scholarly definitions of the concepts of 'culture' and 'civilization'.

The universal meaning of culture in the evolution of society and in human life was a fundamental principle in D.S. Likhachov's work and in his approach to the history of society, to the analysis of various aspects of human life and human existence.

Over the previous years the topic of 'dialogue of cultures and civilizations' has become more and more widespread. The main point here is that this dialogue is not an invention of academic historians or cultural anthropologists. It was a real historical phenomenon inherent since ancient times.

The dialogue of cultures constitutes the core of civilizational unity of the world, interconnection of continents, regions, countries and peoples. In the dialogue of cultures and civilizations we can trace the worldwide character of human history, universalism and unity of the world.

For a long time it was assumed that the unity of the world (or Europe, for instance) is realized through its diversity, including interaction of different cultures, lifestyles and civilizations.

In ancient times this dialogue was realized through mutual influence of tribes and peoples, their customs, morals and manners, languages, etc. It is for many years that scholars have been using the concept of 'contact zones' which formed in different parts of the world, as a rule, at the intersection of different tribes and peoples. Such zones are known to exist around the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, in the Baltic region concerning Europe, in the Middle East in Asia, and so on.

It was in the contact zones that diverse cultures encountered and interacted, where their assimilation or rejection took place.

The peculiarity of the role of culture in human history is that in most cases it promoted closer relations between peoples and countries, relieved tension and allowed to eliminate or minimize conflicts.

The Age of the Enlightenment, which concurred with formation of national states, was a striking example of dialogue of cultures. In these conditions amorphous and universal cul-

ture was supplemented by culture with characteristically national features.

And, consequently, world culture becomes a sum and synthesis of national cultures. 'Nationalization' of culture was a logical historic stage of the 18th–19th centuries. It became an important factor in forming the national identity of countries and peoples.

Making a positive impact on the abovementioned processes, 'national culture' at the same time was fertile soil for ideas of national identity and national superiority.

In these complex and inconsistent conditions, the importance of dialogue of cultures is growing. This dialogue takes place both within one particularly multiethnic state and between different countries.

The dialogue finds way in comparing cultural achievements, in cultures interpenetrating each other, in synthesizing cultural processes.

Dialogue of cultures and civilizations gains particular importance when relations between countries and peoples become tense. In this context our attention is drawn to the 19th and, in particular, to the 20th century.

In the 19th century reciprocal influence of cultures became one of the most important processes, in what concerns mostly Russia and Europe. European countries were discovering for themselves great works of Russian literature, music and painting. The influence of Dostoyevsky and Turgenev, Chekhov and Tolstoy, Tchaikovsky and others became one of the overwhelming trends of the development of Europe. In their turn, many young Russian painters and artists began their creative development in Italy, France, Germany, etc.

When it comes to the dialogue of cultures we cannot neglect the 20th-century experience.

In the 20s–30s and in the post-war period the process of the rise in the importance of culture was going on, and thus dialogue of cultures and civilizations intensified.

This dialogue acquired particular value in the conditions of globalization when the interconnection between countries and continents developed rapidly and in various aspects.

The 20th century is a period of fundamental changes on the African continent when dozens of African and Asian countries gained independence. And, consequently, the cultural dialogue within the African continent and relations of Europe and the USA with African countries became dramatically important.

The interest that historians and scholars in other humanitarian fields take in the so-called 'global history', is also naturally connected with understanding of the role of culture and civilizational processes in revealing the meaning and importance of 'global history'.

Another issue has been under discussion of late. The case is multiculturalism especially as applied to European countries.

Recent shocking claims made by the leaders of England, France and Germany about a practical failure of any attempts to form a multicultural unity in these countries gave rise to a tide of debates and comments.

The recent years of the EU work have clearly demonstrated that all member countries of the European Union strive to preserve their ethnic and, first of all, cultural identity, make efforts to preserve their own culture, history and language.

But serious problems have emerged due to the fact that ethnic diasporas adhering to a different faith and a different lifestyle exist within a number of European states. Experience showed that the process of involving these diasporas in the culture of countries of their residence turned out to be an extremely difficult task.

Under these circumstances, it is the dialogue of cultures and civilizations that acquires particular value in these countries.

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for World History (the Russian Academy of Sciences), President of the State Academic University for the Humanities (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. He is the author of more than 300 scientific publications including 11 monographs: *Mirmoye sosushchestvovaniye. Teoriya i praktika* [Peaceful Coexistence: Theory and Practice], *Brestskiy min 1918 g.* [The Brest Peace of 1918], *Yevropeyskaya ideya v istoriyi. Vzgl'yad iz Moskv* [The European Idea in History, 19th–20th centuries. A View from Moscow], *Istohya XX veka. (Novye melody issledovaniya)* [History of the 20th Century: New Methods of Study], *Istoki tsiv-ilizatsiy* [Sources of Civilization], *Zapadnaya Yevropa i SShA* [Western Europe and the USA] and others. A. O. Chubarian is managing editor of periodicals *Yevropeyskiy al'manah* [The European Anthology], *Rossiya i Baltiya* [Russia and the Baltic States], *Tsivilizatsiy* [Civilizations], *International Social Sciences* journal, *Cold War History* international journal. He is Editor-in-Chief of the journal of the International Association of Institutes of the CIS countries *History Istoricheskoye prostranstvo. Problemy istoriyi stran SNG* [Historical Space. Issues of the History of the CIS Countries], Member of editorial board of *Novaya i noveyshaya istoriya* journal [Modern and Contemporary History]. He is President of the Russian Society of Archive Historians. Chairman of the National Committee of Russian Historians. President of the International Association of Institutes for History of the CIS Countries. Foreign member of Royal Norwegian Academy. Member of the Presidential Council of the Russian Federation for Science, Technology and Education.

In this context Russia can serve as an example of developing multiculturalism. Interaction of different cultures and ethnic identities under flexible and balanced policy of the authorities can promote the development of Russian unity and all-Russian culture and identity.

It does not mean that multiethnic Russia faces no serious or challenging problems concerning ethnic relations.

Experience of many European countries, Russia in particular, the situation on other continents attach a new meaning and give a new urge for the dialogue of cultures and civilizations, make it central to many political and ethnic processes and encourage scholars in different areas and in different parts of the world to concentrate on scientific research of problems of mutual influence of cultures and civilizations.

V. Churov¹

NATIONAL (MULTICULTURAL) FACTOR IN AN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

1. Where multiculturalism differs from internationalism

European-style multiculturalism is rooted in the colonial past of Western European states, that is, it originally referred to the co-existence of cultures of former colonies on the territory of the former metropolitan country. However, the collapse of multicultural model accounts for the fact that some cultures (subcultures) are unlikely to cooperate with others, or, in some cases, intentionally tend to dominate, or at least, temporally isolate themselves from others.

Internationalism as a model of peaceful multiethnic class co-existence was based on the class theory, and it implied, of course, cooperation of proletarian subculture and, partly, peasant subculture rather than cooperation of bourgeois subculture. The collapse of internationalism occurred very fast: it started with Hitler's rise to power (it was a disgrace to talk about international relations with NSDAP) and ended with the fascist Germany's invasion into the Soviet Union in June, 22, 1941.

2. Multiculturalism and the electoral system

In the present-day world the last oasis of multiculturalism, that is, of peaceful co-existence and cooperation between cultures and nations is, generally speaking, the electoral system. In particular, this accounts for the fact that it is the electoral system that theoretically and legally denies any cultural, class, social and national differences among participants of electoral process based upon universal principles of general, equal, etc. elections with a secret ballot of voters. Various multicultural models of electoral systems are used both in federal and unitary states, including those where the population is historically and politically divided into different linguistic groups (for example, in Belgium).

There are several exceptions from a common civilizational rule that provide the principle of peaceful political and electoral co-existence in order to ensure state unity and territorial integrity, political parties representation and the right to vote in compliance with ethno-confessional modes of civil society in a state. On the whole, electoral legislative acts have some articles that promote free and effective electoral participation, including ballot procedure, of national minorities as well as other categories of voters and participants of elections. In fact, a range of various models is used to achieve it:

- first, provision of equality in language in the wordage of electoral documents, namely, ballot papers;

- second, establishment of special, including national, deputies' quotas that provide guaranteed parliament representation, including formation of an independent national electorate district, as a rule, within the frames of national enclaves (the Voting Rights Act of the USA 1965 guarantees and ensures voting rights of representatives of racial and linguistic minorities, declaring, in particular, the statute that any amendments to the voting system in certain states are eligible provided the Congress of the USA authorizes them, and another statute that se-

cures the rights of voters on territories where the predominant language is other than English, and so on. In 2006 the USA Congress passed the bill renewing the Act for 25 years more; at midterm elections to the Congress on November 7, 2006, special multi-language service was provided to the voters unable to understand or speak English fluently);

- third, establishment of certain advantages for candidates nominated by national political parties (in Poland political parties that represent interests of national minorities are admitted to seat allocation despite the threshold acting towards other political parties (following the results of the early parliamentary election on October, 21, 2007 German national minority was allocated with 1 seat (before they had 2) and they have had their representative in the Sejm since 1991; representatives of other national minorities (Belarusian, Ukrainian) were listed among candidates for political parties or coalitions, and 2 and 1 representatives were elected, respectively.)

In present-day Lebanon, a multiconfessional state that survived through two civil wars between Christians and Muslims in the second half of the 20th century, confessionalism is a basis of the state system; it legally secures relations between political and religious spheres of society, which includes the procedures of political representation and the structure of the electoral system of the country. Thus, the office of Lebanon President (elected through indirect elections by the deputies of the Parliament) is entitled to a representative of the Maronite Catholic Church, while Prime Minister is a Sunni Muslim and Speaker of the Parliament is a Shiite Muslim, although this distinction is not enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic. This distinction (constitutional and legal tradition or convention) in based on the Taif Accord aimed to eliminate tension in relations between ethno-confessional communities. Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution ensures balance of representation in the Assembly of Representatives (Parliament) for both Christians and Muslims, and also proportional seat allocation between confessions existing in the country and belonging to every religious community. After the latest Parliament Elections of June 7, 2009, Muslim communities had the following allocation for their 64 deputy seats: 27 seats were allocated to the communities of Sunni Muslims, 27 to Shiite Muslims, 8 to Druzes and 2 deputy seats to Alawis; among 64 'Christian' deputy seats 24 were allocated to the Maronites community, 14 to the Greek Orthodox community, 8 to Roman Catholics, 5 to representatives of the Armenian Apostolic Church, 1 seat to a representative of the Armenian Catholic Church, 1 seat to Protestant Confession communities and 1 to other groups of Christian followers.

Ethno-confessional approach in administering the state affairs is enshrined in the Constitution of Cyprus, but in reality, due to the armed intervention of a foreign state that pursues exclusively its own national interests, electoral multiculturalism and democratic development of multicultural electoral system is temporary suspended. For example, in accordance with article 1 of the Constitution, President of Cyprus is elected by the Greek community, while Prime Minister is elected by the Turk-

¹ Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Author of over 30 scientific works including the books: 'Mystery of Four Generals,' 'The Whole Russia Is Voting: on Legal and Organizational Peculiarities of the Coming Elections' and others.

ish community. Pursuant to article 62 of the Constitution of the Republic, 70 percent of deputies (35 members) out of 50 deputies of the House of Representatives are elected by the island's Greek community and 30 present by the Turks. In accordance with article 63 of the Constitution, individual voting lists are prepared for representatives of both the Greek and the Turkish community, whereas voters residing abroad cannot, unlike in Croatia, take part in parliamentary elections. After Turkey's military occupation of North Cyprus (in 1974) Turkish deputy seats (24 seats) that Cypriot Turkish were deprived of in 1963, are still vacant. It was for the first time after 1963 that during parliamentary elections of May 21, 2006, Cypriot Turks residing in the Greek part of the island were eligible for election as deputy, out of 500,000 recorded voters 270 were Cypriot Turks. At present, after the Referendum on Unification in April, 2004, failed, as 75.8 percent of Cypriot Greeks rejected the UN unification plan, while 64.8 percent of Cypriot Turks approved of it, under constant efforts of the UN enhanced by rise to power of new political leaders in Greek and Turkish communities elected in the course of Parliamentary (held, in Greek community, on May 21, 2006) and Presidential elections in both separate parts of Cyprus, all political parties undertake new steps to unify territorial integrity of Cyprus, one of the critical tools to achieve it is to use the potential of dualistic electoral system that must provide and at the same time guarantee equal political representation of interests of both the Greek and the Turkish community in a unitary Parliament.

A special position of some ethno-confessional communities is recorded in the electoral legislative acts of the Croatian Republic due to the fact that during the election to the Sabor (Parliament) one special electoral district is formed for Croatian voters currently residing abroad (404950 voters), and also one eight-seat electoral district to provide representation of national minorities (248899 voters) (one seat per national minority, such as Hungarian, Italian, Czech and others. During the parliamentary elections on November 25, 2001 one deputy was elected to represent Czech and Slovak national minorities, 3 deputies for the Serbs, 1 for the Austrian, Bulgarian, German, Polish, Gypsy, Romanian, Russian, Turkish, Ukrainian, Wallach and Jewish national minorities in all, 1 deputy for a Hungarian minority, 1 for Albanian, Bosnian, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and Slovenian national minorities altogether.

In Belgium, the linguistic element is one of the constitutional fundamentals of the federal state structure, electoral campaigning and electoral system. It is a well-known fact that because of linguistic problems in 1970 a state and electoral system reform was launched in Belgium that has now become a federal state with 3 levels of political and linguistic representation bodies since 1993. The Belgian Constitution stipulates a complex structure of the country's dissolution into constituent entities in terms of language: 3 communities (French, Flemish, and German) and 4 linguistic areas (French, Dutch, German and the bilingual French–Dutch capital region in Brussels). In addition to that Belgium comprises the Flemish, the Walloon and the Brussels regions; members of the Parliament are also divided into linguistic groups – the French and the Dutch; the Government shall contain equal number of French- and Dutch-speaking members; alongside with that freedom to use all languages spoken in Belgium is declared, and none on them can be the state language. Belgium also enjoys the principle of ethnic and linguistic representation (similar to the seat allocation principle) during the elections to the Senate (the Upper House of the Parliament). Out of 71 senators, 40 are elected by direct voting: 10 people from the bodies of each the Council of the French Community and the Council of the Flemish Community, one senator from the Council of the German Community and 6 and 4 new members are co-opted by Flemish senators and Francophone senators respectively. That is why the voters are grouped into certain linguistic electoral bodies formed on

the basis of a linguistic principle. Voters residing in the capital region can vote for one of the two linguistic lists of candidates, while votes of other regions can only vote for the list of candidates of the linguistic area of their residing.

3. Roots of variety of national electoral systems

In real life, electoral systems are multicultural in every sovereign state; however, they are not multicultural in terms of common (universal) principles of electoral procedures. The most conspicuous example are America's unsuccessful attempts to arrange a European type of electoral system in Afghanistan, Iraq or Palestine. On the other hand, the electoral system of Japan that was formed under a considerable influence of the German Constitutional Law (Meiji period) and later under the American Constitutional Law (after World War II) meet the standards of democratic elections nowadays (despite some rudiments of outdated census). It is a noteworthy fact that Japan adopted Western liberal values and standards voluntarily, comparing them and choosing the most suitable: for example, in 1870, a Japanese Councillor for Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister-to-be Itō Hirobumi remarked after his visit to the USA that the American Constitutional Law had served him as a model of what should not be recorded in the Japanese Constitution. Differences in electoral systems are grounded in national history and traditions, the decentralized American Electoral system including, that date back to the times when each state was fully sovereign and delegated part of its authorities to the Union or the Confederacy.

History and past of the country affects the voters and candidates bodies. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland active and passive voting right is entitled to the citizens of Member states of Commonwealth of Nations and the Republic of Ireland. Moreover, each of the countries has its own established state system, most of them do not accept the British monarch as head of the state, and the Commonwealth is not a political union. Besides, in Northern Ireland a great political and legislative role belongs to a confessional division of the voters' body and a division of political parties under the confessional principle (Catholics and Protestants, and supporters and opponents of state union with England).

A long history of autocratic regimes in Central and Southern America also influenced electoral legislation of the countries in this region. In these countries, it is quite common to experience a constitutional (or other legislative) banning for duties of an elective post to be performed by relatives or remote kinsmen of the official in question in order to prevent any encroachment, and banning to combine an elective post and services to a religious cult. Thus, among restrictions of passive voting right on Presidential and Vice-Presidential Elections of the Republic of Nicaragua, Article 147 of the Constitution refers to people who led or financed a coup, which confirms a complicated history of this state, in particular, and the whole region, in general. The New Constitution of Bolivia stipulates new guarantees for the native people of the country. Thus, the native Indians (36 peoples) shall be broadly represented in various authoritative bodies: special quotas are introduced to represent the native Indians in the Parliament; apart from Spanish, all native Indian languages are declared state languages, and to speak one of them is a mandatory condition for civil servants seeking a job; and Roman Catholicism is no longer a state religion. In El Salvador in accordance with Article 82 of the Constitution the ministers of any religious cult may not belong to political parties, nor may they produce political propaganda in any form; in Honduras, to become a deputy one should, in particular, hold no priestly dignity or pastoral position in any confession (Article 198 of the Constitution of Honduras). While in Cuba, as opposed to that, in accordance with Article 43 of the Constitution, the state claims the right achieved by the Revolution that all citizens, regardless of their religious beliefs, ethnic

origins and any situation that may be humiliating to human dignity, have access, in keeping with their merits and abilities, to all state positions and jobs.

4. Multicultural electoral systems and international electoral standards: limits of harmonization

Electoral systems have common challenges concerning how to reach the international standards worked out by the humanity.

None of the countries has managed to provide a full-term realization of *the principle of universal right of suffrage* so far. Almost everywhere there is a local residence requirement; an age requirement; inadmissibility for those who were nominated to fill or hold the same elective office, for those who are held in custody, for the disabled and so on. Very often this list records more or less historically established but outdated requirements (literacy requirement, property ownership requirement, and others).

Due to several reasons *the principle of equal suffrage* cannot be enjoyed on a full scale. For example, it is impossible to achieve absolute equality of all electoral districts. The borders of electoral districts are, as a rule, rigidly bound to the administrative district borders, very often historically established.

Unlike the principles of universal and equal suffrage, *the principle of direct suffrage* is not global. Many countries have historically enjoyed the system of indirect elections to the head offices in the state, of leaders of legislative and executive bodies; in many countries, according to a deeply-rooted tradition, a monarch takes a symbolic part in the procedure.

Not in all historical periods *the principle of a secret ballot* was considered indisputable, in some epochs, for example during the Great French Revolution (until 1793), a secret ballot was considered a way for a voter to 'conceal' his opinion from fellow citizens.

The principle of compulsory and periodic elections is one of the principles recorded in international documents. However, the history of any state can be witness to turmoil that does not allow to observe the principle of periodic rotation for members of a representative authoritative body or elective officers.

The principle of freedom of expression is accepted by almost all countries; alongside with that in a range of the countries participation in elections is compulsory.

Frequently *transparency and publicity* of electoral procedure, first of all, to what extent mass media take part in it, is not specified by law, but is regulated on the basis of traditions.

There are several approaches in the world to *fair elections* and to provision of competition for political parties taking part in them and of equality of their chances: some of the approaches ensure a full-scale supervision in terms of provision of equality for all parties and candidates, while others only claim the most general principles.

One of the main principles of democracy is that results of elections should *express the will of the people*. However, the very type of electoral system is determined, as a rule, by the history of the state, in the states with a well-established electoral system even discussions on the necessity of reforms in electoral legislation can last for decades.

Views on well-organized elections also change with time. Steep increase in the number of voters (due to abolition of many electoral qualifications) made elections universal and mass-scaled, while advances in technology, first of all, in IT, set new goals for organizers of elections in order to provide a chance to declare the elections well-organized.

In terms of elections, the world community also faces challenges that concern multicultural society, incorporation of its basic elements, including ethno-confessional ones, to the structure of national electoral systems.

– Linguistic challenge: genuine multilingualism takes extra financial and other kinds of expenses that increase due to printing electoral ballots in several languages, which affects not only the size of the ballot, but increases expenses on publications of candidates' biographies, of various explanatory and information materials, especially for the illiterate, about participants of elections and, first of all, about political parties, their pre-election programmes and platforms.

– Family traditions and social conventions: they are manifested in the so-called 'family' voting, in some cases there are tribal peculiarities, say, voting under the order of the elders.

– Educational problem: deep in the multicultural system there still exist subcultures defined by a person's social status, education, wealth, and ethnic origin. Hence, the challenge of education arises on the very primitive – primary – level, that is, necessity to record universally understood symbols on the voting ballot, in particular, concerning political parties that take part in elections, and some difficulties to introduce new ways of voting, including explanations about systems of on-line voting.

– International relations: despite the fact that formally every electoral system is above any national relations, this challenge should be considered when drawing borders of electoral districts with traditional settlements of certain ethnic groups and during migration periods of peoples. For example, if the traditional territory of a settlement of one people (ethnic or ethno-confessional group) is massively inhabited by voters of another nationality (or confession).

– Religious (confessional) peculiarities: they should be taken into account, as organization of elections in multicultural society with, for example, large number of Islamic people faces the fact that there should be held two-day elections – on Sunday and Monday. Although some countries transit to one-day elections. For instance, Lebanon adopted a legislative amendment in 2008 that stipulates transition from three-day elections to one-day elections.

– Law-abiding citizens (voters and other participants of elections): various cultures differ in terms of the law-abiding scale.

– Migration factor: within the frames of certain culture or subculture mobility (the migration level) of voters differs that should be taken into account when applying various forms of voting.

Alongside with that, one of the main trends of development of electoral systems in modern world is, we would say, a full-scale preservation of multicultural elements of electoral systems and electoral procedures on the whole, which can provide, with due performance, not only stable, but also democratically dynamic and peaceful development of the state, of institutions of civil society, of common nationality.

PREREQUISITES FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE OF CIVILIZATIONS

One of the main aims of a dialogue of civilizations is to get a better mutual knowledge of habits ('moeurs et coutumes'; 'Sitten und Gebräuche'), of everything that concerns the daily life of people and societies in all realms of endeavor, not just in the cultural one.

It is to prevent misunderstandings which often are due to ignorance, and thus avoid frictions and irritations which may trigger clashes, conflicts and even war. It is about mutual enrichment and fructification, about striving for a more decent international society based on mutual respect, trust and also cooperation when it comes to global challenges.

The purpose of such a dialogue should certainly not be a confluence of civilizations, not even a convergence, not a global or world civilization. The existing civilizational and cultural diversity should not just be preserved but strengthened.

Conditions of a dialogue

What are the conditions for a meaningful dialogue of civilizations?

What is needed is certainly a certain degree of self-confidence on the side of those engaging in a dialogue. A lack of confidence leads to introversion, to turning away from the other.

What is also required is a self-critical attitude, the capacity to question oneself, the capacity to relativize, i.e. not to absolutize the own culture but to examine one's own civilization in relation to others. Of great utility are also a balanced and open mind, a willingness to learn and to accept alterity, a dose of humility which allows one to see not just one's own strengths but also one's shortcomings and to acknowledge the frailty of any human endeavors.

Of strong significance are some degree of empathy, that means the capacity to understand and even share the feelings and views of others, a solid level of erudition, i.e. of knowledge about other civilizations and also some cosmopolitanism, an openness towards the world ('Weltoffenheit').

Among the factors and attitudes that may harm a dialogue of civilizations are without doubt what one may call cultural autism and the striving for a cultural autarchy.

What is also detrimental is a penchant for cultural monism which would deny the value of other civilizational models, ethnocentrism as well as any form of superiority and supremacism that put the own civilization a priori above all the others. Such attitudes which can be reinforced by quasi-colonialist behavior have certainly been widespread throughout the centuries in the West but also in large parts of Asia, for example in China and Japan, and they do even exist in Africa between different ethnical groups

The rise of phobias

What we are watching now is the rise of intolerance, xenophobia, racism and, more specifically, islamophobia throughout the West, of national egoism, but also of a certain kind of communitarianism and even tribalism.

First the German chancellor Angela Merkel, then the French president Nicolas Sarkozy followed by the British prime minister David Cameron have proclaimed that multiculturalism has failed. Other European political leaders are now joining the chorus. What they mean in fact is that monocultur-

alism should prevail, what Germans call 'Leitkultur', a leading culture that should guide and in a sense dominate all the others. Implicit in such a thinking is a hierarchy of cultures. Even if they say that they want to apply this preference only to their own society, it does in fact reflect a feeling of superiority and a longing for exclusion of anything that is different.

This debate also highlights the fact that globalization is above all and perhaps exclusively an economic stratagem meaning the unimpeded flow of goods and, to a certain degree, of people, provided they are highly qualified. It means producing where the costs are lowest, and it thus entails outsourcing and delocalization, squeezing the globe - the natural resources as well as the labor. It is not Prometheus but greed unbounded. It implies deregulation but at the same time standardization, harmonization or, more concretely, Westernization and above all Americanization and therefore less and less diversity. Paradoxically the endorsement of globalization is accompanied often by a psychological mechanism of withdrawal into nationalism and even parochialism. People travel more, but this does not necessarily mean that they get better acquainted with different cultural achievements; mobility may even reinforce their prejudices.

Moreover, this globalization may cause a feeling of drowning and trigger a longing for the coziness of small retreats and for simple answers to an increasingly complex environment. It may stimulate the search for scapegoats - foreigners, other races, migrants - and reinforce the feeling of rootlessness, of a lack of identity and moral references.

These trends may be illustrated by the erosion of aesthetic standards and by a growing intellectual confusion by what is sometimes called postmodernism, namely the deconstructing of art, philosophy and ethics under the slogan: anything goes.

How can in a debate between unity versus diversity a level playing field be reached? The history of civilizations is about considering that one civilizational model is superior to the other(s). From this superiority the right to impose one's own civilizational standards including religion on others was deduced ('mission civilisatrice'), the right to conquer, dominate, even exterminate the people and extirpate the culture as did for example the Spaniards in South America.

The history of civilizations is indeed a history of the clash of civilizations. In this Samuel Huntington was right even if his main purpose was to bring this contradiction down to the neoconservative fear of a rejection of the American model by a growing part of the world and above all by Islam. Islam is feared because of what is perceived as its strong religious and cultural roots which may lead it to oppose and resist the American model, whereas China and others, because of their consumerist obsession, are not seen as posing such a strong civilizational threat.

A clash of societal concepts

What can go wrong and what does go wrong for the moment in the relationship between civilizations?

The debate on the West and Islam is dominated by stereotypes, by denigration, by distortion of the reality. More and more people in the West, including so-called experts and of course politicians and journalists, are propagating a warped image of Islam, fanning often millenary fears - 'Turks ante Vienna'. One can watch an instrumentalization of islamophobia by largely confused and clueless parts of the Western establishment.

These fears may sometimes express genuine concerns but more often reflect a latent feeling of inferiority of a secularized, materialistic, pseudo-hedonistic and despiritualized West-

¹ Director of Luxembourg Institute for European and International Research, Ph.D. Author and editor of a number of scholarly papers on issues of European and international politics, including: *Russia-EU Relations: New Challenges and Opportunities*, *The Vitality of Russia*, *The Vitality of China and the Chinese, Beyond East-West Confrontation: Searching for a New Security Structure in Europe*, *The Vitality of Japan: Sources of National Strength and Weakness*, *The Euro as a Stabilizer in the International Economic System*, *Europa auf dem Weg zur Weltordnung?*

ern society against an Islamic world that is perceived as beholding strong beliefs coupled with a missionary zeal, demographic anxieties of a rapidly aging Western society as opposed to a demographically dynamic Islamic one, more generally the feeling of an irreversible Western decline and a headless West forgoing the springs of its former superbia. These feelings are certainly also fed by remnants of old colonialism, thinking of other cultures as being inferior and not worthwhile of being respected.

Some of the irritations and tensions are certainly due to diverging societal conceptions. There is for example the issue of gender with the Western 'modern' idea of not just equal rights but equal roles for men and women when it comes to family life, work, sexual behavior, with what seems to be an implicit Western goal of a unigender society whereas Islam professes an equal respect for men and women, but prescribes different roles.

A similar divergence exists when it comes to the rights of homosexuals, with the West professing that homosexuality has the same worth as heterosexuality, that homosexuals should be able to marry, establish a family and have children, and also their profound divergences regarding other basic ethical issues such as abortion and euthanasia.

An issue that is permanently raised is that of the political system with the West proclaiming that democracy as practiced by it is the only true political system and stating that Islam is not compatible with democracy and that means with basic freedoms, individual autonomy and self-determination.

The same is true regarding the role of religion with the West advocating the separation of state and church whereas Islamic societies want to apply the sharia which is prescribing religious and secular duties for every individual.

A further example that can be cited is the concept of honor which in mainstream Western society is an obsolete and even obnoxious notion. Contrary to the Islam the West sees no specific honor of men as compared to that of women and doesn't accept any right to defend the honor. Indeed Western society has given up the whole idea of honor.

All this means that the present debate is about basic values and beliefs such as reason, tolerance, fairness and autonomy but also respect and solidarity. These key values set the framework and at the same time the limits of any dialogue.

Tolerance in fact is not much more than a practical device, a *modus vivendi* allowing to preserve a peaceful status

quo, preventing an escalation of violence, an outburst of fanaticism and all kinds of excesses. Tolerance, however, cannot last indefinitely: sooner or later it will lead either into real respect or it will degenerate into intolerance. As an example one may take the famous Edict of Nantes signed in 1598 by Henry IV of France granting toleration to Protestants but revoked by Louis XIV in 1685.

One may also cite the example of the Netherlands where a system of toleration permitted for centuries the peaceful coexistence of Catholics and Protestants, in pillarized communities (consociational democracy). This system began to break up in the 1960s and has meanwhile faded away. The Netherlands is on the verge of becoming one of the most intolerant societies in Europe, even if this intolerance is no longer between different Christian communities but between a largely secularized native community and Islamic immigrants.

A minimum ethical code

In order to be able to engage into a meaningful dialogue among civilizations it would be useful to adopt a minimum ethical code that could be respected by all civilizations. Sticking to this code would help to make the dialogue substantive and resilient. It would mean that beyond all differences and divergences there will be a common stock of norms and values which will not just be Western but universal and which can lay the ground for a decent international society. Among them are the respect for physical and psychological integrity, of basic dignity, of diversity of opinions, of believes and creeds, compassion and empathy, generosity and solidarity, a striving for legal, political, social and economic justice, participation and inclusion of all citizens in all societal processes, the rejection of humiliation and of oppression, of exploitation and discrimination.

Without this the seemingly most subtle civilization remains barbarian at core. The refined taste in music and arts, sophisticated artistic products as well as scientific achievements are not sufficient by themselves. What is needed is a nobility of the heart, a much greater sensitivity, a new global awareness and sense of responsibility of the world as such, transcending narrow national and regional frameworks. Civilizations have to renounce the millenary superiority that has caused so much misunderstanding, disarray, conflict and destruction, genocide and culturicide. Such a dialogue must be the opposite of proselytizing - it must proceed in the full respect of all specificities, affinities and preferences of all involved.

Piotr Dutkiewicz¹

FOUR TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: POST-CRISIS SHORT-TERM SCENARIO

Globalization, as we have known it, is over. Some countries are deciding to protect themselves first before protecting global markets. It seems that protectionism – both overt and hidden – is slowly regaining favour as the policy of the day despite public assurances to the contrary. Centers of power and wealth are on the move, making the usual, Keynesian 'market uncertainty' contagious to social and political processes.

Three processes are dominating current macro-economic trends: uneven speed and depths of economic recovery, sharpening 'new poles of growth' and application of differentiated regionally economic policies aiming at recovery.

Thus the key questions are: What patterns of international development are emerging in the world system? and How can

we sketch out how these will shape the next three to four years? In answering these questions at least four processes (intertwining politics and economic) seems to shape the immediate future of the world markets.

The first is the uneven performance of global markets in 2010 followed by disparity in the speed and depth of different states' economic recovery. Generally speaking, the global economy did quite well in 2010, as global output rose by almost 5%, more than most forecasters expected. The darkest predictions did not materialize. Recovery, however, is taking different shapes. The Chinese economy did not suffer any serious setbacks and the Indian and Brazilian economies, despite quite a high level of inflation and rising food prices, are booming with 7-8% GDP growth. They are accompanied by most emerging economies. This is not the case in America. Compounded economic and political problems have seen the world's largest economic and military power become less cer-

¹ Director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian research at Carleton University (Canada), Ph.D. Professor. Author of books *Problems of Local Development of Poland* (1989), *NATO Looks East* (1998) and publications: *Challenges of Democratization: Prospects of Political Transformation in Eastern Europe* (in coauthorship), *The New Role of Canada in Relations with Russia* (in co-authorship) and others.

tain of itself and vulnerable to external challenges, neither of which has gone unnoticed by outsiders and rising powers. Europe, for all its efforts, cannot be considered as a whole, with its healthy German core surrounded by the cancer-prone economies of Ireland, Greece, Portugal and Italy. In other words, the world economy is on its way to becoming divided into three macro-economic zones: surging emerging markets (most of the BRIC included), a fragmented EU and a lagging North America. These three macro-regions are heading in different directions, divided not only by 'traditional' engines and barriers of growth (such as level of human and financial capital, institutional capacity etc.), but also by the combined inheritance of the economic crisis and different policy prescriptions for their futures.

Secondly, in each of these three zones of 'post crisis recovery' (for the lack of better term) there are their own internal 'cores and peripheries'. So far intra-regional cooperation is still quite smooth (see EU and NAFTA), but tensions are openly visible (see the ongoing debate on the future of the euro) and the run for survival (both economic and political) is taking a more dramatic turn in a form of sharpening 'egoistic' and protectionist policies. It is, for instance, quite legitimate to ask for how long Germany will be willing to protect other EU economies with its taxpayers' money and when and how the Merkel government's spending cuts and high taxes will be diverted from helping Greece to supporting its own shrinking social programs. In other words, within the global economy the 'centers of recovery' are emerging with inevitable effect of influencing and potentially consolidating their power over the close 'neighborhood'; this emerging trend will likely continue at least for two reasons; one being simply 'nationally egoistic' in maintaining higher speed of recovery that others second is that those 'centers' also taking less nationally 'egoistic' task of helping to maintain regional economic and political stability (Germany is the good example).

Thirdly, these 'zones' of post crisis recovery will likely apply different policies to foster renewed growth and regain stability (economic and otherwise). These policies are starting to be quite amazingly differentiated from each other, thus creating even more uncertainty and suggesting the possibility of a 'policy conflicts' among key world market players. In fact some of those conflicts are already quite visible. What is good today for China to maintain its level of growth is not necessarily the best for the US or EU (or even China's close neighbors). The same applies to the EU and Latin America or the US and EU or even within North America between US and Canada. The point is that diverging economic policies may create additional global tensions (for instance on approaches to exchange rates or level of state intervention). In short, the US along with the strongest

EU countries and a few leading emerging market economies will most likely pursue differing economic paths, focusing their attention primarily on national and regional issues. For instance, Germany seems to be set to continue applying strong austerity measures while the US is going in a very different direction by pursuing further tax cuts and supplying the economy with more money; at the same time, emerging economies are focusing more on taming growing inflation and rising trade imbalances and mitigating the consequences of poverty.

Unsurprisingly however, some intervening variables are likely to play a role in the scenario outlined above. Despite the fact that macro-economic imbalances will likely create new geopolitical imbalances and thus would create a more plural distribution of power and resources, the US may demand 'special arrangements' within a process of global power arrangements and distribution of wealth. As US will (for some time) remain a leading world power, I agree with Robert Skidelsky's observation that 'its natural evolution is towards it becoming the fifth wheel on every coach, rather than the driver of the whole team'. One of the big question's is whether China (and other key players) will continue to accept as necessity to have a 'fifth wheel'.

Where is Russia in this picture? Russia might want to re-create in a new form its own periphery that would be based on common security and energy cooperation with its immediate neighbors. It will be a complex task, however, as Russia has lost during the last twenty years a significant portion of its industrial base and thus is not as attractive partner as China or India. Even a short analysis of BRIC data show that Russia is lagging on many key indicators but as US interest in the Russia's neighborhood is diminishing such scenario is becoming quite possible.

Instead of a summary – linking economy to politics.

Let's try to extract most likely consequences from the above (economics) for the global politics. At least three routes are looking as most plausible to propose. First, as new 'centers of growth' will likely be so absorbed by their own problems as a result that they will spend less time and energy on international cooperation and 'global issues' (such as, for instance, the environment and local conflicts). The first result might be that this might be a pre-cursor to the end of an era: the final retreat of full spectrum liberalization and deep globalization. For financial governance, we are about to see the renaissance of the nation-state as the unambiguous hub of regulatory authority. Secondly, while 'going inward' may not lead to direct confrontations, diverging interests (followed by diverging policies) will create more tensions and greater unpredictability followed by political instability on a global scale.

B. Eifman¹

THE PETERSBURG BALLET IN THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Appearing at conferences and symposia is a genre that differs markedly from my daily work. I generally treat words with caution and have a good deal more trust for the language of dance. My understanding of life, human fate, art, and creativity

¹ Ballet director of St. Petersburg Academic State Theatre of Ballet, choreographer, People's Artist of Russia, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Author of more than 40 ballets, including: *Anna Karenina*, *Don Quixote or Fantasies of a Madman*, *The Karamazovs*, *Red Giselle*, *Who is Who*, *Master and Margarita*, *My Jerusalem*, *Musagete*, *Onegin*, *Duel*, *Requiem*, *The Russian Hamlet*, *Tchaikovsky* and others. Mr. Eifman has created a number of TV-ballets. He is Laureate of the State Prize of the Russian Federation, 'Triumph', 'the Golden Mask', and 'The Golden Floodlight' Awards. He was awarded St. Petersburg Government Prize in literature, art and architecture. He is decorated with the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 3rd and the 4th degrees, Commander Cross of the Order of Merit (Poland), the Order of Arts and Letters (France).

is expressed in the shows at our theatre. How successful these have been is not for me to judge, but I can say with every certainty that I never thought of ballet as an art of beautiful movements. For my whole life, since my years as a student, with inevitable mistakes and sometimes achievements as well, I have built my theatre as an artistic form of communication with the world, and I seek ways and opportunities to express with the language of body movements and learn about the objects of the life of the human soul, and the elements of the passions.

The complex, mysterious, metaphysically deep and contradictory cultural integrity of St Petersburg, understandable through sensory perception, entirely possible to experience concretely but difficult to subject to a theoretical definition,

is inseparable from ballet. Ballet is likewise inseparable from it. Nature, architecture, artistic life and images of art, and the social status of the imperial capital form complicated connections, mutual changes of the material into the spiritual and vice versa. The White Nights are also, after all, not only a natural phenomenon. In Murmansk and Petrozavodsk, the day is longer still, but the White Nights are connected specifically with St Petersburg, they are inseparable from Pushkin and Dostoyevsky, from the amazing graphic picture of architectural lines which show up most elegantly against the background of an off-white night sky.

While doing research for one of his works on the appearance of the counterpoint of styles in art, Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov builds an analysis which relies to a significant degree on the activity of Petersburg ballet-master Marius Petipa. In three pages of his book, he not only assesses with professional precision the place and role of this extraordinary choreographer in the development of Russian ballet of the second half of the 19th century, but also traces the influence of this sphere of Petersburg art on music, painting, literature, and theatre direction. These pages alone could be developed into an interesting theoretical treatise.

The Petersburg ballet and choreographic education have been in Russia for nearly 300 years. For the entire 18th century and a major part of the 19th, foreigners played an all but defining role in the ballet (as both ballet-masters and dancers). Charles Le Picq, a Frenchman and disciple of the great Noverre, invited in 1785, not only danced leading parts and introduced the public of Petersburg to the ballets of his teacher, but also initiated the publication of Noverre's famous theoretical work, *Letters on Dance and Ballets* in Russia. Charles Didelot and Gilles Perrault figure later in the life of the Russian ballet, and it was by their efforts that one of the most professional troupes in Europe was formed in St Petersburg. Already at the end of the 18th century, the Russian ballet had come to influence European choreography (the ballet-masters brought shows given in Petersburg back to the European stage, and Russian dancers toured abroad). The ground was prepared for the phenomenal breakthrough of the art of dance to a new level of quality. This period is called 'the Petipa Era'.

It is impossible to separate the processes that occurred on the ballet stage from the great music of Tchaikovsky and Glazunov, which to a great extent determined the 'symphonization' of ballet. The democratization of the audience is connected precisely with this music. Of course, the theatre remained a stronghold of the aristocracy, but at every show, students and intelligentsia filled the rows of seats.

I would like to emphasize one circumstance that is highly relevant today. The blossoming of the Petersburg ballet, having begun in the 18th century, would have been impossible without the colossal financial investment and patronage of the Tsar's family, especially in the latter half of the 19th century. The outstanding American choreographer George Balanchine imagined Petipa's position to be ideal: the ballet-master was attracted by inclusion in the 'imperial service', and at the same time felt total internal creative freedom. In the final analysis, expenditures went not to the entertainment of the élite, but to the development of the country's culture, and consequently the democratization of the public.

At the end of the 19th century, having absorbed the best in world choreography, the Petersburg ballet became a global leader in this area. Not merely a star, but precisely a leader, for it led the further development of a global art that went beyond Russia's borders.

In 2008, Russia and France, and the whole world along with them, observed the hundredth anniversary of Diaghilev's 'Russian Seasons'. The artistic ideas of Diaghilev were formed in St Petersburg. Here, in 1898, one of the first artistic journals, *Mir Iskusstva* ('*The World of Art*'), was founded, which is fa-

mous for its brilliant articles and a magnificent selection of illustrations, printed with a level of quality that seems impossible for the 19th century. Artists, composers, and critics gravitated around the journal, and it received support from patrons. Diaghilev was a fantastic manager and financier. Benoit once said, with mixed feelings of joy and annoyance: 'Oh, if only Diaghilev were a minister of finance.'

In Petersburg, the magnificent ballet music of Stravinsky emerged, and it was 'Petersburgian' music, as the music of Tchaikovsky had been earlier. Balanchine insisted on this, basing it not on the biographical facts of the composer's life (who studied and died here), but on the inner traits of his personality, expressed in music – restraint, a sense of proportion, nobility, 'European-ness' and 'the imperial spirit'.

In 1909, Paris sees the Russian ballets *Giselle*, *The Polovt-sian Dances*, *Scheherazade*, and *The Firebird*, and is stunned by the talents of Pavlova, Karsavina, Ida Rubenstein, Nijinsky, and Fokin. The new choreography of Massine, Nijinsky, Lifar, Balanchine, and Fokin are revealed to the world.

Diaghilev brought the Russian art beyond Russia's borders. Aleksey Tolstoy described with great precision Europe's reaction to this encounter with Russian culture: 'The Western world has never seen such refined and perfect art.'

In this paper, there is neither the possibility nor necessity of naming each of the productions that came out of Russia which to a large extent determined the paths of global artistic development, and continued to develop them for a long time. George Balanchine, one of the shining figures of world choreography, was shaped by the Petersburg culture and the Imperial Theatrical School. Another great name is that of Maurice Béjart. He proudly calls himself a disciple of Russian teachers – former soloists of the imperial theatres, without forgetting to note that Russian teachers of the Soviet period shaped generations of dancers in Japan, Korea, China, and Cuba. And many dancers, ballet-masters, and teachers working within the territory of the former Soviet Union and in all regions of the planet have been prepared and continue to be shaped on the stages of the Choreographic School (since 1991, the Academy named for Agripina Vaganova) of the Petersburg Conservatoire!

The movement of our ballet in the global historic space, interrupted by two wars, again proved to be 'groundbreaking' in the 1950s (at the time of 'the thaw'). Tours of the Bolshoi Theatre showed Europe and America true marvels – Galina Ulanova and Maya Plisetskaya – and later, the new wave of tours in the '60s and '70s revealed Natalya Makarova, Vladimir Vasiliev, Rudolf Nureyev, and Mikhail Baryshnikov. Our ballet, unfortunately, could not display choreographic innovation, but the power and charm of classical dance conquered and enchanted.

The present situation in the Petersburg ballet (and to a large extent in Russian and even global ballet) is alarming – a crisis. On the one hand, there are indisputable achievements: well-deserved international recognition of our artists – Ulyana Lopatkina, Diana Vishneva, Svetlana Zakharova, Igor Zelensky, and Farukh Ruzimatov.

However, there is no special reason for optimism. There are few new choreographic ideas, and for the last twenty years, practically no new names of choreographers have appeared. The staffs of our country actively copy the examples of modern western choreography, which are often no longer up to date. Under these circumstances, the solid cultural legacy of past eras is being recklessly given up to oblivion, and the traditions of Russian ballet theatre are being ignored.

The existence of culture under market conditions does not mean, by any means, that culture is part of the market. A symphony orchestra cannot and should not compete with a popular variety show performer, a poet with a writer of detective and romance novels. Sponsorship is an important and necessary component of financing culture, but only as a supplement to

the compulsory provision for it in the budget. The salary of Vasili Ivanovich Kachalov was comparable to that of the Russian prime minister. He received this money not in envelopes, but at the cash desk of the Art Theatre. Marius Petipa was allotted a pension of 9000 rubles. This is a fantastically large sum. This pension is, in itself, culturally significant. Fortunately, today, unlike in the sad situation in the 1990's, the figures of the ballet arts, as a rule, have no cause for complaint about inattention to them on the part of the authorities or the absence of state care. I can at least say this regarding the situation in our theatre. So, at present the project of the Dance Academy is being realized in St Petersburg. In September 2012, the Academy is to open its doors. At this educational institution, new generations of workers in the ballet arts will be nurtured. We intend to search for talented children throughout Russia, giving special attention to gifted orphans and children from problem families.

However, not everything looks so cloudless for the fragile art of ballet. The mass information society, under the conditions of which we all live, is characterized by the unmitigated hegemony of mass culture. For this reason, we can, sadly, speak of serious art's peripheral, marginal existence today in the general context of culture. Pop culture, of course, is needed, and moreover every person is connected with it in one way or another. The matter is about balance, however, about the correlation of opportunities.

To speak of all this is very bitter. It is significantly more pleasant to share the joy of communicating with the public in our city, in Russia, and in the world. I believe that our staff does a worthy job of representing Russian choreography throughout the world. We compete with troupes that have ten times the budget and modern stages in their countries. Our theatre attracts viewers tired of the endless repetition of several titles of the classical repertoire and of abstract ballet that is glaringly out of touch with theatrical tradition and devoid of any psychology or dramaturgical foundation.

For me, the art of dance is a unique opportunity to research the spiritual and psychological world of man with the help of that intricate set of artistic tools that is the ancient language of the body. People often ask me why most of my protagonists are suffering, sweeping characters sunken deep in madness and un-

reality. The answer is obvious. I was always interested in the world of human passions, agonies of the soul. However, I am almost more strongly carried away by the opportunity to address eternal philosophical problems – those 'accursed questions' about the place of man in the world, about good and evil, about love and freedom.

The composition of ballets is also a wonderful chance to reveal the unknown in the known, referring to the texts of the works of great Russian and foreign authors or the pages in the biographies of legendary historical figures. It is precisely by touching on what is hidden between the lines, the internal magic of Pushkin's, Tolstoy's, and Dostoyevsky's texts, that generates new poetics and philosophical meanings.

There is a cultural memory, in which the atmosphere of plays is revived and Anna Pavlova, Mathilde Kchessinskaia, and Olga Spessivtseva continue to dance because in the dialogue of cultures not only texts, buildings, rhythms, and lines participate, but also people – every one of us. Culture is not only an environment, but a *Lebenswelt* (life-world). We cannot forget this.

The title of Doctor *honoris causa* of the University, which Natalya Mikhailovna Dudinskaya was awarded in 1995, occupied a worthy place in the range of the great ballerina's numerous in-country and foreign titles and awards. But the fact that this occurred 32 years after she left the stage is a fact that merits respect and admiration. The reality of ballet, as opposed to architecture or literature, is ephemeral. The curtain falls, and there is nothing more. But it turns out there is. And it will be there as long as our cultural memory is maintained. Thanks to the University.

Pushkin's question faces us now, as never before:

Shall I behold the Russian Terpsichore's flight
that her soul performs?

Pushkin, the great visionary possessed of a powerful and discerning mind, could hardly have supposed the moral and intellectual pertinence of this query in Russia at the beginning of the third millennium. The answer lies far beyond the boundaries of ballet. Will we be able to live in a dialogic world, or will our existence become a collective monologue? It all depends on us.

M. El Zahaby¹

ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN PROMOTING THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

It will be interesting during this International Scientific Conference to reflect on the impact of globalisation in the field of culture dialogue, and the role Technologies of Communication and Information could now have on a global culture.

Information and communication technologies are today considered by the United Nations development Program, as 'indispensable' to the well-being of individuals and the development of societies. Meanwhile, globalization as a process of 'multiplication, acceleration and intensification of economic, social, political and cultural interactions' is especially influenced by the development of the information and communication technologies (ICTs). The increase of speed and quantity of information circulating is one of the major characteristics of globalization. It is in this context that the terms 'knowledge economy' or 'information society' become meaningful. With this progress in the fields of informatics and telecommunications, the internet, the stock markets of the world being interconnected, and a virtual economy is born: according to the variations of the interest of currencies and the perspectives of remuneration of the capital, the financial profit of the investment

becomes more important than the productive function. It is therefore in the field of finance that the global village, dreamed of by the Canadian McCluen², comes to life at its best. *But the repetition of crises brings us to ask questions on the minimal regulations of these markets that escape to all control.*

Entertainment companies shape the perceptions and taste of people everywhere, spreading of western ideals of capitalism and promoting their values and cultures; Internet and cable TV are sweeping away cultural boundaries.

Let us start by tracing the borders between different cultures, is it easy to state how many cultures there are at the present time: a Western, a Chinese, a Hindu, an Islamic, or an Arabic one? Many people, even outside the West, think of Western culture as the dominant one on the international scene. But what is Western culture? A certain way of life forms among diverse nations, of an economic liberalism, political institutions, an absolute freedom society? *It seems that the definition of Western culture is becoming more and more diffuse. Is the today's world going forward in a slow dissolution of cul-*

¹ Permanent Delegate of the Arab Republic of Egypt to UNESCO.

² Herbert Marshall McCluen (1911–1980) Canadian philosopher and sociologist.

tures in what we might consider as modernization or globalization? Before, different regions of the world were not interconnected, now, they are all interdependent. Indeed, it seems that different cultures increasingly are losing their boundaries. Culture and globalization came to be understood as mutually incompatible.

Globalization paradoxes

According to Hegel cultural identity is essentially determined by difference, any culture defines itself in relation or in opposition to other cultures. History shows, that these relations are not as simple as we think. There were cases where a culture exercised its authority over others due to mere economic interests. The financial world is one of the principal factors of the globalization of the economy, with the establishment of the planetary market of capitals and explosion of speculative funds. It has begun at the beginning of the 1970's with the petroleum chocks and blowing up of the international liquidity which partly resulted from it, and with the peel-off of the dollar vis-a-vis the gold standard and generalized fluctuation of currencies that followed on the other hand. At the beginning of the 1990's, after the disappearance of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, the international companies launch a vast movement of redeployment of their activities. Globalization expresses a new phase in the planetary integration of economic, financial, social, ecological and cultural dependency.

But this apparent unification of the global space hides profound disparities. The world of the globalization is the world of the concentrations of all and, therefore, reinforces the inequalities. The gap between those who can take the opportunities offered by globalization and those who cannot find their place, between rich and poor, is growing at all levels: planetary, regional, national, and local. Only one fifth of the humanity consumes (and produces) the four fifth of the world's richness. Again without regulation, globalization causes marginalisation of the weakest and proliferation of illicit or criminal activities. Without contra-power, the capitalism will lead to concentration and monopole that ruin the competition and question the market mechanisms. 'As a change of scale, that is invention of a new pertinent space, the globalization only by existing inevitably creates tensions on the preexisting local configurations by threatening them by competition.'

The West was forced to define regulations to face the growing number of multiple clandestine. Public force had to regulate globalization by fixing norms, distributing the wealth, developing the territory, and so paradoxically globalization is accompanied by comeback of states that incline to protectionism, closure of frontiers, and introduction of legislation that puts limits. The free exchange is challenged as soon as it compromises some questions considered substantial as employment, security, health or access to energy. The zones of influence are constituted by bilateral agreements.

The incertitude face to face to the mutations of the world, rapidity of changes provoke as reaction an affirmation of local identities, reactivation of communities: search of identity bases. *Once more, globalization paradoxically fragmentises the world. Never ever have the commemorative fights and religious intolerance been so intense.*

Role of information and communication technologies (ICTs)

Cultures or civilizations have always, more or less strongly, interacted and this ongoing exchange is what helps to enrich or impoverish a civilization. ICTs nowadays play a fundamental role in the process of constructing and affecting of societies as well as of their cultures and identities. New technological developments have made it possible to establish connections among mobile telephones, televisions, personal computers, and other electronic devices. It presents a great opportunity for con-

tact and exchanges with others; it is the pillar to opening and diminishing physical distances effects. It is possible to know what is happening at the far end of the planet in a real time, and to have access to a huge amount of information. On the other hand, many people point out the risk of homogenization, and by focusing on one type of cultural offerings that would tend to become the norm. For D. Wolton¹, one more of globalization paradoxes lies in that the increased availability of information does not automatically coincide with a better understanding of the world; meaning that having access to a wealth of information does not mean that we can understand better what is happening on other side of the globe.

On the contrary, physical distances being reduced, the cultural differences appear with greater acuity. Badly understood, cultural differences can become problematic, become subject to rejection. That is why *globalization of culture is also political.* Under the pretext of preserving its authenticity and its cultural uniqueness, any group may withdraw unto themselves, develop nationalist, extremist movements, and take xenophobic or racist actions. Cultural issues, long considered of lesser importance than political or economic questions are now viewed with more accurateness because they may also be potential carriers of conflict.

The access of a rising number of individuals to the common information and communication networks leads to two effects:

– The first is the birth of a sort of 'common culture' marked especially by recourse to an 'English of communication' (sometimes called globish for global English), and that brought by cultural products (cinema, music, television, and informatics) or lifestyles (western sports, Italian or Chinese cuisine...). Some people take it for a risk of impoverishing of the cultural diversity, even domination of a certain conception of economic and social relations. Many of us feel that the most public symbols of globalization consist of Coca-cola, and the news on CNN. The term of the universal civilization, itself, is subject to polemics.

– The second is the sharp realization of cultural diversity and the interdependence of all the individuals. Because of the multiplication of the information sources, there is a better knowledge of certain habits and the world diversity. Minority cultures could thus find a visibility. ICTs give the opportunity for small cultures to express themselves and flourish, to reach a wider audience, to compare each other and to open themselves to the world. Question of this international dimension is accompanied with the rise of the importance of the NGOs as most important actors.

Cultures, however, which have not mastered the ICTs, may not be able to develop against the ever-increasing weight of other cultures that dominate the media space. There is indeed an imbalance in the interactions of different cultures, and it seems that we have now understood the risk that this imbalance has. Access to ICTs is not uniform and even. There is a gap (digital divide) between the developed countries and 'developing countries'. The concepts of 'global village' or 'global information society' have to be nuanced, since a large majority of the world population is denied access to information and communication networks. Today, 80 % of people in the world are excluded from the global information networks. Less than 4 % of Africans are connected to the Web. Once again, the field of culture is also subject to commercial transactions and the process necessitates introduction of some rules that would make sure that the rights of ownership and the rights of authors are respected. It is all there the input of the Uruguay Cycle² negotiations. But beyond these exclusive rights we have to ask

¹ Dominique Wolton (1947-), Researcher. Information and Communication Sciences.

² Known also as Uruguay Round. It is the most important of the international negotiations cycles in the frame of the General Agreement on GATT, between 1986 and 1994. It has given birth to the World Trade Organization (WTO).

ourselves, *did globalization preserve the cultural identity? And what are the sociocultural inputs and impacts of the globalization?* It is these questions that could rise today with regard to the protection of the cultural identity.

Can globalization preserve cultural identity or is the cultural diversity being challenged?

Over the last decade, experience shows that Culture is varied from society to society, but liberalism makes problems to the preservation of identity of some nations of so called minority cultures; or even, it could cause their disappearance and assure thus the supremacy of the dominant culture. If it is true, that much of the world beyond the West has been impregnated and in a sense contaminated by Western culture, so a global restructuring and rebalancing would be needed. A new model, based on nation's diversity, will have to be founded on a number of common values, mutual respect and beliefs. Culture is the domain par excellence where the diversity is the source of research and expression of a one whole nation. Furthermore, *culture cannot be reduced to economic and financial issues*, so the prospect of abandoning it to the simple laws of supply and demand seems unsatisfactory. The question is: *how to ensure the preservation of cultural identities in an open world where capital flows, assets (including cultural) and services circulate virtually without obstacles?* How to live together in diversity? This question arises at the beginning of this millennium. D. Wotton calls for the implementation of a cultural coexistence: 'To organize cultural cohabitation is to ensue a minimum of mutual understanding as to absorb the effects of globalization'. Ensuring cultural diversity means to preserve and develop the multiplicity and interactions between the various cultural expressions around the world and enrich our common cultural heritage. Cultural Pluralism (according to the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity of UNESCO), 'could be the political response to the above question, that is to say, global governance capa-

ble of managing peacefully relations between various human groups, implying that all cultural expressions are represented in a democratic and faire manner.

Media promoting dialogue and understanding among different cultures

In multicultural societies, the media; today, by its role in shaping public opinion, have a potential to be the vital channel in promoting dialogue and reducing conflict among cultures. This could be achieved through two axes: (1) diffusing knowledge and deeper better understanding of local or national communities, belonging to different cultures, about their habits, ways of thinking or styles of life; and (2) through facilitating dialogue, based on tolerance and mutual respect, among different, religious, ethnic and social groups, on all national, regional and international levels. But this media potential is still far to be realized.

Examples from various parts of the world: the last year tragedy where the Buganda Royal tombs, the world's cultural heritage site, were burnt, the Rwanda genocide of 1994, or again the Serbian war and everywhere where ethnic or religion armed conflict prove that the failure to understand each other and the rights of both to be 'different' and to be 'equal' is disastrous.

To face this challenge of cultural coexistence and living together despite cultural differences, it is necessary that the international community, associations, NGOs and other stakeholders, devise an innovative mechanism enabling every culture to express itself and to be heard, enabling cultural diversify to persist by allowing each culture to protect its unique characteristics without being cut off from others, expecting its survival and assure its development, and enabling dialogue between different groups. The media have to assume its duty as a facilitator of inter-culture dialogue effectively, and cooperate more closely among themselves, at the local, national, regional and international levels.

Souheil Farakh¹

FROM DIALOGUE TO PARTNERSHIP OF CIVILIZATIONS: PRINCIPLES, OBSTACLES, PROSPECTS

The fundamental idea of institutionalizing both the UN and UNESCO is that dialogue can resolve conflicts, that variety is a universal benefit, and that the peoples of the world are more united by their common fate than they are separated by their identities. The UN, in the way it was intended, can become a good basis for dialogue between civilizations, a forum for such dialogue to expand, and be fruitful in all spheres of human activities. (1)

It was stated by Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary General, almost ten years ago. Since then hundreds, if not thousands conferences, seminars and meetings have been held in various countries of the world. In this respect several critical questions arise, I'll try to give answers to some of them.

Why is the culture of dialogue between different civilizations, religions and spheres of knowledge still not widespread and accepted in the West, and why is it not attractive for the advocates of totalitarian political and religious doctrine in the East?

¹ Ph.D., foreign member of the Russian Academy of Education, Professor of Chair of Philosophy of the Department for Humanities at the Lebanese University. Author and compiler of books: *Spiritual Secularization and Religion: Experience of Christianity and Islam* (Dukhovnaja sekularizatsija i religija: opyt khristianstva i islama), *F. M. Dostoyevsky. God, Man and Civilization* (F. M. Dostojevskij. Bog, chelovek i tsivilizatsija), *Metropolitan Ilya (Karalm) and Russia* (Mitropolit Ilija (Karalm) i Rossija), *Diversity of Cultures: Experience of Russia and Levantine East* (Raznoobrazije kul'tur: opyt Rossiji i Levantijaskogo Vostoka) and some others.

What principles are essential, what problems and prospects are possible in the course of dialogue and, more important still, of building partnership of civilizations? Finally, what tentative conclusions can be drawn in the process of dialogue and partnership?

I do not claim to give exhaustive answers, on the contrary, I leave the matter open for profound and critical rethinking, I'll try to make the first sketch of a holistic picture on this topical issue.

Principles of Dialogue

Dialogue has its base, conditions, constraining factors and desirable effects that should reveal themselves in relations between man and the environment, between civilizations and religions, between various spheres of humanities and natural sciences. Let us try reducing them to the following points.

First, before starting a dialogue with anyone, it is necessary to have it with oneself. In such a case, one should analyze both uniting and separating elements. As any dialogue based on common sense and emotions starts with the choice between doubt and certainty, between different ideas and policies of behaviour. All that is typical of man, and it is within one ideology, one faith, and one culture.

Second, dialogue requires a partner, moreover, a sincere partner, because only in an open dialogue there is an emotional

move towards each other that grows into a mutual tendency to further rapprochement and cooperation. In this regard dialogue turns out to be an entry to the process of cognition extension and of deliverance from incorrect thoughts and judgements about oneself and the other party. Besides, the truth, as stated by one of the most prominent sages of the East, the metropolitan George Hodre, 'cannot be born out of a closed heart. It emerges from two ideas, superposing one another.' (3)

Third, as every man has his strengths and weaknesses in various fields, any dialogue should be developed on the basis of equal attitude towards Western and Eastern man as a universal value and on the basis of equality of man before the Creator and the Universe.

Fourth, a successful dialogue is determined by unconditional acceptance, respect and concern of the parties about each other. Dialogue is not built on the attempts at convincing the partner that one's statements and activities are correct and denying the partner's ideas and experience. On the contrary, a genuine dialogue should be based on clarification, understanding, learning and a delicate approach. The principle of social behaviour that determines our attitude towards personal cultural 'ego' and interaction with the partner's cultural 'ego' involves acknowledging principles of objectivity and relativity when evaluating contribution of each person to civilization.

Fifth, it is assumed that the partner has a free will, because dialogue requires independence in thoughts and broad knowledge of the parties rather than strict obedience to the letters, blind submission to ideological dogmas and drifts of historical memory filled with antagonism and confrontation.

Sixth, dialogue should advance us to the next stage in partnership that involves all levels and spheres of activities of all peoples in the world, the most important of which are:

- (a) exchange of ideas about spiritual, moral and ethical values;
- (b) partnership by means of creating a broad network of economical, public and cultural relations, as well as relations in scientific spheres where the parties take efforts to cooperate in order to support mutual interests;
- (c) dialogue as a debate, which is a democratic discussion in order to enhance meaningful, rational and critical spirit in the relations of both parties;
- (d) dialogue and partnership of experiences treated as analysis of positive and negative attempts in terms of sociology for meaningful development and bringing out full potentials, constantly feeling and perceiving the reality and the existence.

Seventh, the influence of the parties of the dialogue should be bilateral. Despite the fact that a typical feature of life is struggle between the strong and the weak (which advocates of Darwinist social philosophy focus on together with the supporters of the idea of an inevitable clash of civilizations and religions), the thinkers of Western and Eastern worlds should count on another model of relations between religions and civilizations, that is a positive and meaningful cooperation.

Such are the seven principles that create a successful pattern that at first sight seems idealistic and hard to realize, because dialogue, to say nothing of partnership, faces obstacles inside the two worlds as well as obstacles of relations between these worlds.

Obstacles for Dialogue and Partnership

Every people of the world has its own language, religion, pattern of thinking and behaviour. Differences are a *natural obstacle* in matching one people with another; however they make the emergence of dialogue and partnership inevitable, which, in turn, becomes an essential moral and ethical duty. Alongside with that, as French sociologist Armand Matler duly noticed: 'Dialogue and partnership held between different people turn into an exciting adventure, that is performed between

people differing in their ethnical and cultural features and traits.' (2)

The second obstacle which is, to my mind, the most important one, is not concerned with the differences, but is rather confined to two basic problems. The first is the lack of anthropological thinking about the humanity and the existence in general. The second is the lack of rational and reasonable personal thinking.

The lack of these two approaches can be distinctly traced not only among 'common' believers in the Western and Eastern worlds. It is clearly manifested in the ideas of religious and cultural élites that form the public opinion, mass consciousness and tastes. It is here that the greatest hazard can be observed, because such a lack creates the main obstacle for a universal objective academic thinking about man, religion and culture.

The third obstacle, none the less significant, concerns the pressure of historical memory on both parties of the dialogue. Divergences between cultures and religions are rooted in differences in the sacred texts and rituals. They are related to a multi-centenarian struggle for territories and spheres of influence that manifested itself in clashed and numerous wars.

In the so-called 'hot spots' we can witness demonstrations of fanaticism, religious fundamentalism, and terrorism as the extreme level of hostility. On the contrary, in peaceful areas movements in favour of constructive dialogue between various religious communities operate actively. Of the areas with both scenarios, anxious anticipation and awareness are typical.

To achieve the goals one should concentrate on development of the strategy to perform the following tasks:

- (1) study historical memory thoroughly and determine its effect on the present;
- (2) apply comparativistic methods in terms of objective anthropology;
- (3) study mutual attraction between religious and historical languages and the thought that these languages realize;
- (4) identify the causes of contradictions between a scientific approach and the one produced by imagination and fears. 'Knowledge and culture,' Mohammed Arkoun, a scholar in Islamic studies, states, 'become broader and more abundant when accurate measures of justice, truth, good and beauty are applied, and not only for a single clan, tribe, group, community and nation, but for the whole mankind.' (4)

The fourth obstacle, that prevents opening the gates of dialogue wide, concerns poor knowledge of sacred texts and religious people. Quoting from German philosopher Paul Holbach, 'ignorance is the father of sins'. There are plenty of controversial issues between people of different beliefs, the sources of which did not come from an outside pressure or attempts to conquer and capture the loot, that were pretending to be a religion, but rather ignorance of the core essence of sacred texts that are abundant with love, peace and pure worship of the Almighty. Such common spiritual and religious values can be traced in any religion.

The fifth obstacle is the most severe competition between secular and religious thinking about the issues of existence and life. Absence of mutual recognition of limits of knowledge, material and spiritual opportunities of each party supports tension in relations between the parties. Religious thinking that links the fates of mankind to the Creator's will and wish and that attempts to establish an interval between the Creator and His creation in order to deliver His glory from temporary variations and constant historical dramas appears to be very positive, without doubt.

At the same time we can notice that secular ideology, on the contrary, links fates of people, dialogue and partnership of civilizations to a general course of history of mankind, that is, to the dialectics of constantly changing historical movement that is accompanied by constant evolution of all types of public consciousness.

In this respect, any idea, religious or secular, delivers itself from certain restraints, but at the same time, sets limits through certain warnings. Not only does it create a significant cognitive challenge in the course of universal dialogue and partnership between states and people all over the world, but also causes a huge split in cultural and ideological basement of one civilization and one people as well as a gap between the followers of one religion among the believers and the followers of one ideological trend among secular people.

The sixth obstacle is mixing historical dimension of a religion with its ceremonial dimension and artificial interpenetration of political and religious elements. This phenomenon is clearly seen in most countries of the Middle East where monotheistic world religions emerged. Unfortunately, such phenomena affect all believers living all over the world. The above-mentioned is a stumbling stone on the way to mutual learning and positive contact not only between believers in different countries, but between people of one nation who belong to different religions or confessions.

The seventh obstacle exists in many countries of non-Western liberal democratic world; it is their insufficient and abridged democracy. Absence of democratic culture and experience there makes most systems of power close to autocratic models. Alongside with that, many leaders, unable to establish their power by means of democratic order, exploit their past religious and political heritage.

The eighth obstacle, probably the most complex, because it concerns the so-called 'masters of globalization' that occupy key positions in managing finances, politics, have power and authority on the territory of the 'golden billion' countries. They are not interested in cultural dialogue, and even less in fair partnership of civilizations. On the other hand, business and political ruling élites of the countries outside 'the golden billion' are not concerned with the dialogue of civilizations either.

As a result, these matters inevitably conflict with the idea of creative and fair dialogue and partnership of people, between civilizations that strive to cooperation and integration.

Prospects

Despite the obstacles, there is a range of common standards that form universal issues in various fields for all people.

There are very broad spheres: cultural, philosophical, religious, spiritual, political, economical, where it is possible to have a reasonable and rational dialogue and to achieve agreement on making partnership strategy between the parties in various spheres. I would like to concentrate on some of them.

On philosophical, religious and spiritual levels there are matters of existence that can be studied creatively, openly and thoroughly, taking cultural and religious achievements of all civilizations into account. In particular, these are the matters of life and death, forgiveness and responsibility, pain and happiness, earthly and eternal life and other significant matters of life that concern the present-day man.

Both Western and Eastern worlds with their religious, ethnic and cultural diversity make a rough area of dialogue and conflict of cultures, religions, interests and expectations. These two worlds need tight and close rapprochement, because this is something required by the logics of their interests and by realistic and rational strategies effective and beneficial for both parties.

Our faith is strengthened by cohesion and cooperation of a number of powerful and active forces and figures for the sake of creating a realistic basis for the universal dialogue and partnership of civilizations. Nevertheless, it is necessary to create new techniques and institutions for dialogue and partnership on the level of non-governmental organizations (especially where various cultures and confessions co-exist), the ones that would take charge of observing the rights of national and religious minorities in their regions.

I should also mention several important plans by the UNESCO, forward-looking projects and activities performed by many organisations inside and outside Russia that represent various civilizations on different levels and in different spheres. In particular, International Institute named after P. Sorokin and N. Kondratiev and above all, its President, academician of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences Y.V. Yakovets, who introduces new ideas and practical proposals for the UNESCO in the field of science, education and culture (5).

All of us will have to have an intense struggle to establish the mode of global development that could decrease risks of clashes and conflicts between civilizations. In this struggle a critical role belongs to efforts in such areas as international relations, religion, morality, education, economics and law. It is very important to strengthen responsibility and partnership between civilizations. A thorough understanding of responsibility, as emphasized by a German scientist Hans Jonas, 'leads people to the technological era by means of philosophical thinking and humanitarian morality and encourages them to build relations between them on new moral grounds' (6).

In this respect it is appropriate to recall the words by Russian-American sociologist Pitirim Sorokin: 'The truth, the good and the beauty are united again in the paramount triad of values which reveals more and more completely the mysteries of the Supreme reality and which loyally serves the mankind in its creative mission on this planet and beyond' (7).

In this regard a demand arises for new philosophy of ethics, culture, security, spirituality that should follow the imperatives listed below:

(1) work to create universal ethics in relations between individuals, communities, peoples and civilizations. Within the frames of this ethics principles of mutual respect, mutual responsibility, cooperation, solidarity and social justice are formed;

(2) promote and propagate ideas of cultural, religious and spiritual diversity. Human world should be as diverse and multi-coloured as the plant and animal worlds;

(3) create techniques to achieve peaceful co-existence, cooperation and mutual exchange between all civilizations and cultures in order to turn the Earth into a common and friendly fatherland for everyone;

(4) deliver from the illusion of the need to keep closed national identity and fundamentalism. Be committed to universal values and ideas;

(5) prevent dissolving national features after the transition to a unified mode. Maintain originality of every people and of every individual, keeping personal features;

(6) if the progressive advance of globalization and technological and informational progress is an actual and predestined fact, preserving a sound value nucleus in the cultural identity of peoples is a moral duty for the strong and the weak, for the superior and the inferior, for the élite and the masses;

(7) if the response of politicians and peoples to domination of consumer ideology turns into orientation on a spiritual element of man's personality, religious élites should perform this hard task. Taking into account the sacred religious mission and eternal spiritual principle, these élites should pay much attention to spiritual education of people, concentrate on morality and withdrawal from temptations, abandon the baiting of political and material comforts, but many representatives of religious institutions fall short of the mark;

(8) the world will not survive through a new wave of wars, conflicts and clashes of civilizations.

The future of human civilization on the globe depends on the results of speculative polemics, confrontation of various forms of academic, religious, cultural discourses. In every advanced civilization, every advanced country, every advanced culture, whether authentic or borrowed, such confrontation has its peculiar traits. However, it leads to working out universal hallmarks that prepare the mankind's entry into a new earth and space age.

References

1. Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations: Inter-Confessional and Cross-Cultural Dimensions (Dialog i partnjorstvo tsivilizatsij: mezhkonal'noje i krosskul'turnoje izmerenija) // Compiled by S. Farah. Moscow – Beirut – Nizhniy Novgorod: 'Medina' Publishing House, 2010, p. 10 (*in Russian*).
2. Armand Matler. Diversité Culturelle et Mondialisation. Ed. La Découverte, Paris, p. 32–33 (*in Arabic*).
3. Metropolitan George Hodre. Islamic and Christian Relations: Interpretation of the Present and the Future. – Beirut: Centre for Strategic Studies Research and Documentation, 1994, p. 209.
4. Mohammed Arkoun. Rethinking Islam. – Beirut: Atuya, 1996, p. 232.
5. UNESCO's Universal Declaration. On Strategy of Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations in Science, Education, Culture and Ethics. – Moscow, 2010 (*in Russian*).
6. Hans Jonas. Le Principe de 'Responsabilité'. Une éthique pour la civilisation technologique. Ed. de la Cerf. Paris, 1992.
7. P.A. Sorokin. The Main Tendencies of our Time (Glavnyje tendentsii nashego vremeni) – Moscow: Nauka, 1997, p. 241–242 (*in Russian*).

M. Fedotov¹

‘US’ AND ‘THEM’ IN THE PRISM OF MASS MEDIA

Some truths need no proofs; however, they need regular and extreme efforts to be recognized. One of such truths is love of one's neighbour. Despite the maxim 'Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them' with its two-millennium history, man has approached this moral imperative no closer. This is particularly true if we talk about people who speak a different language, profess a different faith, and have a different colour of skin, a different nose or shape of eyes. Then, in contrast to God's principle, for whom 'there is neither Greek nor Jew', there appeared notorious 'Paragraph Five' that drew a dividing line between 'us' and 'them'. According to the Constitution of Russia this paragraph can no longer be found in application forms. But, 'they don't judge you by your passport, but by your face', as the saying goes.

Ethnic minorities are not an exclusively Russian challenge, as there are about 3,500 ethnic groups worldwide that reside in more than 200 nation-states. Even this simple comparison illustrates that titular nations are outnumbered by minorities in the context of historically mixed nations. 100 years ago Vladimir Soloviev wrote: not a single nation can live in itself, with itself and for itself; but it carries out a certain inherent function in the shared life of humanity, which is interpreted as its national idea.

All the attempts to redistribute ethnic territories or property etc. by force only lead to numerous victims that cannot be justified by the earlier proclaimed aims. They also bring about new severe hardships in our disquieted world. Interethnic conflicts keep breaking out time and again despite their irrationality and immorality that have been shown many times. They also bring closer Samuel Huntington's apocalyptic forecast on the coming 'clash of civilizations'. However, most of the times a conflict of civilizations turns out to be a clash of ignorance in fact. This is one of the reasons for a deep international concern about interethnic relations.

¹ Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights, Secretary of Journalists' Union of Russia, LL.D., Professor, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation. Mr. Fedotov is one of the authors of the USSR law 'On Press and Mass Media' (1990) and the law of the Russian Federation 'On Mass Media' (1991). Professor Fedotov is author of more than 200 scholarly publications, including books: *Law of Mass Media in the Russian Federation* (Pravo massovoj informatsiji v Rossijskoj Federatsiji), *Legal Foundations of Journalism* (Pravovye osnovy zhurnalistik), *Law on Mass Media at the Crossroads of Centuries and Views* (Zakon o SMI na perekrestke vekov i mnenij), *Russian Federal Law 'On Mass Media': 15 Years on the Watch of Freedom* (Zakon RF 'O sredstvakh massovoj informatsiji': 15 let na strazhe svobody), *Desk Book on Media Self-Regulation* (Nastol'naja kniga po medijnomu samoregulirovaniju), *Russian Legislation of Mass Media: Formation, Development, Degradation* (Rossijskoe zakonodatel'stvo o SMI: formirovanije, razvitije, degradatsija), *Laws and Practices of Mass Media in Europe, America and Australia* (Zakony i praktika sredstv massovoj informatsiji v Evrope, Amerike i Avstraliji) and some others. M.A. Fedotov is decorated with medal issued by UNESCO on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Russian Orthodox Church Medal of St. Most Orthodox Prince Daniel of Moscow. Mr. Fedotov was awarded the Russian Federal Government Prize in Print Media.

In its desire to contribute to conflict prevention and peace-making, the world community has worked out some common regulations. They are manifested in the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Council of Europe's Framework Convention and other documents. In the Document of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE in Copenhagen, in particular, it was admitted by the member-states that ethnic minority issues can only be adequately settled down within democratic political context, which ensures the respect of human rights, political pluralism, social tolerance and enforcement of legal rules that prevent the misuse of public power. At the same time they undertook the responsibility to protect ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identities of ethnic minorities, to react against incitements to violence, discrimination, hostility or hate.

Naturally, conflicts do not break out of the blue. And strawberry prices at a kolkhoz market place are not the real trigger of conflicts, unlike Rafik Nishanov tried to make us believe a while ago. Conflicts are objective; their escalation or calming down depends on a number of aspects – economy, foreign policy etc. Besides, the tendency to distinguish between us and them is inherent in man. It is easily taken in, and rapidly grows into hostility, especially in the event when certain groups are in an open conflict about their vital interests, most of the times connected with access to limited resources. This form of the herd instinct shows, better than anything else, that there have been few steps made by the humankind on its way from the ape towards the image and likeness of God. Moreover, to implement the intra-class autarky none of the features like religion, race, language, region, nationality, profession or party membership is relevant as a trigger for distancing and alienation. That may account for a close proximity of extremism and aggressive nationalism – in their essence, in their tactics for the resource mobilization and in their methods for undermining the national status quo. It is no coincidence that very often the supporters of both trends act as a united front in Russia's politics and mass media. It is also no coincidence that one and the same article of Russia's Constitution (Article 29) prohibits propaganda and agitation that incite social, as well as racial, national or religious hostility and hate. Finally, it is no coincidence that the way towards tolerance in politics and international relations goes through the pluralism in politics and ideology, through a high degree of protection of human rights for everybody, for ethnic minorities in particular, through an access to mass media etc.

Although these are not journalists who initiate the problems of ethnic minorities, a careless or inaccurate piece of information, however, may easily trigger a conflict. And vice versa, a calm, accurate, fair, balanced and thorough coverage contributes to turning a conflict into a discussion, to escaping from the vicious circle of violence. This is the very reason why

the global intellectual community attaches a great importance to mass media and its role in prevention and settlement of interethnic conflicts. For instance, throughout the crisis in Bosnia UNESCO was supporting (financially as well) the local mass media with the internationally recognized independent stand towards the parties of the conflict; they were disseminating impartial information and supported peaceful coexistence and mutual understanding.

Support for independent mass media in promoting social reconciliation in post-conflict societies is manifested as priority in the UNESCO programme documents, and also in the decisions on particular countries. On the contrary, UNESCO Executive Council was unanimous in its concerns about the activities of the radio station that made the direct and public incitement to genocide in Ruanda; the decision was made on a special investigation into the media's role in the organization of mass ethnic killings (145 EX Decision. 8.3. II).

The specific character of the subject about ethnic minorities is that it goes on putting mass media before the moral-and-legal choice, while putting the authorities before the political-and-legal one. The choice of his role is the journalist's responsibility: whether to be an objective impartial observer, an advocate for tolerance and for cross-cultural dialogue or 'a spokesman of the public', trying to cash in on the ethnocentric myths and genuine ethnic sentiments. The governments' responsibility is to separate the wheat of concern and earnest criticism from the chaff of 'a team propagandist, agitator and manager', to stay within the framework of democracy, to stop incitement of hatred and discord and to stay away from censorship.

The Sana'a Declaration, adopted at the UNESCO Regional Workshop in Yemen on January 11, 1996, says: 'Reasonable journalistic practice is the most effective safeguard against governmental restrictions, values, and pressure from groups that have a special interest.' But what is the definition of 'reasonable journalistic practice'? It is clear to the global intellectual community that defining the guiding principles for journalists' activities is the responsibility of mass media professionals. Any attempts to set up deontic norms and guiding principles should come from journalists themselves. Any disputes, where journalists or mass media are one of the parties, should be dealt with in the context of civil, but not of criminal law and code.

But what is the actual reality? Journalists face a whole lot of dilemmas: how to escape accusations for incitement of hatred, on the one hand, or for betrayal of their own national or ethnic interests, on the other; what kind of tone brings up a growth of interethnic tension, and which one does quite the opposite; how to be impartial, if your audience is judgemental; how to be upright, if the people who own mass media want a biased coverage.

Indeed, 'a soldier of the ideological front' cannot and should not be impartial. A journalist, working under the democratic regime, is able to do so. But should he? Is it possible that the balanced information and the information in equal small portions about the attitudes of diverse parties guarantees objectivity?

Rather, the only institution that keeps trying thoroughly to find out reasonable limits for coverage of ethnic minorities' issues in mass media is the Press Council (www.presscouncil.ru).

The Council firmly believes that the incitement of social and national intolerance is reinforced by the biased information about the conflicts' background and the parties involved. The Council's decisions on particular cases are aimed at working out some commentaries (not always indisputable) on certain regulations of the Constitution, the Law on Mass Media, Journalist Moral Code that prohibit the propaganda of ethnic strife.

Obviously, at the present stage these guidelines are very scarce to help an editor or a 'field' journalist to master a civilized manner for coverage of ethnic minorities' issues. At the same time, State Supervising Committees are also not ready to compensate for the absence of such. On the contrary, due to the framework of public power independent bodies with the structures of civil society in their background, the developed democracies have accumulated an indispensable experience of how to respond to the violation of good manners in mass media coverage of ethnic relations.

The incident with Fun Radio, a popular French FM radio station, is extremely revealing in this respect. The scandal broke out on January 27, 1995. It was the 50th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz concentration camp; and the radio host, in his talk with one of the listeners, referred to Auschwitz as 'a country house', 'very attractive', which is 'on sale right now'. The Supreme Audiovisual Council of France, which had criticized one of the Fun Radio programmes for some sex-related 'dubious statements' a year before the incident in question, responded immediately and condemned 'the tone of ridicule'. Chairman of the Council Hervé Bourges said: 'Fun Radio's prank was provoking a scandal and even got beyond the bounds appropriate for black humour.' In the official note to the CEO of Fun Radio, it was pointed out that 'the radio station can be taken to court according to the Civil as well as Criminal Law, aside from the sanctions adopted by the Council'.

In his turn the executive of the radio station said that it had been a pure accident, 'very awkward, indeed'; he also obliged the radio host to apologize when on air. This almost idyllic picture makes up a striking contrast to the one in our country, where there are hundreds of Black-Hundred publications, whose ideas nourish radical nationalists of all stripes, inspire extremists and make up an ideological background for the armed pro-fascist groupings.

The problem is not whether it is necessary to restrict freedom of speech to fight against international terrorism; the problem is how to make use of it in this fight. However, while restricting freedom of speech is quite a simple thing (if there is the government will), making use of it needs a lot of effort of heart and mind. Every person – a journalist, a politician, an official, a businessman, a man in the street – should feel his responsibility to other people, to those who will come after us. We will need a total moral mobilization to perceive the idea that was so amply expressed by Martin Luther King Jr.: 'We must learn to live together as brothers or perish together as fools.' If we fail to find support in our own conscience, or if we agree to sacrifice freedom to our fighting against extremism, we will eventually understand: ignorance has won a victory on the civilization and made it its own likeness.

A. Flier¹

ELITIST, FOLK AND MASS CULTURE: DIALOGUE AT THE SCAFFOLD

It is a common knowledge that there are many features to distinguish and classify various cultures. For instance, it is obvious that cultures differ in ethnic, confessional, class features; one doesn't have to be a specialist to be able to see their specific character. Grouping and labelling cultures by technological, archaeological, economical and some other features is not as obvious, so only experts can systematically distinguish them. Among those subtle but very relevant differences differentiation by social functions is one of the most important.

Such phenomena as elitist, folk and mass culture² are well known, they are constantly studied (including comparative analysis). Elitist culture and folklore are very often contrasted by social, artistic and stylistic features, while mass culture is defined as 'a waste of civilization'.³ However, their functional differences are much more complicated, and the meaning of their distinction more important.

By its social function, elitist culture (which more precisely should be called creative) is mostly targeted at customized production. It is performed by trained people with special qualifications, and the quality of the product is the key criterion to assess their work. That's why creative culture most vividly manifests itself in upscale commissions, it can be called 'elitist' judging by its consumers and customers rather than by manufacturers.

But it should be pointed out that social elite most willingly takes part in the production process, especially in humanitarian and artistic segments. Creative culture is a culture of high quality, it provides, first and foremost, social differentiation by occupational groups, social strata, fellowships. People of this cultural type have common professional activities and quality assessment readings. The most valued professional appraisal for these people is to be called an 'expert', 'professional'.

Folk culture (more precisely called traditional) is, by its social function, targeted at non-specialized production (family consumption) and material, informational, social, cultural exchange (mostly with community members). It is a culture of domestic community communication, and conventions are the key element of it. Traditional culture is mostly performed by the peasantry, universal labourers, who can execute all household activities and symbolic acts to exist under the given conditions. The basic criterion to assess their work is how their activities correspond conventions. It is a culture of tradition, it provides, first and foremost, ethnical social unity (that is, communicational unity). People of traditional culture have common place of dwelling, and their dwelling is the basis for their iden-

tity. The most important assessment for specimens of culture is to be called 'locally made'.

Finally, mass culture by its social function is mostly targeted at material, informational, artistic, etc. consumption. It is a culture of the crowd, the audience in the cinema, sport fans at the stadium, customers in a shop, clients of a restaurant, people on a holiday excursion, i.e. people united by chance, by a situational short-term common interest. Such culture does not produce anything by itself, it only hires trained people to satisfy its needs. It is a culture of consumers and control over consumption ambitions. The control over consumption is a political goal. By its functions, mass culture is mostly political, it makes situational processes of mass consumption run smoothly. This culture is market-conditioned, with constantly changing market environment, it unites people by a common type of consumption or entertainment. The key identifying labels in this culture are the names of hobbies: a punk, a rocker, an actor's fan, a football team's fan, and so on.

Hence, we deal with cultures that provide production, exchange and consumption par excellence. Historical roots of creative and traditional cultures are no mystery, but as far as mass culture is concerned, one has to identify its historical predecessor, because mass culture as we know it only appeared in the second half of the 19th century. To my mind, its historical predecessors were cultures of closed male communities, isolated from large-scale social contacts, who were united only by the type of consumption – criminal gangs, prisoners, prisoners of war, soldiers of fortune, and so on. Members of those communities were united by a 'food pot', just like visitors of modern fast-food restaurants. History does not know other types of purely consumer communities.

This brings up a question of dialogue between the cultural phenomena mentioned above. It should be pointed out that in the course of history these three type of cultures were absolutely autonomous. They were isolated by people who produce and consume cultural products, they had so different values that they did not compete with each other, to say nothing of any serious interaction.

Absence of direct and straightforward interaction, however, does not mean there was no dialogue between those cultures at all. The dialogue was indirect, and as a rule, it was manifested through adoption of certain values and meanings originating in the bosom of one social culture and later expanding to other cultures in characteristic forms rather than through adoption of typical socially related forms. It was elitist culture that most explicitly affected other social cultures with its prestigious features. But folk culture was also likely to affect elitist one with its endogenous values and norms, though with no formal traces. Mass culture, being marginal and, as a rule, deviant, was not likely to be the source of any impact.

But in the second half of the 19th century industrial revolution started in Europe (including Russia) and North America, which resulted in large-scale urbanization, when hundreds, thousands, millions, dozens of millions of peasants and province dwellers migrated to cities, this also involved ethnical and political migrants. Such a large-scale mass migration has not only physical impact, but cultural as well. It was a cultural migration, to an alien cultural environment, to different norms of social justice, to other symbolic systems and so on. Moreover, it was transition of millions to the social environment lacking centuries-old established conventions that always used to play a crucial role in providing social stability, that used to make people's behaviour predictable and community-friendly. Actually, the process of migration triggered blurring of the social grounds of traditional culture.

¹ Professor of the Chair of Philosophy, Cultural and Political Studies at Moscow University for the Humanities, Head of laboratory of Pedagogic Cultural Studies at Institute of Adult Education of the Russian Academy of Education, Head of Research centre 'School of cultural modelling', Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 350 scholarly publications, including monographs and manuals: *Culture Genesis* (Kul'turogenez), *Cultural Studies for Culture Experts* (Kul'turologija dlja kul'turologov), *Non-Cultural Functions of Culture* (Nekul'turnye funktsii kul'tury), *Culture between Bondage of Conjunction, Bondage of Tradition and Bondage of Status* (Kul'tura mezhdu rabstvom konjunkturny, rabstvom obyčaja i rabstvom statusa) and some others.

² Cf., for example: Kostina A.V. National Culture — Ethnical Culture — Mass Culture: 'Balance of Interests' in the Modern Society (Natsionalnaya kultura — etnicheskaya kultura — massovaya kultura: balans interesov v sovremennom obščestve), Moscow, 2009; Gans H. Popular Culture and High Culture: an Analysis and Evaluation of Taste. N. Y., 1974.

³ Adorno T., Horkheimer M. Dialectics of Enlightenment (Dialektika prosvesčeniya), Moscow—St. Petersburg, 1997; Davydov Y.N., Rodnyanskaya I.B. Social Studies of Market Conditions. Critical Analysis (Sotsiologiya konjunkturny, Kritičeskij analiz), Moscow, 1980; Golitsyn G. 'High and Low' Art: Systemic Role of Elite Subculture (Iskusstvo vysokoye i nizkoye: sistemnaya rol elitarnoy subkultury) // 'Creation in Art and Art of Creation' journal (Tvorčestvo v iskusstve i iskusstvo tvorčestva), Moscow, 2000; Zakharov A.V. Traditional Culture in Modern Society (Traditsionnaya kultura v sovremennom obščestve) // 'Social Cultures Studies' journal (Sotsiologičeskiye issledovaniya), 2004, № 7 and others.

Under such conditions traditional culture was being displaced by mass culture, the latter regulated social behaviour on the basis of common consumer interests rather than on common historical conventions. I'm not going to discuss if we benefited from this substitution. Mass culture successfully performs its social stabilizing function, and if the elder generation doesn't like rock-n-roll, fast food and TV commercials, it is not yet the end of the world.

The problem is rooted rather in the fact that mass culture gradually began to perform stabilizing function too successfully, it became too universal and convenient for everyday life in all social strata, and it started to displace other types of culture from social environment, at least on a household level. It was the time when 'cultural guillotine' started to operate, it chopped off segments of elitist and traditional cultures that were quickly losing their social significance and productivity.

We can still remember the phenomenon called 'the intelligentsia household culture', it was widely spread in the national urban life in the intelligentsia circles some decades ago. What has remained since then? As I can judge, intelligentsia culture is turning to professional activities and professional consumer culture. We belong to the literati mainly by our occupation rather than by social and cultural status. At work or when going out we can still observe intellectual lustre. But at home, on a household level, in everyday consumption, modern Russian intelligentsia have almost transited towards mass culture standards, because they are more convenient, take less time, which is very important in modern galloping life, they take less intellectual efforts so highly required in professional activities. As far as high culture is concerned, I'd like to emphasize that specialists are becoming its basic manufactures as well as consumers. Musicians are constantly complaining: it is mostly musicians that make the audience of classical music concerts, while the number of other kinds of audience is decreasing. It is an empirical fact of our life. But, judging from the works by Western scholars, the same effect can be detected there, too, though in specifically Western forms.¹ Thus, what we call elitist (creative) culture is being encompassed within production and consumption of professional sphere, with no room to operate anywhere else. But in private life mass culture is getting universal.

Traditional folk culture is in a more difficult position still. During the 20th century this type of culture was losing its social grounds, because its social basis, the peasantry, was being blurred. Actually, by the late 20th century, industrially developed countries of Europe and North America could boast of having the peasantry only in the climate-unfriendly areas, where modern advanced agriculture is inefficient (for example, among highlanders). Spots of traditional folk culture in its natural living form can still be detected there. But we know practically nothing of this culture. We see it mostly on stage, where it is imitated by professional performers. Actually, nowadays, traditional culture in modern society is turning into a historical relic, a museum item that is kept for the benefit of tourists, both foreign and local ones.

But people of traditional culture are characterized not only by specific professional skills, but by specific psychology as well. These are people with 'common face' that gives expression to norms and interests of the rural community,² these people are competitive only in terms of team activities and community life.

Such social and psychological type of people can be found not only in rural, but urban areas, too. Under modern urban

conditions they have been transformed into social outsiders. They cannot successfully compete with more well-educated and psychologically flexible urban dwellers who base their activities rather on personal initiative and distinct individuality than on approved procedures of co-performers, like in rural areas.

Traditional culture becomes a certain 'cultural reservation' for social outsiders, within which they receive psychological compensation and social support. Nowadays many books are devoted to noticeable tendencies of neo-archaization in modern culture.³ Obviously, there are plenty of reasons for it, but one of the main reasons is demand for psychological compensation from social outsiders, which they achieve through turning to norms of traditional culture.

But search for traditional culture manifests itself not only in folk singing. New York 9/11 and recent explosions in Moscow underground are also demonstrations of traditional culture, showing teeth in the face of attacks of the social progress. It is the struggle not for returning to an established social status, as there is no chance to return it, it is a form of the loser's social vengeance against the winner. As they say, 'die with your boots on'. Nowadays these acts are performed by Islamic extremists, but there is no knowing who can join them tomorrow.

Now it is time to draw the conclusions. Peaceful co-existence of the three social functional cultures has come to the end. The dramatic changes started in social and cultural spheres of life, at least in the societies transiting from an industrial stage to a post-industrial one. General characteristics of the new order can be described as follows.

Mass culture is definitely taking the central place in the modern social cultural system, this type of culture assumes the role of universal culture that constantly, totally and globally regulates life style and leisure time of all social strata. Its complete victory results from such features as extreme flexibility, algorithmic convenience, intellectual and symbolic simplicity. High culture representatives most willingly use what mass culture has to offer, as the latter is the most efficient in terms of time, technical expenses and intellectual efforts. It is a 'fast-food' culture in a direct and figurative senses of the word. Mass culture is very suitable for semiliterate and poorly educated people, as it has simple symbolic codes and social orientation. This culture is growing basic and unrivalled at the market of consumption and entertainment.

Elitist (creative) culture is located in the specialized spheres of professional activities and consumption. Its artistic elements are obviously growing outdated, they are luxury items of consumption. But social importance of its cognitive element is becoming more valuable. Elitist culture is turning into specialized industry of producing new knowledge and meanings, which is, actually, the key target of the post-industrial stage. Creative culture has always performed this function, but it is only nowadays that creative culture is concentrated on it so intently. However, secondary segments of this culture, such as occupational and household ones are functionally chopped off by the guillotine of tough functional specialization.

Historical prospects of traditional culture seem very complicated and blurred (I'm talking, of course, about industrially developed countries that lack classical peasantry). Its artistic element is totally absorbed by stage imitation; its material household practice is almost suppressed by more available products of industrial mass consumption. Traditional culture is quickly losing its utilitarian, practical life-providing functions, it is principally turning into a mostly symbolic culture. For quite a long time now political powers have been using traditional culture as an ideological element demonstrated for the sake of propagation. But social characteristics of this culture

¹ Bauman Z. *Individualized Society* (Individualizirivannoye obschestvo), Moscow, 2002; Baudrillard J. *Le système des objets* (Sistema veschey), Moscow, 2001; Eco U. *A passo di gambero: guerre calde e populismo mediatico* (Turning Back the Clock: Hot Wars and Media Populism) (Polny Nazad!), Moscow 2007 and others.

² Kostina A.V. *Correlation Between Traditionism and Creation as the Basis of Social and Cultural Dynamics* (Sootnosheniye traditsionnosti i tvorchestva kak osnova sotsiokulturnoy dinamiki), Moscow, 2009.

³ Cf. for example, Khachatryan V. M. *Second Life of the Archaic: Archaic Tendencies in Civilizational Process* (Vtoraya zhizn arkhaiiki: arkhaziruyuschie tendentsii v tsivilizatsionnom protsesse), Moscow, 2009.

are specially targeted at social outsiders, it becomes their 'cultural reservation', where it keeps strong positions as a 'shelter for people outside the social progress', and this function is very likely to become the key one.

Does it mean that any dialogue between those three forms of culture ceased under the new conditions? Not in the least. In present-day conditions it is exercised in its specific forms.

Undoubtedly, living fashion of elitist culture to adopt specific forms of folk culture, typical of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that was associated with the final stage of establishment of bourgeois nations and with keeping specifically ethnic features of European cultures, has now come to its end. Although 'ethnic art' still remains very popular nowadays, its popularity is based on principally new grounds: on high merchandise touristic appeal of exotic ethnic items rather than on keeping live ethnic sentiments (and ethnic sentiments are not selling off).

Sound dialogue between elitist and traditional cultures is now being carried out in a completely different aspect, first, in living through national history, in ethnic cultural historical memory. As far as historical memory is concerned, it was only during the 20th century that oral folk culture started to be respected alongside with urban culture of dominating strata. This process is likely to develop further, because it is getting quite clear nowadays that history of a state and history of people are

different things. Present-day dialogue between elitist and folk cultures is carried out in the field of historical memory.

Dialogue between elitist and mass cultures has been carried out for a long time, it is clearly manifested in the fact that mass culture provides elitist culture with most successful commercial forms, which enables the latter to survive under present-day conditions, while elitist culture provides mass culture with cultural models and content patterns that the latter is unable to create. This mutual exchange turns out to be very productive, but decidedly pragmatic, technical, unable to create any new cultural values.

Finally, dialogue between mass and folk cultures seems to be the least evident and fruitful. Mass culture just adopts some forms from folk culture that are successful with the consumers as highly exotic and then it uses those forms in the contexts that have nothing to do with traditional ones.

I presume the further course of events will depend on the pace with which new conventions will appear in mass culture, i.e. how quickly mass culture will be turning into new traditional culture of urban populace. The latest studies show that these processes have already started.¹ But it is still practically impossible to imagine what segment of elitist and old traditional cultures will die out in the epoch of new social cultural trend to enhance functional specialization of cultures.

The scaffold of history is ever working, indeed.

G. Gatilov²

GLOBALIZATION, DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND THE UN

At the present stage of human development, globalization is becoming an objective factor affecting practically all spheres of our life. One cannot ignore the fact. No doubt, the domain of culture cannot help being exposed to the influence of globalization processes. Moreover, it is culture that is the most sensitive to the impact of globalization. Its forms are manifold and, in fact, can be expressed both through dialogue of cultures proper and through their interaction, interpenetration, enrichment, and through some other forms.

When such a dialogue develops in the evolutionary way based on mutual respect and equality, cultures enrich themselves with the most attractive features and characteristics of their dialogue partners and at the same time remain independent and self-sufficient. In fact, dialogue of cultures is most effectively accomplished when it is a natural continuation of civilizational traditions.

The situation can evolve in a different direction if another set of values, other alien social priorities and life goals are implanted in the social environment with its own values and goals historically developed over centuries and even millennia. Such an approach lays the foundation for a possible conflict within the clash of cultures.

Both scenarios are quite common at the present stage of the development of the world civilization. Therefore, it would be, perhaps, inappropriate either to put a negative spin on dialogue of cultures in the age of globalization, or to view it through rose-coloured glasses. It opens up both new opportunities and new challenges, poses inevitable threats and offers indisputable benefits.

It should be noted that special importance has been attached to the issues of intercivilizational and intercultural dialogue in recent years. Viewed previously from a purely theoretical point, they grew into the factors that directly affect internal stability of states and international security.

Long before the significance of promoting dialogue of cultures and civilizations became widely discussed, it had already existed *de facto* as a programme of the United Nations. That did not occur by accident. The UN platform brings together 192 member states, each having its own culture and traditions that can be sometimes similar and close, but still distinct. Moreover, there are many examples where a diversity of cultural trends efficiently coexists, interacts and develops within a single country.

In that connection, efficiency and performance of the dialogue initiated by the UN is determined, above all, by shared issues and challenges the international community faces at various stages of its development, as well as by understanding the need to compromise and take into account the views of partners in order to achieve mutually agreeable results.

With this understanding in view, many countries have come to realize the importance of addressing issues related to the need for pertinent governance of cultural diversity. So, the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) was initiated to pursue these goals. It is not by chance that this structure was formed under the auspices of the United Nations, the organization providing the most realistic opportunities to establish a broad intercivilizational dialogue between state officials, civil society groups, religious leaders, scholars, representatives of culture and mass media.

Russia is interested in further strengthening and developing this intercivilizational movement. Our representatives are actively involved in its work at all levels: at annual forums of the Alliance, at ministerial meetings of the AoC Group of Friends, as national coordinators of the events of the AoC Group of Friends, as permanent representatives to the UN in New York. Alongside with these events, non-governmental, social, scientific, educational institutions of our country actively participate in civil society programmes.

An important milestone of the development of the Alliance, of course, was its third Forum, held in Rio de Janeiro in May, 2010. It demonstrated a growing interest of the global community in the problems of dialogue between civilizations, confirmed the relevance of this organization and gave a fresh impetus to its future activities. The Forum identified steps to promote this initiative in prospect.

¹ *Surova E.E.* Iconic Traditions of the Modernity (*Ikonicheskiye traditsii sovremennosti*) // 'New Traditions' journal (*Novye traditsii*), St. Petersburg, 2009.

² Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Author of a number of publications, including: *Peacekeeping UN 'Blue Berets'* ('*Golubye kaski*' OON na sluzhbe mira), *Results of 'The Great Gathering' at the UN General Assembly* (*Itogi 'bol'shogo sljota' na Genassambleje OON*), *Results of the UN Doha Forum* (*Itogi foruma OON v Dohu*) and some others. G. M. Gatilov is decorated with the Order of Friendship.

Among the Forum announcements was that of launching several projects to foster intercultural dialogue and pertinent governance of cultural diversity. Holding such a far-reaching event in Brazil reinforced the Alliance of Civilizations and turned it into a global initiative that goes beyond the originally specified format of the dialogue between the Islamic world and the West.

A milestone in the development of the relations between Russia and the Alliance was a visit of High Representative of the UN Secretary General for the Alliance of Civilizations, J. Sampaio to Moscow in September, 2010. The talks at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and other organizations and agencies confirmed our mutual engagement in enhancement of cooperation that will gain a momentum by involving Russian Duma deputies into full-scale parliamentary work of the Alliance of Civilizations. The Russian Orthodox Church also expressed its willingness to advance the interreligious trend in the format of this intercivilizational movement.

A network of regional partnerships is gathering pace under the guidance of the Alliance. The process of developing regional strategies to promote intercultural dialogue has been launched, particularly for the Eastern European countries, for Euro-Mediterranean area and for the Iberian-American region. The first steps have been taken towards developing a similar strategy for Central Asia.

Those taking part in the debate shared their strong aspiration to view the Alliance of Civilizations as an influential mechanism of a 'soft force' in the hands of the UN, aimed at preventing outbreaks of new conflicts based on religious grounds and featuring clashes of cultures and at reconciliation of the parties in the ongoing and simmering conflicts. The Alliance could pursue these policies with all its humanitarian tools available to achieve rapprochement of the opposing sides.

However, not all conflicts are caused by contradictions of intercultural or interreligious character. They often accompany a number of interrelated negative processes: in particular, such as globalization, accelerated modernization of traditional societies, demographic problems, etc.

All this brings forth conflicts endangering both internal and external situations and what is more important regional ones. In this regard, the most striking example is the events recently observed in North Africa and the Middle East.

The explosive potential accumulating in the region for decades has fuelled a serious destabilization. The crisis has spread over the vast geopolitical space and had a direct negative impact on international security, global energy, financial and economic systems. The region entered into a phase of prolonged and profound instability, fraught with dangerous challenges for intercivilizational relations.

Can this area become a platform of actions for the Alliance of Civilizations with its 127 members, including a large number of Arab states? Is it appropriate to use its humanitarian practices to help ease the situation? The answer seems obvious. Efforts of the Alliance related to this area in the form of 'good will mission', as it were, cannot be more sought-after.

The difference between the Alliance of Civilizations and previous initiatives in this area seems to be precisely in the fact that within this framework, the main focus is not on the metaphysical issues of 'dialogue of civilizations', but on the real problems related to intercultural interaction. Taking into full consideration interests of civil society, it is also important to note that the Alliance is basically an interstate movement; it makes its decisions with due regard for the opinions of its member countries and international organizations, which helps to maintain the high prestige of this association, as well as to advance the solution of large-scale problems.

I would like to draw your attention to yet another aspect. Religion is an inextricable part of culture. It is logical then to consider interreligious dialogue to be an important element of dialogue of cultures. The United Nations could also serve an optimal platform for its promotion.

An imperative of our age is participation in the discussions of the global agenda by the leaders of major religious confessions

alongside with civil society representatives within the non-governmental segment of the United Nations, because the agenda issues are of moral, ethical, and religious significance.

In this regard, our country has put forward the initiative to set up the Consultative Council on Religions under the UN aegis, whose main task would be to establish a broad dialogue between different denominations and international organizations.

A structure like this could bring together representatives of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, dharmic religions, and Shinto. Being in fact of a religious nature, the Council on Religions could practise secular forms and methods in its activity. Its competence would extend to such areas as interreligious dialogue and dialogue with non-religious worldviews, the fight against defamation of religions and manifestations of intolerance and xenophobia, the protection of places of worship and holy sites, maintaining cultural and civilizational diversity in the context of globalization, promoting the resolution of regional religion-induced conflicts.

Efforts to advance this initiative in the UN have shown that so far some countries either reject the idea of embedding a religious component into international dialogue assuming the principle of separation of church and state, or are still wary of it. Sometimes this topic is considered in terms of providing unconventional sects and pseudo-religious groups and movements with additional freedoms of different kinds. Apparently, certain countries question the initiative fearing that their format of intercivilizational and intercultural dialogue may be contested.

Convinced of the need in this structure, Russia has offered to start with establishing High Level Group on Interconfessional Dialogue within UNESCO under the Director-General of the UN as an intermediate step as long as this idea has not met universal approval of the UN member states. The first steps towards the institutionalization of such a group seem encouraging, yet the issue is still to be resolved, considering the already mentioned reasons. One of the options for its resolution could take the form of some non-governmental organization accredited to UNESCO pursuing shared goals, although it hardly matches the scope and scale of the original idea of Consultative Council on Religions under the UN auspices.

In his speech at the 16th Session of the UN Council on Human Rights at the high level held in Geneva on February 28, 2011, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov highlighted 'the need to promote interconfessional concord, to join efforts of leaders of world religions to resist extremism and protect people jammed up in conflict zones.' He also said that 'the situation in many regions of the world, including the Balkans, Africa, South and South-East Asia, the Middle East, indeed requires an more accurate in-depth account of the religious factor, more so that in some cases, like the fate of Jerusalem, this factor is crucial.' Noting that Russia has consistently facilitated the proposal of interreligious dialogue on the platforms of the UN, Council of Europe, and UNESCO, Sergey Lavrov at the same time expressed hope for support of our partners in the issue.

Perhaps the original idea of creating an advisory council on religions should be revived at some other point. To do this, concert efforts of all confessions participating in its activities would be needed to support the idea of interreligious dialogue and include it in agenda of the UN. Efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church and its representatives abroad could promote the initiative at the local level.

In fact, anything would contribute greatly to propagate and support the idea: all kinds of specialized sites, conferences, symposia, round tables, whatever would promote its better perception and raise the global awareness.

Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on its behalf, could endorse the idea and begin organizational procedures aimed at putting the initiative into action as part of the UN activities.

No matter how the problem of mechanism of interreligious dialogue is resolved, involvement of the potential of upstanding trends of the global religious community in dialogue becomes an imperative, and its promotion and strengthening is the vital task of the world politics.

Yu. Goligorsky¹**'A TALE TOLD BY AN IDIOT, FULL OF SOUND AND FURY,
SIGNIFYING NOTHING'**

For those participants of the 'Readings', who were born and raised in the Soviet Union, there is no need reminding of a wonderful Alexander Mitta's film '*Gori, Gori, Moya Zvezda!*' ('Let My Star Be Bright Forever!') However, for those who haven't seen this iconic Soviet-time movie, I'll describe just three episodes from the film, featuring an inimitable actor, Eugene Leonov.

Leonov's hero – Pasha or Pashka – is a low-grade 'dream-pedlar', parasitizing off the back of the new medium – silent film. Pashka's 'milking cow' is a short primitive movie, depicting a young and wealthy lady of dubious virtue, who at a drop of a hat turns her back on her husband and embarks on a one night stand on the beach with a local Lothario, while her neglected young daughter accidentally drowns in the sea.

Pashka demonstrates this tear-jerking film to the unsophisticated village crowd, while supplementing the 'tragic' story (remember, it is still a silent movie!) with his loaded comments. Why 'loaded'?

Well, because every time the comments' nature is cut and trimmed in accordance with the audience's tastes. So long as it is unclear who is in charge in the village, Pashka's comments are completely devoid of any political slant and erring on the side of the anti-urban kitsch:

*Here is a city Dame – no morals and no shame...
And here is a Moscovite Dandy reeking of brandy...
...This mother's brain is made of garments and silly tales...
...This Zhigalo is on the go – he is only thinking of how to score ...*

*...That's what these city characters always do:
They hop in and out of marital bad, without much ado...
...But Mother-Nature cannot stand fornication:
It claims poor child's life for her Mother's deviation.*

But the village's power-vacuum is soon filled in by the 'Reds' – the Communists. The take-over deems to Pasha important enough to change the narrative and provide *the same movie* with a new and more 'socially responsible' voice-over:

Proletariat is down the mine, a farmer works like a bee,
While the bloodsucking capitalist is enjoying the Black Sea...

...Have a look, comrades, at one of these tossers and spivs:

The Entente Cordial sent him to Russia in his sloggi briefs...

...Such lack of morals ooh la la – is the order of the day for the world's bourgeois ...

...Years of oppression will permit us to glee when we drown the White Baron Wrangel in the Black Sea.

And again – a change of political scenery: the 'Whites' wipe out the 'Reds' from the village. The Village Hall audience comprises now of the Dukes, minor aristocracy, a motley of freeloaders, their mistresses etc. Ever so alert to the public's taste, Pashka changes his tune yet again:

The roses were so fresh and fragrant,
While Russia did not have these Commissars, whose smell is so repugnant...

...Who hasn't been a prisoner of passion?

*But our souls stayed always squeaky-clean...
...The child is dead, but hardly better will fare the fate of those who stayed alive...
The parents too will have succumbed to this Red menace,
But their horrid death will be avenged by the noble Whites...*

Why such a lengthy intro? The fact is that sometimes, while I watch TV programmes in various countries, I am reminded of 'Pashka - the Dreams Pedlar' and his 'topical' voice-overs. The technique of his 'creative writing' has hardly changed with the times. The accepted wisdom is that the camera's lens does not lie. It is true – camera cannot lie. Lie only those who hold camera in their hands. By all means not all of them are liars but some of them – do.

I am always amazed to discover how the video material, obtained by various broadcasters from the same news agencies, acquire completely different meanings in the hands of those who prepare them for broadcast.

'Terrorists' in some commentaries assume the halo of 'the freedom fighters' in others. 'Thugs and marauders' in one despatch are transformed into 'political activists, fighting against racial discrimination' in another.

'Strategic aviation, conducting an indiscriminate carpet bombing', is transformed into a 'modern and effective deterrent against the aggressor and the guarantor of the safety of civilians'. (Some of you, – and let the blame rest squarely on your shoulders! – may well think that I'm talking about the recent war in Georgia. The others will fathom out the makings of the conflict in Libya... Well, you are free to interpret my words as you see fit...)

The temptation to present your own point of view as the only correct one is fraught with unpredictable consequences, ranging from the funny to tragic. It generates harmful stereotypes and weakens people's resolve for a constructive dialogue. I myself have had to explain in London that 'not all Russians are either agents of the KGB, or oligarchs, capable and eager to buy up all the British Premier League soccer teams'.

While in Russia, I often have to argue that 'Albion is not always perfidious; that Brits are far from incessantly scheming against Russia, and not all of them are consuming copious volumes of lager round-the-clock'.

Perhaps I am overdoing things but not very much. The stereotypes are being created. They are created by the mass-media. And these stereotypes take strong hold in people's minds.

Many mass-media outlets are in awe of those who can exert political, financial, and sometimes even physical pressure on them. It is a classic adage: 'He who pays the piper calls the tune'. Generally, journalists try to resist this pressure. Because of their professional stance, some of them risk damaging their career, losing their jobs, or even worse – their life. Others are more adaptable: they master the art of dumbing down and do it so skilfully or, if you prefer, spectacularly that most viewers, listeners and readers are absolutely sure of the veracity of what they had seen, heard or read. The most striking fact is that that the pace of the technological progress in the means of delivery of information is in the vast majority of cases in inverse proportion to the masses' ability to critically judge the information they receive.

Staggering progress of the Internet has created a multi-million army of 'Pashka – the Dream-Peddler'. Some

¹ Independent journalist, producer (Great Britain). Mr. Goligorsky has worked as anchorman, producer and editor for the BBC World Service (London). Creator and the first Director General of the BBC School of Journalism at the Yeltsin Ural State Technical University (Yekaterinburg). Founder of the PTP Partnership group (London) on informing the West of political, economic and cultural projects which appear in the CIS states. Mr. Goligorsky took part in establishing local representative offices of the BBC in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Central Asian republics, Russia and the Ukraine.

people call Internet the 'global cesspit', while others just consider Internet as a triumph of freedom of expression. I think it is still too early to pronounce who is right. But already today it is clear that very influential forces have deployed an army of 'mercenaries', who trawl targeted sites on the Internet and plant under various 'nicknames' pieces of information, or to be more precise – disinformation at their masters' behest. Well, enough of horror stories. It would be more helpful at this stage perhaps to offer a solution.

First of all, I must stress that I cannot see much use in enforcing either more restrictive or punitive measures. For starters, it might be more effective to try and change the system of ownership and control of the mass-media, when neither the proprietor, nor the shareholders, nor the Government, nor the opposition and no lobbying group can exercise unchallenged TOTAL overall control over an important media outlet. Both Rupert Murdoch and Alexander Lebedev could tell you what stringent guarantees they had to give when they bought up some major British publications, which, though effectively bankrupt, were still very prestigious and influential. Nobody sees anything wrong with compliance with this requirement.

It seems to me that today the majority of experts in Russia too are not questioning the wisdom of having an effective system of public checks and balances that can withstand the onslaught of both Governments and opposition; of big money and uncontrolled Internet. The threat of prosecution can hardly be more effective than a reputable form of public control, which brings together under its auspices all major shades of political, economic, cultural and social life. Such organizations – call them Supervisory Councils or Boards of Trustees – must not manage day-to-day business of a media outlet. Their terms of reference must go much further: they have to analyze the state of society and its responses to important events and to make appropriate strategic policy (but not operational!) adjustments to the work of the outlet under their control. The more diverse interests are represented in such public monitoring bodies, the more confidence ordinary people will have in the mass-media; the more representative will be the views expressed by the mass-media. The more difficult will be for the 'Pashkas-the Dream-Pedlars' to dumb-down their audiences. The easier it will be to conduct a meaningful dialogue.

A. Gorbenko¹

THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN THE GLOBAL DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

I

All languages practically have the concept of 'culture', it is used in various situations. The concept is very wide, as it reflects a complex and multifaceted phenomenon of human history. Experts in this field claim that there are over 500 definitions of culture nowadays.

Applying this concept to our present-day life, we can define culture as a collection of material and intellectual values together with ways to create them, abilities to use them for the sake of human progress and to propagate them through generations. The initial form and origin of cultural development is human labour, ways of doing it and its results.

Speaking of culture, diversity of its forms is a noteworthy fact. Cooperation and relations among people might be much simpler, should there only be one form of culture. Many conflicts and controversies would be easier to overcome, communication or adaptation to a new environment would be smoother or effortless. But no-one would like to live in such a boring, dull and monotonous world. Interaction with people of other cultures enables us to discover something new, examine advantages of norms, traditions, activities of a foreign culture. Comparing cultures provokes thought, promotes changes and progress.

That's why it is more accurate to state that living in a monocultural world is not only tedious, but undesirable and even dangerous. Lack of inner diversity and differentiation is a crucial sign of stagnation and inability to evolve.

Alongside with that, cultural diversities are deeply rooted, they reflect peculiarities of life in a certain social, historical or ethnic community; they are closely linked to natural and social environment. Being established, culture of any community becomes an active historical force. That's why cultural features affect history and social development of peoples.

¹ Vice-Mayor of Moscow on media, inter-regional cooperation, sports and tourism in Moscow Government, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies). Chairman of the Committee of Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry on Entrepreneurship in mass media and book publishing industry. President of the Guild of Press Publishers of Russia. Mr. Gorbenko is decorated with the Order of Honour.

Every culture as an integrate unit is unique and exceptional, which means that different cultures are equal in certain respects. But it is the exceptional combination of national and regional features that makes a certain culture comparable to others.

Diversity of cultures is an objective reality, it can be treated in two ways: to follow either the concept of unity of all world cultures, or that of cultural incongruity, the latter principle stating that every culture is stimulated by its own principles and cannot interact with other cultures.

Modern world culture is a complex diverse integrity, a family of various original cultures, whose primary value is the one of 'creative minds'.

Although 'dialogue of cultures' could be traced to ancient times, interconnection and interdependence of cultures have been growing together with globalization of history. It is only cultural identity that provides a due place in the world history, it is only cooperation (rather than isolation) of cultures that provides harmonious development of cultural identity.

As far as progress of science and technology is concerned, together with technical advances and material cultural values, no explanations are required: isolation and failure to cooperation and world relations lead to degradation and retardation. The same process can be noticed in intellectual culture. Environment in general, and cultural environment in particular, means cooperation for the sake of survival.

Culture influences all spheres of public and personal life, it is getting a more powerful and real force in the modern world, its 'voice' is raised in favour of freedom and democracy, gaining the global response, uniting people, informing of and warning against the true and false ways for peoples and the humanity in general to develop. Human experience in the 20th century showed that lack of freedom and democracy backs, to a certain extent, 'large leaps' only to come to an inevitable and complete crash.

We gain a chance to reveal active and developing cultural values through adopting intellectual treasures of the world cul-

tures, and through treating living cultural heritage of the preceding generations carefully in order to meet the needs of the modern world. Social progress or self-cultivation are impossible without such cultural values.

Significant social and cultural changes concerning almost all spheres of public life in many countries and of many peoples, raise a challenge of cross-cultural cooperation or cultural dialogue, and its role in the world cultural development.

II

History of social development demonstrates that technological progress together with new types of mass media contribute to promoting cultural icons and values. In fact, cultural icons and values originally stayed within the frontiers of a family, tribe or clan. Every tribe enjoyed their own system of symbols, conventions, traditions and beliefs (for instance, tribal totems). Evolution of language and literacy enabled people to expand culture to large distances, since then culture has started to cross the borders of various communities, states and countries. The most conspicuous example of such cultural expansion is how Christian ideas penetrated into various communities and states by means of Gospels or the acts of the Apostles. Further inventions and discoveries in the field of mass media eliminated all physical borders to broadcast information, and they created perfect conditions to global broadcast of any cultural models.

Mass media available to any social stratum are elements of mass culture. They appeared in the early 20th century. Without doubt, such type of culture was of less cultural value, however it was easy to understand and it supplied information about various events. It met urgent needs of people, but quickly failed to be relevant.

Every day we receive a vast amount of information, but absorb only a tiny part of it. If the mainstream audience takes a new cultural norm or value as beneficial and imperative, if it can compete with other norms of the culture concerned, it becomes part of the culture. Further on, such cultural norm is adopted by people, it enters personal culture as an integral part, then the process recurs.

Modern mass media play an essential role in the social life, they are of direct relevance to social activities. Every day millions of newspapers get to the audience. Hundreds of radio stations are on air bringing news from remotest areas of the world. Thousands of TV towers, dozens of space satellites make us witnesses of events in various countries.

It was due to printed press that nations could league into centralized states, because the press created a new type of social stratum, that is the audience of a certain newspaper. Members of this cluster are separated by distances, but united by the information they consume. The press enhanced and straight-lined production of uniform symbols and meanings on the national scale. Nowadays mass media not only constantly repeat this process, but make it global as well. Although mass media are obliged to solve certain challenges in political and social spheres, in real life they are independent enough, mass media have their own targets that sometimes confront social needs, and mass media use various methods to reach their goals. Mass media can also have political influence on human minds and emotions.

The main goal of mass media in any society is to provide information. For example, autocratic regime introduces governmentally loyal views and values through political propagation in mass media. Unlike autocratic society, a democratic one provides freedom of thought and hence various viewpoints on matters, which, in its turn, promotes effective competition for power. Rational model of mass communication dominates here quite evidently. It is aimed to convince people by means of logical hierarchy of information and reasoning. This model provides competition of various mass media for attention and trust of their audience. In democratic states it is illegal to

use mass media to provoke racial, national, class and religious hate, though some political forces apply emotionally efficient methods to propagate their ideas and values. Such methods overshadow rational reasons and arguments, which is clearly manifested during election campaigns.

Methods of mass manipulation are widely used in totalitarian, autocratic, and especially ethnocentric regimes, whose political propagation is rich in emotional content oppressing people's minds. Mass media apply methods of psychological indoctrination based on fears and beliefs in order to promote fanaticism, mistrust, hatred to political opponents, other nationalities and all dissidents. The fact that mass media are a powerful force to affect people's consciousness is clearly demonstrated in digital mass media. Their role is increasing with technical advancement. Their emotional influence on people's consciousness and feelings cannot be overestimated, as they gather the largest audience. Nowadays, TV occupies the top position, it gradually replaces newspapers and magazines, successfully competes with the radio. Competition with the press is accounted for by new TV technologies.

While new mass media attract broader audiences, disputes on whether the staff of new mass media will observe professional standards are growing more and more acute, as such standards have been formulated and verified in the course of history and they distinguish professional press from tabloids. Advocates of civil journalism claim that it is new forms of independent mass media that provide free and sound access to information for the society, and the sources of news outside the basic mass media scope will enrich public dialogue rather than impoverish it. Positive experience of several net mass media whose motto is 'every person is a reporter' supports this point of view. Apart from that, advocates of civil journalism quite reasonably indicate that 'high professional journalistic standards' very often disguise double deals of private companies that, for the sake of profit, establish business contacts with closed societies and oppressive regimes who limit free access to information, such as severe 'state control over the Internet'.

In modern culture Internet communication adds to and enriches mass media and system of education, blurs the frontiers between real and virtual world, brings to life a variety of views and positions, breaks the barriers between capitals and provinces, broadens cultural and educational space, moreover, quoting from M. McLuhan, encourages rebirth of natural communication principles typical of preliterate culture, and this rebirth occurs in a new acoustic and visual form and makes a certain 'extension' of a human nervous system.

Modern media technologies enabled the creation of a new communication culture that synthesizes textual, visual and acoustic messages. Inside it both objective data and false and misleading information are operating, which opens opportunities to manipulate mass consciousness and create a fake image of the world.

Capacities of digital mass media types to model images can provide new paths for creative activities, dialogical thinking, but alongside with it, they can form negative attitude towards the world. One of journalistic functions is to form culture, which means that journalism as a social institution should take part in propagation and promotion of high moral values, educate people on world cultural images, and thus enhance comprehensive development of people. So a journalist ought to be aware of cultural preferences and interests of the audience in order to provide suitable information.

Of course, journalistic activities can be aimed at broadening or converting interests of the audience, but the primary goal is to serve preferences, interests, fancies and choices of the audience efficiently. Taking care of intellectual personal growth, journalism can stand against destructive effects of the so-called 'mass culture', and against such phenomena as kitsch and cul-

tural ersatz, designed for underdeveloped or perverse tastes. Alongside with that, a primary goal of journalism is to form a genuine mass culture, that is to involve all levels of society to genuine culture on a large scale.

Modern mass media have successfully learnt to cross cultural barriers by using manipulation techniques, that is expressing their approval or reprimand of certain social norms, ideals, values and by introducing them into mass circulation. In modern society, information infrastructure wins the palm, while in industrial culture personality's growth was basically connected with the level of production development and products consumption.

Information technologies dominating in mass media created a unique communication environment, where one can witness misbalanced distribution of information together with the elimination of the former system of values. It leads to informational advantages of one party over others, and it gradually transforms into its economical, political or social advantages. One can also detect an essentially new level of informational technologies, opportunities for mass media to state their opinions freely and to create a new essence of culture.

III

Our epoch is witness of high-rate advancements in information and communication technologies that dramatically change economic, social, cultural image of the world, which results, on the one hand, in breaking established mental stereotypes, moral norms, national traditions, and in origination of a unified global culture, but on the other hand, in growth of national identities. Such processes can be compared with physical laws of centripetal and centrifugal forces.

Thus, the phrase 'who possesses information rules the world' is growing more topical in an informational society. This promotes vast facilities for mutual benefits of cultures, for consolidation of the society, as well as for segregation and hatred.

Dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations is a casual routine for millions of people. It is our Fatherland that demonstrates a unique example of system unity of diverse ethnic cultural categories, and that successfully passes all endurance tests.

Mass media are a part of modern reality with all its conflicts, in one way or another mass media copy these conflicts. From this point of view, mass media are an instrument or an additional factor that contributes to changes in order to meet the needs and targets of social and political situation.

It's a well known fact that problems of interethnic cooperation and especially tough interethnic conflicts, criminal incidents and outbursts of mass turmoil attract journalists who are concerned with public attention towards their articles, they also attract owners and editors of mass media who are anxious to increase circulation of their papers.

That's why descriptions of ethnically concerned events, incidents and processes in mass media targeted at mass audience often turn out to be outrageous and biased. To make the information sound more authentic and to make it easily available, journalists tend to aim at opinions of ethnic cultural majority in the area, as a result they inevitably follow the stereotypes of mass consciousness. Journalist's professional awareness and responsibility, mature corporative culture of mass media staff guarantee that the frontier between tolerant or neutral statements and provocative ethnically tensioned ones; between objective information and propagation of national, racial, religious hatred will not be crossed. Under the growing influence of mass media, communication processes, including ethnical contacts, set forward one's ideas of one's ego as compared to other 'self': how the other party sees me, how they evaluate my image; what feelings — pride or humiliation — my image arises. It enhances personal sensitivity towards ethnical images of

'insiders and outsiders'. The opinion formed and broadcast by mass media can be accepted as an individual point of view, or a personal idea, which affects individual behaviour.

Toolkit to nullify negative effects of mass media in cross-ethnic relations is not large, it includes criminal prosecution, acts of civil legislation, measures of administrative restraint, moral and ethical pressure.

As this challenge is acute and mass media impact on interethnic cooperation can cause even more conflicts, expert and managerial communities bring forward a number of special projects. These projects determine that a person in charge can filter and limit the flow of ethnically concerned information that mass media broadcast into public consciousness.

This position seems vulnerable from many points of view. First of all, it does not concord with basic values of a democratic society. As far as public interests are concerned, it cannot be considered appropriate either. Provided the authorities restrict the flow of topical and authentic data on the most burning challenges in interethnic relations by means of loyal and controlled mass media, these informational 'lacunae' will be filled with 'tabloids' and media owned and produced by extremists.

One can easily imagine the sort of events, their interpretations and doctrines that will be offered by such mass media. It is also worth noting that mass media, or any information, is a market product, and if one of market sectors is tabooed, it may encourage the growth of shadow structures, thus resulting in large expenses for the society and government. Poor managerial decisions will contribute to cultivation of gossips, speculations, forgeries, so powerful levers to manipulate public opinion will spring out.

Any attempts to put such a position into practice will inevitably result in public mistrust of the authorities. One can be absolutely sure that modern technical advances will give an information consumer a chance to object to such a position effectively, that's why administrative solutions of this sort will never be of any practical relevance. Potentialities for self-regulation within the journalistic professional community based on moral and ethical codes are quite often overestimated and interpreted as a sufficient compensatory sanction against dishonest journalists. Optimists hope that journalistic community can organize itself and control professional performance of members of the community effectively.

In 1994 the 'Code of Professional Ethics for Journalists' was passed in Russia. In accordance with this Code, the Grand Jury of Journalists' Professional Union adopted resolutions on its panel sessions to strongly condemn activities of journalists who published ethnical conflicts promoting materials. Unfortunately, journalists do not consider it obligatory to follow the ethical norms of the Code. It does not mean that journalists are morally corrupted and deliberately tend to escalate interethnic tension or insult ethnical feelings. Xenophobia in newspapers and magazines is sponsored by a number of objective social factors. Independent press in market economy can only exist if there is consumer demand on newspapers and magazines, just like on any other product. It is evident that the demand is backed up, firstly, by consumers' competence and, secondly, by dominant values of the moment, in the case of ethnical challenge — ethnical relations scenario.

Journalists together with media investors have to produce and sell intellectual goods that potential consumers are eager to buy. In the situations when mass consciousness combines violent terroristic acts and ethnical conflicts, when criminal incidents are ethnically coloured, when acute social competition is interpreted by people in the streets as a result of ethnical stratification, when migration boom results in obvious ethnical and cultural gap; mass media are most likely to sell production that meets the needs of their consumers.

One has to remember that information market is highly competitive. Ethnical challenges are the most tradable topic,

that is why journalists have been publishing conflict promoting materials, editors have been putting them on the front pages, mass media tycoons have been investing into periodicals that find ready market. Journalistic community is fully aware that scandalous publications are tradable. So, it is of no use to rely upon moral stoppers of journalists and top managers of mass media.

All this does not mean that the authorities have to abandon altogether applying such a 'lever' as an appeal to moral norms of the profession in order to affect journalistic community. But its effectiveness shouldn't be overestimated. It is possible to limit the flow of ethnical conflict promoting materials in the press only by referring to the law, and penalty can be imposed upon the delinquents only in full accordance with the law. Otherwise, ethical sanctions can become a dangerous weapon of reprisal against the dissenting mass media. Established as resolutions and protocols, ethical and moral assessments of journalistic and mass media activities have to add to legal assessments rather than substitute them.

Dishonest journalists who provoke interethnic hate threaten social interests and are detrimental in terms of national security. That is why it is possible to protect the society from negative impact of conflict promoting mass media effectively only when all civil society structural elements concerned take an active part in the process. Social control techniques should involve, firstly, detecting ethnical conflict promoting publications by means of ethnical and cultural public institutions concerned, secondly, professional expertise under aegis of local authorities, thirdly, legal assessment of journalistic or mass media activities, fourthly, ethical assessment of journalistic activity performed by professional community.

Another element should be involved into this technique, the element that can positively affect the quality of mass media presentations on ethnical events and processes. I mean that professional ethnologists should be involved in constant cooperation with respectable mass media as experts. Sometimes an editorial office cannot afford to have journalist in the staff writing on ethnic issues, but any established periodical can afford to pay for a preliminary examination of materials to be published or broadcast. It is worth noting that ethnologists with a high degree of professional competence are few in number, so the matter of which experts to involve to editorial offices on a regular basis has to be solved under constant guidance of the most renowned experts. Journalists and editorial office staff specializing in ethnical issues should have career development ethnological training courses. Well-balanced ethnological education for journalists, even a short-term one, can be of a great practical use.

IV

Successful solution to political, economical, social challenges is getting more dependable on a very subjective factor, i.e. personal active social position in the modern period of Russian history.

Nowadays it is vital to shift focuses of social ideas from the public to the personal, to high personal social consciousness and intellect. Mass media should organize a campaign aimed at ethical and moral education of citizens based on human-

istic, patriotic principles, the ones of international solidarity, including counter-propagation against ideologies of chauvinism and nationalism stigmatizing them as invalid and harmful. The key task is to attract 'opinion leaders' opposing those who make profit on people's fears and superstitions. Most popular TV showmen, figures of cultural and scientific communities, famous experts, religious missionaries should contribute to negative assessment of nationalistic ideas. This work should acquire a status of a national project.

For multinational Russia it is vital to provide integrity of the state and the success of current reforms. That is why mass media are indispensable assistants and powerful levers of the authorities. It is significant, however, that historical perspective should prevail over immediate 'political expediency'. A good example illustrating the point is mass consciousness created by mass media regarding such global all-human challenges as environment, nuclear or biological war, etc. As the world opinion on these challenges is clear and obvious, it can be said that mass media present quite an adequate information that does not contradict social values, which allows to form a stable and long-term opinion. A stable and long-term opinion should also be formed regarding interethnic peace in Russia.

For reference:

Moscow Government considers its key target to perform a well-planned work in order to master various forms and methods for presenting interethnic relations in the city mass media, together with other global topics, as respect towards culture and religion of other peoples, creating a stable antagonism to extremist nationalistic and religious ideas and acts.

To prevent manifestations of political and religious extremism a number of special TV projects have been launched lately.

To harmonize interethnic and interconfessional relations the *TV Centre* channel broadcast 8 episodes of the series 'The Borders of the State', these episodes were devoted to religions and faiths of peoples in Russia.

Four episodes of the documentary the 'Spiritual Bases of the World Civilizations' were made: 'Catholicism' and 'Ancient Churches of the East' in 2008, 'Russian Orthodoxy' and 'Protestantism' (52 minutes each) in 2009. These films produced by the Committee were broadcast on *SARAFAH* and *TV Centre* channels.

Four social commercials have been made for the series 'My Capital: All Colours of the Peoples of the Country' (30 seconds each). They were broadcast on *TV Centre*, *TV Capital* and *Doveriye* (Trust) channels. More social commercials are being made now.

New films are being made now about history of the world religions, history of multicultural Russia, cultures and traditions of its peoples.

The radio station 'Moscow Speaking' broadcast the programme 'Moscow the Multinational' devoted to various problems of interethnic and interconfessional relations; to traditions and conventions of peoples in Russia and all over the world, to events in the country and the city concerning life and culture of national communities.

A number of socially relevant periodicals, including those co-established by executive bodies, are financed from the city budget.

'Ethnosphere', the monthly magazine, is financed from the city budget. The magazine publishes data on ethnic communities and the way they take part in Moscow social life.

PEACE CULTURE AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Each epoch has its Culture and together with education they make up a Model of correlation with Man. Culture is a kind of defence for man and an important part in the foundation of state security.

European vision of this architecture is connected with Antiquity, its ideals of the harmonious man in a well-shaped world. In the Middle Ages, Europeans envision the world in the light of the omniscient God. Without Him one cannot perceive life. In the age of Enlightenment, culture and education come to the fore. They help people overcome ignorance and strive for truths including those in philosophy and politics. People are increasingly confident that their world has a chance to become stable, freed from violence and, moreover, from wars as means to achieve goals on the international arena.

Reality happened to be different. The opinion that the war is the continuation of politics by other means has prevailed. Pacifist outlooks on the international relations have also become widespread, though they have not significantly affected world history.

Europe that regarded itself as the cradle of Enlightenment, became the arena of the two world wars and numerous military conflicts. It was Europe that became the cradle of fascism, the ultimately racist ideology; it is Europe where the gloomiest ignorance and genocide on an unprecedented scale have their roots.

In the 20th century, two main trends were continuously growing in opposition – the force of law and the law of force. The feeble League of Nations gave way to the United Nations Organization; international law was becoming stable, positive diplomacy was taking an active stance. Some important international and legal treaties were signed between the states with diverse political systems.

The force of reason seemed to be about to triumph over violence, but in fact it did not occur. Bipolar world, with its balance of interests, has gone, probably for long, and is replaced by the world with new challenges, with the global financial and economic crisis, and with the absence of strategic consensus between influential nations, particularly in the field of international security.

In these circumstances scholarly research is gaining weight, particularly the research that provides politicians and diplomats with sound advice. This advice is available when we recognize the priority of knowledge and peace culture, when we do not forget about the negative experience of bygone years, especially dangerous militarist mentality.

Peace culture plays an important part in dialogue of cultures. It favourably benefits international relations in which national states, their foreign policy and diplomacy play a decisive role. Peace culture is pivotal for the force of law. The UN is its unique foundation.

This planetary democratic organization is the consequence of the great victory of Soviet people and our allies over the powerful and ruthless enemy – Hitler's Germany and its allies. For the architecture of international relations, the UN is one of

its main fulcra. It has many shortcomings, but they result not from its Charter but from an insolent conduct of substantially armed states when they pursue their power politics.

An important task of the enlightened part of the world community, which is primarily the world of science, is not to miss the moment when mankind finds itself 'on the point of no return'. In this case, keeping peace will be not only problematic but impossible. 'Points of no return' can be found not only in aviation but in politics as well, including international relations. One example will suffice – the creation of the UN. If it had not been founded in the summer of 1945, it would not have ever been founded. The UN was set up as a result of appalling losses and shocks European nations had gone through during World War II. It was a cruel time which led to great expectations for earthly paradise and for a unique result. A planetary democratic organization was set up aimed, as its Charter reads: 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind'.² 'Untold sorrow' united the leaders of the anti-Hitlerite 'Big Three' coalition in a spiritual move to build a new architecture of international relations. It was a real triumph of peace over fascism, and we are the descendants of this great victory.

Founding the United Nations helped overcome the 'point of no return' which came into existence after the death of US President Franklin Roosevelt and with the coming of Harry Truman as the new host of the white House.

At the conference in San-Francisco (April 25 – June 26, 1945) Moscow took some decisive steps to save the heritage of the Dumbarton Oaks conference (August 2 – November 7, 1944) and particularly the Crimea conference of the three allied countries the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (February 4–11, 1945).

If the foundation of the UN had been thwarted, the architecture of international relations would have been quite different, shaky and subject to a risk of a third world war.

Of course, the UN, as my father used to tell me, with its growth became something like an anthill, but it is a 'high-ranking anthill', where many international issues are resolved by the techniques of many-sided diplomacy.

Under globalization, international relations are seriously affected by civilizations, the balance of economic and military forces, regional peculiarities of geopolitical zones. Such is the case. Still I want to single out from this sum of factors one force that perceptibly affects our present and future, the force of international law. It is the result of the evolution of peace culture epitomized in different fields of human knowledge including diplomacy as an art of resolving international conflicts by peaceful means based on compromises.

The law of force is such a way of organizing global architecture of international relations when centres of financial and economic power belonging to multinational corporations of big states and their allies appropriate natural and other riches of the Earth in proportions which are far from being fair.

Where does it lead to? To degradation of life, to increased migration of population, to changes in ethnic structures not only in particular cities and nations but, in the long run, continents including Europe and even the USA.

It is unclear what civilizational transformations all these processes will lead to, more so because these trials are accompanied by natural disasters; the Earth, home for all of us, falls apart, ecology degrades, the amount of fertile lands and drinking water decreases. What do world political élites busy themselves with, in this situation as unsteady as a swamp and fraught with serious danger? What line do they tend to sup-

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, leading researcher at Institute for International Security Issues of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. Author of over 30 monographs: *Africa in World Politics* (Afrika v mirovoj politike), *Masks and Sculpture of Tropical Africa* (Maski i skulptura Tropicheskoj Afriki), *The Kennedy Brothers* (Brat'ja Kennedi), *New Thinking in the Nuclear Age* (Novoje myshlenie v jadernyj vek), *Andrei Gromyko: The Flight of His Arrow* (Andrej Gromyko. Poljot jego strely) and some others. Mr. Gromyko is also the author of more than 300 articles in journals. Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Scientific Council for the African Issues. President of the movement 'For the Consolidation of the Democratic World Order and the UN Support'. Honorary member of the Royal Academy of Sciences of Morocco, of Malagasy Academy of Sciences, Doctor *honoris causa* of University of Leipzig. Mr. Gromyko is decorated with the Order of October Revolution, the Order of Friendship of Peoples. He is recipient of the USSR State Prize and V.V. Vorovsky Prize.

² Preamble to the UN Charter 'We, the people of the united nations'.

port in international relations? It is hard to remain impartial answering these questions. We can observe an alarming picture of a gradual destruction in the international and legal mentality. Even the significance and viability of such a unique social and political structure as the state is defied. Counter-productivity of these arguments is obvious. They pursue some lucrative economic and also far-reaching political and geopolitical goals.

What are international relations? They have many features, but there is a principal one. International relations are first and foremost relations between nations. The norms of international law primarily regulate relations not just between people but between nations. That is why the UN consists of the nations possessing equal rights. As its members, the UN admits not peoples but states. The UN Charter says about friendly relations between the 'nations'. This means states because in English the word 'nation' sometimes means the same as 'state'.

What place is reserved in the architecture of international relations for Russia in the 21st century? What will its shape look like? Will it be nice and beautiful or...?

Saccharine slogans do not provide us with answers to these questions. In fact, we are not looking for them. We live in the

situation of a criminal rampage, tacky shows and chaotic reforms. The country has lost its former might. Bureaucrats can only work when kicked by their superiors. The disbanding of the Soviet Union has turned into a disintegration of the Czarist Empire which had been assembled for centuries. What is left of it is the symbols of power and formal uniforms.

The main hope for a union of three Slavic nations in Eastern Europe – Russia, Belarus and the Ukraine – is fading too. It would be naïve to think that 'the window of opportunities' for this union will exist forever. It will not!

We pin some hopes on the Commonwealth of Independent States. Russia's contenders would like to destroy it, too.

If integration processes of Slavic nations wither, East Europe will find itself in a situation which will defy any definition. It will look like Great Disorder. Our political élite, lulled by rosy dreams of 'universal' enrichment, prefers to keep these thoughts at bay. It is more comfortable and cosy to do it like this. The architecture of international relations will build itself without us. The thing is that there will be no place for a beautiful and strong building of Russia on the horizon. And we will have to stair into this architecture in order to be able to exclaim: 'There we are!'

P. Gusev¹

RUSSIAN MASS MEDIA: CAN FALLING BEHIND THE WORLD DEVELOPMENT BECOME IRREVERSIBLE?

In his last year's address to the Federal Assembly, President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev made an unexpected hint at the state which, according to him, should start to get rid of assets alien to it, such as 'plants, newspapers, ships'.

'State agencies must no be owners of 'plants, newspapers, ships'. Everyone must do what he has to do,' Russian President declared. Mr Dvorkovich was a mouthpiece of the idea that the state must free itself not only from excessive functions but also from excessive property. According to him, privatization at a regional level can bring a few dozens of billions of roubles. Mass media must be privatized as well: 'In some regions there is not one but a few newspapers, which is a useless waste of money of the local budget,' the aide to President said. 'It is necessary that newspapers be objective sources of information,' he remarked. 'The period of adopting regional plans of privatization can last as long as half a year.'

This message carefully expressed by President of Russia even without figures (demonstrating the amount of money and assets which government bodies appropriated on a long-term basis for its need), terms of payback and a concept of the work to be done, caused in a certain part of society (particularly in its media section) a heated if not rapturous reaction.

Some people, me included, called Russian President's motto (with all doubts) revolutionary! We, that is those representing the media community, rushed into discussions, conversations, searches for answers to the principal question — when will the long-awaited denationalization of mass-media take place, and how will it affect those who work for newspapers, television, the radio and the Internet?

In December, 2010, the Committee of the Public Chamber for Communications, Information Policy and Freedom of Speech in Mass Media conducted some interesting hearing on this subject in the glorious city of Tver.

Some of my thoughts and conclusions as well as some points of the presenters at this discussion seem to be worthy

¹ Editor-in-chief of *Moskovsky Komsomolets* daily, Chairman of the Journalists' Union of Moscow, Chairman of the Public Chamber Commission of the Russian Federation on communications, information policy and freedom of speech in the media, Honorary worker of culture of the Russian Federation.

of attention of the participants of the 11th International Likhachov Conference.

According to 'Rospechat' statistics, the year 2010 saw an eight per cent increase in registered mass media compared to 2009, and 34 per cent increase compared to the year of 2005. Today there are 94 thousand registered forms of mass media in Russia, 73 thousand circulate in printed form and over 17.5 thousand electronically.

It is interesting to note that the number of regional mass media registered in 2010 is twice as large as that of national mass media. In the previous year, this difference was not so substantial. For example, in 2005 regional mass media outnumbered national by mere 11 per cent, in 2006 by 16.5, while in 2009 by 42 per cent.

The average volume of regional papers was 18 pages, magazines – 98 pages, the same for national papers – 20 pages, magazines – 102 pages. Popular and advertising magazines prevail (14.6 per cent and 12.4 per cent respectively). Political journals make up 7.9 per cent, scholarly and popular journals – 7.8 per cent, children's magazines – 2.9 per cent and literary magazines – 2.7 per cent.

Political papers make up the bulk of the printed word (42.3 per cent), advertising papers – 17.1 per cent, papers in the category of 'leisure and entertainment' – 12.9 per cent. Daily papers and monthly magazines are leaders of periodicity. According to the 'Rospechat' statistics, in 2010 registered electronic media increased by 33 per cent, while the number of Internet sites registered as mass media forms doubled. Compared to 2006, the rise in the number of Internet sites registered as media forms is 62 per cent (from *Media Atlas*, 14.01.2011).

'Vedomosti' newspaper reported, however, on December 1, 2010 that there were no exact figures about the number of mass media belonging to local authorities and how much money is allocated for them from local budgets. The Ministry of Communication does not have this information. The same source stated that the plans to totally privatize local papers and television channels had not been previously discussed.

The reaction of the authorities to Russian President's suggestion is quite interesting. For instance, chairman of St. Petersburg Press Committee Alexander Korennikov agrees that Russian regions should get rid of subsidiary assets, but insists that the city administration needs its own papers and TV channels to explain the 'essence of its decisions' to the citizens. The city has a free newspaper 'St. Petersburg Dnevnik' and a cable channel 'St. Petersburg' (whose budget is sixty million roubles for the four months of 2010).

A high-ranking official of Krasnodar Mayor's office does not consider mass media subsidiary assets either (the office possesses 'Krasnodarskiye Izvestiya' paper and 'Krasnodar' TV company): 'Commercial mass media would be too expensive for us to get them to cover the activities of the authorities.'

In the existing situation, the authorities will always support their own mass media. Besides direct financing they have some other ways of administrative support, viz. organization and sometimes coercion to subscribe to its publications, sending out admonishing letters, etc.

State-owned mass media are generously financed from the budget. According to the information from the Committee for Communication of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, 381 million roubles will go from Krasnoyarsk budget to fund information policy. This is almost twice as much as in 2010. This money is intended for supporting local papers, magazines, television, 44 district and city newspapers which are financed from the regional budget, with only 28 million roubles to spend on publishing materials in non-government mass media.

In the regions, city media-holdings are set up again which are formed and financed by regional and municipal executive agencies. A telling last year's example of it is the reorganization of 'Tatmedia' (Tatarstan) combining over a hundred media agencies into a republic agency for press and mass media with endowing it with state authority in the sphere of media.

Of all the constituent entities of the Federation, Moscow ranks as the biggest budget sponsor of mass media.

At the same time our colleagues observe that independent public and political papers are dying as a class. They are replaced by free newspapers financed from the budget. They are fully controlled by regional authorities, the latter spare no money for them. Hundreds of thousands of copies are given out free, and these papers are published at the expense of the budget of state and municipal newspapers. Media market is being destroyed at a daredevil speed. Competition in the printed word market is getting tenser and tenser; public and political papers and magazines are fighting to survive in these circumstances. To say nothing of the independent publications whose situation is twice as difficult.

In today's Russia, the notions of 'media-business' and 'information' often mean different things. Subsidies in exchange for necessary information – this is the pernicious formula which damages both the mass media and regional authorities. Local press is heavily dependent on local authorities. For instance, in the Altai region during two years 24 chief editors of local newspapers were replaced by new ones. It occurred after the local elections of 2005–06. Direct subsidies from local authorities to mass media are no less detrimental. These two counter-market flows, if taken nationwide, form a multi-rouble river of subsidies.

According to the statistics from the Ministry of Finance, Russia will spend 174 billion roubles on the support of mass media in 2011–13.

The state will sponsor 'Russian Gazette', 'Voice of Russia', State Television and Radio channel, TV channel 'Russia Today', information agencies 'Novosti' and 'ITAR-TASS'. A number of radio stations and Internet sites can be added to the list. Besides, 51 per cent of shares of the First TV channel be-

long to the state. Life shows that the state in fact controls NTV which formally belongs to Gazprom. The government allocates money to support sports broadcasts and to formulate the concept of the Olympic Games in Sochi.

The majority of independent mass media managers regard this policy as wild and ruinous for our country. Many of them understand that it is necessary to support mass media, particularly municipal, local or regional. But directly feeding thousands of mass media workers is a dangerous and perilous policy.

There are some other quite ingenious suggestions as to the use of budget funds in a much more effective way other than directly sponsoring mass media by the government. Let us say, the government faces a problem of excessive drinking and alcoholism. These problems must be tackled in earnest. The government, instead of giving away money to support countless state-owned papers, magazines, television channels and radio stations, had better set up a program of social advertisement drawing public attention to this problem. The government could pay and place such ads in mass media through different agencies, through the Federal Press and Mass Communications Agency. A similar approach could be used towards the demographic problem as well as the problem of tolerance including religious tolerance and some others.

There is a danger that close relatives of municipal and regional bosses 'all of a sudden' may become the owners of mass media as soon as privatizing state-owned mass media has been put in action. Odds are that state-owned mass media will be bought by criminal bosses during privatizations. Changing hands is an important issue.

The process of denationalizing mass media is far from being simple. If 'small-scale' press in small towns and villages does not get support, it is bound to disappear, because in those places there is no advertising market, nor their own sponsors.

It is necessary to change the law on mass media, or else to agree on the conditions stipulating that the state should have one mass media mouthpiece through which the population is informed about certain documents, decisions and regulations.

The government must realize the fact that time has come to give a legal definition of state mass media in the law on mass media. The other question is whether state-owned mass media should exist at all. A bulletin could publish acts and regulations.

The attempts to change the law on mass media are constantly made. Last year, for instance, the Public Chamber Committee on Mass Media voted down over 70 amendments to the law on mass media, primarily concerning the tightening of the law and the conditions of journalists' work, stiffening their rights and freedoms.

The attempts to change the law still take place. For example, on 22nd of February, 2011, the State Duma adopted in principle the bill 'On the changes in some legislative acts of the Russian Federation in connection with the improvement of legal regulation in mass media, television and radio broadcasting'. The bill in some parts affects the legal regulation of the Internet.

The Public chamber declared in this connection that it would conduct an assessment of this bill, that any innovations regarding the Internet and its legal regulations were received with caution, for they were fraught with the threat of censorship and restrictions on information dissemination. It was emphasized that this issue of new amendments should be approached very flexibly, together with the expert community, bloggers, publicists, editors, journalists and lawyers.

The Public Chamber of the Russian Federation formulated its own suggestions regarding privatization of mass media and sent them to all government agencies. The message is that the funding of mass media should be funnelled through

public structures, through public chambers so that the government bodies should be excluded from the direct distribution of funds. The experience of this kind does exist. This is the third year that the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, not the government, has been distributing billions of roubles among public organizations.

In essence our suggestions as to the denationalization of mass media are as follows:

- Prohibit, through laws or at least regulatory and legal acts, government bodies at all levels from lobbying their ‘own’ publications; force them to leave from the board of cofounders of mass media and in this way stop direct funding.

- At the federal level prohibit by law government bodies from establishing and funding public and political mass media, except for papers and magazines of small ethnic groups and/or those for the disabled.

- Limit state mass media established for official announcement of laws and other regulatory acts and commentaries, in publishing infomercials and paid ads.

- Establish preferential taxation of mass media editorial boards with the exception of those publishing ads and those with an erotic content.

- Keep postal tariffs at a 2010 level for the subscription to newspapers and magazines within two or three years.

- Prohibit ‘Post of Russia’ from levying extra payments from mass media for delivering printed matter to newspaper stands.

- Resolve the question of keeping post-offices intact, of resuming the practice of a five-day working week. Today, the number of post-offices in the country is diminishing, some working two to three days a week, which in its turn leads to the decline in subscription to daily newspapers and the violation of subscribers’ rights.

- Develop and realize a programme of denationalization of press by means of gradual transformation of state mass media into public or private-owned mass media; introduce without delay a ban on non-government mass media participation in the authorized capital of state-owned mass media and, reversely, state mass media in the authorized capital of private mass media; change the way state mass media are managed with regard to their professional independence and public opinion; exclude state-owned media from the ads market.

- Reform organization, legal and economic status of local media, that is municipal, district and city papers, information centres, TV- and radio stations, to ensure their independence from the owner and from the government bodies.

- Set up a Public Fund financing local media in order to ensure this independence, which is not subjected to the fluctuations in the existing regional and municipal authorities.

Time will tell if the situation with newspapers and publicized intentions of the Russian government to denationalize media will come true or whether it will be just a bait for liberal intellectuals, for civil society during the presidential campaign, a kind of remake of the trite joke about a mental clinic patient who writes a letter to his mother saying that ‘everything is fine, they have everything they need, even a swimming pool; the doctor even promised to fill it with water if they behave nicely.’

The ironic tone in which I finish my notes should not mislead anybody: the subject of present-day Russian media being far from healthy, its inability to ensure constitutional rights of the public for objective and honest information and to develop in the wake of world values and democratic trends, is vitally important.

Russia is at a crossroads, and mass media are obliged to help her make a correct choice.

Intense, enormous and even risky work is ahead.

So, as the saying goes, we will smile later.

P.S. By the way, on dialogue of cultures.

Many participants of the discussion on the denationalization of mass media would find it interesting to learn that – in Georgia, for example, state-owned mass media are banned.

Many experts confirm that the country has the best legislation in the field of mass media, not only in the former USSR area, but among all East European countries. First, Georgia is the only country in the post-Soviet space whose Constitution prohibits establishing state-owned mass media. Second, Georgia has the best law on the freedom of information. Third, all articles potentially hazardous to journalists have been removed from the criminal code. Finally, there is no system of accrediting journalists in Georgia, so all foreign journalists are free to go anywhere and any time they want: permission is not required.

Moreover, the government introduces new standards of publicity of information and media freedom. The government has decided to adopt higher and more democratic standards, similar to those that already exist in the USA, Great Britain and other developed countries of the world. It has started working on a bill specifying the owner of mass media: who stands behind newspapers, magazines and other media means, where they get their funding from. The bill ensures that information should become freely accessible and public.

- In the Ukraine, it is planned to abolish state-owned and communal mass media within seven years from now. A respective decision was taken regarding a bill on denationalization of state and communal mass media. They will be liquidated within seven years.

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: THE LIMITS OF CULTUROLOGICAL ANALYSIS

1. Two historical events of recent times compel us to return to the matter of dialogue among cultures, and, in particular, to look anew at the matter of its very possibility. The first of these consists in the recognition by the French President and German Federal Chancellor of the collapse of multiculturalism. The second is the revolt of the masses in a number of North African and Near Eastern countries, masses who are themselves representatives of those who, having come to European countries, proved impervious to the policies of multiculturalism. Outwardly, these events do not seem to be connected, but an inner connection nonetheless exists.

The revolt of the Muslim masses in their own countries permits the supposition that the collapse of the policies of multiculturalism actually signifies recognition of the limitation of the culturological approach to problems of intercultural interaction in developed European countries. In order to understand and practically resolve these problems, it is absolutely necessary to broaden the research approach to them.

2. One must first of all take into account why and how in the culturally homogeneous countries of Europe, enclaves of the different culture of expatriates from Third World countries are emerging. It is perfectly obvious: getting into developed countries by legitimate or illegitimate means (with most, of course, getting in by fully legal means), people from the so-called 'Third World' are fleeing destitution, lawlessness, or sometimes both. In the final analysis, the same cause which generates the flow of emigrants from these countries also brought them out onto the streets: it is dissatisfaction with the social and political conditions of their lives.

Furthermore, it is necessary to understand why people, having become immigrants, do not reconcile themselves with their second-rate material and social position, although it is much higher and better than that of their compatriots who stayed in their native countries, and that which they had when they were living there themselves. The problem is that not only the same causes, but also the same ideals and aspirations induce people to leave their countries behind and to go out on the streets. These are the values of democracy, freedom, and human dignity. Making the decision to emigrate to a developed Europe, people are counting not only on the improvement of conditions in their lives in comparison to what they had in their native countries, but also on a dignified existence by European criteria. However, it is precisely this that they do not receive here. They discover, to their surprise, that Europeans see their cultural distinction, the colour of their skin, their hijabs and minarets, but do not see their human kinship with them, that precisely because of cultural differences they are more ready to isolate them and drive them out than to understand and cooperate with them. This is the cause of the tendency to irrational and destructive activity which is generated more by deep envy and wounded pride than the aspiration to defend one's rights. In connection with the foregoing, it would not be out of place to cite the unexpected and quite exact judgement of Slavoj Žižek: 'Fundamentalist Islamic terror is based not on the

faith of terrorists in their own superiority and not on their desire to protect their cultural-religious identity from the onset of global consumer civilization: the problem of fundamentalists is not that we feel that they are worse than we, but rather that they secretly believe so themselves (this is apparently what Hitler himself felt about Jews), and precisely for this reason our indulgent, politically correct assurances that we do not feel ourselves to be superior only strengthens their fury and *ressentiment*. The problem is not in cultural differences (their attempts to preserve their identity), but rather the reverse: fundamentalists are already like us because they have secretly applied our standards and measures to themselves. (This clearly also relates to the Dalai Lama, who gives grounds for Tibetan Buddhism in Western terms of striving for happiness and the avoidance of suffering.) Paradoxically, fundamentalists lack a certain dose of 'authentically racist' belief in their own superiority.'²

In a word, the revolt of the masses in Arab Muslim countries, taking place under the banners of social justice and democracy and, insofar as it takes place under these banners, allows us to understand that the politics of multiculturalism is suffering a collapse for the very reason that it does not get to the social and moral depths of the problems.

3. The fate of multiculturalism in Western Europe has not only an abstract-cognitive meaning, but also, importantly, has significance for our understanding of the situation in Russia. Russia, of course, fortunately differs from Western Europe in that it has the experience of several centuries of life as a state with conditions of ethno-cultural and religious diversity. However, the significance of this experience cannot be overstated: it is limited by the historical conditions in which it emerged and the forms in which it existed. The cultural diversity of contemporary Russia is qualitatively different, at least, in two respects.

First, the peoples and religions of which the Russian state was formed lived, on the whole, on their historically existing territories, preserving the relative isolation and continuity of their ways of life. In this respect, it is revealing that for two large alien newly arrived peoples – Germans and Jews – special territories were marked out and autonomous state-administrative structures were created in the Soviet years: this was evidently done in order to include them in the traditional Russian version of cultural diversity. In the present, the situation has changed radically: people belonging to different cultures and religions are abandoning their ecological niches and have entered into spontaneous and systematic communication, which has reached sociologically significant proportions. Today, the multiplicity of cultures is not only a characteristic of the demography of states, but a reality of everyday life.

Second, the Russian state (in both the Tsarist and Soviet periods) was super-national (an empire, a union of republics). The contemporary Russian state, if we bear in mind its basic post-Soviet historical vector, is developing in the direction of a nation-state, namely an ethnically Russian nation-state. The problem of combining a single state identity with a diverse array of cultural identities thereby acquires new dimensions and is fraught with conflicts. This becomes a problem as critical for the ethnically Russian and Orthodox population itself as for the other ethno-cultural and religious groups.

4. Multi-culture is the new reality of a new global era and a new historical calling, for Russia among others. In as far as the contemporary world is becoming globalized, there is no alternative to the politics of multiculturalism. Today it is obvious for everyone that the growing unity of humankind in the areas

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Chair of Ethics of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Author of more than 400 publications including: *Sotsialnaya priroda npravstvennosti* [Social Nature of Morality], *Zolotoye pravilo npravstvennosti* [The golden Rule of Ethics], *Velikiye moralisty* [The Great Moralists], *Yazyk i sovest'* [Language and Conscience], *Filosofiya, moral', politika* [Philosophy, Ethics, Politics], *Antichnaya etika* [the Ethics of Antiquity]. Managing editor of the yearly *Eticheskaya mysl'* [Ethical Thought], editor of a series 'Biblioteka eticheskoy mysl' [The Library of Ethical Thought], editor of *Social Sciences journal* (the English edition), member of the editorial board of journals: *Filosofskiy nauki* [Philosophical Sciences], *Voprosy filosofiyi* [Issues of Philosophy], Vice-President of the Russian Philosophical Society. Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology.

² Žižek S. 'Some Politically Incorrect Thoughts on Violence.' *Logos*, No. 2. 2006, p. 9–10.

of technology, economics, financial communications, and, in part, politics, is accompanied by a strengthening of historically established historical and cultural differences, by a surge of various ethnic, religious, regional, and other identities. However, not everyone sees the connection between these things – that the diversification, if it can be expressed this way, in the area of spiritual life is a continuation and supplement of globalization in the material sphere. The point is not simply that the spiritual and cultural diversity of the world is itself being illuminated in globalism perspective, and that the feeling of cultural uniqueness is intensifying and being brought up to date. There is something else that is more important still: in the framework of the processes of globalization, the regions prove to be interconnected by the principle of communicating vessels, which inevitably leads to the free movement of people and generates a situation of cultural diversity as a norm of social life. Attempts to place legal and physical barriers in the way of people's free movement contradicts the very essence of globalism, which, it stands to reason, does not mean we must throw open the doors for the free movement of people in the same way that they have been opened for goods and information. It merely means that cultural pluralism of the sort that has taken shape in the developed countries of the West and in regional centres like Moscow is, to a great degree, a consequence of the unevenness and disproportion of economic and social development among countries and continents. It must not be seen only as a culturological problem. Naturally, dialogue between cultures, as a means of legitimating cultural diversity, must be interpreted with a clear acknowledgement of its possibilities and limits – with the kind of acknowledgement that, on the one hand, sees in the diversity of cultural forms the interests and aspirations common to all people, and on the other hand, keeps open the prospect of forming a global community of people.

An exact definition of the proper content and possibilities of dialogue between cultures at the same time permits us to outline its limits and thereby combine ethico-culturological analysis of multi-culture with the social and philosophical-historical approaches to it. An adequate understanding of the dialogue of cultures consists in interpreting it as an open process – the kind of mutual relations among people, which is merely one aspect of their multifaceted and simultaneously historically developing combined activity. From this point of view, a number of conceptual positions are especially important.

5. One of the key ideas of the conception of dialogue of cultures consists in the fact that cultures in themselves do not interact, do not come into dialogue. Only people, belonging to one or another culture, are able to do this. Cultures, especially cultures in their ethno-national, religious, civilizational embodiment, are unions of large, sociologically significant groups of people. The state of belonging to a culture is a generalizing, not an individualizing, characteristic of a person. At least two conclusions can be drawn from this.

First, since belonging to a culture is a common characteristic of a large group of people, no one of them has an exclusive or preferential right to speak (testify) in the name of the culture, to represent it. It is all the more true that people belonging to one culture and carrying it within them can understand and, more often than not, really do understand its essence and needs in different ways. A Russian is equal to a Russian. A Christian is equal to a Christian. A European is equal to a European. There is no Russian who would be more Russian than another. A Russian remains a Russian even if he adopts another faith and another name. There is no Christian who would be more Christian than another. Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy was a deeply devout Christian, but the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church saw his positions as non-Christian. However, the right of one man to consider himself a Christian was as legitimate as another's right to deny this to him. There is no European who would be more European than another. Even if he

leaves for Haiti and lives there according to local customs, he remains a European and, perhaps, in fact, the very fact that he has changed his location and way of life makes him more so than otherwise.

Second, the behaviour of separate individuals, their acts, should not be inferred from their belonging to a culture. Belonging to a culture, like, for instance, belonging to humankind, is only a condition for the behaviour of individuals, it designates certain frameworks, space in which their acts are carried out, but does not account for them. Of course, cultural identity is a more concrete characteristic than biological identity, but it nevertheless remains too general for an understanding of the behaviour of different individuals.

6. We can assume that the motivating role of individuals' cultural identity proves to be something else, in particular, it becomes more conscious and active in the process of their interactions with individuals belonging to another culture, in a situation of multicultural existence. However, we must keep in mind that people who belong to different cultures meet and interact with one another not, as a rule, in connection with their cultural differences, but in perfectly concrete connections and with interest in problems that lie entirely outside these differences. As an example, in Moscow in recent years we have often been contacting Tajik immigrants working as yard cleaners under contract in our places of residence. They work in this capacity not because they are Tajik, but because necessity requires them to. They are hired for this work not because they are Tajik, but because they are willing to do it. The conditions for this small case of multiculturalism are a specific matter and coinciding interests – our interest in having clean yards, and their interest in earning money. The existing cultural differences between us in the given case have no direct relation to the matter at hand. This is how it happens in the overwhelming majority of cases.

A multicultural situation is fraught with the danger of falling into the abstract thinking that the concrete facts and individual activities of a person can be examined exclusively through the prism of his belonging to another culture. It requires a higher intellectual standard and moral discipline than a monocultural environment: the first consists in the concreteness of thought, the ability to judge each matter by its own criteria, and the second requires a rationally conditioned restraint of valuation, the straightening of relations in the logic of individually responsible behaviour. For instance, if, returning to our example, the yard cleaner tidies up well and behaves himself respectfully, and, in particular, if he does the job poorly and causes inconvenience for the residents, then we must understand that so acts and behaves not 'a Tajik' and still less 'the Tajik', but our yard cleaner, a concrete individual. There is a deformity in judgement when a substantial and concrete analysis of concrete acts binds itself to one abstract, namely ethno-national characteristic of a person, as if this were the fundamental or sole determining factor of his behaviour. Such a fault in thinking leads logically to ethical destruction and turns into one of the most dangerous forms of moral demagoguery and falseness.

7. The situation of multiculturalism becomes dramatically strained and goes into its own substance whenever the subject of relations between people belonging to the different cultures itself becomes a fact of their belonging to them – what distinguishes them from one another as representatives of different cultures. These can be language problems, things held sacred by the ethnicity or religion, behavioural and ritual cultural symbols, one understanding or another of historically overburdened and ideologically loaded problems, etc. Given all the distinctions of these subjects in themselves, and the degree of their acuteness in different contexts, it should be noted that there is something common to all of them: they enter into the mental nucleus of a person, fixing his personal identity and

feeling of worth. The link of a person with his ethno-national culture, religion, and through them with his own civilization is closer than, for instance, the link with his profession, social group, cultural-aesthetic movement, region, institution, and so on. This connection has an intimate, personal, and in this sense inalienable nature. The general rule, in my view, should consist in treating the cultural identity of a man as respectfully and correctly as possible, with an understanding that the matter concerns his personal dignity.

The symbols of cultural identity, all that a man interprets as sacred for himself, cannot be a subject of dialogue, and, perhaps, of any public discourse. In the process of the dialogue of cultures, and in order that this dialog be productive, one can discuss everything, except the question of their comparative values. Every person's own culture is the best culture in the world, just as the best woman in the world is always one's own mother. Cultural identity is to be found beyond the boundaries of what is subject to free choice if we understand this to mean a rationally weighed procedure. It relates to the same range in which an individual's convictions and beliefs are situated. The dialogue of cultures, in my view, should be structured on the same scheme, with the same restrictions and caution as the interpersonal dialogue.

8. The morally cemented basis of the dialogue of cultures, the guarantee that people's belonging to different cultures will not prove to be a destructive influence on them, is tolerance, including political correctness as an element of it.

Tolerance is a forbearing attitude not simply to the uncommon, irritating peculiarities of surrounding people, but to those of their peculiarities owing to which they are and remain different, cannot be other than different – different owing to their racial, ethnic, and social origin as well as to their beliefs and cultural belonging. This is a forbearing attitude not in the sense of sincere generosity (gentleness, leniency, and so on), but rather something similar to a consciously cultivated, even permanently assumed position in one's attitude to necessity. Having originally emerged as toleration in the conditions of a religious schism and as way of its legitimation, tolerance spread with time into the realm of political and party persuasion and, in the contemporary era, into the differences rooted in belonging to different cultural worlds. Tolerance presents itself as a spiritual-moral and ethical-legal basis for the unity of civil society, social and public space, taking shape in spite of the initial differences among individuals, over their worldview, beliefs, political convictions, and cultural differences.

Tolerance as a definite type of relationship between people permitting them to cooperate and be mutually respectful in spite of their differences in culture, political views, and visions of the world, does not imply the relativization or devaluation of the same culture, political views, and visions of the world. Rather, it is necessary to follow it as a demand for more serious, responsible, reflexion-enriched attitudes to the worldview and spiritual-moral bases for human existence. Moreover, tolerance implies not a person's repudiation of absolute values constituting the internal spiritual nucleus of his personality, but only refraining from attributing absolute importance and supremacy of meaning to one's own views of life.

In the capacity of virtue and of a common norm of behaviour for man in contemporary, pluralistic, multicultural society, tolerance has many manifestations, among which political correctness has recently gained particular currency and import. Political correctness undergoes various, often deserved criticisms and even ridicule. Indeed in some cases it takes comical forms and becomes the instrument of ideological abuse. Nonetheless, correctly understood political correctness is an enormous humanitarian achievement precisely in the connection and context of the dialogue of cultures. As far as I understand,

political correctness consists in a purposeful objective directed at clearing the public space of words, figures of speech, gestures, and acts that carry a visible or hidden negativity, can be interpreted as insults by those to whom they are directed (it is especially important to emphasize: the very fact that they are interpreted by some group as insults is enough to consider them as such).

9. The dialogue of cultures does not remove the differences between cultures, and in some ways even aggravates them, making them clearer to acknowledge or feel. The dialogue is an expression of the diversity of culture as well as a way of preserving it. Of course, dialogue between cultures is possible insofar as they have something in common, such as shared fundamental principles. At the same time, it presupposes differences, reproduces and reinforces them, and shows the specific uniqueness and value in itself of every culture. The dialogue of cultures is a testament to the fact that culture exists and must exist in a diversity of forms, and an ever-increasing diversity at that. In connection with this, a question arises about the prospects for a historical evolution of the forms of political life, about the possibility of a global community of people. Is this very possibility of such a community not bringing the dialogue of cultures to a close?

To answer this question, it is necessary to take into account that in the dialogue of cultures there is always a supplementary 'subject' – beyond the cultures that participate in the dialogue, there is also the process of the dialogue itself. In order to mark out the process of dialogue as a place for meeting, the space of reciprocity among people belonging to different cultures, it is necessary to make one distinction.

People of different cultures can meet on the soil and in the space of one particular culture (in a typical case the immigrants would be from Asia and Africa, living in the countries of Europe). They might also meet at the intersection of different cultural inflows, on territory which in this respect might be considered neutral (in a typical case, international airports, international organizations and so on). The difference between these two distinct events is fundamental. In the first, cultural differences are attendant, secondary and in this sense accidental factors (Muscovites could clean up Moscow yards themselves, and it would be better if they did). In the second case, cultural differences are an essential factor, since those communicative areas themselves are intended and set up specifically for people of different cultures who appear there in the capacity of legal and welcome participants in some social matter. The given difference can be designated in just such a way: people belonging to different cultures meet among themselves in the first case in spite of their belonging to different cultures and in the second case, because of this. The fundamental difference is that the potential for conflict of cultural differences in the second case is much (qualitatively) smaller than in the first, and may even be said to be entirely absent.

The dialogue of cultures, in the proper, strict sense of the word, as a cooperation or union of people belonging to different cultures, has its place precisely in the second case, when the area of dialogue, the matter that unites them, is in the space between cultures. The peculiarities of people's behaviour, their mutual relations at the points of intersection between cultures, their ability to be together, remaining in the framework of cultural identity, permits us to infer that in the process of the dialogue of cultures (at least to the point where it unfolds in neutral spaces) and certain universal, super-cultural forms of communication have the capacity to become the embryo of a global community of people. However, the global community of people is another subject altogether (something qualitatively different from culture, a kind of super-culture) which goes beyond the framework of ethical-culturological analysis and must be situated in the field of other scientific and research methods (axiological, philosophical-historical, etc.).

G. Hajiyev¹

ETHICAL ASPECTS OF LAW-GOVERNED STATE

In the scientific community there exist ideological and theoretical concepts regarding which one cannot definitely say who, where and when created them. Such concepts being achievements of the universal human intellect gain their formal and substantive diversity according to the peculiarities of a certain national culture. National and cultural identity of a certain model emphasizes the peculiarities of its perception within the established system of views and traditions. Along with it, the modern human community clearly demonstrates striving and readiness for a wide-range dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations. Forming the multicultural space of interstate and interpersonal communication makes for internationalization of ideas and views in the context of which ideas of universal values are reflected, to a certain extent accepted and supported by all states and peoples. Certainly, the concept of a law-governed (or rule-of-law) state is among such ideological and theoretical concepts.

The idea of a law-governed state appeared not in the science of law. It is the most important concept substantiated in I. Kant's works of the philosophy of law written in the last decade of the 18th century. It is doubtful whether the great philosopher could suppose that the idea of a rule-of-law state will prove to be one of the most practical ones and will become the basis for rapid development of constitutional law in the 19th and the 20th centuries.

Kant outlined an original programme of gradual and long improvement of all forms of public authority on the basis of restriction, to be more exact – self-restriction of the state authority.

As a most important legal idea the principle of a rule-of-law state is a whole set of commands, imperatives, prohibitions addressed to the public authority by the public authority itself under the influence of the civil society.

Some of these commands and prohibitions appear under the influence of ethical norms.

Developing the idea of regulatory content of the principle of a rule-of-law state the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in the enactment of December 23, 1999, in the case of constitutionality test of certain statutes of federal laws of the rates of insurance premium payments to state social off-budget funds noted: 'The principle of a rule-of-law state enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation... entails certain requirements, recommendations and prohibitions concerning certain actions of state bodies. In taxation, the mentioned constitutional rule bars the legislator from introducing control in a way that provokes law-abiding citizens to conceal incomes and understate the base liable to taxation.' The state cannot encourage a delinquent behaviour of citizens, it is immoral; this is the essence of this requirement. Developing this idea the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in a number of its decisions reviewed the system of citizens' registration at a place of residence which is in effect in our country and ruled that this system is overcomplicated, which, in fact, is a provocative act causing the breach of rules of this system.

¹ Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, LL.D., Professor, Lawyer *Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Author of more than 200 scholarly publications, including monographs and learning aids: *Protection of Basic Economic Rights and Freedoms of Entrepreneurs Abroad and in the Russian Federation: Practices of Comparative Analysis* (Zashchita osnovnykh ekonomicheskikh prav i svobod predprinimatelej za rubezhom i v Rossijskoj Federatsii: Opyt sravnitel'nogo analiza); *Entrepreneur – Taxpayer – the State: Legal Views of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation* (Predprinimatel' – nalogoplatelshchik – gosudarstvo: pravovye pozitsii Konstitucionnogo Suda Rossijskoj Federatsii); *Constitutional Principles of Market Economy* (Konsitutsionnye printsipy rynochnoj ekonomiki); *Constitutional Economics* (Konstitucionnaja ekonomika) and others. Chair of editorial board of the 'Comparative Constitutional Review' journal, member of editorial boards of 15 journals.

Testing the constitutionality of product certification law following Mr Redicop's complaint the Constitutional Court formulated an important requirement which is reckoned among the regulatory content of the principle of a rule-of-law state, which also has an ethical foundation. It is reduced to the rule according to which this principle presupposes, in the sphere of activities of bodies of executive power, equidistance of these bodies from a range of business organizations. The equidistance – as a display of objectivity, non-selectiveness, on the whole – of equity of the public authority in its relations with the business. The practices of commercialization of state functions, creation of the so-called 'authorized legal entities' which public authorities entrust with doing business on the basis of state resources are inadmissible first of all in terms of rule-of-law state. There is no doubt that in the state there are such spheres – first of all, education, science, art – where we cannot rely on spontaneous development of commodity-money relations. Otherwise not only the foundations of a rule-of-law state, but of any state on the whole can be destroyed. Karl Marx, who revealed the objective laws of market economy, warned that there are segments of society where it is impossible to succeed relying on nothing but the law of value. He spoke about the extreme danger for public authorities which appears when an official perceives the state function he performs as his property from which he is eligible to draw income.

When our country got down to reforming the systems of education, science and culture, the reformers were guided by certain 'monetarist' assumptions which, in fact, are just immoral. If one of the reasons that made adopting the Common National Exam possible was that in this way financial flows between higher and secondary education are regulated, the results of the reform will prove to be deplorable as the initial target is false.

Another ethical aspect of a rule-of-law state is the authorities' focus on seeking citizens' trust. In a number of decisions made by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation an idea is repeated as a refrain: in a rule-of-law state authority must be exercised in a way that will observe the principle of maintaining the trust citizens put in law and the state's activities, which presupposes preservation of sensible stability of legal control and the inadmissibility of introducing arbitrary changes to the system of legal regulations which are in effect. This imperative of a rule-of-law state means that the most dangerous form of treachery is treachery of the public authorities. Thus it is inadmissible to give a retroactive effect to the law which establishes or aggravates responsibility. (This is the norm stated in the first clause of Article 54 of the Constitution of Russia.) And when necessary, the legislator is supposed to provide citizens with opportunities, in particular, by way of temporary legal control, within some reasonable period of time to adapt themselves to changes introduced to the law.

Maintaining trust in public authorities is the basic idea for reforming administrative machine and administrative legislation.

In the Russian Legislation Development Concept (2010) it is noted that the current transformation of the administrative law and administrative legislation is inseparably connected with the change of the role of state and its bodies in social life. The state is supposed to perform only the functions that are necessary and useful for the society, the contents and the scope of the functions depending on the goals which are set for the society on every stage of its development.

Under these conditions the main trends of enhancing the state's functions and its role in social and economic development of the Russian society are: improvement of quality and availability of state services, which requires analyzing and in-

interpreting a number of questions. This is a universal character of such services, indications basing on which certain socially important actions can be referred to the category of public services, the circle of subjects in whose interests the aforementioned activities are put into practice, which allows characterizing the services as public, and certainly, categories of officials who can carry out activities on delivery of state services.

At that, it seems necessary to take into account the imperatives which form the contents of the principle of a law-governed state: subordinating to the right of public entities, restricting state bodies from direct intervention in economic activities and, along with it, improving the quality of availability of public services with the purpose of establishing trust put in public authorities. In fact, the idea of a rule-of-law state entails an assumption that public authorities should not only rely on methods of force and on security agencies (they should not pose themselves as just a 'strong' state). Public authorities must earn people's trust.

And finally, a rule-of-law state as a theoretical concept of constitutional law contains an important ethic requirement for bodies of public authorities: they must be self-critical, able to admit their mistakes and strive for their public correction. In this context Decree of President of the Russian Federation of February 9, 2011, 'On public discussion of draft federal constitutional laws and federal laws' can be perceived as a move towards a rule-of-law state. The public review of draft laws stipulated by this regulatory act will make it possible to eliminate faults, provided, certainly, that it does not become a mere formality.

The situation seems to be more complicated with another branch of state power – with judicial power. Can we make the legal review of the judicial decisions which have taken legislative effect? Especially if it is about the so-called 'high-profile verdicts' which undoubtedly have some political flavour. Giving a speech at a meeting of the Council for Civil Society and Human Rights on February 1, 2011, President D.A. Medvedev maintained that the society needs efficient courts. And to achieve it the 'absolute privilege' providing judges' in-

dependence must be supplemented with public monitoring of judicial decisions.

I believe that the citizens' right for public review of high-profile judicial decisions (not only of verdicts brought in on criminal cases, but also of the decisions made by the Constitutional Court) is a right guaranteed by the Constitution. The first clause of Article 32 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees that citizens are eligible to participate in administration of state affairs. There is a number of citizens' rights to manage public affairs. Among these is the right to try criminal cases as a juror, to make public and town-planning reviews, to participate in the work of the Public Chambers and to make a public review of actions of public authorities.

A letter from the Presidium of the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation asked whether a public organization of expertise to analyze the criminal procedure in cases where the verdicts have not yet taken legal effect is in accordance with constitutional regulations, and whether it is a public form of pressing the court when handling a case. The Chairman of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, in his reply that had been approved of by Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, drew attention to the fact that judges' privileges are inseparably connected with their responsibilities, which means, first of all, the accountability of the judiciary to the society. The judicial authority, as entrusted with the right to control actions of other branches of power, needs special guarantees of non-interference with the course of justice. Due to the reduced opportunities of legitimate control executed by other branches of power, public control over justice gains additional importance. On the other hand, such control is an essential protection from illegitimate administrative pressure put on court. Being one of the forms of 'feedback' between the society and the judicial power, a social reaction both to judicial decisions in certain cases and to the established practices in certain categories of cases cannot be restricted from the standpoint of the opportunity to analyze such cases and to evaluate them particularly but not exclusively in public.

B. Ilizarov¹

ON CRUCIAL DIALOGUES WITH THE PAST

(THE CHARM OF EVIL: FROM THE CULT OF THE LIVING TO THE CULT OF THE DEAD PERSONALITY OF STALIN)

On socio-cultural dialogues, horizontal and vertical

All living cultural communities (civilizations) are in close or distant ties, in dialogues. These ties are always beneficial, even in the event that proposed values are interpreted by the other side as evil and are eliminated. These ties are made in direct or indirect ways. Sometimes dialogue between cultures becomes a monologue: there is no reciprocity or return. In ancient and medieval times, all of these types of links existed, but were limited to next-door neighbours. With time, cultural contacts were implemented more intensively and with more

distant cultures. Cultural dialogues also began in remote retrospective: the discovery of ancient monuments, and especially of ancient Eastern cultures, allowed Europeans, and subsequently the whole world, to carry out complicated and profound 'dialogues' not only 'on the horizontal', but also on the 'vertical', descending through time. With time, the social memory of humankind acquires a much greater depth and complexity by penetrating into the prehistory of humankind, the Stone Age and even deeper layers of the past. Other ancient cultures and their personages are perceived by the majority of contemporary people purely intellectually, almost without emotion. 'Dialogue' is carried out in an entirely different way with one's own past. We will note that globalization cannot only be considered an intergrowth of contemporary cultures 'on the horizontal', but as a mastering by humankind of the enormous diversity of the cultures of the past. D. S. Likhachov emphasized this continually, especially in his brilliant oral speeches. But in every culture of the past and present there are elements causing rejection and disapproval from the perspective of common human morality. What is the fate of negative experience and how does it correlate with positive experience? Here for the first time an attempt is be-

¹ Leading researcher of the Institute for Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. Author of books: *Stalin's Secret Life: Based on the Sources of His Library and Archive; to Historiosophy of Stalinism* (Tajnaia zhizn' Stalina: po materialam ego biblioteki i arhiva: k istoriosofii stalinizma), *Relevant Theoretical and Methodological Issues of Soviet Archivistries* (Aktual'nyje teoreticheskie i metodologicheskie problemy sovetskogo arhivovedenija), *Role of Documental Monuments in Social Development: Theoretical Issues of the Use of Document on Architecture* (Rol' dokumental'nyh pam'jatnikov v obshchestvennom razvitanii: teoreticheskie voprosy ispol'zovanija arhitekturnykh dokumentov), *Historiometric Issues of Archivistries: Methods of Measuring Volumes of Written Information* (Istochnikometricheskie problemy arhivovedenija: metody izmerenija objomov pis'mennoj informatsii), *Image of Stalin: View from the 21st Century* (Obraz Stalina: vzgljad iz XXI veka), *Word Raising from the Dead... or the Case of Lazarus. Based on the Sources from People's Archives* (Slovo voskreshaet... ili precedent Lazarja. Po materialam Narodnogo arkhiva) and some others. A number of books have been translated into foreign languages.

ing made at rationally comprehending the problem of good and evil as parts of the historical and cultural heritage.

We must 'converse' with the past and even ask questions of it. It takes revenge not for the fact that we distort, exaggerate, or belittle it. It takes cruel revenge for being suppressed and kept silent. Addressing the past, assessing deeds of long ago, disentangling secrets is one of the forms of confession and repentance, and confession can be accepted or not. When it is accepted, a moment of relaxation of tensions occurs in society — a catharsis — and society is freed from a terrible burden, and even rejuvenates and acquires an ability to move onward. Moving without looking back, however, it comes to the next choice between what is good and what is evil again and again. Human history is not only the history of development, the accumulation and exchange of material and cultural values, but also of the development and accumulation of good and evil throughout the history of humankind.

History and the problem of morality

From some time in European historical science, morality and history became incompatible. Was it from the time of Machiavelli? I do not believe so. He only expressed openly that of which everyone was convinced before him, namely that in the name of the good for people and society, the leader has the right to go beyond the borders of good, justice, and honesty. Machiavelli convincingly formulated the ancient thesis — by the strength of evil we guard against the weakness of good: our state, our citizens, their peace, and their culture. This is an instinctive reaction of any man to any danger, pain, or fear. The state may, after all, be criminal, the people depraved, the culture degraded, their 'peace' acquired by the spilling of innocent blood. Can we be convinced of this after looking over the annals of the ancient historians? They understood that man in history is an imaginary 'object' if he is led away from the field of 'good and evil'. We remember, however, the Biblical books of Kings, the history of the Maccabees, the labours of the historians of the ancient Roman Empire in the period of moral decay or of Byzantium. Nonetheless, universal practice long before Machiavelli distinguished state and private interests and morality. This is how all leaders and most politicians, commanders, serfs, slaves, patricians, and samurais thought long before Machiavelli. However, as distinguished from Machiavelli, they agreed that not only the prince of this world, but they themselves, people usually glad of the protection of good and justice, had the right and will to commit evil: 'an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth'. Deliberately taking advantage of the services of evil for good purposes became the habitual practice namely for European culture. Those societies which we relate to the cultures of 'the East', in this sense, were always less sanctimonious. In the Modern Era, Russia continually and to ever greater degrees demonstrates its belonging to Europeanism.

Only Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy had second thoughts at the end of the 19th century and, appealing to the example of Jesus Christ, began to preach non-resistance to the evil with violence, assuring everyone that work would provide a way for mankind to settle down in the best possible way. Tolstoy did not live to see how in the 20th century, millions of people mastered and experienced a depth of violence and anger that mankind had not been able to sink to in the previous thousand years. Meanwhile, even greater animosity and violence would not have been an effective resistance to this unprecedented evil, and those who did not resist would not have avoided it.

This question puzzles me as a historian: where does this universal and unquestionably God-given knowledge come from? The knowledge of what they considered evil and why, those various categories of citizens of ancient Babylonian, British, Russian, and other old and new empires, republics, sultanates, and principalities? Investigating the state of morality of different states and cultures is very important, but I am not

yet familiar with even one scientific work on this theme. The split between the morality of the individual and the morality of 'the collective' began to show in the most ancient proto-human communities. Since that time, the state as a higher form of organizing communal living, initially with the goals of self-preservation which compel citizens to coexist (i.e., the law), sooner or later enslaves these very people. In external life, as well, from time immemorial, in relation with other nations and states any kind of morality was denied, which had always been accepted as normal. Only the ancient prophets from Biblical history were the first to show the close connection of personal, social, and state morality, invariably noting good and evil in every separate person, people, and kingdom as basic causes for the rise and fall of states, societies, and individuals. At the other end of the world, people of another culture and religion entirely — Confucius and other sages in ancient China — came to the same conclusions. Ancient Israel fell, many Christian states and states of other religions fell, people migrated, most ethnic types were reconfigured to the point of being unrecognizable, and the role of individuals in history became more and more crucial, not only in separate countries, but for the whole world. Precisely for this reason, after the ancient historians, I believe that if the original cause of the recurrent rise in development of the state is an augmentation of the potential for good and a decline in the supply of evil, then the original cause of the fall of any state is brought about by the critical overextension of potentials between good and evil, leading to inevitable social catastrophe.

It stands to reason that for the state, as for any organization, there is no and there can be no morality, but cataclysms befall it when the level of morality of its leaders and citizens declines catastrophically. In paper after paper, I quote the words of Nicolai Berdyaev, written about this exact matter: 'A radical split occurred between the personal morality, especially evangelical, Christian, and the morality of the state, the morality of the kingdom, the morality of the practice of 'the prince of this world'. That which was regarded as immoral for the individual was regarded as completely moral for the state. The state always made use of bad means, espionage, lies, violence, murder; the differences here were only in degree. No one could ever explain and justify, plainly, why things that were unquestionably vices and sins for the individual — pride, self-importance, egotism, mercenariness, bloodlust and violence, falsehood and perfidy — turned out to be virtues and prowess for the state and nation. This is the greatest lie of world history.'¹ He is right that duplicity is the very characteristic of most of the notable state figures of world history and they are just people, or more precisely, each of them is merely a human, though he possesses great powers. Like all people, they are given merits and stricken with vices which are justly associated with the vices and merits of the state they govern. Whether the state becomes progressive or criminal only depends on the character of the actions (which policy is adopted) that the leadership and people subject to its power commit. Nazi Germany is a recent example of this. Thanks to its leaders and the citizens who indulged them, the state could be criminal, duplicitous, and exploitative or socially balanced, forbearing, and even wise. The duplicity of the Soviet state consisted in the fact that its leaders promised to create a paradise on earth — that is, to build socialism. It was as if V. Soloviev had had a presentiment of the great temptation lying in wait for his countrymen. According to the words of S. Frank, he 'once, while critiquing Tolstoy, noted that although the state cannot create a paradise on earth, its purpose is to prevent [life] from turning into a hell.'²

Only Europeans, and only in the modern era, have come to fallen in the endless progress of humankind, considering all fallen civilizations as intermediate steps leading from bar-

¹ Berdyaev, N. *Russia's Destiny*. 1990, p. 97.

² Frank, S. *The Russian World-View*. St. Petersburg, 1996, p. 465.

barism to the summit of the contemporary European world. Condorcet and Hegel, each from his own side, lent philosophical substantiation to this optimistic thesis. Marx brought to the idea of endless progress one of the deepest historical-philosophical models: the model of sequentially ascending socio-economic formations. Hegel spoke of the phased progress of a World Spirit, and Marx spoke of the spiral development of the materials transformed by man's labour. However, such 'unscientific' ideas as everyday good and evil were lost to both authors. Hegel was too enthusiastic a philosopher and considered these ideas to be lofty and therefore incorporeal abstractions, through the fertilization of various civilizations by the Spirit. The historical materialism of Marx pushed him to the conversion of material good into evil and back again, depending on the level of development of productive forces and relations of production. From the time of Machiavelli to Marx and later, people's tears, grief, freedom, joy, the elevation of the human spirit or the baseness of moral deformity and the spilling of innocent blood gradually lost all meaning for the historian. And 'princes of this world', by violence in one place and by education and bribery in another, neutralize the feeling of good and evil, not only for free professionals, but also for ordinary citizens.

Of course, it is not by chance that ancient chroniclers, Old Testament and ancient historians, Christian apostle-historians, and historians of ancient China for the most part thought in categories of 'good' and 'evil' and fearlessly took upon themselves the role of judges. They felt that everything about which they wrote, including themselves, was always between two intense poles of the soul.

What we are speaking of is something that is born along with man and never dies in him. The mechanism constituting the core of every soul works like a moral law. It is impossible to hide from it even behind the thickest armour of indifference or seething hate of justice. Immanuel Kant placed the mystery of this law at the same level as the mystery of the origin of the unbounded Universe: 'two things always fill the soul with new and ever stronger awe the more often and more continually we reflect on them — these are the starry sky above me and the moral law within me.' And this was written by a philosopher who considered (not without cause) the inborn antagonism among people a fortunate motor of social progress. However, even more than a hundred years after the death of Kant no one came closer to an understanding of the essence of moral law, as a categorical imperative or as a starry-eyed sermon about the usefulness and harm of abstract good or mean-spirited evil.

Moral law is a law of choice

All people, no matter to what culture or religion they may relate, understand that there is good and evil and how they come to one life choice or another. Thus, for example, everyone knows that there is truth, but no one knows what truth is. Understanding the difference between good and evil dictates any life choice: it is an inborn knowledge-operation, the operation of the 'moral law within me', which presents itself as the basic instinct of man. Man is the only living thing who can, with a willing effort, quell in himself practically any instincts and urges: self-preservation and fear of death, hunger, inpropagation, aggression, altruism, greed, egotism and so on, and in this he differs from the animals. However, the instinct, exclusively human and conscious, but still an instinct, of choice cannot be suppressed rationally. Even dismissal from the world and its temptations in the most extreme forms is a choice-operation, like a choice between good and evil. In my historical material, I came to be convinced that the choice instinct is the most powerful of all the instincts and the most responsible, since by suppressing or releasing all other instincts and wishes, man chooses them as a good or evil for himself, for others, and for his descendants. The instinct of choice carries the func-

tion of the regulator of all the spiritual, intellectual, and physical life of a person, from the moment of birth until his death. It consists in the fact that the principle of choice in itself is put into man, as an obligatory, compulsory mechanism. This is any choice, at the time of which an internal analyst other than the will assesses each action, word, thought, and gesture, marking them as favourable events or not. It assesses the scope of human honesty (the human conscience). I have begun to speak of honesty although it is well-known to everyone that there is no more deceitful and perfidious being than man. The history of humanity began (in the Biblical version) with the choice of love but at the same time with conscious lies and deceit. More often than anything, man deceives himself and lies to himself. Who is it, however, to whom he tries to lie, or before whom he repents? For ordinary consciousness, this is 'the internal man', the conscience, for scientific consciousness, it is the Freudian superego, and for religious consciousness it is the presence, the 'breath of God' (Tolstoy). These different concepts mean the same thing.

It is necessary to remember that in the second half of the 19th century, Friedrich Nietzsche honed Machiavelli's formula to a sharper precision in an essential way: a great man not only can do evil in the name of strengthening the good. He is obligated to overstep both, acquiring the godlike freedom of an authentic creator. Nietzsche himself and his powerful followers of the twentieth century could not go beyond the boundaries defined by the extremities of 'good' and 'evil'. Moral law lays insuperable restrictions on all of our actions, words, and thoughts. It is possible to convince yourself that you are indifferent to what your actions lead to, that you are free from all moral limitations for the sake of the common good, that you may annihilate one group of people or entire peoples for the happiness of others, but this is always an illusion. A moral law is a law because it cannot be disobeyed. The inexorable power of this law lies not in the fact that it limits a man's freedom of will, but in the fact that, being absolutely free, man is forced to choose, understanding that he is choosing. He cannot avoid choosing! You cannot fail to understand that you are choosing! But you can lie about it. Kant failed to take all of this into account.

From this point of view the history of people is a history of the constant augmentation of poles to which people, generation after generation in all fullness bring their life experience. They always make their choice consciously and freely understanding what kind of contribution and to what pole it will lead at the present moment. Thus, the authentic history of people is a history of choice.

A dialectic connection exists between good and evil, but this is not the kind of connection which flows back and forth between one and the other. This is a connection, toward which good strives, for the sake of levelling, 'removal' of the rage of historical evil. Evil over the course of human development aspires to a radical alienation from the good. On this question, the contemporary French philosopher J. Baudrillard reflects: 'At the same time that Good presupposes a dialectic link with Evil, Evil bases itself upon itself, on its total incompatibility with Good. Evil, in this way, comes out as a master of the situation. And the principle of Evil, the rule of eternal antagonism, triumphs.'¹

From my point of view, this triumph is always temporary, at least until the good of life loses its capacity to 'envelop' personified evil, holding it in a common area.

The strength of good and the charm of evil from a historical-philosophical perspective

Even as we try to relate how in a concrete historical situation, one action, decision, or phenomenon or another embodies either the dark or light side of the moral field, we fall into a trap.

¹ Baudrillard, J. *The Transparency of Evil*. 2006, p. 205.

The historical context in which the choice is made endlessly changes the situation insofar as this context is part of the historical process and is itself formed in the same system of moral coordinates. Were Stalin's decisions, including the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact, right or wrong in his relations with Hitler in the pre-war years? The answer to any such question begets a sequence of national, class, confessional, or clan-based historical reckonings of accounts which produce results contradicting their own signatories. There cannot be a human tally or book-keeping of good and evil, but only an understanding of what is truly good and truly evil. The counting is carried out, after all, against our wills.

Regarding what to consider good and what to consider evil, a great many opinions are put forward. The most widespread is the relativistic point of view, very well formulated by Leo Tolstoy, who reflected: 'It is possible to be conscious of oneself, in a certain way, as a block of ice and water. In the first event, the sun is evil, in the second it is the greatest good.'¹ However, we know ourselves as living things, and therefore for us, the absolute good is life, and evil is that which is opposed to it.

Life is the greatest value for all people on Earth and for this reason the universal good, the true good is that which gives, maintains, and multiplies life. For man, life is the unity of physical, spiritual, and intellectual components; it is everything that develops and broadens the sphere of life.

True evil is that which impedes life, that which causes death. It is not death in itself that is evil, but rather precisely that which is its cause. A man who causes suffering or death is a source and bearer of evil. Stalin's policy (and of course, not only his) objectively enabled the unleashing of the Second World War with its slaughtered millions.

In the human world, good is not symmetrical to evil. The two halves of the one moral field are not equal in any quantitative, qualitative, or essential relation. Life, as a higher manifestation of the good, is a possession of everyone, and for this reason good is opened in all people and is present even in villains like the breath of life. Therefore, in the process of historical development, good grows along with the growth of life and all that is necessary every day for its maintenance and development. In its turn, evil is personified conspicuously in separate individuals or groups of individuals who fall into the orbit of evil. Therefore, evil, rising to an immensely high concentration in separate people and fulfillers of ill will cannot, all the same, attain such a scale as the good of life in all its manifestations, in daily concerns, in children, and, most importantly, in love.

Nature of Stalin's personality cult during his life.

The charm of evil

Great evil possesses the kind of charm which can be preserved for years, and sometimes for centuries. Having no chance to dwell, even briefly, on the darkest and most typical manifestations of evil in human history, we will look at the sphere of greatest importance for people's collective life — the concentration of evil in the sphere of government activity by example of the personality cult of Josef Stalin.

Like most people on Earth, Stalin was not born evil. Until he happened to come to the very centre of Soviet political power, the measure of evil and the measure of good by which he measured off his pre-revolutionary life differed little from that which the people of his circle permitted themselves to use: the students of the Seminary in Tbilisi, the revolutionary underground, later the leaders of the Bolshevik party, having seized power in the country and unleashed the civil war. It is true that all stages of this path were accompanied by the opening up of greater evil, and the revolution and civil war connected him, like all its participants, to a great deal of bloodshed. Until the 1920s his measure of good and evil was approximately equal to the measure of other political leaders of the second rank, on the

side of the Reds, as well as the on the side of the Whites. The first rank was unquestionably occupied by Lenin, Trotsky, Kolchak, Denikin, and others, who had drawn significant masses of fellow citizens into the fratricidal war. The personal and, in a way, unique downfall of Stalin began at the moment when, as fate would have it, the first step was made towards the formation, from an ordinary, undereducated and undeveloped individual, into one of the bloodiest dictators in human history.

If he ended up at the head of the party-state apparatus as a result of the internal intrigue of the Politburo and practically by accident, then later events developed according to the classic scheme, which, with some slight variations or others, all dictators of the world have used. Entering the sequence of temporary unions with some party groupings against others, he 'concentrated unbounded power in his hands' in very short order. (This is what Lenin wrote in the well-known 'Letter to the Party Congress'). Stalin inherited from Lenin's Politburo a system of a new and special quality control over society. Beyond the usual administrative and economic functions, the Soviet system of governing acquired perfectly new elements: a state party; an especially powerful secret police, able to control virtually every citizen; a massive worker-peasant army deprived of caste honour. The extraordinariness of such a system also consisted in the fact that each of these forces controlled the others, through a mutual intergrowth from one to the others. The party had its cells in all the structures of force, in the army and state apparatus; the secret services had their informants and special subdivisions in the army, party, and state apparatus at all levels; the army carried out not only the tasks of external defence and attack, but also inside, the state's punitive functions. All of them were controlled by a small group of party leaders, which attached a significant priority to the party organs before other political 'strongmen'.

By the end of the 1920s, Stalin was personally in charge not only of all the power of the bureaucratic apparatus, but also the armed forces, the state security organs, and the party. The party was especially important, as the party implemented not only the formation of a unified ideology, but also created a special spiritual and moral climate in the country. Whoever possessed the party possessed the morality and the feelings of the Soviet people. Thus, without any special effort, Stalin sat astride the red 'three-headed dragon'. I know for certain that at first Stalin sincerely proposed, without encumbrance from the opposition and at a fast pace, to single-handedly make the Soviet people happy by building them an earthly paradise — that is, 'socialism in one country'. However, those measures that he took without a talent for statesmanship (purges of the party, collectivization, industrialization, the Cultural Revolution) became a baleful sneer at democratic and socialist transformations in the developing society.

Removing his real and imagined opponents, he quite soon caught the usual sickness of dictators — fear for his own life and the apprehension of losing the delights of absolute power. From year to year, these fears grew and pushed toward a build-up of repression, which in turn thickened the atmosphere of fear. The arrogance of an ordinary individual who had received unbounded and uncontrolled power into his own hands led to the most dreadful social catastrophe in all of human history. In its consequences, it is comparable to the catastrophe into which Germany was plunged by Adolph Hitler. He also fascinated Germans with his own specific charm of evil.

Stalin personally arranged his image from a few angles at once: the spiritual image, and the external and intellectual portrait. All three components had very little in common with his 'prototype'. In essence, these were masks, which spellbound his countrymen and masked his true nature.

Everyday human arrogance always gives birth to a cult: in the family, in small communities, in one's own soul. However, people who have suddenly gained possession of unbound-

¹ Tolstoy L. N. Decree, p. 210.

ed power begin to burn with Satanic arrogance, which pushes them towards an indomitable self-deification. In all 30 years of his governing, Stalin consciously and regularly built up a cult of his own personality, as ‘the genius of all times and peoples’. The main tools of this process were terror and fear, which he directed at his fellow citizens, and which soon paralyzed all urges to resist. The terror was inspired by crudely falsified ‘open’ political processes, mass shootings by sentence of extrajudicial agencies, ‘instructions’ for mass arrests and repression from the very top of the hierarchy. Even by the most modest estimates of the Stalinist secret police, in the years of his government, more than 3.3 million people were executed. The fear that permeated all social life excited people to mass hysteria and masochism and turned them into informants, each more in love with their ‘leader and teacher’ than the next. By the end of Stalin’s power, his cult of personality was fed not only by naked terror and fear, but also by surrogate ‘love’ and ‘respect’. The image of the new ‘Ivan the Terrible’ rose from the underworld, filling the souls of the people of the USSR with triumphant ecstasy. The culmination of this ecstasy coincided with the victory in the Great Patriotic War, the casualties of which overshadowed the suffering and terror of the repression.

However, this charm of evil was also fed by other means. Of these, the most important were the fascination of the special, ‘ideal’ image of Stalin, and the pictures of a future, ‘communist’ society.

All the years of Stalin’s dictatorship created, with the help of photographs, paintings, and sculptures, a sequence of images which crudely embellished his real image. The peoples of the USSR came to ‘see’ their generalissimo as a strongly stocky, lean, high-browed, grey-haired, handsome man, without clearly visible ethnic characteristics. This image was so strongly impressed on people’s consciousness thanks to the mass media, which were multiple and, before our time, presented ‘Marshal Stalin’ in just this way. Even the films and news photographs saved from this era do not have the capacity to influence the charmed imagination of the leader’s contemporaries and their numerous descendants.

Stalin carved out his intellectual portrait, in the image of ‘the genius of all times and peoples’ (one of his official titles during his lifetime) by direct interference in nearly all academic disciplines, systematically leading campaigns for ‘Marxist’ output, which was in fact a Stalinist direction in one science or another. Physics, biology, linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, genetics, crop production, and history are not even close to a full enumeration of those sciences in whose subjects Stalin personally intervened. Especially impressive work was done in the area of historical science. Stalin rewrote the entire history of Russia and the USSR, the history of foreign countries, the history of the Communist Party, the history of the Bolsheviks of Transcaucasia, and, most importantly, his own biography. In this system, all previous history of humanity, and the history of Russia, Georgia, and the parties turned into mere preparatory stages for the pedestal of the majestic, historically unprecedented figure of the Soviet leader. The ugly and dishonest Stalinist historical-philosophical model, with a few minor corrections, is reproduced in the brains of our countrymen to this day.

The cult of the dead personality and its fading away

To love and respect the images of the dead and elevate them into a cult are completely different things. After his death, dead Stalin’s cult matured not out of his life-cult, and even less out of love and respect for his deeds. The after-death personality cult of Stalin outlived its rise and fall. It suddenly went into decline, then grew, but always under the influence of two fac-

tors: secrecy and propaganda. After the death of the idol, his cult continued to live a mechanical life for three more years. The political descendants of Stalin had an interest in this, having thoroughly hidden all of his crimes. After the ‘exposure’ in 1956, one of the Stalinist masks which hid the scale of his repressions was lifted slightly. If, during Stalin’s life, the victims and executioners kept changing places, which maintained a high level of unanimous ‘love’ for the leader and universal hatred for ‘the enemies’ in society, then after the 20th century, society naturally divided into Stalinists and anti-Stalinists. The secret of Stalinist power, like the power of boundless evil, was publicly a half-open secret, and by the will of the leaders of the time, it became part of the official propaganda. Under Leonid Brezhnev, a change in course occurred and the Stalinist sentiments were revived in part of society, at the same time meeting a deaf opposition from society’s other part. Under Mikhail Gorbachev, the situation changed again: many archival documents were made public, and the mechanisms of the repression became known, the names of previously taboo personalities were exonerated. Here again, an anti-Stalinist trend prevailed in the public mood. Another turn occurred in 2003. The best-preserved structures of the Soviet past — that is, the intelligence services and the specialists in the area of public relations technology — became the leaders of a contemporary surrogate of Stalinism. The communist party and Soviet army could not endure the ‘perestroika’ years, and the structures replacing them are not yet effective. However, under the influence of basic propagandistic channels, esteem for Stalin again came to rise in mass public consciousness, resurrecting a deeply false Mephistophelian formula about the evil that created good for the people and victories for the country. We are living, no doubt, in the day before the next turnabout towards anti-Stalinism.

The development of dead Stalin’s personality cult illustrates well the dialectic of good and evil in a historical perspective, when a sequence of exposures and resurrections leads to the gradual lowering of concentrations of the toxin of evil in the public body. When the time comes for catharsis, the relaxation of the tension caused by the tragedies of the Stalinist era, then a new time will come and the majority of Russians will hold an attitude towards Stalin more or less like that which they hold for Batu Khan or Ivan the Terrible — curious, but nothing more. Neither authentic love nor spite.

The essence of good is the source of life and life itself. Life on Earth grows out both qualitatively and quantitatively: a universal human civilization is developing which to ever-greater degrees has the capacity to maintain the growth of fertility rates, lifespan, the level of wellbeing, the intellect, mutual understanding, and so on. The expansion of life sooner or later will overflow past the edges of the Earth with all the consequences that flow from this. However, the historical failures and downfalls of evil, turned up by Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Genghis Khan, Caesar, etc., will deepen not once with the succeeding leaders and Fuhrers in unpredictable time, in unknown countries, or on another planet. Thus in historical perspective, the distance between the two poles will grow, but the dialectical connection between them will be preserved for much longer. This permits the good in ‘dialogue’, time after time, cycle after cycle, to ‘extinguish’, gradually, the burning sting of evil, and thereby remove the overstretch between the poles, leading to a common catastrophe. Dialogue, the Word, is the only means by which it is possible to restore the balance of good and evil in society. When the dialogue of living life with the dead past becomes impossible, the moment of the final rupture will come.

A. Isayev¹

CONFLICT THEORY OF SOCIAL LABOUR RELATIONS AS THE RESOURCE FOR TRANSITION FROM THE CONFRONTATION POLICY TO THE CONCORD POLICY

It is commonly known that there are two agreements forming the basis of any society. The first is an agreement on human rights. The second is an agreement on governing. When talking about this, we mean that any society consists of multiple social, age-related, property-owning, professional and etc. groups with diverse interests and rights. In this connection, first of all, people should come to an agreement upon the rights of every group, which presupposes a number of compromises, restrictions on some rights in exchange for extension of the others, etc. The second agreement presents the solution to the question of who will supervise the observance of the terms of the first agreement. Here we have two models of a social agreement, or, to use the modern parlance, of a 'social contract'.

The first model offered by Thomas Hobbs was later titled the 'vertical social contract'. It assumes that people come to an agreement upon their rights and then entrust the state with a task to supervise the observance of the rights and, at the same time, to regulate these rights, i.e., to intervene freely in this area.

The second model offered by John Locke was later titled the 'horizontal social contract'. It has a small but significant distinction from the vertical contract. The distinction is that the society engages the state as a manager and entrusts it with a task to supervise the observance of the rights, but in no case to interfere into distribution of these rights, or their correction.

Historical experience has clearly shown that the leading tendency in the development of the world is a transition from the vertical social contract to the horizontal one. At the same time, history allows us to draw the conclusion that in the context of the vertical contract the conflicts arise in the relationship between a person or social group and the state (represented by its bodies and organizations). In this case, since the state is practically an ideal apparatus of coercion, the conflict resembles the state's 'home match' in which it has the decided advantage.

At the same time, the vertical contract allows for relatively stable and conflict-free relations 'along the horizontal', since the state firmly supervises almost all spheres of the social practice (including even a household sphere) and acts as a judge rather than an arbiter.

In the context of the horizontal contract the role of the state gets substantially limited, and the civil society starts exercising its functions.

Such a situation significantly extends the sphere of conflicts between different social groups, political parties and individuals, as well the conflicts in the 'individual — social group' and 'individual — society' systems, etc.

It is the civil society that causes the objective necessity to develop the science and practice of predicting, resolving, analyzing and managing conflicts, i.e. the theory of conflict.

The transition to the social society is impossible without total rejection of the conflict-based political models of the previous ages. For example, the doctrine of liberalism posed itself as a conflict between an individual and the society; Marxist doctrine was founded upon the global conflict between labour and capital. Var-

ious nationalistic doctrines were rooted in the theory of struggle between nations for social surviving.

Conflicts in modern Russia are numerous, various, and at times very acute. It is appropriate to mention here several conflicts in the Northern Caucasus, based upon interethnic relations. Mass disorders in Manezhnaya Square in Moscow may be traced to the same, i.e., ethnic, origin. Relations in social-labour sphere sometimes take a sharp form. These conflicts are associated with plant closure (Pikalyovo is a spectacular example), non-payment of salaries, transition from full-time to part-time work, infringement of workers' rights, etc. However, we should admit that these conflicts reflect the principally new relations between individuals, social forces and strata, as well as between the state and a person. History generally demonstrates that life of the modern society is impossible without conflicts.

But in modern Russia conflict may become a source of developing and making decisions which will push our society forward. We have an experience of using mechanisms of social partnership. Conflict theory today being a scientific discipline and an area for professional and practical activity promotes the development of cultured attitude towards a conflict.

This cultured attitude suggests that (1) conflict should be understood as an absolutely normal phenomenon, but not as a sign of crisis; (2) conflict must be controlled by an expert; (3) conflict can and must be regarded as a tool to resolve vital problems, as well as to improve and optimize the psychological climate.

In this case a conflict theoretician's aim is not to substitute one of the participants of the conflict for himself, but to help them in finding an optimal way out of the conflict situation and in coming to a mutual agreement.

It is a sure fact that conflict theoreticians will be in demand at the labour market. This will not become so on its own. It will take place if the conflict theoretician expertly monitors the essence and the dynamics of the development of working, ethnic, social-cultural and other relations, predicts zones of tension and instability, problematic situations, including relationship between employers and employees, government bodies and population, migrants and indigenous society and etc.

The other no less important area of the conflict theoretician's activity is drawing up recommendations on conflict prevention for entities of social practice, i.e. the state and municipal authorities, enterprises, trade unions and so on. For this purpose it is necessary to explore specific features of the emerging conflicts, identify 'entities in conflict', their motives and clarify their attitudes.

And finally, the conflict theoretician serves as a facilitator for the participants in conflicts; he or she gives advice on possible actions and their consequences if the conflict persists. The conflict theoretician informs the participants of the conflict on all feasible ways and methods for conflict resolution, develops the form and schedule of talks or other conciliation measures and coordinates them with the participants in conflict.

Thus the conflict theoretician is an extremely interesting and at the same time a challenging profession that requires a mastery of the most up-to-date methods and technologies.

¹ Chairman of the Committee on Labour and Social Policy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Candidate of Sciences. (Political Studies), associate professor. Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (on a voluntary basis). Author of a number of books on issues of social, trade union and labour movement, including books: *Fundamental Changes in Labour Law of Russia* (Osnovnyye izmeneniya v trudovom zakonodatel'stve Rossiji), *Communist Party of the Russian Federation: Words and Deeds* (KPRF: slova i dela), *Economic Democracy – Modern Ideology of Traditional Trade Unions of Russia* (Ekonomicheskaja demokratija – sovremennaja ideologija traditsionnyh profsojuzov Rossiji), *Economic Democracy in Modern Russia* (Ekonomicheskaja demokratija v sovremennoj Rossiji) and some others. Member of the 'United Russia' party Supreme Council Bureau.

GLOBALIZATION AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

Introduction

I wish to thank the organizers of this Conference for inviting me, for the second time, to participate in this highly prestigious Conference and to present my thoughts on the theme: ‘dialogue of cultures in the conditions of globalization’ within the context of Nigeria.

It is usually helpful to start any discussion on globalization with some of its definitions. In contemporary terms, globalization has been described in many ways: for example, it has been called a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities². H. J. J. G. Beerkens defined it as a state in which ‘the world-wide interconnectedness between nation-states becomes supplemented by the term itself, a process in which basic social arrangements become dis-embedded from their spatial, mainly nation states context, due to the acceleration, diffusion and expansion of transnational flows of people, products, finance, images and information.’³

These definitions represent some of the contemporary codifications of the factors that have appeared to have been essential features of globalization.

It has been established that the term globalization was first used in 1952 to denote a holistic view of human experi-

ence in education but began to be widely employed by economists and other social scientists in the 1960s to describe development of free trade and rapid development of information technology and communication science⁴.

The emergence of globalization has given rise to fear, caution, and sometimes outright mistrust in many societies and undoubtedly, African societies among them. Generally, globalization has been perceived, and this, often justifiably, as negative in these societies and elsewhere, because of its effects on developing countries and the fact that it has contributed to the destruction of some cultures in the attempt to impose foreign cultures, goods and other values, towards enriching the pockets of a few institutions, states and individuals to the detriment of many who continue to languish in poverty and penury. Developing countries in general therefore saw globalization as the instrument of Western countries to financially oppress and disorient them. Yet, globalization has both its positive and negative attributes.

The positive and negative effects of globalization

Dr. Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan and Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, in 2006, made a summary of the negative and positive effects of globalization as shown in the tabulation below:

Positive Side of Globalization	Negative Side
Globalization opens people’s lives to other cultures and all their creativity and to the flow of ideas and values.	As cultures interact, some cultures are being diluted and/or destroyed at the expense of others and negative values are being spread all over the world with relative ease.
Information and communication technologies have eased interaction among countries and peoples.	The world is now divided between the connected, who know and who have a monopoly on almost everything, and the isolated, who do not know and who practically have nothing.
Globalization has eased international trade and commerce, facilitated foreign investment and the flow of capital	Globalization has encouraged illicit trade in drugs, prostitution, pornography, human smuggling, dumping of dangerous waste and depletion of the environment by unscrupulous entrepreneurs
Globalization has freed labour across boundaries and facilitated ‘brain trade’.	Globalization has facilitated the ‘brain drain’ in developing countries, thus reducing further their human capacity.
Globalization has set new rules that are integrating global markets.	Globalization has set new global rules that have further marginalized Africa’s poor countries and people, especially in areas of trade.

As indicated above, to practically every positive aspect of globalization, there are possibilities for negative outcomes in the pursuit of the demands of globalization. For example, advancements in the field of information and communication technology has brought enormous progress in the interaction of cultures and peoples, yet it remains a factor in the digital divide which has tended to widen the gap between those ‘who know and who have a monopoly on almost everything, and the isolated, who do not know and who practically have nothing’. Another example; while welcoming the easing of international trade and commerce, we cannot afford to be blind to the negative aspects of the manner in which globalization has led to many illicit trades in drugs, prostitution, human trafficking, and dumping of dangerous wastes in weak and ill-informed nations. In this context, the emergence of the internet and computerised information have brought with them possibilities of cultural

incursions into nations at large without any respect for cultural norms and ethics.

Does globalization create conditions for dialogue of cultures?

Globalization has become part and parcel of human existence. Cultures, however, need protection, since they represent the very basis of human identity. From all indications, therefore, the world is constrained to live with the coming-together of cultures and globalization. Whether the underlying factors of the two oppose each other, or not, and whether they have mutually benefiting effects, or not, remain fundamental questions.

Culture is defined as the shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive constructs, and affective understanding that are learned through a process of socialization. These shared patterns identify the members of a culture group while also distinguishing them from another group.⁵

What makes people unique is their cultural identity and practices. We could therefore ask the question: if a culture is ‘diluted’, does it add to or reduce the value of that culture? Al-

¹ Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Nigeria to UNESCO.

² Dr. Nayef R. F. Al-Rodhan and Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, *Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition*, Geneva Centre for Security Studies, June 19 2006

³ Beerkens H. J. J. G. *Global Opportunities and Institutional Embeddedness*, Higher Education Consortia in Europe and Southeast Asia. University of Twente, 2004

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ See the Center for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition. Retrieved on 8 March, 2011. URL: <http://www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html>

though globalization opens peoples' lives to other cultures and their creativity and to the flow of ideas and values, as cultures interact, some cultures are being diluted and/or destroyed at the expense of others and negative values are being spread all over the world with relative ease. It should however be noted that through globalization, boundaries are reduced to the minimum, the rapid exchange of information over the internet, telephone and other means of communication has considerably affected the time and speed with which information is exchanged as well as the rate at which people learn new patterns of behavior, cultures and new beliefs.

The exchange process which takes place each time two different cultures communicate, plays a significant role in culture dialoguing. The mutual sharing of information means that people are learning from each other, and there is a dialogue going on. If that is so, it could then be said that globalization paves the way and creates conditions for exchange and dialogue among cultures.

Multiculturalism, cultural pluralism as global culture

The interactions of cultures have always led to interconnectedness and have yielded learning, development and progress to the benefit of humanity in general.

Globalization has led to the quickening and intensification of these interplays. Global concepts and cultures are emerging, such as human rights, democratization freedom, good governance, culture of peace, free trade, gender equality, etc. The global music industry has become a single entity where the same clips of music, for example, are popular in New York and Abuja at the same time.

The role of language

Language education connotes multicultural education. Every language tells a story of its civilization. Therefore, the acquisition of another language brings with it the enrichment of another civilization and all its treasures. In the cross-fertilization of culture in globalization, language is a significant factor. The former Director-General of UNESCO, Mr. Koichiro Matsuura, speaking of globalization and languages said and I quote: 'Globalization has an effect on the use, knowledge and acquisition of languages. Language provides a medium through which people understand each other, express their emotions and transmit cultural values and social practices'¹. Language is indeed a determining factor in cultural identity.

The employment market and the basic requirement for languages from today's professionals constantly remind us of an on-going race for adaptation to the narrowing down of the 'global village'. In this race, the gap between those who can adapt, and those who cannot, is in part determined by how well one can communicate in the others' languages. This, of course means that the more an individual can close this gap, the more relevant he can be and the higher the possibilities opened to him or her to compete favorably, both professionally and culture-wise.

In an attempt to facilitate mutual understanding, countries and organizations tend to choose a few languages as 'official' for communication. In Nigeria, for example, English has remained the official language since independence. On the other hand, taking cognizance of the national reality, three major Nigerian languages have been retained for national use, Hausa, spoken in the north, Igbo, spoken in the east and Yoruba, spoken in the west. Action has also been taken to accommodate as many other languages as possible, out of the three hundred and fifty languages and dialects spoken in the country, by making use of them at the state levels, thereby reducing the risks of their extinction.

¹ See 'Statement' by Koichiro Matsuura, UNESCO Director-General (2008), in *Globalization and Language: Building on our Rich Heritage*, International Conference, Tokyo, Japan, 27-28 August, 2008.

Nigeria in a globalizing world

Most literature on the African share of globalization focus more on the negative contributions and consequences for Africa. Apart from mostly reported drain on financial and human capital, internet scam, foreign aid and the overdependence on natural resources extraction, it is right to mention, here, that Africa has indeed contributed and still contributes to the dialogue of cultures on the platform of globalization.

With its liberal intellectual and multicultural endowment, a fast developing music and movie industries, Nigeria, for example, is very active in the ongoing dialogue and exchange of cultures with other African countries and with the rest of the world. At the same time, Nigeria makes every effort to keep its traditional cultural practices intact, alongside the opportunities that the new modernity – in globalization – offers.

Transborder mobility

and the brain-drain/brain-gain phenomenon

Statistics have it that one in every five Africans you meet today is a Nigerian. This fact has further manifested itself around the world in the number of Nigerian immigrants and the wave of achievements they have recorded outside the shores of Nigeria. In the aftermath of the economic depressions, which negatively affected many developing countries in the 80s, as a result of the IMF-imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP), South-North migrations saw many Nigerian professionals leaving the shores of Nigeria with their skills and cultures at a pace that created the malaise of brain-drain? This outward movement of professionals however became an important platform for cross-cultural interactions, integration as well as the romance of indigenous African and western intellectual and technical know-how. On this intellectual and scientific platform, many Nigerian academics and scientists have created a niche for themselves in their new-found western societies, while bringing with them the indigenous knowledge that has sometimes resulted in development of new disciplines. For example, the knowledge of traditional medicine and the dynamism of the African society created the opportunity for new African studies and disciplines in Western universities. The cross-intellectual experience, reinforced by ICT, also fosters increased joint degrees between universities in Africa and the West, more fellowships and research possibilities that mirror interconnectivity and multidisciplinary of understanding the diversity of the world we live in.

While Nigerians are proud of these achievements, they are also conscious of the enormous need for educated, qualified personnel for the development of their home country. Every effort is therefore being made by Government to devise ways and means of creating channels through which they can still contribute to national development.

ICT, Science and technology cross-breeds

The massive and rapid development and distribution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) represent the primary channel for the enhanced cultural exchange as we now have it. It has been said that 'ICT has the potential to facilitate the promotion of cultures and thereby promote intercultural dialogue and ultimately, peace'². ICTs also encourage and strengthen innovations and creativity, and this has been established in the case of Nigeria. As foreign influences, through the internet, television and other communication gadgets brought new cultures, the quantity and quality of exchanges these instruments provide were quickly accepted and exploited. At the moment, Nigeria has a 50 percent teledensity with over 70 million telephone lines (highest in Africa)³, from 0.4 percent it had in the year 2000. The open-

² Ibid, 29.

³ The 50 per cent teledensity translates to over 70 million telephone lines, the highest in Africa which has a subscriber base of 280 million. Retrieved on 9 March, 2011. URL: http://www.africanmanager.com/site_eng/articles/14192.html

ness of the Nigerian spirit to new cultures and intellectual stimulation has made it possible for Nigerians to contribute to the progress of their adoptive societies in term of inventions. In 2008, a Nigerian engineer, Jelani Aliyu, was widely applauded by the media for inventing an environment friendly car, the chevy volt, described as an American revolution by General Motors in a Communiqué¹. This engineer is a product of both the Nigerian and the American education systems and has succeeded in providing an answer to the quest of the automobile industry for environmental compatibility. We could cite other examples of Nigerian intellectuals who have been able to take advantage of their new environments to make outstanding contributions to their new homes while still being faithful to their African culture. But Nigeria is also in the process of trying to turn the brain-drain into the brain-gain, with the establishment of a number of associations of educated, qualified and well-trained Nigerians in the Diaspora who are being mobilized and motivated to offer their services and their acquired expertise as contributions to the development of the country.

Nigerian music, film and fashion industries

Another very visible movement towards positive conversion of the interaction of cultures, traditions and trade potentials in Nigeria are the music, movie and fashion industries.

Nigeria is popularly referred to as 'the heart of African music' because of its role in the development of West African highlife and palm-wine music, a combination of native rhythms with techniques imported from the Congo for the development of several popular styles that were unique to Nigeria, like 'apala', 'fuji', 'juju', highlife, and 'Yo-pop'. Subsequently, Nigerian musicians created their own styles of United States hip hop music and Jamaican reggae. Nigeria's musical output has achieved international acclaim not only in the fields of folk and popular music, but also Western art music. Nigerian music is now a hit in various African countries, beating the barriers of language difference². Ronnie Graham, a historian who specializes in West Africa, has attributed the success of the Nigerian music industry to the country's culture - its 'thirst for aesthetic success and an appetite for life, love and music'.

Any discourse on Nigeria's contributions to a global culture will be incomplete without mention of the now huge movie industry, the 'Nollywood' phenomenon. 'Nollywood', (as compared to India's Bollywood and USA's Hollywood) emerged as an experiment of some sorts in the early 1990s, as an alternate solution, by film makers to the crunching economic downturn of the nation. It soon became a full blown movie industry worth over 15 billion naira. The Nigerian film industry, which is now known and is attracting the attention of global cinema, is considered as one of Nigeria's positive cultural contributions to the international community.³

The third industry that portrays, at a glance, the pluralism of culture in Nigeria is the fashion design industry. At any occasion, Nigeria is known for its originality of designing foreign styled attires with traditional fabrics. Indigenous fashion designers, such as Mudi, Dakova, Frank Oshodi, Maufechi, Hale-ro, are examples of international award winning culture Ambassadors of Nigeria, who, through their work, identify with foreign cultures and the facilities of globalization, while exporting the well known Nigerian traditional fabrics to the four corners of the world.

¹ See A Nigerian Designs a revolutionary Car in the US, Africa News, Friday, 8, February, 2008. retrieved on 9 March, 2011. URL: <http://www.africanews.com/article12558.html>

² See Music of Nigeria. Retrieved on 7 March, 2011. URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Music_of_Nigeria

³ Retrieved on 7 March, 2011. URL: <http://www.nollywoodfoundation.org/html/nollywood.html>

Conclusion

Globalization as a factor in international development has received criticisms on the ground of its western capitalist hegemony, orientation towards increased material well-being of the rich at the expense of the poor, and its potentiality in providing undesirable moral consequences and unpleasant cultural by-products.

Yet, globalization is neither good nor bad. Rather, certain aspects of the complex, and multi-faceted process of globalization have impacts that can be viewed in different ways depending on the values at stake.⁴ Hence the importance of the crucial responsibility of the promotion of the protection and the preservation of culture as a crucial and living element that can preserve its positive influence in the specificity of people without being reduced to stumbling blocks against development and progress.

We see the beginning of this in several cultural elements now emerging in the contemporary Nigerian environment.

Multiculturalism and pluralism are already taking their forms as positive products of globalization and manifest themselves in the case of the Nigerian. They also are present in the action of Nigerian professionals in the Diaspora, who, while remaining true ambassadors of Nigeria and its culture, contribute to the progress of their new homes and still seek to bring their acquired expertise to bear on the development needs of their country.

These are Nigeria's stories, but it is also the story of several developing countries, which are now making good use of the opportunities offered by globalization.

As globalization is here to stay, it is incumbent on all in a world that is based on human solidarity, to join hands in ensuring that its positive aspect are made available for the good and progress of all, and that the international community pulls its resources together to attenuate the effects of its negative outcomes, especially, for the most vulnerable.

References

1. Beerkens H. J. J. G. Global Opportunities and Institutional Embeddedness, Higher Education Consortia in Europe and Southeast Asia, University of Twente, 2004
2. Damen L. (1987). *Culture Learning: The Fifth Dimension on the Language Classroom*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
3. Hofstede G. (1984). National cultures and corporate cultures. In L. A. Samovar & R. E. Porter (Eds.), *Communication Between Cultures*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
4. Luchhohn, C., & Kelly, W.H. (1945). The concept of culture. In R. Linton (Ed.). *The Science of Man in the World Culture*. New York. (pp. 78-105).
5. Kroeber, A.L., & Kluckhohn, C. (1952). *Culture: A critical review of concepts and definitions*. Harvard University Peabody Museum of American Archeology and Ethnology Papers 47.
6. Lederach, J.P. (1995). *Preparing for peace: Conflict transformation across cultures*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
7. Linton, R. (1945). *The Cultural Background of Personality*. New York.
8. Parson, T. (1949). *Essays in Sociological Theory*. Glencoe, IL.
9. Banks, J.A., Banks, & McGee, C. A. (1989). *Multicultural education*.
10. Useem, J., & Useem, R. (1963). *Human Organizations*, 22(3) Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon
11. Ian Angus (2002), Cultural Plurality and Democracy, International Journal of Canadian Studies.
12. Mike Featherstone (2006), Theory, Culture and Society, Geologies of the Global 23 (387), 2006.
13. Tom G. Palmer (2003), Globalization and Culture: Homogeneity, Diversity, Identity, Liberty, Paper Presented to the Workshop 'Campaigning Free Trade', organized by the Liberia Institute of Friedrich Naumann Foundation, November, 2003.
14. UNESCO (2005), Convention on the Promotion and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, Paris, 20 Oct. 2005
15. Norio Ota, Impact of Globalization on Japanese Language and Culture, York University
16. The Center for Advanced Research on Language Acquisition <http://www.carla.umn.edu/culture/definitions.html>

⁴ See Laurence E. Rothenberk (2003), Globalization 101: Issues in Global Education, The Three Tensions of Globalization, Occasional Papers from the American Forum for Global Education, No. 176, 2002-2003.

N. Khrenov¹

THE FATE OF RUSSIA'S CIVILIZATION IDEA AT THE AGE OF GLOBAL CULTURE FORMATION

The point of the dialogue in its broadest sense — as the dialogue between cultures and civilizations — can only be perceived if we are aware of the difficulties and controversies of real history standing in its way. Let us try to analyze these difficulties and controversies. The main problem of establishing a dialogue would be imperial ambitions which are related to monologic but not dialogic forms of communication, particularly if we speak of the communication between cultures and civilizations.

The difficulties in establishing a dialogue between Russia and other nations arise from the fact that at the turn of the 21st century the Russians face at least two challenges. The first one is connected with disintegration of a huge community consisting of different ethnicities, nations and religions, and it is actual within the borders of Russia only. What is positive and what is negative in this process? To what extent is it positive and what are its negative aspects? Will this process continue or can it be stopped? Can it be blocked if it is something like a natural phenomenon? If we try stopping it, even more destructive forces might spring to life which can only be suppressed from the outside rather than from the inside. There are many of those willing to do that and much has been done already in this respect.

We should, however, figure out what is going on in Russia. Is there any other force detached from weapons which would cement ethnic and national organisms and which would help strengthen people's solidarity and identity. To resort to arms is a risky enterprise, yet quite effective in bringing out the real identity. War enables to strengthen 'us' versus 'them'. In extreme situations, a concept of the enemy instantly springs to mind from the subconscious. This concept appears to be what usually unites people. This is both a uniting and disentangling means, one being a sequel of another.

If there were a state in the 20th century which could be viewed as an empire, this state could immediately acquire an image of an enemy, because at the age of expanding democracy an empire seems absolutely out of date. But what is the Soviet Union if not an example of an empire in its modern form? Its disintegration was met with applause all over the world. It was viewed as yet another fall of an empire following falls of other empires. That is why the West is welcoming the disintegration of Russia.

Through this commotion, however, one cannot clearly see that with the Soviet empire and the concept of the enemy disappearing, a new implication will emerge: the extinction of collective solidarity. This is the problem not only for Russia but America as well. America has lost the concept of an enemy. This loss has become a blow in the face of America's collective identity which has led to the search of a new concept of a foe

in the Muslim world. This makes it obvious why the concept of an enemy is necessary to sustain one's identity.

The disintegration of the Russian empire and imperial identity is a positive fact exemplified by the breakup of all empires: French, British, Austro-Hungarian. As a result, we get nations getting their own statehood, for instance when Czechoslovakia came into existence as an independent republic after the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Some predict a subsequent disintegration of Russia, viewing it exceptionally as an empire. As early as in the 19th century, N. Danilevsky spoke of an *a priori* Romano-Germanic world's distrust of Russia. To prove this, he analyzed military events of the 19th century, noting every time that Western Europe rarely sided with Russia and never sympathized with it. The whole world would form its judgement about Russia grounding these judgements on the negative reactions of Western Europe. Danilevsky maintained that the public opinion of Western Europe is even more hostile to Russia than that of its diplomats (1). It is the public opinion of Western Europe that supported the war with Russia and came to terms with Napoleon's dictatorship. This *a priori* negative attitude to Russia surfaces every time when Russia enters a war. It results from the opinion that Russia as an empire is a colossal aggressive nation forever expanding its borders and thus threatening European independence of (2).

And since this is the case, Russia *a priori* is viewed as the oppressor of freedom. So every achievement, bloom or revival of Russia is seen in the West as its defeat. The matter is also that the West sees in Russia not only a hostile but also an independent source which defies assimilation. Russia exists as an independent and unique reality. From this opinion it is just a stone's throw to Hitler. When we read Danilevsky's lines: 'Everything that is distinctively Russian and Slavic, Germany plays down as deserving scorn, and eradication of it constitutes the holiest of obligations and the true goal of civilization' (3), you are afraid of your own conclusion as to how insightful some thinkers are in predicting world catastrophes. So identification of Russia with an empire in Western mentality has determined the relations between Russia and the West and become an obstacle on the way to a constructive dialogue.

But Russia cannot be reduced to an empire though one has to admit that the imperial structure had notably determined Russia's history in the past. Unfortunately it had determined its history in the 20th century. G. Fedotov says about the transformation of the old empire into a new one, 'For the majority of us tailoring the USSR out of Russia, a nominal federation of peoples, looked like a dangerous disguise concealing the old same Russia or even holy Russia.' (4)

Whatever ideological disguises for the imperial structure (Marxist, Communist, Socialist, etc.) were used, in the 20th century Russia continued to display its imperial structure. Some think that this is what largely prompted the emergence of fascism, which had an imperial complex at its roots. According to I. Ilyin, 'fascism emerged as a reaction to Bolshevism, as a concentration of state and security forces leaning to the right.' (5) However, even the Russian Empire starting from Peter I was not only a 'jail for peoples'.

Civilizational role of the Russian Empire with regard to other nations is evident. Within its borders the process of cultural upbringing of all peoples was going on. This was the kind of the enlightenment, which G. Fedotov characterized as 'shining from the West yet in the rays of the Russian word'. This mission of Russia is real not only for the peoples constituting the empire. G. Fedotov notes that 'along the Western border,

¹ Deputy Director for Research, Head of the Theory of Art Section the State Institute for Art History and Criticism (Moscow), Professor of the Chair of the Humanities at Russian State University of Cinematography, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy). Author of over 400 scholarly publications, including books: *The Acting Man in Russian Culture* ('Chelovek igrayushchij' v russkoj kul'ture); *Cinema: Rehabilitation of Archetypal Reality* (Kino: reabilitatsija arhetipicheskoj real'nosti); *Performances in the Age of the Revolt of the Masses* (Zrelischa v epokhu vosstaniya mass); *Will for the Sacred* (Volja k sakral'nomu); *Culture in the Age of Social Chaos* (Kul'tura v epokhu social'nogo khaosa); *Russian Proteus* (Russkij Protej); *Images of the Great Gap. Cinema in the Context of Cultural Cycles Succession* (Obrazy velikogo razryva. Kino v kontekste smeny kul'turnykh tsiklov); *Socio-Psychological Aspects of Interaction between Art and Audience* (Sotsial'no-psikhologicheskie aspekty vzaimodejstviya iskusstva i publiky); *Audience in the History of Culture. The Phenomenon of Audience in the Context of Mass Psychology* (Publika v istoriji kul'tury. Fenomen publiky v raketse psihologiji mass); *Social Psychology of Art. The Age of Transition* (Sotsial'naya psikhologija iskusstva: perekhodnaya epokha) and some others. Member of Russian Filmmakers' Union, member of the Union of Theatrical Figures of Russia.

Russian administration had to deal with more civilized nations than the mainstream nation'. (7) But history was unfolding, and it was becoming obvious that the empire was an outdated form of co-existence that restrained the development of the spiritual potential of its nations. Despite the fact that they were part of the empire, they somehow developed on their own. The moment had come, however, when they demanded a greater independence than the empire could permit. This demand was particularly strong from those nations that had been included into the empire by force, as every empire is predisposed to broadening its borders. This circumstance is characteristic of every empire, including the Russian Empire. Once the imperial instinct is on the loose, it needs space to get realized. The pursuit to expand in space is a law of empire's existence in any form. This circumstance did not facilitate a dialogue. Oswald Spengler referred to the West as an example of this complex.

The world is witnessing the collapse of one of its last empires. The victory of the Soviet Union in World War II strengthened and stabilized this empire. If we assume that Russia is an empire, then we are living through its 'decline'. We need new Spengler to rewrite the ideas of Western countries' 'decline' expressed by him after World War I and to apply them to the Russian situation. Science cannot help reacting to that. For instance, Tsymbursky in his works develops an idea that the three-thousand-year-old history of Russia induced the idea of Russian Westernization with its super-task of 'the rape of Europe' and invited to perceive Russia as a unique type of civilization with an archetypal 'island' complex inherent to it. In fact, Russia is turning back to its pre-Petrine period, i.e. the 18th century (8).

This 'decline' for Russia can be as painful as you wish but not terminal. Russia will naturally continue to exist even if its imperial structure disappears completely and finally, because the empire is just a political structure, which under the 20th century total liberalization has become quite archaic. If the empire disappears, so will the structure of statehood that was brought to life within the imperial borders. This structure of statehood is based on the military dominance, which is necessary to expand its influence all over the world. This kind of stimulus of expansion is the most characteristic feature that fuels the empire and makes it a real force. The psychological stimulus of the empire, however, manifests itself with the support of the military might only.

Today we are witnessing a specific situation: Russia is overcoming not only the Communist ideology, that used to be the basis of collective identity in the 20th century, but the imperial complex as well. Russia is ceasing to be an empire, so is the ideological and political basis for the collective identity that used to determine the processes in Russia over dozens of years. It would be appropriate to ask a question: what will become another basis for the interaction of the nations it consists of? And the one between Russia and other nations. What will be the foundation of its collective identity corresponding to the present-day realities? Is it going to be a completely new identity? If it is to come into existence, what will be its basis? Another quite important question: will it be a completely new identity or will it somehow be linked to the previous experience of Russia? The solution to all these internal questions will determine the fate of its communication with other civilizations.

In this case it is vitally important to reconsider the relation between the state and culture. It is necessary to understand the relation of the collective identity not only with the ideology and the state but with culture, which today is overcoming the spirit of modernism and reviving the inherently conservative guidelines. If the new identity in Russia is going to be linked primarily to culture, this identity will not have to be built anew, it should be inferred from the tradition and culture in general. In this case all preceding history of culture can be read in a

new way. Those guidelines dictated by the state with regard to culture, which existed in the age of modernism have to be re-considered. Today, when the empire is being transformed into a type of civilization, culture has to be correlated with the needs of civilization, so it must resist the old approach when it was seen solely from the point of view of modernism, i.e. from the point of view solely utilitarian and functional. It can also be viewed beyond the time-frame of modernism, which inculcated thinking with the help of short periods in historical perspective. In other words, Enlightenment guidelines or guidelines of modernism with regard to culture today are visibly inferior to the Romantic guidelines.

Will this new foundation of the collective identity be completely new, designed on political technologies, or had this foundation existed forever, but we were not aware of it while now the situation makes us realize and understand its potential? Of course, this task requires efforts from the humanities. What we call identity, emerges due to the elements that already exist in the subconscious of peoples and require actualization. But when identity springs up and establishes itself, it is capable of forming and supporting solidarity between people and nations.

So the first challenge is borne out of the internal situation in Russia, namely, the disintegration of the empire in its new, Bolshevik version. This can explain the criticism of the preceding policy and history of Russia in the last decades of the 20th century. This criticism, however, has to be constructive. Its purpose is to lead out of the imperial impasse. Liberated from the imperial identity, nations populating Russia can be united under the aegis of some other identity. This new type of identity has to be given a name and it has to be conceived. The humanities are to work at it. Too many questions here have no answers so far.

No sooner had the first challenge materialized than the second challenge surfaced, the one connected with the risk of Russia dissolving in the global culture. This second challenge arises in the situation when there is still no creative answer to the first challenge. Russia is still euphoric after the fall of the state which had existed dozens of years. The state which functioned in the form of a challenge, some internal challenge, which was perceived as a challenge too late.

The disintegration of the state, however, is not a positive solution because the consequence of this was social anomy, which turned into a new challenge. No positive and creative solution has been found yet. Liberalization of the economy and democratization of public life just add to the disturbance and do not seem to be a creative answer. This creative answer should obviously be linked to something else. So, from the middle of the 1980s, Russia found itself in a situation similar to the one in which the urban world had been in the 19th century. In this context, social anomy was brought to life. Its perception began with the help of sociology (E. Durkheim) and psychology of masses (Gustave Le Bon). This new situation required a creative answer to the social anomy as a challenge.

The mentioned second challenge, which we are about to analyze, is connected with the situation that is not internal for Russia. However, it determines internal processes in many ways. This second challenge triggers the need in a creative answer to the first challenge, which is a social anomy as a result of the empire's disintegration. Hardly had Russia given a creative answer in the form of abolition of imperial statehood and liberalization of the society, which was dictated by the West and which should be considered correct, as the West began promoting another project connected with globalization and, as a result, with a bigger interaction between countries and peoples of the world. This is no doubt a constructive project for the dialogues between peoples. In fact the obstacles in the political field have been eliminated, and time has come for peoples to unite. The cold war is over and there are prospects of solidarity

of peoples and dialogue between them, which was determined by the previous history. Everything is consistent and justified.

On the one hand, what new challenge is being discussed? On the other hand, the matter is that in reality liberalization unfolds in the form of a total social anomy which can lead to dictatorship, while globalization in its ideal form looks like something that differs significantly from real globalization or from the realization of this ideal project. The unfolding impetus of 'all-unity' which in Russia as well as in the West is perceived as an imperative, which is evidenced by V. Solovyov's reflection, threatens the identity of existing social and state organisms, their dissolution in some amorphous and anonymous community as a result of movement towards global culture. The fright of this possible dissolution breeds panic thrusting the world into chaos. The danger, at that, results not from the project of 'all-unity' but from the forces that could use this project in their imperial interests. Thus, the second challenge emerges in history.

So the second challenge is connected with the danger of Russia dissolving in the global community. This danger for Russia is real, for the country has not yet overcome social anomy after the disintegration of the Soviet empire. Consequently, it is unable to oppose this dissolution. In principle, planetary community is a positive process. At last the utopia that was in existence quite a long while has come true. However, the expansion of globalization evidences that in reality the creation of planetary community leads to the influence of one civilization, which is seen turning into an empire similar to the Roman empire. Russia does not any longer claims to be one and does not display imperial mentality. The phantom of an empire emerges, however, every time when we start thinking about America. This was particularly evident during the presidency of George Bush.

It turns out that the danger originates not from the essence of the expanding globalization but from the attempts of some civilizations to impose their imperial ambitions on the rest of the world. This is what Western researchers also understand. For instance, T. Fridman maintains that current globalization sponsored by the U.S. is not a naturally launching process. It is implemented by America by force (9).

Globalization in itself, which originates in the West, is not a negative but quite a positive process gained by humankind through much suffering. Its idea is attractive and can be perceived as a constituting part of that healing light radiated from the West. If, however, we take a closer look at the reality rather than the ideal image of globalization, we cannot but see some contradictions. The idea of globalization is promoted not just by the USA as a progressive nation, exemplifying political arrangement based on reason expounded by Enlightenment thinkers, but the USA as a new empire, the country with clearly defined imperial goals and, correspondingly, with military appetites. It leaves no place for dialogue. In this case, the idea of globalization in its real form is all but absurd.

We were witnessing the fall of yet another, 'third Rome' in its Bolshevik edition. It was inevitable because the empire was not exactly the form enabling to disclose all spiritual potential of every ethnic community, of every nation constituting it. Of course, one can argue that this existence within the boundaries of the empire was exclusively negative. But if we take into account the fact that every ethnic group did develop and did evolve spiritually, even under the favourable influence of the new empire, which is to be admitted, it is still obvious that sooner or later the imperial structure (though politically this structure was termed otherwise) would turn out to be too tight and uncomfortable.

In the last decades of the 20th century, when there was no terror of Stalin's age, when socialism was on the verge of showing its human face, when the time was called a 'thaw', ethnic groups and nations felt not only a craving for more free-

dom but a chance of freedom. This circumstance became the grounds for disintegration of the Soviet Union. Alexis de Tocqueville rightly stated that real revolutions happened not in the absence of freedom but when freedom was looming as a reality (10). Then an urge to get this freedom fully and completely steps on stage. Gorbachev's perestroika with its truncated freedom of speech became a running start for the reforms to follow and the social anomy going along with these reforms.

It is obvious that globalization is good. This optimism, however, could vanish as it vanished in the early 20th century on the eve of World War I, when the humankind began to feel its unity as it never had before (11). Why can this progressive process of globalization demonstrate its negative aspect? It is because the progressiveness of this process is linked only to consciousness. The unconscious aspect of this process is linked to the activation of traditional imperial mentality. The matter is that in the 21st century, the logic of globalization processes repeats the model of the Roman empire, i.e. it follows the programme dictated by one state and, consequently, in the interests of this state. It is this circumstance that breeds resistance against globalization and awareness that globalization processes can bring about the destruction of national identities.

Instead of the global community where each nation can demonstrate its potential (which is to denote the ideal vision of globalization), nations and states find themselves enclosed inside an imperial community, while this time the empire acquires unprecedented scales. All analogies, even of Russia, fail through. The only analogy is of the Roman empire. But when the latter started to set claims on being the world empire and set out to realize this project, it lost its democratic achievements. Besides, in accordance with its programme of globalization, the new empire pursues its own interests including a number of orange revolutions and using breakaway Soviet territories to build an umbrella to protect against the aggression on the part of other nations. If the USA brings peace to other nations, why does it have to feel endangered? But we are least of all concerned about the fate of America. The focus of our interest is on Russia which faces double challenge.

Today, Russia's future is wrongly viewed from the overseas as connected with the inevitable revival of the empire. The West is ready to welcome Russia's revival. But from its point of view, this revival will inevitably take the form of an empire. We have to step out of this vicious circle and give Europeans a guarantee that Russia has an alternative to becoming an empire.

Indeed, had Russia always been an empire? S. Huntington writes that the late 20th century marked the end of history as the history of ideologies, and a history of civilizations began (12). Yes, the world is undergoing rapid transformations. Traditional identities are falling apart, their places are being taken by new ones. What are the decisive factors here? What principle makes old communities fall apart and new ones emerge? Today nations tend to isolate themselves; they acquire independence and reunite again on the basis of being parts of some civilization. This identity for some reasons had been obscured. But what does it mean? This means awareness of the variety of their identity, which is called civilizational. For Russia it is a vital question, since the ideological basis is gone but there are dozens of ethnic groups and nations. So everything which is linked to the empire in Russia will scare off. Though at the level of mentality, the idea of empire had not been formulated but it had been implied and helped other nations alienate themselves from Russia. In this case, one should admit the vulnerability of the humanities which are not able to sort out civilization problems. Incidentally, there is no demand on behalf of the state to research this problem.

However, one cannot but mention that for several decades a science of culture has been forming in Russia. It happened in Russia, not in the USA where positivist tradition prevails in the

humanities. The sources of Russian culturology lie in one of the scholarly paradigms born in the West in the age of Enlightenment. The other alternative paradigm is the Romantic one. At different times different civilizations applied these paradigms. Today two civilizations, Russian and American, are separated by the unlikeness with regard to these paradigms. America is faithful to the Enlightenment paradigm, while Russia uses the Romantic one. Doesn't it throw Russia back into the past? Yes, it does, but positively. This should be sorted out. Today Russia can acquire its civilizational identity by exiting from the Enlightenment paradigm. For Russian mentality is characterized by the breakthrough into some more remote historical epochs. Russia must remember its Byzantine roots and the time when the Russian civilization originated. Russia must abdicate from the imperial complex and find some evidence in history that attests to its existence as a civilization. This is the goal of the whole complex of the humanities.

The discrepancies between the Russian civilization and the Western civilization will exist forever, for having become related to Byzantium and having assimilated its spiritual potential, Russia became an alternative to the West, for it was Byzantium that was a primary alternative to the West. Having adopted the Orthodox ideology, Russia acquired an image of a 'heretic' in the West; this image would change but never disappear. It couldn't have been otherwise because this image had, first of all, belonged to Byzantium. 'The reality was the Christian world,' Jacques Le Goff affirms. 'It is this world by which a medieval Christian measured the rest of the mankind and defined his own place in relation to others. And primarily in relation to a citizen of Byzantium. Since 1054 this citizen was considered to be a heretic.' (13)

Russian people bear this label of heresy until present day. Of course, it has long been forgotten that in Western history the conquest of Constantinople in 1204 caused no less jubilation than the conquest of Jerusalem (14). This historical borderline remained in the subconscious of both Byzantines and Russians, but Russia is just another reality, not because it does not want to and cannot become another West, but because it is an alternative civilization. This circumstance annoys the American empire which won't see any alternatives in the globalization proclaimed by it. Russia will remain as such even if its political system will be democratic, just as the West wants it to be. It is because it is an independent type of civilization where the quest for collective identity constitutes a permanent problem.

We hold the view on Russia as a civilizational type. For example, V. Tsymbursky, who suggested some rather unusual ideas, is prone to another point of view. He writes: 'Would it be a mistake to see Russia as a civilization? Let's say that its description in terms of civilization corresponds to the essential features of Russia and in many ways explains many complexities of its history. In the world geographical layout it takes a special niche which does not overlap with the platforms of other civilizations and which is characterized by independent state and geopolitical tradition that is 400 to 500 years old. More than enough has been written about particulars of Russian spirituality as well as about its connection through a number of secularizing transformations with the history of the Northern branch of Orthodoxy in Russian geopolitical conditions after the fall of Eastern Orthodoxy under the Islamic pressure in its Mediterranean fatherland.' (15) When describing the type of social relations in Russian civilization as it has been in the last 400–500 years, this researcher points out two main features of this statehood: first, it is an exceptional role of the state as a principal civilizer, and, second, the convergence of cultural and political functions when political crises were accompanied by the crises of social self-identity.

Russia borrowed from Byzantium not only religion and culture but its political structure, namely, the empire, and, consequently, the principle of relationship between different eth-

nic groups within the Byzantine empire. Here again we have to come back to the question of solidarity of different nations and ethnic groups, which had existed and overstepped the boundaries of the empire and had meant some other reality.

One of the first to pose the question of this specific solidarity was, probably, I. Ilyin while he was trying to perceive Western goal of dismembering Russia. He could clearly see, in the mid-20th century, that Russia in its imperial, Stalinist forms would disintegrate. Surprising is that his prediction was so correct. In his opinion, this process of disintegration would involve the whole world. 'The territory of Russia will boil with endless schisms, feuds, clashes and civil wars, which will constantly lead to world clashes. This transition will be absolutely inescapable solely because the countries of the whole world (European, Asian and American) will invest their money, their trade interests and their strategic plans in the newly formed small states; there will be rivalry between them, they will fight for dominance and for 'base stations'.' (16)

Ilyin resorts to terminology which is nowadays familiar to everybody: he calls Russia which is being cut to pieces, 'gigantic Balkans', a nation which is turned into a source of wars and mutinies. When writing those lines, I. Ilyin did not know what the new empire would do to the Balkans at the beginning of the third millennium. Since Russia is similar to the Balkans, it is doomed to a similar fate. In other words, dismembered Russia will become an incurable sore of the world. Terrorism in its modern forms testifies to it. While debating the danger of disintegration of the Russian civilization, Ilyin dwells on the reasons for and needs of such a breakdown. He sees these reasons not in internal but in external circumstances. The reason for dismemberment according to Ilyin is the 'chronic animosity' of the West towards the Russian empire and Eastern Orthodoxy. 'We know that Western nations do not understand and do not tolerate Russian distinctness. They test the unified Russian state as a dam for their trade, language and aggressive expansion. They are going to split the unified Russian 'broom' into thin twigs so as to kindle with them the dying light of their civilization. They need to dismember Russia in order to lead it through Western equation and uncoupling and to destroy it; this is the plan of hatred and lust for power.' (17)

The current challenge in its global forms, not in elemental but in new ideological forms ensuing from America, threatens Russia not as an empire but as a civilization. Mutiny including its internal — individual and collective forms — refers to the fundamental mechanisms of people's survival. That is why it is a challenge. And this is dangerous. We do not feel differences between Russia as an empire and Russia as a type of civilization. How can we do that? We have not been developing the theory of civilizations since the time of N. Danilevsky. That is why we and the West take the decline of Russia as a civilization as the fall of Russia as an empire.

From the standpoint of liberal theories, the disintegration of the empire, as it is known, is positive. So we tend to feel euphoric and ecstatic over the continuing disintegration of Russia, being unaware of the fact that it is not the empire which is falling apart but the spirit of Thanatos which is conquering our minds. Falling of the empire has long mutated into the fall of civilization. Mesmerized by liberalism, Europeans also fail to understand the difference between an empire and a civilization and greet any decay in Russia including the decay of Russia as a civilization.

When Ilyin speaks of Russia not as of mechanism but as of a living body, he means the type of civilization. Stating this, we find a creative answer to the first challenge, to the disintegration of the Russian empire. Defying solidarity in its imperial forms of a Byzantine origin, Russia at the same time resists the dissolution in the imperial identity, which is currently being imposed by the USA. But in this complicated modern situation,

Russia has to make a choice regarding its identity, because vacuum breeds mutiny and experiments with identity.

A hint at the understanding of what is going on today with identity, both Russian and European and American, was suggested by S. Huntington who announced the age of clashes of civilizations and, consequently, another union of nations according to the civilizational principle, and an outburst of disunion of those collective bodies that determined history until now. But this unification of nations on the principle of civilizations means that there must be some new collective or, to be more exact, civilizational identity.

But what does cultivating civilizational identity in Russia mean? The answer to this question is in the existence of two alternative historical paradigms in establishing the collective identity: Enlightenment and Romantic. If the former is futurist and faces the future, the latter is passeistic and faces the past. The disintegration of the Russian empire in the late 20th century is the disintegration of the symbiosis between old traditions and the ideology of modernism or the Enlightenment paradigm, rather insensitive to ethnic, religious and national elements.

In conclusion, we will repeat: in order to participate in the full-fledged dialogue between nations, Russians ought and have to understand their civilizational identity which is able to establish solidarity of the peoples that are part of Russia. Humanitarian science is obliged to help realize this situation. In order to facilitate the solution of this issue, it is necessary to stimulate cultural research. We also want to make sure that the West stops perceiving Russia exclusively as an empire. It has to realize that it deals with a specific civilization and has to speak its language. This circumstance and only this will facilitate a

full-fledged dialogue between cultures and civilizations in the modern globalized world.

References

1. Danilevsky N. Russia and Europe. An Outlook of Cultural and Political Relations between Slavic and Romano-Germanic World. Moscow, 1991, p. 21.
2. Danilevsky N., op. cit., p. 24.
3. Danilevsky N., op. cit., p. 52.
4. Fedotov G. The Fate and Sins of Russia. Selected Articles on the Philosophy of Russian History and Culture. Vol. 2, St. Petersburg, 1992, p. 316.
5. Ilyin I. Our Tasks. Historic Fate and the Future of Russia. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1992, p. 75.
6. Fedotov G., op. cit. p. 317.
7. Fedotov G., op. cit. p. 319.
8. Tsymbursky V. The Island of Russia. Geopolitical and Chronopolitical Works. 1993–2006. Moscow, 2007.
9. Johnson Ch. Nemesis. The Last Days of American Republic. Moscow, 2008, p. 136.
10. Toqueville A. The Old Order and the Revolution. Petrograd, 1918, p. 144.
11. Weber A. Selected Works: Crisis of the European Culture. St. Petersburg, 1999, p. 434.
12. Huntington S. The Clash of Civilizations. Moscow, 2003.
13. Le Goff J. Civilization of Medieval West. Moscow, 1992, p. 132.
14. Hubner K. Nation: From Oblivion to Revival. Moscow, 2001, p. 41.
15. Tsymbursky V. The Island of Russia. Geopolitical and Chronopolitical Works. 1993–2006. Moscow, 2007, p. 184.
16. Ilyin I. Our Tasks. Historic Fate and the Future of Russia. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1992, p. 225.
17. Ilyin I., op. cit., p. 256.

Walther Leisler Kiep¹

CHANCES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE GLOBALIZED WORLD

At the beginning of 1990 the USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and the US President George Bush, Sr. ensured peace (in Europe, for the first place) when in their talks they finally brought the Cold War to an end. At the same time they showed their profound understanding of the ways the history goes on and also their unprecedented willingness to act.

As the result of the talks between the two Presidents, East-European countries gained their independence, and the two German states united. Moreover, Mr Gorbachev and Mr Bush made it possible for the European Union to become an all-European structure.

At the same time, Mr Gorbachev managed to keep the Russian Federation as a world's great power that is closely connected with the Central Asian states.

Europe

As a large and important state, Russia occupies a major part of Eurasia. As far as Russia, with its capital city of Moscow, is a European state, I would like to state that European cultural and economic space embraces the area in between the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans. The population of Europe is 740 million. At the same time, Russia, with its rich sources of raw materi-

als, is one of the most important participants in this cultural and economic space.

A peaceful finale of the Cold War, financial independence of the Russian Federation, expansion of the European Union with its membership of 27 states, and a genuine partnership between Russia and the EU have made it possible to reinforce the role of Europe's cultural and economic space in globalization processes.

Globalization

The above-mentioned processes in Europe promoted a clear-cut differentiation of centres of economic might in the world; while technical progress (first of all, electronic microchips, container shipment and aviation) has made our world more transparent and has also brought time zones closer to each other. We are obliged to use globalization as an opportunity for peaceful development of our planet!

When, not a long time ago, leaders of China and the USA spent four days discussing the challenges and opportunities for mutual partnership, everyone realized the influence and opportunities of globalization: a partnership based on a reciprocal compromise that can lead to mutual understanding and cooperation for the benefit of people.

Germany and Russia

With this regard, I would like to express my heartfelt belief that we, Russians and Germans, have barely 'touched upon our common problem', as they say in the USA, though we did make certain achievements in our cultural and economic cooperation.

Now when the Cold War is over, Russia and Germany have no time to spare; they should establish cooperation in security, which means cooperation with NATO! When the Cold

¹ Public figure and statesman of the FRG. Dr. Kiep has been a member of the Christian Democratic Union since 1961. He was the treasurer of the party (1971–72). Dr. Kiep has been elected to Bundestag several times since 1965. Minister of Finance of Bundesland of Lower Saxony (1976–80). Chairman of the 'Atlantic Bridge' society (1984–2000). Dr. Kiep has been President of German University 'European Business School' since 1994, honorary member of the congregation at Freiberg University of Mining and Technology, member of the congregation at Columbia University (New York), and member of trilateral commission on promoting European–American–Japanese cooperation (New York) since 1994. Chairman of the board of 'Young People for Mutual Understanding' foundation. Author of a number of publications, including: *Where is Europe going?*, *The Bridges of My Life: Reminiscences* and some others. Dr. Kiep is decorated with the Grand Cross for Services to the Federal Republic of Germany.

War was over, NATO is no longer a deterrent for the non-existent USSR. The Alliance grew into a global safeguard of peace! We share a crucial mission: to explain this function of NATO to all the members of European cultural and economic space, including Russia, as well as to other states worldwide!

I do not think that understanding a new function of NATO is enough to initiate a step-by-step nuclear disarmament in our globalized world.

Russia and Germany should assist each other in their economic development, which also offers an opportunity for closest links between enterprises of the two countries.

Russia has almost no medium-size family businesses for production and trade, while German economy relies on such companies. At the same time it should be noted that medium-size enterprises are most susceptible to innovations, because they have to compete with other market participants. This fact is illustrated by a lot of patents, registered by medium-size enterprises. It is very difficult to transpose this mode of entrepreneurial culture to Russia, as medium-size enterprises are overcautious about investing into development of their businesses abroad.

I would like to propose a plan, which would enable those interested young people of Russia to get the idea of such businesses, family businesses for the first place, through their personal visits to Germany. Such a form of express education should help young people understand daily mechanisms of medium-size enterprises in such spheres as innovative activities, marketing and management. They should personally see how these enterprises are competing with each other. And then they should use their impressions to decide on the schemes to set up this kind of entrepreneurial model in Russia.

With investing into Germany's large- and medium-size companies Russia could support the economic development of Germany. Insufficient company's equity makes up a real problem for German companies. Russian investments could reinforce German companies in global competition; besides they could promote transfer of technologies from Western Europe into Russia. Russia, as a source of raw materials and energy, and Germany, as a state with a hi-tech economy, could strengthen each other for successful competition with other global economic players. In the European Union, Germany should also promote a more favourable attitude to such contacts between companies.

M. Kirpichnikov¹

THE ROLE OF SCIENCE AND A SCHOLAR'S RESPONSIBILITY IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

It is obvious that science has several missions. The everlasting and one of the most important missions is that science is an inseparable part of culture. It has always been this way. In the 20th century science is becoming the basis for new technologies: this is another mission. There is also a notion of strategic function of science, though this one may well be covered by the 'technological' mission.

What are the things that change principally in the age of globalization in the 21st century? With new anthropogenic technologies a new issue of 'prognosis and choice' becomes urgent: how could a stable path be found for the civilizational development?

When we speak about the prognostic function of science, it makes me think of what John Kennedy, one of the 21st century's outstanding political figures, once said at the alumni meeting at his alma mater. He said that he had thousands of experts who knew how to build a pyramid and could do it, but he had no one who knew if a pyramid should be built at all. Thus, it is an exclusive prerogative of science – but not of clairvoyants, or prophets or somebody alike – to answer such questions. Nowadays the prognostic mission of science is getting its leading role among the other ones. Why does it happen? With the establishment of new technologies the question of their safety and efficacy arises. I firmly believe that scientific community is responsible for the credibility of the acquired knowledge, efficacy and safety of new technologies. However, the decision to use them lies on the whole of the society. Therefore, it is not only the safety issue that needs consideration, but also such parameters as the readiness of the society and socially ap-

proved ethic norms that largely depend on scientific progress. At the same time, we should remember that any technology – nuclear energy, space exploration or information technologies, achievements in life science – can be used to benefit as well as to destroy human beings. We have witnessed quite a number of examples of these in the recent decades. It is collective intelligence that can guarantee that the right path for civilizational development is taken.

Let us dwell on safety issues, first of all, on human health safety. How do the achievements of life science make it possible to face the challenges?

Indeed, information of new diseases and reoccurrence of the forgotten ones stir up our minds. Different fevers, different types of hepatitis, AIDS, smallpox etc. – why are they possible? The point here is that one of the basic characteristics of a living thing is its changeability and adaptability. We can remove a lot of threats, but new forms of life will still appear, independently, due to changeability and their will to survive. New diseases will appear; old diseases will reoccur. A flu virus makes up a definitive example. The same is true for different kinds of fever and hepatitis, AIDS etc. Of course, other factors should be considered as well. On the one hand, nowadays we can detect causative agents more effectively; on the other – our activities change agents' natural habitat and may potentially influence their innate changeability. Therefore, the main threat today (and the everlasting one, at that) is new infectious diseases, but not the bioterrorism which is caused by socio-economic factors. There is only one possible response to this challenge – combat alertness of fundamental science. That is the main reason for supporting science, especially life science.

It should be noted that there are anthropogenic threats apart from biological ones. Let us refer to the notorious history of asbestos. As early as 1898 the observations proved this mineral to be very harmful. However, the long 100 years passed before the world supported the EU asbestos ban. This is a typical example of our tendency to underrate the very principle of safety's absolute priority. That is why I am putting a special stress on it.

Thus, bio-safety issues are connected to the fact that new threats will go on to come up from biological sources of natu-

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, Head of the Biology Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Head of Chair of Bioengineering, Dr. Sc. (Biology), Professor. Author of over 250 scholarly publications, including books: *Principles of Structural Organization of Proteins and Use of Proteins in Constructing New Protein Molecule: Theory and Experiment* (Printsipy struktumoj organizatsiji belkov i ikh primeneniye k konstruirovaniyu novykh belkovykh molekul: teoriya i eksperiment), *Protein Engineering of Man-Made Proteins* (Belkovaya inzheneriya iskusstvennykh belkov) and some others. Editor-in-Chief of the journal *Moscow University Bulletin. Series 16. Biology* (Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 16. Biologiya). Prof. Kirpichnikov is decorated with the Order of Honour and the Order of Friendship.

ral origin for the first place, and from human activities, for the second. The illustrations are abundant.

Yet there is one more problem area – bio-ethics – connected with the development of modern biology. Let us begin with the issue of genetic information accessibility. How do you like it if your employer or insurance company get your genetic data: the information on your hereditary or acquired susceptibility to different diseases? Is the society ready to accept that? A lot of ethical issues occur in medical practice in connection with transplant operations or euthanasia. And what about genetically modified objects? It is most likely that if we think of the mouse, which, due to its genome change, produces therapeutic antibodies, we will say that it is essentially useful, because today it is the only method to treat many serious diseases.

One of the most critical issues of the last decade is cloning, both reproductive and therapeutic. Reproductive cloning is a simple reproduction of an individual. It is clear that, first, we are not ready for it, and, second, we don't need it. Therapeutic cloning is reproduction of human tissues (e.g., skin or liver etc.) or organs from a single relevant cell. Isn't that good? The world has taken the right path: to ban the former and to support and develop the latter.

The everlasting and acutest problem of transplantology lies with the fact that it can be very tricky to decide whether to save a life or to get a donor. Thus, considered from the moral perspective, therapeutic cloning is preferable.

Animal testing is another controversial issue. Generally speaking, we cannot say that tests on animals and humans are a history. The 2005 Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine was awarded to the Australian scientists (Barry J. Marshall and J. Robin Warren) who discovered *Helicobacter pylori* – bacteria in human stomach that causes ulcer, gastritis or even malignant tumours. These two researchers were testing *Helicobacter pylori* on themselves.

The role of life sciences in the context of sustainable development (SD) is another important issue. What is our concept of 'sustainable development'? It is a pattern of resource use that aims to meet human needs while preserving the environment so that these needs can be met not only in the present but also for the generations to come. Almost all theorists and practitioners insist on steady economizing to prevent a further extended use of non-renewable resources. We need a steady cutback in our consumption of those through scientific and technologic achievements and cuts in unpractical expenditures. The world has come to recognize the role of life science's achievements. The notions of 'green economy' or 'bio-economy' have appeared. The present-day biotechnologies are becoming backbone technologies. Therefore, I firmly believe that the current recession is not only financial or economic in nature. Indeed, financial mechanisms do need revision. But the problem here is even more significant: it requires changes in the motivation of human behaviour. In this respect, we have to deal with a systemic crisis. So, if we want to develop sustainably, what we should adhere to is permanent economizing instead of consumption priority. And finally, we have the precautionary principle which follows from the concept of sustainable development. It states that when we are not sure about a new technology or not ready morally to use it, we must first of all consider its possible risks.

Natural science stems from fundamental discoveries; so it is a sheer delusion to think that the latter can be planned or forecast. I would like to bring your memory back to the 1953's basic discovery in molecular biology made by James Watson and Francis Crick. They found out and proved that all genetic information about a living organism is encoded in the DNA's double spiral. Such discoveries result in new technologies. They are followed by development and application, another important stage. I separate these stages deliberately, because application of technologies is not a scientific or even technical matter; it is the matter for the whole society: the further we go with technological development, the more often we face the technologies of dramatic

anthropogenic effect. The application issue has always been meant for the whole society; nowadays this issue is crucial.

When my teacher, academician Alexander Bayev, was asked about the difference between applied and fundamental science, he would answer that there was good and bad, but not fundamental and applied science. Nowadays, in the context of market economy the difference between fundamental and applied science can be clearly seen. Applied science can be an article of trade, while fundamental science is invariably financed by the state, and no company will invest into it, unless as a charity. Technologies are articles of trade and merchandise. Indeed, while the production of therapeutic antibodies is making its first steps, its estimates on the market amount to dozens of millions of dollars. To meet the country's demand for a certain therapeutic antibody all you need is an adequately equipped laboratory, and you can make millions and millions of dollars. The same is true for almost any science-intensive product. However, the collaborative effort of dozens or even hundreds of research teams is required to make such laboratory possible, to develop new technologies and supply it with them and to train personnel. The only way to solve the problem is to develop and support fundamental science.

Motivation of young researchers seems most urgent in such a context. The perspectives for fundamental science largely depend on reasonable and efficient motivation of those involved in research. However, a pay rise alone cannot solve the problem. In addition to salaries, accommodation and infrastructure, the competitive work conditions are required, technically equipped no better and no worse than abroad. Sometimes, this is more valuable and important than salaries. What is a 30,000 rouble monthly pay, if you have no up-to-date equipment? Another important aspect is like this: a young researcher enters a laboratory to see his boss wearing broken shoes, because the state 'couldn't care less' about him. And the young man is thinking on his own perspectives in 20 or 30 years: Is he also destined to wear broken shoes? The young researcher's confidence in the future will only come up if we take a systematic care of science and of the future.

I would like to note that science cannot be divided into young and old; science is one and all. Yet, there are young researchers, on the one hand, and experienced and renowned researches, on the other. It is clear that if this fact is ignored, the mature scientist has his name and CV to support him in a competitive research. The young ones who don't have a competitive CV should be given privileges, and, therefore, supported.

I firmly believe that the most important thing for a true scientist is his awareness of the fact that science is the thing he cannot live without. This idea brings my mind back to what Pyotr Kapitsa, Russia's outstanding scientist, once said: 'Scientist is not the one who keeps writing scientific articles or is doing science. Scientist is the one who cannot but do science.' I think that this is the main motivation point for the contemporary scientists as well. I would also add ambition to this list. They are eager to get recognition and do something new (I deliberately start with non-material issues). Thus, we must provide for the adequate framework to make the best and most committed scientists stay in Russia.

It is equally important to perceive the need to do science as a kind of instinct, which implies a constant craving for knowledge, a scientist's reasonable curiosity. It reminds me of what one of my teachers, an outstanding Russian scientist, academician Vladimir Engelhardt, once said. When, at an anniversary celebration, someone expressed admiration for his devotion to science, Engelhardt responded: 'What are you complimenting me for? It is my innate instinct. Luckily, it matches the interest of the society. I cannot help doing science. It is like a good appetite: a healthy person cannot help eating.' So, the young scientists are blessed in their decision to do science, because their inner motivation is totally in accord with the objective interest of the society. And indeed, this is a blessing and an immense responsibility at the same time.

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND CO-EVOLUTION OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC SYSTEMS

Coexistence and multi-aspect cooperation of countries on different development stages, with different economical institutions is an acute problem in the epoch of globalization. To solve the problem, two polar processes turn out to be essential to consider: on the one hand, economic technologies of the countries concerned are counterbalanced, the quality of the goods produced in developing and developed countries is levelled out, several social institutions are moved to other countries. *Convergence* is obvious and clearly observed at a fleeting glance.

On the other hand, disunion is visibly growing, it touches insight differences in mentality, interpretation of meanings, intentional and expectational spheres. Those are evidences of divergence.

The two processes interweave and balance each other on various levels, they create a complex structure of international economics, both statically and dynamically. Thus the world economics turns out to be volatile as well as crisis-loaded. Under such conditions co-evolution would be the best way out. Co-evolution is a concerted coordinated independent growth in the absence of war, crisis and turmoil.

What structures and types of inter-state cooperation can contribute to a country's transition from divergence to co-evolution? In this paper I consider countries as socio-economic systems; firstly, I analyze the inner functional structure of such systems along with basic types of inter-state cooperation, and show that it is intercultural dialogue that has to play a crucial part in creating mutually evolving world. Secondly, I will attempt to demonstrate that the structure of basic inter-state cooperation is made of special 'blocks', i.e. groups of four countries, wherein each country belongs to one of the four types of socio-economic systems. Such a structure can provide stable and concordant development of the multi-polar international world.

These results are based on a *new theory of socio-economic systems* (1) and its conclusions. The theory itself is derived from the so-called János Kornai Paradigm (2). According to the paradigm, countries have to be treated as types of socio-economic systems, which allows to detect both basic differences of the countries concerned and their common features. Unlike traditional view on a system as a family of elements and links (the endogenous definition), the new theory of systems emphasizes treating a system as a relatively stable part of the outside world that has integrity and inner diversity (the exogenous definition). That enables us to examine relations between the *position* of a system in the outer space-time continuum and its *state* within the inner coordinates.

¹ A corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Economy), Professor. Director of the Institute for New Economic Information of the New Russian University, Head of Chair of Economics of the State Academic University for the Humanities, Head of Chair of Institutional Economics of the State University for Management, Head of Chair of System Analysis in Economy of the Financial Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation, professor of the Department of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University, of Moscow School of Economics under Lomonosov Moscow State University, member of other universities.

Author of more than 500 scientific publications, among which are: Strategy of a Company (Strategiya predpriyatiya); Microeconomics of Knowledge (Mikroekonomika znaniya); The Theory of a Firm and the Practice of Russian Enterprises: Status, Problems, Prospects (Teoriya firmy i praktika rossiyskikh predpriyatiy: sostoyaniye; problem; perspektivy); Evolution of the Institutional Systems (Evolutsiya institutsional'nykh sistem); Production Functions: Theory, Methods, Planning (Proizvodstvennyye funktsii: teoriya, metody, planirovaniye); Forward Production Planning in Company: An Attempt of Modelling (Perspektivnoye planirovaniye proizvodstva v ob'edineniy (opyt modelirovaniya)), and others.

Editor-in-chief of 'The Economic Science in Modern Russia' journal (Ekonomiceskaya nauka v sovremennoy Rossii), Deputy editor-in-chief of the 'Russian Journal of Management'. Member of the Academic Expert Council on Anti-Crisis Policy of the Analytical Administration of the Executive Office of the State Duma. Laureate of the V. S. Nemchinov Award of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002. Decorated with the Medal of the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 2nd degree.

It was stipulated (3) that every socio-economic system has 7 subsystems that perform principal functions for the system to be viable. Every subsystem produces a product both utilized inside the system and exported outwards. Among these subsystems are the following: mental subsystem that produces mental models, images, conclusions; 'cultural' subsystem that forms meanings, values and examples; institutional subsystem whose product manifests itself as the institutes applied inside the system as well as translated outwards; cognitive subsystem that produces knowledge; technical-technological subsystem that produces products, services, goods; imitational subsystem that verifies if other systems' experience can be applied under this system's conditions (it produces the co-called 'cases'); 'historical' subsystem that produces much the same cases based on the system's own historical material.

Thus, generally speaking, every socio-economic system exports, apart from products and services, mental models ('thoughts'), cultural values and models ('meanings'), institutions ('norms'), knowledge, generalized exterior cases (speaking figuratively, 'stories') and generalized interior cases (speaking figuratively, 'life cases', precedents). Although all subsystems take part in creating or producing every product, we can tentatively regard each product as a result of the corresponding subsystem's operation. It enables one to treat socio-economic system's performance as an interaction of the subsystems stated above, where each subsequent subsystem is rested on the results of preceding one and, in its turn, maintains stability of the latter.

Now we can see that intersystem cooperation involves not only commodity-money exchange, but transfer of a number of intangible asserts as well. And noteworthy is the fact that in modern world such a non-commodity exchange is no less important than commodity turnover, especially for the development of systems population.

When applied to countries treated as socio-economic macrosystems this concept can be formulated as follows. Countries export and import: mentality of the people or society, cultural values and meanings, institutions, knowledge, products and technologies, together with such phenomena as generalized descriptions of approved solutions to eliminate problematic situations (precedents) that occurred in other geographical and historical conditions. Each of the items of inter-state cooperation can be described in terms of several features: (a) 'transportability' — how easily one unit (portion) of this type of amenities can be isolated and transferred from a donor-country to a recipient-country; (b) establishment period — time required for the unit to get naturalized in a new place; (c) usefulness — chances to use the unit efficiently and risks of its negative effect on a recipient-country. Estimating the items of inter-state cooperation in terms of these features, one can notice that mental models are the least transportable, as they are a function of psychological traits of the population and of peculiarities of its history. It takes large expenses to transfer and establish institutions, and the recipient takes a risk of a long-term dependence on the donor (4). The same can be stated about importing knowledge and tangible assets. Inter-state exchange of precedents involves overcoming linguistic and general cultural barriers, so it is of limited practice.

The analysis shows that inter-state cultural exchange stands out among the seven types of inter-state exchange. In most cases it doesn't involve obligatory overcoming of linguistic barriers, it is based not only on reason and habits, but on feelings and emotions as well. Items of cultural ex-

change are invariant in terms of geographical space and calendar time, they are universal values. It is essential to note that products of the cultural subsystem are 'more systemic' than those of the other subsystems: every cultural phenomenon can be regarded 'as a mirror reflecting the cultural system in its integrity' (5).

As a result, products of cultural activities subjected to intersystem transfer become new socio-economic systems (naturally, on another scale, compared to the donor system), the new systems being of a *fractal* character. Finally, all these features of cultural phenomena provide background for each prospective cultural import, and they also encourage cultural resonance. (Import is a fact for a system provided the imported item is, in turn, a system with all functional subsystems simultaneously interacting with corresponding subsystems of a recipient system). (6).

Due to these traits, cultural exchange is certain to become the main type of exchange and maintain integrity of the world socio-economic space. Cooperation of inter-state cultural phenomena is very complex in nature. Successful synthesis of such phenomena is quite rare, which is the reverse side of their systemic character. Under these conditions, every such synthesis has elements of mutual diffusion of the countries concerned. It should be pointed out that mechanistic (precisely, theoretically multiple or 'point-by-point') merging of systems is almost impossible (because modern world witnesses none of 'nano-economical' technologies to assemble an integrated socio-economic system from the outside elements of two or more systems, in contrast to physical nanotechnologies).

Direct synthesis of multicultural phenomena is hard to achieve, which can be illustrated by low quality of artistic cross-cultural co-production (it is difficult to name successful attempts to co-produce feature films, works of literature or music, etc.). But it does not mean that integrate multicultural space has no chances to be created. Further development of a general theory of socio-economic systems might suggest some models to harmonize global cultural space in terms of heterogenic and homogeneous structural ratio (7). Nowadays mutual acquisition of inter-state cultural phenomena (rather than their systemic merging) and their study based on cultural traditions of the counties concerned is a natural form of cross-cultural cooperation that can be treated as a form of dialogue. In the course of the dialogue, the item of cultural import being systematic, it provides cooperation among all subsystems of the importer and the exporter, thus enhancing their mutual and concerted evolution. New multi-cultural phenomena can find their roots here. Conjugation of cultural phenomena is similar to the process of institutions growth (8).

Such dialogue opens way to a certain coherent development of the countries concerned, because the systemic character of every cultural phenomenon subjected to a transfer allows concentration and translation of typical features and elements of national cultures to each of the countries.

Now we may consider the structure of inter-state cultural and other cooperation in terms of the theory of systems.

According to (9), every socio-economic system belongs to one of the four types: object-type; project-type; process-type; media-type, so it can be considered from this point of view. Object-type systems exist independently, disregarding the observer, they are objects with a certain territorial shape, they don't have an *a priori* period of existence. Territorial boundaries of this system, unlike its time lines, are physically felt by all its elements. On the contrary, elements of process-type socio-economic systems acutely feel passage and limitation of time rather than territorial boundaries. The basic component for such a system to function is a process of development and evolution. For project-type systems both territorial

and time limitations are significant, thus such systems operate on the basis of a project, i.e. a complex of activities with a common target and allocation. Finally, elements of media-type socio-economic systems are not perceptible to time and space limitations.

Despite the fact that every country has traits of all the four system types, one of them can be distinguished as a dominating one. Thus, the USA is a typical project-type system, China is a process-type one, Japan enjoys traits of an object-type system, Russia belongs to a media-type one. (10)

Any performance of a socio-economic system (including the global one) is a combination of four processes: creating new amenities, producing (multiplying) new samples, distributing (transferring), exchange; and consuming (utilizing) material, intellectual and other values and resources. In the global economics the countries perform these functions unevenly, which depends on the system type of the country concerned. According to (11), each type system performs two of the four functions stated above, one of the functions being primary, the other secondary. Each function is put into life by 2 systems of different types. For example, an object-type system performs primary production function and secondary consuming function. For a project-type system exchanging function is primary, while production is secondary. For a process-type system distributing function is primary and consuming one is secondary. A media-type system enjoys consumerist function as primary and distributing one as secondary.

These terms provide a natural mode for economical space to function. The mode can be specified as follows: socio-economic systems of the space in question are grouped into the so-called *quartets*, i.e. blocks of four systems of different types that perform four basic socio-economic processes. Correlation between elements of a quartet is not symmetrical; as the dyads 'object-type and media-type', 'media-type and process-type', 'process-type and project-type', 'project-type and object-type' manifest close, almost symbiotic relations; while the dyads 'object-type and process-type' together with 'project-type and media-type' inevitably demonstrate some tension. Nevertheless, the analysis shows that a peculiar circumferential structure of a quartet enables it to combine inner diversity with outer stability. Quartets interact within the so-called inlaid structure, where each system of a certain type interacts with the three other systems of different types.

This model is only theoretical, however, it can serve as a basis to form a well-balanced and established structure of the global socio-economic system.

How can it be applied in practice? Above, I gave several examples of the countries that are typical systems of a certain type. According to the concept mentioned, the USA, Japan, China and Russia compose, in a way, a self-sufficient system that can provide a complete cycle of creating, multiplication and distribution of almost all types of material products ranging from intellectual to agricultural. These countries can make a block to create a certain 'central' quartet of the modern world. Central not in the way that it imposes its will on other countries and groups, but as it may become a model to form similar quartets. Such a union comprising countries of the three continents: Europe, Asia and America, might turn out to be a 'crystallization point' for new world order based on the principles of the inter-state co-evolution. Dialogue of cultures treated as an exchange of systems' cultural phenomena in the block can result in creating local inter-state cultural subspace, a more harmonized and adaptive one as compared to the global cultural space. Development of such harmonized 'cultural oases' based on quartets will, in turn, benefit enable the creation of an integrate global cultural space.

References

1. Cf. Kleiner G.B. 'System Paradigm and Theory of Enterprise' (Sistemnaya paradigma i teoriya predpriyatiya) // 'Issues of Economics' journal (Voprosy ekonomiki), 2002, No. 10; cf. Kleiner G.B. 'System Paradigm and Economical Politics' (Sistemnaya paradigma i ekonomicheskaya politika) // 'Social Sciences and Modernity' journal (Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost), 2007, Nos. 2, 3; cf. Kleiner G.B. 'System Resource of Economics' (Sistemnyi resurs ekonomiki) // 'Issues of Economics' journal (Voprosy ekonomiki), 2011, No. 1.
2. Kornai J. 'System Paradigm' (Sistemnaya paradigma) // 'Issues of Economics' journal (Voprosy ekonomiki), 2002, No. 4.
3. Kleiner G.B. 'System Paradigm and Theory of Enterprise' (Sistemnaya paradigma i teoriya predpriyatiya) // 'Issues of Economics' journal (Voprosy ekonomiki), 2002, No. 10.
4. Cf. Poterovich V.M. Elements of the Theory of Reforms (Elementy teorii reform), Moscow, Ekonomika, 2007.
5. Likhachov D.S. quoted from: Zapesotsky A.S. Philosophy and Sociology of Culture (Filosofiya i sotsiologiya kultury), Moscow, Nauka, 2010, p. 81.
6. Kleiner G.B. 'From the Theory of Enterprise to the Theory of Strategic Management' (Ot teorii predpriyatiya k teorii strategicheskogo upravleniya) // 'Russian Journal of Management' (Rossiyskiy zhurnal menedzmenta), volume 1, No. 1. 2003.
7. Kleiner G.B. 'Strategy of System Harmony of Russian Economy' (Strategiya sistemnoy garmonii ekonomiki Rossii) // 'Economic Strategies' journal (Ekonomicheskiye strategii), 2008, Nos. 5–6.
8. Polterovich V.M. 'Transplantation of Economical Institutions' (Transplantatsiya ekonomicheskikh institutov) // 'Economic Science of Modern Russia' journal (Ekonomicheskaya nauka sovremennoy Rossii), 2002, No. 3; Stieglitz J. Scan globally, reinvent locally: knowledge infrastructure and the localization of knowledge. In: Diane Stone (ed.) Banking on Knowledge. The Genesis of the Global Development Network, 2000, p. 24–43.; Kleiner G.B. 'Economics of Russia and Crisis of Mutual Expectations' (Ekonomika Rossii i krizis vzaimnykh ozhidaniy) // 'Social Sciences and Modernity' journal (Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost), 1999, № 1.
9. Kleiner G.B. 'System Paradigm and Economical Politics' (Sistemnaya paradigma i ekonomicheskaya politika) // 'Social Sciences and Modernity' journal (Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost), 2007, Nos. 2, 3.
10. Kleiner G.B. 'Global Missionary or Global Moneymaking: Is there a third way for Russia?' (Globalnoye missionerstvo ili globalnoye stazhatelstvo: est li tretiy put dlya Rossii?) // Dialogue of Cultures and Partnership of Civilizations: 10th International Likhachov Conference: St. Petersburg, the University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 2010; Kleiner G.B. 'System Paradigm and Economical Politics' (Sistemnaya paradigma i ekonomicheskaya politika) // 'Social Sciences and Modernity' journal (Obschestvennye nauki i sovremennost), 2007, Nos. 2, 3.
11. Kleiner G.B. 'System Resource of Economics' (Sistemnyi resurs ekonomiki) // 'Issues of Economics' journal (Voprosy ekonomiki), 2011, No. 1.

V. Kvint¹

CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS ENVIRONMENT OF STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION

The role of culture on the global marketplace

Globalization has very important cultural and religious implications that must be understood by strategists operating in the Global Marketplace. Its critics often argue that it is causing a global conversion of cultures that dilutes the authenticity and uniqueness of local culture. In fact, strategists have to take into consideration two paradoxical cultural dynamics: a global conversion of cultures and, at the same time, an embrace and protection of local cultural idiosyncrasies. Firstly it is related to linguistic culture, its transformation under the influence of the global market. While English has practically been established as the standard means of communication in the GMP, there are several regional languages of great importance—Spanish in Latin America, Russian in territories of the former Soviet Union, and Arabic in the Middle East and North Africa. In addition, there are languages that represent significant markets of people dispersed throughout the world—the francophone market (extends to every inhabited continent), the German market (several European and African countries), the Portuguese market (Portugal, Brazil, and several African countries), the Italian market (Italy, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Albania) and the Arabic market (the Middle East and the Arabic Diaspora throughout Europe, Africa, and North America). The GMP has created a

need for widespread comprehension of key foreign languages and comprehension of foreign cultures. Nevertheless, English is the language of business. As editor-in-chief of Forbes, Steve Forbes wrote, 'English is the language of economic opportunity... If you know English, the Information Age is your friend. If you know English, the doors of opportunity are wide open. But if you don't, you're stuck—and in danger of being left behind.'

The same goods, services, and technologies are being used throughout the world, which is contributing to further global integration and unification and is both a factor and a consequence of the GMP. The GMP accelerates global progress, because innovation and new ideas become widely accepted and implemented. Cross-cultural exchange of ideas and technology is also a consequence and factor of the GMP. It creates a process of constant evolution and optimization of strategies and operations. This process is leading to the creation of a more unified, peaceful, and tolerant world. But at the same time, different political and ideological environments and varying consumer behavior throughout the GMP present a challenge to the process of global integration and strategists trying to build success in this changing environment. This requires companies to have a global strategy that takes into account differences in consumer behavior in national and regional markets.

Cultural convergence is a two-way street. The success of corporate global strategy is related to the reflection of the growing influence of the GEM business cultures and its conversion with well-established business ethics and practices of companies from Developed countries. A great example of this phenomenon is ArcelorMittal, the world's largest steel-producing company, owned by the British-Indian Mittal family. This family used a hybrid of Indian and British values to become one of the most successful family-owned and operated businesses in

¹ Foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Financial Strategy Chair at Moscow School of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Author of more than 450 scholarly publications, including books: *Outline of Strategy (Abris strategiji)*, *Business and Strategic Management (Biznes i strategicheskoe upravleniye)*, *Global Market Under the Formation in a Transitory Period (Global'nyj formirujushchijjsja rynek v perekhodnyj period)*, *Global Market Under the Formation: Strategic Management and Economy (Global'nyj formirujushchijjsja rynek: strategicheskole upravleniye i ekonomika)*, *Business and Strategic Planning (Biznes i strategicheskoe planirovaniye)*, *Emerging Market of Russia (Voznikajushchij rynek Rossiji)*, *Capitalization of New Russia (Kapitalizatsiya novoj Rossiji)* and some others. Prof. Kvint is Member of the Bretton-Woods Committee (Washington D.C.) which monitors activities of the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the WTO. Member of the editorial board of journal *Economics and Mathematical Methods (Ekonomika i matematicheskije metody)*. Prof. Kvint is decorated with the Order of Friendship.

² Forbes, Steve. (1999). *A New Birth of Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, Inc. p. 59

the world. Their success is reminiscent of the DuPont family in America in the nineteenth century, when they merged French ethics with American business culture. The business culture of the Mittal family should be studied by executives throughout the world, not just those from India, or the GEM. When the Mittal family purchased Arcelor, a leading European steel company, it was one of the first examples of insourcing by an emerging-market company in the developed world as a new global trend, which can be defined as 'an allocation or reallocation of resources internally within the same organization, even if the allocation is in different geographic locations'.⁷

Another significant cultural trend is related to the mass culture of the U.S. as a Superpower – Americanization. Behavioral norms of the U.S. have spread throughout the global marketplace and workplace. For example, diplomas on the walls of executives' offices in Albania or Brazil are a symbol of interaction with partners and clients from U.S. companies. It used to be the case, prior to the influence of this trend, that people from the GEM keep their awards and diplomas at home, not displaying them in corporate offices. However, there are limits to Americanization, even on small-scale issues. In the U.S., it is not uncommon when buying a car to kick the tires as a kind of perfunctory test of the car's quality. This is not advisable in many EMCs, especially Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. When looking at a new car, if someone were to kick the tires in one of these countries, the salesman would likely (at the very least) kick that person back. The aim of this joke is just to give an idea for foreign investors that even day-to-day behavior varies substantially among cultures and can be the source of misunderstanding, if they are not accounted for. As the saying goes, the devil is in the details. Professional behavior is a summary of many small cultural issues to which foreigners have to be sensitive in order to develop a positive office atmosphere.

McDonald's is often portrayed as an instrument of Americanization of foreign countries. To a certain extent, McDonald's is one vehicle through which American consumer culture has spread throughout the world, but its international success is based on its ability to cater to local tastes and preferences, often with the help of local partners. McDonald's does not enter new markets expecting to replace local cuisine with hamburgers—such a strategy would inevitably result in failure. In fact, McDonald's corporate strategists develop a variety of entry strategies in EMCs in accordance with regional, national, and local cultural and religious values. For example, in Muslim countries, McDonald's provides Halal food, as well as kosher menus in Israel. Another important part of McDonald's global strategy is to always hire local people and to use local traditions and culture in its advertising. The successful application of McDonald's strategy is related to its ability to cater to local tastes and preferences. This is the model for strategists that are developing entry strategies for countries of the GEM. The diversity of the GEM and the role of cultural traditions are much stronger and more relevant than in developed countries, which have reached a much higher level of cultural conversion.

Culture as a strategic risk factor

The variety of different cultural, historical, and religious traditions and the ethics of business practices in EMCs compared to developed countries deeply affect the mentality of international investors and business culture of companies.

This variety is being estimated and basically it not poses only certain challenges but even threats to international investors and companies. These challenges and threats can be referred to as cultural risk of investments.

This basically refers to the cultural gap between a foreign investor, merchant or entity and the society of a potential recipient of investment or business activity.

For example, words such as democracy, elections, public opinion, etc. that are universally embraced in developed countries have completely different connotations in the populations of EMCs. Many of these people have not rejected democracy outright, but associate it with the chaotic transition period after the fall of dictatorships leading to and during the liberalization of command economies. Furthermore, what to strategists and executives from developed countries may seem like an oppressive dictatorship covered in transparent democratic slogans may be a tremendously positive step forward from the brutal dictatorship that people were once forced to endure. The legacy of dictatorship deeply affects the business culture of the GEM. Many foreign managers and executives will be shocked by the lack of initiative of employees in EMCs. This is a result of generations of risk-averse behavior that understandably occurred under dictatorships. In many EMC societies, there is only one correct answer – whatever the boss thinks.

The rapid pace of urbanization in the majority EMCs furthers the cultural gap faced by foreign strategists. Large portions of urban populations have just arrived from provincial villages. These people experience a double culture shock – one with the more sophisticated urban culture (museums, theatres, libraries, etc.) of city life, as well as the shock of dealing with foreigners and interacting with international culture for the first time. This is the source of a great deal of conflict between foreign executives and managers and their local blue-collar employees.

The best way for foreign companies to handle cultural risk is not to try and change the mentality of local populations. This is a gradual process that happens slowly as they interact with different types of people. What has to be an integral part of a successful entry strategy is for foreign companies to make the effort to understand local traditions, histories, and political and business cultures. Foreign companies must be willing to change their typical practices in order to work more efficiently under new conditions.

It is also very important that strategists of foreign companies do not misinterpret backwards political and business cultures as a reflection of a society's knowledge of high culture, such as art, literature, film, etc. An entry strategy for the GEM has to be developed with respect to the very deep literary and artistic traditions, especially in EMCs like Russia, those of Eastern and Southern Europe, Argentina, and India. Strategists should expect that many people with whom foreign businessmen will interact will be very knowledgeable about high culture of the world. American strategists may not be familiar with writers whom Europeans (and most people of the former Soviet Union) grew up on, such as the French novelist Guy de Maupassant or the German writer Eric Marie Remarque. It would be very difficult to find Latin American executives that are not intimately familiar with the works of the Colombian Nobel Laureate in literature, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, or the Brazilian author Jorge Amado. It would be equally difficult to find Chinese executives and strategists that do not embrace the teachings of the ancient philosopher Confucius. Any leaders unfamiliar with the Italian political philosopher and Renaissance man Niccolò Machiavelli will struggle to be successful in the Byzantine business cultures of the Balkans and the Maghreb. EMCs' high culture and especially literature should be studied by foreign executives and strategists as it can be a very effective means of bridging cultural gaps during the implementation of strategy.

There are many examples of the disastrous results of a failure to address cultural strategic risks. The theme parks of Walt Disney Co. were very successful in the U.S. and even Japan, but due to an entry strategy that inadequately evaluated cultural factors, initially failed miserably in France. In 1992 Disney opened a theme park outside Paris that failed to meet projected earnings and attendance and lost a great deal of money.

⁷ Schniederjans, Dara G. Outsourcing and Insourcing in an International Context. p. 3.

Disney made the mistake of assuming that the French would spend the same amount of money on entertainment, pay the same entrance fee, and enjoy the same food as Americans and Japanese. All of these cultural assumptions were strategically wrong; Disneyland Paris became successful only after making certain adjustments, like serving alcohol, which would be inappropriate according to U.S. cultural norms.

Cultural risk is an especially important aspect for entity specific strategy development and implementation. This does not only apply to entities that are located in foreign countries. It can also apply to consumer culture in certain industries towards particular products and services. For example, in January 2007, when Microsoft released its newest operating system, Microsoft Vista, it was the result of the development and implementation of Microsoft's strategy for several years to combat Apple computers. They gave substantial at-

tention to make sure that Vista would be simpler and take less time to load. Microsoft also used a tactical step—to delay the day of release of Vista in order to build up anticipation of this product by customers, and to increase initial demand. Without evaluating the success or failure of the Vista operating system, this example is very appropriate for introducing a new product into emerging-market countries, where people first need to be familiarized with the existence of the product, second of all, have to believe that it is easy to use, and third that people will anticipate the product for some time before they are able to purchase it.

The cultural risk as a phenomenon and a new strategic category may be learned fruitfully by strategists together with culturalologists. Ignoring the influence of this phenomenon in the strategy development and its implementation would lead to complex and negative economic consequences.

S. Lavrov¹

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AS THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTOR IN STABILITY AND SAFETY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Another International Likhachov Scientific Conference gives us a unique international area for exchanging opinions on global problems of contemporary society, the discussion of basic trends in the sphere of culture, education, humanities, and foreign policy.

It is symbolic that it traditionally takes place in St. Petersburg, which by rights is called the Northern Palmyra. In the 'window into Europe' created by Peter the Great, it is especially clearly felt that the world is indivisible, just as security is indivisible, and the problems of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations are similar throughout the Eurasian space. It is gratifying that the efforts of the leaders of St. Petersburg, in which 134 ethnicities and 30 religions are represented in harmonious interethnic and intercultural relations, received the recognition it merited from UNESCO – in 2009, the city was awarded this Organization's honourable prize for advancing ideas of tolerance.

Time inexorably moves forward. However, in full correspondence with the thesis formulated by the poet, that 'what is large can be seen at a distance', the spiritual and intellectual legacy of the outstanding scholar, humanist, and patriot Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov is becoming ever more indispensable. A project elaborated on his initiative in the mid-1990s was the Declaration of the Rights of Culture, in which culture is regarded as the main source of humanization of human history, placing its deposit in the 'piggy bank' of international efforts through the analysis of timely questions of the present.

It is difficult not to agree with the position, contained in the Declaration, that the dialogue of cultures provides mutual understanding between peoples and a revelation of the spiritual uniqueness of each of them. Among the most important tasks that stands before humanity today is to learn to live together, understanding one another, helping one another, and respecting one another. President D. A. Medvedev noted this thought on 11 February of this year at the meeting of the presidium of the State Council in Ufa, at which questions of interethnic and

interreligious accord and the development of national cultures were discussed. Assistance in affirming atmospheres of mutual understanding and mutual trust in relations among peoples, the maintenance of interest in other cultures, and the advancement of open and equal-rights-based mutual enrichment of intercultural dialogue are the top-priority areas for the application of our efforts.

It is obvious that the contemporary world is enduring one of the most dynamic and dramatic stages of its development. A graphic confirmation of this thesis is the stormy events that have occurred of late in a number of regions of the world, including those in the Near East and North Africa. Fundamental changes are occurring which deeply affect the interests of all states and societies, and are seeping out through the contours of the new polycentric world structure.

As President Medvedev emphasized at the conference of ambassadors and permanent representatives in July of 2010, in the foreground in global communication is the aspiration to harmonize relations, to reduce antagonism, and to adjust effective cooperation. In the international community, it is consciousness of the absolute necessity for added effort in searching for answers to challenges and perils common to everyone, understanding of the fact that we are all 'in the same boat'. This trend is objective and appropriate.

Among the visible testaments to the change for the better in international affairs is the signing and ratification of a new Russian-American Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty. Acknowledgement of the lack of alternatives to transferring Euro-Atlantic policy to a more constructive channel, including the modernization of the architecture of European security, the noticeable results of the summit of the Russia-NATO Council in Lisbon and the OSCE in Astana. The beginnings of a fundamental healing of Russian-Polish relations say much for the benefits of this. It is important to preserve and build on these positive developments.

At the same time, predicting how the international situation will develop is not simple: the globalizing world is still overloaded with different risks and full of the sharpest contradictions. This, however, is a peculiarity of any critical stage in global development. The other matter is that there were few who were ready for this; they were waiting for 'the end of history' and the euphoria in the spirit of 'victory in the Cold War' impeded them. For this reason, more talk of turning to a healing of international relations is reliably guaranteed until it comes.

¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, member of Security Council of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Since 1972 Mr Lavrov has been working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and Russia. In 1994–2004 he was permanent Russian envoy to the UN and Russian envoy to the Security Council of the UN. Author of a number of scholarly papers, including: *Popyika zaglyanut' v poslevoynnoye budushcheye* [An Attempt to Look into Post-War Future], *Neskol'ko shtrihov k mezhnarodnomu portretu Moskvy* [A Few Touches to the International Portrait of Moscow], *Rossiya i Indiya: Vzaïmnyygodnoye sotrudnichestvo i strategicheskoye partnerstvo* [Russia and India: Mutually Beneficial Cooperation and Strategic Partnership], *Mir vpoiskakh novogo ravnovesiya* [The World Seeking a New Balance] and others.

For its own part, Russia comes to the alignment of a renovated world's new paradigm openly and non-confrontationally. In communication with our foreign partners, we persistently advance the idea that the imperative of the present age is the transformation of old views saturated with the spirit of isolationism and distrust. The growth of mutual trust is enabled by the fact that questions of development are now in the foreground for everyone, as the global crisis showed. This creates a powerful unifying agenda in international relations. All that remains is to recognize it. However, this is the most difficult part. After all, as Leo Nikolayevich Tolstoy wrote, 'the hardest, most unshakeable convictions are the most superficial. Deep convictions are always movable'. We must emphasize that the 'backwardness' of approaches with a particular, rigid outlook also enables, to a significant degree, the preservation of hotbeds of opposition and conflict on the soil of cultural identity, repeated manifestations of religious intolerance, and attempts to export prescriptions for development to other countries.

In connection with this, the period of the 'Cold War' presents itself as a distortion of space and time during which, as in the years of the Religious Wars in Europe, ideological differences became the arena for inter-governmental antagonism. Reference points in values and models of development, which each of the two opposing camps imposed on other states, emerged as the tools of this kind of confrontation. This unification faithfully followed the logic of bloc discipline, which ran the show in global politics, although often the states would 'sign up' with either camp using words pursuant and relevant to their own pragmatic interests. Unfortunately, the inertia of such approaches, particularly the claims that each camp made about the universality of its own values and model of development, continues to manifest itself. We must overcome this vicious logic and return to the norm, keeping in mind the free competition of value systems and models of development, the advantages of which should not be imposed, and affirm our own example, which, by the way, is also the most important element of 'soft power' in contemporary international relations.

As shown by the logic of events in the Arab East, first launched at the beginning of this year by the social disturbances in Tunisia and Egypt, in implementing universal, generally recognized principles and norms, it is absolutely necessary to consider the specifics of one country or another. It appears that the matter of how these principles and norms are translated into the language of national consent and legislation must be left to the discretion of each single, separate state. In this matter, the religious and cultural-moral traditions of societies cannot be ignored.

The winds of globalization, having made the world into a single, informationally transparent unit, are at the same time causing it to become socially disconnected and impoverished from the point of view of cultural-civilizational diversity. Judging by the resonant statements of a range of countries, the policy of multiculturalism is not returning adequate results. The question is, why? It may be that it has simply not been re-adjusted to new realities, and then another question faces us about who is to blame in the situation where representatives of different cultures turn out to be on different sides of 'the culture-value barricades' and thereby replenishes the intolerance and radicalism in society. To a certain degree, mankind is once again in its history faced with the dilemma which N. A. Berdyaev described in his book *Russia's Destiny*, published in 1918. Discussing the problem of 'spirit and machine', he noticed that 'the mechanistic nature of culture is pulverizing the flesh of the world... organic matter, ancestral material life, blooms and dies in it'.

On the other hand, we must note the global trend, directed at strengthening the 'diversity of colours' and 'patchwork pattern' of contemporary civilization, which sometimes complicates the process of true orientation for more members of

the world community and demands innovative approaches in reaction to the existing and nascent challenges of our time. With the disintegration of the bloc system, the former mechanisms for regulating international life which, with the help of hard discipline, tied the global fabric together, not permitting any indeterminacy or unpredictability. Today inter-governmental alliances and states have ceased to be the sole regulators of moral-spiritual and cultural relations. As a consequence of the emancipation of international relations from their previous ideological fetters, new players are coming out into the global arena — civil society, NGOs, media, the Internet community, religious structures, the unification of diasporas, and various outstanding individuals. Finally, with their cultural values and models of development becoming more energetic, the rapidly developing states of the East are occasionally and forcefully entering into the dialogue of cultures.

In the face of new challenges, collective efforts at adjusting intercultural and interreligious dialogue are acquiring special meaning. Culture's potential is growing as an effective tool for smoothing over disagreements between states and nations and preventing conflicts on humanitarian ground. We feel that efforts that can be undertaken on an international and regional level of effort through the preservation of inter-civilizational and intercultural agreement often do not correspond in due measure to the scale and dynamics of the threats that are emerging due to the unbalancing of previously existing configurations. All the while, the urgency of cultural diplomacy, which also finds reflection in the activity of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is growing.

In the UNESCO Declaration, approved in 1953, it was emphasized that 'the problem of international mutual understanding is a problem of cultural relations. Out of these relations, a new global community of mutual understanding and respect must be born. This community should take the form of a new humanism, in which universality is achieved by recognizing the common values of cultural diversity.' We should be glad that today, not without our help, this understanding is being affirmed step by step in the minds of those on whom the fate of the globe depends.

The conceptual document, accepted in our country for the first time, entitled 'Basic Policy Directions of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of International Cultural-Humanitarian Cooperation', which was confirmed on 18 December, 2010 by President Medvedev, promises to become one of the means of advancement of Russian priorities in matters of inter-civilizational agreement, global cultural dialogue, and multi-religious tolerance. The document defines aims, tasks, and principles of Russian state's activity in this area. Its regulations are presented as a kind of 'road map' for activating international cooperation and creating a durable base for the development of Russia's interactions with foreign countries and partners in the plane of cultural politics.

We are proceeding from the assumption that the spread of Russia's cultural influence beyond its borders will enable the affirmation of our country as one of the leading states of the modern world — as befits and follows from its history of many hundreds of years. Major actions of a cultural-humanitarian orientation have positively recommended themselves — national years for Russia and various foreign countries, 'cross-back' language years, culture weeks. There is a broad demand for Russian art abroad, either in tours or in exhibitions. The opening of Russian centres of science and culture in different countries of the world, which are set to become the leading organizations supplying Russian cultural presence abroad, has acquired an intensive character. The activity is fruitful of such Russian structures as the Federal Agency for Affairs of the Commonwealth of Independent States, of our countrymen living abroad, and through international humanitarian cooperation ('Rossotrudnichestvo'), the 'Russian World' Fund, the

Russian Culture Fund, the International Roerich Cultural Centre, the Slavic Fund of Russia, and the 'Knowledge' International Association. We will continue to render assistance to this and other similar organizations.

One of the most important directions of Russia's external cultural policy is interaction in the sphere of the humanities within the framework of the CIS. The broadening of intercultural dialogue is welcomed by all the member states of the Commonwealth and is considered one of the key resources of Commonwealth countries' stable socioeconomic development in general, the rise of their creative and intellectual potential, a factor in the preservation and deepening of the relations of friendship and partnership.

The current year has been declared the Year of Historical-Cultural Heritage in the CIS. The provision of its implementation on a higher level is set to enable the realization of the Plan for Priority-Based Events in the sphere of humanitarian cooperation of the member-states of the CIS for 2011–12, for which more than 160 events, encompassing practically the entire spectrum connected with the humanities, are being planned. In the period of Russian chairmanship of the Commonwealth in 2010, the Concept of Cooperation of CIS Member States in the Sphere of Culture was adopted. The Inter-Governmental Fund for CIS Member-States' Cooperation in the Humanities, which in five years of activity realized about 250 projects, plays an important role in the increase of intercultural connections. Among the initiatives advanced by them of late is the Inter-Governmental Programme of 'Cultural Capitals of the Commonwealth', in the framework of which a pilot project is planned for completion this year.

UNESCO is of great use in the UN's line. One of the results of the UN Summit on Millennium Development Goals which took place in New York in September of 2010 was its participants' recognition of the leading role of culture in the achievement of a steady pace development. Thematic debates on the 'Dialogue of Cultures in 2010: Rethinking Policies in the Context of World Culture', organized in the framework of the 185th session of the UNESCO Executive Council by the Russian chairperson, fit successfully into a programme of various events in 2010, which was declared the Year of Closer Relations Between Cultures by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Our chairmanship of the Executive Council permitted, first of all, the organization of a trip to the Russian Federation of a group of representatives of the member-countries of the Executive Council, which was timed to coincide with the Tenth International Likhachov Scientific Conference and was mentioned in a report entitled 'The Role of UNESCO in the Development of Cultural Diversity and Closer Relations Among Cultures'. A High-Level Panel to examine questions of peace and dialogue of cultures was created under the direction of the General Director of UNESCO, our participation in work that permits worldwide expansion of the field of intercultural dialogue, which includes the implementation of religious-spiritual measures.

The position of the proceedings in many regions of the world demands a fuller consideration of the religious factor. It is difficult to overstate the significance of religious components in the matter of adjusting inter-civilizational dialogue. Russia takes an active part in the work of such constantly operating mechanisms as the Higher-Level Dialogue on Interreligious and Intercultural Cooperation for Peace, the Trilateral Forum on Interreligious Cooperation for the Benefit of Peace, and the Ministerial Meetings on Interreligious Dialogue and Cooperation for the Benefit of Peace. Consequently, we advance the proposal to adjust interreligious dialogue in the areas of the UN, the European Union, and UNESCO. In September 2007, we took the initiative in creating, under the aegis of the UN's dialogue forum — an advisory council of religions, which would give representatives of the main world religions the op-

portunity to hold meetings about international agenda matters, including confessional and value components, on a regular basis. As an intermediate step toward the realization of this idea, Russia proposed to work on education in the framework of the UNESCO High-Level Panel on Interreligious Dialogue.

The Alliance of Civilizations, created in 2005 under the aegis of the UN, is an important tool in matters of developing the dialogue of cultures in the contemporary stage. The Russian Federation participates in its work and makes up part of the Group of Friends of the Alliance, numbering 127 members. The National Plan for the Development of Relations with the Alliance of Civilizations, approved by President Medvedev, has also been elaborated and is being implemented successfully. In correspondence with this document, Russian investment in the efforts of the Alliance for Development of Inter-Civilizational Dialogue anticipates state institutions' broad cooperation with social, non-governmental organizations, representatives of the academic community and other segments of civil society. We are attentively observing the development of the regional component in the activity of the Alliance. We do not exclude the possibility of Russia's participation in the implementation of a range of regional strategies within its framework. We support the efforts of the Russian Orthodox Church in the development of religious component of the Alliance of Civilizations, in particular as regards the organization in partnership with UNESCO of the section on interreligious dialogue within the framework of the fourth Forum of the Alliance in Qatar in December of this year. We welcome the Church's involvement in holding events within the framework of the Global Week of Harmonious Interreligious Relations.

We place no small hope in the ministerial session of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Istanbul in May of 2011. At a session of the Wise Men's Group, created on the initiative of the Turkish representative at CMCE, of which V.P. Lukin, Authorized Representative of the Russian Federation on Human Rights, is a member, they plan to present a new conception of 'how to live together in Europe in the 21st Century with different commonalities inside of European society'. The document is, in the first place, targeted at assisting the overcoming of the growing disconnection in Europe by ethnic and religious characteristics and manifestation of intolerance connected with it.

We note the many years of fruitful activity in the areas of inter-civilizational and intercultural problems of the Global Social Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations'. This NGO's arrangement of its own daily sessions on the Greek island of Rhodes has already become a good tradition.

We are proceeding from the assumption that today one of the priorities for the international community is higher effectiveness of global intercultural dialogue by way of coordination of the efforts of various mechanisms in a given sphere. The very logic of global development pushes toward the formation of a pool of non-governmental structures, in which the problems of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations is the basic sphere of activity.

On the whole it is beyond doubt that the process of globalization and, consequently, the broadening of the scales of cultural dialogue of peoples will continue. It stands to reason that the matter is not in the creation of 'a single and indivisible' global culture. The world never was and never will be unified and homogeneous. However, the growth of the degree of interdependence and interpenetration of cultural processes and their participants is on hand, and it is important to be on the crest of such changes.

Russia will in future, as before, assist in the advance of comprehensive intercultural and inter-civilizational dialogue at the global level. The choice in favour of a broad cooperation and mutual enrichment of cultures and civilizations has endured throughout the history of our multiethnic and multi-

confessional country. I think that today Russia's role as a cultural-civilizational bridge is turning out to be more indispensable than ever.

Our common task is to find the optimal correlation between the uniqueness of cultures and civilizations and their openness to dialogue and mutual enrichment. The present global crisis

indicated an urgent need for a renewed model of relations not only in the sphere of economics and finance, but also in the interpretation of socio-cultural consequences occurring in a changing world. I am convinced that the search for answers to these questions will become a real investment in the efforts to build a polycentric, just, and tolerant world order.

V. Lektorsky¹

MULTICULTURALISM AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

1. Once the idea of a 'melting pot' (merging different cultures into a kind of uniform integrity) had been rejected both theoretically and practically, the idea of multiculturalism came to take its place. Multiculturalism was interpreted as the concept of protecting cultural diversity and autonomy of cultures. It was linked to the principle of tolerance: respect for a different system of values, worldview, lifestyle. The idea of multiculturalism (together with the principle of tolerance) was practically implemented in the past decades both within certain countries (primarily in Western Europe) and globally.

2. Today, the resulting experience of this implementation demonstrates the following. Both multiculturalism and tolerance in the form in which they are understood and practised now, can lead to mutual cultural isolation. As a consequence, on the one hand, individual cultures can leave the global civilization process, stagnate and lose an incentive to develop. On the other hand, there is a danger of some cultures losing their identity, if enclaves of alien cultures incorporated in them are increasingly spreading the sphere of their influence (apparently, present-day Western Europe is experiencing such a situation).

3. The dialogue of cultures seems to be the only fruitful way out in the current world situation, since it involves mutual openness of cultures instead of their isolation. It should be noted that multiculturalism can be interpreted as a dialogue, too. In this case it will be a new concept of multiculturalism different from the one practised today. The dialogue does not mean uncritical acceptance of others' experience, it only suggests an opportunity to consider a different perspective in the understanding of a situation to deal with contemporary issues. In other words, it is through a dialogue that true interaction of cultures becomes possible, as well as their development and self-transformation.

4. In this regard, a number of clarifications and elucidations must be made. First, the culture as a whole cannot practise the dialogue. 'Dialogue of cultures' is a metaphor. Only individuals, groups, communities, institutions may engage in dialogue. Secondly, the dialogue, as a rule, is not about the system of cultural values. The latter constitutes cultural identities and accordingly personal identities of people belonging to a particular culture. The dialogue about religious doctrines, which may be associated with certain cultural values, is impossible either

(the religion that allows other religions to question its own doctrines destroys itself). Therefore, intercultural dialogue is only possible and fruitful in the context of solving certain practical problems: in relation to understanding the problems, to proposing the means to address them taking into consideration different ways of viewing and handling circumstances within diverse cultures. These ways can be compared from the point of view of their efficiency. It should be borne in mind that under new conditions (and they are constantly changing in the modern world) their evaluation may also vary.

5. In order for an intercultural dialogue to be possible, certain conditions should be observed. First and foremost, all participants need to agree on a specific common framework, a common space of the dialogue. Otherwise, different cultures become incommensurable, and their representatives are unable to understand each other because there are no shared prerequisites for them to rely on. This common framework exists within separate countries in the form of constitutions and legal systems, and globally in the form of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the international legal system. The problem is that the system of international law has many lacunae that hinder the settlement of a number of emerging challenges the world faces today; and there are contradictions in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, one of the examples being the contradiction between the right of an individual and a group of people to freedom of movement and travel and the right of a culture to protect and sustain itself. Another condition for a feasible intercultural dialogue is the belief in its fruitfulness, i.e. the determination to improve the ways of understanding the world and man, the importance of going beyond one's own cultural boundaries and at the same time the recognition of the equal participation of partners in the dialogue. However, the second condition of intercultural dialogue is lacking in most cases. Instead, attempts are made to impose a particular system of cultural values on all the rest and to accompany it with a hypocritical reference to multiculturalism. Since the future of civilization is correlated with intercultural dialogue, the main problems today are the creation of the conditions for the dialogue: a commonly shared space for values and mutual respect. It is very difficult in practice. But there is no other way. Globalization does not eliminate these problems, it only aggravates them.

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the 'Issues of Philosophy' journal (Voprosy filosofiji). Author of more than 300 scholarly publications, including monographs: *Subject, Object, Understanding* (Subjekt, objekt, poznanije); *Classical and Non-Classical Epistemology* (Epistemologiya klassicheskaja i neklassicheskaja); *Transformations of Rationality in Modern Culture* (Transformatsiji ratsional'nosti v sovremennoj kulture); *Philosophy in the Context of Culture* (Filosofija v kontekste kulture). Editor-in-Chief and one of the authors of a series of books *Philosophy of Russia of the Second Half of the 20th Century* (Filosofija Rossji vtoroj poloviny 20 veka) (M., 2008–10). Many of his works have been translated and published in the USA, the UK, the FRG, France, Finland, South Korea, Turkey, China and other countries. V. A. Lektorsky is decorated with the Order of Badge of Honour and the Order of M.V. Lomonosov.

A. Likhanov¹

CHILDHOOD AS THE WHOLE OF MANKIND'S RESPONSIBILITY

1.

In February I had a chance to visit India and communicate with my colleagues who dedicated their lives children's protection and, in the broadest sense, to the public good.

A greatest country with the population of 1,300,000,000, with its moral background based, along with religion, on the combination of philosophy and political practice of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Gandhi, it escalated my professional interest. Of course, my interest was professionally-oriented: how do they tackle children's problems? And at the same time it was indigenous, because childhood of any country is evidence not only of its contemporary economic condition, but of its spiritual aspirations as well.

India is one of the pillars of modern civilization. Its population outnumbers not only the world's leading countries, but entire continents. What does it hold in store for the world? How does it interact with the world?

A huge billboard at Delhi airport says: '50 percent of all managers of the world come from India.' And this serious message invites discussion of intercivilizational relations (not just interstate or international, which seem narrower).

Here are two striking and, in a way, opposed vectors: overwhelming poverty of the multimillion majority and the powerful social and technological breakthrough on a truly global scale.

Today India has over 1,000 engineering colleges and another 1,000 schools of various levels, offering diplomas in computer technologies. Every year two million programmers and computer specialists graduate from more than 300 universities and colleges incorporated in them.

Conclusion: Indian graduates today outnumber the entire population of France. The annual export volume of software is nearing 50 billion USD. Software exports from India can be compared with the exports of oil from the Arab world.

But where did those experts who have created this electronic realm emerge?

2.

Are they perhaps particularly gifted in mathematics?

An Indian researcher Pavan Varma tells us about 16-year-old Shatrundzhae Verma, who was the best graduate out of 2 millions from the state of Uttar Pradesh in 2003. He lived in a village with no electricity. Every day he commuted 10 miles to his school and back. He became the best out of 2 million students! Santosh Kumar, a son of a rickshaw, went to a school that is located in a shabby cabin, but still bears the name of the great Indian mathematician Srinivasa Ramanujan. His teacher, Anand Kumar, does his best to prepare children from poor families to enter technological universities. In 2007 all of his 30 students were admitted to them.

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, writer, Chairman of the Russian Children Fund, Director of the Research Institute for Childhood of the Russian Children Fund, President of the International Association of Children Funds. Author of literary works, fiction and journalism, including: *Clean Stones* (Chistyje kamushki); *Deception* (Obman); *The Maze* (Labirint) (the trilogy of *Family Circumstances* (Semejnije obstojatel'stva)); *Good Intentions* (Blagie namerenija); *Golgotha* (Golgota); *Innocent Secrets* (Nevinnnye tajny); *Capital Punishment* (Vysshaja mera); *Spring Flood* (Pavodok); *Nobody* (Nikto); *A Broken Doll* (Slomannaja kukla); *Russian Boys* (Russkije mal'chiki); *School for Men* (Muzhskaja shkola); *Juveniles* (Sletki); *Pre-Childhood* (Preddetstvo); *Compassionate Mood* (Sostradatel'noe naklonenie) and others. A. A. Likhanov is decorated with the Order of the Labour Red Banner, the Order of Badge of Honour, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th and the 3rd degree, the Gold Lomonosov medal and orders and medals of Bulgaria, Georgia, the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Armenia. He is the recipient of Leninist Komsomol Prize, the Russian Federation Presidential Prize in education, the Russian Federation Governmental Prize in culture. Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

This suggests a natural conclusion: children of the poor climb the ladder of computer technologies to migrate to a higher social status.

Let us add that India produces some of the best medicines, and it strives to build a modern, technologically-equipped army, develops nuclear power with the help of Russia.

Specialists are in demand everywhere, and well-off layers of the nation cannot supply them all. The country is witnessing a popular thrust upward. In fact, this social process has long taken intercivilizational significance.

The desire to escape from poverty, in my opinion, can be compared with the pathos of the transformations in the Soviet Union in 1930s–1940s when the door was open for all those willing to get education. Now it is not to say that the door is half-closed, it is still wide open. However, getting in through it and, most importantly, getting out cannot change the social status of grassroots.

The pathos of a breakthrough is no longer there. Even the very desire half vanished.

In the state that has distanced itself from career planning, lawyers and economists are spawning while globally renowned Russian engineering school has been practically eliminated. What jobs are available for new engineers?

3.

I think the example of India, very different from Western European, American and Chinese practice, could serve as a basis for changes in Russia.

This, above all, motivates students to break through; it creates the national fervour of a new type, the revival of what earlier used to be called high-demand calling.

Despite the fact that the state has spent a huge amount of money on school computerization, we are not witnessing the explosion of interest in the innovative technology, comparable to what has happened in India. It would be not only interesting but also economically reasonable to analyze why not.

4.

In India, some other analogies sprang to my mind. This country is known to be one of the poorest nations, but pursuit of wealth and abundance can be seen everywhere. Moral postulates of Mahatma Gandhi have retreated. But still all this happens with the moral and economic catalyst: the desire to escape from poverty.

A similar dream – to become wealthy – prevails in our society, too. Unlike India, though, schoolchildren do not possess a similar mass enthusiasm. Do not possess it so far? Or do they not possess it already? Pinning hopes on connections, chance or fortune instead of vigorous mastering of the desired subjects is a mass factor. In this connection, it would not hurt to speak about schools in India and Indian education in general.

In my opinion, Russian high and higher school of today is losing its energy and power. This is because the state does not need professionals. Offices are overwhelmed with drifters who are quite content with what they have.

Should the state be content as well, the state that let the mass branches of industry go with the flow and with private initiative?

5.

Childhood, in the intercivilizational analysis, rarely comes to the forefront as an international, interpersonal and intercontinental goal and challenge.

When an epidemic in Ethiopia strikes, the UN and the Red Cross do not make a special provision for supplying medicine,

clothes and food for children. More often than not, it is part of common efforts. From the organizational standpoint, it is clear and in line with the purpose.

Still, there were situations in the world when children in certain countries used to die out by scores and could only be saved by intercivilizational understanding and unselfish humanism.

A striking example of it is poliomyelitis, of which the world in general has managed to get rid.

The serum for this deadly infection was made by American physician Albert Sabin. Selling this serum became, as it was to be expected, a business in the USA. At that time Japan was struck with the epidemic of poliomyelitis. It was in the 1960s, and children were dying. Then the Soviet Union did something that was hard to imagine: a ship was sent with the serum as a gift, and children were saved.

This story has a sequel, and a rather dismal one. The time I am speaking about was when poliomyelitis was eradicated in the USSR. Now it has come back, first to the eastern countries of the CIS, and then to Russia. But now the serum costs money. We have finally accepted and committed ourselves to Western values.

6.

However, I would not like to conclude on this note.

I am deeply convinced that all children are equal. They are not responsible for where they were born and what their parents are. All people, especially children, have a right for joy, health and protection. Unfortunately, Russo-Indian relations, which are primarily organizational and material in character, do not extend as far as childhood aid and childhood protection.

This sphere is passed, by word of mouth, on to the civil society that lacks resources, practice and moral resolution to surpass the saying that charity begins at home.

This is actually a lowbrow approach. It should be got away with remembering that international relations begin with the mutual assistance between nations.

One can notice a certain bent in the relations between civilizations. It should come as no revelation. Some systems live off the others imposing their vision of truth on them. To my mind, we have apparent and bloody proofs in the events in North Africa and the Middle East. Fidel Castro has long been predicting a third world war, not political, not organizational, but a real hot war.

I believe that from the standpoint of Indian day-to-day existence, the way Libyans live is almost a paradise. And we are openly jealous of Kuwaiti people, especially of the benefits they get from the government, which in this way tries to avoid standard Arab bloodshed. Few people understand what is going on in these countries. But it is evident that people's discontent alone fails to explain it.

In fact, the whole Arab world is under attack. Time will show whether it comes from the inside or from the outside. Somebody, however, would like to reap benefits from disrupting Muslim world's unity, even if unstable one.

Muslims live in India and in our country. To categorize one of religions as a delayed-action mine is unreasonable.

But the unreasonable sometimes comes in demand. Who demands it and on whose behalf? Are we not in for a danger of the global conflict between civilizations and religions, which is even beyond theoretical description?

Unfortunately, one cannot rule out any splits today.

Childhood of the world is threatened with unheard-of misfortunes.

V. Makarov¹

ON TRANSITION FROM COLLECTIVENESS TO INDIVIDUALITY

We are accustomed to connect achievements in science, art or culture with definite creative personalities. The protective copyright is flourishing. Market economy, which allowed selling anything, was especially helpful. Newton and Leibnitz used to debate on the precedence in scientific discoveries, while nowadays people are more concerned about royalties.

However, creative work in old times, when it was also practised, was not linked to definite personalities. The very fundamentals for the humankind result from the collective work. Language makes the most conspicuous example. It does not have a definite author, with an exception of, maybe, artificial languages like Esperanto or even Hebrew. When we say 'Roman or Arabic numerals', we refer to the collective work of relevant civilizations. The

diversity of languages, signs or letters indicate the presence of team work in all cultures. Mathematical signs maybe the only thing connected with a definite person, Vieta. But this is rather an exception than a rule.

The above-mentioned statement about languages can also be applied to what we call folk art: tableware, clothes, carpets, songs, tales, which is an indispensable part of modern life.

Little by little, individuality sprouted within collectiveness. All sacred books that contain the core of world religions have traces of individual work. The Bible, the Quran, Talmud etc. cannot be called obvious results of purely collective work.

The book by Sergej Ivanov (2010) illustrates how individual work was taking over in creativity. The book describes how the most widely known things (100 items) were invented, from the axe and the wheel to penicillin and the microwave oven. At the present stage almost all achievements in science, engineering, art and culture are connected with certain people. But almost half of the things that make up the 'List of 100' don't have an author.

The copyright law crisis

The question is: how far will individualization reach? Where will it stop? Nowadays with the boost of the Internet we are getting to a deadlock situation, since any idea — clever, stupid or even nonsensical — can be introduced on a personal blog. And it has already been practised. What if some of these ideas prove to be needed by society, or popular, or fruitful? Then its author will ride the gravy train because of the current copyright law, although a closer look may prove him a monkey playing a keyboard, or, which might be the case, even a computer program generating meaningful texts. This situation suggests that

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor. President of the Russian School of Economics, Head of the Economics Department of the State Academic University for the Humanities of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director-Organizer of the Higher School for the State Administration at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Author of more than 300 scientific works, among which are the following: *Mathematic Theory of Economic Dynamics and Balance* (Matematicheskaya teoriya ekonomicheskoi dinamiki i ravnovesiya, with co-authors), *Intangible Assets and the Intellectual Property Value Assessment* (Otsenka stoimosti nematerial'nykh aktivov i intellektualnoy sobstvennosti, with co-authors), *Russian Science and High Tech at the Turn of the Third Millennium* (Nauka i vysokie tekhnologii Rossii na rubezhe tretyego tysyacheletiya, with co-authors), *Russia in the Globalizing World. Modernization of the Russian Economy* (Rossiya v globalizuyushchetsya mire. Modernizatsiya Rossiyskoy ekonomiki, with co-authors), Professor *honoris causa* of Lomonosov Moscow State University. Editor-in-chief of 'Economics and Mathematical Methods' journal (Economika i matematicheskiye metody), member of the editorial boards and panels of the journals: Economics of Planning, Social Sciences, 'Cybernetics and the System Analysis' (Kibernetika i sistemnyi analiz), 'Economy of Modern Russia' (Economika sovremennoy Rossii), 'Science of Science' (Naukovedeniye), 'Optimization' (Optimizatsiya) and others. Laureate of the USSR Council of Ministers Award, Laureate of the L. V. Kantorovich Award and of the Demidov Award.

the current copyright law needs correcting. There is an on-going discussion on this issue.

Such discussions have resulted in a most outstanding breakthrough, which is called 'open source'. It started when some programmers uploaded their software for a free access and called for collaboration to modify them. At the same time, preservation of publicity for the modified software is required. It has become the precondition for a new practice of copyright law, called copyleft, alternative to the standard copyright.

New teamwork technology

Why do I call this situation a breakthrough? Because teamwork, the creativity of the masses has found its legal basis. It has been boosted up. A flexible combination between the individual and the team work has been found. LINUX, a computer operating system, has its initial author. It becomes more and more popular owing to the whole army of programmers, who lay no claims on the authorship.

The Wikipedia is the most spectacular open-source example. There is a person, who started the Wikipedia. But this is it. Its content is created through teamwork. Its most attractive characteristic is 'being alive'. Wikipedia is a 'living' source unlike classical encyclopaedias and reference books. That is why we prefer using this one.

Meanwhile, there are no in-depth studies of the Internet — of blogs, live journals, twitters, Facebook and other social networks. It is clear that we have to do with teamwork here. But it is not clear though what the result of the teamwork is, how it comes to be, how it should be measured or documented. Hot-heads maintain that the riots outside Moldova's parliament building, on Manezhnaya Square, in Egypt and other Arab states are products of social networks.

Fractals

My hypothesis is: Russian mentality, to a higher extent than other mentalities, possesses potential to produce teamwork masterpieces. To illustrate this, I will refer to the mathematical notion of 'fractal' which is widely known. Fractal is a kind of a system where the parts are the reduced-sized copies of the whole. Russian matryoshka doll is a definitive example of a fractal. Nature provides examples of fractal properties: snowflakes, different optical and many other phenomena. These phenomena always make an eye-catching show.

Our eminent writers intuitively follow fractal patterns in thinking. We can take M. Bulgakov's 'The Master and Margarita' as an example. It is not a simple story-within-a-story structure, but nested plots. Yu. Osipov, Professor at Moscow University, admired this feature so much that he wrote his own novel, a novel about the novel. The question arises: do we have teamwork here? 'Fractal' thinking works so that a creator, probing into the depths of his work, incorporates achievements made before. That turns an individual work into a collective one. Gogol, Pushkin and other authors used folk tales to create their masterpieces. It makes them exponents of folk art.

Fractals do not only represent an inward movement. They also represent the making of a superstructure. The Koch snowflake is a well-known fractal curve that results from such transformation of its boundary. Speaking about art, modern interpretations of classical works also have something fractal-like in them. For instance, Chekhov's works have been on stage for many years, serving as the background for the next stage-directors' creations. Although, sometimes they run to the extreme; I am referring to a well-known screen version of 'The Three Musketeers' when dogs featured as musketeers.

Consistent collective improvements make up nothing less than another evolutionary type. Standard evolution (according to Darwin) comes off as changeability (mutation) of population specimens, as the survival of the fittest and inheritance of the survival patterns. The basic product is being modified through teamwork;

it can also be called an evolution. Newton emphasized that he was standing on the giants' shoulders. And it is obvious that Newtonian mechanics is the result of creativity of many scientists, not just of geniuses.

I would like to write a couple of words about geniuses in teamwork. At the dawn of cybernetics Mr Pekelis, a talented journalist, wrote an article 'On the Collective Genius'. He made a whole set of examples to show that a team of genius may not have member geniuses at all. It is role balance that is most crucial. There must be a leader, an idea generator, a sceptical critic, a scrupulous inspector, a plodder etc. But the most important thing is the team's optimistic atmosphere. A team made of geniuses proves to be unable to work.

Let us get back to the issue of evolution in populations. At the age of informational technologies a population of copies can be made in a jiffy. By the way, such copies are being created all the time. They live to their own rules. In the open-source framework some of them are being successfully modified, while others are not. They follow the law of natural selection. Like in the animal kingdom, branching is likely to happen. A popular bestseller has dozens of screen versions. Some people make their millions in social networks, while others go on wasting their money.

The age of crowds

In conclusion, I would like to discuss the creative potential of the masses, which is highly topical in connection with the latest events in the Arab world. In *The Age of Crowds*, a well-known book in Russia, Serge Moscovici, a French psychologist, provides a detailed discussion of the crowd as a separate unit in the life of a society. He describes the crowd as reckless, heroic, noble, criminal and hysterical. The epithets are endless. Moscovici writes: 'Blending of individual personalities into a single heart and mind is the basic internal characteristic of a crowd. They conceal individual diversity and diminish intellectual abilities. Everyone wants to resemble his or her neighbour. Such a mob carries you along, like a tidal wave carries along pebbles. At the same time, social class, educational background or culture make no difference.' Thus, Moscovici seems to defy the creative potential of the crowd.

This is certainly not so. Moscovici himself devotes a separate chapter to the description of the role that communication plays in generating crowds. He discerningly forecast that new means of communication would create new ways of crowd-making, which we have recently witnessed. A simple example of the crowd's creativity is making trodden paths. Landscape designers know that paths should be made where they have spontaneously been trodden.

If we turn our attention to a new social arrangement, the creativity of the masses seems to be a point to consider. It is a well-known fact that Lenin borrowed his concept of the Soviets from the masses. If we analyze the discussions of different ideas in blogs, we could single out the ideas that are most popular with the crowd.

And who knows, we may well get to a new type of crowd, whose representatives are not made stupid, according to Moscovici, but, on the contrary, are becoming richer and richer in spirit. Professor Buzgalin of Moscow University remarks: 'Everyone of us is a potential owner of the whole human cultural heritage, of any scientific knowledge and objects of art... There is only one trifle left — the resources to swallow it up, to cope with it and to classify it.' Consuming this heritage together is more fun. And when masterpieces are given birth to, it will be one glorious pay-back for all, because we are a team.

References

1. Ivanov, S. 1000 let ozarenij (1000 Years of Inspirations), Moscow, Vokrug Sveta (Round the World), 2010.
2. Moscovici, S. *The Age of Crowds*. Moscow, Centre for Psychology and Psychotherapy, 1996 (trans. French Edition 1981)
3. Russia and the World — XXI. Materials from the workshop at the Centre for Problem Analysis and Governance. Moscow, Scientific Expert, 2010.

Juan Antonio Mark¹

ALLIANCE OF CIVILIZATIONS: FIVE YEARS OF ADVANCEMENT

Five years is not a long lapse of time, but in the context of the world politics when events follow one another at an incredible speed, reflecting on this five-year period involves a certain prospective. Thus, five years after the initiative voiced by the Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan had been adopted, we can reckon up the developments of the Alliance of Civilizations.

I would like to quote Mr Rodríguez Zapatero and Mr Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, heads of governments of the co-sponsors of the Alliance initiative, their joint article published by the French newspaper *Le Figaro*. 'Over the five-year period the Alliance has gained support of the overwhelming majority of the UN member-states and more than twenty international organizations and it has become an exemplary international platform in the issues of cross-cultural cooperation and dialogues.'

In my presentation I would also like to sum up the results of the path covered, but as I have had the privilege to speak on this floor every year since I came to Russia as Ambassador of Spain, I will not cover all the five years of the Alliance's history, I will concentrate on the last twelve months, i.e. on the period from mid-2009 to mid-2010, especially fruitful in events, when the world crisis caused tension and uncertainty in the world. Any crisis involves risks of ruination of the existing order, hence, of greater importance are the schemes of cooperation implying an open dialogue between its various participants and cultures. In the times of any crisis it is essential to resist the temptation of turning to isolationism, nationalism and protectionism. It is only in an open world that prosperity can be achieved. In our modern world we are entrapped in rapid changes, which is a cause of frustration for those who view these changes as some threat to their privileged position. A crisis always provides opportunities for those who fear changes. It is necessary to secure mechanisms employed to defend dialogue and understanding, so the initiative of the Alliance of Civilizations is a relevant mechanism for that.

That year was fruitful, decisive for the initiative's future: we witnessed the announcement of the initiative as one of the main principles to resolve conflicts between cultures. The following major events took place this year:

Adoption of the Resolution No. 6414 on the Alliance of Civilizations by the General Assembly. According to that document, the General Assembly of the UN is recognized as a tool to foster cross-cultural dialogue and cooperation.

Presentation of new state projects on dialogue and cooperation between cultures. A special attention is given to regional strategies of the Alliance of Civilizations in South-Eastern Europe (Ministerial conference in Sarajevo, 2009) and the Mediterranean region (Summit in Alexandria, June 2010).

Launching of the projects which serve as instruments of providing prompt answers and global search of experts in media and a scholarship programme in Madrid and Istanbul.

The Third Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations held in Rio de Janeiro on May 28–29, 2010. Highlighting the priorities of the Alliance of Civilizations was its greatest result. It is for the first time that Latin America has become the chief participant of the development of the Alliance, and considering the fact that Latin America has served as a meeting point between cultures since the early modern era, gaining the leading role by this continent is a significant event worth mentioning.

I will further dwell upon a few of the abovementioned factors:

Recent expansion of the Alliance

In the last twelve months the following countries and international organizations joined the Group of Friends: Angola, Saudi Ara-

bia, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Research Centre for Islamic History, Art and Culture; Columbia, Congo, Ecuador, the United States of America, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation, Organization of American States, Dominican Republic, São Tome and Príncipe, Surinam, Uzbekistan. Among new members I would particularly like to mention the USA recognizing the importance of their joining the Alliance, as well as a great number of Latin American and African countries. It strengthens the universality of the Alliance.

Developing new areas of attention

In accordance with the address of Mr Jorge Sampaio, the High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, national coordinators were appointed by the representatives of the Group of Friends. Their primary objective is to implement the mission of the Alliance on the national level.

Global interconfessional networks

This year special attention was given to relations between different confessions. Here we can name Saudi Arabia joining the Alliance as an event of great importance in the area. It is worth reminding that the Alliance takes part in the development of the processes aimed at the establishment of dialogue with religious organizations, like the one organized by the UN Fund for Population or the Parliament of World Religions.

Development of government projects and strategies

Twenty-three states are developing and launching their national projects that advance cross-cultural opportunities and promote elimination of the barriers on the way to equality.

The same approach that facilitates state projects has been used to define two significant regional strategies: one is for South-Eastern Europe (approved in December 2009 within the framework of the conference coordinated by the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and the other is for the Mediterranean region initiated by Egyptian president Mubarak. Alongside, the foundation is being laid for two more strategies — in Latin America and Central Asia.

Development of projects and programmes of the Alliance

Initiatives and projects at the horizontal level have got growing support on the part of the governments of the member-states. In the field of education such an initiative is worth mentioning as the clearinghouse on 'Education about Religions and Beliefs' of the Alliance of Civilizations whose site (<http://www.aocerb.org>) was launched in June 2009. A research network of the Alliance of Civilizations is another major project of the Alliance, which includes a wide network of research institutions that represents a group of knowledge-based thinking in its main areas: migration, media, education, and youth.

In youth issues the Global Youth Movement is of importance. It is based on the youth strategy adopted during the Youth Event in Istanbul in April 2009. The Youth Solidarity Fund is another example. It provides funding for youth projects fostering contacts between young people of different cultures. The website for young people also fits the context. The site is an interactive centralized service to discuss youth issues linked to their awareness about diverse cultures. Other initiatives on a smaller scale include, for instance, 'Plural+', the festival of youth video devoted to the migration problems, which is promoted by various international organizations and foundations and is backed by International Organization for Migration.

¹ Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Spain to the Russian Federation.

In the area of media such projects stand out as an educational programme for journalists in Pakistan, Nepal, Indonesia, and Arab countries. In this regard we can mention a global search engine for experts presently comprising over 350 entries. During the period involved the growing instant response resource created in 2008 has become an indispensable tool available for journalists as well as experts (over 700 all over the world) who have access to analysis, information and comments on all current events through the Internet.

In the field of migration and integration a fresh impetus was given to migration and integration areas, and round-table talks have been held on the topic of interethnic cities.

Third Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations

Held annually, the Forum of the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations brings together world leaders, prominent political personalities, international organizations, foundations, business leaders, civil society groups, religious groups, youth, and mass media with their extensive contacts to develop innovative associations and to promote new initiatives aimed at building trust and understanding between various communities.

The Third Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations was held on May 27–29, its slogan being ‘Building Cultures, Building Peace’. The conference played a significant role in defining the initiatives intended to consolidate the work of the Alliance.

High Representative’s political priorities were reinvented. At that, new strategies and a dialogue with new partner countries were highlighted. It was recognized that the Group of Friends is to play an instrumental role in the Alliance activities since now on, the growing role of the Alliance Ambassadors was agreed on and the decision was made to form the Consultative Group under the High Representative.

On top of the achievements of this global conference I would like to focus on the three of them: the Forum signed and prolonged the Memorandum of Understanding between international organizations working in many areas of the Alliance (UNESCO, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Labour Organization), it inaugurated the first two ‘Dialogue Café’ virtual stations (in Lisbon and Rio de Janeiro) and launched the Online Community on Migration.

What outcomes of such a decisive forum can be expected of the Alliance in future? We can expect its consolidation as a foundation for the UN’s political and cultural dialogue (along with the Development, Human Rights, Peace and Security). The Alliance will rely on the political and cultural sphere headed by an efficient government and managed with diversity. This subject will draw attention of those who will convene in the upcoming Forums of the Alliance which will be hosted by Qatar (Doha) in 2011 and Austria (Wien) in 2012. Diversity will be of increasing value throughout the 21st century. Variety of species in nature is a prerequisite of its exuberance, the same is true for the human society, but it is nowadays that we will globally acquire awareness of diversity. While originally, a few thousands years ago, a new discovery was always accompanied by shock and confrontation, now the integrity of a movement will mean that the 21st century will require focusing on its positive aspect. Transfusion of cultures in a broader sense of the word will serve as a foundation for the global community in the 21st century. This diversity must be steered into a positive direction so that it can be not only retained but also perceived as a powerful force intrinsic to humankind, the force that mechanic and monotonous world, which would exist beyond the mentioned dimension, lacks. Hence, the importance of the challenge the Alliance faces.

Coming back to the heads of governments Mr Erdoğan and Mr Rodríguez Zapatero’s words, ‘credit of trust to the Alliance is based on its achievements in implementing practical projects related to the following areas: education, youth, migration, and media (...) and on its ability to combine global approaches and local decisions.’

According to the statement made by the two heads of governments, the work should be aimed at two parallel areas: in the global context (attracting new members and signing new documents on cooperation with international organizations) and at a local level (realized mostly in national plans).

Besides, it is essential to pursue advancement and support the institutional role of Secretary-General of the Alliance Mr Sampaio, whose commitment to this initiative that promotes understanding is of crucial importance. I would like to conclude my short presentation pointing out unanimous recognition of both personal qualities of Secretary-General and his impeccable work as head of the Alliance.

A. Markov¹

CIVILIZATIONAL MATRICES OF RUSSIA AND THE WEST: PROBLEMS OF MUTUAL MISUNDERSTANDING AND INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE

Constructive and mutually useful dialogue, including intercultural dialogue, is dialogue of differences on common soil (Mikhail Bakhtin). Unfortunately, the value-normative space of ‘the common’ in Western European and Russian cultures has already been steadily shrinking for several centuries, obstructing the peoples’ purposeful attempts to understand one another. The ‘zone’ of misunderstanding formed in two system-forming spheres, out of which the spiritual matrix of civilization takes shape: in a model of socio-economic organization and in ethical conceptions of man. The origins of civilizational conflict come out in the depths of the centuries — in those times when the worldview foundations of the socio-economic paradigm of Western civilization were set out and formed the spiritual nucleus of Russian culture.

¹ Professor of Philosophy and Cultural Studies Chair at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Education), Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including: *Otechestvennaya kultura kak predmet kulturologiyi* [Russian Culture as an Object of Cultural Studies], *Osnovy sotsiokulturnogo proyektirovaniya* [Elements of Socio-Cultural Planning], *Proyektirovaniye marketingovykh kommunikatsiy. Reklamnyye tehnologii. Svyazi s obshchestvennostiyu. Sponsorskaya deyatel'nost'* [Project Planning of Marketing Communications. Advertising Technologies. Public Relations. Sponsoring Activities] and others.

Undoubtedly, Russian culture initially formed like Christian and European culture (something about which academic D. S. Likhachov spoke and wrote more than once). The first and deepest ‘window into Europe’ was cut out by Prince Vladimir of Kiev — the ‘window’ into the spiritual world of Byzantium, from which an authentic, original Christian tradition came to Rus’, organically absorbing the humanistic enthusiasm and energetic character of the ancient culture. Moreover, Russian culture is not just a variety of European Christian culture, but its concentrated expression, its spiritual nucleus preserved in historical time. It was precisely Russian culture that could preserve on a worldwide scale the ethical ideal that has remained current since Christ’s Sermon on the Mount, an ideal already contained in the earliest literary texts.² This is to say that already in the earliest stages of the formation of Russian spirituality, key Christian values were being stated, on the basis of which corresponding human qualities also formed — love, compassion and forgiveness, indifference to material prosperity,

² Already in the *Word on Law and Grace*, by the first Russian metropolitan Illarion (first half of the eleventh century), the idea of spiritual uniqueness of culture is stated, and the great Christian value of freedom of the individual and the denial of the moral suitability of the Old Testament law is affirmed. (‘The law of Moses has departed and Grace and truth have filled the whole world, and faith has extended into all tongues and to our Russian people.’)

and human solidarity.¹ Russian culture preserved the spirit and essence of the true Christian culture (and therefore also the true European culture) in spite of all the temptations and painful trials that fell to its lot (or perhaps because of them).

The culture of Western Europe took shape, undoubtedly, in the same way as Christian culture, but in time it lost the spiritual essence of Christianity. The 'spiritual fork in the road' at which the paths of Russian and Western European culture separated was the 15th and 16th centuries. At precisely this time, Rus' became conscious of its cultural mission in world history, the essence of which was captured in the concept of 'Moscow as the Third Rome'.² Already on the basis of the consciousness of this great mission, the 'Russian idea' would later acquire a national-political character, successfully executing its goals of unification and expansion.

At approximately the same period, Europe was going through a stage of reform with the opposite vector of movement. This period is known as the Reformation, which was brought about by a profound spiritual crisis of Western European culture. A new ideology (within the frameworks of Calvinism and Protestantism) formed at precisely this time, making up the basis of contemporary Western civilization (the vices of the church in the Late Middle Ages – the sale of indulgences, venality, depravity, and others – were a visible jolt).

The capitalist model of life-structure which began to take shape in the 16th and 17th centuries and continued its spiritual expansion in the intellectual space of Europe of the 18th century became the kernel of the socioeconomic paradigm of Western civilization.³ The process of formation and cultural legitimization of the capitalist system carried a conceptual, normative, and ideological character and consisted in the alignment of principles (and in essence, in the replacement) of the civilizational ethos of Christian culture.

As is well-known, for many centuries in pre-capitalist societies, the heroic ethic, with its ideal of 'glory', was dominant, and money-grasping was perceived (in Christian as well as Muslim cultures) as a sin and a sign of moral inadequacy, as the lot of social outcasts. Correspondingly, the culture of that time interpreted trade and industry as the embodiment of greed, miserliness, and cruelty. According to Max Weber, in the modern era the 'heroic ethos' was replaced by the bourgeois ethos of the Protestant ethic, which 'rehabilitated' commercial-industrial activity, imparting to it the status of religious service: this kind of study began to be regarded as worthy of a Christian.

The adjustment of the Christian spiritual matrix began with the attempt to create a new theory of the state, a more perfect system of political administration (Machiavelli, 1469–1527). At the base of this lay a pessimistic view of human nature. The logic of these thoughts was this: in their lives, people are guided by passions, which turn human history into a chain of senseless cruelties. The history of cultures and civilizations knows two ways of restraining human passions: coercion and moral restrictions. Neither of these, however, ultimately has the capacity to constructively resolve the problem: faith and reason are impotent in their aspiration to curb human sinfulness, and Christian morality could not improve 'human nature'. It was therefore necessary to find more effective methods for perfecting people and running society. Thus the search began for means that would generate an alternative to Chris-

tian morality. A 'third' prescription appeared which led to a revolution in social thought: using human passions for the attainment of 'the common good'.⁴ At the base of the 'third path' lay the replacement of the criteria of the moral value of human passions, which had to be given cultural legitimacy. The initial position was this: people are guided by egotism, lust for power, a desire for pleasure, and self-interest; passions are stronger than beliefs and reason, are destructive by nature, generate all the greatest misfortunes of humankind – war, hunger, and mass death. However, a just social order can be built on the foundation of the mutual regulation of passions. The theoretical 'justification' of passions began with the birth of the idea of their 'devouring one another', of the passions' capacity to restrict each other (Bacon, 1561–1626; Spinoza, 1632–1677). Later, the conception of balancing passions was born (Hume, 1711–1776), according to which some passions (covetousness, cupidity, profit-seeking) could be used for the pacification of other passions – vainglorious and carnal desires, or lust for power. Thus, the theory of managing social progress by means of 'the reasoned positioning of one passion against another'⁵ gradually emerged. The final rehabilitation of the passions occurred in the age of the Enlightenment, which came to embody in real life the conception of the improvement of the world with the help of passions, ultimately giving them the status of 'governable interests' (Hume). The rehabilitation of passions expressed an optimistic notion (especially among the French materialists) of the possibility of 'improving and correcting' human nature. Subsequently, the idea of using passions for 'the common good' became the foundation of political economy and the pivot of the ideology of liberalism.

The main ('privileged') passion was cupidity, which was evaluated positively and was attributed with having the capacity to rein in other passions, and to balance and suppress destructive human impulses – that is, other passions (Helvetius, 1715–1771). Cupidity, which had earlier been considered a dangerous passion (and in the primary Christian context as the most repulsive, killing the soul in a human being) now became an attestation of virtue in individuals. It was given cultural legitimacy and came to rule over the world.⁶ If piety towards money and prosperity had previously been considered a trait of slaves, lackeys, and simple folk, now the passion for profit was seen as the promise of 'a bright future'. 'Making money' was called 'interest' and came to be seen as a stable and tranquil passion, and the very concept of 'interest' was accorded a neutral moral value and theoretical status.⁷

The reasoning for giving 'interests' the role of a saving remedy became the main intellectual trend of the modern era. 'Interests' were identified with material gain and usefulness – that is, with reason; the idea emerged that development of the economy would have the capacity to improve human nature as well as the social and political order. With time, moral values became political postulates and received the status of ontological foundations and epistemological principles of social philosophy and politics in the modern era.⁸ As A. Hirschman emphasizes, philosophers accomplished this principal task. The socio-political results of such a spiritual revolution were significant: 'aristocrats of the spirit' were replaced by people striving for the gratification of material interests – people who had earlier been scorned by the aristocracy (members of different marginalized social groups which produced money-lenders, merchants, and indus-

¹ D. S. Likhachov shows how this moral-ethical line later developed in the Russian annals, in Old Russian icon painting, in hagiographic literature – in the people's beloved, unpretentious little books for family reading, describe the lives of Orthodox saints, who in their temporal biographies embodied to a maximum the Christian essence of human life: love and mercy in relations with one's neighbours, freedom as a premise for the expression of the divine nature of the human soul, suffering and the repudiation of riches, social justice and conciliarism.

² This mission was first declared in the dispatch of the Pskovian monk Philotheus to Grand Prince Vassily of Moscow: 'All Christian kingdoms have come to an end and come together into the one kingdom of our sovereign, and this is the Russian kingdom: for two Romes have fallen, and the third stands, and there is no fourth.'

³ An analysis of the transformation of the capitalist paradigm into its aspect as a value system can be found in the work of Polish scholar A. Hirschman (the currency of whose ideas V.P. Makarenko elucidates in his article 'The Theory of Capitalism: The Dead End of Social Knowledge?' *Socis*, 2001, No. 3).

⁴ These 'prescriptions' still form the basis for the most common variants of ideology, social theory, and policy.

⁵ See: Hirschman A. *Namietnosi i interesy: u intelektualnych źródeł kapitalizmu*. Krakow, 1997, p. 34.

⁶ The words 'passion' and 'greed' (in a negative sense) were replaced by 'usefulness' and 'interest'.

⁷ See: Hirschman, A. *Namietnosi i interesy: u intelektualnych źródeł kapitalizmu*. Krakow, 1997, p. 47.

⁸ The idea of the 'balance of passions' was used for this in the policy of the 'Founding Fathers' of the United States and the leaders of the French revolution for the foundation and realization of principles of division of powers and the social contract. The theory and practice of democracy and the paradigm of social thought of the modern era connected with it stand on these illusions. See: Hirschman, A. *Namietnosi i interesy: u intelektualnych źródeł kapitalizmu*. Krakow, 1997, p. 34.

trialists); economics and international politics were freed from the control of reason and Christian principles of morality. But this conception ultimately proved to be a 'delayed-action mine' for European culture: the basis of interest was shaped by the worst of the human passions — cupidity, which as history has shown, paradoxically resounds with other 'sins', supporting and stimulating their anti-cultural energy and manifestation. Life has shown that passions are inherently destructive and a civilization founded on their affirmation has no prospects on a historical scale.

Precisely the mutually exclusive vectors of the value aspirations of a cultural system provide for the low effectiveness of processes of intercultural dialogue between Russia and the Western world. The opposition of Russian culture and Western civilization as mutually exclusive systems is obvious: if a culture affirms spirituality, sociality, and conciliarism, it is shameful and sinful, a civilization that is aggressive and self-sufficient does not know shame and sin; if moral rules are in force in a culture, then force and outward forms of coercion, based on law, are dominant in that civilization. Russian culture, which was initially founded on the values of authentic Christianity (in the Orthodox version), having preserved its spiritual matrix throughout many centuries, could not 'comprehend' a representative of the Western world with his rationality, profit, and passion for gain. The 'ideal' tendency of Russian consciousness was the essential mental characteristic of our reality: the people demonstrated in history a profound thirst for a 'cosmic transformation' of life, and were ready to give all their strength in the name of saving Holy Rus', the defence of the Fatherland, the construction of communism, and so on. This dominant ideal (and motivation) was deeply built into the spiritual matrix of the cultural organism. At the beginning of the 20th century, the Russian people did not want to build a 'capitalist paradise', but rather took up the construction of the 'Kingdom of God on Earth', which they took not as the result of the evolution of the present, but as a miracle of a cosmic scale. As soon as faith in the miracle was lost, the energy of total nihilism and indeed cosmic self-destruction was turned on. Today, there are only spiritually blind leaders and today they cannot understand a simple thing: a Russian person does not want and will not build a world of material prosperity without an ideological foundation.

However, from the moment of the 'bourgeois revolution' of the 1990s, the spiritual matrix of Russian culture has undergone the most brutal kind of destruction: by turns, the system of its value coordinates, among them the path of non-critical adoption and forcible implementation of Americanized economic and political models, which were raised on the inherently different value-normative soil of Western European culture.¹ The submersion of the people into a 'capitalist paradise' was a suicidal project from the spiritual point of view. The anthropological type of the 'neo-heathen', gaining a foothold in

the body of Russian spirituality to this day, was conceived in the bowels of Western civilization, which long ago replaced its Christian spiritual matrix and now openly professes financial success, amorality, and hedonistic individualism. Parallel to the strengthening of the 'heathen man' is the 'purge' of the spiritual-moral bases of 'Russianness'. This process gained substantial strength with the development of the means of communication and the arrival of new, effective technologies for the treatment of mass consciousness, which are actively used in the act of destroying traditional moral norms, and the washing-out of the ideas of normal and pathological, good and evil.

Today the capitalist model is going through a crisis which concerns not only the real economy but also the conceptual foundations of man's and society's reality. At the civilizational level, the basic cause of the crisis is the depletion of the dominant global paradigm: the ruinous consequences of the development of the capitalist model of economics are incompatible with the prospect of humanity's survival.² Capitalism's 'outcomes' are impressive: it destroyed European 'high' culture, which embodied the great spiritual values of Christianity; it changed the anthropological type of man of Christian civilization; capitalism in many ways defined the crisis of non-European civilizations, manifesting, on the spiritual plane, a repressive influence on the consciousness and behaviour of a 'Third World' man with the help of 'products of disintegration' of mass culture. The capitalist model of life-structure placed under threat the existence of human civilization as a whole: it is obvious today that the capitalist crisis will lead to the growing population's struggle for diminishing resources (including food and water), and the question of population reduction will inevitably come up, which may place the question of the species *Homo*³ onto the agenda. In the context of what is taking place, the prospects for the human race look quite bleak: 'The world will live out its last relatively calm decades before a crisis-within-crises, the likes of which have never been and, it would seem, will sweep away not only capitalism with its supporters and opponents, but all of post-Neolithic civilization. And if it should turn out that humanity, reduced, say, to half a billion or a billion people, survives it, then the new society will most likely be as different from civilization as civilization was from the Palaeolithic. Some of the contours of the world after such a turning point are already visible.'⁴

At the present time, responsible humanitarian scholars, of Russia as well as of the countries of Western Europe, are concerned about the understanding of the sources of the crisis of European civilization and about the working out of new paradigms of the reality of man and society.⁵ And the impending misfortune, paradoxically enough, is becoming a site for intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding between the representatives of different civilizational matrices.

² An economy that is 'governable from the top down' and 'mixed' is also ineffective as a means of solving social problems, and for this reason cannot be regarded as examples for imitation. See: *Hirschman, A. Namiennosci i interesy: u intelektualnych zrodel kapitalizmu*. Krakow, 1997.

³ At the same time, Russian scholars (especially representatives of the liberal intelligentsia) continue to feel that the misfortune of Russia is in the inconsistency of capitalist development. This attests to the existence of a crisis of contemporary social knowledge, which is not in a condition to comprehend what is taking place, describe the possible consequences, or propose models for adjustment.

⁴ *Fursov, A. The Parting Bow of Capitalism*. <http://yablor.ru/blogs/andrey-fursov-konec-trety-epohi-4-krizis-bibleyskogo-proekta/728907>

⁵ Liberal ideologues of the capitalist model have shown their intellectual impotence to explain the causes of the economic crisis and continue to insist on this model as the only possible option.

¹ Unfortunately, in recent years such adoption is also typical for the educational sphere, which represents a fundamental institution for the preservation of a people's culture.

V. Matviyenko¹

MULTINATIONAL ST. PETERSBURG: MODERN EXPERIENCE OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Nowadays national relations are becoming more and more important all over the world. Though globalization is expanding, it does not diminish the importance of national and ethnic identity or preservation of richest cultural diversity. We are well aware of these problems here, in St. Petersburg, and have learned to manage them. We know that preserving social peace and harmony can only be achieved through the widest dialogue of cultures. This dialogue implies mutual influence and interaction of cultural traditions. It also serves as an impetus of their mutual development and enrichment.

The very concept of 'culture' presupposes the existence of some 'cultural code' — ethic, moral and spiritual values — which, if lost, means the ruin of the society. At the same time, any national culture, when it sticks to its original core, experiences the influence of other cultures and adapts them in different ways. Under the impact of new cultural transplantations the traditions are reconsidered, and new vital values and reference points are introduced.

Therefore, dialogue implies not just admitting or understanding abundant cultural diversity, but also something more complicated. One culture strongly needs another in order to develop and improve. Many researchers affirm that Russia's great modernization in the reign of Peter I was the definitive example of such practice. That modernization, with its heart in St. Petersburg, was extremely successful. It let Russia become one of the leading countries in Europe and the world.

For centuries St. Petersburg has been home to the people of different nations and ethnic groups. Our city was formed as a multinational and multi-confessional centre that represented the amalgam of nations, cultures and religions of the Russian Empire. Peter I, the founding father, managed to accumulate in the new capital all the best that other countries had to offer. Thus, favourable conditions were developed for the integration of Russian and Western cultures. Migrant workers, skilled workmen from Russian provinces and foreign experts took part in building St. Petersburg. The city was taking in great numbers of people who belonged to different confessions, spoke different languages and practiced different faiths. All this can be traced in the city's image, its toponymy and traditions. It is a remarkable fact that, according to the 19th-century population census held in St. Petersburg, a lot of foreigners who came to Russia named themselves Russian. New church buildings, cathedrals and temples of different religions were being erected; national schools were being opened and national communities were being initiated. St. Petersburg not only evolved into a 'crossroads' where cultures met, it also came to possess its own unique polyphonic culture.

It was in St. Petersburg that the genuine cultural élite of multinational Russia was born. Representatives of almost all nationalities of Russia and neighbouring countries studied here.

¹ Governor of St. Petersburg, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. She graduated from Leningrad Chemical Pharmaceutical Institute, in 1985 she graduated from the academy of Social Sciences under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, in 1991 she completed the career development courses for diplomats under the Diplomat Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. In 1972 started career within the Komsomol organization as head of a department at Petrogradsky District Komsomol Committee; later she was the First Secretary of Leningrad Regional Komsomol Committee. She was the First Secretary of the Krasnogvardeysky District Committee of the Communist Party, Deputy Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Leningrad Soviet. She was elected as people's deputy to the Supreme Soviet and headed the Committee on Women, Family Protection and Children Affairs. V. I. Matviyenko served in the diplomatic service and held several diplomatic positions including posts of Russian ambassador to Malta, head of Department of Relations with Federal Subjects, Parliament, Social and Political Organizations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, member of the board of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russian ambassador to Greece (1997-98). V. I. Matviyenko was appointed Deputy Prime Minister of Russia for Welfare. On March 19, 2003 she was appointed Presidential Envoy to the Northwest Federal District.

It was here where intellectual élite of different nations came to recognize themselves as spiritual leaders of their own nations.

Today national diasporas of St. Petersburg are profoundly integrated into all spheres of city life; they have become an integral part of civil society. St. Petersburg of today, with its 5,000,000 residents, has about 200 ethno-cultural social organizations and over 300 religious buildings. More than 140 ethnic groups live here in peace and harmony, mutual respect and friendly communion. The House of Nationalities, opened in St. Petersburg, has become a coordinating council for national and ethno-cultural associations.

At the same time, the migration flows which increased all over the world at the end of the 20th century set new challenges for us. Almost all over the world people are getting more and more mobile, while societies less and less homogeneous. Sixty years ago, in 1950, the daily number of people who crossed borders was 70,000, while at the end of 2000 this number was over 2 million. Russia is also involved into the problems of global migration. Nowadays our country follows the USA in the list of the countries that receives more than 12 million migrant workers each year.

Migration is the most important demographic process with its economic, political, geographic and other aspects. It is also a multidimensional socio-cultural phenomenon and a source for an unceasing cross-cultural dialogue. It is worth saying that multicultural societies have recently become a reality in cities and countries all over the world. However, cultural differences may have quite a different character. One point is cultural differences between the Spaniards and Catalans in Spain, who have been neighbours for decades, and quite another story is cultural differences between Christians and Muslims, the representatives of the European and Asian civilizations. We know from experience that such distinct cultures tend to have certain stereotypes which prevent them from a normal dialogue.

There are different approaches to the problem of cultural interaction between ethnic migrants and local population. The world knows a lot of patterns for such mutual intercourse: from segregation (a separate existence of cultural communities) to assimilation (a full acceptance of new values and norms by migrants). The objective truth is that none of the European countries has succeeded in solving the problem of mutual adaptation of the immigrants and of the host society. At the same time, we found European experience very useful.

The spirit of pioneers and innovators has always been characteristic of our city. Historically, St. Petersburg championed new ideas and results of the Age of Enlightenment in Europe. It was also the place where new and progressive ideas got rooted and found their implementation. A few years ago we adopted the programme of 'Tolerance' that is supposed to strengthen and bring harmony to interethnic relations. This Programme has been practised in the regions of Russia. It was also approved by the European community. St. Petersburg was awarded an honourable prize for the promotion of tolerance and non-violence by UNESCO.

The 'Tolerance' Programme takes into consideration the needs of St. Petersburg residents and of those who come here as guests. At its first stage (2006–10) the Programme was targeted at the breeding of tolerance on the humanistic principles inherent to our city. The second stage (that will last till 2015) is focused on the issues of integrating 'new city dwellers' into the city's community and of providing them access to the polyphonic culture of St. Petersburg. The new version of the Programme was developed by the leading experts in harmonization of interethnic relations, distinguished men of culture and

leading, eminent scientists and teachers. The Programme pays special attention to the adaptation of migrants. Moreover, it also contains a range of measures to solve some economic, social and household issues. Particularly, it encourages the Russian language training for children and their parents who come from other countries to settle in our city.

We are fully aware of the fact that the image of St. Petersburg, social peace and stability depend upon the success of 'Tolerance'. This Programme touches upon almost all spheres of life in a megalopolis: education, science, youth and safety. The cross-cultural and interconfessional dialogue involves school, family and social institutions. This dialogue takes places in newspapers, on TV and on the Internet.

Xenophobia and nationalism are spreading in many countries. So, to breed tolerance in people, there should be no lagging behind these trends. At a recent meeting on the enforcement of law, President Dmitry Medvedev of Russia emphasized the need for strengthening prevention of extremism and crime among young people. We are proud of a considerable experience in this sphere, too. St. Petersburg is rightly has the image of one of the safest cities in Russia.

The cross-cultural dialogue in St. Petersburg is going on. Mutual understanding and respect, neighbourliness and partnership are the principles that the development of St. Peters-

burg puts forward. Popular exhibitions 'The Bread of a Multinational City' and 'This City Protects Me: The Multinational Family of St. Petersburg' stimulate concord and peace among different nations. The exhibitions' names speak for themselves. Concord between nations stands out at the festivals 'Culture of Peace for the Culture Capital' and 'Ethno-Mechanics'. Numerous reference books dwell upon the specific features of different cultures. A unique 'Ethno-Calendar of St. Petersburg' has been issued; new videos and films on tolerance have been produced; the children of newly arrived residents study at a multiethnic school with innovative curriculum. It is difficult to imagine the calendar of St. Petersburg culture without such flamboyant national holidays as Sabantuy, Norouz and many others that have become the city's cultural brand.

The multiethnic and multiconfessional culture of our city has become subject of profound research, international scientific conferences, seminars and round tables.

St. Petersburg is destined to be a multiethnic place. At the same time, there is a 'nationality' shared by each city resident, that of a 'resident of Leningrad – St. Petersburg'. We are united by such things as love of our wonderful city and of its priceless historical heritage, and mutual responsibility for the city's present and future.

A. Melikhov¹

THE SHARED APARTMENT OF CULTURES

In the liberal world, a new rhetoric has emerged in which dialogue and tolerance appear as the same kind of panacea as the dictatorship of the proletariat in Marxism-Leninism. However, it occurs to me that only the victors are tolerant and pragmatic, wishing to take quiet pleasure in the fruits of their success – the defeated always hate them and write self-consoling tales in the spirit that they lost exclusively because of their own magnanimity and nobleness, and the victors rejoiced over them only because they were base and ruthless. Increasing the amount of tolerance in our world can only be done by decreasing the number of people who feel they have been defeated. However, not many will fit on one pedestal of honour, or it will cease to be a pedestal...

Is it possible, though, to give every people, every civilization its own pedestal? This is precisely the task peoples take up in the periods of their establishment – every people creates its culture, its pedestal for self-glorification, and preserves its vitality and viability only as long as this collective vision lives within it. This is why, notwithstanding the liberal catechism, national cultures do not draw closer to one another, but on the contrary, nations become disconnected in the most dramatic way. It is not the respectable, cosmopolitan 'tops' of cultures, but the semiconscious 'roots' of prejudice and legend that constitute the foundation of each nation's conviction that it is the best of all – they are created for the sake of this conviction.

The dialogue of compromise is possible in sharing out profits and gains, but impossible in a beauty contest. The competition among peoples is more similar to a beauty contest than to bargaining among businessmen. Nations create themselves

and unite in civilization not for the sake of achieving some practical material aims – that is what industrial and financial corporations, including criminal organizations, are for – but rather for the sake of attaining an (always illusory) feeling of selectedness, uniqueness, involvement in something beautiful, honourable, and long-lasting. Can you imagine, however, a society in which everyone feels 'chosen', when the competition of imaginations, not the competition of profits and technologies, takes place?

Alas, in spite of the liberal tales, the more people have in common and the better they know each other, the more strongly they irritate one another: each begins to understand better that his lofty image of himself has no place in the world of the other, that the other, exactly like he himself, reserves the most elevated feelings for himself. The conflicts of vision cannot be overcome by any 'education in tolerance', for tolerance is not an independent quality, but only a consequence of confidence in one's invulnerability.

I will venture to formulate this principle of interaction among cultures: peoples must communicate through their rationalized élites and pragmatized peripheries, and it is desirable to reduce contacts of national bodies, their cultural nuclei, to a minimum.

The main difficulties of intercultural communication emerge when the masses come into contact. This is because for the man of the masses, there is a dangerous tendency to judge every social group by its most harmful representatives – so, today, the majority of common people associate Islam, for instance, with terrorism. In order not even to shatter this prejudice completely, but merely to weaken it, it is necessary to demonstrate constantly with emotionally impressive examples that the Islamic world is not something uniform, unbroken, unanimously rising to struggle with the infidels, that with this world it is entirely possible to cooperate and the extremists are themselves renounced by the majority of their own countrymen.

In order to reduce the fear of one culture before another, it is necessary, first of all, to portray the rivals who cause anxiety as weak and suffering, for strength always causes anxiety.

¹ Writer, journalist, Candidate of Sciences (Physics and Mathematics). Deputy editor-in-chief of 'Neva' literary journal (St. Petersburg). Author of literary and journalistic works and fiction, including: *Provincial* (Provintsial), *Scales for the Good* (Vesy dlja dobra), *Confessions of a Jew* (Ispoved' yevreja), *Atlases Bound, or The New Don Quixote* (Gorbatye atlanty, ili Novyj Don Kikhot), *Romance with Prostatitis* (Roman s prostatitom), *Murdering Love* (Ljubov'-ubijitsa), *Sages and Poets* (Mudretsy i poety), *The Whole World Is Foreign Land for Us* (Nam tselyj mir chuzhбина), *The Pest* (Chuma), *In the Valley of the Blessed* (V doline blazhennyh), *Love for Our Country's Graves* (Ljubov' k otechestvennym grobам), *The International of Fools* (Internatsional durakov) and some others and author of a number of scholarly publications on mathematics. A number of literary works have been translated into European and Chinese languages. Mr. Melikhov is Nabokov Award winner, recipient of Gogol Literary Prize, etc.

In any event, it is worthwhile to acknowledge distinctly how naïve the conception of multiculturalism is in counting on the peaceful, equal coexistence of many cultures within the scope of a common state: cultures at the most basic level are directed not at equality, but at dominance, at exclusivity. If a culture does not provide a person with the illusion that he is a part of something that is 'the best of the best', the greatest, the most beautiful and just, his motive for defending it or even making small sacrifices for it disappears. Then it is doomed to defeat and disintegration, and the people belonging to it are doomed to the horror of insignificance before an endlessly enormous and endlessly indifferent universe. For the main task of a culture also consists in creating a protective layer of illusion which guards a person from acknowledging his own meagreness. This is why every culture needs its own corner, where it can feel like the undivided host, it is necessary to avoid communal living spaces for cultures wherever possible. However, today's globalization creates such 'shared apartments' on unprecedented scales, and this is why avoiding the collision of cultural nuclei – the collision of mass illusions – within one country is practically impossible.

Fortunately, it is true that the overwhelming majority of Muslims stay, as before, in their traditional living spaces, and, so as not to make terrorists or 'sympathizers' out of them, the economically stronger West should not infringe upon their defensive dreams, and should minimize its cultural expansion – this could be called a principle of maximum cultural non-intervention. Western people usually notice the incursion of 'aliens' into their cultural environment, but do not notice the incursion of their own customs, mores, tastes, standards, and ways into the cultural environment of those whose aggression they fear. However, their aggression is born out of exactly the same fear of turning out as second-class people in their own home.

However, every person, even in his own home, should feel himself to be the wisest, the fairest, and the most respectable. This is only possible in separate living quarters, never in a 'communal flat'. Contemporary terrorism in some measure can be likened to a high-minded communal quarrel. Cultures enrich one another only at a distance, when each voluntarily takes from another that which he likes. We must recall how we loved the West from afar, how we chased after the books by Remarque and Hemingway, how developed jazz almost underground and renamed Lenin Street 'Broadway'! We must remember what vigilance, and enmity, at that, the 'American way of life' began to cause when Russians started to divine contempt and coercion in its penetration into their cultural environment...

However, slowing down cultural expansion is, though difficult, possible as long as we are speaking of cultures divided by state borders. What shall we do, then, with different cultures that are now in the confines of one state as the result of migration or conquest?

To eliminate the struggle of cultures for the first place is impossible, it is only possible to attain first place in different spheres, assuring yourself, only yourself, and not out loud, that your sphere, precisely, is the most important. Thus, a champion in running looks down on a gymnastics champion, who repays the feeling in kind, and as a result everyone is satisfied, and ignores the ironic looks from the chess champion.

This division must be protected without aspiring the impossible – friendship among peoples: individuals of different nationalities can make friends as much as they wish, but peoples cannot make friends, for they are born out of an aspiration not for equality, but for chosen-ness, and humble peoples do not linger in the historical arena for very long. You will often hear this: 'How can there not be friendship among peoples? There were two Georgians, a Jew, and three Kazakhs serving in our battery... We had two Jews, a Georgian, and three Balts living in our communal flat!' It must be clarified more often that the

friendship of individuals and friendship of peoples are perfectly different things, that in a crew, a military company, or in a communal flat, people are not representatives of their nationalities, because nationalities are enormous, hereditary *structures* united by collective illusions which do not withstand the sceptical gaze of outsiders, which is why outsiders are feared.

The common man, feeling he has lost to some alien in some everyday situation, begins to feel his whole country has lost and to incline towards the slogan 'Russia for the Russians'. Therefore, *it is primarily ethnic minorities that are interested in Russians' sure domination, and consequently also in their peacefulness.*

In order that the representatives of different cultures be able, to a certain extent, to hear; to put themselves in one another's positions, the strong must acknowledge their strength, and the weak their weakness. The strong must not go into hysterics and start swatting flies with cobblestones, and for the weak, it would be unwise to issue challenges to those on whose peacefulness their fate depends. This last point is, of course, more painful to the minorities' national pride, and I am not suggesting that they reject it, which is to say vanish; I only propose gratifying this pride in those spheres where individual will and individual talent are valued more highly – where it is possible to achieve a great deal of personal success, and in this to become an object of the love and pride of the Russian majority, as happened with Muslim Magomayev, Mahmud Esambayev, Vysotsky, Okudzhava, Alfyorov, and Slutskaya.

Common people must be made to realize more often that all the international success of Russian scholars, athletes, and artists is, in the end, registered to the Russian people, just as the architectural masterpieces constructed by Italian architects are St. Petersburg's glory.

The representatives of ethnic minorities can achieve as much high success in the culture of the majority as they wish, calling for nothing but love and pride, until they make themselves felt as an alien intrusion into the dominant culture: *the equality of individuals is entirely possible, but the equality of cultures is a dangerous utopia*, the dominant culture will not permit this without suffering defeat in a civil war. 'Who is the master of the house?' This fateful question will shield all cultural problems for a long time. The competition of individuals engenders only irritation, but the competition of cultures engenders a sacred, selfless hatred, for the loss of a sense of collective chosen-ness leaves a person defenceless before the terrible face of eternity. On the other hand, if ethnic minorities develop their culture for their own use (what all national cultures initiate from and are intended for), then it may well turn out that – at a certain distance – the national majority will be charmed by it. Cultural distinctions are fully welcomed and freely borrowed by all peoples, as long as this is felt to be a *voluntary choice*, – this is how the accentual-syllabic prosody, architectural classicism, ballet, the shish kebab, and jazz entered Russian culture. However, even the smallest hint of compulsion, of forced intrusion, will immediately invite a reaction of total rejection.

In general, the successes which permit each people to be proud of itself and to charm others are created by its ethnic aristocracy. This is why the creation of a national aristocracy, reliance on the most gifted and romantic, is the wisest national policy. This is a much better realization of the principle of 'winning respect by success, and not pressing out tears because of misfortunes'. Furthermore, the resources of sympathy are as limited as material resources, and are often mixed with even greater insults. Therefore, even for the most long-suffering 'little peoples', having somehow brought down on its own head the misfortune of being envied and watched with suspicion by a noticeable part of the majority, it is better not to get involved in this competition, in which each side will exaggerate its own wounds and understate those of the others: in any such contest, he who is physically weakest loses.

For the ‘small peoples’ it is worth remembering what every reasonable person remembers with sadness in personal life: that if some misfortune befalls you, other people’s own worries will remain with them and take first place all the same, and the authorities, even benevolent, since this property might be inherent to them, will not begin to quarrel seriously with the majority for a minority.

Therefore, even for the most outrageous reasons, appealing for support to a people and to the authorities are completely different things if we remember that they have entirely different aims: a people has pride, first of all, and the authorities have security. Appealing to a people, it is necessary to emphasize its magnanimity and blamelessness, in every way removing responsibility for the actions of the villains and psychopaths, no matter how many of them there may be (‘Nazis have no nationality’), and in every way emphasizing the common interest in peace and prosperity of the shared country (which is the absolute truth). With the utmost earnestness, the authorities must be made to open their eyes to the fact that closing their eyes to the deeds of Nazis brings more unpleasantness upon them than it prevents.

This is about the reasonable behaviour of minorities in their relations with majorities. For internal use, one more piece of advice can be offered to them: less pathos. It stands to reason that crimes against innocent people must be marked as inhuman (but not aloud), with the understanding, however, that they are very human, too human: having felt a real or imaginary threat to their inspiring tales, no people managed to avoid outrageous cruelties. If we do not give heightened expectations to human nature, there will be fewer causes for offense, and if even you become the pride and joy of the majority, all the same you will never be quite their own, only your grandchildren can belong completely to them. However, any outspoken cultural dialogue will, without fail, hurt you somehow.

It is necessary either to reconcile oneself with this or to leave, going to any of the worlds where exactly the same problems await one. It is therefore better to be patient with what cannot, in any case, be avoided. It is true that this is easier to proclaim than to fulfil: not imitating tolerance, but being tolerant in good faith, is the mark of the strong.

The relative peace between peoples in past times was only established through imperial power, which proved stronger than any indigenous people in isolation and was even stronger than those alliances which appeared... The truth is that such power had practically never been achieved by any empire – none of them was strong enough to conquer all of its vassals at once – or, at least, to do so without causing danger to its own existence. Thus, the principle of ‘divide and conquer’ was created. Mature empires came to an even wiser principle (without formulating it outright): collect tributes and do not touch culture. This is the safest dialogue of cultures or, at least, foundation for it – cultural non-intervention. If possible, do not touch religion or customs – in a word, nothing that relates to a primary human value, to collective illusions. Preserve for the indigenous minorities the right to bury the dead as they wish, marry how and whom they wish, eat, drink, dance, dress and even hold legal proceedings – it stands to reason under the control of ‘federal’ power. The best thing, also, is to govern vassal-peoples through their own élites, lulling these élites’ pride to sleep with the possibility of entering the ‘federal’ élites, then, like the pride of the ‘pebs’, it will be put to sleep by the fact that it will practically never be necessary to encounter outsiders in one’s mundane life.

The pragmatic leaders of national communities are talking about something similar today: about rights to their own

courts – it stands to reason, under the supervision of federal power. In other words, if the community begins to abuse these rights, certain sanctions will have to be used for this – even to the point of depriving them of this honorary prerogative. However, if the community is able to provide for law and order among its members, then its cultural activity will also come to attract sympathy many times stronger.

Theoretically, voluntary national communities could also make themselves ‘separate living quarters’ in which each culture could serenely enjoy its own chosen-ness, not irritating others’ ears with its self-importance, revealing only its universal elements. The only question is, how, even so, do we prevent conflicts, even armed conflicts, between these unique and incompatible views? After all, in past times, the world was far from offering any equality of rights, and provided, rather, for inequality: those national communities that were successful in bringing their members into the world with normal social surroundings were in some ways encouraged, while those that did not know how to curb their swindlers, rapists, and extremists were deprived of this encouragement.

All of this is within our capacity when now, as it was then, only the ‘federal’, ‘imperial’ élite, interested in safety and prosperity of the multinational whole, implements it. If such an élite proves to be unable to tame the inevitable ambitions of certain peoples with either a carrot or a stick, it will open a path to a conflict of all against all. Before, at least, it was like this: either everyone hates the central power and imagines that without it they would live in peace and friendship, or everyone gnaws at everyone else and dreams of a central power to whom they could appeal for justice against their neighbours’ impudence.

And thus, we have come to the conclusion that for a more or less safe dialogue of cultures, it is necessary to rehabilitate the expression ‘imperial consciousness’, which in certain circles has long since become a dirty word.

I will venture to propose that *imperial consciousness compels us to sacrifice ethnic interests in the name of the common entirety of the state*. That is to say, imperial consciousness is not a higher concentration of nationalism at all, as many have grown accustomed to thinking today, but, on the contrary, is a way of overcoming it.

This is also the challenge facing national minorities: to maintain imperial consciousness. Only the confidence of a people that it is a self-reliant master, and responsibility for the multinational whole will provide for your safety. I understand that safety alone is far from adequate, that there is still pride, but after all, asserting oneself outside the sphere of struggles for power can be a thousand times more successful – in fact, the most admirable and long-lasting examples are beginning outside the boundaries of this ‘communal living space’! Picking on the Russian majority, portraying its natural patriotism as something low and spiteful, doubting its right to domination within the state, you will, all the same, not achieve equality in force, but only awaken vengefulness and nationalist revanchism: skinheads are only the very first and most meagre bloom. Maintain imperial consciousness, for the only thing that may replace it is nationalist consciousness!

The organizational forms of mutual relations of national communities with the people of the dominant culture may be different. The main thing is that they serve one basic strategy: *each culture must be sure about the fundamental, culture-forming feeling of their own exceptional character; must be sure about its traditional heritage, whatever it may consist of – territory, social functions, or self-image – only in this case will culture be able, without causing enmity, to exchange its universal elements.*

V. Mironov¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES AND GLOBALIZATION THREATS

Cultures communicate within a special meaningful space, which Dmitry Likhachov defined as dialogue of cultures pointing out their inevitable interpenetration into one another.

The subject of my presentation is to analyze the changes that occur in modern culture under the influence of scientific and technological progress in general and in the sphere of communication and mass media in particular, greatly transforming the way dialogue of cultures runs and, hence, modifying human culture on the whole.

We understand culture as composite of human practices, set of material and spiritual values created by people. One part of culture is 'petrified' in a way and represents, on the one hand, the totality of authentic historical and cultural monuments and, on the other hand, the system of values, such as the Good, Truth, Beauty, Justice, reflecting the goals of human existence. This 'museum-like' part of culture is a factor of its stability.

At the same time, culture is a living body that adapts to the conditions of its existence and functions and develops a set of 'practical means' to adapt to the changing environment, which constitutes its civilizational part. Thus, culture couples the two opposite patterns: the commitment to preserve values and the need to adapt to the changing civilizational medium of culture.

In addition, we will interpret culture, primarily as a semi-otic system of coded signs, meanings and implications. In this sense, culture is a text as a set of encoded meanings of culture. Therefore, learning culture always means learning texts within the context of the whole culture's Text.

The actual language serves as a coding tool of culture and at the same time it is essential for the decoding of meanings. Thus, to comprehend culture does not mean just to understand the text structure (to acquire grammar rules of the language), but to penetrate into its special inner meaning, which is necessarily connected with the history of cultural development. Codes of culture associated with the history of their origin constitute the historical memory as an essential part of culture.

Development of a society leads to the transformation of the relationship between the communication means and the text. At the present stage, means of communication are becoming the prevailing content of culture, shaping the way of perception of information, and hence, affecting the mechanisms of meaning generation. They are no longer in the background of cultural events, but a special formation dominating other components, forcing them to comply with the laws of communication.

In the course of its development human culture experienced a similar phenomenon during the period of the emergence of writing. The script was the first cultural breakthrough made locally, which formed the boundaries and features of cultural communication. Meanings of culture were recorded in writing, which surely led to the development of a system of concepts and foremost to their proper arrangement. Culture explosion (similar to the one caused by a recent emergence of electronic media) was triggered by the invention of printing, which led

to the dominance of the linear type of thinking confined within the limits of grammar in classical culture, thereby transforming the perception of reality.

Printing brings oral culture beyond the horizons of phonetic and space limitations, but at the same time, constrains it within the national language boundaries. According to Yu. Lotman, the national language encodes culture making it semi-otically closed. Therefore, the interaction between cultures takes the form of a certain 'clash' of separate cultural meanings. As a result, we observe the layers of 'horizontal' information associated with decoding of the codes of contemporary cultural systems, and 'vertical' information associated with the additional factor of historical interpretation. Thus, culture appears to us as some whole, consisting of subsystems of local (national) and fairly detached cultures.

The locality of classical culture was manifested in the fact that for an insider it was an almost 'petrified' system, the core meanings of which remained unchanged for centuries and were passed down from generation to generation through evolutionary adaptation of new phenomena, claiming the status of cultural values. This ensured its stability.

The adaptive mechanism was based on the structural division of culture into two components. The 'lower' part of culture absorbed stereotypes, traditions and norms of life, characteristic to most people in their everyday lives, and it was close to any person. 'High' culture developed products that were far from standard life stereotypes and perceptions, it was withdrawn from reality and presented an ideal cultural stratum. This high, refined part of culture has gradually evolved throughout the history of human civilization into Culture 'with the capital C'.

Local culture possesses certain oppositions of meanings, some of which will be considered further as an example, as they undergo transformations in modern culture.

The dichotomy of 'unapparentness vs. apparentness' dealt with the following idea. Certain phenomena, facts and patterns of behaviour, although they belong to real life, may be hidden from a person at the level of cultural stereotypes. There appears to be a peripheral zone of existence, or its inner side, present in people's lives but not discussed, as it requires some discretion.

The dichotomy of 'native vs. alien' reflected the situation of isolation and self-sufficiency of a local culture, which became apparent when it contradistinguished itself from other cultures (the opposition being quite severe at times). Each culture would build a firm structure, a kind of 'immune resistance' to other cultures, blocking alien elements and influences. 'My own' (inner culture) was considered to be true, and other cultures were perceived as a repudiation of what was my own, and therefore false, and in extreme cases even hostile.

The linear principle of arranging meanings of a written text was a cultural model of self-expression for a long time, which was supposed to be followed. And in this capacity, it was fixed as one of the main features of classical culture. Accustomed to think linearly, i.e., designing the text in accordance with grammar rules, we extended the linear principle to interpret the world as well. The systematic linear vision becomes a way of explaining things through the linear and closed structure.

During the period of classical culture, cultural creativity was aimed at making complete perfect objects. It gave the feeling that absolute cognition of existence, the world and the man was possible. Whether it is a piece of music, architecture or philosophy, it is always a perfectly complete piece of work with a thoroughly thought-out structure from the beginning to the end. A literary text was generally viewed as a standard text, as a certain complete meaning.

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Philosophy Department at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation. Author of a number of scholarly publications and manuals, including: *Patterns of Science in Modern Culture and Philosophy* (Obraztsy nauki v sovremennoj kul'ture i filosofiji), *Philosophy and Metamorphoses of Culture* (Filosofija i metamorfozy kul'tury), *University Lectures on Metaphysics* (Universitetskije lekciji po metafizike), *Ontology and Theory of Knowledge* (Ontologija i teorija poznanija), *Philosophy* (Filosofija) and some others. Editor-in-Chief of journal *Moscow University Bulletin. Series 7. Philosophy* (Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 7. Filosofija), member of editorial boards of journals *Issues of Philosophy* (Voprosy filosofii), *Bulletin of Russian Philosophical Society* (Vestnik Rossijskogo filosofskogo obwstwa), *Philosophic Sciences* (Filosofskie nauki). Prof. Mironov is Vice-President of the Russian Philosophical Society. He is decorated with Medal of the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 2nd degree. Prof. Mironov is recipient of Lomonosov Prize.

Dialogue of cultures was conducted within a particular communication space, which Yu. Lotman aptly defined as semiosphere. Under these conditions, the area of linguistic intersection of languages, i.e. the overlapping area was quite insignificant, while the one beyond it was huge. It was desirable and essential to expand the area of language confluence, whereas the tendency of self-preservation of inner cultural meanings prevented that. So, the situation of 'cultural tension' was created (Lotman).

The processes of globalization change the nature of dialogue between cultures, destroying classical culture viewed as a system of local cultures. Transformation of culture does not mean just change through an evolutionary modification of individual elements of the system but changing the essence of the system, i.e. its transition into a different quality. Transformation is a directional inner change, which, unlike revolution, for example, is hidden from an observer to a greater degree, since it is realized through the incorporation of alien elements into it that on the surface do not destroy the system itself, but eventually force it to function in a different way.

Modern culture undergoes processes similar to the transformation of a cell when an enthetic DNA paragraph is implanted into it. Culture is literally attacked by 'media viruses' (D. Rashkoff), and as in the case of living organisms, the greatest effect is achieved in the areas where immune system, in our case 'culture immune system', is suppressed, or when culture depends on the supplier of cultural viruses. Increasing number of cultures that absorb donations of cultural infections is able to modify the entire human culture.

As a result, the local nature of culture is destroyed. Dialogue of cultures begins to unfold itself in other semiotic conditions, different from those in which local cultures contacted. Global communication space makes cultures interact according to the laws and stereotypes of communication that can be far apart from the essence and traditions of cultures themselves. Communication grows into an independent substance. Cultures immerse into an aggressive communication environment. Communication as a means gets transformed into communication as a goal or state. An array of media resources coupled with the latest technology and mass media compositions turns the space of semiosphere as a condition of adaptation of cultures into infosphere as an independent reality.

The dichotomies of local cultures crumble away. For example, the dichotomy of 'unapparentness vs. apparentness' gets modified. What was formerly supposed to be hidden from 'outsiders', turns into its opposite and becomes open. 'Forbidden' relations between people within the former culture, on the contrary, become fashionable and popular. Sexual revolution in the society reveals traditionally closed, although not forbidden, images of sexual life and sexual experiences thrusting them beyond individual intimacy. Indulgence largely involves 'eroticization of culture' viewed as manifestation of the highest freedom in choosing individual pleasures. Previously, only a small number of individuals used to be simultaneously exposed to its perception, whereas now millions of people regardless of their age can absorb it. Yu. Lotman assesses sexual revolution as an influential accomplishment of counterculture that is hard to oppose.

The principle of completion is endangered. Prevailing in classical culture, it gives way to video clip-like consciousness, based on fragmented perception of reality. Integrity of the world breaks down and people seemingly freely design their own pictures putting perceived video puzzles together.

Global integrative linguistic trends start to prevail. It results in the situation when political, scientific, technological and other conditions are so favourable for the expansion of one language that all other languages yield to it and become subordinated. Common stereotypes, universal assessments, common behavioural patterns, most available and simplest com-

ponents dominate in the new communication space. We can understand people worldwide if we share the identical values and our meanings overlap. We welcome communication for the sake of communication, communication devoid of any meanings, communication with one's own mirror image in accordance with the prescribed communicational stereotypes.

A number of forms claiming the status of cultural ones increases sharply. The old system of values experiences powerful pressure and ruination, while adaptation of new symbols to the traditional system of values is restricted by the adaptation time frame.

The balance between high and lower culture is tilted then and the latter becomes a mass culture not only in terms of subjects involved, but also in terms of lower quality of products consumed. G.S. Knabe defined it as 'the plebeian protest'. As a result, the way of product distribution rather than its quality or value becomes a prevailing factor. Mass culture is a typical lower culture, reinforced by the latest means of audio-visual reproduction.

Under these conditions, the lower part with its mass character of production and consumption cuts loose from the general culture system and generates an anti-cultural phenomenon of 'pop-culture'. It does not have ethnic roots despite using its national language. The most cardinal feature of pop-culture is free mass production and consumption of its makes, which amplifies an infinite sphere of delectation and entertainment. Modern society is transformed into a manufacture of pleasures, the whole nation going on a consuming spree.

A specific characteristic of pop-culture is its extreme aggressiveness and pantophagy, which is manifested in replication of everything including works of genuine art. Pop-culture 'unleashed' itself from the system of culture and took a perverted form of a mock culture. The reason pop-culture develops is its ongoing promotion in media sphere penetrating not only the entertainment sector, but all spheres of human activity including the whole range from individual behaviour to self-expression in politics, business and philosophy. It is self-expression of mass culture and the product of communication space.

Another reason for pop-culture to flourish is an integrated communication space. Pop-culture takes the form of public events called shows. These performances are not one-man show opposed to another-man show, but spectacles based on collaborative participation. Collaborative participation itself is the main form of communication. Pop-culture is a perfect medium for media viruses to spread. Media is the space where familiar faces tumble around. Recognition of pop-stars or political pop-leaders also contributes to the expansion of pop-culture.

Since the endless show of pop-culture permeates every individual's life, it is not limited to traditional means of entertainment; it turns the entire reality into entertainment. People are literally looking for a visual appeal, and mass media resources help present all its glamour. Real life is replaced with endless reality shows, as an example of the highest level of simulation, which is not so harmless, because it develops in man uniform patterns of behaviour that are easy to manipulate. We plunge into the 'reality', which is designed by mass media. A show is a modern carnival that has come into our lives, lasting endlessly unlike the one in the Middle Ages. Lower culture is almost officially recognized, and its representatives are decorated with high honours and awards, they become heroes. A carnival character of show-culture is entrenched by communicative resources of the Internet. Communicating on the Internet is a virtual carnival procession, with all its attributes. There are masks instead of interlocutors that are free to say anything, including insults and alike. The Internet transforms real life into a virtual carnival, significantly prolonging the time of rejoicings.

Mass culture and shows penetrate all levels of social consciousness, including science, forming its image, adapting in-

formation according to the laws of mass communication beyond recognition, and making it consumer-friendly. This is displayed, for instance, in the increasing number of false scientific discoveries. Mock scientific research is well funded through various awards and grants and gradually deforms the human mind. True science is much harder than its simulation, the latter being not only an easier but also a more trouble-free way to get funding for scientific research.

Philosophy is self-consciousness of culture, reflecting its image on a certain stage of historical development. It is natural then that it is affected by the dominating mass culture. Mass media boost the popular images of philosophy and advertise them as products well adapted to be perceived by mass consciousness. Their meaning is then turned round and these turn-skin images become a matter of professional interest for philosophers, like, for example, the Simpsons family's or Dr. House's philosophy. The line between authentic philosophical content and its simulation disappears.

The Postmodern period in culture generates simulative forms of philosophy. It serves as a theoretical justification for a cultural transformation, as an opposition between common consciousness and rational and theoretical consciousness, raised to the level of new philosophical comprehension. Thus, the pivot of postmodern line is a critical attitude to the text, to rational thinking in general, since it is these components that are characteristic of classical culture.

Metaphysics with its principles of rational explanation of existence through reason and logic, which is interpreted as a vehicle of dogmatism, is declared to be the main enemy of postmodernism. Hence criticism of the language of metaphysics as the language of philosophy follows. The language previously understood as a tool of conceptual analysis of objects acquires some demonic features, capable of imposing its structure on objects and existence in general. Methods of deconstructive destruction get absolutized and deconstruction itself placed into the centre of philosophical reflection. Philosophical problems are being refracted through the 'language', which becomes possible due to the undermining of well-established linguistic stereotypes and due to new meanings and values.

Postmodernism grew into a form of philosophy, the development of which miraculously coincided with the changes in the communication sphere. The emergence of a new system of communication through the Internet practically realized a number of theoretical ideas that would have remained unnoticed otherwise. The 'death of the author' has become possible since in the virtual space of the Internet any accountability for a message is easy to avoid, and the temptation to hoax increases. The idea of a hypertext is widely used. This means that fragments of information form endless associative chains, not necessarily meaningfully connected with one another.

Postmodernism gained popularity as it appeared to be at the crossroads of tectonic shifts occurring in human culture and, paradoxical as it may sound, it can become the bridge that will connect us and the classical culture. Earlier we could only speak figuratively about the semiotic space, within which all the philosophical concepts are placed. Philosophy is viewed as dialogue of all thinkers beyond time. Today, thanks to the Internet space, this virtual dialogue can be enhanced with almost real participation. In such a situation, the problem of philosophical interpretation is brought to the forefront, no matter whether an idea carries a by-line or not. Postmodernism was apt to sense it, and its representatives called our attention to linguistic creativity as such, showing that interpretations of the text have no limits and that it is a philosopher who often acts as its ultimately free interpreter. At the same time, it should be understood that the postmodern line in philosophy is not quite original. Rational and constructive work of the philosopher may as well include a deconstructive approach.

Postmodernism has reflected the mindset of the Postmodern age, in which a man got tired of reading long texts, be they pieces of literature or philosophy. He has absolutely no time for this, being busy with absorbing information clips. At the same time, postmodernism witnessed greater freedom of man in expressing his ideas, building his own schemes to explain various phenomena of life and not wanting to use ready-made patterns. The only problem is to define the borderline beyond which vapidity and simplification thrive under the guise of freedom.

V. Naumkin¹

THE WORLD CIVILIZATION AND MIDDLE EAST REVOLUTIONARY WHIRLPOOL

The events that started in the Middle East earlier this year posed once again an acute question concerning the ways of development and the fate of modern civilization (assuming it is a single civilization based on the formula 'one civilization – many cultures'). The overthrow of the tyrants who had ruled their countries for decades is bound to have the consequences that the regions and the world are yet to face, and which are unclear so far. But it is perfectly clear, though, that the Middle East has entered the age of momentous social and political transformation and this process influences and will keep influencing the system of interrelations between various areas of the universal globalizing civilization including those between the West and the Islamic world.

Conceptual reflection on what has happened in the region is yet to 'ripen'. However, we can already say today that we have witnessed the emergence of a *new type of a mass protest movement: the revolution of the educated young*, caused, primarily, by social reasons. We are witnessing movements that lack an organizational structure, a united leadership, a programme and a plan of action, which put forth simple demands: to ouster overstaying dictators, their clans, families, close environment and institutions they controlled (government, parliament, political parties, leaders of law enforcement agencies). In all cases, the demands of the rebels were of pronounced political character. Communication networks were instrumentally used to propel these movements. Not by chance the key players in the new revolutions are called 'the Facebook young'. Pan-Arabic context of the events facilitated the translation of the experience of certain countries to others. And what 'triggered' the first spontaneous youth marches in Tunisian streets was a self-immolation of a desperate young man who gave up his unsuccessful fight against a rotten and corrupt bureaucratic tyranny. The act became a 'symbol'. This is one of the concepts of the *symbolic choice theory* that could help understand new developments in the Arab East.

¹ Director of the Institute for Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. He is the author of over 500 scholarly publications, including books: *Istoriya Vostoka* [Histories of the East], *Ocherki po etnolingvistike Sokotri* [Essays on Ethnolinguistics of Soqatra], *Sokotriytsy* [The Soqotri], *Islam i musulmane: kultura i politika* [Islam and the Muslims: Culture and Politics], *Abu Hamid al-Ghazali* [Abu Hamid al-Ghazali], *Pravilnyye vesy* [The Right Scales], and others. Mr Naumkin is the Chair of the editorial board of the 'East (ORIENS)' journal, of 'Vostochny arhiv' ['The Eastern Archive'] journal, he is a member of editorial boards or editorial councils of the following journals: *Tsentralnaya Aziya i Kavkaz* [Central Asia and the Caucasus] (Sweden), *Vestnik rossiyskoy natsiyi* [Bulletin of the Russian Nation], *Vestnik MGU* [Bulletin of the MSU. 'Oriental Studies' Series], *Sovremennyy Islam* [Modern Islam]. Many of his books have been translated into foreign languages.

Concepts of the *social movements theory*¹ would be useful for adequate understanding, in particular, such concepts as 'frames', 'framing', 'resonance', 'resource mobilization'.

However, as a theoretical understanding of the events of early 2011 is not the issue of our consideration, I will dwell upon some more practical aspects of their interpretation. Russian experts and, in particular, media environment came up with two interpretations of the turbulent events in the region, both based on the 'conspiracy theory'.

According to one of them, the events were inspired and even organized by some Western (primarily American) groups via the Internet (Google, Twitter, Facebook, etc.) and in this sense they were analogous to the recent 'colour revolutions' that took place in the post-Soviet area. A fairly well-known analyst, K. stated: 'It is unlikely that people would march out for no particular reason in Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Yemen, Syria all at the same time.' However, either the author hardly understands, if at all, the situation in the region, or he deliberately distorts the facts (both the time and the countries are mixed up), with the only aim to find fault with the Americans: it looks as if they had planned everything to be this way long ago. According to this theory, some overseas puppeteers just pulled the strings of multitude of educated young Arabs (in my opinion, many of them are much better at global politics than the author). And it looked as if it was orchestrated by 'the Brzezinski'. Why should this omnipresent elderly professor, who had retired long before, take up such a responsible and difficult mission is beyond the present discourse. Though they say, his commitment to the project of 'a deep partnership between the United States and radical Islam' lasts quite a while. Before, similar arguments could also be heard, but they were only articulated by the most odious representatives of the Israeli extreme right-wing circles 'obsessed' with Islamophobia (by the way, the author affirms that Israel is probably the only 'obstacle against the merge of the U.S. and Islamism').

Professor A. from Cairo, a good acquaintance of mine and an old friend of our country, listened attentively to a well-known TV reporter's presentation based on this theory and then told me, 'How sad it is that your analysts treat our wonderful young people like the feeble-minded who are unable to march out all by themselves!' Perhaps the authors of similar press and electronic media reports were guided by good intentions. A colleague of mine, M., waving some printouts of 'Wikileaks' and heatedly arguing with me in a popular TV show seemed to believe genuinely that he was able to impress the Arab friends, as he is head of one of the societies for friendship.

In fact, such reports only brought discord between us and the Arabs (which is absolutely out of line with our interests). In any case, Arab sites regarded the allegations of our 'experts' not as anti-American (as they were probably meant to be), but as Arabophobic. As it is known, people are especially sensitive to what is said and written about them abroad at times of momentous changes.

According to the other conspiracy theory, the entire protest movement was organized and secretly led by Muslim fundamentalist forces. Allegations of this kind match well the escape of Gaddafi, who desperately struggled for power and tried to shift the blame for the bloodshed in the country to the Is-

lamists. Another TV-show participant, C., remarked that at the end of the tunnel of all similar revolutions there is sure to be 'a gloomy, bearded bloke in a turban and with a Kalashnikov in hand'. In other words, even if the Islamic radicals are not running the show on the new Arab political arena at the moment, they will take advantage of the victory of the rebels anyway. Obviously, no arguments were posed to support this theory. On the contrary, the reality indicated that the lead over protesting Islamists (who are far from being united, by the way) was taken by other players.

The events in the Middle East coincided with a new surge of terrorist activity of religious extremist groups in the northern Caucasus. Some Western experts suggested that echoes of the Middle East revolution might reach northern Caucasia. Unfortunately, some of our experts and even officials were too quick to declare that there was a cause-effect relation between these two processes. I think, to claim some Islamist forces, who are allegedly behind the mass demonstrations in the Middle East region, responsible for the aggravated situation in the northern Caucasus, is hardly productive. As if our own problems, which are similar to those in the East, were not enough: corruption, exclusion of the youth, dominance of corrupt officials, clan system and nepotism, unemployment, high prices, inefficient local governance, lack of representation. It would be reasonable to focus on the eradication of these diseases, which generate protests. This, of course, does not mean that radical, extremist ideas from abroad can freely intrude our Islamic space. We must not weaken our struggle against their constant and increasing penetration. And it was quite unnecessary to state persistently and publicly that such revolutions would never occur in our countries. Western politicians never believed that this model was ever relevant for their states.

Some Russian experts in the conspiracy theory managed to fuse the two interpretations. Thus, analyst K., mentioned above, argued that 'Islamism is a special religious subculture and the West is directly involved in its nurture'. The Muslim Brotherhood organization is, of course, a British project. Obama is to responsible for the fact that, in his famous speech in Cairo, he offered a hand of friendship to the Islamic world, as if there were no deep misunderstanding between the West and the Islamic world that divides the modern world. Further on: our attacks on any movements under Islamic slogans (although they were not numerous in this case) are unlikely to bring us any dividends. Besides, while the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt (as it has already happened to the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, the next-of-kin party 'Islah' in Yemen and Hamas in Palestine) are certain to become an official parliamentary party in the near future, we have them included in the 'black list' of extremist organizations, which will undoubtedly hinder our cooperation with the new Egyptian regime. The U.S. administration, which initially manoeuvred over its attitude to the events in Egypt, and which later supported the revolt, definitely scored well and won the support of those who may rule this country tomorrow, while retaining confidence of its traditional supporters – the military establishment of Egypt.

Perhaps, youth revolutions against Arab dictators and their tyrannical rule are to become one of the main events of this year, and the depth of their impact is yet to be realized.

¹ On these theories see: Naumkin V. V. 'Islamism, Ethnicity and Conflicts: on the Role of Symbolic Politics'. Bulletin of Moscow University, 'International relations and World Politics' Series, No. 1, 2009, p. 9–27.

A. Nekipelov¹

ON THE CONCEPTS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The theory of economic growth is known to be a key element of modern macroeconomics. Economic growth is understood here as dynamics of 'national output' within a timeframe which is produced (and thus exchanged, distributed and consumed) within a certain period of time (normally a year). The importance attached to such aggregate indexes is correlated to the fact that national output is regarded as a basis for public welfare.

Attention should be drawn to the fact that, in accordance with this approach, the standard macroeconomic theory takes up the position that public welfare is of 'scalar nature': it can (and must) be expressed by a single index. However, the question of what kind of index (gross domestic product, gross national product, national income, etc.) serves these purposes best, remains open to some extent.

If we strictly follow these settings, the economic growth rate is the ultimate measure of success, and the concepts of 'economic growth' and 'economic development' should then be regarded as synonymous.

This approach to the problem of measuring social welfare and its dynamics was, by and large, accepted not only by the economic theory but also in practice. All countries attach a great importance to the most accurate measurement of the 'degree of economic activity'; that is why the so-called 'system of national accounts' for the purpose has been universally implemented and is being continuously improved. The global community pays great attention to international comparisons of growth rates in different countries. Modelling economic growth has become one of the most popular trends of economic research.

Meanwhile, this approach has a number of inherent faults, all of them long known. It makes it impossible to take into account such types of economic activity which results are not objects of market transactions. These include, in particular, both work within households and negative environmental impacts of human activities. The index value of the cost of the national output is unable to feature such significant aspects of public welfare as level of personal income differentiation. In fact, can a society be indifferent regarding the distribution of the goods produced? Finally, intractable methodological problems arise when we compare indexes of economic activity over a longer period of time (new products are manufactured, the structure of production and pricing change), or those between different countries (the result of the comparison will vary depending on which country's prices, out of those compared, will be applied to measure national indexes).

The science of economy develops along three main lines in its attempts to eliminate (or at least, mitigate) these problems.

The first one is to improve somehow an index of aggregate product itself. It is well known that in 1972 two prominent American economists James Tobin and William D. Nordhaus tried constructing an index of economic activity which would take into account non-market productive activity and the adverse effects of human production performance on the envi-

ronment. The name of this index is very telling – NEW (on the one hand, it is an English word 'new'; on the other hand, it is an abbreviation for Net Economic Wealth). Although pilot measurements of the scale of economic activity were carried out, the index was never implemented: the primary reason being a large amount of costs involved in collecting the necessary information.

The second trend is to develop a suitable approach applicable to difficult methodological (and sometimes merely unsolvable) cases regarding measurement and comparison of aggregate products based on a 'convention'. Of course, this does not solve the problem per se, but it at least allows achieving uniformity in the measurement of economic growth over different time periods and in different countries.

Finally, the third approach is connected with an attempt to switch from a single measure to evaluate socio-economic progress to a set of measures. Such an approach has become widespread. Economic analysis aimed at providing an overall evaluating of economic growth included many measures then; and in addition, a variety of indexes has been introduced to design a generalized characteristic of at least a number of results of economic activity (for example, an index of human capital). These developments resulted in distinction between the concepts of 'economic growth' and 'economic development' and the emergence of a special economic branch called 'development economics'.

No doubt, the work along all these lines can improve our understanding of economic performance, its effectiveness, and, therefore, is of great practical importance. However, the following questions remain and they are no less insignificant.

First, the attempt to introduce a single value index of social welfare is inevitably confronted with an obstacle, namely, the fundamental lack of markets for some products of human activity. To overcome this obstacle various 'conventions' are needed, which indicates the lack of 'pure solutions' devoid of arbitrary character.

Second, a set of indexes, allowing us to form a 'stereoscopic' view of the results of socio-economic process, does not provide us with its generalized evaluation. Any indexes based on that evaluation, in their turn, can only be constructed with some rather arbitrary conventions. This is due to the fact that the value of any index depends on the 'weight' of the indicators used in its calculation.

Considering the above, let us regard the following issues.

National output is rather a vector of goods produced and services provided over a certain period than a scalar parameter. It can be represented in a scalar form with regard to the price of these goods and services, whereas prices are only an attribute of the market (and therefore not applicable to non-market environment). It is these issues that relate to the abovementioned problems of inter-temporal and inter-country comparisons. Besides, methodology for measuring social welfare based on the cost value of national output is, strictly speaking, of limited use – it is only applicable to market economy. This alone suggests its theoretical imperfection: in fact, other forms of economic interaction between people existed in the history of humankind, too, and we cannot state that those societies did not face the issue of providing for public welfare.

Trying to escape these constraints and compromises poorly compatible with pure science, it seems relevant to approach an issue of individual well-being of a so-called 'economic man' well-developed by the microeconomic theory. In a well-known 'problem of consumer choice' personal income is viewed as a measure of an individual's well-being, but the only reason for that is the fact that money income can be converted into a set

¹ Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Author of more than 200 scholarly publications, including books: *Essays on Post-Communist Economy* (Ocherki po ekonomike postkommunizma); *Formation and Functioning of Economic Institutions: from 'Adventures of a Castaway' to Market Economy Based on Individual Production* (Stanovlenije i funkcionirovanije ekonomicheskikh institutov: ot 'robinzonady' do rynochnoj ekonomiki, osnovannoj na individual'nom proizvodstve); *Central and East Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century* (Central'naja i Vostochnaja Evropa vo vtoroj polovine XX veka) and some others. A. D. Nekipelov is a member of the Academic Board at the Security Council of the Russian Federation. He is decorated with the Order of Honour, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th degree, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

of goods and services raising the well-being of the individual concerned. In macroeconomics, national output equal in value to total product of the country is already regarded as a direct measure of social welfare. Aimed at that, adding up all incomes of an individual contradicts the ban accepted by microeconomics to compare well-being of individuals. This reflects a qualitative difference between microeconomics as a 'pure science' and macroeconomics as a 'realistic science'.

But can we apply the approach determining individual well-being developed by microeconomic theory to the problem of evaluating social welfare? This question can be formulated differently: do we need 'pure macroeconomics' built on the same principles as modern microeconomics?

The attempt to apply a microeconomic 'head-on' approach to a macro-level implies the following. First of all, it is necessary to define a system of social preferences with regard to all possible states of the 'environment'. Then, the society faces various resource constraints and it needs a comprehensive idea of them. So if we could, at least theoretically, solve these two problems, then the choice to use existing resources in the most effective way as regards public welfare would be identical to the one that the 'economic man' makes to solve the problem of a consumer choice.

Incidentally, this approach would mean the formation of 'pure, or vector, macroeconomics', which would clearly define such commonly used concepts as social interest and social priorities. The former would be identified with the highest level of welfare attainable with existing resources. Top-priority social activities would be interpreted as the spheres with insufficient amount of resources allocated to them earlier in terms of public interests.

However, the 'head-on' approach will not do, a famous 'general possibility theorem' by K. Arrow being an obstacle to it. The American economist raised the question of what should 'social preference ordering' be like, so that it would be possible for the individual preferences to yield to the group ranking? The key result he came up with was unexpected even for him: the only way for transition from certain preferences to different

ones is a 'dictator', that is an individual whose views of group welfare become group preferences.

Despite enormous intellectual efforts of many scientists, the problem remains open to date. One of the research areas is to change the problem setting itself. A new question arises: how will the social choice depend on one or another mechanism applied to make it? Of course, such a setting can be rebuked for being tautological. It turns out that in order for the public to make a choice, they must first make up their mind about the ways of making the choice. Perhaps, in this case we should not speak of tautological thinking, but of actual contradictory nature of the object. In fact, the rules for decision-making by social communities have not been the same throughout human history. They undergo changes today as well, and according to certain rules in favourable cases.

Of course, 'pure theory of public welfare', if such should ever be developed, cannot be applied directly to the analysis of actual economy and political decision-making. A complete analogy with the microeconomic theory can be applied here, basic concepts of which, including the issue of the consumer choice, cannot be used in practice. The value of a pure theory is of ideological rather than utilitarian character. It helps understand both a complex configuration of the internal forces driving the society and its members and the limitations of a 'realistic science' in viewing them.

Conventional macroeconomics and the theory of economic growth as its important component, in their turn, 'flatten' the complex multi-dimensional (vector) reality to a simple scalar representation. Simplifying the real picture of the world, this theory helps understand the basic interrelations in real life and make decisions on this basis. It also inevitably gives rise to distortions, and, therefore, it becomes necessary to perform further 'realistic analysis' going beyond macroeconomics, within the scope of 'development economic'. Thus, an attempt has been made, necessary for real life, if not to eliminate then to bridge the gap between the concepts of economic growth and economic development.

N. Nikandrov¹

IDEAS AND MYTHS AS MEANS OF UPBRINGING AND EDUCATION

As Konstantin Stanislavsky once said, the theatre starts with a coat-hanger. In this sense, it is right to say that everything that surrounds us educates us. We are raised by that which is made by men especially for this purpose. Schools as institutions of child-rearing and education are an example. Everything that is made by man for quite different aims, but can also be purposefully used for educational ends, also serves to educate us – for instance, the production of art in all its variety.

The ideas and myths to be discussed here are created by men for different purposes. However, the wish and intention to change someone's concrete opinion, understanding, and sometimes worldview, is always present, explicitly or latently, in

both the process and results – that is, in these very ideas and myths. This means that ideas and myths educate and constitute means of education or – more broadly – socialization ('life education').

The process of creating and using ideas and myths is an interesting one; but it is also practically important. An understanding of this importance becomes sharper in times of evolutionary and, especially, revolutionary change, in times of civil and international hot wars, and also cold, ideological wars. After all, in one way or another, rivals always create their own myths in propaganda and ideological quarrels – which they do not, of course, call myths – and also debunk and eliminate the myths (of course, myths!) of their opponents, and sometimes even the creators of these myths ('no person, no problem', as disgusting as that may sound). This creates the opportunity to imagine oneself, one's neighbours, one's allies, one's party, one's country in an advantageous light, and others' in a completely different light. And insofar as any education is an education of values, there is no place here for full neutrality and impartiality. It would seem that K. Scott, editor of the English newspaper *The Manchester Guardian* in 1930 wrote the very true and aphoristically witty phrase that facts are sacred, but their interpretation is free. However, before this, as well, and later, it was clear to many

¹ President of the Russian Academy of Education, academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Education), Professor. Author of more than 300 scientific papers including the following books: *Russia: Socialization and Education at the turn of the millennia* (Rossiya: sostializatsiya i vospitaniye na rubezhe tysyacheletiy); *Development of Values: Russia's Version* (Vospitaniye tsennostey: rossiyskiy variant); *Prospects of Education Development in Russia* (Perspektivy razvitiya obrazovaniya v Rossii); *Education and Socialization in Modern Russia: Risks and Opportunities* (Vospitaniye i sotsializatsiya v sovremennoy Rossii: riski i vozmozhnosti); as well as the following course books: *General Foundations of Pedagogy* (Obschie osnovy pedagogiki, with co-authors); *History of Pedagogy* (Istoriya pedagogiki, ed.); *Didactics of Higher Education* (Pedagogika vysshey shkoly); *Organization of Teaching and Education Process at a Pedagogical Institute* (Organizatsiya uchebno-vospitel'nogo protsessa v pedagogicheskom institute); *Introduction into the Speciality* (Vvedeniye v spetsial'nost'). Member of the Committee of the Russian Federation on UNESCO. Laureate of the Award of President and Government of the Russian Federation in the field of education.

that the selection of facts without any distortion could create a perfectly different understanding of a given phenomenon or event. The intentional falsification of historical events or 'black PR' of one's opponents turns out to be much stronger. At that, this is not only ideological, but also affects the area of ownership and other relations. By the way, doing a special Internet search for 'black PR', the author predictably found the very first link, by the address turbocontext.ru, – among 5 million responses (!) on Yandex – an entirely frank and open invitation to use these methods: 'Non-standard solutions. Effective tools. Confidentiality. Call.'

I have already had to write about how black PR is used in the sphere of education (Nikandrov 2007). Without returning to the subject, I will merely recall that even in this short brochure, there were examples of the use of black PR in ancient (including ancient Greek) history, and, of course, in modern times.

We will limit the quite wide area of the use of ideas and myths to those that concern education, and still more, to those that concern ideological and patriotic education. To examine the differences between them in detail would be interesting, but this will not enter into our task. People have begun to talk about ideology and ideological education in Russia again after the quite long hiatus of the 'hard '90s', for example, after Vladimir Putin's coming to power. This interruption was not absolute. Thus, still in the middle of the '90s, in a series of works, I had to state the, in my view, completely incontrovertible thought that ideology is not merely conceptual-political education in Marxist-Leninist understanding, but any system of ideas that can be shared on any level of any social group (Nikandrov et al., 1996). Along with this, any ideology also has an educational aspect, although the scales are also quite different: from a small group of people to a state. Under this condition, of course, we must remember that according to our Constitution (Article 13), no ideology can be established as official or obligatory.

It is precisely this last condition that made many people, in fact speaking of ideology, use other terms, another phraseology. In this sense, the appearance by President Dmitry Medvedev on the 22nd of April, 2010, at the meeting of the State Council devoted to the development of youth creativity, is extremely important. Among other things, the President remarked that it was necessary to carry out ideological education, which, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, had practically ceased. Developing his thought, Pres. Medvedev emphasized that it was precisely for this reason – the absence of ideological education – that for many of our young people, American action heroes have become the ideal.

It is true that the ideal is no better than this. Since everyone has watched these action films over the years, it is easy to remember what these heroes are like. As a rule, they are supermen. 'Super' relates to physical strength, strength of character, and an attractive appearance. Often, he is a 'fighter for a just cause', he saves the whole world from danger, his own country as well as his loved ones. Often, he is a 'good' or 'former' cop, who must fight not only criminals, but also 'bad' cops. Very often, he is a lone hero, which makes it possible to emphasize his 'super' qualities.

It has already been noted many times that practically any image of violence on the screen awakens aggression in people, especially in teenagers, even if it is violence that is also used, as usual, in fighting against evil. For this, thrillers from America and elsewhere have often been scolded and noted that in recent years, we were 'ahead of the whole world' in this area, both in frequency of incidents and in naturalizing violence. In addition, we must not fail to mention that American action films and American thrillers played a quite useful role in the United States which many of our own productions of this genre are now gradually beginning to play. They taught civic courage and patriotism, and defended and propagandized the American

way of life, at the same time showing the unattractiveness of other 'ways of life'.

Insofar as film is a relatively new art form, in the past this was pre-Soviet Russia, the Soviet Union, and its allies on all continents. Now, it is all those countries, including contemporary Russia, which either do not accept the American way of life at all, or do not do so quickly and actively enough. However, in the 'pre-film' era, the situation was just the same in a fundamental way, the corresponding ideas were simply brought to life in other ways. Travelling through time and space, ideas and myths altered, but continued to fulfil their function. In all variations, they showed the authors (individual people, their groups, nations, and countries) in a positive light, and 'the others' (again, individual people, their groups, nations, and countries) negatively. It is true that this was not always done primitively, in black-and-white. 'We' could be not absolutely, but 'basically', positive. 'They' could be not absolutely, but 'mostly' negative. This added verisimilitude and plausibility, and strengthened the propagandistic strength of the myths. However, let us recall even now that often, before giving any positive assessment of any political figure, the evaluators say, for example, these phrases as a preamble: 'We can treat in different ways...' or 'Of course, you could argue with...' or 'Of course, we agree about everything with...' There were various forms, but they all meant the same thing.

In ancient times, for which there is no time in a short article, myths were created, first of all, to explain what was otherwise inexplicable – for instance, natural phenomena. However, the value of ideas and the value of the idea of patriotism were already basically understood. Simonides of Ceos (556–468 B.C.) argued that a man had to have a glorious fatherland in order to be fully happy. Similar thoughts can also be found in ancient China and India, although they, like Greece, were divided into different areas (countries and city-states) with different names and different governments. Another example is closer to us in time. With the creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, the national anthem caused some difficulty. Created many decades before the emergence of Fascism – first the music (by Haydn), and the words forty years later (by A. Hoffmann) – this anthem was interpreted after the Second World War as purely Fascist, especially for the words of the first lines:

Deutschland, Deutschland über alles,
Über alles in der Welt
(Germany, Germany, over all,
over all in the world).

It was thought, until the President of the FRG Heiss and Chancellor Adenauer agreed in open letters to one another, that the anthem should begin with the third line of the original text:

Einigkeit und Recht und Freiheit
Für das deutsche Vaterland
(Unity, law, and freedom
for the German fatherland).

After all, the meaning of this text – in fact the struggle for a united German Fatherland, for the joining of numerous principalities, earldoms, and baronies into a single Germany or, if we recall Simonides of Ceos – into a 'glorious' (united, large, and strong) fatherland. It is as if twenty-five centuries had not passed since then!

Love for the Fatherland, patriotism, is one of the ideas which occurs one way or another in the history of all countries, large and small. This is precisely the reason why, for it to become a reality, not only known to the population, inhabitants, and average citizens, but fully accepted by them as the scope of their everyday lives, special work is required. Accordingly, it is precisely around this idea, which has a clear educational meaning, that a great deal of ideas derivative from it have formed which support it.

Several myths have been formed – have not merely taken shape, but have been purposefully formed. It would be more correct to say not only several, but an enormous number, if we remember that there are many countries in the world that have bilateral and multi-faceted relations. Moreover, for all the allure of the ideas of friendship among peoples, the competition among countries, societies, and states has never disappeared. This is especially true now that the idea of competitiveness is ideologically promoted at all levels. Competition, naturally, takes different forms – harder and softer, civilized or barely distinguishable from banditry, in economic life and in science, in space and on battlefield, everywhere and in everything. Mythology has always been attractive, and is still attractive, as an effective means for educating a person and a nation for competitive struggle, and for the successful conduct of this very struggle.

The attempt to give even a brief survey of the different myths of different countries and peoples in history and modernity is a profoundly interesting and practically important task, requiring considerable time, many specialists, and a great deal of room on paper and in electronic media, for its completion. However, limiting it within the framework of Russia, we may refer to interesting work that has already been completed. We will note, first of all, Vladimir Medinsky's books (2008–11). I am intentionally using such a long list of this author's publications because these very titles fully reflect those myths that in different times were composed and used abroad as well as in Russia for purposes of ideological struggle, both cold and hot wars. These are myths about Russian drunkenness, laziness, and brutality; about Russian thievery, Russia's special path and long-suffering; about Russian slavery, filth, and 'the prison of peoples'; about Russian affinity for a strong hand and incapacity for democracy; about Russian dirtiness and age-old technological backwardness; about the Russian threat and secret plans of Peter I; about the special path and the enigmatic Russian soul; about the violence of Russian history and people's bearing of suffering. Some of the other books enumerated below will aid in understanding who, when and with what purpose this myths were composed, and how they spread.

Mythology for purposes of ideological education and ideological struggle is a special case of the consciousness manipulation (Kara-Murza, 2002). To count on the strict, logical, impartial exposition of facts to achieve these goals, through an equally impartial selection of these facts, is hardly possible. We must recall K. Scott's aphorism, mentioned above and disproved in real life. There is still another aphorism, attributable to various authors: 'I know that you are impartial. But to whom are you more impartial?' Correspondingly, emotions are needed, so myths are also needed. In Sergei Kara-Murza's informative book, there is a chapter with the indicative title: 'Myths of Social Consciousness: Large Projects of Manipulation'.

Long before the appearance of this book, already in the 1950s, I had to learn, by personal experience, what these 'projects' were. As a student of foreign languages, I listened to foreign radio. I was not pursuing any kind of ideological goals in this, I was an entirely ordinary, patriotically inclined Soviet citizen. I was not thinking about the consciousness manipulation, I did not interpret these radio broadcasts as any kind of 'project'. However, the broadcasts from different radio stations in different countries gradually led toward perfectly unambiguous conclusion: if there is not some kind of agitprop on a global scale, some kind of ideological department – and this is difficult to propose, I do not believe in a global government even today – then there is some kind of substitute or equivalent for global agitprop. It is impossible that there is not, if the assessments of significant events in the USSR and socialist countries generally coincided in the world arena, both in estimate and in the examples used for demonstration. And this 'something', this system of myths taking shape over the centuries (not years

or decades, but centuries), is strongly reinforced by means of self-censorship.

The examples of what was then information only relevant in passing to my basic purpose – learning languages – is easy to find in the interesting and eminently readable books of V. Medinsky. Take, for instance, the myth that the Russian army was always defeated. Beginning with the medieval source of this myth, which has not lost its currency even today, stated in hundreds of versions abroad and on our native soil. If the Russian army suffered defeat, which did, of course, happen – this was intensified with vivid details and frequent repetition. If, as occurred more often and on a much greater scale, the Russian army achieved victory, this was 'not due to, but in spite of', was always at the price of enormous casualties, with the help of 'general Frost', and with inaction and incompetence by real generals.

Another example: Peter the Great's 'Last Will and Testament'. No one ever saw it in the original, and there is also no reliable information about copies of it. However, whenever it is necessary to 'go to Russia' – for Napoleon Bonaparte, for instance, the myth is recalled to explain this aggression. In those years, explanations were not really required. At the beginning of the 19th century, war was an entirely customary way to solve territorial and economic problems. But why not? It is a good supplementary argument. More than a hundred years passed, and Hitler's propaganda once again pulled this myth out into the light. Another half-century passed. Shortly after his election, President Vladimir Putin hung a portrait of Peter I in his office and again, the Western press recalled this myth. True, this did happen before the 'reset'...

And the age-old anti-democratic tendencies of Russia, the inability of Russians (or, more precisely, the people of Russia, the inhabitants of Russia in general) to adopt democratic life patterns? The *veche* (popular assembly) of Novgorod, which existed before European parliaments, is forgotten. It is also forgotten that in the United States, slavery was abolished six years after the serf laws were abolished in Russia. Statistics also fail to confirm the thesis about more numerous executions in Russia than in the countries of Western Europe, about the ferocity and cruelty of Russians.

The wildness and uncouthness of Russians was written about abroad already in the era of Aleksey Mikhailovich, before Peter. However, the myth of Russia as *République de Haute-Volta* with missiles is much younger, and the drunken Russian cosmonauts on board the spaceship, causing difficulties with a sledgehammer is from the 1998 film *Armageddon*.

I will not give further examples. Once again, I recommend reading V. Medinsky. What Hitler advised in his table talks is still an operating principle: Repeat, as often as possible, that which you wish to instil in the masses, who are stupid and naïve. However, I will mention one detail with reference to a quote from Medinsky, since it concerns not the private world, but a conclusion of another character, with which I cannot disagree: 'After the reforms of Peter the Great, in Russia itself there appeared a number of people with the psychology of 'historical foundlings'. They accept the black myths about Russia with delight, and even create more of them themselves' (Medinsky, 2008, p. 257). Examples are easy to find in the writings of many of our authors from the era of perestroika and the 'hard '90s'. One does not even have to search – it is enough to watch the TV series *Shkola* (School). A better example of the black myth from the area of education is hard to find, and after all, it was created by Valery Gai Germanica in 'this country' – this is what our motherland is called by some of its inhabitants. Yes, the myth is entirely contemporary, although it is made by prescriptions that are familiar from the past: collect deficiencies that are all possible and all occur in different places, concentrate them in one place (for instance, under the roof of one school) and build the myth that they are typical.

Thus, myths serve ideological and educational purposes as a medium. The result of the application of this medium is the creation of a certain presentation about some subject, person, country, or society. And now one can return from myths to ideas, to that generalized representation of Russia that is created with the help of mythology. As has already been observed (Nikandrov, 2010 etc.), many printed publications, radio and television, and the system of advertising all create a far from positive image of Russia, connecting equally negative ideas with it.

1. Negativity and evil in the world prevail over good.
2. Our world is a world of violence (physical, military, sexual, psychological), conflict, and rivalry, which we must consider natural.
3. The basic (sexual) instinct is really the foundation of everything. Here it is difficult to determine with the 'norm of accessibility', but, according to many facts, we are now in this attitude practically 'ahead of the whole world'.
4. The cult of *dolce vita* ('the beautiful life'), wealth in general and money in particular is natural and necessary, 'the education of rational needs' is a vestige of the communist times, higher (spiritual) needs are either from scarcity or from stupidity.
5. The market rules the world, and not only in the economy, but in all interactions among people.
6. Competition and rivalry for profit and resources are natural, mutual aid and altruism, all the more, are the exception, the lot of saints and eccentrics ('Take everything out of life').
7. These are ideas of a global plane, but several of them concern Russia especially.
8. Russian authorities at all levels do not care about the people and are corrupt to a high degree. They were better in the 1990s (that is, when they agreed to what the United States demanded).
9. The Russian Army, militia, and in general all agencies of law and order are against the people, cruel, and corrupt.
10. Even if civic patriotism was possible in Russia at one time (for instance, during the Great Patriotic War), the character of relations between the people and authorities now make it impossible.
11. Human rights and liberties are not protected in Russia and are consciously violated by the authorities and by people in relation to one another; this happens more often than in 'civilized' countries.
12. The supreme hierarchy of the Orthodox Church in Russia was stained in the distant past by its cooperation with the KGB, and in recent years by the unscrupulous use of the market mechanism for gaining profits, and the state unilaterally supports only the Orthodox Church, which is a violation of the Constitution.
13. Russia's level of development is extremely low.
14. Among the countries of the CIS, there are insurmountable antagonisms caused by the history of the Russian and Soviet Empires and by the imperial 'manners' of contemporary Russia.

Russian power is also ineffective because it is split. There is an insurmountable antagonism between the centre and regions, among the branches of government, and in the 'Medvedev-Putin' tandem as well.

It stands to reason that in affirming every thesis, an experienced propagandist, agitator, or PR expert (they are often the same person) will find something. The law discovered long ago in ancient Rome – *calumniare audacter, semper aliquid haeret*, that is, 'slander boldly, and something will always stick' – is still in force. With constant repetition, a great deal always 'sticks'.

Several especially 'damaging' ideas and myths – that is, more precisely, those which impede the patriotic education of Russia's citizens, also demand special attention. These are, first of all, those myths which concern recent history, although they may have a quite ancient origin. Myths about the history of ethnic relations in Russia, including the history of the entry of

various regions into the Russian Empire, are relevant here. In anti-Russian campaigns, similar interpretations of the 'hloodomor' (famine) in the Ukraine, the run-up to the Great Patriotic War and the character of its beginnings, the roles of the USSR and allied powers in winning the victory over Fascism, the re-examination of the outcomes of the war, the illumination of the activity of the terrorist underground and collaborationists during the war years (the 'forest brothers', the *banderovtsy* [Ukrainian nationalists], the Russian Liberation Army), new causes and risks for Russia and so on. These periods and materials offer an especially favourable opportunity for anti-Russian propaganda, which explains the creation by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of a Commission for Counteracting Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests (Decree, 2009).

Travelling through space and time, ideas (and the myths that correspond to them) alter, sometimes turning into their opposites. These transformations are usually caused by established cultural, for instance religious, traditions. Thus, there are quite serious distinctions in relations to infidels even within the framework of Abrahamic religions. The Old Testament, established in the Judaic tradition, already contained a demand to love one's neighbour, although many link this only with Christianity. However, 'neighbour' was understood to mean a member of the same faith, and the requirement did not extend to representatives of other belief systems. 'Avenge not and have no spite against the sons of thy people, but love thy neighbour as thyself' (Leviticus 19:18). Note this: Your people! In early Muslim communities, the idea of the infidel-enemy is preserved. In the eighth surah of the Koran, 'Production', we read, 'O you, who have come to believe! When you meet those, who have not come to believe, do not give them the rear. He who gives them the rear that day, if it be not for a turn in the battle or for joining a detachment, he will bring down the wrath of Allah upon himself... It is not you who slew them, but Allah who slew them.' How the Catholics related to believers in other faiths is shown by the Crusades.

This question is regarded completely differently in Orthodoxy. From history, we know that Orthodoxy, having gained strength in Moscow, did not extend to the South and East with flame and sword. In the 18th century, when there was no longer a patriarchate in Rus', the Church was to a high degree dependent on the state, which in fact was setting the task of Russification, there appeared a very interesting instruction from the Chief Procurator of the Holy Synod about how to teach newly baptized children (for instance, Chuvash children). It required the teaching of Russian reading and writing, the alphabet, the Decalogue, the Book of Hours, the Psalms, the catechism, the ornate cursive writing and 'with this to look after them, so that they will not forget their native tongues'. Except during school hours, 'it is necessary that they speak all the time in their native dialects'. This was the 18th century. However, still earlier (in the 9th century) Theodosius Pechersky, one of the first Fathers Superior of the Kievo-Pechersky Monastery (later the Lavra [monastery of the highest rank]) in one of his messages, wrote 'Show mercy not only to your own brother in faith, but also to others: when you see the naked, the hungry, possessed by winter or misfortune, be he a Jew, a Saracen, a Bulgarian, a heretic, a Catholic, or a pagan – give to any, deliver him from trouble, for all you can' (cit. D'yakova, 1994, p. 117). The differences are completely clear, and they are conditioned by cultural, or more precisely, religious-cultural factors.

We must say that Russia always differed in tolerance towards the representatives of other cultures and religions. Of course, as in all countries, there was everyday anti-Semitism, and there were Jewish pogroms. However, the scales were incomparably smaller than in many other countries. This is why, even now, we have every reason to hope for the gradual peaceful resolution of those ethnic problems which are partially

explained by not always successful reforms, and are partially and consciously introduced from the outside. This is why, fortunately, Russia is far from what Angela Merkel, Nicolas Sarkozy, and David Cameron were saying in 2010–11 abroad. Their words differed, but were all in the same spirit of what Chancellor Merkel first expressed: the policy of multiculturalism, or *multi-kulti* (and yes, it sounds as pejorative in German as it does in Russian!) has completely and conclusively failed.

Together with this, we must remember that peaceful solutions of this kind on Russian soil will not come about on their own. Without forgetting our peaceful traditions, we must take into account that ideas, as the classic wrote, become a material force when the masses take possession of them, and this force can be used for the execution of tasks quite detrimental to peace. We will consider that ideas are created often especially for the purposes of struggle, are often strengthened by expertly elaborated mythologies, and their use in politics is as artless as their use in the education of those who take part in them is cautious and measured. In politics, however, everyone eventually participates, since, as it was once cleverly observed, if you do not involve yourself in politics, it will eventually involve you in itself.

References

1. D'yakova Ye. A. 'Before the Holiday'. *Cosmopolis*, 1994. 320 p.
2. Medinsky V. R. 'On Russian Drunkenness, Laziness, and Brutality'. *Olma*, 2008. 528 p.
3. Medinsky V. R. 'The Peculiarities of National PR. The True History of Rus' from Rurik to Peter'. *Olma*, 2010. 624 p.
4. Medinsky V. R. 'Skeletons from the Closet of Russian History'. *Olma*, 2010. 528 p.
5. Medinsky V. R. 'On Russian Thievery, the Special Path of Russians, and Long Suffering'. *Olma*, 2010. 528 p.
6. Medinsky V. R. 'On Russian Slavery, Filth and the 'Prison of Peoples''. *Olma*, 2010. 624 p.
7. Medinsky V. R. 'On Who Created Myths About Russia and When'. *Olma*, 2010. 240 p.
8. Medinsky V. R. 'On the Russian Attraction to a 'Strong Hand,' and Incompetence at Democracy'. *Olma*, 2010. 256 p.
9. Medinsky V. R. 'On Russian Dirtiness and Age-Old Technological Backwardness'. *Olma*, 2010. 224 p.
10. Medinsky V. R. 'On the 'Special Path' and the Enigmatic Russian Soul'. *Olma*, 2010. 176 p.
11. Medinsky V. R. 'On Russia – 'The Prison of Peoples''. *Olma*, 2011. 176 p.
12. Medinsky V. R. 'On the Brutality of Russian History and the People's Long-Suffering'. *Olma*, 2010. 240 p.
13. Medinsky V. R. 'Villains and Geniuses of PR. From Rurik to Ivan IV'. Saint Petersburg, *Piter*, 2011. 320 p.
14. Nikandrov N. D. 'Cultivation of Values: The Russian Variant'. *Magistr*, 1996. 100 p.
15. Nikandrov N. D. 'Ideology and Ideological Education: Are There Any, and Do We Need Them Today?'. *Rodnaya Ladoga*. 2010, No. 3, p. 59–68.
16. Nikandrov N. D. 'Black PR: The Benefit for Journalists, Readers, and Listeners'. *Sayteks*, 2007. 28 p.
17. Decree of the President of Russia from 15 May, 2009 'On a Commission Under the President of the Russian Federation for Counteracting Attempts to Falsify History to the Detriment of Russia's Interests'.

L. Paseshnikova¹

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN THE SYSTEM OF PERSON'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

The constitutionalization of academic freedom, as researchers note, began to come into effect in the 20th century through its attachment to one or another aspect in sources of international and European law, as well as in the basic laws (constitutions) of states.² At present, separate elements of academic freedom are reflected in the constitutions of various countries (although not in all of them).

Thus, the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, in Article 5, Paragraph 3 states that 'art and science, research and teaching are free. The freedom of teaching exempts no one from the authority of the Constitution.' The constitution of Italy reads, 'art and science are free, the teaching of them is free... Institutions of high culture, universities, and academies have the right to autonomous organization within the scope set by the laws of the state' (Article 33). Article 20 of the Basic Law of Spain, beyond recognizing and fixing the right to free expression and spreading of views, ideas, and opinions in oral and written form or by other means of reproduction, proclaims the freedom of teaching which, in essence, is closely connected with academic freedoms. The constitution of Swit-

zerland (Article 20) fixes the condition by which 'freedom in receiving education and in the conduct of scientific investigation is guaranteed'. Academic freedoms are fixed in the constitutional legislation of Greece (Article 16, p. 1): 'Art and science, research and education are free. Their development and assistance to them is an obligation of the state. Freedom of the universities and freedom of education exempt no one from the obligation to observe the Constitution.' A quite detailed regulation of academic freedom is given in the Constitution of Brazil. Chapter III, 'On Education, on Culture, and on Sport', contains an independent section (portion) 'On Education'. Here, it is set down that 'instruction is carried out on the basis of the following principles' (and these fundamental principles of educational activity are formulated in quite elaborate detail). In setting down academic freedom in its laws, Japan was limited by the guarantee of freedom of scientific activity. This was also important insofar as the constitutions of several states, such as Canada and the United States,³ paid little attention to this aspect. I would like to focus here on the fact that the very idea of 'academic freedom' in constitutional acts, as a rule, is not used, and the matter is rather about the fixing of its separate elements (scientific freedom, educational freedom, the autonomy of universities).

The comparison of these constitutional positions attests to the fact that comprehension of academic freedom, just like its content, carries a fairly ambiguous character and varies, from the simple statement in a constitutional act of the presence of freedom of education and scientific research (Switzerland) to a detailed elaboration of the substantive aspects of a the given

¹ First Vice-President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Curator of the Department of Law, Professor of the Chair of State Law. Author of more than 30 scholarly publications, including: *Legal Relationship in Education: Correlation between the Civil Code of the Russian Federation and Specific Legislation* (Obrazovatel'nye pravootnosheniya: sootnosheniye GK RF i special'nogo zakonodatel'stva), *Enforcement of Constitutional Right for Getting Higher Professional Education in the Russian Federation* (Realizatsiya konstitucionnogo prava na poluchenije vysshego professional'nogo obrazovaniya v Rossijskoj Federatsiji), *Interpretation of the 'Freedom of Education' in the Context of National Legal Culture of Modern Russia* (Ponimaniye 'svobody obrazovaniya' v kontekste natsional'noj pravovoj kul'tury sovremennoj Rossiji) and some others. Professor Paseshnikova is decorated with the medal of the Order for the Services to the Fatherland of the 2nd degree.

² Volosnikova L. M. *Academic Freedom as a Legal Phenomenon*. p. 102.

³ See: 'Constitutions of Foreign Countries' / Compiler V. N. Dubrovin. 2001.

institution, implemented in the framework of a particular section in a national constitution (Brazil).

As regards the Constitution of the Russian Federation, the term 'academic freedom' is not to be found in it, but we can locate its separate elements in the system of person's constitutional rights and liberties, provided for in Russia's Basic Law. First, the rights to education (Article 43) and the freedom of scientific research and teaching (Article 44) are set down. In this way, for the authors of the Constitution, education, teaching, and scientific research (science) are treated as separate, independent kinds of social activity, united by a certain aspect. Relative to academic freedom, the current Constitution contains no specific norms, which, however, should not be understood as a derogation of this institution. Item 1 of Article 55 of the Constitution fixes the condition, in correspondence with which 'the enumeration of rights and liberties in the Constitution of the Russian Federation should not be interpreted as a denial or depreciation of other universally recognized rights and liberties of man and citizen'. In our opinion, academic freedom can be related to a number of universally recognized liberties (about which, in particular, the statement of its elements on the level of international law attests) and in this capacity, academic freedom should be regarded as an object of constitutional legal regulation.

It is necessary to note the importance of just such a statement in law of academic freedom (or even its elements) on the constitutional level in the system of fundamental personal rights and liberties. The institution of human rights and liberties, the rule of law as a principle and aim of the development of the contemporary civilized state is central in constitutional law. This is the core of the constitutional system. The philosophical doctrine of freedom as a natural condition of man and his highest value serves as the foundation of this institution.

A legislator can fix rights in norms, especially constitutional norms, only if real political, economic, social, and other premises for implementation of those rights have already taken shape. Ye. A. Lukasheva rightly observes that individual rights are not 'given' by the legislator: 'The legislator cannot artificially 'understate' or 'overstate' the volume of rights and freedoms; he is bound by the principles and norms of natural law, the conditions of social interconnection of people, and the condition of the economic development of society.'¹ It is impossible to deny the statement that the contemporary 'catalogue' of the rights of man, fixed in international law documents and constitutions of states is the result of an enduring historical formation of standards and criteria established by the norms of the contemporary world community.²

With regard to the institution of the researcher's academic freedom, it is well-observed that 'academic freedom is only possible where a system of higher education, the nucleus of which is universities, are called upon to unite science and teaching. At that, such academic institutions must be large enough and sufficiently well-endowed materially to have great significance in society and really carry out self-government'.³

Rights, liberties, and duties of the individual have social significance consisting of the satisfaction of diverse needs and interests. As regards rights and liberties as elements of academic freedom, they traditionally relate to a group of social or socio-cultural law. The second, in our view, is more precise. Thus, for instance, A. N. Kokotov relates laws on education, freedom of creative (including scientific) work, and freedom of teaching to a number of spiritual-cultural rights and liberties which are aimed at providing people with the opportunity for creative development, familiarization with their own values

and those of other peoples and civilizations, and the augmentation and improvement of their own cultural environment.⁴ The point is that social laws are aimed foremost at guaranteeing an adequate standard of life for the individual; cultural laws at social development. Certainly, the availability of a fitting level of education and academic degrees and titles influences a person's standard of life, although, unfortunately, in our country this is far from a guarantee not only of a high, but even of an adequate living standard. It is becoming much more profitable, having received one's education (or sometimes without it), to go into commerce or government than into science and academia. These, however, are the costs of the Russian market economy, and cannot be considered a worldwide trend. The basic purpose of academic freedom, in our view, is not the growth of the material prosperity of those who enjoy it, but their spiritual, ideological, and moral development. This is why the laws we can examine are, in our view, essentially cultural in greater measure than they are social, and, all the more so, that the very idea of culture in many respects also reflects the condition of different spheres of social life on the whole and of the individual in particular. Moreover, we can even trace their connection to political laws if, for example, we regard freedom of speech, of expression, and so on as elements of academic freedom. It is not by mere chance that the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of 4 December, 1986 directly stated the 'indivisibility and interdependence of economic, social, civil, and political rights'.

In speaking of the place of academic freedom in the system of constitutional laws, it is also necessary to note that these laws include rights of man and rights of the citizen. That is to say, it is possible to make a classification of rights and liberties independent of the subject – the holder of these rights and liberties (the citizen, foreigner, stateless person), in other words, independently of belonging to the citizenry of a certain state, or of what is expressed in the sum of their mutual rights and duties. Citizenship in the first place influences the volume of political rights. As regards socio-cultural rights to which, as we already determined, academic freedom as a whole and its component elements relate, then by a general rule they are defined as rights of man with no dependence on the presence or absence of citizenship. There is evidence of this in the use of normative sources (in international as well as national constitutions) of formulating 'each man has the right', 'to each is guaranteed'. The belonging of the aforementioned rights and liberties to the individual, independent of citizenship, reflects their natural, inalienable, and non-negotiable character. As, for example, V. V. Spasskaya emphasizes, 'the natural character of the right to education is explained by the fact that it is characteristic for a person to develop himself, to create, to make something new, to accumulate experience and knowledge in one area or another, and of course, to pass along what he has worked out and learned to other generations, in which, in fact, the essence of education consists... Education and self-improvement are the natural condition of man, the precondition of his achieving the full value of his existence in society.'⁵ It is not by chance that UNESCO recommends considering the right to education as an element of the right to life, the right to development that must be realized throughout a person's life.⁶ The right to education cannot be transferred to another person, group of people, society, or state, either by agreement, or by force of law, or on any other basis. The person himself cannot renounce his own right to education, and must not be forbidden from exercising this right.⁷

⁴ Kokotov A. N. *Constitutional Law of Russia*. 2006, p. 81.

⁵ Spasskaya V. V. *The Right to Education as the Source of Educational Relations*. p. 78.

⁶ *Constitution of the Russian Federation. Theoretical and Practical Commentary* / Ed. by Yu. A. Dmitriyeva. 2007. Access through the justice-legal system 'KonsultantPlyus'.

⁷ Spasskaya V. V. *The Right to Education as the Source of Educational Relations*. p. 78.

¹ Lukasheva Ye. A. 'Legal Status of Man and Citizen.' // *Human Rights* / Head editor Ye. A. Lukasheva, 2000, p. 95.

² Golovistikova A. N., Grudstyna L. Yu. 'Rights of Man: Evolution of Development.' // *Advokat*. 2006, No. 6, p. 87.

³ Volosnikova L. M. *The Genesis Academic Freedom in the United States: Legal Tradition or Constitutional Law?* p. 43.

V. Petrenko¹

HUMANITARIAN CULTURE AND EDUCATION: A FOUNDATION FOR PRESERVING RUSSIAN IDENTITY²

The press and sociologists are writing, and the higher leadership of our country is speaking, about growing social tension in Russia. Russia is sick with the syndrome of authoritarianism and corruption at the same time, and the problem of 'national identity' is acute. The problem is not new, having been inherited from the USSR and its subsequent disintegration. The Sumqayit massacre and the Nagorno-Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan which resulted from it, the massacre in Osh and the contiguous territories in Kyrgyzstan (and its recurrence in the bloody incidents of last year), the Transnistria-Moldova territorial conflict, the two Chechen Wars in an already-independent Russia, the interethnic conflicts in Kondopoga, Rostov, Stavropol, Chelyabinsk, and quite recently in Moscow (on Manezh Square) and St. Petersburg are all symptoms of this lingering illness. But the sickness is far from being exclusively Russian. Under other conditions, nearly all of Europe and partly the United States are encountering the same problem. The problem is related to the uneven development of countries or (specifically in Russia) their different regions, and to the limited supply of natural resources. There is a peculiar 'backward wave of colonization' of former mother countries and seats of empires by expatriates of former colonies. The problem of high birth rates and limited natural resources was first put forward by Malthus and was then known as the 'Malthusian trap'. Let us draw up a certain, significantly simplified scheme of demographic self-regulation. The high birth rate in part compensates for the high death rate, short lifespan, death in war, and the entry of part of the population into monastic life. Such a 'negative backward link' was active at the level of separate countries, creating a dynamic balance in population numbers. Countries that achieved economic and cultural progress had the possibility of increasing their populations and carrying out expansion, colonizing the remaining countries at a certain historical time. This mechanism was active until the 20th century. In that century, the population of the leading cultures inevitably began to change their previously accepted democratic behaviour with regard to high birth rates. The equal rights of women, their inclusion in the economy, and later marriage ages, connected to the necessity of longer education, inevitably led to the lowering of birth rates in economically developed countries. Under these conditions, the humanization of economically and culturally leading countries, and globalization subsequently, have led to the economic, scientific, and cultural achievements as well as successes in medicine becoming the property of both the countries and regions of outsiders. Indeed, these outsiders have preserved their traditional ways of life and high birth rates connected with them. The result has been ever-increasing demographic and immigrant pressure from the Third World population and traditional cultures

on economically developed countries. All of this is occurring against the background of aging populations and depopulation in former mother countries and centres of empires. The demands of the economy dictate the necessity of an inflow of immigrants as a labour resource and of drawing in immigrants. However, ethnic disturbances by the Arab and African youth in the suburbs of Paris, and immigrant strikes with the police in Manchester, Lyon, Naples, and so on have shown that if the first waves of Third World immigrants were willing to do the hardest and least prestigious work, their children do not assimilate well into the culture of the new nation, preferring to live on welfare and government benefits, which aggravates economic and political problems. If the massive wave of emigrants to Europe from Third World countries started in the mid-1960s, then Russia encountered a similar problem in the years around the collapse of the Soviet Union. Here, I place the expatriates of the Caucasus and Central Asia into the role of immigrants for the European part of Russia and Siberia, and the Chinese for the Far East. Moreover, though labour immigration from Central Asia and China is supposedly temporary, through the 'shift work arrangement', immigration from the North Caucasus by people who are citizens of the Russian Federation does not necessarily imply a later return to the place of origin. The demographic problems connected with the ethnic problems and ethnic disturbances, proceed with a time-lag when compared to Europe, which implies a certain chance and a faint hope of learning from others' mistakes, and a hope for the formation of a sensible national policy.

I see, as the main danger in Russian ethnic politics, the possibility of a loss of national identity (see the concept of identity in Taifel, Turner 1986). To paraphrase von Clausewitz, 'A people that does not wish to feed its army will feed another's,' I will add, 'The country unable to maintain and develop its culture will simply disappear, assimilating and dissolving into other cultures.'

Russia is a multiethnic state, and what is unique in Russian culture is fusion – the integration and synthesis of Slavic, Finno-Ugric, Tatar, Turkic-language-speaking peoples, and northern minorities. The substance of this was influenced by the cultures of our former and present compatriots: Ukrainians, Tatars, Armenians, Jews, Georgians, Byelorussians, Kazakhs, Germans, Buryats, Koreans, and so on (it would be desirable to mention the representatives of all nationalities having Russian citizenship). Russian culture is also inconceivable without contact with the culture of France, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Sweden, Mongolia, China, India, and the United States.

The Russian ethnos is not a biological concept, but rather a culturological one, uniting people of distinct ethnicity, belonging to Russian culture, thinking in the Russian language, and identifying themselves with Russian history. As an example, we can look at poetry, a very important part of Russian culture, as a unique experimental laboratory for the Russian language. 'The Sun of Russian Poetry,' Aleksandr Sergeyevich Pushkin, a descendant of an African, 'A Russian man after a hundred years of development,' as Fyodor Dostoyevsky called him; Mikhail Yur'yevich Lermontov, descendant of the Scotsman Learmonth, creator of the 'Dictionary of Greater-Russian Language' Vladimir Ivanovich Dahl, a Dane by descent; Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Blok, who had German roots; Konstantin Dmitriyevich Balmont, who had Scottish roots; and Russian poets of Jewish descent Boris Leonidovich Pasternak, Osip Emil'yevich Mandelstam, Iosif Aleksandrovich Brod-

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Professor of General Psychology Chair at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Psychology). Mr Petrenko is the author of over 240 scholarly publications, including monographs: *Vvedeniye v experimental'nyuyu psikhologiyu: issledovaniye form reprezentatsiyi v obydennom soznaniyi* [Introduction to Experimental Psychology: Studies of Representation Forms in Everyday Consciousness], *Psikhosemantika soznaniya* [Psychosemantics of Consciousness], *Lektsiyi po psikhosemantike* [Lectures on Psychosemantics], *Psikhosemanticheskiy analiz dinamiki obschestvennogo soznaniya (na materiale politicheskogo mentaliteta)* [Psychosemantic Analysis of the Dynamics of Social Consciousness (on data of political mentality)], *Osnovy psikhosemantiki* [Elements of Psychosemantics]. A member of editorial boards of journals: *Psikhologicheskii zhurnal* [Psychological Journal], *Psikhologiya* [Psychology], *Obschestvennyye nauki i sovremennost'* [Social Sciences and the Modernity], *Istoricheskaya psikhologiya* [Historical Psychology], *Moskovskiy Psihoterapevticheskiy zhurnal* [Moscow Journal of Psychotherapy], *Metodologiya i istoriya psikhologii* [Methodology and History of Psychology].

² Research conducted with the support of the RGNF (the Russian Humanities Academic Fund).

sky – these are just a few clear examples of creators of Russian culture in the realm of poetry and language.

Russian identity, in addition to the very important adoption of intra-domestic autobiographical memories, forms on the path of adopting Russian language, history, and literature, which, together, may be called an education in the humanities. This, which is found first and foremost in a school, is undergoing a systematic degradation. The experience of communicating with older schoolchildren shows that they do not possess even elementary historical knowledge. During a discussion of M. E. Koltsov's work, not one of the first-year students (who had lately been schoolchildren) of the prestigious Moscow University could answer my question about when the Spanish Civil War took place. This event is connected with the first resistance against fascism in Europe, with the creation of the International Brigades and our volunteers' participation in them. It had enormous ideological significance and is a fact in our own history.

My colleague A. P. Nazaretyan – a psychologist and specialist on Latin America – taught leaders of the Communist Parties of South America, partisans, sometimes living in their homelands without legal permission, in the Institute of Social Sciences for many years. While showing many different levels of education and general culture, they were, on the whole, sincere fighters for a better lot for their peoples, fighters against imperialism and exploitation. For many of them, the Soviet Union represented the ideal of what they were striving for, a country of victorious socialism, 'God's paradise on Earth', a just society, without exploitation. The image of the Soviet Union for them was, more often than not, stereotypical and simplistic. Encountering some of the negative examples of our lives, they were genuinely surprised: 'How can there be crime in your country? How can it exist in the land that has finished with the exploitation of man by man?' The stereotype of the representation of our country and the low cognitive complexity at the base of the social structure often led to what Nazaretyan (2005) calls 'turcoat stereotypes'. The shock from the mismatch between expectations and reality often led a person who came as a fiery devotee of our country to leave, if not as an opponent, then at least profoundly disappointed in our country of 'victorious socialism'. In the same way, a number of post-perestroika emigrants to the West sometimes come back to Russia disappointed in the 'free world' and turn into gung-ho patriots. At the same time, systematic social knowledge and knowledge of the humanities allows for liquidation of the influence of negative events, and leads to an understanding of the regularity of existence and of the coexistence of its darker and lighter sides. During the perestroika years, an argument about original sin made by a certain priest (whose name now eludes me) stuck in my memory: The original sin, he proposed, did not consist in the fact that Adam and Eve, having broken God's ban, ate the apple of the tree of knowledge and we, their distant descendants, are sinful, as it were, 'by inheritance'. It is rather that in coming into this world, we inherit (or internalize, as psychologists would say) the history and culture of our ancestors and become functional derivatives of this history, which includes both the events of which we can be proud and those that cause us shame and feelings of guilt for our ancestors, as well as for ourselves. We are, after all, fed by their resources, and have absorbed their mentality with all its facets of good and evil. Indeed, we are our ancestors in new historical clothing. Accepting the relay race of the generations means accepting responsibility for the maintenance and development of our history and culture, feeling pride in the history of our country but guilt for its harmful deeds. This guilt discomfits and even sometimes distresses us. That is why it is sad to observe 'new young conformists' – some of them in the *Nashi* pro-government youth organization – willing to take credit for and pin on their own chests the services of their forefathers, but unwilling

to suffer their hard fate and, most importantly, unwilling to accept responsibility for the fate of their country and struggle for its improvement and modernization. It is more profitable to sing 'Hallelujah'. These ironic lines from the Soviet period come to mind: 'We do not sow, or plough, or build. We take pride in the social system.'

Man is not only a pragmatic creature, striving for the maximum gratification of his individual desires and needs; he is not only social, striving to take a worthy place in society, where the area of 'my ego' broadens to include the people in one's surroundings (parents, children, friends, co-workers, my city, my country); he is also symbolic, living in a world of language, signs, and symbols, in which, besides economic and political struggles for resources and influence, there is also a competition on the mental and semiotic level for dominance of meaningful symbols and representations, for one's own treatment and interpretation of historical events, and in short, an ideological struggle takes place for the dominance of one's own picture of the world, of one or another individual or collective subject. Finally, a person is also a transcendental creature, striving to get out of the frame of his own life. My individual self, through identification with the history of my family, kin, or country, through identification with profession, science, or art, which can be interpreted as a form of service to something everlasting and eternal, acquires a sense of its own existence. Ultimately, religious faith (and not only religious), as the history of humankind shows, is the best proved path toward acquiring a sense of existence as a singular person, or as humankind, and offers a multitude of symbols which supply man's moral reference points in the world. In this respect, in order to learn about the politics of one state or another, the prognosis of its development and place in the world community, it is not only important to carry out a political and economic analysis of its resources, or an appraisal of its military strength or social conditions (education, health, culture) but also (and this relates closely with the last) to evaluate the condition of the society in the spiritual sphere, the degree of trust in the society, the degree of charitable treatment for the needy under its guardianship and relying on its support. In other words, the 'condition of minds', the 'quality of the population', 'social capital', and the 'mental landscape', 'social configuration', and 'ethnic relations', 'religious toleration', and 'the tolerance in the society' are all necessary components in a political prognosis of the development of one or another state. These aspects of 'mental cartography' constitute an academic subject known as 'the Psychosemantics of Consciousness', or 'the Psychosemantics of Social Mentality' (Petrenko, Mitina 1997; Petrenko, Mitina, et al. 2000; Petrenko, Mitina, Karitsky 2010; Petrenko, Mitina 2003).

Russia is an multiconfessional and multiethnic state. As our research of the semantic space of political parties and the semantic constructs of political consciousness have shown, just before the collapse of the USSR it was the opposition between communist and religious ideology that constituted an ideological dimension (Petrenko, Mitina 1997). First-wave democrats could not or did not want to create their own ideology or advance their own vector of direction for the 'Russian idea'. The result was that a potential contradiction emerged between religious consciousness, which bore at its source an element of the 'non-Possessors' movement' ('*nestyazhatel'stvo*', a rejection of personal property and material rewards), and the consumers' ideology, which advanced under the slogan of 'personal enrichment' and the persuasion that 'in economics, what is moral is what brings profit'. The time-bomb of this contradiction in value systems of social consciousness was aggravated by the problem of the multiplicity of religions. That religion can unite is attested by the historical experience of the making of great empires which emerged under the influence of world religions that had appeared at so-called 'axial times' (K. Jaspers 1997). The principle of Christianity that there is 'not a Greek or a

Jew,' in one form or another is inherent to all world religions. They became global by removing the problem of ethnic and national antagonisms, replacing them with the principle of religious unity. The quasi-religion of Communist ideology, and not an ethnic foundation, expressed this in the slogan 'Workers of the world, unite!' The fact that in the Soviet Union, or at least in central Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and so on, people were interested not in the ethnicity of their neighbours, but their personal qualities, attests to the truth of the slogan of the Brezhnev period about how a new social commonality had been created in the Soviet Union — the idea of the Soviet people was not just an ideological cliché, but had a real foundation. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the role of the source of unity and spirituality fell to religion. However, in the conditions of a multiconfessional state, the rallying of the people on a religious basis inevitably turns into antagonism between peoples on religious principles. In the civilized world, the separation of church and state is caused not by any particular godlessness on the part of the ruling élite of democratic societies, but by the necessity of guaranteeing equal rights to citizens, to the representatives of different nationalities and frequently of different religions, and to both atheists and believers. The correct sentiments expressed by President Medvedev at the meeting with leaders of parliamentary factions in January 2011 — that under current conditions in Russia, it is necessary to place particular emphasis on the development of the culture of the titular ethnic group (it would be beneficial if a real programme for financing such effort followed these words) — might turn Orwellian: 'All animals are created equal, but some are more equal than others.' Empires which do not hold onto their ethnic and religious equality collapse sooner or later. The fall of the Ottoman Empire serves as a clear example. The Empire perpetrated a massacre of the Armenian and occasionally of the Kurdish populations, during the Young Turks' implementation of the programme of creating a nation-state. However, regarding the Soviet Union at the time of 'the Brezhnev stagnation' and Russia of the present, we are running up against the opposite situation, in which ethnicities having titular statehood had a certain advantage in relation to the Russian population. Our statement about the USSR specifically concerns the post-war period. We know very well about the mass deportations of Crimean Tatars, Greeks, Koreans, Chechens, Ingush, the suppression and persecution of the Don and Ter Cossacks, the anti-Semitism and repression of culture and religion (for instance, shamanism) of minorities in the Stalinist time. However, in the Khrushchev–Brezhnev period, the situation changed dramatically and the ethnic republics enjoyed substantial economic nourishment. In this period, only three republics — Russia, Azerbaijan (due to oil), and Belarus (negligibly) — were donor-republics, and even the 'fat' Ukraine took advantage of benefits from the Union. We can recall the mastering of 'virgin and fallow' lands in Kazakhstan, the restoration of Ashgabat and Tashkent after monstrous earthquakes, the building of electrical industry plants in the Baltic States, and so on, all at the same time as the economic degradation of the small towns and villages of central Russia, the resources of which were chiefly redirected to the peripheries of the state. The inhabitants of the republics possessed, in a way, a dual citizenship, having career advantages in their own titular republics and making full use of the Union's quota system in education and administration in the power apparatus. I can offer an illustrative example from my own life. I applied to the prestigious Moscow University three times and only on the third attempt did I succeed in overcoming the enormous competition for placement in the Psychology Department. Many students of the same year were accepted on their first try due to the republics' quotas. As a rule, these were the children of local official and party élites. However, as students, we did not discuss the ethnic aspects of university admissions. Among those who were given advantage

due to phone calls from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, there were enough Russian kids. A similar situation was also seen in postgraduate admissions. A whole stream of students from the Baltic States studied in our department, and it pains me to acknowledge that the majority of these former fellow students of mine, having become influential people, do not maintain contacts with their alma mater, apparently not considering it as such. In the new Russia, the advantages of the titular nationalities with their own statehood have been preserved, if not enlarged. Dagestan, Tatarstan, Bashkiria, Yakutia, Chechnya, Ingushetia, and other republics have their own leaders (presidents, until recently), and their own government agencies. They possess a competitive advantage in their own lands and throughout the country in their expatriate communities. Many, especially the republics of the North Caucasus, are subsidized, but as a result of significant corruption (endemic in all of Russia, but flourishing especially on the strength of clan relations in national republics) also possess the initial entrepreneurial capital. All of this supplements their competitive advantages.

One of the lines of possible ethnic opposition is distinction by religious affiliation. In order to avoid confrontations based on religious principle, in the new Russia under Yeltsin, the possibility of religious realization for different faiths was opened up. This is good, in that it enables spiritual development for at least a part of the population. It is not good, however, from the point of view of the possibility of opposition and even confrontation due to religious affiliation, as shown by the growth of tension and terrorism in the North Caucasus. Allowing religious services by foreign preachers holding fundamentalist views (such as Wahhabists) and the opening of madrasahs and mosques with money from foreign sponsors who have their own geopolitical goals not matching the interests of Russian statehood have been conducive to the radicalization and growth of tension in the Caucasus, as shown by the two Chechen Wars and the terrorism throughout the North Caucasus. Fundamentalists professing nationalism are also present in the Orthodox Church. The antithesis to religious opposition in the population is the cultivation of universal principles and values, and emphasis on the humanities, which present a standard of spirituality and morality.

Thus, Russia faces a dilemma. The demographic cross including low birth rates and high death rates connected with the aging of the population requires immigration as a source of labour resources for the maintenance of the economy. The massive inflow of people of other domestic and religious cultures with different value systems threatens a washing-out of Russian identity, a fall in the level of national culture, and the transformation of it on the field of its traditional territory into one of many ethnic cultures competing on the same level. This is occurring against the background of a fall in 'the quality of the population' of the Russian ethnicity itself — its level of education and culture, including knowledge of Russian history, literature, and art. The quality of the population also includes the attitude to labour as a source of good. It is not by chance that side by side with the Protestant work ethic (if we recall Max Weber's work affirming that Protestantism paved the way to capitalism) the Confucian and Buddhist work ethic also led to the appearance of Far Eastern economic 'tigers' and 'dragons' (Japan, China, South Korea, and now Vietnam, which is growing in strength). In Russia, motivation to work is in decline because the quality of life and level of income are negatively correlated with educational level and work achievements. In the 1990s, the poorly educated but obnoxious mediocrity, 'C student' entered the stage, and his tastes and needs have since become the point of orientation for mass culture. Family ties, by which the children of the élite not only inherit their parents' capital, but also automatically occupy high-status places in the social hierarchy, have taken the place of the value

of work. For most of the rest of the youth, television and glamour magazines transmit the idea of a 'happy event' — a lucky marriage to a rich businessman — for young women, or of a successful business career, a job as an official or a bandit for young men. Numerous cash lotteries and contests of the 'win a million' type also play on the idea of 'luck' not connected with an active working life (although in fairness we should note that in the last case, the value of education, although indirectly and in a distorted form, is still promoted as a precondition for this kind of luck). Only the laziest of politicians failed to berate the television programme 'Dom 2' and accuse it of promoting loose morals. I believe the malignancy of that programme is that young, healthy kids, not working anywhere, producing nothing of material or spiritual value, can successfully have sex and talk about their personal relationships at the expense of state-subsidized television, while thousands of young (and old) taxpayers who are willing to peep through the keyhole become firmly convinced that in order to be successful it is not necessary to study or work, but rather to fight one's way to appear on television, to fall into the circle of the well-heeled establishment. Leaders of this subculture, along with officials and businessmen, become 'the new Russian élite'. The scientific, artistic, and even military élite appear only at the outskirts of this 'feast of life'. The miserable salary of a teacher of the middle or high scale (the salary of a docent in an institution of higher education in the provinces, with all the supplements for a degree, does not exceed 15,000 rubles) does not permit the maintenance of an adequate standard of living, and many things combine to undermine progress on the main task — teaching and enlightening the generation that is now growing up.

Both the inflow of immigrants into Russia and the falling 'quality' of the native-born population necessarily increases the significance of education in the humanities and humanistic culture as a formative and supportive factor in the nation's

mentality. As in the lyrics of the boisterous children's song, 'together we sing songs, together we read books'. However, books and scientific journals, having ceased to receive state subsidies (which they enjoyed in the Soviet period) are distributed in minimal circulation, and are in no position to enlighten the population. The state has moved away from policy for the humanities, having given it up for a market economy. Scrimping on culture and education, the state is 'cutting off the branch on which it sits', and will receive (and indeed, has already received) a mass of degraded youth, easy to lead astray under nationalist slogans, and barely literate immigrants unprepared to accept and love the culture of their new place of residence, which has not become a new motherland. The low standard of education in the humanities will inevitably result in interethnic antagonism, ethnic terrorism, and 'the pointless and ruthless Russian rebellion'. The way out of this trap is education in the humanities that leads to spiritual growth.

References

1. Nazaretyan A. P. *The Psychology of Elemental Mass Behaviour*. Akademiya, 2005.
2. Petrenko V. F., Mitina O. V. *A Psychosemantic Analysis of Social Consciousness Dynamics*. Moscow State University, 1997.
3. Petrenko V. F., Mitina O. V., Berdnikov K. V. et al. *Psychosemantic Analysis of Stereotypes: Images of Tolerance and Impatience*. Smysl, 2000.
4. Petrenko V. F., Mitina O. V., Karitsky N. N. et al. *The Image of Russia in the Eyes of Russians and Foreigners*. Moscow University of the Humanities, 2009.
5. Jaspers Karl. *Common Psychopathology*. Praktika, 1997.
6. Petrenko V., Mitina O. *Russians' Representations of Geopolitical Space*. *European Psychologist*, 2003, vol. 8, No. 4.
7. Taifel H., Turner J. C. *The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior*. *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. 1986.

M. Piotrowsky¹

TWO MUSEUMS AND TWO SQUARES

The National Museum of Iraq in Baghdad. The Museum of Egyptian Antiquities in Cairo. The two instructive symbols and the two stories — very much alike and different at the same time. Once again they showed that such events — be it a combat or a riot — when they occur in the vicinity of museums, are deadly dangerous for them.

Museums should be cherished. Not only because they store precious artefacts, but also because they are saving the nation's DNA and that of the mankind. The changes in the seemingly dead past tell on our present and future. They are taking an active part in intercultural dialogue in every possible direction, at all levels and in most critical situations.

The story of the National Museum of Iraq represents an internal cultural dialogue within Iraq, the current dialogue between the West and the East and non-contemporaneous Easts of different epochs. The museum was looted while Baghdad was invaded by the US military force. The Americans fired it, and

later left it unprotected and unsecured. The museum fell victim to looters of all sorts. The occupants' disregard of their basic responsibilities was taken as a sign of cultural neglect worldwide. In Europe, Americans acted otherwise.

A considerable stir was made by mutual accusations and excuses. Later, it became apparent that the Iraqi authorities had been no idiots in that situation, as had they been no idiots in many other occasions, in contrast to how they are usually pictured. The most valuable artefacts had been relocated, though they were also damaged by the fire. Quite a few of the stolen pieces were returned to the Museum in the result of the international investigation. And the investigation is still going on, as well as the organized pillaging of archaeological monuments and unauthorized excavations. The world community, represented by UNESCO, rushed to help by advice, especially at quiet locations, such as Kurdistan. There was a grand opening of a few museum halls to the select public; but they soon were closed again. The occupation administration and the Iraqi government have other important things to do.

One of the American investigators involved in the international investigation in question has published a marvellous book, *Thieves of Baghdad*. It represents a model of a politically committed analysis, according to which the Iraqi themselves are to blame for almost everything. They had placed weapons in the museum. They didn't ask for help. The exhibits were not properly stored, registered or protected, and so forth. The book also describes several categories of looters, which makes up a

¹ Corresponding member the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Russian Academy of Arts, Director of the State Hermitage, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. Author of over 200 research works; these are *On the Muslim Arts*, *Historical legends in the Koran*, *Koranic legends*, *Supermuseum in the time of the ruin of the Empire (museum as a evolutionary factor)*, *Muslim Arts: between China and Europe*, *Legend of the As'ade al Kamil*, *the King of the Himjara Kingdom*, *South Arabia in the Early Middle Ages*. *Establishment of the medieval society*, etc.

Deputy Chairman of the Arts and Humanities Council under the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress, Chairman of the Russian Museums Union, Editor-in-Chief of the *Christian East Journal*, Chairman of the Guardian Council of the European University in St. Petersburg.

useful typology of museum robbers. There are museum people among them; they know what to take and where to look. Then, there is the street mob. It wants gold and makes no choice between originals and replicas. In Baghdad, plaster replicas of ancient statues were crushed up. The American militaries also got hold of some things. Then the locals, familiar with the antique market, appeared. Then dexterous thieves came, efficient and skilled in leaving no traces. Unfortunately, this is the typology we will later come across with in Cairo as well.

The National Museum of Iraq was not only saving history, it was a symbol of the Iraqi as a country, which appeared not a long time ago. It used to exhibit both pre-Islamic and Islamic relics, those of Sumerians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Persians, Arabs and Kurds. The ideology of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party has evolved from pure Arabism to the overall Iraqi historical heritage. The memory of the triumphant victories of Assyria and Babylon were often regarded as enthusiastically as the victories and achievements of the Islamic civilization. Though Arabism and Islam crowned all the achievements made. The National Museum of Iraq represented a symbol, visual and deliberately created, of horizontal and vertical integration of Iraq with its special emphasis on ancient history. As far as we can judge by some fragmentary information from Iraq, 'Shiite' approach is gaining weight now, which views the Babylonian and Assyrian background as nothingness, and ancient monuments as unworthy of honour.

The memory lingers on the episode when Saddam Hussein Monument was being destroyed by the Iraqi when the US Army invaded Iraq. The hateful tyrant's portrait is being thrown away; the evil idol is being smashed. The struggle against idolatry is very important for Islam, at its early stages as well as nowadays. The square where this monument used to be, is in the centre of Baghdad; it is called Firdaus (Paradise). Next to it is the Palestine Hotel, where most of the journalists used to stay in the wartime Baghdad. They made the most of the crowd on the square. The US military were there as well together with propaganda troops. The Americans helped the Iraqi remove the statue from its pedestal. There appeared a historic picture which turned into a symbol of victory. Like other well-known symbols (the seizure of the Reichstag, raising the flag on Iwo Jima), this picture is authentic, though it is targeted mainly at the audience, TV audience to be precise.

TV style was one of the 'managers' at another square, Tahrir Square (Liberation Square) in Cairo. It is in the heart of the city. The area around Tahrir Square includes the National Democratic Party (NDP) headquarters building, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Nile Hilton Hotel, Headquarters of the Arab League building, famous historical cafés and, of course, the celebrated Museum of Egyptian Antiquities. Its content, roots and architecture symbolize the pride of the pre-Islamic Pharaoh times. The museum symbolizes the 20th-century Egypt. The Museum of Egyptian Antiquities came into existence much earlier than the National Museum of Iraq, and it focuses exclusively on ancient Egypt (as well as its new buildings now erected at Giza). There is the Coptic Museum for Christians, and the Islamic Museum for Muslims.

The Museum of Egyptian Antiquities fell victim to the days-long manifestation on Tahrir Square in January, 2011. During the violent night of January 25, when the building of National Democratic Party headquarters was set on fire, looters broke into the Museum. Like in Baghdad, the museum staff must have been involved. Like in Baghdad, the robbers went for replicas and copies first. Like in Baghdad, they didn't get into the main depository. A few figures were broken and two mummies beheaded by the angry looters. But, unlike in Baghdad, they were soon kicked off the museum. The demonstrators made a human shield and were defending the museum till the military took over and kept on defending it. No access to the antiquities was given to the experienced 'antique dealers'. The missing exhibits were few; and most of the missing things were found right away. Archaeological monuments and depositories all round Egypt were controlled by the Security Guards. Though much more exhibits were missing there. But the demonstrators were right – it was no Baghdad there!

At Tahrir, they didn't throw off a statue. But the whole place was haunted by the 'idol' of Egypt's President, a new Pharaoh – Mubarak. In Egypt the word 'pharaoh' has two emotive meanings. On the one hand, it is a symbol of Ancient Egypt, of its by-gone and revived might and glory. Nasser, Sadat and, of course, Mubarak associated themselves with it. Mubarak's way to move and to stand corresponds to the Ancient Egyptian style. The Museum of Egyptian Antiquities and Cairo University represent the same style and symbolism. On the other hand, their foes – supporters of Islamic mass movements – used to call them 'pharaohs'. Pharaoh in the Quran, as well as in the Old Testament, is a villain and a tyrant, who was oppressing the People of Moses and who was chasing them up to the Red Sea. The Quranic Pharaoh is a symbol of extreme arrogance, a great sin for Muslims. Mubarak turned into such a pharaoh in the eyes of the Egyptians. And they were shouting to him: 'Go away.' And he did. Time will show if the dream of a Pharaoh has gone as well. By the way, the Quranic Pharaoh got drowned in the Red Sea, but his body was later cast up on the shore. Like a chance to repent one's sins. The museum robbery also has some idoloclastic taste. I read in some English-language blogs, in connection with the Museum of Egyptian Antiquities robbery, quite fanatic things: like such things are right and just, the whole pagan heritage should be thrown off and destroyed.

All these significant events in the contemporary history of the Middle East unfolded around museums, and museums' iconic status and symbolism indicate that domestic and foreign coups have turned back pages of history. Egypt has been brought back to the 1950s struggle against idolatry, when its army shared with their Muslim brothers the victory over the Pharaoh King. In Iraq, the Shiite imams as heroes are substitutes of Assyrian Kings. While in Libya the older Royal Sufi banner of the Senussi order has taken over the green-coloured Islamic banner of the secular and religious Jamahiriya.

The political dialogue of cultures starts all over again.

References

1. Bogdanos M. *Thieves of Baghdad*. N. Y., 2005.

V. Popov¹

GLOBALIZATION AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

We live in an extremely complex age: today, world history is a common, global stream of civilization into which all peoples and countries are drawn with their own unique cultures, world-views, and historical experiences.

Since the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, humanity has been in a state of deep crisis and transformation – it is a period of change that has predominated for more than two centuries of industrial world civilization, with the global dominance of the West and the change to post-industrial civilization, for which, as can be seen today, the characteristic tendency is the relocation of the centre of activity and influence to the East.

The authors of modernization theory affirmed that the scientific and technological revolution would lead to a loss of trust in traditional values. The countries of the East received and offer to adopt the paradigms of another, ‘genuine’ civilization and cast off the experience of their own historical paths. However, in practice, the instinct of self-preservation has sprung into action, resistance to attempts at unification is increasing, the defence of identity – national, religious, and linguistic – and the aspiration for preserving traditional values. In each culture and separate environment, there is a system of coordination, a different understanding of man, his rights, and his freedom. The West and the non-West may have different views and definitions of good and evil, conflict and cooperation. This contradictory unity is an integrity to the world, which determines its viability as a complex dynamic system. Like never before, the truth is becoming clear – that the world is rich precisely in its diversity.

The peculiarity of globalization in the 21st century is the unprecedented speed and scale of changes. In the foreground of world politics, new states and groups of countries are emerging with the potential for global influence, with the capacity for changing the balance of power, for inclusion in the historical creative work of millions. These are China, India, the countries of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and the Islamic world. The East is undergoing modernization, and what is important is that this process does not take place in the form of Westernization, but rather takes its own unique path. The broadening of the democratic, economic, and political influence of new geopolitical powers runs against the powerful opposition of the United States and Europe, which are trying to defend their dominance in the world.

Lately, the role of the Islamic civilization has grown perceptibly. It played a significant role in world history and has now exerted the most meaningful kind of influence on many aspects of life in different countries, and on international relations. The significant growth of the Islamic world in the last two decades is connected with a whole range of factors, not least among them the strengthening of its positions in global

financial-economic structures, thanks to the extraction of the rich supplies of oil and gas present in many Muslim countries and the saving of significant financial resources. It is not an accident that in the G20, three places are reserved for Islamic states.

Throughout the millennium, the Muslim civilization went through the smallest changes. Islam as a religion attracts its adherents to social justice and tolerance of other faiths. (In particular, the matter is that the theory and practice of rendering help to the needy and poor, care for orphans, calls for self-improvement and so on.) Islam is a state religion in most Arab countries and in many others. In a Muslim society, (in contrast to the West, where the individual is the primary value) the ethical foundation is *umma* – the community, based on the unity of faith. Muslim communities exist in nearly all countries. It is noteworthy that only one religion, Islam, was taken as a principle of intergovernmental organization, uniting 57 states – the Islamic Conference Organization. It was precisely around this that the not dissimilar Organization of the United Nations was formulated.

The result of the increased influence and continued broadening of Islam’s influence has now turned out to be the centre of world events. A concrete example is the Arab–Israeli conflict, for which the prospects of a just resolution are, even today, unfortunately quite remote. The future of Iraq (from which the United States are to withdraw its forces within the next two or three years) also arouses serious concern, as do the persistent acuteness of the situation in the region of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the alarming uncertainty of the Iran problem, to say nothing of other hot spots like Somalia, Sudan, and others.

In the last quarter of the 20th century, humanity has been plunged into a global demographic crisis. This is expressed in the decline in fertility rates, the aging populations of most states, and the increasing number of countries (primarily in Europe) in which depopulation is taking place. With the continuation of this trend, by the end of the 21st century, the average age of an inhabitant of this planet will be 64 years, with a dramatic reduction in the population of working age. The planet will be populated by elderly people tired of life, unable to respond adequately to the call of the times and doomed in the long-term.

The deficit of labour resources in some countries and a surplus of them in others (with a dramatic gap in standards of living) has led to an increased flow of legal and illegal immigrants, a broadening circle of mixed civilizations and, as a consequence, to the intensification of inter-civilizational and intercontinental antagonisms. Migration – the movement of people throughout the world – has always been a constituent part of global processes, enabling economic development, and mutual cultural and scientific enrichment. In the present, its pace has quickened. Migration has reached unprecedented scales – 200 million migrants – characterized by the appearance of new forms and showing signs of a likely increase in the upcoming years. It has proved to be a great influence on the political and economic condition of most countries, it creates new ‘knots’ in problems that have manifested themselves especially clearly in the time of the global financial crisis. Representatives of other civilizations have noticeably extended their presence in the West, mainly in Europe and North America.

Before recent times, most of the countries of Western and Central Europe had populations of one ethnicity and one religion. Practically the only religion practiced in Europe was Christianity, under the canopy of which European civilization formed. In recent decades, the influx of Muslim immigrants from Africa and Asia grew sharply. According to official data,

¹ Director of the Centre for Partnership of Civilizations of the Institute for International Research at Moscow State Institute for International Relations (University) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Science (History). Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. From 1967 to 2007 he served as an officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Russian Federation. He held positions of the Ambassador of the USSR and of the Russian Federation for North Yemen, later the Yemen Arab Republic, the Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the Tunisian Republic. Ambassador-at-large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in charge of the relations with the Organization of the Islamic Conference and other international Islamic organizations. Author of the following monographs: *Persian Gulf in Plans and Policies of the West* (Persidskiy zaliv v planakh i politike zapada) and *Close Tunisia* (Blizkiy Tunis), as well as numerous articles in various Russian and foreign mass media. He took part in numerous international conferences and also headed Russian delegations. Member of the Board and Director on International Relations of the Islamic Culture, Science and Education Support Foundation. He was decorated with the Order of Friendship, several medals of the USSR and the Russian Federation as well as Tunisian Order of the Republic of the First Degree. In 2008 he was decorated with the highest award of the Council of Muftis of Russia, the Order of Al-Fakhr.

about 24 million Muslims are living in Western Europe; according to other data appearing in various reference books, the number of Muslims in Europe (including those living on the Balkan Peninsula) has reached 40 million. At present, Islam is the religion with the second-highest number of followers in Great Britain, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Demographers predict that by 2015, the number of Muslims in the European Union will double as a result of high birth rates, the process of reunification of families, and the continuation of Muslim immigration from North Africa and the Near East. We should also take into account the fact that a greater number of Europeans are adopting Islam: one million in the last decade. By the calculations of some American political scientists, by 2023 the number of Muslims in the world will surpass that of Christians of all denominations. Islam, which used to appear as a speck on the religious map of Europe, has now become a significant component part of the continent.

The distinct trend of the spread of Islam is manifest in the Near East. For instance, according to experts' predictions, in the near future the Arab population of Israel and the occupied territories will be equal to that of the Jews. In this light, Israel's attempts to hinder the creation of an independent Palestinian state look illogical and short-sighted. The statements of current Israeli leaders of their resoluteness to preserve the Jewish state correlate poorly with the trends of Muslim distribution.

Europeans understand that without immigration, it is impossible to manage: having raised their standards of living, they cannot maintain them by their own efforts. The size of the native, rapidly aging population continues to shrink. The main problem, however, is that in the countries of Europe, the efforts and measures made for immigrants to adapt and adjust to the traditions, criteria, and way of life of Europeans, to integrate into European society, have collapsed. With constant migration, cultural identity reproduces itself. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in one recent speech, openly acknowledged the failure of the policy of multiculturalism.

Islamic culture is becoming an organic and legitimate part of European culture. Like mushrooms after the rain, numerous different Muslim organizations and structures are appearing. Millions of Muslims strongly wish, along with their aspiration to fit into the European environment, to preserve their genetic and confessional attachment to their historic homes (which is perfectly natural). This desire appears in even the second and third generations of immigrant families. The youth reacts especially strongly to the widespread treatment of them as second-rate people, which often manifests itself in a sharply demonstrative rejection of European moral norms. Extremist moods are born precisely in such environments. 'Rings of alienation' form around large Muslim communities.

Several sources of misrepresentation of Islam are hidden in the depths of history of European civilization, when the image of Islam as an aggressive religion took shape. Europeans recognize the enormous influence of Islamic culture on Medieval Europe, but in the annals of memory, historical events connected with antagonism between Christians and Muslims tend to dominate. A peculiar historical amnesia can be observed: the Islamic history of Europe has been forgotten.

All of this creates conditions of permanent tension in society. It gives rise to fear in the face of the prospect of the 'Islamization' of Europe. It is likely that the greatest expression of this is to be found in Thilo Sarrazin's book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany Does Away With Itself), published in September 2010. The author is a former member of the Executive Board of the Deutsche Bundesbank, and has held a series of important government jobs. Sarrazin warns of the danger posed by the growing Muslim population, especially as regards the immigration of Turks, inasmuch as this will turn Germans into a minority in Germany and lead to their material and mental

degradation and, in the end, to the degeneration of the nation and disappearance of traditional European culture.

The situation in Turkey is an example of particular concern and disagreement among Europeans. They regard with great suspicion the strengthening influence of Muslim organizations in Turkey and its current direction of an ambitious policy oriented toward activating relations with the Islamic world. It is a large country at a strategically important crossroads. Bordering on Iran, Iraq, and Syria, and having the second-largest army (after the United States), it is an indispensable ally for the United States and Europe. This state is becoming the symbol of the compatibility of democracy, capitalism, and Islam. The principal European powers, most of all France and Germany, fear the joining of nearly 80 million Turks into the family of the European Union, and their surpassing Germany in population (in light of Turkey's high birth rates and the decrease of the native population of the Federal Republic of Germany).

Speculating on the fears of Islamic extremism (which is connected with the great terrorist attacks in the United States, Great Britain, and Spain), the conservative faction of the European elite is setting forward the act of blocking the 'Islamization of Europe' as a task of the greatest importance.

This, in turn, is leading to an objective shift to the right in Western European society, as it is precisely the anti-immigrant parties or parties with dramatically expressed nationalistic programmes that are using slogans supported by the majority of voters. It is noteworthy that precisely this kind of mood helped Nicolas Sarkozy win the presidential elections in France.

Muslims, in turn, fear that Islamophobia in the West is gradually taking a tougher form. Research conducted by the European Centre for Monitoring Racism and Xenophobia (in Vienna) attests that Islamophobic feeling is on the rise in Europe, and many Muslims feel that they are being threatened and misunderstood.

The deepening rift between civilizations threatens many further complications not only in Europe, but also in many countries on other continents.

In North America, where the Muslim community numbers seven million, the axis of confrontation runs along the line of relations with Spanish-speaking immigrants (Latinos). The topic of Islamization is secondary, but is gradually gaining greater significance in the politics of the United States of America. This was demonstrated by the controversy started in 2010 over the building of a Muslim centre in New York, in the place where the two famous towers of the World Trade Center were destroyed in terrorist attacks. There is also the tragicomic story of how some pastor named Terry Jones from a small town in Florida came up with the idea of publicly burning 200 copies of the Quran, and how the American President, Secretary of State, and other well-known officials expended a great deal of energy in convincing him to abandon the idea.

In modern society, extremist forces exist which propagandize the idea that clashes are inevitable. In the Muslim world, radicals feel that it is necessary to create (or revive) an Islamic caliphate and the resume the dissemination of Islam throughout the world. In Western states, it is the trend of affirming that Islam begets extremism and terrorism, and therefore fighting against it is the obligation of all inhabitants of the West, as far as Islam engenders real threats to the well-being of Judaeo-Christian civilization. In recent years, especially after September 11, 2001, extremists on both sides 'went to work' at making relations between Muslims and Christians 'heat up'. This brought about great moral and material damage, for example in the notorious 'cartoon' scandal connected with the publication of caricatures of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper. As is well-known, the fomentation of religious and national discord is a traditional weapon of ruling groups in attempting to retain power.

The theoretical starting point for the aggravation of opposition was the American political scientist Samuel Huntington's argument about the 'Clash of Civilizations', first set forth by him in 1993, in an article in *Foreign Affairs*, and, later, in a book. The main threads of the argument are about the end of the era of ideological conflicts and the coming of a new stage, in which the divisions will fall along lines of cultural or civilizational difference. One of the fundamental conclusions is that Islam presents itself as the main threat to Western civilization.

The reaction to this concept was promotion of the idea of a dialogue of civilizations by Iranian president Mohammad Khatami in the 1990s. At the time, this proposal found broad support in the international community; the General Assembly of the United Nations, adopting the corresponding document, declared 2001 a year of Dialogue of Civilizations. In the UN, a High-Level Panel was founded, which on 8 September, 2001, published an excellent report on this subject.

The terrorist act of 11 September, 2001, the strategy of 'War on Terror' as a priority for the whole international community advanced by the U.S. administration, the subsequent strikes on Afghanistan, and the U.S. invasion of Iraq undermined the effort to spread ideas about dialogue between civilizations, pushing it into the background. This initiative did not attain the resonance that was its due, and U.S. opposition to the Iranian project played a significant role.

In 2005 (after the 2004 terrorist attacks in the Madrid train station), the Iranian government made the proposal of creating an 'Alliance of Civilizations'. This idea was formed, in the end, as a Spanish-Turkish project and enjoyed the total support of the United Nations.

Washington responds to such initiatives with deaf ears. For instance, while in Turkey in April of 2009, President Barack Obama ignored the Turkish government's invitation to take part in a conference of the 'Alliance of Civilizations', which had been timed to coincide with his visit (although upon taking the post, he had declared his intention to repair relations with the Muslim world). Under U.S. pressure, other countries also keep their distance from these initiatives. Formally, no one openly speaks out against the dialogue of civilizations, but in practice these ideas never attained the necessary dynamic, were not spread, found no repercussions in the international community and failed to influence the course of world politics. In essence, the idea of the dialogue of civilizations fell into the trap of a crisis. The root of the problem, in our view, consists in the fact that the West persistently tries to impose its own view of this problem, its own values and assessments.

It has become obvious in the 21st century that, without reconciliation of dialogue and real cooperation among civilizations, it will be impossible to save the world: hate can only beget hate. Real dialogue can only be generated on the basis of mutual respect, readiness to listen to and consider others' opinions, tolerance, and good will. The Bush administration, in which neoconservatives set the tone, presented the struggle with Muslim radicals (whom they called 'Islamofascists') as a task of the utmost importance. Their particular focus was on how to handle extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and African countries by coercive means.

The conclusion drawn by specialists studying the elaboration of the problems of terrorism was that terrorism could not be handled by punitive action. Recourse to a broad set of different means, particularly political means, is indispensable. Today, a concerted opinion is emerging that it is impossible to resolve ethnic, religious, or national conflicts through force. It is not by chance that such a large number of so-called 'frozen' conflict situations exist. The experience of events in Iraq or Israel's wars with Lebanon and the Gaza Strip convincingly attest that military power many times superior to that of one's opponent is not conducive to reconciling quarrels. Despite the fact that military force remains a strong argument, the mere

ability to come to an agreement will effectively lead to a way out of an impasse and open a path towards real reconciliation of the problem, taking into account the interests of everyone concerned. Other solutions either beget fragile, short-term truces, or drive the sickness inward, or prepare the ground for even wider conflicts.

Swift changes necessitate placing a new matter on the agenda: the problem that contemporary peace arrangements fail to reflect the emerging situation in the world, that world institutions cannot cope with the solution of many urgent tasks at the regional, as well as global level. This is obviously manifest in the work of the UN, the structure of which, by general acknowledgement, demands serious adjustment. The global economic crisis demonstrated the necessity of adopting solutions at a global level. The pace of changes in social, political, and economic life under the conditions of globalization has become so swift that state officials and bureaucracies do not always have time to summarize and comprehend new phenomena and frequently follow the standards of a bygone era.

In the present, a change to a post-industrial, technological way of life, from a bipolar to a multipolar structure, is taking place. Contemporary civilization has an anthropogenic character. Innovation changes both the specimen of the human being and his environment, and exerts a psychological influence on peoples' consciousness. Globalization from the material sphere has come into the realm of human consciousness, the nascent evolution of human thought is collapsing; the mass influence of the media is bringing a phase of human reflection to a close — the most important thing for the formation of cogitative structures. It leads to a washing-out of the norms of the human community and establishes new standards. This is an indication of the decline of global industrial civilization and the global industrial paradigm. At the same time, the forerunner of the scientific revolution and society was founded on knowledge. The scientific and technological revolution 'reformatted' historical time, cultural space, and perceptions of the world.

The crisis in the development of civilizations finds expression in the crisis of religions. This has existed throughout human history. The peculiarity of the present moment is that the crisis has engendered an aspiration among part of the clergy (especially in areas of Muslim and Orthodox Christian influence) to return to the age of the supremacy of religion, not only in spiritual life, but also in political and economic life. Certain figures promote the conception of religious states in which clerics hold ruling positions in all spheres of society, which essentially implies a return to a certain renaissance of religion 'under the banners' of past centuries in the spirit of the Middle Ages. This kind of trend is similar to utopian and reactionary attitudes.

In the meantime, the changing value system exposes new aspects of the dialogue of cultures. Under these conditions, the role of so-called public diplomacy expands. (Information appearing on the WikiLeaks website demonstrated that channels of official diplomacy are not always sufficiently reliable.) Undoubtedly, there is a set of questions that must be resolved only at the level of governments and heads of state. Along with this, in a world that is growing increasingly complex, many questions must be discussed at the level of public and academic-expert councils which, in interpreting new phenomena, can propose corresponding solutions to state leaders.

The Dartmouth conference of Russian and American public officials and academic workers, which recently celebrated its 50th anniversary and demonstrated its effectiveness, constitutes precisely this kind of effective channel of public diplomacy.

Russia seems to play a key role in new creative processes. Russia's natural, geographical, and historical conditions (the largest state in the world by area) have stipulated what at present is called an environmental, especially

distinctive type of civilization, which represent an organic alloy of European and Asian cultures. Russia, by religion, culture and cultural origins, is unquestionably a part of Europe. It formed together with Europe when, in the 14th century, in the age of the Renaissance, national cultures began to take shape. European culture played an exclusive role in the enlightenment and moral improvement of humanity. Besides this, it was thanks to Europe that university education appeared in Russia. Without it, the rebirth and creation of the state would have been inconceivable. It is also important to note the union of Russia with the East, the steppe, at that time: for 240 years, Russia formed a part of the Great Mongol ulus, and later of the Golden Horde. All of this territory (with Mongols, Buryats, and so on) later became part of the Russian state, and Rus' was saved from outward expansion.

Peoples living within Russia's territory are capable of achieving the kind of mutual understanding and brotherly co-existence which are not easily attainable in other countries. This is our genuine wealth and political platform: Russia has a spiritual base and unique practical experience of developing relations with various countries. It absorbs and preserves different objects and phenomena on its territory, which allows it to move in different directions (as distinct from those countries which invariably move forward or stagnate in their development). For Russia, the sense of territory creates the illusion of a double-sided boundlessness of time. Russia is like a gallery

of times where elements of the future appear side by side with the past and present.

Against the background of danger that the civilizational split threatens for the fates of humanity, and the obviousness of the fact that it will not be overcome with compulsion and force, there emerges a natural, positive role which Russia might take upon itself. In Russia, since time immemorial, the adherents of many religions have lived together, constituting one state, and throughout history, there have never been religious wars. The proven experience of a tradition of peaceful coexistence by Orthodox Christians, Muslims, and adherents of other faiths was spread throughout Russia. The mission of Russia as an environmental system is ensuring the unity of the cultural space and the connectedness of time, and the creation and preservation of national and world culture. Russia can itself become a distinctive cultural bridge. Our task is to avoid extremes, instead choosing harmonious, weighed, and well-thought-out decisions.

In 2011, the world will observe the tenth anniversary of the 'black day' of contemporary history – 11 September, 2001. Now, the task of uniting all reasonable people in the West and East, in order to isolate and neutralize, with their combined efforts, extremist forces on both sides is becoming more urgent. They must join forces to solve pressing problems of a planetary scale connected with natural disasters, ecology, the protection of the environment, epidemics, the overcoming of famine, violence against children and, probably the most important problem – the threat of spiritual impoverishment and loss of moral orientation and values.

Vasil Prodanov¹

DOES MULTICULTURALISM INCREASE CONFLICTS IN NATION-STATES?

The making of nation-states at the beginning of the modern era is inextricably connected with the formation of single national cultures which become the bases for the formation of a unified 'we' of the greater masses of people. The unified national cultures are founded on what such authors as Benedict Anderson call 'imagined communities'. Such institutions as the conscription-based army and compulsory national education play a key role in this relationship. States aspire to the cultural homogeneity of the population in their territory and, with this goal, use the most diverse methods, from forcible resettlement of other ethnic and cultural communities out of the country to coerced or voluntary assimilation. In the United States, which is an emigrant state accepting people of the most diverse nationalities, ethnicities, and religions, a peculiar mechanism is created, known as the 'melting pot', which in the final analysis leads to the integration of a multitude of individual origins, each different in its own way, into a single nation. However, in recent years the mechanisms for creating a single national culture are to a large extent failing, and this leads to the disintegration of various single states and to aggressive separatist movements. In America, separate communities are all conscious of themselves as different, which leads to the disintegration of the state into Italian-Americans, African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and so on. Those making up a single whole look, in this way, different. Even Jews, having preserved their identity in an alien environment for millennia, when settling in Israel form into distinct groups and cultures which create their own parties and isolated districts as the living spaces for specific minorities. It seems that human identity is becoming more mobile

¹ Corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Philosophical Sciences (1988–92) and the Institute for Philosophical Research at the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (1995–2010), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of over 500 scholarly publications, including 21 monographs: *Person and Politics, Knowledge and Values, Bio-Social Values, Bioethics, Civil Society and Global Capitalism, Violence in Modern Age, The Future of Philosophy and some others*. Prof. Prodanov is a member of editorial boards of a number of journals, *Monde Diplomatique* being one of them.

and people are tending to return to the initial historical forms of cultural belonging, and the earlier ability to assimilate minorities along the lines of nation-states and national cultures is disappearing.

One of the trends of the third industrial revolution and post-Fordism is that they are conducive to a horizontal, networking kind of relationship, in which separate subjects stand on an equal footing due to the hierarchical and asymmetrical links of inequality among them. The internet and the information revolution play a key role here, creating an enormous amount of horizontal interdependence between quite diverse regions of the world. The previous 'imagined communities' of nation-states, localized in defined territories, begin to be shaken by increasing amounts of 'virtual communities' created through global communications, and for which a common cultural space is not territorially localized. Thus favourable conditions for the erosion of the potentialities of nation-states emerges, for their collapse in a number of places, for strengthened migration and sometimes greater multiculturalization of homogeneous societies. The ideology of democracy, in its own right, affirms egalitarian priorities. The number of educated and urbanized people in the world inclined toward dialogue is growing. The world is becoming more postmodern and relativistic, and this is conducive to tolerance and cooperation, with every subject seen as having the right to his own differences from others, as long as he does not disturb the rest. In developed countries a large middle class with post-materialistic values is also more inclined to dialogue. This leads to a growing cultural relativization and the rise of the most postmodern ideas beyond the scope of larger narratives. In the global market of cultural symbols and ways of life, a person may easily change his identity, identifying himself with different cultures.

At the surface, a decrease in diversity would seem to be observable – for instance, in all parts of the world, people drink Coca-Cola, wear jeans, watch Hollywood films, and go

to McDonald's. However, at the same time in the United States, which is seen as a cultural menace to the rest of the world, the influx of new waves of immigrants, ideas, and events changes American culture itself. The number of Chinese restaurants in the world surpasses the number of McDonald's restaurants so hated by antiglobalists.

In fact, the experience of modernization in Asian states shows that it is possible with the preservation and affirmation of cultural distinction and uniqueness. At the same time, traditional cultures are not left unchanged either, but undergo constant changes and reconstruction. New communications become the key element in supporting the preservation and development of cultures. They provide the opportunity for the consumers of a certain product, separated in physical space, to come together, and enable the formation of specific communities with their own niches in culture and the market. For example, it is an incontrovertible fact that in Great Britain today, people are using Welsh in Wales, and Gaelic in Ireland, and different countries in Europe are delegating authority to local power more than before. The global information revolution is strengthening, not weakening local cultures, and is stimulating the creation and invention of a multitude of similar new ones. It is precisely this that constitutes one of the most important preconditions for the continuous appearance of newer and newer states, corresponding to emerging, strengthening, and formerly undetected local identities.

As a reaction to the present situation, a policy of multiculturalism and recognition of diverse identities has emerged. The term 'multiculturalism' and the related policy were first formulated in the 1970s in Canada, and became popular along with the changes occurring in North America. They were the result of the beginning of the struggle for autonomy for Quebec, for civil rights in the United States and in connection with the appearance of the so-called 'third generation of rights' relating to communities, as opposed to the first two 'generations', which were for individuals.

The idea of multiculturalism entered political practice in the social sciences and political philosophy, becoming a basis for the development of a new direction in this philosophy, with such categories as recognition, politics of recognition, politics of identity, and multiculturalism at their centre. Works in this area by such political philosophers as Charles Taylor, Amy Gutmann, and Will Kymlicka acquired worldwide renown. Multiculturalism proved inevitable with the growing flow of emigrants and the ethno-religious diversity of states. On the 2nd of November, 2001, UNESCO adopted the 'Universal Declaration of Cultural Diversity', the goal of which, according to the General Secretary, was to 'confirm once again the conviction that multicultural dialogue is the world's best guarantee'. The Declaration emphasizes that cultural diversity is embodied in the uniqueness and pluralism of the groups and communities of which humanity consists. Stress is placed on diversity in cultural relations, as well as in biological species, as a precondition for changes, innovations, and creation.

However, the problem is that this diversity will be combined with other kinds of differences, most likely with economic and political differences. We encounter the idea of equality and respect for different cultures in Herder in the 18th century as well, but from that time to the present, a series of obstacles have appeared in its path which we now have to face. The first obstacle was that separate cultures vary in their scale and capacity to exert influence on the rest. Hegemonic cultures, thanks to mass media, language, and wealth, dominate over all the others for a certain period, which is now seen in the example of American and, in particular, of Hollywood culture. 50 to 60 per cent of translations in the contemporary world are from the English language, which presupposes the global rule of the Anglo-Saxon type of culture of 'the Gutenberg galaxy'. Even in countries that are well-known for their specific policies of

implanting their cultural identities, like France, 58 per cent of all translated books are from English language texts. In smaller states, this percentage is even greater, such that in Serbia it reaches about 70 per cent. In the other direction, only 3 to 6 per cent of translations in the world are from other languages into English, which attests to the enormous cultural asymmetry which no UNESCO declarations can overcome (Wischenbart, R. 2007). It is necessary to keep in mind that when it comes to the film industry, such asymmetry is even greater. In addition, cultures are a mechanism for legitimizing power and identity, as a result of which policies are prepared and politicians are eager to assert their cultural hegemony, and a great number of political battles find expression in cultural wars and conflicts. Furthermore, the ideal of respect and equality of cultures runs up against the fact that where many cultures exist, a question emerges about what cultural unity can reply upon. In general, what are the limits of cultural diversity and differentiation to which we should show tolerance? It is obvious that such limits are necessary and tolerance toward any possible culture is impossible. And finally, cultures are not somehow solid and immutable. They develop and change at a particularly quick pace in our own times, and the question emerges: to whom, specifically, should we show tolerance in this process of change?

In this context, multiculturalism became a pressing issue for philosophical and political discussion on the North American continent, and later in Europe, where this matter was called into question by the rising right-wing and populist parties. Discussion related to the publication by the former Bundesbank official Thilo Sarrazin was particularly significant. In the final analysis, the conclusion was formulated by German Chancellor Angela Merkel, which she stated at the youth conference of the HDS organization:

In the early 1960s, our country invited foreign workers, and they still live here now. For a time we lied to ourselves and said, 'They will not stay with us, they will leave after some time,' but this is not what happened. It stands to reason that our approach was guided by multiculturalism, by the idea that we could live side by side with one another and appreciate one another. This approach failed, completely failed.

It is emphasized that in the conditions of globalized communications, the integration of local diasporas is becoming all the more difficult. So, for instance, if the spouses of Turkish immigrants in the 1960s stayed at home, cared for the children and watched German television, thereby learning German, they now watch Turkish-language television and their acquisition of German becomes more difficult. The additional, growing mass of immigrants creates tension in the labour market and a situation in which socio-economic and ethnic inequality coincide.

In principle, conservatively oriented authors and politicians estimate all this critically, differently from the liberals and social democrats who place special emphasis on human rights and, in particular, on cultural and collective rights. Moreover, under the conditions of globalization, when differences in economic policies between the left- and right-wing political forces are erased, the relation to culture and to such questions as unity and diversity in society become the dividing line between them. Conservatives usually express alarm about the disintegration of collective identity under the pressure created by immigration and multiculturalism, while liberals, especially left-wing liberals and social democrats, emphasize the defence of diversity, or the multiplicity of cultural and any other rights. No one denies that cultural diversity is necessary, but questions exist about its limits and about what conditions are necessary for unity. Will the present society agree to young Muslim girls in Europe going to school in yashmaks? Or if I am a practising Muslim in Bulgaria, will I be permitted to have four wives as an expression of tolerance toward my culture, or must I obey the Bulgarian legal system and submit to the Christian culture of monogamy? And so on and so forth. Who will determine,

and how, the language, symbols, and signs with which the different cultures will interact, and in this sense form a common culture within a framework permitting respect and a good livelihood. The central problem of these discussions is whether the state will maintain its neutrality in relations of cultural differences or whether these should become a part of it. Is cultural diversity only characteristic of civil society or will it also manifest itself at the level of politics, party, and state? Traditional distinctions between ideologies will move into normative theories of multiculturalism – there are left-wing essentialists who emphasize the preservation of minority cultures; liberal anti-essentialists, for whom the individual right of choice is the most fundamental thing; procedural multiculturalists, who look for the manifestations of cultural differences within policies and states, taking account of various ethnic, religious, and racial quotas in administrations and so on; and conservative anti-culturalists fighting for the preservation of national integrity and against the dangerous multicultural division of society.

In the discussion of multiculturalism, diametrically opposed opinions about the negatives and positives of multiculturalism form in many relations. On the one hand, we have the thesis that multiculturalism weakens national unity. As a counterbalance to this thesis, an opinion exists that it breaks down the barriers that divide people. In the same way, there are opposing statements that multiculturalism creates unrepresentative élites who assume the right to speak on behalf of their communities and, on the other hand, the opinion that in giving power to minorities, multicultural policy leads to greater participation and representation.

However, behind all of these discussions there is a fundamental dilemma showing the various forms of multiculturalism – those which are dangerous and hold the potential to create conflicts, and those which hold this potential only to a minimum degree. In order to understand this dilemma, we will distinguish two methodological approaches to multiculturalism – the essentialist and the constructivist.

Cultural essentialism (or naturalism) proposes that any culture possesses a unique, fixed essence which exists independent of context or intercultural relations and which makes an ethnic group act the way it acts. This essence manifests itself to a greater or lesser degree in every representative of the culture. It follows from this, for instance, that if an immigrant has left his country and separated from his culture, in the new place he must find his old state of cultural belonging and be limited by it. Cultural belonging is not a right to choose, but becomes, rather, a predetermined essence which may presuppose negative sanctions and discrimination, and this, in its own right, constitutes a precondition for ‘cultural war’ and a ‘clash of civilizations’.

In contrast, *cultural constructivism* (or anti-essentialism) is founded on the idea of the active role of the individual in the creation of cultural products. It is true that individuals are born and develop in certain cultural realities, but they change the parameters of this reality. Moreover, in the modern global world, in which production of culture is a gigantic industry, uninterruptedly generating gigantic flows of cultural products, which with the help of a global mass media can reach anyone regardless of his local or national culture. For this reason, only individuals carry any responsibility for culture, and their belonging to a certain culture does not necessarily imply certain characteristics of behaviour. Anti-essentialism assumes that culture and cultural identity change and that the individual can reject any of its characteristics, change them or choose an alternative culture. The individual has a greater potential for engaging in a dialogue of cultures because he denies an understanding of cultures as solid, closed substances, taking into account that they enter into many varied and complicated combinations. Anti-essentialism, like essentialism, can also be dangerous because it leads to cultural relativism, even up to the point of dividing

cultures, of overemphasizing their specific character rather than the commonalities among them. The question about the content of values inherent in one culture or another – that is, to what degree these values can be a basis for the coexistence of different cultures – is ignored, and a comparative appraisal of these values is avoided. A blind eye is turned to the fact that different values and rules can carry elements of incompatibility between cultures, and that the question about the coexistence of different cultures is not independent of the rules and values that each culture carries within it. There is an overemphasis on individual choice and self-determination when the real matter is about identity and does not take into consideration that each individual is, in any case, a part of some history and in conformity with some community. It is no accident that Samuel Huntington refers to multiculturalism as a dangerous ‘anti-Western ideology’ which hampers immigrants’ assimilation and creates an America with a multitude of groups having different political values. (Huntington, 2004, 171)

However, if multiculturalism is interpreted with fear in immigrant states like Canada, the United States, and Australia, what could we say about states with ancient historical traditions to which immigration is unfamiliar and the bulk of the population is homogenized into a common identity in cultural relations? These, after all, rely on a certain history connected to this identity and the extremities of the ‘politics of difference’ can turn into a tool for dehomogenization and serious conflicts. Because there cannot be a state that is not formed on the basis of some common identity of the population on its territory, or unless some ‘neutrally’ united or multiculturally disunited institutions bring about this union on this territory. Europe as a single political and economic community will be able to maintain itself only in the event that, despite its 27 languages and national identities, it can unite around a language with common culture, values, symbols, and identity.

The fact that no static, unchanging identities and cultures exist – and we have, rather, a multitude of identities and different levels of cultural belonging – that we could take into account that common political units are only possible if, regardless of their cultural diversity, at a higher level they depend on a common nucleus, a part of their national identity. The policy of recognizing differences should not operate at the expense of the policy of recognizing unity. Relying solely on the civic (political) concept of a nation, in which a legal attachment to some national power is the only thing groups of people have in common, then this national power would not be able to remain intact. In any case, what is necessary is a common cultural concept of the nation, as well as of the virtual or imagined community representing a common field of communication through common language, places of memory, signs, symbols, and meanings.

After September 11, 2001, in North America as well as in Europe, there was a dramatic strengthening of voices proclaiming that unlimited multiculturalism could not exist, that it must be linked to the introduction of a single set of national rules, requirements, and conditions. These voices, which also came from previously liberal politicians, could also be heard in public debates in Europe after the religious attacks and murders in the Netherlands, Great Britain, and Spain. There is talk of a ‘crisis of multiculturalism’, and even ‘the death of multiculturalism’ (Malzahn, 2006). The previous conservative denial influenced not only the liberal and social-democratic parties. Thus, for instance, René Kuperus, a representative of the Dutch labour party, registers the growing ‘multicultural disapproval’, especially in the ranks of social-democratic voters of the national parties. Speaking of the ‘new historical mission of social democracy’, he emphasized the necessity of ‘saying good-bye’ to the concept of a multicultural society. ‘This is a hard choice, but I believe that the conception of multiculturalism has caused a great deal of harm and uncertainty for emigrants as well as

for those who were born here... It contradicts to the successful model of integrating perceptions of another culture and assimilation in the sense of ensuring employment, equality, and social and political participation' (Kuperus, 2007:37). He added that an enormous number of Dutch people (70 per cent) renounce multiculturalism and feel that 'minorities should adjust to the national culture'. From this, it follows that instead of multiculturalism, it is necessary to speak of a 'national identity' which can be understood as something connected with 'a super-ethnic community and sense of solidarity' (Kuperus, 2007:42).

This type of view, which goes against the current multiculturalist extremes by emphasizing the shared cultural characteristics of nationality in a nation-state has everywhere led to an increase of demands for naturalization of foreigners directed towards their unification, which is connected with their common national language, history, culture, and traditions.

In 2003, the French Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy proposed a complicated multiple-choice test with questions to which any immigrant desiring French citizenship might have to respond. Among them were questions like 'Can a married man be convicted for the rape of his wife?', 'What does the principle of individual liberty mean?', 'At what point in time were church and state made separate in France?', 'What are the rights of foreigners in France?', 'What are the three principles of social security?', 'Who must give consent, if you wish to marry?', 'What are the colonial marine territories of France?', 'What are the two ways by which a people can exercise its right to national sovereignty in accordance with the French constitution?', 'When was slavery abolished in the French colonies?'

In turn, the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 2005 published a series of questions, to which each immigrant would have to answer, connected with the geography, history, and monarchy in the country. In March of 2006, the German province of Hess introduced a test which would be necessary to pass for German citizenship, consisting of a hundred questions divided into basic groups — common information about Germany, knowledge of its history, constitution and basic laws, elections, the electoral system, the basic laws, parties, lobbies, state structure, culture, education and science, and national symbols. In late 2005, the Dutch parliament adopted new rules for receiving citizenship in the Netherlands. In their opinion, future immigrants should be made to take an exam on Dutch language and culture, and, in order to take it, they should go through a 250- to 350-hour training period on these subjects. A good command of Dutch is the first condition of integration

as well as ultimate assimilation of different immigrants, with the result that they receive a common Dutch identity.

All of these changing kinds of the practice of integrating foreigners into a single national culture are an expression of awareness of the fact that a person can be connected with different elements of local and global cultural space, that different immigrant societies and minorities may exist, but their functioning in a single political community is dependent on a common cultural identity. It is true that in contemporary states, accelerated changes in the area of culture and demographics are taking place, but if they fail to create cultural and not just political mechanisms for integrating various minorities around one whole, then this would threaten the existence of these states in general. The state security in the area of culture is dependent upon the presence of a single cultural space, which unites and serves as a foundation for communication and solidarity among citizens, based on their common experiences, rules, and norms. This, on its own side, means that separate cultures in multicultural societies cannot be monads, containing individuals within them, but must adapt to the environments in which they are found; they must carry out an active dialogue, be part of the dynamic evolution that transforms each particle into a single whole, they must be open to a new cultural synthesis. With the appearance of very powerful alternative cultural communities within the framework of the nation-state, their preservation depends to a greater extent on the degree to which they find points of contact with the other shared cultural spaces that united them. Wherever the multiculturalistic situation turns into a multitude of autonomous cultural identities without the necessary mutual interaction by means of which they transform and adapt in the direction of shared identity, the corresponding territory is under the threat of dangerous conflict, cultural discord, and disintegration.

References

1. Kuperus René (2007). 'How Do Small Countries Like Bulgaria and the Netherlands Survive Global Transformations and Preserve Tolerant Societies?' In: *Dialogue and Tolerance in Politics*, author Maxim Mizov, S., CIPI, the Alfred Moser Foundation and Foundation for Social Solidarity.
2. Malzahn S. C. (2006). 'Germany's Second Unification'. *Der Spiegel* Online, April 6.
3. Wischenbart Rüdiger. (2007). 'Kultur, Globalisierung und Vielfalt – Eine Fata Morgana.' *Perlentaucherer*, March 16.

Alexander Rahr¹

MODERN SITUATION IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE EU

A good speech should have both a good beginning and a good ending; and they should be as close as possible. I will keep to this rule so that we have time for a discussion.

This year we celebrate new Russia's 20th anniversary. Mikhail Gorbachev became President of the USSR 20 years ago. He initiated Perestroika. He destroyed the communist system and introduced first pluralistic institutions to the USSR. However, the USSR became bankrupt. The people were calling for more freedom than Gorbachev was going to give them.

¹ Director of the Berthold Beitz Centre at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), journalist, political analyst, Professor *honoris causa* of Moscow State University of Foreign Affairs. Author of biographies of M. S. Gorbachev (*Gorbatschow — der neue Mann*), V.V. Putin (*Vladimir Putin: A German in the Kremlin*), books *Russia Floors the Gas and Putin after Putin*. *Capitalist Russia on the Threshold of the New World Order*. Member of the Board of Directors of YES (Yalta European Strategy), member of the Valdai Club. A. Rahr is the laureate of the highest award of the FRG (Bundesverdienstkreuz) for his contribution to the development of German-Russian relations.

The USSR collapsed six years later. Communism was buried together with the conflict between the West and the East and with the Cold War.

Nobody could predict such a rapid collapse of communism. The change itself was so unexpected that member states and the world community did not have a chance to make necessary conclusions.

The West was celebrating its historic victory. Germany was reunited; the economic institutions and political security framework of the West were forwarded to Central Europe; the European Union turned to be the leading force with a common currency, and with its own President and Minister of Foreign Affairs starting from 2009.

Nowadays we are living in Europe that hasn't been half successful before. And this, as the history of the Continent

demonstrates, should not be taken for granted. Thanks God, the right decisions were made by the leading political leaders 20 years ago. Otherwise, we wouldn't be here today.

Europe won't be totally united until Russia joins in the positive reorganization. Let us focus on this topic today. What is happening to the population and the territory of the world's biggest country, Russia? Russia hasn't joined the new EU. On the contrary, the 2005–08 situation in Europe looked very much like a new Cold War against Russia. And it nearly started also. What was done in the wrong way?

A while ago four outstanding German experts on security issues of German Reunification (Deutsche Wiedervereinigung) – Völker Ruhe, Ulrich Weisser, General Klaus Naumann and Ambassador Frank Elbe – published the article in the German 'Der Spiegel' magazine where they expressed their support of Russia's joining NATO. This is a controversial issue for the West. However, there is no coherent discussion whatsoever on the future of NATO, on its self-rating, on its perspective strategic concept. Berlin doesn't express its opinion on the problem either, therefore, it doesn't encourage international debates.

The fact is that our community is scarcely informed about foreign policy and state security, therefore it shows little enthusiasm. The political domain of foreign policy is monotonously dull. There is a real fear of changes. At present, it is the first time in the history of Germany that it finds itself in such comfort and security. Germany needs only minimum effort to spend on its defence because of the US protection; so it feels safe in the world and doesn't have to be afraid of anyone in the world. Germany is counter-obliged to fight together with the USA against Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.

Let us focus back on Russia again. I support the idea that I heard expressed in Germany not once: the peaceful and prosperous Europe is impossible without or against Russia.

When the Cold War was over, Europe had got the opportunity to build a new home together with the Eastern European countries after the fall of communism. The outline for the new European peaceful settlement was established in the 1990 Paris Charter for New Europe. Some new regulations were required to be made to the Vienna Congress to provide a political basis for a historical unity of the united Europe. After the breach of the Warsaw Pact, NATO had either to dissolve itself or delegate its responsibility to OSCE, where all European countries are members, or to grant membership to all states of the Continent. The subsequent establishment was not a new united Europe, but a transatlantic union USA – Western Europe – Central Eastern Europe without Russia. Russia and the new sovereign post-Soviet space were excluded from the European socio-political frame. The Western Europeans, and the members of the Warsaw Pact for the first place, made a crucial decision to unite with the USA for military defence. They saw Russia as a former invader and at times as a foe. At the same time, the reunited Europe was not dislodging the USA, but saw it as the guardian angel. After Russia had experienced its isolation from European socio-political context at the end of the 1990s, it was making attempts to bring the EU back to the concept of the reunited European home. Two weeks after the dreadful September 11 attacks, the prospective alliance on energy and shared technological space – which basically was a free economic zone – were suggested to the EU at Bundestag by President Putin. A year later he proposed a visa-free regime between Russia and the EU, as well as a shared anti-missile shield against the South East. In 2008 President Medvedev proposed to the West a new defence treaty which would provide for a safe coexistence of the USA, NATO, the EU and Russia on the commonly shared continent.

Both Americans and Europeans can't and don't want to support these initiatives. They think there is no alternative to the socio-political network of Europe, with NATO and the EU as its nucleus. Russia is regarded as a weak figure in politics

and an unimportant figure on the world arena to be able to convince the West that the current defence system needs reconsideration and change.

To isolate Russia within the post-Soviet space – its original sphere of influence until 1991 – is still the off-the-record constituent part of the western politics. That is the main reason for the profound mistrust that makes it difficult to work out a positive programme in the spheres that need constructive collaboration. Iran and Afghanistan may serve as illustrations: Russia is reluctant to support the western policy for democratization of the Middle East, because it doesn't want to promote further strengthening of a unipolar world (headed by the USA).

NATO doesn't trust Russia and doesn't inform it on its operational plans in Afghanistan. NATO also keeps avoiding collaborative work within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) due to the unilateral support it gets from Moscow.

As for fighting Islamic extremism, the West doesn't take Russia seriously. Russia's territories are needed as a transit system for NATO; or Russia's sanctions against Iran are required.

Old European states, Germany and France for the first place, have been trying to accept the post-communist Russia; and they strive for a long-term union between western organizations and Russia. They see no reason for the isolation of Russia.

As long as consensus has been the main approach within NATO and the EU, the deadlock occurred. The situation was quite unsafe, because the old agreements between Russia and the West, who used to have reciprocal links during the first 20 year after the USSR collapsed, were being terminated. I refer to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Energy Charter, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements.

The situation changed all together in 2010. The relations between Russia and the West were much better compared to the previous period. The West stopped its talks about a new round of the Cold War. The USA and Russia activated the so-called 'reset' button and eased the tension between the two of them. The new US President Barak Obama opposes the policy of isolation throughout the post-Soviet space. He needs Russia as a partner to deal with the oncoming global challenges and conflicts, such as nuclear weapons in Iran, peaceful regulation in Afghanistan, and, finally, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Perhaps, Russia, the EU and the USA will soon have a shared anti-missile shield, owing to which Russia will get the guarantor power status.

The relations with Poland turned out to be a blessing in disguise. Poland was considered the main critic of Russia in the West. The Polish leaders were hampering the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between Russia and the EU; they also wanted NATO to control the energy supply in Europe and insisted on dissemination of NATO to the Caspian Sea. After the tragic plane crash that killed the Polish leaders near Smolensk, Moscow found the right words of consolation and gave Poland an important sign of reconciliation, so that the tragic event might become a starting point to weaken the tension. In future Poland might decide to reconsider its negative feelings towards Russia, so that the way to the true partnership in modernization of the EU–Russia would always be clear.

The case with the Ukraine shows the weakening of tension between Russia and the West. The West demonstrated that the reorientation of the Ukraine towards Russia didn't cause much anxiety. The new Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich made it explicitly clear that he terminates his predecessor's plans on joining NATO; and, as a result, he managed to get Russian gas at a much lower price. It may be well so, that in future the Ukraine will join the common free market zone of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belorussia. At earlier stages, such prospects used to bring about much discontent in the West; they

also were an indirect cause for the Orange revolution 5 years ago.

Russia is not a threat for the West any more. It does not sell anti-aircraft missiles to Iran; it does not cut off gas supplies to the Ukraine; it does not threaten Europe with the 'Chinese card' or with its own anti-missile shield in Kaliningrad.

Despite the economic reintegration of the former Soviet republics with Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belorussia remain sovereign states that are as close to the West as never before. The external situation is getting favourable for Russia's successful modernization. Western politicians offer Russia a vast partnership for its modernization, from technological exchange to active collaboration in the coming privatization of the former state property. Economic recession hasn't damaged cooperation. By all means, the West is looking for partnership in its own interest. Dominique Moisi, a French political scientist, argues that the transatlantic community is dramatically shrinking. The economic strength of the Asian countries, first of all, of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) is likely to catch up with the European economy in the next 10 years. Today, 13 per cent of the world population live in the West and produce 40 per cent of the world gross product. In 10 to 15 years the BRIC countries will be making more than 40 per cent of the world gross product.

Europe and the USA have to get ready for a new world order, where decisions will be taken not only in New York, London and Brussels, but also in Beijing, Delhi and Moscow.

Igor Yurgens, Advisor to President Dmitry Medvedev, Head of the Institute of Contemporary Development, explains what Russia wants from the West: free movement of capital, services and work force should be in the focus of the relations between Russia and the West. The EU–Russia relations are scheduled like follows: Russia's WTO accession, Russia's OECD accession, new agreements on partnership and cooperation within Belgian Presidency of the EU, the establishment of a free economic zone, and, finally, a probable associate membership in the EU. It is evident that both sides should be more active in approaching these; and visa-free regime is the priority for Russia. D. Medvedev, by his decree, could integrate some elements of European economy management into the Russian modernization strategy. A lot of economic laws of Russia contradict the EU laws. Russia wants to expand security partnerships. This has been already initiated by France. I. Yurgens says that within a 15-year period Russia may join the transformed NATO.

We just have to wait and see. The EU–Russia Summit is coming. It will be the second summit held in accordance with the regulations of the Lisbon Treaty. Will the EU and Russia manage to make up a new schedule for innovations, with the help of the new instruments of foreign policy and of conservation security programmes? This is the matter of trust between the Europeans within the EU countries.

Nowadays there is only one way to build a solid all-European defence framework: Russia, the EU and NATO should negotiate a common strategy in Europe. Such negotiations may take another 10 years, but in the end Russia may well join Europe. The negotiations may bring in the atmosphere of trust; they may also neutralize the geopolitical antagonism that has recently strengthened over the post-Soviet space.

Sometimes the westerners ask that naïve and silly question: Can Russia cut off our gas supply? There is something to be said about this. The gas controversy between Russia and the Ukraine in 2006 and 2009 was connected with transit, but not with the supply of gas. Russia wanted to supply its gas to Europe, while the Ukraine, a transit state, blocked the gas supply. The Ukraine was taking gas from the transit pipeline. Russia cut off gas to the Ukraine to avoid a considerable loss. A Western electricity supplier would also cut off gas to a house-owner who doesn't pay his bills. Anyway, Russia has never cut off gas

to the Western Europe, not even during the Cold War, not during its own economic collapse at the beginning of the 1990s.

The West habitually points its finger at Russia, and reproaches Moscow of its self-will at the energy domain. One cannot but admit the fact that Russia does make use of its abundant energetic resources on which Europe becomes more and more dependent as an instrument to get its world supremacy back. But a detailed scrutiny shows that such countries as the Ukraine, for example, have become skilled at making use of their monopoly on the gas transit from Russia to Europe, in their own political interest. A while ago the Ukraine was only glad to play a victim to stand a better chance to join NATO and the EU.

Why didn't the Ukraine pay its debt for gas to Russia, thereby initiating the gas crisis? Why does the Ukraine refuse to pay the world commercial price? Why is Kiev waiting for concessions from Russia, at the same time provoking the mighty neighbour by its own intentions to join NATO?

Both sides of the gas conflict, Russia and the Ukraine, have considerably damaged their image: Russia because it cut off gas supply to Europe, and the people in the Balkans were freezing for the first time since World War II. After the Orange revolution the favourable attitude of the West to the Ukraine shrank considerably – the Ukraine stained its reputation as a transit state; in future it will also face no opportunity to have new pipelines on its territory.

The EU is going to be more careful than before about collaboration in energy supply. The EU doesn't fancy any further energy dependence on Russia; on the other hand, the EU doesn't want to suspend its relations with Russia either. Next year Russian gas will be delivered to Europe through the new Baltic Sea pipeline. The construction of this pipeline was substantially justified in the context of the Ukraine's actions.

It is the intention of the new Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovich, to weaken the tension in the relations with Moscow, at the same time it not his intention to go cap in hand to the Kremlin. V. Yanukovich suggested a trilateral administration of the 37,000-kilometre pipeline in the Ukraine. In his view, Russian and European companies along with Ukrainian companies should have a 30-percent share. This idea had appeared before the Orange revolution. A trilateral company could then modernize the old pipeline equipment on the territory of the Ukraine; it could also take the mutual control over the gas transit to Europe. If this project had been implemented, we wouldn't have witnessed the notorious conflicts over gas. But V. Yushchenko regarded the national gas network as the symbol of the Ukrainian sovereignty that should never be owned, even partially, by Russia.

When the financial problems of the Ukraine became so evident that there was no place for the reference to the usurping of the transit system by Kiev, V. Yushchenko suggested a bilateral administrative mode to the EU, without Gazprom, by which he enraged Russia again.

As a response to the Ukraine's attempts to use the transportation monopoly in its own political interest, Russia deliberately started the pipeline construction bypassing the Ukraine and other transit states in Central Europe. The North Stream pipeline in the Baltic Sea and the South Stream pipeline in the Black Sea are almost ready for a start-up. Yanukovich was quick to realize that these pipelines will most seriously affect the Ukraine's economy. Gas transit makes up a significant part in the Ukrainian budget. Therefore, right after his coming into office Yanukovich tried persuading Russia to drop its plan about the South Stream construction. Being in the defensive position, the head of the Ukrainian government not only allowed Russia to use the Ukrainian pipeline, but also enabled it to supply gas directly to the Ukrainian clients. On the contrary, the EU keeps its market closed to Russia.

V. Yanukovich has received support from Russia to deal with the domestic economic problems. Russian investors are welcome in the Ukraine again. The new Ukrainian President knows how to negotiate with Russia. For the first place, Russia opposes the Ukraine joining NATO. The thought that Kiev, 'the mother of Russian cities', will become part of the Western military alliance is quite painful for Russia. V. Yanukovich perceives the attitude of Russian government and declares his state free from the dissemination of NATO. The Ukraine should neither join NATO, nor join the Collective Security Treaty of the CIS. Russia and the Ukraine have extended the rental agreement, which would expire in 2017, on Russia's Black Sea Fleet's lease of the naval base in Sevastopol further till 2042.

International energy supply policy has become a crucial factor of the European security. The organizations and political figures who used to deal with armament and disarmament are now experts in energy supply. The debates over energy supply policies have become quite politicized. Due to the controversies, the images of 'friend' and 'foe' are created that bear resemblance to the Cold War stereotypes.

Energy supply policy is, at the same time, the basis that can strategically connect Russia and Europe (or the West). Just as 50 years ago, after World War II, Germany and France, the two sworn enemies, initiated the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and, therefore, following the pragmatic economic interests, provided the economic basis for the all-Europe integration, the energy supply alliance with Russia would allow the EU to implement a long-term integration project.

Strategic partnership of both parties, strengthening the ties between the EU and Russia on the basis of mutual interest, can be achieved through partnership in energy supply. If this partnership is successful, it can be extended into such spheres as armament, atomic and machine industry. Almost 10 years ago President V. Putin in his speech to the German Reichstag proposed to the Europeans the establishment of a

commonly shared technological space that would provide for energy security. For some time the Russian government believed that Russia could modernize its economy without the assistance from the West. Nowadays, V. Putin and President D. Medvedev have critically reconsidered this issue and are ready to cooperate with Europe and the USA in the modernization programme.

Energy remains the main framework for modernization in Russia. In terms of cooperation with the West, European companies can be more involved in the development of modernization technologies. On the other hand, the EU could admit Gazprom and other energy corporate groups to its market. Upstream investments into Russian economy are profitable for the Western companies. In turn, Russian corporate groups want to supply gas directly to their clients through downstream transactions.

There is nothing else standing in the way of the EU–Russia partnership in modernization.

Of course, not all that glitters in Russia is gold. There are serious problems with the establishment of the constitutional state, corruption and the spread of xenophobia among its population. Indeed, Russia is not a democratic state; the civil society has not yet been formed, and it has no true freedom of speech as in the West. Parliament is subordinate to the executive power, while the legislative power is still not independent.

However, we should recall the condition of Russia 25 years ago, prior to M. Gorbachev's coming to power. The country was a dictatorship that threatened us with nuclear warheads. This epoch is gone, and we should give Russia, that is going through a troublesome transformation period, more time and show more patience. The starting point for Germany was May 1945; and civil society was not built in a day.

Napoleon Bonaparte once said that 'there are thieves who cannot be punished, and who steal the most precious thing from you, your time'. I hope I haven't stolen your precious time.

H. Reznik¹

ANTINOMIES OF A SOCIAL STATE

1. The Constitution of the Russian Federation proclaimed Russia a social state apparently 'to grow into'. The post-totalitarian country, which in 1993 went through economic reforms as urgent as painful, which avoided a civil war, asserted its aspiration to establish the supremacy of law and create all conditions for its citizens to live worthy lives. However, today these norms, as expressed in principles and in goals, significantly diverge from reality.

For the country to develop successfully towards the strengthening of the constitutional order, the protection of human rights and freedoms, the growth of citizens' welfare, the ability to correlate the principles of the rule-of-law state and the principles of the social-welfare state will be critical in practical policy, because they are essentially contradictory: the former refer to formal equality and the rule of law in a so-called material sense, the latter mean redistribution of the national income in favour of the socially vulnerable.

Constitutional lawyers almost universally point out this contradiction and warn against the risk of giving too broad a definition of a social state, the risk being especially great for our country in regard to its recent Soviet past with its state paternalism and totally regulated economy existing in it.

2. The excessive presence of the state in the economy and the preservation of the population's paternalistic, spongy

er moods, which became most evident in the first decade of the 21st century, represent the present-day reality.

Powerful objective factors facilitated such a situation. The income to be distributed must be earned. Early 1990s struck a heavy blow at most citizens, particularly at those employed in state-financed organizations and pensioners. In the second half of the decade Gaidar's reforms started to bring positive results and the middle class sprouted in the country. It is small business that helped Russia survive the default of 1998 at the lowest cost. And then oil prices skyrocketed. It is to the inflow of oil money that public-sector employees owe for the growth of their salaries, pensions, housing construction for military men.

But the millennium's first years of 'fat lot' also witnessed a proliferation of bureaucracy, redistribution of property and growing involvement of the state in the economy (public corporations, controlling interest and block equity holding in large enterprises), a rampant corruption hampering entrepreneurial business. Mentality of the resource-based economy restrains private businesses. Naturally, small business investments in the development of their enterprises have been decreasing since 2005. Even considerable allocation of state funds to support small businesses were not able to stop this tendency in the critical year of 2008. The number of small businesses continued to fall in 2009 and 2010. Many bankrupt entrepreneurs sheltered themselves under the wing of the state, pushing up the number of employees in state-financed institutions and companies. According to statistical surveys, over 60 per cent of the popula-

¹ President of the Bar of Moscow, Chair of the Legal Profession at the Academy University for Law under the Institute for State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, *LL.M.*, *Lawyer Emeritus* of the Russian Federation.

tion today receive salary from the state. Development of economically independent middle class came to a halt, the material gap widened. Authorities favour the social structure where poor state employees prevail, whose standard of living, albeit slightly, still goes up. People are becoming aware that certain improvement of their condition is due to goodwill administration rather than their own initiative. Paternalistic mood is gaining momentum, and the memories of the 'shock' of the 1990s are ideologically exploited to discredit liberal values while the empty treasury inherited from the collapsed USSR and the oil price at 8 dollars (not 108!) per barrel are hushed up.

3. The reaction of young people to the current situation is telling. In the 1990s the most popular careers were those of an economist and a lawyer, while now applicants flood colleges and departments of public service. Images of mansions and foreign cars owned by state and security officials have impressed the minds of the younger generation. Apparently, young people with such an attitude will question innovations and modernization.

Hereby, the first decade of this century demonstrated that an inexhaustible oil fountain provides both growth of public-sector salaries and corruption – easy money is never tight. Hopefully, the authorities will realize the colossal damage caused by corruption not only to economic development of the country, but also to the people's morals, and, finally, not in words but in deeds, will fight against it, without relying on falling oil prices.

4. Following the crisis of 2008, social problems cannot seem to be pulled out by oil prices alone. In similar situations, raising taxes might be the only remedy. But Russia in this regard confirmed its uniqueness once more. With graduated tax, the treasury was filling slower than with the flat thirteen percent introduced in 2000. The reasonable decision was not to increase it, for achieving the intended figures seems an improbable task. Instead, from January 1 this year the social tax has been increased – for small businesses it has risen from 14 up to 34 percent. For the majority of small business owners, the consequences of these soaring figures are predictable – they mean being kicked out from the market.

Taxation is probably the acutest and most painful question of government policy. Legal culture of democratic countries envisages a particularly thorough procedure of amending the tax burden: discussions in the media, heated parliamentary debates, negotiations between employers and trade unions. At our Duma, everything went smoothly: with almost no debates, with the voices of small and medium-sized businesses muted.

5. In a legal state, the rights and freedoms of man are ultimate values. A special place among natural and inalienable rights is reserved for the right of possessing private property. It is the recognition of the right to possess capital goods that

historically determined the progress of freedom, formation of an independent individual who is endowed with inherent dignity. The obligation of every person to pay taxes and levies established by law, must not turn into an excessive taxation substituting legal principles by a 'redistribution ecstasy' in a social legal state. The right for private property is guaranteed by the Constitution. With regard to it, important precedents were set up by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation. In two resolutions (February 1998 and December 1999) passed over the grievances of self-employed citizens – small business owners, farmers, lawyers and notaries – the Constitutional Court recognized a six-fold increase of the insurance payments to the Pension Fund of the Russian Federation a limitation of the right for private property violating the constitutional principle of legal equality of citizens.

6. In Russian journalism the concept of radical and liberal state is in the crosshairs of criticism – this kind of state is viewed as the 'night watchman' minimizing its interference with the economic and social life by a targeted aid to the most vulnerable groups of population. One should not, however, forget the response to this criticism suggested some time ago by Ludwig von Mises: 'It is difficult to understand why the 'state as a night watchman' should be more absurd or wrong than the state that looks after making sauerkraut, buttons for pants or publishing newspapers.'

7. Political and private rights, property and freedom of enterprise – the so-called rights of the first generation – are different indeed from the rights of the second generation – economic, social and cultural by the degree of their juridical definiteness: many of them are defined in a generalized or even declarative manner – they cannot be presented in court to be defended. The other is also correct: if the structure of a liberal state is not able to provide the solution of vital problems concerning labour, housing and healthcare, the majority of population loses confidence in it and a liberal state gives way to an authoritarian one. The value of liberal rights and freedoms must be in the minds of both strong and independent citizens and ordinary average citizens devoid of any ideology in their unpoliticized everyday life.

8. The growth of the middle class must be a strategic goal of economic and social policy of the Russian state. Historical experience of social and legal states proves that this is the best way to overcome mass poverty. Middle class is the basis for modernization. This class takes care of its economic problems and does not need privileges. What it needs is freedom of enterprise guarded by the state. But the latter must conduct its dialogue with this class in a respectful, not paternalistic manner as with a partner and not a blind cripple who needs to be led by the hand.

A. Safonov¹

DEMOGRAPHIC CHALLENGES FOR THE ECONOMY AND LABOUR MARKET IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

Dear colleagues! Using academician Guseynov's and academician Styopin's constantly repeated terms, one should note that at present time Russia is accelerating in the transition from a traditional to an anthropogenic type of civilization; the transition is coming to its end in the context of the formation of global culture.

¹ Deputy Minister of Healthcare and Social Development of the Russian Federation, Professor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Economics) Class 3 Active State Advisor of the Russian Federation.

Author of a number of textbooks, instruction materials and reference books: 'Management of Social Expenditures: Actual Problems and Modern Tendencies,' 'Modern State of Social Labour Relations in Russia and Prospects of Their Development'. Head of collectives of authors of encyclopaedias and proceedings on job safety and work conditions, social insurance, managing social expenditures.

It may not seem surprising that culturecentrism has become one of the most striking characteristics of the annual Likhachov conference held on these premises. As an empirical scholar I would like to attract your attention to certain aspects of how factors outside culture influence the situation in the country: demographical challenges of our time that bring forth migration flows and generation imbalances that obviously impact the evolution of the country.

When discussing development of economics and labour market in the Russian Federation it is necessary to focus on quite a critical challenge: overall ageing of the population. This tendency appeared as long as in the times of the Soviet Un-

ion. However, after its collapse, the situation worsened. Among other things, owing to the fact that it was typical of the European territory of the Soviet Union to have a low level of birth-rate and it was no longer balanced by a high birth-rate in the republics of Central Asia.

1. Proportion and number of performers of the retirement age

In the period from 1990 to 2010 the number of senior citizens of the retirement age grew by 11.1 per cent. Whereas total population decreased by 3.9 per cent during this period. Proportion of senior citizens of the retirement age in total population of Russia during the period from 1990 to 2010 has increased from 18.7 per cent to 21.6 per cent, or by 2.9 per cent.

The number of senior citizens of the retirement age in the period from 1992 to 2009 increased by 13.9 per cent, while the total number of the employed decreased by 2.4 per cent during this period. The rate of senior citizens of the retirement age in the total labour participation rate in the period from 1992 to 2009 increased from 6.6 per cent to 7.7 per cent, or by 1.1 per cent. Whereas the minimal rate of performers of the retirement age in the total number of labour participation rate was 5.4 per cent (1995); the maximal rate was 7.7 per cent (2009). The largest rate among performers of the retirement age belongs to women. Their rate in the total labour participation rate increased in the period from 1992 to 2009 from 64.0 per cent to 74.6 per cent, or by 10.6 per cent. The rate of male performers decreased during this period from 36.0 per cent to 25.4 per cent, or by 10.6 per cent.

Considering the rate of performers of the retirement age in the total labour participation rate, one can see that the rate of male performers decreased from 2.4 per cent to 1.9 per cent, or by 0.5 per cent, while the rate of female performers increased from 4.2 per cent to 5.7 per cent, or by 1.5 per cent.

When featuring the rate of performers of the retirement age, it should be pointed out that during the period from 1992 to 2009 the rate of performers of the retirement age increased from 21.5 per cent to 25.8 per cent, or by 4.3 per cent. Whereas the rate of male performers of the retirement age decreased from 26.5 per cent to 23.5 per cent, or by 3 per cent, while the rate of female performers increased from 19.5 per cent to 26.6 per cent, or by 7.1 per cent.

This tendency creates a range of grave challenges both for an economic growth of Russia and for a social policy in general.

2. Economic challenges

(A) The most obvious is the decrease in the level and quality of consumption of people. Retirement and termination of the employment contracts largely decrease families' incomes. Average salary level in 2010 was 21 193 roubles, while average retirement benefit was consequently 7476 roubles or 35.6 per cent of the average salary. So, decrease in the labour participation rate and increase in the rate of the retired (who are not engaged in labour activities) will, under otherwise equal conditions, prevent the growth of aggregate consumption of people.

Two extra factors should be kept in mind: Russian pensioners, unlike those from the developed countries, do not have personal savings under the Defined Contribution Pension System; and consumer needs are exported by labour migrants from outside Russia replacing pensioners at the labour market to the countries of their permanent residence (according to the data from the Central Bank of Russia, it was \$13 billion in 2009, and \$14 billion in 2010).

A lower level of income of senior citizens of retirement age changes the structure of consumption, too. The main expenditure item is utility bills and basic consumer goods (food staff, cheap clothes, medicines). On average, these expendi-

ture items make over 72 per cent in the aggregate consumption structure.

The consumption structure also becomes very dependable on utility bills rise. Because this type of expenses cannot be effectively managed by citizens. Living in apartment houses (over 71 per cent of families) or lack of funds to upgrade heating systems chiefly make people automatically increase their expenses on this item following the rise in prices on energy, heating and water supply.

In its turn, it promotes a negative effect on the industries involved in manufacturing time proof goods (residential construction; advanced household appliances; communication facilities; computers; cars and so on) together with service industries. For example, in the structure of expenses of this group of people average expenses on purchasing household appliances total 1 per cent; on purchasing means of transport 0.1 per cent; leisure services 0.8 per cent; education 1.1 per cent; eating out 1.2 per cent; housekeeping services 1.1 per cent. So the rise in the structure of senior citizens of the retirement age decreases an aggregate potential of development of innovative industries in the Russian Federation due to a decrease in income and amount of consumer needs.

(B) Changes in gender and age structure towards citizens of the retirement age also decrease potentialities of budget revenue from personal income taxes.

In particular, it is connected with a constant salary decrease for performers of the retirement age. For example, according to the data from the Russian Committee on Statistics, in 2009 the level of salary of performers over 60 years old was 11 per cent as low as compared to an average salary. According to estimated data, for personal income taxes in 2008 it totalled in 14.7 billion roubles of potential decrease of income, while for consolidated social tax over 29 billion roubles consequently.

Alongside with that, senior citizens of retirement age due to a low level of income become one of the main 'consumers' of social welfare: housing allowances; rehabilitation services; medical health services; other social allowances.

(C) Increase in the rate of performers of the retirement age leads to decrease in labour efficiency under otherwise equal conditions. It is related to many circumstances:

- decrease in efficiency of vocational education and occupational retraining of performers of the retirement age (an employer's expenditure on this item evens itself out over a much longer time);

- objective physiological limitation to intensive labour (it especially concerns performers operating in the industries with a high rate of manual labour);

- constraints on performers of the retirement age at production units with dangerous and hard working conditions (due to the body's decrease in adaptive abilities).

One of the aftermaths of scientific and technological revolution is an accelerated process of depreciation and obsolescence of performers' skills and qualifications.

Advances in innovation processes in the field of modern manufacturing are accompanied by advances in positions of employment towards higher degrees of professional awareness. Alongside with that, there occurs a boost in the process of renewing performers' qualifications. For example, according to the estimates of foreign experts, the majority of performers have to change the occupation and qualification no less than 4 to 5 times during labour life to keep up with the changes in professional sphere,¹ and it demands advancement in educational and vocational training to enhance professional mobility of the performers.

Nowadays the rate of obsolescence of knowledge is about 4 times as high as the rate of knowledge renewal within one generation. To keep up with qualifications and meet the needs of present-day life, a performer has to spend at least 4 to

¹ Employment for the 1990s. White Paper. L.: HMSO, p. 12.

6 hours per week on studying the latest achievements in his professional field.

In present-day world 'operational lifetime' of qualifications and skill is very short. For example, in the academic literature of the USA one can detect a special unit to measure obsolescence of professional competence, the so-called 'half-life of knowledge'. The term means the amount of time after graduation that has to elapse before a performer's competence decreases by 50 per cent due to obsolescence of the knowledge gained and generation of new information.

For example, loss of knowledge value in the 18th century took place during the life of 10 generations, so during the life of one generation approximately only 10 per cent of knowledge gained in the youth grew obsolescent. By the middle of the 20th century knowledge had lost half of its value in a 5–6 year period, or it grew 97 per cent obsolescent during the productive life of a graduate. At the turn of the 80s and 90s this period was 5 to 6 years for engineers at enterprises with forward technologies, while for doctors and biologists the period was only 3 to 4 years. Nowadays permanent skill improvement becomes crucial for a performer to keep up with his qualification.

We live in a dynamically changing world where knowledge quickly grows obsolescent. 'The half-life of knowledge' in the most advanced branches of industries is less than 2.5 years. Generation of new information leads to changes of business environments, which makes the company and its staff change as well.

If in the early 20th century a university graduate felt professionally confident for 20–30 years, by the early 21st century 'the half-life of knowledge' has decreased to 5 years!

According to the data from American economists, annual knowledge outdated is 5 per cent for theoretical and 20 per cent for practical knowledge that engineers, doctors, biologists and other professional performers possess. American research showed that obsolescence of knowledge of a graduating engineer in 1940 was 12 years, that of a graduate in 1960 was 8–10 years, while that of a graduate in the 1970s was 4–5 years. For a graduate in the early 21st century obsolescence of knowledge is 2–3 years due.

Recent studies have identified that about 20 per cent of knowledge is annually lost after graduation. Its quick obsolescence is traced in various fields. For example, in metal works industry knowledge grows obsolescent every 3.9 years; in mechanical engineering industry every 5.2 years; in chemical industry every 4.8 years, in advertising every 5 years, in business every 2 years and so on.

So acceleration of scientific and technological advance naturally raises the issue of economic appropriateness of professional training for senior citizens of the retirement age and of their average physical abilities to provide quick professional adaptation to new technologies and knowledge.

3. Challenges of social policy

General tendency of population ageing raises a very grave issue of potentialities of various directions of social policy.

First of all, it concerns labour policy.

Among the main challenges are:

- low demand from employers and discrimination;
- low territorial and inter-sector mobility;
- low level of adaptation to changes in social status.

In particular, it is more difficult for senior citizens of the retirement age to find a job. To a certain extent, employers realize a discrimination policy towards this stratum. As it was

stated above, it is related to their abilities to adapt quickly to new technological needs; to the level of production efficiency; economic wisdom of expenditures on their professional retraining. Besides, the society has certain stereotypes in operation that also form the policy of employers towards recruitment of performers above 60 years old.

So, a typical situation for this stratum is a longer period of job hunting in case of job loss and quite often mandatory early retirement. Employment promotion programmes naturally become more expensive and less effective.

Besides, employers understand a high level of dependence of senior-age performers on their usual work places and deliberately decrease operational facilities for this stratum (level of wages, job positions).

Another aspect is an objectively low inter-sector and territorial mobility of senior citizens of the retirement age. Performers of the retirement age do not tend to change the place of dwelling. It can be explained by their established family relations, traditional life style, and other social and psychological traits. This factor affects both the labour market and the potentialities of retraining programmes and inter-regional programmes of overpopulation.

The stratum in concern is also more psychologically sensitive to social status changes. In its turn, it imposes restrictions on job seeking programmes related to changes in requirements to the level of education and social status.

It is quite natural that the abovementioned peculiarities of conduct of senior citizens of the retirement age at the labour market make state programmes of job seeking more expensive, and the result of those programmes is more short-termed.

In the system of rehabilitation the population aging leads to extra expenditures, because at an elderly age chronic diseases aggravate and general health status decreases. The structure of medical services also changes towards the involvement of complex advanced technologies and increase in the duration and frequency of medical services.

Increase in the number of senior citizens of the retirement age leads to increase in expenditures concerning the system of nursing homes for the valetudinarian and disabled. It raises the issue of seeking for stable funding sources for the whole sphere of social welfare. For example, in the West European countries such expenditures are financed through a special payroll tax.

Naturally, one of the main challenges for the social policy is balanced retirement benefits. This challenge is not a feature peculiar only for the Russian Federation. It is typical of many economically developed countries. An attempt to solve this problem through increase in the retirement age faces obstacles in the form of restrictions of labour policy and employers' attitude towards senior citizens. Apart from that, recruitment of senior citizens of the retirement age competes with recruitment of the young.

So, the analysis carried out here shows that demographical situation provides a range of grave challenges for a stable social and economic development of the Russian Federation. I believe this is a vast area for conflict studies: the abovementioned demographical problems can promote the tension between the migrants' flows and the permanent residents of various regions of the country. It should be foreseen and measures should be undertaken to prevent it. It is important to consider the potentialities of the inter-generation tension and conflicts related to both hardships of growing mature for the young and adaptation to new realities for the elderly. Social stability will much depend on effective tools and solutions to these problems.

Reza Sajjadi¹

THE URGENCY OF DIALOGUE BETWEEN ISLAM AND CHRISTIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH FOR THE SAKE OF SAFETY AND SECURITY

It has been common practice with the oppressors of all times to find and use different excuses for their own blunders before the public opinion as well as to set the stage for further actions. This practice is illustrated by the use of various widespread public fears and phobias, such as the fear of evil spirits or wizards, the fear of God or other gods and the fear of natural disasters.

When World War II was over, almost all the world, but not the USA, was in ruins. It was the time when America had got a chance to dominate the world. Such domination presupposed, besides economic and cultural measures, the US military presence. And the USA justified their presence in different parts of the world under the pretext of the fight against communism. In this context the USSR and Soviet people were pictured as abominable monsters. This image was so vivid that even 20 years after perestroika was launched, it is not faded. But when the USSR collapsed, the communist monster died, and no longer had the USA a valid excuse for their actions and

threats to the whole world. So, they invented another monster, a monster of Islam and Islamic terrorism.

They invaded Afghanistan, as they put it, to fight terrorism. It happened in the context when there was no reliable information either on al-Qaeda, organized by the USA themselves, or on the events of 9/11. A lot of people in America believe that the US intelligence designed the September 11th attack and ascribed it to Islamic terrorism. Today they are trying to pull the North Caucasus into the crisis using the assistance of the Wahhabis (the representatives of Radical Islam supported by the USA) and the US money (in the framework of the United States Agency for International Development, USAID). However, public opinion is taking the whole situation as a fight against Islamic terrorism.

To avoid the trap set by the USA, it is urgent that the leaders of two religions, Islam and Christian Orthodoxy, start a series of dialogues and serious negotiations and increase their congregation with the help of mutual understanding and respect.

Mehdi Sanai²

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN GLOBALISM CONDITIONS

Theoretic View

Globalization is a meaning for procedure of developments occurred in the 2nd half of 20th century in the world and caused to decrease role of countries, nations and internal rules and increase international rules and procedures. This meaning of current procedure of global changes under title of globalization, which has been more developed in the recent 2 decades, attracted several thinkers and different theories have been presented in this regard.

This procedure affected on internal political issues, local economy and local cultures. Conflict of globalization and cultures and affecting their roles among societies under their dominance is one of the abovementioned issues. This short essay intends to answer this question: Where is the position of dialogue of cultures in globalism era?

As an introduction, first we discuss about main subject of globalism. Not much time has been passed from applying globalism word. In 1961, a valid dictionary (Webster) presented some definitions about globalism and globalization for the first time. Anyway, using this word has been limit up to the latest decade of 20th century.

Globalism is generally using in three fields. Sometimes, it means economy globalism with system of global free market and international economic structures. Main influence of economy globalism is on global Trade Organization which its structure and rules contain national and local economies. 2nd

aspect is globalism of information revolution which has been occurred and as the result and by applying information technology, internet and electronic mail, distances has decreased and the world changed to a unit village. The 3rd aspect is cultural globalism. Global culture has been created from theories, values and common ideals and appeared in form of art, music and common kind of cloths. This common culture outruns from many cases of national cultures and religions.

Thinkers have different ideas about globalism. Some people face globalism as titles of a project. That is, globalism has been designed and created previously by westerns especially USA for continuing dominance on the world and this procedure developed during the recent decades. Other group considers globalism as a process which has formed during a period. They discourse about globalism of capital in 16th and 17th centuries and believe that the current process is continuation of the former processes and says that we shall consider profits and losses. Based on this idea, globalism is a process and globalization is a project.

Distinction of globalism and globalization could make the current changes analyzable. In globalism favorite, eagerness and will of nations and governments are important and it is a procedure accepted by the countries and they get along with that. However in globalization force and threat are existed and this project raises objections in the majority of the world areas.

The fact is that distinction of globalism and globalization is difficult and this procedure is currently developing by applying modern tools rapidly. In fact, even without using force, globalism influences tendency and demand of societies.

Considering these difficulties, we know that for analyzing dialogue of cultures in globalism conditions we shall consider globalism and its dimensions precisely and then analyze these conditions based on dialogue of cultures.

Globalism: Dimensions & Specifications

When we discuss about globalism, it means that role of the over-national elements is increase in policy of all countries and global affairs. Globalism is increasing over-national elements

¹ Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Russian Federation. B. Sc. (Electronics) and M. Sc. (Management). Mr. Sajjadi occupied executive positions in the office of the President of Iran. Author of a number of scholarly works devoted to issues of politics, scientific and technological development, shipbuilding, engineering in oil, gas and other strategic industries, nano- and biotechnologies, promotion of cooperation between universities and branches of industry.

² Member of Parliament of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Director of the Research Centre for Russia and Eastern Europe at the University of Tehran (Iran), Professor of the Law Institute at Tehran University, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies). He is the author of books: *Along the Great Silk Road... Encounters on the Kazakh Land, Relations between Iran and the CIS Countries of Central Asia: Social, Political and Economic Aspects, The Muslim Law and Politics* (a study guide), *Relations between Iran and Russia*, and of numerous scientific articles. He is the honorary member of the Writers' Union in Russia, a member of Kazakh Academy for Social Sciences, an advisor to *The Encyclopaedia of Islamic World on Russia, Central Asia and the Caucasus*.

inside societies, countries and their policies. However, this evolution has broader dimensions. In fact the mentioned evolution can change relation of human and his environment. In view of John Tomlinson meaning of this movement from a limit view toward an open view is not passing a 'local discipline' to a 'super Discipline', but its meaning is more effectiveness of communication, transportation and then extending 'mutual relation' between humans. For instance, development of communications and communication tools and also increasing transportation systems create possibility of communication between far distances, different political unions and new cultures. Oxford believes that globalism is a set of processes which 'press' the world and help formation of a 'unit world'. It is emphasized that this 'unit world' is not a steady world but a 'world faces to increasing and expanding relation and unity'.

Theoreticians of 'globalism' has emphasized on meaning of 'mutual relation' as well as extending state of 'interconnectedness'. They believe that relations between different parts of the world are improving. Because globalism in different fields (such as exchanging goods, capital and services, communication between people, knowledge, mode and even organized crime and etc.) is in practice to develop. Increase of mutual relations and phenomenon of global interconnectedness cause to growing over-national systems. These systems increase boundaries due to separation of individuals' profits based on national, tribal and other divisions. On the other side, globalism will bring increase of numbers of 'global common dangers'. These common dangers, such as dangers due to 'environmental crisis' or dangers due to 'nuclear wars', are considered as structural and their limits of effectiveness is not limited to a special region or place, but they affect all over the world. If we consider globalism not as a kind of 'world integration' and 'global unification' but as 'placing in a global frame', so we considered globalism as a normal aspect.

From one side the above-mentioned meaning of globalism will lead toward decreasing control of governments on their citizens. This matter could be seen in the field of economy by development of foreign investment in international level. However it does not limit to this field and has been extended to cultural territories. By development of satellite channels, internet and cultural privatization, cultural control of governments on the society has been declined and different political and cultural messages are exchanged among the societies more and more. But meaning of all these evolutions is not formation of 'global culture'.

The 2nd consequence of globalism is increasing local-global relation. That is, each event in one part of the world could attract interest of the entire world and thus social relations will be improved. In this state, globalism means increase of global social relations which close far parts together in a manner that when an event occurs beyond several kilometers, effect of which is on all parts of the world. Exactly like that event occurred in a local area. On the other hand, globalism has inconsistent effects on balances between person-nation-global. It means that balance among government - nations has changed due to appearance of over-national forces on one side and on the other side balance among person and government-nation has changed inversely. Thus, tribalism and tribe tendencies play a role in harming governments through tendency to separation.

Giddens believes that globalism process has no contradiction with rationalism tendencies and this is a globalism and makes contradiction. Globalism process causes that people feel 'differences' more and be more sensitive against them. This sensitiveness arise objections. So we shall not emphasize on convergent aspects of globalism, because divergent aspect may be unconsidered. For instance cultural globalism could not remove meaning of borders in real world but causes to several conflicts in different areas of the world for strengthening that

or creating new borders. Identity has taken more 'real' meaning in many cases. On one side some problems are remaining in the world which will not be resolved by cultural globalism. Events occurred on 11 September shows this fact. With development of globalism we shall consider that economic analysis of globalism could not be enough and cultural analysis of globalism should be also considered.

Now it shall be attended that what relation could be formed between globalism process and culture, as per its general meaning. Notwithstanding differences and its wide variety, we can categorize relation of culture and globalism or cultural reactions to this process into three groups.

Cultural similarity: This reaction to globalism is a kind of passivity and permutation. In this relation cultures generally become passive against globalism process and lose their traits while accepting new culture. This reaction is normally considered as a result of economic globalism under dominance of capitalism global system and multinational companies.

Cultural Specialism: One other type of relation between globalism and culture could be investigated under title of cultural specialism. In contrary with cultural similarity or integration theory, some of theoreticians believe that cultural reaction against globalism process is not passivity and capitulation. In many cases cultural reaction is accompanying resistance and even stressful objection which is generally expressed as recourse to lingual, religious, tribal and racial identifier elements. In the other words, globalism process can organize some aspects of life in modern society while reinforcing and surviving cultural and personal differences.

Cultural Combination & Evolution: The 3rd type of reaction to global process is analyzed with title of cultural combination and evolution. In fact we can not consider the complex and variable cultural world only as a combat or passivity field. Globalism process in cultural view, despite cultural globalization, could put cultures and existed identities together and its result is a kind of relation, symbiosis and competition. This kind of reaction, which is generally expressed under titles such as hybridization, translation and offensive, believes that cultures are neither omit in globalism procedure nor return to their first roots but they could remain by evolution and combination with other cultures.

For describing the above matters we can say that local life has a significant role in human societies even today and this status is continuing in globalism conditions. Tomlinson in globalism and culture book use global phrase of 'Localization' narrated from Roland Robertson. That is the same 'dichotomy' hidden in meaning of globalism. In fact, various societies become global. However, at the same time globalism will become localized. It means that a society, which globalism pervaded to, absorb it and in the other words globalism absorb localization but shows itself in a cultural way. In this meaning, globalism does not mean procedure of connection between societies as a result of a global culture which connect them, but globalism is a procedure of voluntary connection among societies which try to reproduce their internal culture based on global cultures.

Arjun Appadurai separated each of political, economic and cultural issues for globalism and then designs 5 fields of tribal, technological, financial, communicational and ideological for the said issues. In tribal field, he mentioned tourists, immigrants, wanderers and other human groups which 'are moving'. Technologic field has been resulted with interaction among new and old technologies, development of communicational technologies and interaction of individuals with that. Financial field is a free flow of capital beyond governments' control.

Among these fields, communicational and ideological field have the most complexity. He mentions ability of information transfer in communicational field which is a significant issue in cultural globalism. Ideological field is holder of power ele-

ment due to its ideology-oriented nature and always is along with government – nation. Appadurai believes that each human, tribe, population and government has a special interpretation from globalism and it is not clear that how these interpretations are in conformity with the fact of ‘globalism’. Therefore, globalism is absolutely local. So individuals and societies are not passive against globalism but they can show it different from reality by different interpretations from globalism.

Despite theories of message originality, power of transmitter and passivity of message receiver, reception theory and significant role of message receiver believes that globalism shall not be necessary along with cultural domination of cultural texts and messages producers because 1st, the messages and texts are transferred having contained contrast elements, 2nd, texts receivers do not face them with passivity and they are not bound to use preferred code in decoding these texts, 3rd, in a world that passing modernity, at least in conversation dimensions, is along with its claims in connection with reality, honesty and truth and definer traits for a modern dialogue are escaping from integration, emphasizing on differences and empowering ‘margins’, suitable basis is provided for escaping from routine anti-legitimations in the field of dialogue and thus, a way will be opened for showing different ‘voices’.

Up here, it is specified that resistance, increasing stresses and also combination of cultures are probable in globalism process.

Existence of these reactions can express necessitate of dialogue for decreasing violence and help their peaceful combination and decrease probable risks.

On one side, some believes that globalism procedure has appeared in 2 different dimensions of globalization from above and globalization from below. globalization from above has been considered as a ‘capitalistic oriented’ procedure which technical organizations affiliated to Nations Organization such as Money International Fund, Development Bank and etc. and also multination companies have a significant role in that. Adversaries of globalism believe that the said procedure will result to increasing economic gap between rich and poor countries.

In contrast, globalization from below process has been defined as a ‘people oriented’ procedure and nongovernmental organizations and private foundations have a significant role in that. They emphasize on paying more attention to human rights, medias freedom, maintenance of environment and other cases. Therefore, globalization from below will cause to decreasing challenges due to globalization from above. In this controversial process, dialogue of cultures could play a constructive role. That is, it will create balance between two procedures of globalization from above and globalization from below.

Dialogue of Cultures

One of common mistakes in line with dialogue of cultures is that we consider it as an explanatory theory beside other theories related to culture. But in fact, dialogue of cultures is not an expository, descriptive, explanatory or scientific theory about former and future relations of cultures and civilizations, but is a meaningful behavioral movement which intends to renovate and change those relations and thus, addresses political and social wills. Social science theories are generally considering the real world as a set of real truths and specified affairs and intent to analyze, explain and discover its rules. While meaningful behavioral movements construct realities and actions and given them aim and meaning. Therefore, meaningful behavioral movements will become a part of history, while scientific theories look at history in a second and passive position and analyze that. When meaningful behavioral movements give solidarity to an era of history and life, then theoreticians come and analyze that.

We can find such diversity in thoughts of many thinkers. For instance, Carol Marx said in the famous phrase: ‘Philosophy has interpreted and expressed the world up to now but the important issue is that how we can change that’. Thus, socialism, not as a liberal science of reality, but as a revolution project and in the other word, as a meaningful movement, gives a meaning to life and social actions in a period of history. So we can say that ideology of political Islam and Islamic revolution movement has intended to renew identities, actions and formulations.

The result is that meaningful movements construct reality of the future. These movements and myths are not considered as a science of historical and social evolution but analyze tendency towards a special situation (like war or peace), because the history itself does not assure natural tendency toward any direction. In the other words historical evolutions and realities follow meaningful movements in this meaning. Dialogue of cultures is another behavioral and meaningful movement which may create another life style in global surface and different tendency in science and research.

Thinking Style of Dialogue of Cultures

In general dialogues are events with known and unknown sources. Marxism, as a project of modern revolution, was a combination of German idealism, French Socialism and English Political Economy. Fascism appeared from different thoughts such as school of romanticism, traditional Conservatism, social Darwinism, philosophical idealism and racial theories. In addition ideology of Islamic revolution have had a various and complex history. Dialogue is like a mosaic which is combined from antonym and various elements. Therefore, we shall not decrease then to a unit source.

Roots of dialogue of cultures is untread to not only west rationalism but also to east philosophies and religions. Complex form of dialogues in different levels could be seen instead of war and combat in teachings of many famous people from Buddha, Zoroaster, Jesus and Islam Prophet, to Tolstoy, Gandhi and Habermas. Origin of Islam has come from school of Koran. Koran promised to give many gifts to all followers of monotheism religions (Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Zoroastrian and etc.) and advise them to have talent of listen to speech of each other.

Result

We saw that probability and possibility of leveling world culture and cultural integration is too weak due to broadening globalism process and in contrast, due to wasting balance between person-nation-world, probability of cultural resistances exists in frame of more real meaning of identity and increasing tribalism procedure and tribal tendencies as a result of globalism process.

Globalism tendency on contemporary world shall be multi-dimensions and performed considering appearance of new behavior, new public rights, based on international rules, strengthening government and people oriented society in all countries and improving their responsibility against international issues. It is necessary that all elements of international system (government and civil foundations) are able to participate in designing and making international decisions actively and equally.

In this frame dialogue of cultures should be used for correct, human and practical settlement of many of global issues of the contemporary era such as tribal and identical crises, family crisis, environment crisis, behavioral crisis in line with some scientific researches, crisis of international political formalities and etc.

Dialogue of cultures can not accept a global society with unilateral values, but believes in a global society having considered different values, principles and cultures. In fact we can say that this idea is proving existence of a multi-dimension world

and refuse a global evolution toward globalism by method of 'global unit culture' with purpose of creating larger markets for selling goods and satisfying all national cultures with one culture and also believes that a dialogue about force, imposing secularism, pressure and fearing could not be effective.

This idea believes that common and middle public principles of cultures are so close and merged together and no conflict is necessary among them and any contrast and conflict is due to the existed dominant discipline and endeavor for obtaining dominance. Otherwise, in case of cognition of different values and dimensions, no conflict will be possible.

Events on 11 September and other terrorism events not only can not refuse and reject dialogue of cultures, but also prove that human being needs a constructive and permanent dialogue between cultures to resolve their many issues. Two main ways for performing dialogue of civilizations are as follows:

Mutual effectiveness of cultures in long term. Essence of this procedure is relating to natural passing of affairs, geographical and historical reasons and is not depending on individual selection and tendency. This mutual effect has been performed during centuries among Iranians and Greeks in ancient era and then among Europeans and Asians through Abri-sham Road.

Dialogue of civilizations and cultures through dialogue between their representatives. This method of conversation is a conscious and purposive activity and is not relating to historical and geographical elements.

Dialogue of cultures believes that if human being existed from limits of categorization, had more cognition about history and culture of other tribes and wanted mutual understanding, many contrasts will be removed and the best way for this important issue is dialogue.

Role of Iranian culture could be considered as a powerful element for partnership in process of dialogue of cultures. Special trait of Iranian culture is that two Iranian and Islamic dimensions are existed in Iranian culture which can collect wide parts of the world together and make a dialogue and interaction. In analyzing Iranian culture we shall consider two elements of being Iranian and being Muslim of Iranian nation at the same time. On the other side, Iran is a country which accepted Islam eagerly and its people applied their civilization and culture for serving improvement of Islam and Islamic science. Many famous people in Islamic era have raised from Iran and thus, in thousand-year evolution of Iran and also evolutions of a recent century, mutual influence of being Muslim & Iranian should be considered.

Although culture is a wide issue and thus socialists have no common idea about a comprehensive and complete definition, but among majority of definitions, culture is identity and character of a nation which resulted to social life and common destiny of people. In fact, each society has some common needs, pains, feelings, arts, wants, habits and behaviors and collection of the mentioned cases could be called as culture. Now, if some of these particulars are common between different societies, these commons could be used for more interaction and intimacy and removing probable contradictions. This matter, especially about Iranian culture which is consisting two Iranian and Islamic dimensions, due to wideness of Iran borders during history and historical commons with different areas of the world, becomes more important.

Under these conditions, Iranian culture is capable to create connection among different cultures and civilizations and simplify their conversation, because its elements could be connectable. For example, Persian language has been used among people of neighbor areas and even in some parts of India from previous.

Development of Iranian culture could be seen in different areas of the world. For instance, historical buildings exist in Central Asia which maintains their Iranian architecture and handicrafts. In addition, people of Iran, central Asia and many other neighbors of Iran have common traditions like Norouz Celebration.

Many traditions have been formed under influence of Islam. Sufism philosophy and literature which has a significant presence in history and literature of Iran is a powerful element in life of people of central Asia, Caucasus, and some parts of southwest of Asia (in central Asia Naghshbandieh, Kabrouyeh, Eisavieh, Ghadirieh and Chashtieh are active). In addition, Islam can be an important element for connection of different people in the world with different cultures and various nations by itself. Existence of different and several national minorities in Iran and also Iranian minorities in many areas of the world can reinforce idea of dialogue of cultures.

In these dialogues, Islamic Iranian culture can emphasis on common values which all religions brought its message and Islam became for completing and improving that values: human behavioral and natural common values. In a world full of materials, we shall not pay attention to materials, but shall emphasize on a values which do not exist. Justice, family, peace, calmness and also respect to others could be values rose from Iranian culture and can solve many challenges existed in the world.

Marc Scheuer¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

It is a distinctive pleasure to take part for the second time in the annual International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Globalization as a process has been building up for a long time, but the pace of its development has dramatically accelerated in recent decades. It is now confronting humanity as a whole with an unprecedented set of challenges – which have been extensively described – and simultaneously with unique opportunities to address them. Provided we have the necessary resolve. Provided we can also look at Globalization as an ethical challenge and an ethical program to inhabit the earth together, creatively, peacefully and in a sustainable way.

This program not only requires improved governance at all levels. It calls for cultural changes as well, through a dialogue of cultures.

¹ Director of the Secretariat of Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations Organization.

In their recently published book 'Humanity on a tightrope'², Paul Ehrlich and Robert Ornstein recall that the history of humanity is one of a growing complexity of our affiliations and that 'we have been truly ingenious in finding ways to separate "us" from "them", stressing differences over commonality, and forming all sorts of culture gaps'.

Some of these culture gaps are lethal. Not only do they generate a concerning level of entropy, distracting energies from priority challenges faced by all members of societies or by humanity as a whole and hampering sustainable development. They also threaten peace, by maintaining fear, suspicion, discrimination and hatred. Ways must be found to develop more empathy.

² Humanity on a tightrope: thoughts on empathy, family, and big changes for a viable future. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2010

The United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOOC or 'The Alliance') contributes to such efforts. It has been set up 'to address widening rifts between societies – or even within societies – by reaffirming a paradigm of mutual respect among peoples of different cultural and religious traditions and helping to mobilize concerted action to that end.' The initiative 'reflects the will of the vast majority of peoples to reject extremism in any society and support respect for religious and cultural diversity'.¹

Respect for cultural diversity and the bridging of cultural gaps through dialogue are increasingly seen as being in a close and reciprocal relation with sustainable development and peace. Research is under way to better illustrate that link and possibly offer some tools for measurement. There is little doubt, for instance, that meeting the eight Millennium Development Goals contained in the 2000 Millennium Declaration of the UN would be significantly enhanced by greater intercultural understanding and cooperation. Conversely, achieving the Goals would benefit intercultural dialogue and would put us on a fast track to a world that is more stable, more just, and more secure. The Fourth Annual Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, scheduled in Doha (Qatar) in December 2011, will re-visit that link. It is expected to recommend a few targets, broadly inspired from the MDGs methodology, for new action in the areas of Education, Media, Youth and Migration, on the way to building more tolerant and inclusive societies, at local and global levels.

The dialogue of cultures is a convenient word for an extremely complex and decentralized process, involving a multitude of actors, public and private, religious and secular, non-profit and corporate. Cultures interact through people. While states (and international organizations) have an important role to play, both individually and together at regional level, it is to a large extent a bottom-up process.

In the conditions of a fast globalizing world, some factors are particularly relevant for such dialogue: a growing awareness of interdependence; patterns of increasing uniformity but also of revivals of traditions; a more visible role played by religions as two thirds of humanity feel strongly connected to a faith; direct exposure to diversity as a daily experience by many as a result of massive migrations, urbanization and various forms of expatriation or of a 24-hours new cycles and new forms of global communication; and the assertive role played by youth, often a majority part of any population.

Cross-cultural interactions would tremendously gain from a greater sense that all humans are genetically related, share the same dignity and human rights, have many personal and social aspirations in common, have each a number of affiliations and layers of identity and are part of a same global environment at risk. This would help set the scene and key aspects should probably be acquired from a young age through elementary education.

It is against a strong background of commonality that the knowledge of relevant specifics should be promoted, through education again – including education to the diversity of religions and beliefs – but also through people to people contact.

Respect for all in diverse societies will be all the more easily promoted that in public services, editorial committees and

newsrooms, parliaments and local authorities, ngos and the corporate sector, diversity is secured in recruitment.

Building inclusive societies, respectful of the internal and global diversity, is an ever going process, with ups and downs, successes and failures. There is no monopoly of truth, no standard achievement. It requires a lot of bottom-up efforts and sharing of experiences, within a public framework of good governance, guided by the principles which have been recognized as universal. It also requires from all, whatever the length of their history in a given society, a sense of building together an evolving common society. This is not a given, considering for instance the recent statements of failure of several European models of 'integration'. Systematically tracking the successful experiences wherever they occur and widely exchanging on the causes for such successes is a must. The Alliance contributes to the demarche through an on-line community on migrations and integration.

Cultural differences, real or not, are often inappropriately invoked in situations of tension, which are more readily explainable on economic and social grounds. The excessive 'culturalization' of tensions and conflicts may be misleading and dangerous. They may hamper any dialogue.

Media have a crucial role to play in resisting stereotypes and helping citizens understand the complexity of issues and the sensitivity of cross-cultural interaction. Joint training for journalists and opinion leaders from different societies and cultural backgrounds is in itself a major exercise in intercultural dialogue. The Alliance, for its part, will continue to offer such trainings, in the context of 'West-Muslim' anxieties and beyond. It will also continue to expand an 'Expert Finder' on-line application, providing expertise, opinions and contacts on a range of issues and unfolding crises.

People to people contact and community projects across cultural and faith inspired lines, at national and international levels, are a particularly useful way of transforming dialogue into action and deeds. Accordingly, the Alliance is supporting exchange programs (Fellowship Program), whether physical or virtual, but also innovative social initiatives bringing together citizens from different cultural backgrounds and perspectives. Enabling young people to engage and to channel part of their creative energy on public good projects, including intercultural projects, is a high priority.

The resources of the Arts, cuisine and sport must also be harnessed. They often provide illuminating shortcuts and facilitate ownership by large numbers. The Alliance finds supporting short video production by young people very rewarding in that respect.

The capacity for dialogue and cooperation of faith based initiatives is particularly important in building bridges and creating spaces for dialogue. The Week of Interfaith Harmony recently established by the United Nations General Assembly is a milestone in that respect.

Intercultural dialogue is actively under way, in particular in the Euro-Mediterranean area and along a broader 'West-Muslim' axis. As Globalization further expands, it must more systematically include more cultures, in particular from Africa and some parts of Asia not yet much involved. Without them, essential partners are missing. The Likhachov Conference may give a welcome boost to such expansion.

¹ Alliance of Civilizations, High Level Group Report November 2006.

Eberhard Schneider¹

GLOBAL CULTURE AND THE INTERNET

Pluralistic Global Culture

If we speak about global culture, sooner or later the question will arise: what is it, anyway? Maybe, contrary to Samuel Huntington's hazardous clash of cultures, we are on our way to global culture? What are the elements that make up global culture? Is it new culture beyond national and regional cultures; is it made of elements shared by all cultures? Is there anything that they share at all? Or, perhaps, global culture is only a beautiful idea without *fundamentum in re*?

Global culture cannot result from syncretism of diverse cultures. People, nations and cultures are getting closer due to economic globalization, and this continuous process does not lead to gradual dissolution of national cultures. On the contrary, their differences project more clearly due to their getting closer. If culture is a fundamental national identity, then 'global culture' cannot be a sluggish dissolution of national identity into the overall cosmopolitanism.

I think global culture may be interpreted as intercultural interaction contrasted to emphasizing cultural differences. In intercultural interaction, which also includes interreligious interaction, different cultures and religions keep their characteristic features, without isolating each other. Diverse cultures and religions provide each other with a free space for identity and accept each other. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the community of nations within the United Nations in 1948 formulated the minimal legal consensus for global culture.

Global culture is not a global united culture, nor any predominant culture, like the American culture that some people consider predominant or want to make it such. Such attempts will get a backlash. Global culture lives by intercultural communications. An intercultural discussion is possible between agents of diverse cultures.

Intercultural dialogue between representatives of diverse cultures is an effective tool for the making of global culture. It has been more than ten years of such exemplary dialogue within the International Likhachov Scientific Conference. For almost thirty years the Internet has been an ever-operating and efficient tool of millions for the practical cultural exchange.

The Internet

The Internet is an important tool for the making of global culture. *First of all*, I think it is a *source of information and a mediator of knowledge*. For the first time in history we have access to an enormous information database in all possible domains. Furthermore, it provides telephone and video connection, radio and television broadcasts, and print media.

The second point is: the Internet is a *global* informational source. It knows no limits. Of course, reading texts requires language skills, but illustrated material speaks for itself.

The third point is: the Internet is a *free information resource*. It can be used for free, for it is a nongovernmental resource. Through the Internet one may easily avoid governmental censorship over mass media. Internets networks often oper-

ate worldwide and they are immune from any domestic vetoes, after all. Even if access to an internet provider is denied by the state, a resourceful user will be able to evade this and get a desired access in a roundabout way.

The fourth point is: the Internet is a *democratic source*. Anyone can use it if connected to it. Even if you have no internet access at home, you may use numerous internet cafés. Internet access does not depend on your income. You may browse for any information, and in the event of inadequate language competence, you may use online translators.

The fifth point is: the Internet is not only a passive, but also an *interactive source*. An internet user may send and receive emails, even if spam gets on the nerves from time to time. One can communicate and make friends in a chat room and, perhaps, later switch on to contacts in real life. Users may take part in blogs, express their opinions on different issues – political as well. Some heads of states set up their blogs, where people can share viewpoints on their political speeches. In blogs you may express your opinion under a nickname without fear of being identified. And there will be no personal identification in the event of an internet café. There are all sorts of information a user may upload to Facebook, Twitter, YouTube etc., and the whole world gets immediately an open access to it.

Point number six is: the Internet is a tool of global economic activity. Through the Internet one can get a job contract in any corner of the globe. The Internet intensifies competition among commercial enterprises, for these are not only domestic companies that are competing, but also businesses worldwide. People from different countries, united in a single project, make up virtual enterprises on the Internet.

Indeed, the Internet, like almost everything on our planet, is subject to criminal influence, against which anti-virus programmes, that are constantly updated, make up a shield. Authoritarian and dictatorial regimes consider the Internet a threat. Such an attitude refers to every point mentioned above. However, the Internet faces a problem which is probing deeper and deeper into the human consciousness: I am referring to the problem of growing reduction of the private sphere of life. It occurs when 'digital natives' upload personal data or, sometimes, even private pictures. With reference to such representatives of a new internet generation, the famous Descartes' philosophical statement 'cogito ergo sum' can be recast as 'I am online, therefore I am'.

Sometimes the Internet is compared to the time when the life started on Earth, when inorganic molecules gave life to the organic ones; perhaps someday the Internet will also evolve into a more meaningful mode of global culture. The whole world gets immediate access to the information that I upload to the net. Figuratively speaking, I always have to think together with the world. It is necessary to consider things not only from a national angle, but also, with the help of the Internet, from a virtually global one. Anyway, the use of the Internet leads to the progress of new cultural and political thinking.

¹ Professor of Political Science at the University of Siegen (Germany), Ph.D. Dr. Schneider is an expert on domestic policy of Russia and the former USSR. Author of more than 12 books, including: *Das politische System der Russischen Föderation*, *Das politische System der Ukraine*, *Die Formierung der neuen rußländischen politischen Elite* and of more than 100 scholarly articles. Member of the Advisory Board at the Independent Centre of European-Russian cooperation 'EU-Russia' in Brussels.

CAPITALIST SOCIETY: CONFLICTS AND DEVELOPMENT

The Frankfurt School,² of which Jürgen Habermas is a late representative, first appeared as an intrinsically contradictory, heterogeneous trend in Western social sciences. Developing over several decades, it went through a significant evolution, in the course of which its principles, goals, and socio-political functions changed. Emerging in the 1920s and remaining theoretically and organizationally intact until the 1960s, the Frankfurt School had a great deal of influence on the development of Western social thought and its forms and methods. The crisis and organizational breakup of the school did not lead to oblivion for its ideas. On the contrary, they attained a certain prevalence not only in Europe, but in the United States. What accounts for this phenomenon?

First, it is the fact that the Frankfurt School's key problem was its attitude to Marxism. It went through a dramatic evolution precisely regarding this point, changing from a course that drew upon certain ideas and propositions from 'dialectic and historical materialism' to a wholly independent direction for Western social philosophy. In the West, nevertheless, the Frankfurt School was sometimes identified with the development of Marxism: it was referred to as neo-Marxism, Western Marxism, and so on.

Second is the continuing and possibly increasing interest in critical theory connected with the work of Jürgen Habermas, who was labelled as part of the Frankfurt school's middle generation during the life of his teacher Theodor Adorno, but came to be reckoned among the School's most important representatives following Adorno's death.

Such a critical guideline is the continuation of the tradition of the Frankfurt School, and, in particular, of Theodor Adorno's views. However, this function must be closely connected with the analysis of capitalist society, and in this Habermas also follows the School's tradition. In their own time, the founders stated that their goal was a comprehensive study of bourgeois society.³ This tendency can be traced distinctly in Habermas's work. His first works – *The Student and Politics* (1961) and *The Structural Change of the Public Sphere* (1962) – and later works – *Science and Technology as Ideology* (1967) and *Problems of Legitimation in Late Capitalist Societies* (1973) – are connected in one way or another with the examination of the contemporary condition of capitalist society.

Habermas noted that someone who uses the expression 'late capitalism' implicitly affirms that in capitalism organized by the state, social development progresses 'contradictorily' or 'by crises'.⁴ In this way, the processes of crisis in contemporary capitalism, their causes, and their consequences prove to be at the centre of Habermas's research. As a foundation for his theory of 'late capitalism', Habermas formulates the following questions: Can the potential for conflict and apathy grow

to a scale that threatens the system? Does a tendency towards the unity of the working class and a constitution of class consciousness emerge from the politically mediated relations of labour and capital? Why have problems of legitimation (justification) in late capitalism become more important?⁵

Characterizing the economic system of late capitalism, Habermas noted the increased role of the state, which begins to fill the 'functional gaps' of the market. This tendency becomes dominant and brings about changes in the economic, administrative, and legitimation systems of capitalist society. It is stated that the public sector can function independently of the market in its investment decisions, but all the same, is the central question about enterprises controlled directly by the state, or about the particular firms that are maintained by the government's orders? In the administrative system, as Habermas indicated, serious changes, as compared with the period of classical capitalism, began to occur. The state apparatus regulates the macroeconomic cycle through global planning. The state replaces the market mechanism and creates favourable conditions for the functioning of capital by organizing supranational economic blocs and developing the aerospace and military industries. This is made possible by such measures as the improvement of material infrastructure (transport, public health, housing construction, urban and regional planning) and non-material infrastructure (the financing of academic research), heightening the productive capacity of human labour (a public education system, professional training, programmes for re-training for new professions), the removal of the social and real costs of private capitalist production (unemployment benefits, charity).

From this it follows that capitalism 'institutionalizes' productive forces – that is, provides them with long-term development. The growing complexity of the capitalist system demands the constant broadening of 'the capacities of administration' and, as a consequence, the role of the state in the life of society grows in strength. The state influences the current state of affairs and the development of infrastructure, and creates the preconditions for the perfection of the capitalist capacity for production. The state thereby determines limited conditions, frameworks, in which private entrepreneurial activity may come into being. All of this, in Habermas's opinion, means that in capitalist society, economics loses its supremacy, and social life loses its 'capitalist dynamics'.

Habermas feels that the 'social state', existing in the conditions of 'late capitalist' society, sharply changes the character of class relations.

The introduction of social and labour legislation, the legal institutionalization of tariff conflicts and other questions connected with the employment of the population have done a significant amount to take the edge off of class struggle. Even if labour has an alienating character, Habermas argues, then either the 'humanization' of the workplace or the increase of pecuniary rewards compensates for it.

Through public policy, the state makes up for the weak market positions of separate categories of labouring people (workers, consumers, tenants). Such policy is directed not only toward overcoming social inequality, but toward the support of the 'environmentally important' areas of transportation, protection of the landscape, and public health.

As a result, Habermas concludes, conflicts connected with distribution already lack an explosive force. Class structures are glossed over and made anonymous. Paradoxically, on the one hand the process of making capital continues, and on the other the removal of class conflicts occurs.

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Centre for Security Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academic Adviser to School of Contemporary Social Sciences at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including the books: *Philosophy of J. Habermas* (Filosofija Ju. Habermasa), *Society and Social Change* (Obshchestvo i sotsial'nye izmeneniya), *Theory and Practices of Economy and Sociology of Knowledge* (Teorija i praktika ekonomiki i sotsiologiji znaniya), *Power, Economics, Politics, Culture* (Vlast'. Jekonomika, politika, kul'tura), *Terrorism in the Modern World* (Terrorizm v sovremennom mire), *Bases for Consolidation of the Present-Day Russian Society: Sociological Aspects* (Osnovaniya konsolidatsiji sovremennogo rossijskogo obshchestva. Sotsiologicheskie aspekty) and some others. Member of the State Commission for Academic Degrees and Titles of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation. Editor-in-Chief of journals: *Information Warfare* (Informatsionnyje voiny) and *National Security* (Natsional'naya bezopasnost'). V.L. Schultz is decorated with the Order of Honour.

² Habermas J. *Theorie und Praxis*. Fr. a. M., 1974. S. 9.

³ Jay M. *Dialektische Phantasie: Die Geschichte der Frankfurter Schul und des Instituts für Sozialforschung. 1923–1950*. Fr. a. M., 1976. S. 7–14.

⁴ Habermas J. *Zur Rekonstruktion*. Fr. a. M., 1976. S. 304.

⁵ Habermas J. *Theorie und Praxis*. S. 14.

All systems of contemporary capitalism are directed at keeping probable conflict in a hidden state. 'In our time,' writes Habermas, 'starting from the Second World War, in the most progressive capitalist countries, class conflict is being kept essentially in a latent state. The business cycle is drawn out in time and periodic gallops of depreciation of capital proceed into prolonged inflationary crisis with soft market fluctuations, and finally, dysfunctional collateral appearances of economic crisis are filtered and dissipated in quasi-groups (consumers, pupils and their parents, passengers, the sick, the elderly, and so on) or in private groups with a small degree of organization.'¹

All this leads to the collapse of class identity, as class consciousness 'gets fragmented'. New conflicts emerge, for instance the discrepancy between the modern military apparatus (and production) and systems of transport, education, public health, between the natural growth of cities and the regulation of tax and finance policy.²

Habermas notes two difficulties resulting from the intervention of the state in the functional gaps of the market. First of all, this is a crisis of rationality, when the administrative system fails to fulfil the imperatives of government which it has adopted from the economic system. It is, secondly, a crisis of legitimacy, when the legitimation system fails to maintain the requisite level of loyalty from the masses. A state which takes upon itself the entire, growing volume of administration must manoeuvre among the interests of individual capitalists, the entire capitalist class, and the rest of the population. It is here that the crisis of legitimacy emerges which Habermas exposes as a crisis of motivation. This can be understood as 'a disagreement between the need for motives, on the one hand, and the supply of motivation by the socio-cultural system, on the other'.³ In other words, Habermas interprets the crisis of the system of motivations as a discrepancy between the motives and the demands of individuals and the possible compensation of them by the state. Administrative solutions are taken as relatively independent from concrete demands and the goals of the states' citizens. As a result, capitalist society loses its identity.

Proceeding from this, Habermas critiques the Marxist understanding of the role of contemporary capitalism.

The epistemological ineffectiveness of Marxist theory is established first. Habermas marks out four social facts that, in his opinion, Marxism cannot explain. First is the overcoming of the rupture between state and society which was typical of the era of early capitalism, its 'liberal phase'. In the present time, it is liquidated through shared emotion, which is why the 'state and society are no longer found in their classic relation of superstructure and base'.⁴ Second, the living standard in the foremost capitalist countries, according to Habermas, has grown so much that alienation has lost its economic form. Third, it follows from the previous points that the proletariat loses its role as the performer of the socialist revolution. Revolutionary class consciousness is not to be found in the nucleus of the working class, and for this reason 'any revolutionary theory loses strength when its addressees are experiencing such conditions'.⁵ Fourth, an analysis of socialism in reality fits poorly into the Marxist analytical framework.

Marx's well-known phrasing in the preface to his *Critique of Political Economy* does not satisfy Habermas. Nor do the other foundational treatments of the problem in Marxist literature: those of Plekhanov or Engels, Adler or Labriola, or, finally, Lukács, Korsch, or Adorno. For too long in Marxist literature, according to Habermas, there has existed a purely economic understanding of the correlation of base and superstructure. Corresponding to them, each society can be dismembered into partial systems which are arranged hierarchically: the economic, socio-political, and socio-cultural. In accordance with this conception, the processes of higher partial systems are determined by the lower systems (in the sense of causal dependence). This means that the economic system determines the possible development of different partial systems. However, the Marxist conception of base and superstructure, Habermas argues, is limited in that, first, it shows the dependence of the superstructure on the base only for the critical phase of the development of society, when it passes to the next level of development. Second, this conception does not have the capacity to explain the growing role of the state in the economy and other areas of social life within the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution. Meanwhile, theories of post-industrial society indicate the kind of conditions under which evolutionary pre-eminence proceeds from the system of economy and housekeeping to the system of education and science.

Society uses the most diverse institutions for the organization of social life, and among them are the elements of superstructural phenomena. However, it does not follow from this that they acquire the significance of the basic structures of a certain means of production. In studying the evolution of the utilization of the concepts 'productive forces' and 'relations of production', a certain effect is seen. However, in Habermas's opinion, the dialectic of productive forces and relations of production is often understood in a sense that is too technically focused. In historical materialism, productive forces and relations of production do not develop independently of one another, but rather form structures that (a) correspond with one another, and (b) give the sum of the final number of structural-logical stages of development, so that (c) the result is a logically developed, organized range of means of production.

The development of the productive forces, Habermas proposes, sooner allows, but does not call for, a revolution in the relations of production and the evolutionary renovation of the means of production. Great internal advances in development which led to the emergence of the first high cultures or to the emergence of European capitalism did not comprise the condition for, but rather the consequence of the productive forces.

In this way, it remains unclear how the change from one means of production to another comes about. The attempt to explain this change through the concept of social conflict and class struggle means that this is only a descriptive approach. Only an analytical answer can explain why society goes through an evolutionary step and how it must be understood, consequently, that social battles under certain conditions lead to new forms of social integration and to a new level of social development.

¹ Habermas J. Zur Rekonstruktion... S. 310.

² This conclusion leads Habermas to the following classification of social movements in FRG: (1) antinuclear and ecologic movement; (2) movement for peace (including the North-South conflict related); (3) civil initiatives; (4) alternative movement (house capture, alternative projects, agricultural communes); (5) minorities movement (the elderly, the homosexuals, the disabled); (6) youth sects and life assistance groups; (7) religious fundamentalism; (8) anti-taxation protests; (9) parents' groups protests; (10) movement against 'modernist' reforms; (11) women's movement; (12) international in their significance autonomist movements struggling for regional, linguistic, cultural, confessional independence. (See: Habermas J. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Fr. a. M., 1981. Bd. 2, S. 578.) As is evident, there is no place for the organized workers' movement in this classification.

³ Habermas J. Zur Rekonstruktion... S. 321.

⁴ Habermas J. Theorie und Praxis. S. 228.

⁵ Ibid. S. 229.

Yu. Shemshuchenko¹

TRENDS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE HIGHER EDUCATION SYSTEM IN THE UKRAINE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE BOLOGNA PROCESS

The Bologna process caused revolutionary changes in the educational system of Europe of the 21st century. The Declaration signed by the ministers of education of the European countries in Bologna on the 19th of June, 1999, was intended to step up the educational cooperation on the continent. It became an important tool to develop democratic society and to internationalize higher education.

Unfortunately, the Bologna process is not always being realized consistently in the post-Soviet states. Particularly in the Ukraine, where the work was reduced to quantitative indices. Since the beginning of the 1990s the number of higher education institutions has reached 900 there, while there are 100 of those in Great Britain, about 80 in France, about 60 in Italy, and 11 universities in neighboring Poland. At the same time, today there are almost 300 higher education institutions that graduate students with diplomas in law. It is about the same number of diplomas that all the European universities taken together graduate.

Last year 380 thousand adolescences left high schools in the Ukraine. There were almost 800 thousand places ready for them in higher education institutions. It is usual practice that a town with the population of several hundred thousand people has 5 to 7 higher education institutions. This caused the decrease of quality of higher education and the race for diplomas rather than for knowledge. It is no coincidence that college graduates, particularly lawyers and economists, faced difficulty finding jobs.

The current Constitution of the Ukraine guarantees everyone the right to obtain free higher education in state and communal educational institutions (Article 53). There is not a word about fees for education in the Fundamental Law. But at present more than 30 per cent of higher education institutions are actually private ones existing due to payments of their students. The portion of higher education institutions with a mixed financial system – through the budget and tuition fees – has significantly increased.

After the Declaration of Independence of the Ukraine had been enunciated, the legislation on higher education could not withstand the chaotic situation in this sphere. New laws opened sluice gates of privatization of higher education, created a complicated four-level system of grades in education and qualification (Junior Specialist, Bachelor, Specialist, Master), neglecting the criteria of students' training quality.

The current Ukrainian law 'On Higher Education' (2002) did not change the situation for the better. The ideas of Bologna process were not embodied in it properly and in full.

¹ Foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, academician of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, Director of V. M. Koretsky Institute for State and Law of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, LL.D., Professor, honoured worker of science and technology of Ukraine. He is the author of over 800 scholarly publications, including books: *Local Soviets and Maintaining Law* (Mestnyje Sovety i obespechenije zakonnosti), *Man, Nature, Law* (Chelovek, priroda, zakon), *Scientific Legal Thought* (Akademicheskaja juridicheskaja mysl'), *State and Public Monitoring of Environment* (Gosudarstvennyj i obschestvennyj kontrol' v oblasti okhrany okruzhajushchej sredy), *Legal Issues of Ecology* (Pravovye problemy ekologiji), *Nature and Law* (Priroda i zakon), *Legal Status of the Academy of Sciences of Ukraine* (Pravovoj status Akademiji nauk Ukraini); scientific articles: *The Earth's Ecologic Constitution: Concept Approaches* (Ekologicheskaja konstitutsija zemli: kontseptual'nyje podkhody), *The Modern System of Energy Legislation in the Ukraine and Main Trends of Its Improving* (Sovremennaja sistema energeticheskogo zakonodatel'stva Ukrainy i osnovnyje napravlenija jejo sovershenstvovaniija), *Problems of the Agrarian Law Development* (Problemy razvitiija agrarnogo prava v Ukraine) and others. Y.S. Shemshuchenko is academician-secretary of the Department of ecological and agrarian law of the National Academy of Legal Sciences of the Ukraine. He is editor-in-chief of the *Legal State* (Pravovoe gosudarstvo) scientific yearly. Mr. Shemshuchenko is Laureate of M.P. Vasilenko Award of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, the Ukraine State Award for science and technology.

After almost 20 years, the government sounded an alarm at last. At the moment Verkhovna Rada of the Ukraine is debating the new version of the draft law 'On Higher Education' submitted by a group of people's deputies of the Ukraine. This project is more strongly based on the European standards of higher education. But there are problems mainly concerning a concordance of those standards with the national identity in the sphere of higher education. Some trends resulting from this draft law are discussed below.

First of all, it should be noted that we have accepted the idea of the Bologna process about the reduction of the number of levels of the education and qualification system. The draft law excludes the grade of Specialist from this system leaving the degrees for Junior Specialist, Bachelor and Master.

As a matter of fact, the Bologna model is based on the two-grade system of Bachelor's and Master's degrees. But it is not adopted by all countries which signed the Bologna Declaration. An appropriate transition period is deemed to be necessary, the Ukraine undergoing this time of change now.

Certain changes in duration of the tuition period for Junior Specialist's, Bachelor's and Master's degrees are being planned. Provided that the general secondary education is complete, the standard duration of the tuition period for Junior Specialist is 2 to 3 years, and that for the Bachelor's degree is 3 to 4 years. The standard duration of the tuition period for the Master's degree is 1.5 to 2 years, given that the Bachelor's educational qualification has been obtained. And only universities and academies will have the right to prepare students for the Master's degree.

The draft law legitimates the Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D) degree in the Ukraine in the context of a broad use of this educational and scientific level in the countries of Western Europe for a long time. It is analogous to our Candidate of Sciences academic degree, and the conferment of the PhD degree takes place after the public defence of a PhD dissertation.

Doctors of Philosophy will be prepared through post-graduate education at universities, academies and scientific institutions during the 4-year period. A PhD dissertation must be notable for 'its substantial scientific novelty' and of 'practical importance'.

Now about the Doctor's degree. It is a kind of the second educational and scientific level after the PhD. Preparation for the degree of Doctor of Sciences will be realized through doctoral education at universities, academies and scientific institutions. The standard duration is 3 years. A thesis for the Doctor's degree should include the results suggesting that 'an important scientific problem' has been solved there.

The system of standards of higher education for every educational qualification level and profile of vocational training was validated in the Ukraine at the beginning of the current century. According to the new draft law 'On Higher Education', a higher education standard should be understood as an aggregate of norms determining requirements to the educational qualification (educational-scientific) level of a graduate of a higher school (scientific institution), to the nature of education, to the period of education and to the tools for evaluation of the quality of special education. The appropriate standards are the basis for evaluation of the quality of higher education, as well as the quality of educational activity of higher schools and scientific institutions, which is the basis of the Bologna process.

In accordance with the European experience, the draft law encourages the development of the university form of higher education. The organizational system of this education will be based upon universities, academies and colleges. As for insti-

tutes, they will have the status of structural subdivisions of universities and academies.

Higher education institutions may be in public, communal or private ownership. But in public- and communal-owned higher schools the number of full-time first year students admitted on the ground of public contract should be no less than 50 per cent of the total number of students.

The draft law reflects the European idea about the formation of a higher education network on the base of large universities and academies. In this connection the appropriate quantitative criteria were established. In particular, a traditional university suggests that no less than 10 thousand full-time students will study at this university specializing in no less than 8 branches of learning. A professionally-oriented university suggests no less than 6 thousand students and 4 branches of learning. An academy suggests no less than 3 thousand students and 1 or 2 branches of learning.

The requirements for the scientific personnel training have been also provided. In a traditional university this training should cover no less than 8 scientific specialities, 4 in a professionally-oriented university, and 2 in an academy.

These provisions of the draft law are not shared by all experts. Opponents, particularly, believe that the lower threshold here is too high. In addition, there is no direct correlation between the number of students in a higher education institution and the quality of education.

The Bologna ideas about the integration of education and science were reflected in the draft-law provisions upon the status of a research university. Such a status is granted to a national higher education institution by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine in order to extend research and innovative activities and to make a more profound integration into the global educational and research space.

The research university is entitled to make decisions about the conferment of academic degrees of Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Sciences, as well as about the conferment of academic ranks of senior researcher, associate professor and full professor followed by issuing an appropriate state-recognized certificate on a routine basis. The university has also the right to set a standard quantity of students and graduates per one academic teaching position within the salary-fund limit, depending upon their total number, etc.

A number of the most well-known national universities have already received the research status in the Ukraine. But this status is still regulated by the government rule, not by the law.

Special mention should be made about the integration of education and science on the base of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences and other state specialized academies (e.g., Academy of Pedagogical Sciences, Academy of Medical Sciences, Academy of Law, etc.). Some years ago the question about the reassignment of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences' scientific research institutes to the universities under the Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Sports was widely discussed in the Ukraine. But this idea was not universally accepted. There are concerns that its realization might cause an erosion of Academy's scientific potential without significantly influencing an efficacy of universities' scientific activities.

In this event, the national experience suggesting the leading role of scientific academies in carrying out research work should not be neglected. At the same time, the effective realization of the educational potential of these academies with their highly qualified research academic staff will be deemed expedient.

The 15-year practice of the Kiev Law University, a unique establishment in the system of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, is a spectacular example. Along with the V.M. Koretsky Institute for State and Law of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, the university is a conceptually new educational and scientific centre allowing students to obtain European-style law education. The Institute's researchers treat the University as the arena for implementing scientific ideas they came up with during inves-

tigations of vital problems in the sphere of state and law. It enables teaching practice based on the spirit rather than the dogma of law within the framework of national and foreign experience as well. In this connection, the fundamental academic courses on all principle disciplines and the 6-volume *Encyclopaedia of Law* jointly prepared and edited by the researchers of the University and the Institute proved to be an important support.

After the Kiev Law University had been organized, the other similar educational institutions appeared within the framework of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences. But in general, this process is not active. It is particularly restrained by the uncertainty of a legal status of relevant universities within the system of the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, as well as other state academies. This issue, however, was not reflected in the draft of new Ukrainian law 'On Higher Education'.

The Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Sports of the Ukraine is the authorized central executive body in the sphere of education. It comprises the State Accreditation Commission, the Higher Attestation Commission of the Ukraine and other subdivisions.

Till the end of the last year, the Higher Attestation Commission was directly subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers of the Ukraine. Its reassignment to the said Ministry seems dubious. This kind of the Commission subordination poses the threat of Ministry's interference into affairs under the Commission's competence.

It should be noted that the process of attestation of scientific staff by Higher Attestation Commissions is not typical for the countries of Western Europe. This provides space for thinking to our lawmaker who would like to improve laws on education and science.

In order to achieve the general goal of the Bologna Process — that is to build common European educational space — we should go beyond a dry determination of its principles. We also need methods for controlling the quality of higher education, they are to be transparent and understandable to everybody. We are especially talking about the internal and external control on the part of state and public bodies, primarily, concerning licensure and accreditation. In this connection, the draft law provides that the licences should be issued to the higher education institutions if only they possess sufficient, their own or placed under their operational management or leased for the period no less than 10 years, material and technical basis; methodological and informational support; a library; teaching and scientific staff according to established standards. The Ministry of Education, Science, Youth and Sports of the Ukraine issues a licence for educational activity, valid within the period that usually equals to the duration of a complete professional educational programme, but no less than 2 years, to a higher education institution provided that this higher education institution has passed successfully the licensing procedure.

According to the results of specialities accreditation, the same Ministry issues an appropriate certificate. This document must bear the speciality, educational qualification level, validity period (no more than 10 years), as well as the location of the higher education institution and of its autonomous structural subdivisions.

Thus, at present we observe the trends of harmonizing the Ukrainian higher education system with the European educational space. To achieve this goal, the state promotes the harmonization of higher education quality evaluation between the Ukraine and the European Union; the attraction of financial resources from international funds and organizations to realize educational and other programmes at higher education institution; the development and strengthening of international cooperation in higher education and science within the framework of bilateral and multilateral agreements. But in order to benefit from this cooperation, it is necessary to comprehend the problem properly at the level of theory and mass consciousness as well. A personal faculty of thinking globally should be formed and fostered in the context of fundamental human values.

LABOUR CONFLICTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CULTURE OF THE POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY

The deeper into the modern post-industrial society Russia enters, the more acute the problem of the Human Being, his/her potential to overcome the social crisis, including labour crisis, becomes.

The topmost importance of the culture-theoretic approach in the investigation of the social and labour conflicts of the post-industrial society springs precisely from the fact that culture is the link connecting the past, the present and the future in the course of social development.

'The labour culture' is defined as the sum total of social values, standards, habits, needs, interests, motives that form a basis for social orientation in the terms of labour relations and act as a regulator of human behaviour in the sphere of labour when human beings create certain products, as well as public relations and themselves as subjects of labour culture.

Forming the labour culture depends primarily on the labour management in the society in the context of certain historical and socio-cultural environment. National labour culture is determined by the interdependence of elements forming culture as a whole, i.e. religion, political culture, family culture, geographical characteristics of Russia.

The changes taking place in modern Russia contribute to the formation of an entirely different worker, and of crucial changes in labour values as well. The labour culture as a whole cannot be reduced to the economic system. Russia needs to find personal institutional and organizational background of mutual adaptation of the labour culture to the post-industrial society.

Taking into account the current situation in Russia, it becomes clear that all the efforts to change 'the Soviet labour culture' into the culture of post-industrial society are ineffective. The ambivalent reality of everyday life allows legally established market values and standards, which are still not fully adopted by workers, to coexist with the traditional ones regulating labour behaviour. As a result, the new market institutes will reproduce the traditional social relations and conventional types of demand and supply, thus creating the so-called 'quasi-market'.

Modern Russia demonstrates a noticeable tendency to adopt any Western more or less working model of labour. However, Russian labour culture is a heterogeneous one. This is caused by the following aspects. First, extensive area and natural climatic conditions originally presenting the environment for the development of labour culture. Second, complex ethnic diversity. Third, religious variety. Forth, combination of technically-backward production with the most progressive one. Fifth, diversity of social production branches. Sixth, irregular development of regions, centres of culture, science and technically progressive production (Moscow, St. Petersburg) existing along with a periphery. All these specific features should be taken into consideration while regarding social and labour conflicts stemming from Russia's integration into the post-industrial society.

At present, the key features of the emerging post-industrial society are as follows: high level of management and its professionalization, informational support, appearance of totally diverse technological modes, humanization of industry and management, strengthening of the role of human factor and economic psychology in business activity. The post-industrial society is also known as post-capitalist, informational and

technotronic; in such a society, the economic constituent loses its prime significance and labour ceases to be a base for social relations because of dominating post-materialistic values, especially the humanitarian ones.

Efforts to characterize social and labour conflicts which are integrate part of the post-industrial society had been made before the post-industrialism was conceptualized. It is obvious that the weakening of the role of confrontation between bourgeoisie and proletariat is not identical with the elimination of the social conflict itself. Wide-spread recognition of the post-industrial concept contributed a lot to the formation of strong opinions that social and labour conflicts are not the result of economic problems alone.

At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, the exclusive role of information and knowledge in modern industry has become universally recognized; science turned into a direct productive force, and every sphere of social life has become dependent on scientific and technological advance. At the same time, one could observe the rapid formation of intellectual elite as a new privileged stratum of the society, in comparison with which both the middle class and proletariat prove to be social groups not capable of claiming for their independent role in production process.

In the modern post-industrial society, bourgeoisie and working class not only found themselves confronted with each other within a very limited (caused by decrease in mass production) space, but also lost their original class specificity, the contours of a new social conflict getting more distinct.

At the same time, the sharpness of the social conflict emerging in the post-industrial society, as well as difficulties of the conflict resolution are associated with the fact that social preferences and the system of man's personal values actually demonstrate no changes during his/her life, which sets a sustainable tone to the confrontation.

Today, an actual social and labour conflict is still not determined by self-consciousness of any member of the society or by the social group or stratum which this member considers himself or herself to belong to. In the modern world, human aspiration to integrate into the stratum of intellectual workers, to say nothing of a dream of an active work in the field of information and knowledge production, is limited not only by personal circumstances, but also by the external ones, primarily, by affordability of education. The intellectual stratification of a great magnitude becomes a framework for any other social stratification.

Many highly developed European and North American countries make stakes on a human being and his/her creativity as the principal resource. It is a person's intellectual capabilities and encyclopaedic knowledge that influence to a great extent the material well-being and social status of man in the post-industrial society. In the current situation, the stratum of highly educated people presents the wealthiest social group and is able to sustainable reproduction.

The post-industrial society crucially changes the essence and motivation of human activity, modifies corporative principles, and promotes new forms of the management of commodity production. In this situation, it is impossible to believe that such a large-scale transformation does not touch deep structures of social organization, does not generate new social strata and does not give birth to new social conflicts.

The formation of intellectual class as the elite in post-industrial society strongly underlines its specificity in comparison with the rest of the society. In distinction from an industrial society, this inequality is rather justified, as the new elite is not of a parasitic type but, on the contrary, profitably uses

¹ Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, President of All-European Regional Council of Trade Unions of the International Confederation of Trade Unions, President of the General Confederation of Trade Unions, Professor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Coordinator of the Russian trilateral commission on handling social and labour relations between Russian trade unions, Russian employers' unions and the government of Russia. Author of many publications on labour and social issues.

the results of their own work, thus contributing to the social progress. Anyway, this cannot mitigate and, moreover, extinguish the flaring conflict where the opposite part is inevitably presented by people who were pushed out from social production with the help of the same technological wave that had raised the intellectual class to the height of its current unparalleled prosperity.

The appropriation of the increasing portion of national wealth proved to be connected not only with labour intensity or efficacy of material and equipment utilization, or even with the level of obtained formal education, but also with the extent to which a person is able to use and generate his/her new knowledge and enrich the brain capital. These trends lead to far more reduced circumstances for low-qualified workers than earlier, since even the economic growth cannot provide them with 'beneficial' working positions, as compared to the past. While the bearers of unique knowledge and talents hold privileged positions at the labour market, the representatives of lower and middle classes face the increasingly severe problems in maintaining worthy standards of living and even in seeking any job.

The trends manifesting themselves for recent decades indicate that the emerging post-industrial society has social contradictions and cannot be regarded as a society that may claim to have achieved full equality. On the contrary, the propagation of information and knowledge as the main aspect of industry lays a foundation for the new polarization of social groups and the formation of a new dominant class. This new contradiction might be threatening because it is in the first time when the prevailing of one social group over the other seems to be quite justified, as the material welfare of the first group is the result of the creative activity of its representatives. In the context of

modern ethics, there are no essential instruments to announce the unfairness of this situation because people are entitled to exercise their inalienable rights for individual development and self-improvement in a way that is not intended to obstruct the development of other people.

In our opinion, the aggravation of the problem of poverty during recent years seems to be a natural consequence of the formation of post-industrial society and reflects the social stratification with further subdivision of the society into 'the intellectual elite' and the lower class alienated from the modern science-absorbing industry.

We should admit that the new elite and workers of the post-industrial society have quite different interests and even systems of values. Moreover, under these new circumstances, the lower class is far more vulnerable, because the only significant resource is knowledge, which cannot be acquired in the course of collective activity. Mass protest and collective struggle typical of the industrial society could become ineffective. At the same time, modern methods and ways to assert social labour interests rooted in application of the modern social cultural technologies appear to be of vital importance.

The modern civilization which seems interconnected as never before, in practice turns out to be distinctly divided. Even during the 'cold war' the integrity of the world appeared to be much more obvious. The formation of the new unipolar world creates the illusion of autonomy of developed countries, but at the same time, this poses a lot of problems (economic, social, ecological, ethnic) that could transform this autonomous post-industrial community into the autarchic one and mediate a real split of civilization, the most dangerous social phenomenon the humanity may encounter in the forthcoming century.

N. Shmelyov¹

RUSSIA: POSSIBLE SCENARIOS FOR THE FUTURE

For when they shall say, Peace and safety; then sudden destruction cometh upon them (...) and they shall not escape.

The First Epistle of St. Paul the Apostle to the Thessalonians, 5:3

Famous Russian producer Nikita Mikhalkov's publication 'Law and Lies. Manifesto of Enlightened Conservatism' has actively been discussed recently among the Russian intelligentsia.

The publication offers a number of interesting thought-provoking things that and touch the soul of almost all Russian readers. I will tell straight off that in the context of the existing uncertain state of the country, a discourse on the sequence of 'Holy Russia' – 'Great Russia' – 'Great Russia without Holy Russia' and alike does not seem very fruitful to me personally. We had N. Danilevsky, F. Dostoevsky, N. Berdyayev and oth-

ers in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Much if not all has been said about Russian man's spirituality and spiritual richness, as well as about his sensitivity to the whole world, his ability to run to extremes.

It seems to me that now, after all our tragedies and turmoil, it is about time that we stopped speculating over the topic 'God–society–people' and started to seek answers to a very specific question 'How?' We all seem already to know what is to be done but we are not aware of 'how'. Therefore, I felt like responding to a new 'Manifesto' and suggesting more or less specific suggestions instead of delusive arguments for what lies ahead and how much we are willing to preserve of the 'Great Russia'.

It is not a coincidence that the sad epigraph has been chosen for this article. I think it is a succinct reflection of the mood in which five generations of Russian people have lived since the early 20th century. Any other nation in history is unlikely to have experienced over a hundred years so many bloody wars and no fewer bloody revolutions, not to mention massive total starvation. Our generations witnessed and remember eight full-scale wars: Russo-Japanese War, World War I, Civil War, Polish-Soviet War, the Winter War (Finnish), Great Patriotic War, Afghan War and recent wars in the Caucasus, and there is no end to them even today. As well as the revolutions of 1905, February 1917, October 1917, the collectivization of 1929–33 with its incredibly disastrous consequences, and equally disastrous 'revolutionary' terror of 1937–38, finally, the current

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for Europe (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Author of over 70 scholarly publications, including books: *Prepayments and Debts. Yesterday and Today of Russia's Economic Reforms* (Avansy i dolgi. Vchera i zavtra rossijskikh ekonomicheskikh reform), *Europe Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (Evropa vchera, segodnja, zavtra), *Europe and Russia: An Attempt of Economic Transformations* (Evropa i Rossija. Opyt ekonomicheskikh preobrazovanij), *Europe and Russia: Problems of the Southern Region. The Mediterranean, the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea* (Evropa i Rossija: problemy juzhnogo napravlenija. Sredizemnomorje–Chernomorje–Kaspij), *International Relations (Mezhdunarodnyje otnosheniya), Threats and Predictions: On Their Adequacy* (Ugrozy i prognozy (k voprosu ob ikh adekvatnosti), *Russia in the Diversity of Civilizations* (Rossija v mnogoobraziji tsivilizatsij) and others. Mr. Shmelyov is the author of novels: *Silvestre* (Silvestr), *On My Way I Felt Unwell* (V puti ja zanemog), collections of short stories and tales: *The Upper Floor* (Poslednij etazh), *Performance in the Honour of Mr. Prime Minister* (Spektakl' v chest' gospodina pervogo ministra), *Pushkin Square* (Pushkinskaja ploshchad'), *Night Voices* (Nochnyje golosa) and some others. Many of his works have been translated into foreign languages. He is member of the Economic Council under the Government of the Russian Federation. Member of the Human Rights Commission under President of the Russian Federation. Member of Moscow Writers' Union and the Union of Journalists of Russia.

'democratic' revolution. The 'social cost' of this revolution is quite comparable to the cost of previous ones. It is natural that with such, so to say, hereditary moods, of the two main probable scenarios of Russia's development in the next 50 years – pessimistic and optimistic – it is the pessimistic one that first comes to mind, permeated with the expectations of impending disaster and the 'end of Russian history'. A lot of things drive one to this conclusion, some belonging to various sides of our life, often without being even related to each other (at a cursory glance).

To begin with, one cannot help admitting the fact that there are some grounds for the arguments of those who say today that Russian people are out of breath, they have strained themselves to the breaking point; and never again will they be able to make up for the hideous genetic damage that was inflicted on them in the 20th century by all the wars and ruthless experiments of our variegated revolutionaries; that in accordance with the theories of such thinkers as Oswald Spengler, Arnold Toynbee, Lev Gumilyov and others, they have already passed the peak of its 'passionarity' and the only thing left for them is to degenerate slowly, by degrees (and as painlessly as possible), dissolving into more powerful and more viable civilizations. They have allegedly depleted all the sources of internal dynamics: the last one that had been accumulated over the centuries was expended in the years of the Bolshevik terror and the bloody bath of World War II. The 20th century broke Russia's backbone; the evidence of this being spontaneous (as the saying goes, 'out of the blue sky') disintegration of the great superpower in 1991 into numerous fragments, hardly historically and territorially viable, and a still huge though somewhat amorphous, jelly-like bulk of Russia proper; and the only guarantee of its existence is its nuclear missile potential preserved from earlier times. But how long will it endure?

The most serious international factors in the long term are presently impending conflict and struggle for global influence of the two leading world powers: the United States and China. If the current dynamics continues in the military, political, economic and even scientific and technological areas, it is quite likely that by the middle of the 21st century the USA will be forced to yield precedence in the global arena to China (especially if the latter will manage to reunite with Taiwan without a major war). If China's manifold influence in South and South-East Asia increases at its current pace (and it apparently will), and if it succeeds in establishing more or less allied relations with another Asian giant, India, then one is certain to be speaking (using the criteria of this very 'passionarity') not only about the 'Decline of the West', but of the beginning of the sunset of the entire Euro-Atlantic civilization.

Another major and probably long-term factor of the present international situation is the outburst of Islamic fundamentalism and international terrorism as its logical derivation. One cannot but agree with those who argue that yet another, World War III has started, the war without borders and rules; and no one knows when, where and how it may end.

One thing seems fairly clear: however the situation unfolds, Russia is in for many years of a persistent and costly fight against Islamic extremism and international terrorism, first on its borders with Central Asia and the Caucasus, and, second, within the country itself where its centuries-old peace between religious denominations might turn quite brittle. It is certain to require utmost efforts on behalf of the political and economic forces of the country, and it will undoubtedly put the current systemic crisis settlement at stake as a minimum.

It stands to reason, this list of threats from abroad which lead in the decade to come to the weakening of Russia is far from being complete. The coming world chaos is aggravated by the most acute problems of the 21st century, such as unrestrained and merciless globalization for the sake of the 'golden billion' which leaves the majority of the world population

bereft of its achievements; many millions of uncontrolled migrants that change ethnic and civilization façade of the contemporary world, primarily in the countries which make the bulk of the European and Atlantic civilization; bloody regional and ethnic conflicts almost on all continents; drug-trafficking and cross-border crimes; ecological threats, natural and anthropogenic calamities, epidemics, diseases, famine, illiteracy of millions of people and the like.

But as I see it, the forthcoming end of Russia's 'independent history' in its traditional form is linked to the internal state of the country rather than to the external factors. Russia is ill from the inside, and this is a hereditary disease. Treating it with the 'revolutionary therapy' of 1991 has only deepened the malady which takes root as way back as in the Soviet times.

The first of modern Russia's maladies to be mentioned on the list is the rapid process of the country's depopulation, the deepening demographic crisis and the abandonment of its vast territories, noticeable shifts in its ethnic structure, the migration of the population from its Eastern regions to the West but not otherwise (as it used to be before the October revolution), the reduced influx of people due to artificial political and administrative reasons, and the increased emigration from the country, the runaways being the most active, capable and educated part of the nation. This all leads to well-grounded misgivings about Russia being able to keep East Siberia, the Far East and some of the autonomies in the Caucasian belt under its rule. Nobody will be able to predict where Russia's Eastern border will be in the mid-21st century – on the Lena, the Yenisei, the Ob rivers or even the Urals.

There is not even a morsel of confidence that in the coming fifty years (statistically, the time-frame of two subsequent generations) Russia will get over the consequences of those perilous structural changes in the economy it was to endure in the last fifteen to twenty years. With the exception of its energy and raw materials sector and partly its military-industrial complex, the old economic potential of the country, which took decades of years to build, has been ruined or nearly destroyed, including such industries as machine-building, instrument making, aviation, automobile industry, ship-building, railways, the whole spectrum of consumer industries, agrarian sector, etc. None of these inspires particular optimism (if we disregard the hope for a miracle ever present in the Russian people since days of yore).

First of all, not a single country in history has probably been in such an odd situation, absurd from the point of view of common sense, when it does not seem to need money (i.e. investments and other assets), while in reality it has enormous and unsupplied demand in money to resolve its most pressing investment, social and cultural problems facing the whole country. In the last fifteen years, according to different estimates, something in the range of 300 billion to one trillion dollars in private capital assets 'have run away' from the country. There is no other historical example of such a massive blood-letting anywhere and at any time. This, however, was not all. In recent years, the state itself has exported about 500 billion dollars which it accumulated in the form of Central Bank's currency reserves and Stabilization Fund's savings and which it 'infused' under the most favourable terms into the economies of the West but not into its national economy. At the same time, Russia's policy was epitomized in the slogan, absolutely insane to normal people: 'The less money the country has, the better.' If you give the situation a sober look, it becomes clear that this money, which went to the West on a mass scale, will hardly ever return: Western economy has already absorbed and digested it.

And money from our businesses cannot so far guarantee the settling of the problem of savings either. This money, first of all, tends to go abroad too. What is left in the country is inadequate to solve its structural problems. Energy and raw ma-

terials sector, trade, civil construction, alcohol production, financial speculations, criminal turnover and partly telecommunications – these are basically the spheres where our business savings settle down.

There is one more potentially significant source of money – foreign investors. But Russia as a hi-tech producer (i.e. potentially their strong competitor) poses no interest for them. Russia attracts them only as the richest energy and raw materials appendage to the advanced countries (the USA, the European Union and China gaining momentum). And, of course, as a significant, yet inadequately explored market for the whole spectrum of consumer goods from tights to cars and airplanes. Russia appears in this connection yet to face most serious tests with an unpredictable outcome, particularly so in connection with its joining the WTO and an inevitable surge of foreign competition on its national commodity and financial markets.

In the sphere of private capital formation and automatic, market transfer of the capital from one industry into another (primarily the transfer from less promising to more promising hi-tech innovative industries), Russia, in all probability, will have to pay quite a long time for the gross errors made in the 1990s. Today, such an automatic market mechanism does not exist, and nobody will take the liberty to say when we will have it. It is a historical payment, first, for the free privatization of huge state assets organized from the above, which turned impudent crooks into multimillionaires and billionaires overnight, and, second, for the state-run dubious ventures such as the issuance of the short-dated bonds with the annual interest rate of 200 to 300 per cent, which has completely corrupted and spoiled Russian business community, which even today will not ‘stir a finger’ unless it is promised a hundred per cent of annual interest (while the rest of the world takes 5–15 per cent as a norm). A fantastic profitability of this sort is only possible in energy and raw materials sector, in alcohol production, in some spheres of commerce and in criminal turnover but not in hi-tech innovative branches, particularly in earlier stages.

Of course, there is little optimism about such an important factor determining the prospects of the innovative ‘breakthrough’ of the country as the current state of Russian ‘brains’. For the last twenty years the short-sighted Russian leaders have meant business when they claimed that fundamental and applied research, education, health-care system and culture in the scales they reached in the Soviet times are excessive for the country, an unaffordable luxury and an unbearable burden which should be done away as quickly as possible. A tenfold decrease in expenditure for science and a fivefold for education, the curtailed state expenditure for research to the absurd 0.3 per cent of the GDP (today in all developed countries it is 2 to 4 per cent of the GDP), miserable salaries of scholars, industrial designers, teachers, doctors and culture workers, lower than the average in the country, have intentionally pushed out (and keep doing it) the most active part of our intellectuals in search for a better life abroad or in the sphere of business.

General social situation in the country is also a matter of great concern.

One can put on the backburner all the dreams of the ‘breakthrough,’ of the surge of enthusiasm and creative energy of Russian citizens until the country’s major social problems are solved, namely: first, one must do away with the widest gap between the average salary of at least four generations of Russians and their counterparts in the developed countries which is six to ten times and more as much. Second, the difference in incomes between the ten percent of highly-paid and low-paid layers of population should be decreased up to the socially secure level; this ratio is 15:1 now (unofficially, it is 60:1) while in all countries of the Euro-Atlantic civilization this ratio is 5–6:1. Third, a real ‘social and market economy’ must be built which would harmoniously combine

market and non-market (including natural) forms to meet social demands, first of all, in social security, health care, education and housing.

In a word, one must take into consideration the real threat of the end of Russia’s ‘independent history’ or its transformation into a history of a different state, undoubtedly European and undoubtedly very significant regionally, but reduced to the boundaries within which Muscovy found itself under Tsar Feodor Ioannovich (late 16th century). One can conjure, however, with the same amount of likelihood, another scenario of Russia’s future by the mid-21st century, and more optimistic at that.

First of all, all these claims that Russian people have lost breath and stamina once and for all, exhausted all resources of creative energy, are questionable. Destructive invasions, repeated ravages and bloody revolts and revolutions have accompanied, with dispiriting permanence, the thousand-year long history of the country. Russia, however, was repeatedly reborn, virtually from ashes, and was reborn more powerful, not at all weakened.

The revolution of 1917, the Civil War, collectivization and Stalin’s terror, great losses in World War II taken together if we speak of the bloodshed and the destruction of the gene pool of the country, cost more than the protracted system crisis in Russia. Now the country still pays the old bills.

Some of our contemporary genetic scientists may have reasons to claim in this connection that the losses in the gene pool of the country during the period from 1917 to 1953 will be naturally reinstated only five generations later. But this is exactly mid-21st century! This means that Russia’s face and dynamics will be determined by, so to say, first quality people, and not those mediocre, bad and even worst quality ones that have survived intact after all tragic events and tribulations of the 20th century.

There is also a common opinion which states that if you want to breathe a new life into a country and its people, there should be a new all-embracing national idea which could unite Russia. A similar idea is obviously opined by Nikita Mikhalikov when he speaks about the ‘cultured conservatism’ which brings to mind the formula of ‘orthodoxy, autocracy, national spirit’ known in Russia of the past. This idea must be spiritually uplifting, equal in its force and expanse to, let us say, the idea of Christian salvation or it must reflect ambitions assumed by a great power (stretching as far as pan-Slavism or, maybe, further), or it should contain the idea of the mankind’s salvation (no less!) from the universal evil and injustice. Long Russian history knows all this not at second hand. I presume, however, that all chances of existence of such totalitarian ideas have gone in Russia, if not for good, then for a very long perspective.

We should not expect any new idea of salvation which could mobilize Russian people to perform heroic deeds – it just has nowhere to come from. At least for two generations to come, there can only be one and ultimate simple idea or, rather, a general mindset, a common goal of the Russian society at large which is preservation and well-being of people, creation, construction, further exploration and progress of the country and making it a fine place to live a decent and stable life for every person and their loved ones.

This seems to be adequate as a moral background not only to lead the country out of the current system crisis but to make a further ‘breakthrough’ in political, social, economic and cultural fields. For the modern world such a swift rise during the lifetime of one or two generations is not at all new: examples of it are Germany and Japan after their defeats in World War II, the ‘Asian tigers’, some Arab countries, Brazil, India and, of course, China. There are no objective reasons to think that Russian people *en masse* are stupider, lazier or morally weaker than any other nation.

Development of international affairs in the future is not by any means bound to be unfavourable for Russia.

There are some well-grounded reasons to expect that Russia's relations with the two currently leading centres – the USA and the European Union – will be increasingly moving towards strategic partnership based on mutual trust and mutual interest. After many decades of balancing on the verge of mutual destruction, neither the USA nor Russia will obviously present a real threat to each other either today or in the perspective.

In essence, the principal problem for the United States in the future will be Russia's potential tight union with China, its major strategic rival. But this course of events does not seem to become a reality by all means. At the same time, the USA and Russia have become allies in the battle against a new threat to the world – terrorism. Russia, by simple logic, is deemed to stage a 'northern front' against aggressive Islamic fundamentalism encroaching primarily from Central Asia and, probably, from the Caucasus.

As for the questionable present US policy to counteract the strengthening of the CIS and to support various 'colour revolutions', its prospects are not clear yet. The USA will hardly go to the trouble of supporting (for an indefinite time) an umpteenth number of newly-founded and internally weak states. If these states choose to rely on their own forces only, their chances of entering international, political and most of all economic life on a par with the rest are slim.

There is no threat to Russia on the part of its future relations with the European Union, even if it keeps expanding. At least, this will not result in the end of Russia's 'independent history'. Military conflict between Russia and the European Union is impossible, Russia's engulfment in the European integration process is unrealistic (Turkey, the Balkan countries, the Ukraine and Russia on top of it as member states will be not a strengthening but a breakdown of the historic process known as the 'United Europe'). All existing frictions between the sides will probably be removed on the basis of mutual compromises by means of standard treaties.

Russia, of course, is both a European and Eurasian country, this fact cannot be overlooked. Russia's future (particularly of its Eastern regions) in many ways depends on how its relations with China develop, with the leader of East Asian community.

History teaches many things. Incidentally, it teaches that with one exception (Indo-China) Middle Kingdom over many centuries of its existence never yearned for territorial expansion. China is interested not in territories but, first, in a possible build-up of its energy, raw materials and water potential. It is willing to participate in the exploration and usage of mineral resources of its neighbours such as Russia and Kazakhstan. Second, it is looking for new markets for its traditional and, from now on, its hi-tech products. Third, it looks to ease conditions throughout the world for migration of the most mobile part of its population (but always marginal one) in a search for jobs and investing its capitals.

Future relations of Russia with the CIS countries do not look grim at all. These countries have been traditionally in the sphere of Russian influence even after Georgia left the Commonwealth and was at war with Russia. Of course, the former Soviet Union will never be restored in its former shape. We cannot exclude, though, an establishment in the fifty years to come of a free confederation of independent post-Soviet states centring around Russia, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan. Some other post-Soviet countries may join this union, this seems to be a real prospect, particularly so after the stand-off in the relations with the Ukraine.

There has been too much in all spheres of life of people in these countries that linked them for many years to classify the 'post-Soviet divorce' as a historically temporary confusion. Nobody needs these newly-formed states as they are now,

while taken independently, severed from each other and from Russia. Their real economic potential in the conditions of the current scale of international competition is hardly viable.

The internal political situation seems to be developing in the right and promising direction. The country has embarked (for the first time in its history) upon building a democratic society, and nothing, except for a threat of intervention from the outside, can seem to divert it from this path. Will we have, considering Russian traditions, a sort of 'democratic caesarism' or a classical parliamentary democracy or a federation with the vast authority of regions similar to that of the rights of American states or Canadian provinces or even Swiss cantons? For the next fifty years this is not of primary importance.

The principal task for at least two generations is the formation of solid foundations for the edifice of Russian democracy, namely an effective system of local self-governance. By the way, it took centuries to build such a system in the leading democratic countries. Russia attempted to do it twice: in the middle of the 16th century (in the first half of the reign of Ivan the Terrible) and in the second half of the 19th century – early 20th century (*zemstvo*, district council). Unfortunately, as the saying goes, patience was in lacking. Today we are again only at the beginning of this journey.

But without an elective, responsible and financially independent system of local governance, Russia can hardly count on the genuine surge of popular creative forces, on the rule of law and order from top to bottom and on harnessing (if eradication of corruption and crime is impossible) of corruption and crime which corrode it from the inside. Smaller local conflicts that spring up for different reasons here and there will have to be put up with for a long while, though. Indicative in this respect is the example of a decades-long battle of Great Britain with the Irish separatists or that of Spain with the Basque movement.

One should not underestimate real opportunities of the noticeable acceleration of Russia's social and economic development. Even the most painful demographic problem in the sense of perspectives can be resolved one way or another if there is an appropriate and purposeful policy. Of course, this problem requires enormous efforts not only on behalf of the state but Russian society in general. First, in the very near future the state will have to find necessary resources (and it possesses them) to support the family in every possible way, to encourage birth rate, to set up a wide network of social benefits, first and foremost housing privileges, for young families, to do away with our national disgrace – homelessness, neglect of millions of people from the orphaned children to the helpless elderly and disabled people. Second, one must revive Russia's migration policy which existed before and which allowed in a short-time frame to explore and populate Siberia and the Far East, at least in part. Third, one should abolish all administrative and, which may be even more important, popular psychological obstacles which hinder immigration to Russia of both the Russians and the Russian-speaking and all citizens from the former republics of the USSR. It is quite possible that such immigration policy will be one of the ways, perhaps a principal one, of increasing population of nearly empty Russian villages and small towns. Fourth, it should come as no surprise, if in the next fifty years Russian government reverts to the policy successfully pursued by Catherine II, who encouraged mass immigration from other European countries to Russia.

The belief in the better future for Russia brings hope that in a not so long perspective the country will get an economic system void of the artificial conflict between the state and the market, between state and private property, state regulation and free enterprise. Today we can see some signs that indicate that the Russian society is ready to acknowledge the main results of the hasty privatization, which has become an unalterable fact: new redistribution of property (it does not matter whether the

owner will be the state or any individuals) would be too costly and could break the stability in the country, which is only coming into existence.

The state under our specific conditions must concentrate on some major economic functions which no other than the state will be able to perform for a long time.

First of all, these include further development of the most part of the country's infrastructure: roads, communication, pipelines, power industry, water reservoirs, melioration, major ports, public buildings, schools, hospitals, conservation systems etc. Second, for a long while (probably, for ever) there will be a need in state-run plants, primarily defence plants. Third, state finance, apart from direct investments, must become the foundation for the credit system of the country, the state must be the creditor and the insurer of the highest rank, analogous to the role of the state in all well-to-do countries. Fourth, without the state support in the form of tax alleviations, preferential credits, protection from the red tape, criminal racket and the like, small and medium-size businesses, which have long become prime movers of the economic progress and a source of innovations in the world, will never come out to the fore from the 'shade' where, according to some estimates, 40 per cent of the country's GDP is being produced.

The state support is also necessary for the agrarian sector, whether it is individual farming, or the emerging farming co-operatives, or agricultural companies: nowhere in the world, either in the developed or developing countries, can this sector function without the budget support. Finally, nowhere in the world, even in the ultimately 'market' economies, can science, education, health care and culture exist without the state being decisively involved in their funding. It is doubtful that Russian business, even under the most favourable conditions, will ever take up this function in full.

It seems that some of the regulatory functions of the Russian state are gaining increasing importance. First, private and corporate property should be given solid guarantees of inviolability. Businesses must be forced to comply with the norms of universally accepted corporate ethics. The state must wage a battle against all quasi-legal or illegal encroachment of someone's property, against corruption, organized crime and criminal turnover. Second, the state must restore the undermined trust of national and foreign investors with regard to the Russian financial and credit system (by the guarantees provided by the state more substantial than exist today). Third, the state should denounce an essentially absurd policy of budget surplus; it must not excessively restrain its deficit. All of these practices are at odds with the centuries-old world practice. One must by no means limit budget expenditures when this must not be done in any possible way. Fourth, the state must pursue the strictest anti-monopoly policy, because in the existing circumstances it is rather the irresponsible activities of natural and man-made monopolies that lead to the smouldering inflation than the financial factor.

I feel some optimism over the fact that Russian wild market of the type of the 1990s seems to be coming to normal. The age of 'robber barons' seems to be coming to an end due to natural causes. They are replaced by business people who are used to or are getting used to play by the 'rules of the game'. There are fewer and fewer business spheres which bring not normal but unheard-of incomes. The common psychology expressed in the words 'the client is always right' is becoming widespread as well as the practice of resolving business conflicts in courts.

The million-strong army of 'shuttle traders' which seemed unconquerable is disappearing. There are more signs showing that social responsibility is not that alien to the Russian businesses, particularly if they have gone past the stage of 'primary accumulation'. Leo Tolstoy once said that 'everything will settle down': Russian business has just passed the stage of its turbulent childhood, and those five or six per cent of the population around the world consisting of the entrepreneurial people, have survived in Russia despite all tragedies of the 20th century. They only want one thing from the state: it should not interfere with them and change the 'rules of the game' too often, it should aid them.

Two generations is a long enough period to get rid of yet another hereditary defect of Russia: the intolerably low payment for human work, which is still made deliberately low. In all economically advanced countries the share of salaries in the GDP is 50–70 percent while in Russia it is 30–32 per cent. Needless to say that this has a negative influence on working activity of Russians, their efficiency and morals. Compelled idleness, crime, alcoholism, drug abuse, and instability of the family – these are all results of poverty and not of man's sinful nature.

Thus, if we take an affirmative and, if possible, unbiased look at things, the balance between pessimistic and optimistic forecasts for Russia's development over the next half century is about 49 to 51 in favour of the latter. Of course, faith is more important for such estimates than logic: someone believes in a catastrophe, someone hopes for a better future – the way things have been and will always be. But even guided by pure logic, one can neither understand nor justify the persistent denial by the present Russian authorities the need to have a strategic, long-term plan of the development of the country, which would be clear to all: to the authorities, to businesses, to the public, and to our foreign partners, too, and which, among other things, would also include the long-term structural (industrial) policy. 'Let us rely on a happy-go-lucky way' – of course, this well-known principle suits many. But it is unsuitable for the country that suddenly lost its former purpose and gained nothing so far instead, nothing that would meet the needs to continue its century-long 'unique history'.

If we could make an arrogant attempt to get a glimpse of the middle of this century it would be reasonable, I guess, to recall the idea once expressed by our outstanding mathematician and futurist, academician N.N. Moiseyev (who once startled the world by his forecast of a 'nuclear winter'): there is no point in guessing and predicting further than 15–20 years ahead, because during this time something is bound to happen in the world, something that will turn everything upside down. For instance, could anyone have predicted, 5 years ahead, let alone 20, such an epoch-making event as the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union? Or the tragedy of September 11, 2001, in New York? And who knows how the global community will react if a long-awaited ship of some extraterrestrials suddenly lands on the Earth in the coming half-century?

With regard to the role Russia either in the East–West or North–South dichotomy, there is only one thing one can be certain of – in 15–20 years from now Russia will no longer be associated with any of these worlds, nor will it be likely to identify itself with one of them. But more probably, it will finally pay off its both past and present historical and human debts. And what is to happen next, only the Supreme Judge knows.

K. Shuvalov¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES: PROBLEMS OF MANAGEABILITY AND SUPRANATIONAL COORDINATION

Those who take part in international debates on issues of cross-cultural dialogue differ in their understanding of the term 'culture', but UNESCO and the Alliance of Civilizations use this word in their documents in its meaning of collective identity to generalize the notions of 'civilization', 'religion' and 'ethnos', which have become quite unpopular in Europe. I will also stick to this generalization which is not quite apt.

Manifestations of intolerance to a different culture are growing in number all over the world. Xenophobia of different types is among the factors that threaten stability and can escalate into a security hazard. Certainly, the state does not stand still in this situation. The basic mechanisms used to counteract proneness to conflict on the grounds of cultural diversity can be found on the national and state level: demographic and migration policies, policies in the sphere of education, employment, information, culture, religion, protection of rights and nation-building. Each of these tools can make a perceptible impact on co-existence of cultures, but hardly anywhere can this co-existence be made balanced and conflict-free with efforts of the state alone.

The idea of a complex response to the conflict of cultures underlies the international initiative which has gained widespread support — the Alliance of Civilizations (AoC). It regards itself as a tool of 'soft power' which is supposed to be used to overcome the conflict-bearing uncontrollability of cultural diversity. The Alliance of Civilizations does not intend to substitute the existing mechanisms of conflict resolution, but it has found its niche in affecting their cultural dimensions, especially through conciliatory work on interpersonal level. The Alliance 'is on friendly terms' with states, international and regional organizations, but it emphasizes its independence in relations with them and is intent on involving new players in the 'democratic management of cultural diversity'; those new players are supposed to represent the civil society in the first place. As the main international organizer of intercultural dialogue, UNESCO is also concerned with the problem of management of cultural diversity. At that, both UNESCO and the AoC evade the question of the subject of management. There is just a hint that it must be democratic. On the international level there is no such subject, and with the theoretic possibility of its appearance under the conditions of the change of the role of a national state in 'post-Westphalian era' there will inevitably arise a question of the cultural identity of the managing subject itself and, consequently, of its impartial, democratic character and its efficiency.

The opportunity to engage the international level of decision-taking in managing the cultural diversity would mean working out its toolkit including the regulatory tools. Neither UNESCO, nor the AoC, nor any other international organizations make it their mission although the leaders of the Alliance of Civilizations speak about coming to a new paradigm of cross-cultural relations as of a long-term goal of their work.

One may notice that the use of 'soft power' in management needs neither the ruling subject nor legal regulation, by definition, as it is exercised through affecting minds by convincing, educating and enlightening. But this activity is aimed not at cultures but at their bearers, i.e. the subjects of law and politics, citizens of their states.

It is evident that it is a sovereign state which now and in the foreseeable future can be the basic and most efficient manager of cultural diversity. It is due not only to the sovereign nature of political management tools but also to the necessity to take into account the enormously varying national specificities of approaches to ways of harmonizing cross-cultural relations.

Along with it, the international level of cross-cultural interaction is of great utility and in demand for many purposes: to cooperate in the line of interstate specialized institutions (UNESCO and its regional counterparts, the International Organization for Migration, interstate regional associations), to sum up the past experience in the sphere of coexistence of cultures, which unfortunately nobody is handling seriously, to conduct a dialogue on conceptual aspects of cross-cultural relations, in which, on the contrary, many are engaged, but Likhachov Scientific Conference and the Rhodes sessions of the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations' are seen as particularly interesting dialogue platforms.

Due to the local problems of coexistence of cultures in some cases it pays to try to solve them in the regional format. At the present stage of its activities the Alliance of Civilizations has brought it to the fore of its work, having prepared and received approval from the states involved of the two regional strategies for the Mediterranean: for the entire region and the South-East of Europe in particular. As a matter of fact, it is about the Alliance granting symbolic aid to the projects which separate state, international and regional organizations, foundations and NGO are carrying out in the framework of their own projects in which representatives of several states are engaged.

At international forums, we often happen to hear that the goal of eliminating cross-cultural conflict-proneness can be achieved mainly and almost completely by expanding people's awareness of 'alien' cultures they happen to encounter. Hence there is the tactics of prioritizing local initiatives aimed at making representatives of different cultures acquainted with one another, thus eliminating prejudices and fears. There is no doubt that this work is useful but one should not overestimate its effectiveness.

Of no less importance is the formation of the attitude for openness and dialogue, respect for people of different traditions, sticking to the rules of communication in any society within every culture. In this context those shaping public opinion — mass media, religious figures, leaders of youth movements, women's organizations — must be held accountable. All of them by nature and due to the fact that their work is carried out in the conditions of competition are vigilant against any attempts especially those made by the state to treat them as an object of control or coordination. The possible solution is to involve them in cross-cultural dialogue, make them allies and associates in resisting conflict-proneness on the grounds of cultural differences. In this case the dialogue between cultures acts as one of the tools for democratic management of their diversity.

The issue of managing cross-cultural relations is not at all that of the bureaucratic casuistry. The rules according to which this management will be exercised predetermine the outcome: whether it will lead to disclosing the creative potential of the interaction between cultures or result in making their competition harder.

¹ Ambassador-at-large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Special Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation on cooperation with the Alliance of Civilizations, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Works in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1976. Worked in different diplomatic levels in the central office abroad, Deputy of the head of the Central Asia Department, Ambassador of Russia in Iran, Director of III Department in CIS countries, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A. Smirnov¹

IS A NON-WESTERN PHILOSOPHY POSSIBLE?

Over the last decade, there has been a great deal of talk about 'non-Western philosophy'. Many publications on philosophy that have come out in the Western world have sections dedicated to non-Western philosophy. These works usually fail to offer clarification of the term 'non-Western', and the significance of non-Western philosophizing for the development of philosophy (which, in this case, means 'philosophy of the Western world') is not discussed, as a rule.

It is clear that 'non-Western' simply means everything that falls outside the defined limits of the West. This term does not convey what is meant by 'everything that falls outside the limits of the West'. In itself, the negation of Western character in philosophizing offers no concept of the nature of 'non-Western' philosophy.

It is perfectly obvious that the term 'non-Western' was allowed to stand in for the old term of 'Eastern (Oriental)', which fell under the scrutiny of part of the Western world due to Edward Said's *Orientalism*. In no way do I associate myself with any of Said's numerous supporters, but one of his assertions does seem well-grounded to me. Said asserts that the West could not comprehend the real nature of non-Western civilizations, and for this reason, 'Oriental (Eastern)' in the West in fact came to mean 'inferior'.

Let us suppose for a moment that Said's thesis is right. Is the term 'non-Western' in some respect better than 'Eastern (Oriental)'? Does it bring us closer to what Said meant by the real nature of non-Western civilizations, non-Western thought, and non-Western philosophy? Of course not. Negation, as pure negation, is pointless. For negation to have any meaning, it is necessary to know what constitutes both the negating and the negated on the whole; in other words, what meaning do they share? In this case, it is necessary to know what constitutes both 'Western' and 'non-Western' philosophy in general; what meaning do they share?

If only this were a simple question. Western and non-Western philosophy, taken together, constitute philosophy. But what is philosophy? And what is Western philosophy, the removal of which from the class of 'philosophy in general' gives us 'non-Western philosophy' as another representative of the same class?

I will not, of course, give a definition or an extended description of philosophy. Instead of this, I will advance a thesis with which I hope everyone will agree. Philosophy is the attempt to universalize the world. I am not asserting that philosophy as a whole can be reduced to this one aspiration and that there is nothing else in it. I am merely stating that this aspiration is always present in philosophy, manifestly or implicitly.

Having taken this as our starting point, we must answer two questions. First, what does 'universalizing the world' mean? Second, can the world be universalized?

Universalizing the world means constructing a cohesive description of it. From this point of view, philosophy presents itself as the attempt to reveal a foundation which will allow us to give a cohesive description of the world. The universal

character of philosophy does not mean that philosophy speaks about everything. It means that philosophy shows us *how* to speak about everything *cohesively*. Philosophy aspires to show how to avoid ruptures (such as the rupture between *Sein* [being] and *Werden* [becoming]) that break our description of the universe into weakly connected parts; in other words, into mutually irreducible segments.

We will proceed to the second question and start with a very simple observation: the world has many aspects. With the help of grammatical categories, linguists classify words of a language relating to these various aspects of the world. Thus, the categories of verb, noun, pronoun, adjective, and so on are present in English, Russian, and other languages. The concept of a philosophical category in Aristotelian interpretation denotes those various aspects of the universe, of which one is not reducible to any other.

Discussing a given question from the point of view of the structure of our speech and our thought, we would be able to notice an extremely important, not to say fundamental, trait of our ability to interpret the world, namely that of categorical subdivision, which is characteristically typical of language and thought.

We will discuss at length the philosophical concept of category, its meaning for the matter of the reducibility of various aspects of the world, and the consequences of this for the construction of a cohesive description of the universe. It is a question of the Aristotelian ten categories.

Categories serve as superior classifications with no higher classes. This means that the world, examined from this point of view (that of categorical division) will fall apart into unconnected segments. Inside of every category, we can move along the general-to-specific hierarchy of classification, either up or down, but we cannot cross the boundaries of category. We cannot find anything in common between, say, the 'substance' category and the 'acting' category: if some such commonality existed, it would indicate a class uniting these two categories.

Thus, superior classes have no shared class. However, there is always the category of being, to which all classes belong, so to speak, in equal relation. All categories represent modes of being, and *in this* sense, they constitute the same thing. They approach unity insofar as we look at the universe from the point of view of the unity of existence. The unity of existence, which Gilles Deleuze once called the pivot of Western thought, makes it not only possible, but necessary, to cross the boundaries of categories and surmount their irreducibility. Categories having nothing in common as such – that is, as marked and distinct aspects of the universe – from the perspective of the unity of being they turn out to be one.

Is this simply a trick? Can philosophy really play with words with the goal of combining what cannot be combined, of making the irreducible reducible? Not in the least. Being is not something common to higher groupings and cannot be displayed in them as their common denominator or common part. The categories approach unity as the unity of being, not in the way a class unites its kinds. Categories turn out to be united, insofar as they are modes of being or, simply, insofar as they *are*.

Merely because the link of 'being' is used for connecting categories with one another, these categories *are* one and the same; and only insofar as they *are* one and the same can they be united by the link of 'being'. Saying, for instance, that a 'stone is rolling', we connect the category of action ('rolling') with the category of substance ('stone') with the connective, 'is'. Here substance and action are one insofar as the action serves as a mode of the substance's being; and inversely, they

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Deputy Director of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Oriental Department of Philosophical Faculty of the State University for the Humanities, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of more than 100 scholarly publications, including 7 monographs: *The Logic of Meaning. Theory and its Application to the Analysis of Classical Arab Philosophy and Culture* (Logika smysla. Teorija i jejo prilozhenije k analizu klassicheskoj arabskoj filosofiji i kul'tury); *Logical and Cognitive Foundations of Arab and Muslim Culture: Semiotics and Visual Art* (Logiko-smyslovye osnovanija arabo-musul'manskoj kul'tury: semiotika i izobrazitel'noe iskusstvo); *La Filosofia Mistica e la ricerca della Verità* (Mystical Philosophy and Search for the Truth – in Italian); *On the Approach to a Comparative Study of Cultures* (O podhode k sravnitel'nomu izucheniju kul'tur) and some others. Executive Editor of the series 'Philosophical Thought of the Islamic World' (Filosofskaja mysl' islamskogo mira). Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the 'Journal of Philosophy' (Filosofskij zhurnal).

are one because and insofar as the action can be regarded as a mode of the substance's being.

Thus, being and the connective 'to be' are not simply near to one another or arising from one another. Although much has been spoken of it, I do not mean the reduction of thought to language. I mean something else: the link of 'to be' unites categories not in an incidental way. 'To be' means 'to be a mode of substance' and in this sense, to belong to the category of substance – that is, to be substantialized. Being and substantiality are one and the same insofar as the unity of being is the unity of substantiality.

In our discourse, a phrase serves as the minimal, or so to speak, as the atomic unit of intelligibility. In this phrase, understood as a proposition, the connective 'to be' is explicitly or implicitly used. The omitted link can be restored: in Russian we usually omit it, while in English, on the contrary, the tendency is to use it explicitly.

To sum up: a connective makes cohesive speech possible by surmounting the incompatibility of categories. This is as true for philosophy as it is for common speech. The link of 'to be' expresses the way that 'being' surmounts the incompatibility of categories by turning them into modes, or aspects, of substance, and permitting the construction of a cohesive description of the universe from the point of view of the unity of being, or the unity of substantiality. Such a substantial picture of the world was worked out by the Greeks and was accepted as a whole by the Western world.

We will return to the basic matter of this article. If non-Western philosophy is possible, then it is possible as another way of universalizing the world. This means that such a picture of the world must be non-substantial. It also means that another link must be used for uniting categories in a non-substantial unity in common speech as well as theoretical thought.

Is this possible?

Numerous traditions of thought exist that do not belong to the Western world and are therefore called non-Western. To speak of all of them at once is impossible, in that they differ more among themselves than any of them differ from the Western tradition. I will speak about Arab philosophy.

Let us first examine common speech. Arabic has the verb 'to be' and, moreover, there are two words that convey this meaning: *vadjada* and *kana*. Arabic is similar to Russian and several other languages in that this copula or linking word is rarely used. It is, rather, implied and can therefore be restored, but it is never restored with the use of those two verbs that convey the meaning of 'to be' in Arabic. Moreover, the Arabic linking word is not even a verb: the pronoun *khuva* ('he/it') serves as the copula instead.

What of this? The linking word in Arabic may be different from 'to be', but is this distinction nominal or essential?

I affirm that in this case we have not only a distinction of names, but of functions. Moreover, these two linking words – 'to be' and 'he/it' – are not merely distinct, but incompatible. This means that one cannot stand in for the other and be used in its stead.

To reinforce this thesis, I could say a great deal, but I will limit myself to one simple example by giving verbatim translations of Arabic phrases into Russian.

We will take an Arabic phrase in which the linking word is omitted: '*ana mutakallim* – '*Ja govorjaschij*' ['I speaking']. I am giving the literal Russian translation of the Arabic phrase. In Arabic, the link is omitted, but this is correct phrasing. In Russian, the link is absent, as in the Arabic phrase, but as distinct from the Arabic, the Russian phrase is incorrect. Let us try to restore the linking word in the Arabic phrase and see if it will be restored in a verbatim Russian translation. For Arabic, the natural way of restoring the linking word is '*ana khuva mutakallim* – '*Ja on govorjashij*' ['I he speaking']. In the Arabic phrase, the

linking word is restored, but in a verbatim Russian translation, it is absent.

Thus, the Arabic linking word *khuva* ('he/it') cannot function like the linking word in Russian.

We will now try restoring the linking word in an Arabic phrase using one of the Arabic equivalents for the verb 'to be'. We get '*ana akunu mutakalliman* – '*Ja jest*' *govorjaschij*' ['I am speaking']. This Russian phrase is perfectly correct. The Arabic phrase sounds awkward, although it is not strictly incorrect; but what is important is that the linking word is not restored this way. It can be restored, but again, only with the word *khuva* 'he/it': '*ana khuva akunu mutakalliman* – '*Ja on jest*' *govorjaschij*' ['I he am speaking']. This Russian phrase is meaningless, but a correct Arabic phrase corresponds to it.

In this way, the verb 'to be', added to the Arabic phrase, does not function as a linking word, and this phrase still requires the restoration of the linking word.

The incompatibility of linking words in Russian and Arabic serves as a preliminary hint of the Arab view of the world. To develop this, let us return to the ground of philosophy.

We have seen that the linking word 'to be' in Western thought is immediately connected with the highest ontological category of being. How does this case match up with the Arabic link of *khuva* ('he/it')?

Khuva ('he/it') is directly connected with *khuvyya* ('he-ness', 'it-ness'), one of the favourite categories of philosophy in Arabic. Speaking about a thing as itself, about a pure thing, means there precisely its *khuvyya*.

Let us note two extremely important aspects of this category. First, from the point of view of Arab philosophers, *khuvyya* ('he-ness', 'it-ness') adds nothing to the understanding of a thing. Second, *khuvyya* ('he-ness', 'it-ness') is equal to *subut* – 'affirmation' – but not to *vudjud* – 'being'. *Vudjud* ('being') is added to the pure thing and is considered its attribute, like '*adam* – 'non-being', which, along with being, serves as an attribute of a pure thing.

Classical Arab philosophy, beginning with its first school, the Mu'tazilis, and ending with the Sufi, went through a complicated evolution, which can by no means be reduced to a history based on the antiquity of the Falsafah school. The three aforementioned principal ontological categories of Arabic philosophy – *subut* ('affirmation'), *vudjud* ('being'), and '*adam* ('non-being') – determine the direction of the discussion by putting aside many important and secondary details. Nonetheless, the conclusion remains true: with the exception of translations of and commentaries on Greek texts (and the whole tradition developed in that course), Arabic-language philosophy identifies a pure thing not with *vudjud* ('being'), but with *subut* ('affirmation').

This second, more material hint relates to the way in which Arab thought aspires to universalize the world. In order to find this method, it is necessary to take one more step and answer the question: what precisely is implied by 'affirmation' and what is the difference between affirmation and being?

These two categories can be separated just like process and substance. 'Affirmation' corresponds to a procedural view of the world, just as 'being' is connected with a substantial picture of the world. To understand and universalize the world for Arabs means to interpret it as a collection of thing-processes, not as a collection of thing-substances.

This is true of Arabic language, with its clearly expressed preference for procedural means of expression. To make this understandable for those who do not know Arabic, I will say that this language predisposes us to see, for example, not 'an arrow that flies', but rather 'the flight of a flying arrow', not 'a stone that rolls down a slope', but 'the rolling of a stone down a slope'. The process is affirmed between the actor and the experiencer, and it is precisely this affirmation that Arab language

philosophy develops as the understanding of a pure thing. But this is, of course, a thing-process, not a thing-substance.

What is the significance of all this for understanding Arab thought and Arab culture? The significance is invaluable, as Arab culture, in its distinct segments, is formed procedurally. I will offer just one example. Islamic ethics is based not on the concept of *fadila* ('virtue'), but on the concept of *'amal* ('deed') (or, to speak more precisely, considering the procedural nature of the language, 'doing'), treating a deed ('doing') as a process affirmed between *niyya* ('intention') as the active side and *fi'l* ('acting') as the passive side of this process. Arabic-language ethical theories, arising as a result of the translation of and commentaries on Greek authors, on the contrary, develop *fadila* ('virtue') and

razila ('vice') as their central substance-oriented concepts. The contrast between procedural and substantial views of the world accounts for the fact that Greek ethical theories had little influence on Islamic ethics proper, the fact noted with some surprise (which is completely eliminated by the arguments developed in this article) by researchers of Islamic ethics.

I will move to my conclusion. The experience of Arab culture is the experience of the construction of a cohesive description of the universe on the basis of procedure. Process is by no means reducible to the aspect of substance, but rather constitutes a starting point for an attempt at a different integral universalization of the world. This serves as an affirmative answer to the question posed in this article's title.

V. Sogrin¹

THE U.S. CIVILIZATION IN THE POST-SOVIET RUSSIA'S PERCEPTION

The perception of the U.S. civilization by contemporary Russian society has gone through three stages. For convenience, we can call these the 'Gorbachev', 'Yeltsin', and 'Putin' stages.

Mikhail Gorbachev, in the first stage of his reforms, was realizing the *Great Soviet Dream* – 'to match and surpass America' on the foundation of socialist modernization, thereby showing that public property, the supervisory role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the proletarian state had the capacity to provide more successful social development than private property, a bourgeois multi-party system, and a capitalist state. However, all of his command-administrative economic and political reforms failed, and already in 1987, Gorbachev had changed the strategy of reform, having made up his mind to unite socialism with the market and democracy. In the eyes of some, this was an attempt to inculcate Western values, but Gorbachev and his ideologues were really trying to show that such values are inherent in true socialism, which would finally be established in the USSR. These ideological manipulations gave rise to fantastic inferences about Western countries, in which the market and democracy had existed for decades. Some Soviet spiritual gurus, among them the writer Ch. Aitmatov, declared developed Western countries – first Sweden, then Germany and France, and finally the United States – to be incarnations of genuine socialism.

This was an absurdity conjured up to save the socialist idea, but one of its consequences was a change in the Soviet elite's perception of Western, including American, values. Quite quickly, Gorbachev and his advisors found a way out of the predicament connected with the class identification of the market and democracy. These institutions were enumerated in a ranking of non-class *universal values*. Gorbachev's advance-

ment of the conception of *universal values* implied the recognition of the countries where the market, democracy, human rights, and civil society were present as blood brothers of the USSR. *So the United States, after having been Enemy Number One, turned into a friend of the USSR*. Gorbachev himself first stated this openly in June 1990 during his visit to the USA. *The Soviet leader declared that the Soviet Union and the United States were 'one civilization'*, and that he accepted, once and for all, the convergence of socialism and capitalism.²

Not all representatives of the Soviet and Party élite were pleased with this ideological revolution of Gorbachev's. Party conservatives labelled Gorbachev and his supporters (especially A. Yakovlev) 'American agents'. However, among Russians, there were some who felt that Gorbachev's ideological compromises with the United States were insufficient, that what was required was not a convergence of socialism and capitalism, but a full rejection of socialism and acceptance of the Western model in its pure form. It was precisely these politicians, of whom the main leader was Boris Yeltsin after 1990, who captured growing support among the masses. In 1991, coming out openly against communism and socialism, *armed with Western and, consequently, American values*, Yeltsin and his team gained a victory in the presidential elections in Russia and trampled the August restoration putsch easily, at lightning speed. A liberal democratic revolution had taken place in Russia.

I am convinced that Russia's perception of Western and especially American values, the desire to live as people did in the United States, had a voluntary character and was not a consequence of the West's scheming and the diversions of the American secret service, as many Russian communists and nationalists-patriots suppose. I will point to the main causes of this ideological-political phenomenon.³ One of them consisted in the fact that by the end of the 1980's the Russian masses, at least the politically active part of them, were profoundly disillusioned about the possibilities of successful modernization of the USSR on a socialist foundation (Gorbachev's perestroika, as a variant of both command-administrative and market-democratic socialism, worsened the economic condition of the country) and perceived a real alternative of progressive social change in the liberal-democratic Western model. According to the data of the All-Soviet Public Opinion Research Centre (VTsIOM), in 1990, 96 per cent of people who were questioned chose in favour of a social model that had triumphed in one

¹ Head of Centre for North American Studies at the Institute for World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chairman of the Russian Association of Americanist historians, Professor at Moscow University of International Relations under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Dr. Sc. (History), Honorary worker of higher education of the Russian Federation. Author of many scholarly publications, including monographs: *Ideological trends in American Revolution of the 18th Century* (Idejnye techenija v Amerikanskoj revoljutsiji XVIII veka), *Founders of the USA. Historical Portraits* (Osnovately SShA. Istoricheskie portrety), *Myths and Realities of American History* (Mify i realiji amerikanskoj istoriji), *Critical Trends of Non-Marxist Historiography of the USA of the 20th Century* (Kriticheskie napravlenija nemarksistskoj istoriografiji SShA XX veka), *Jefferson. Man. Thinker. Politician* (Dzhefferson. Chelovek. Myslitel'. Politik), *Ideology in American History. From Founding Fathers to the End of the 20th Century* (Ideologija v amerikanskoj istoriji. Ot otsov-osnovatelej do kontsa 20 veka), *Presidents and Democracy. American Experience* (Prezidenty i demokratiya. Amerikanskij opyt), *Political History of the USA* (Politicheskaja istorija SShA), *Political History of Modern Russia. 1985–2001: From Gorbachev to Putin* (Politicheskaja istorija sovremennoj Rossiji. 1985–2001: ot Gorbacheva do Putina), *Historical Experience of the USA* (Istoricheskiy opyt SShA) and some others. Editor-in-chief of 'Social Sciences and Modernity' (Obshestvennyje nauki i sovremennost') journal, member of the editorial board of *Contemporary and Recent History* (Novaja i novejšaja istorija) journal.

² *Pravda*. 3. VI. 1990.

³ For details, see: Sogrin, V.V. *Political History of Contemporary Russia 1985–94: From Gorbachev to Yeltsin*. 1994; *Political History of Contemporary Russia 1985–2001: From Gorbachev to Putin*. 2001; *1985–2005: Three Transformations of Contemporary Russia // History of the Fatherland*. 2005. No. 3.

or another liberal-capitalist country (*the greatest number – 32 per cent – recognized the United States' model as the best*), and only 4 per cent expressed a preference for the Chinese model.¹ From 1989 to 1990, in all the Eastern European countries which used to be allies of the Soviet Union, 'velvet' anticommunist revolutions triumphed, swearing allegiance to liberal-democratic ideals. The choice and victory of Eastern European peoples became a powerful catalyst for anticommunist moods in Russia.

The new Russian leadership, having taken shape as a result of the successful anticommunist revolution, the breakup of the USSR, and the emergence of a sovereign Russian state in 1991, acted under a liberal-democratic banner and regarded the United States, the leader of Western civilization, as its ideological and political ally. The first President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, stated more than once that Russia and the United States professed the same values, Russian politicians regarded American models as examples for imitation.² The Russian Constitution of 1993 was put together taking into account the experience of various liberal-democratic countries, but American influence proved to be greatest. The model of the presidential republic, the procedure for impeachment of the head of state in the event of him abusing power, the limit of holding presidential office for only two terms, each for four years, the mechanism of 'checks and balances' in the interrelations of the branches of government, ways of confirming high officials in their posts, and other components of the highest importance were moulded from American constitutional law (they are present in the constitutions of other liberal-democratic states, but the primary source for them was the U.S. Constitution).

The end of the 1980s and the early 1990s were a period of celebration of the Russian political establishment's, the leading Russian mass media's, and even the broader Russian masses' purely positive attitudes towards the United States and its experience and ideals.

A year and a half to two years after the achievement of the 'cordial agreement' between Russia and the United States, a distinct disappointment in liberal-democratic ideals, which in Russia took place on the strength of internal trouble as well as foreign-policy clashes, was immediately extended to their primary promoter, the United States. The USA, for its part, was disappointed in the 'wild' Russian variant of the realization of Western values, as well as in Russia's unwillingness to perceive the United States as having the role of leader of the global democratic revolution, and in practice as the sole hegemonic power of a new world order.

Among the causes for this phenomenon, Russians' disillusionment with the results of radical market reforms took first place, extending to Western civilization and especially to its leader, the USA, which openly patronized and protected Boris Yeltsin and his reorganizations. Instead of the people's capitalism in Russia that had been promised by Boris Yeltsin and his supporters over several years, a kind of government official-oligarchic capitalism with sharp social disparities and mass destitution emerged and took form. The defenders of liberal democracy (the 'Yabloko' Party and several others), accusing Yeltsin and his regime of degeneration, could not effectively withstand the negative consequences of the Russian variant of the change from socialism to capitalism, and the perpetrators of the 'wildness' of Russia's Westernizing experiment appeared to the popular consciousness not as 'renegades' from liberal democracy, but as liberal democracy itself.

In the changing political situation, Yeltsin and the political establishment on the whole attempted to remain faithful to their ideological-political choice, but were unable to ignore the

changes in mass consciousness. In addition, there was a growing temptation to shift the masses' dissatisfaction with their state completely onto the Western partner, removing, or at least underplaying, the Russian establishment's responsibility for the 'wild' capitalism in their country. Thus, an ambivalent attitude towards the United States came to be affirmed in the Russian élite. The Russian élite was not ready to renounce liberal democratic values and ideological union with the United States and Western civilization, but it started to lay claim to its own sovereign niche within it and began increasingly to take issue with the United States, displaying a misunderstanding and non-acceptance of its position and interests.

In the period of Vladimir Putin's presidency, this ambivalence in the Russian political élite's relations with the United States continued and deepened. Throughout Vladimir Putin's period in office (as with his successor Dmitry Medvedev after him), he invariably declared adherence to the principles of democracy, to the desire to modernize Russia. Within the framework and context of such positioning by the Russian president, his ideological environment showed Vladimir Putin to be an ideological follower of the well-known liberal American president Franklin Roosevelt. In 2007, at a conference marking the 125th anniversary of this president's date of birth (a day which was not observed in the United States itself), V. Surkov, the deputy head of the presidential administration, who had gained recognition as the Kremlin's foremost ideologue, stated: 'If in the 20th century Roosevelt was our military ally, then in the 21st century he has become our ideological ally.'³ 'We will not conceal that today, speaking of Roosevelt, we have Putin in mind,' declared G. Pavlovsky, a well-known political engineer in the Kremlin.⁴

However, in reality the development of contemporary Russia has displayed other trends. One of these consists in the rejection of *liberal democracy*, to which Roosevelt was committed, in favour of *sovereign democracy*, the authorship of which is most often attributed to the same abovementioned V. Surkov, and which appears today on the ideological banner of the ruling party, United Russia. In polemics with the West, and most of all with the United States, the Russian leadership and mass media have rehashed arguments characteristic of the Soviet period, which are attempts at demonstrating that Russian democracy is much better than that of the West.

We should speak about the obvious ambivalence of the Russian leadership's relations with the West and the United States. On the one hand, official ideology, voiced by the hosts of television channels and televised agitprop, subjects the USA to severe criticism for hegemony and other vices and purposefully instils anti-Americanism. On the other hand, the Russian élite send their children to study at Western universities, acquire immovable property in the West, and invest enormous amounts of capital in Western countries (the history of former Moscow Mayor Yu. Luzhkov shows that this is useful for the élite in the highest degree). In meetings and negotiations with American leaders, Russian officials behave themselves as if the United States were their close partner, and it does not smell of anything like anti-Americanism. Russia consequently enters into important and undoubtedly beneficial international and bilateral agreements with the United States, cooperates in the War on Terrorism in Afghanistan, and strengthens relations with NATO.

Facts like these give analysts a basis for saying that, for the Russian leadership, anti-Americanism is a product to use inside the country, a tool for mobilizing the masses to support them, as other tools are lacking.

A clear example of the Russian establishment's cynically pragmatic relations with the West, in my view, is its position in relation to the Western and primarily American mass culture.

¹ 'Economic and Social Change: Monitoring of Public Opinion' // *The Informational Bulletin of the VTsIOM*. 1993. No. 6, p. 14.

² Bogaturov A. 'Three Generations of Russia's Foreign Policy Doctrines'. // *International Processes*, 2007, No. 1, p. 55–58.

³ 'Roosevelt is an ally again' // *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*. 9. II. 2007.

⁴ Ibid.

Over the last two decades, American mass culture has firmly taken root in Russia. Many examples of this, some of the least advantageous kind, such as violence, sex, small-minded humour, and a 'tabloid' or 'yellow-press' interest in celebrities, have clogged the Russian media, including the television channels controlled by the authorities. It would seem that the authorities, who are constantly declaring that 'Russia is a unique civilization' (an assessment fixed in the policy documents of the United Russia party) and calling for patriotism and love for the Motherland should resist the spread of such examples, as well as the headlong growth of the country's own national 'factories' of vulgar mass culture, which are allowing the Russian masses to sink 'below the baseboard' in a spiritual sense. But no, the authorities at the very least close their eyes to this, permitting media workers to use the opportunities of the market for their own enrichment at the cost of bad tastes among the masses.

The authorities also do nothing to prevent the Russian masses from adopting the vulgar behavioural manners of the American 'mob'. Russian-style behavioural freedom is added to American-style behavioural freedom: Russians have already grown accustomed to drinking beer in all public places and at any time, and have turned Russian obscenities into or-

dinary conversational speech. Some Russians proudly suppose that in Russia, freedom has become even greater than in America.

I believe that the Russian authorities consciously encourage the identification of freedom precisely and solely with freedom of behaviour. In place of the previous, informal Soviet 'social contract', which consisted in the masses consenting to the political élite's disposal of power and property in exchange for the provision of a minimum level of subsistence, there is now a new informal social contract between the authorities and the masses. The authorities grant the masses the freedom to behave in any way they like, so long as they make no claims to political and economic freedom. Political and economic power must belong to the élite. So far, the Russian political élite's new strategy for maintaining power has shown itself to be effective enough. Time will tell how reliable and durable it turns out to be in comparison with the power-retention strategies used by the Soviet élite.

By my conviction, it is an absolutely necessary task for the academic community and for Russian Americanists to preserve and deepen an objectively balanced approach in studying the United States, to resist propagandistic clichés, and to encourage positive dialogue between the two cultures.

Yu. Solonin¹

CULTURE IN THE CHANGING PERSPECTIVE

Culture is the subject of an extremely broad discourse. This discourse draws on almost all elements of our society's intellectual world. However, we must state that the intensity with which problems are presented does not accord with the degree of attainable understanding. There is no paradox in this statement. The breadth of the polemic is generated by the spontaneously emerging awareness that the knot of the most essential problems of modernity is concentrated in the theme of culture. This spontaneous, massively increasing interest is accompanied foremost by a process of fixating all of the new phenomena and the dynamics of cultural life, and the broadening of the factual sphere. The rationalization of this by scientific means proceeds far more slowly and is carried out in a significantly narrower environment of professionals. The presence of these two spheres and levels of mastering the problems of culture is an important aspect of cultural thought.

If in the sphere of natural sciences and technological problems, where we can also state the presence of similar spheres, the influence of commonplace representations on scientific thought is minimal under the most specific character of a subject in these sciences and means of understanding it, then in the area of knowledge of the humanities the matter consists of something else, but then again under the peculiarities of its subject.² Let us turn our attention to one aspect. Technological progress has come to dominate and define the socio-cultural

dynamic of society. However, in the relation of these two dynamics there is a fundamental contradiction. The first possesses an increasing aggressiveness, penetrating into the innermost bio-psycho-physiological and cognitive structure of man. Under its influence, the speed of change of the subject organization of modes of life, leisure-time, kinds of labour, and forms of life activity in general is growing. In a fundamentally different way, the corporal, psychical, and intellectual organizations of man, and the requirement for their energy resources, are growing in this kind of activity.

The socio-cultural dynamic, much as it has accelerated, which is a certainty, nevertheless has an essentially different rhythm structure. In the clash of this contradiction, the victim is what is regarded as traditional, stable forms of a cultural mastering of the world, and in the first place, those which are connected with reflexivity, contemplativeness, retrospectiveness, and inclusiveness of tradition in the real context of a person's life. The notion of what constitutes the past has changed, but the evaluation and treatment of it has changed along with this. It has become a prerogative and characteristic of the traditional culture rejected by the modern. If the past was usually understood in a retrospective of large durations of time, then it is now defined by the metrics of much smaller size. But such a change in the evaluation of the past has also changed the relation to understanding what is real: the duration of modernity has shortened periods of currency. In the usual sense, the real was defined by the time of stability of a mode of life and the things which formed it, by the conditions of labour, the steadiness of collective and value-based determiners of vital factors controlled by the mental structure of a person through a socio-cultural dynamic. A person had time to accommodate himself to it while preserving a feeling of psychological comfort.

The prognostication and description of the consequences of the disagreement of dynamics of distinct spheres of social life was made long ago by cultural anthropologists as well as philosophers. But preconditions for the 'removal' of the traumatic effects of this disagreement were in no way created. This circumstance engenders the usual complaints about the lack of need for knowledge of the humanities, especially culture

¹ Chairman of the Council of the Federation Committee for Science and Education at the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 300 scholarly publications, including monographs: *Science as Object of Philosophical Analysis* (Nauka kak predmet filosofskogo analiza), *Philosophy of Culture* (Filosofija kul'tury), *What Philosophy Do We Need?* (Kakaja filosofija nam nuzhna?), *Subject-Matter of Philosophy and Substantiation of Science* (Predmet filosofiji i obosnovanije nauki), *Paradigms of Historical Thinking in the 20th Century: An Outline of Modern Philosophy of Culture* (Paradigmy istoricheskogo myshlenija XX veka: ocherki po sovremennoj filosofiji kul'tury) and some others. Member of editorial boards of scholarly journals: *Philosophical Sciences* (Filosofskije nauki), *Personality. Culture. Society* (Lichnost'. Kul'tura. Obschestvo), *Socrates* (Sokrat) and others. Chairman of St. Petersburg Philosophical Society, Vice-President of Russian Philosophical Society.

² The degree of 'enclosure' of the natural sciences from the influence of everyday, commonplace, dilettantish notions should not be exaggerated. It is precisely the pressure of these on science that we must see as the partial cause of the rebirth of creationism, quasi-scientific theories, and interest in esotericism that have penetrated into the traditional scientific environment.

knowledge, by the ruling (not only in the political sense) élites of contemporary society.

Such kind of complaints are often founded on the illusion that the whole matter is the insufficiency of the élites' 'understanding', will, and persistence in conducting an appropriate cultural policy, and finally in the fact that the replenishment of the élite does not proceed from the appropriate social reservoirs. The actual problem has its base in another place entirely. Contemporary ruling élites and leading groups are fully adequate to that socio-cultural model which takes shape with inevitable imminence. For this, it is not the stability of forms that is characteristic, but their dynamic multiplicity, which is based on the internal readiness for modification, alteration, and change. The stability of cultural forms correlated (and was se-

cured) with stability of the value structure of the current culture. Values resist alteration, in which fully reasonable thought is not perceived. The energy of contemporary anthropogenic civilization does not anticipate this, or reduces it to the level of clearly definable pragmatics. In connection with this, a curious paradox is observed: rapid alteration generates demand for foresight, prognoses. Before us, scenarios of different prospects, conditions, and quantitative indicators are drawn. However, they are all washed away by waves of unforeseen effects in the social orders of life. Prognoses cease to orientate, the sphere of the unpredictable widens, culture as a condition for stability changes its condition and ontological bases. Man slips out of the forms of traditional culture, submitting himself to an unpredictable process.

V. Styopin¹

THE PROBLEM OF VALUES IN THE CONTEXT OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

The current relevance of the problem of dialogue between cultures in the era of contemporary globalization is brought about by a multitude of interrelated causes. To an extent, these causes can be divided into three clusters.

The first of these is connected with the swelling migration of people in the modern, globalized world. Problems of adaptation by the representatives of different cultural traditions are emerging. In the established cultural environment of the nation-state, new cultural enclaves emerge, often causing tensions and conflict. It should not be excluded that global warming and its consequences, like the rise of world sea levels and the flooding of large, populated areas of dry land will lead to a new great migration of peoples. And this will inevitably generate problem situations in interactions and encounters of different cultural traditions.

The second cluster of causes which brings the problems of dialogue among cultures to the fore is connected with creating newer, larger, forms of inter-governmental institutions along the path of contemporary globalization.

The experience of the European Union is, in a way, becoming a pattern for many countries. A somewhat different experience of voluntary unification is demonstrated by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed after the collapse of the USSR. It is probable that there will also be a specific character in the realization of projects of integration in a number of states in South America, like the recently announced project to integrate the countries of Asia (Japan, China, India, South Korea, and a range of cities in Southeast Asia).

Integrative processes accompany the search for new cultural identity. As a collateral negative effect of this process, unexpected intensification of national relations may emerge (and this relates to institutions as advanced as the European Union

in terms of integration). This kind of clash occurs even in the CIS. In a way, this is an 'infantile sickness' connected with the search for national identity. By this, I mean the situation in which national élites artificially place their national languages in opposition to Russian, and their national culture in opposition to Russian culture. However, in the 21st century, national identity should not be built on the base of cultural isolation and the search for enemies. These are strategies of the past. This is why dialogue among cultures, which offers mutual respect and enrichment of cultures in the process of interaction, is so important.

Finally, the third cluster of causes, in my view, is the system-establishing causes connected with the search for new strategies of globalization and civilizational development.

At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st, the strategy of globalization was defined by the aspiration to make liberal values the basic future of global integration. Patterns that demonstrate the embodiment of these values presented themselves as an idealization of distinct aspects of the way of life of the consumer society (fully realized in the United States and Western Europe).

Their deeper foundations were the values formed in the era of the establishment of the 'project of the Modern' and subsequently modified in the second half of the 20th century in the process of the formation of the consumer society.

However, today the strategies of globalization which presuppose the imitation of Western models of consumer society are subject to serious doubts.

The growth of people's welfare in economically developed societies is connected with the constant heightening of the level of energy consumption. It has been calculated that if in the present time all of humanity consumed energy at the same per capita rate that occurs in the United States, then all the energy resources mastered, explored and known about to this day would be exhausted, literally in the course of a single generation.

We must add that, in direct proportion to the growth of energy consumption, the pollution of the natural environment is also growing. If we imagine, mentally, that all of humanity realized the standards of consumption of the developed countries of the West, then an ecological catastrophe would take place in only a few years.

Along with this, the majority of developing countries are hardly satisfying this condition, when their population has already been doomed to be outside the 'golden billion'. Developing countries set the goal of raising the level of per capita consumption of the population, and in their ideals, compare themselves with the countries of the West by this indicator.

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Supervisor of the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of the Section of Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and Law of the Department for Social Sciences of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Doctor *honoris causa* of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Mr Styopin is the author of over 400 scientific works, including 21 monographs: *Filosofskaya antropologiya i filosofiya nauki* [Philosophical Anthropology and Philosophy of Science], *Filosofiya nauki i tehniki* [Philosophy of Science and Technology], *Epoha peremen i scenariyi buduschego* [The Age of Changes and Scenarios for the Future], *Teoreticheskoye znaniye* [Theoretical Knowledge], *Filosofiya i universalnyi kul'tury* [Philosophy and Culture Universals], *Novaya filosofskaya entsiklopediya (v 4 t.)* [The New Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (4 vols.)], *Filosofiya nauki: obshchiye problemy* [Philosophy of Science: Common Issues], and others. He is President of the Russian Philosophic Society, Member of the Council for the analysis of critical situations and drafts of governmental decisions under the Government of the Russian Federation. Mr Styopin is a foreign member of National Academies of Sciences of Byelorussia and the Ukraine, doctor *honoris causa* of the University of Karlsruhe (Germany), Professor Emeritus of the Academy of Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China (Beijing), a standing member of the International Institute (Academy) for Philosophy (Paris, 2001). Laureate of Russia's State Award in the field of science and technology.

However, objective environmental and energy limits exist for this process, the violation of which leads to the further intensification of global crises. This means that an alternative strategy of globalization must be linked with the search for new value guidelines and corresponding new paths of civilizational development.

In my speech at the previous International Likhachov Conference, I have noted that in the context of this main task, it is reasonable to divide the two approaches to the dialogue of cultures.

The first of them is emphasized in isolating the universal in different cultural traditions. It is assumed that the presence of universal components will provide for the dialogue of cultures. However, the whole problem is that the universal is interpreted differently in different cultures. It is fused with those layers of thoughts which characterize the historical specifics of one or another cultural tradition. The very attempt to separate the general from the specific runs up against resistance insofar as people identify themselves as a people, an ethnicity, a social group, precisely in connection with the unique characteristics that distinguish them from people of other cultural traditions.

The dialogue of cultures in this approach assumes limits of mutual influence, where the peculiarities of each culture must be recognized and it is necessary to treat each with respect. The preconditions for intercultural mutual understanding are created here, but the possibilities of change in basic values dividing cultures are not considered. Mutual understanding is necessary, but still not sufficient for making new strategies of globalization.

In the second approach to the dialogue of cultures, the scope of the peculiarities that define cultures' uniqueness appear to be changing historically, and constant re-examination of the traditions seems possible. In this case, the analysis is focused on the exposure of trends of changing traditions. In this connection, a question emerges about the preconditions of forming points of growth for new values as a condition for overcoming global crises.

The points of growth for new values are the conditions of culture in which new worldviews are conceived and which can be interpreted by distinct cultures, including the preserved stereotypes of traditional mentalities.

Today the strategy of globalization is defined by the condition of its three fundamental spheres: scientific-technological development, economics, and political-legal regulation. In each of them, it is important to mark out the problem situations and possibilities for the growth of new values. I have already expressed my thoughts relating to the problem situations in contemporary scientific-technological and economic development a number of times, some of them at the previous International Likhachov Conference. I will therefore stop at the main conclusions that I have drawn from my analysis.

The contemporary changes in science and its technological applications are connected with the mastering of complicated, spontaneous systems. This mastering leads to change in the model of scientific rationality. I have designated this as post-non-classical rationality. Within its framework, a peculiar correspondence of values emerges in anthropogenic culture with a whole range of the attitudes of traditional cultures that it had previously repudiated. Here, I have distinguished three main aspects.

First is the representation of our environment as a special, living organism. From the position of classical pictures of the world, they were regarded as unscientific. Today, however, they are included in the contemporary scientific picture of the world as conceptions of a global ecosystem – a biosphere. Second, scientific and technological mastering of complicated, spontaneous systems (and such systems always possess a synergetic character) form new strategies of activity, which are connected by the Wu-Wei principle, the Chinese cultural tra-

dition and principle of non-violent action, developed in Indian culture. Third, with the study of complex, human-sized systems, contemporary science unites the search for truth with the expansion of the ethical regulations of the scientific search. Only the internal ethos of science 'seek the truth', 'increase true knowledge' is no longer sufficient. It must be related constantly to humanistic ideals and values. Such a union is fulfilled in the process of ethical assessment of scientific-technological programs and projects, and it becomes a condition for the attainment of true knowledge. Here, the Western idea about the dominant self-evaluation of the truth begins to harmonize with the ancient Eastern ideas of morality as a necessary condition for the achievement of truth (that truth is only revealed to a moral person).

All of these new value guidelines of scientific-technological development can be regarded as preconditions for the reconsideration of the strategies of our activity in and treatment of nature. However, for now these new value orientations have not become priorities of mass consciousness and daily practice. To a large extent, this is prevented by the dominant guidelines of economic consciousness and the corresponding organization of the global economy. In this sphere of contemporary global processes, problem situations also emerge.

Ervin László, in his book *Macroshift* (published in Russian in 2004), developing the ideas of the Club of Rome about the scope of growth, pointed to a range of myths of contemporary anthropogenic culture which lie at the base of modern economic activity and which must be rejected. In the first place, this relates to the fundamental principle of consumer society: 'the more you consume, the better for the economy'. In the organization of the contemporary market, this principle plays a role of the utmost importance, since the growth of production is connected in a feedback loop with the growth of consumption.

In the process of the formation of a consumer society, this principle was accorded special importance. American market analyst Victor Lebow, in the middle of the 20th century, expressed it in the form of the following doctrine: the economy requires 'that we turn the purchase and consumption of items into rituals, so that we seek spiritual satisfaction, the satisfaction of our own 'I' in consumption. It is necessary for the economy that things be consumed, burnt up, worn out, thrown away and replaced with increasing speed.'¹ E. László emphasizes that contemporary civilization for the past fifty years has demanded as many goods and services (costing unknown prices) as all previous generations taken together.

In the second half of the 20th century, the doctrine of the growth of consumption stimulated the formation of new relations between the commodity and financial markets. The process of the financial sphere became more autonomous and the transformation of money into a special good which became the source of new crisis events in the economy occurred. All of this makes the fundamental principle of increasing consumption as a stimulus for economic growth problematic. However, the rejection of this principle implies a radical change in the contemporary strategy of economic development and the way of life of the consumer society. In connection with this, a new problem emerges: whether the preconditions for such changes exist in the contemporary economy. This is a problem which we must analyze paying special attention to the changes which are introduced by the economy of knowledge, the growth of information consumption, competition in the global currency market, the emerging opportunities for forming a single world currency under international control, and so forth.

I will now discuss the problems of the third sphere, which determine the strategy of contemporary globalization – the spheres of political-legal relations. Democracy and human rights are being proclaimed as fundamental values in the sphere

¹ László E. *Macroshift*. 2004, p. 70.

of the globalizing world. However, even here problem situations emerge.

In his time, Winston Churchill said that democracy has a great many flaws, but mankind has not yet come up with anything better. Democracy does in fact provide for effective management of complicated social systems, since it includes many different feedback connections and corrective administrative solutions. Under a monarchic or autocratic way of ruling, these connections are dramatically weaker. However, in conditions of rapid social change, the defects of democracy also become sharper. In contemporary conditions, it orientates power more towards a tactical than a strategic programme. Presidents and parliaments are elected for relatively short terms. They naturally think about what they will do in this short term, what real results they can attain. They are tactically oriented, but a new strategy is needed, because the matter is about global change, which alters the state of the contemporary world. Politicians should think of their responsibility before future generations, and not simply of a momentary struggle for the votes of the electors. However, simply lengthening the terms of election and power of some politicians does not solve the problem, since, as a rule, the danger of a drift from democratic to authoritarian forms of government will emerge.

Under contemporary conditions, problems are also emerging in the very process of democratic procedures. The appearance of new means of communication (Internet, mobile telephones) creates new possibilities for public knowledge and transparency, more active participation by people in political life, the organization of mass protests, and so forth. Along with this, however, new technologies for programming mass consciousness are being developed all the time. They initiate various practices of informational violence which are camouflaged and outwardly appear to be the voluntary choice of the individual in democratic society. The idea of human rights is thereby made problematic. As is shown in the works of E. Yu. Soloviev, the development of this idea in three Declarations of the Rights of Man took into account the negative experience of monarchic wilfulness, religious wars, and totalitarianism of the 20th century. However, today the new problem of defending the individual from informational coercion is emerging.

The problem of human rights is today becoming one of the most acute in the contemporary dialogue of cultures. It is connected with a special understanding of the value of the individual and individual liberties. Being an individual in traditional societies meant being part of a certain corporative commonality (a clan, work community, or caste), to which the individual often belonged from birth. Therefore, the understanding of liberty in traditional cultures also emphasized its collectivist sense. Individual liberty was understood to be subordinate to collective liberty.

The priority of individual liberties was rooted in the new European culture of the 'project of the Modern'. It formed in the process of the establishment of the anthropogenic kind of civilizational development. It is precisely here that the ideal of free and sovereign individuals takes shape, who can be included in various social commonalities, not being rigidly bound to any of them in particular. Accordingly a priority of individual liberties is confirmed, which accompanies the idea of the right and is formalized in the conception of natural rights of man. Based in the philosophy of the Modern Age, this conception is becoming a theoretical basis for legal practice in democratic states.

In the processes of contemporary globalization, countries and cultures of different civilizational types are interacting. There are still countries where features of the traditionalist type are dominant, and there are communities created by the anthropogenic type of development (the West) which have gained ground along this path, and there are countries that, comparatively recently by historical measures, have come onto this path thanks to the process of modernization (Russia, Japan, China, India, a number of Latin American countries). In these cultures, the archetypes of the traditionalist type of understanding of the individual and the priority of collective over individual liberty are still preserved.

The interaction of countries with a distinct cultures of rights inevitably poses questions about the balance of human rights and the rights of peoples. The peculiar acuteness of this set of problems became apparent in our time in the situations of the 'geopolitical games' of the West, when, under the pretext of the defence of human rights, international rights were violated, wars were begun, accompanied by humanitarian disasters (Serbia, Iraq).

The experience of manipulation with the rights of man attests to the usefulness of a simple truth: violent coercion which tramples on the rights of peoples, not only fails to affirm the ideal of human rights, but also, on the whole, repudiates the very idea of lawful society.

Another aspect also became apparent in the problems of human rights in the contemporary stage of the development of civilization. It is connected with the possible social consequences of the adoption of convergent (nano-, bio-, informational and cognitive) technologies. The matter is, first of all, about new approaches to human rights, taking into consideration the prospect of the ever-widening use of contemporary biotechnologies and opportunities for manipulating the biological base of human life activity.

The prospects of prolonging life to 120 or 150 years, the formation of human biological properties given beforehand, and the use of the new generation of neuro-pharmacological drugs which strengthen memory and other cognitive abilities place new ethical and legal problems before society. As F. Fukuyama noted, the biological revolution, in the final analysis, set something new at stake – 'something related to the nature of man, specific features of the species, common to all people as such'.¹

The idea of the rights of man at the source of his origin was formulated as the idea of natural rights. It implicitly assumed a certain unvarying human nature, common to all people in the world. However, if the use of biotechnologies creates a sharp distinction between individuals in their biological foundations – let us say that the rich will have access to high-priced technologies for prolonging life and forming qualitatively new cognitive abilities, while the poor will not have access to them, then something similar to castes of higher and lower races will be created. How, under these conditions, are we to take the idea of the rights of man?

Today, the accelerated pace of social development is changing much in people's culture and life activity. A number of basic values of anthropogenic civilization are becoming problematic, points for the growth of new values are emerging, and new prospects for the dialogue of cultures are opening. These must be tracked, brought to light, and watched, to see to what extent they are viable, and what their consequences might be. Today this is no longer a purely theoretical task, but a practical requirement of contemporary civilization to determine possible strategies of its development.

¹ Fukuyama F. *Our Post-Human Future*. 2004, p. 147.

M. Titarenko¹

THE EURASIANIST IDEOLOGY AS PARADIGM FOR COEXISTENCE AND FLOURISHING DIVERSITY OF CULTURES AND CIVILIZATIONS

The global financial and economic crisis that broke out at the end of the first decade of the 21st century has acquired a system-wide character now. It has revealed how inconsistent the principal points of liberalism supporters were when they attempted to get the whole world to believe into the 'almighty' market with the alleged capacity to provide – without any support from the state whatsoever – for the economic growth and well-being. Today, the governments of the leading Western states spare neither effort nor money to prevent a profound recession in their economies and to boost up their economic recovery.

The crisis has demonstrated the limited character of the western model and the dangers of the 'overall westernization' to the countries with a different cultural background. Substantial problems of global economy served as a trigger to reconsider the 'universal character' of the western values. The crisis has shown to the humanity that military and political interests were not the only sources for the dramatic conflicts of the last decades. The NATO bombings of Yugoslavia, the invasion of the West into Afghanistan and Iraq, a constant threat of military solution to the disagreements between the West and Iran or DPRK – all these seats of tension appeared due to, apart from other reasons, the Western reluctance and inability to respect civilizational and cultural values, lifestyles and developmental patterns of other states.

The statements from the West that global stability can be established in a monocentric world with the domination of a single superpower were accompanied by the assertions that the clash of the eastern and western value systems and civilizations was only inevitable and natural. These theoreticians as well as the politicians who they inspired, were convinced of the unchallengeable overall supremacy and universal perfection of the North Atlantic and American civilizations, identifying them as global. The events in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that the Western coalition is capable of using military force to depose an unwanted regime in a different state. However, they haven't had any success so far, and are unlikely to succeed in making the local population accept the western political pattern introduced by the overseas military.

The crisis introduced a new viewpoint on the global development trends. The success of China and India in the economically unstable context demonstrated that the western pattern was not universal. Nowadays, the role of local Eastern civilizations (Russian, Chinese, Indian, Japanese, Turkic, Persian etc.) is getting more and more important. They were the foundation for the global civilization in the last millennia. As far back as 1960–80, the economic success of Japan and the four 'little tigers' (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan) encouraged the research of 'East Asian pattern', of its specificity and advantages. Later on the issue of development pattern multitude was sidelined for some time: the triumph of the West that followed the collapse of the USSR brought about the illusion

that the Euro-American pattern was almighty, while the 1998 Asia's financial crisis challenged the 'economic miracles' in East Asia. However, nowadays China, that has maintained a tremendous growth during the world crisis, proves that developmental progress and modernizations have nothing to do with the imitation of the Western patterns.

The crisis has also shown the profound interconnection of the states in the modern world. You cannot deal with such a global issue alone. The crisis must teach all states and nations to cooperate to overcome its serious and destructive consequences. The outstanding contributions of China, India and some other non-European states to sustain the world economic progress, have convincingly demonstrated the significance and need to establish a constructive dialogue between the Western and Eastern civilizations.

Russian culture, creatively borrowing and developing a lot of achievements of the Western and Eastern cultures, have worked out a system of civilizational values with the capacity to become, collaborating with other eastern civilizations, a fruitful alternative to the aggressive and destructive ideology of an overall Westernization. This system of values can contribute to the harmonization of the world, to the promotion of the framework for preservation and prosperity of cultural diversity and civilizations, for a functional dialogue between them. Nowadays these values are taking shape within a *new Eurasianist* ideology, developed in Russia and some states of the former USSR.

During the last century Russia faced some massive challenges more than once. In some cases it was considerably weakened, in others it had an opportunity of a revival, and of getting together its people and territories over again. Russian people paid enormous price to overcome these deadly challenges. This was the case in World War I and the 1917 October Revolution and the Civil War that followed. The Soviet Union that emerged after the Revolution formed a new powerful state. At the beginning of the 1940s the Nazi Germany challenged the USSR to a deadly hazardous combat. The Soviet people, inspired by heroism and dedication of the Russians, won the Great Patriotic War, saved the humanity from the Nazi plague and helped to put an end to the Japanese militarism.

After the USSR collapsed in 1991, the euphoric West declared itself 'the winner' and delivered a *de facto* ultimatum to Russia. Z. Brzezinski, one of the key figures in ideology of fight against Russia as a subject of global history, provided a detailed description of the Western claims and demands to Russia, defined regulations that, in his opinion, Russia must follow. He found a particular pleasure in designing scenarios, schemes and maps of new countries that were to appear after the collapse of the integrated Russian state.² The space of Eurasia where the USSR used to be and where Russia is situated now, Z. Brzezinski defined as 'America's chief geopolitical prize'.³

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the colossal pressure from the West, its open and cynic interference in the domestic affairs of the sovereign state of Russia, an aggressive expansion of mass culture resulted in the diffusion of national and civilizational identity of Russia and its residents. Nowadays, our country is faced with a crucial problem: 'What is Russia, and what are her ways?'

The answer can only be found through the creative understanding of Russia's centuries-long history and our historical

¹ Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute for the Far East Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy) Professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 300 scholarly publications, including 11 monographs: *Russia and East Asia* (Rossija i Vostochnaja Azija), *Russia Facing Asia* (Rossija litsom k Aziji), *China: Civilization and Reforms* (Kitaj: tsivilizatsija i reformy), *Russia: Security through Cooperation: East-Asian Vector* (Rossija: bezopasnost' cherez sotrudnichestvo: Vostochno-aziatskij vektor), *Geopolitical Importance of the Far East: Russia, China and other countries of Asia* (Geopoliticheskoje zachenije Dal'nego Vostoka. Rossija, Kitaj i drugije strany Aziji) and some others. Many of Mr. Titarenko's works have been translated into foreign languages and published in China, Japan, the USA, the Republic of Korea, Germany, Vietnam, India and other countries. Honorary professor of a number of universities and Academies of Sciences of China, the USA, Cuba, the Republic of Korea, Vietnam and Turkey. Mr. Titarenko is decorated with the Order of Badge of Honour, the Order of Honour, the Order for Services to the Fatherland of the 4th degree. He is recipient of E.V. Tarle Prize of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

² Brzezinski Z. *The Grand Chessboard*, Moscow, 1998, p. 108–148, 239–240; Brzezinski Z. *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*, Moscow, 2006.

³ Brzezinski Z. *The Grand Chessboard*, Moscow, 1998, p. 43.

lessons and through an objective analysis of favourable and unfavourable domestic and foreign environments of our statehood and civilization. The order of the day is to recognize the Eurasian geopolitical and civilizational reality of Russia in the context of defining the strategy for the country's recovery, its economic growth and cultural development.

These tasks should be implemented in the context of *co-operation and interaction of all Western and Eastern states in the conditions of globalization*. The New Eurasianist principles should make up the methodological and conceptual basis to a long-term strategy for the development of Russia as an integrated multinational state, and also the integral part of Russia's foreign policy doctrine. These principles are the cornerstone element to provide for the security of our country, to preserve its territorial integrity, to strengthen its sovereignty and its international prestige. One cannot but agree with L. Gumilyov, an outstanding Russian historian, a theoretician of Eurasianism, who wrote: 'The secret is: if Russia is to be saved, it will only be saved as a Eurasian power, and only through the Eurasianist ideology.'¹

Prince N. Troubetzkoy, one of the founding fathers of the Eurasianist movement in 1920–30, defined the core of Eurasianism as a common way for the peoples of Eurasia: 'The peoples within the Eurasian brotherhood are interconnected not due to one or another limited set of principles, but due to their common historic way. *Eurasia is a geographic, economic and historic unity. Their lives are intertwined*. They have made up a gigantic clew that cannot get unravelled...'² Nowadays the favourable environment for Russia can be provided through compliance with these principles together with maintenance of relations with its neighbouring and more distant countries at the level of state and public diplomacy. This will be Russia's share in promoting a polycentric world and a functional intercivilizational dialogue to counterbalance such doctrines as 'the clash of civilizations' and 'the end of history'.

The same question was on the agenda of debates and political struggle between the Westernizers, who supported the Europeanization of Russia, and the Slavophiles and later statist-nationalists, who emphasized a unique character of Russia's culture as a symbiosis, synthesis of various cultures and historical experience of various nations, who lived or are still living in Russia or the neighbouring territories. Nowadays we are talking about a convergent combination and synthesis of the original Russian Slavic culture with Christianity that came from Byzantium together with a substantial portion of humanist and political culture and also with Finno-Ugric, Turkic and Tatar-Mongol cultures. The latter were the mediators through which Russia adopted the segments of material and political cultures of China and India.³

When it comes to the self-identification of Russia and its peoples, geopolitical issues cannot be ignored. Indeed, Siberia and the Far East make up two thirds of Russia's territory. Beside the Russians and the Slavic peoples, Russia is home for more than 100 major nations and ethnic groups, including dozens of indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Far East, who cannot possibly be taken as a part of Europe.

Asian states and nations regard Russia as a part of the European culture while the Europeans, especially the Western Europeans, see Russia mainly as an Asian state. None of these viewpoints gives a complete picture of Russia and Russian cultural identity. The factors that give rise to developmental contradictions and initiate persistent fluctuations in Russia's policies are like these: disregard of the Eurasian nature of Russia's geo-

political location and of its civilizational identity; Eurocentric predominance in ideology and politics; attempts to present the whole territory of Russia as a space of Greater Europe. These things also undermine international solidarity of the Russians and of other peoples of Russia, as well as decompose cultural identity and weaken Russia's position in the world.

Russia's domestic policy since Peter I lacked consistency in the domains of geopolitical and cultural identity. Longing for progress in modernization, Peter I was pushing Russia towards Europe. In the Soviet times V. Lenin and some of his associates were urging people upon a fight against the Asian elements in Russian culture and mentality. The result of this was Eurocentric predominance and disparagement to genuinely Russian, Slavic roots of the Russian civilization. Eurocentrism developed a specific economic and political shape through the applied politics of the Russian government. It showed through:

- the concentration of finance and strategic targets of development in the European part of the country;

- the transformation of the vast Eastern regions, rich in natural resources, into a peculiar colony for the European part of the country. The efforts aimed at the development and growth of Siberia and the Far East were not adequate to the potential of this region;

- the development of the Eastern part of the country became unilateral; regional economy was predominantly focused on raw materials. In the 1930s the Kuznetsk Metallurgical Combine – an industrial giant – was built in this region; a number of machine-building plants were erected in the Far East, Eastern and Western Siberia. During the Great Patriotic War Siberia accepted the major industrial businesses transferred there from the European part. However, it was the time when convict labour was the major tool for development.

It is worth mentioning that as far back as the middle of the 18th century Mikhail Lomonosov, the founding father of Russian science and education, the Russian language reformer, was the first man to formulate three strategic issues for the Russian state to provide for its sustained and adequate development.

First, 'Russia's power will grow with Siberia and the North Ocean, and will reach the major European settlements in Asia and America'.⁴

Second, 'when it gets the desired way across the North Ocean to the East, then it will be free to strengthen and expand the Russian might in the East, using both a sea route and a land route through Siberia to the Pacific'.⁵

Third, the great scientist called 'preservation' and 'growth of the Russian population', at least by 1 000 000 per year, one of the most important tasks for the Russian governance. At the same time M. Lomonosov attached special importance to the promotion of friendly cooperation between the Russians and indigenous peoples of Siberia and the Far East.

The proposed three-sided scheme – the development of Siberia and the Far East, the Northern Sea Route (to link Russia and Asia) and the population growth – remains topical nowadays as well. An outstanding scientist and Russia's patriot Dmitry Mendeleev, who shared Lomonosov's strategic idea, believed that if Russia went this way, then, by the end of the 20th century it would become a prosperous and successful world's respected country with the population of 500 million. Later on Russia's eminent figures kept emphasizing the exceptional importance of the development of Siberia. Especially, they pointed out that Russia's politicians and all Russian élite should realize the Eurasian geographic position of Russia, the significance of international collaboration with its neighbours in the Far East to develop Siberia and the Far East.

They attached special importance to the strengthening of interactions and mutual understanding with China, to the pro-

¹ Gumilyov L. *Ritmny Evrazii: epokhi i civilizacii (Rhythms of Eurasia: Epochs and Civilizations)*, Moscow, 1993, p. 31.

² Troubetzkoy N. *Evropa i chelovechestvo (Europe and the humanity)*, Sofia, 1920 (emphasis mine).

³ See Titarenko M. *Rossija litsom k Azii (Russia facing Asia)*, Moscow, 1998, p. 5–10; *ibid.* Ch. 'Novoye Evrazijstvo i aziatskiy aspekt' (The New Eurasianism and Asian Aspect), p. 13–79.

⁴ Lomonosov M. *Zapiski po russkoy istorii (Notes on Russian History)*, Moscow, 2003, p. 392.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 388.

motion of allied relations between both countries. In his *Zavetnye mysli* ('Cherished Thoughts') D. Mendeleev made a special emphasis on the Russian-Chinese cooperation and its permanent significance for successful development of both our countries. The scholar predicted: '... being originally independent, *China may still gain more weight*, and the better friends we will become by then, the more we will profit from this.'¹ D. Mendeleev also wrote about the significance of cooperation between the two states for the world order: 'The union between Russia and China will be a forerunner to the overall world union at least because it would comprise more than one third of the world population; and the union could only be peace-keeping in nature, because of innumerable domestic needs the both parties have and incalculable resources that no other state can boast of.'²

National self-consciousness of the residents of Russia and its super-ethnos – the Russians – cannot but consider the undeniable fact: the Russian civilization has been shaped and is developing within the geopolitical space where the major civilizations (Great Russian, Slavic, Byzantine, Romano-Germanic, Finno-Ugric, Muslim, Chinese, Indian, Mongolian-Turkic) and the indigenous civilizations who dwell along the Volga, on the Urals, in Siberia, in the Far East and in the northern regions, overlap and interrelate. The last two centuries' history shows that any political attempts of Russia, biased toward Europe or Asia, will inevitably weaken the social framework, undermine the fundamentals of national cultural identity and deprive the flexibility in making key decisions on its future. Russia can move forward only if it perceives the inseparable wholeness of its two major state identities – Western and Eastern.

At the end of the 20th century Russia's culture and civilization were so much humiliated, that the political task was set to 'join the world civilization'. This basically meant that its own culture was denied. This was the way to the profound diffusion of national identity, to Russian culture losing its consolidating powers, to Russia's civilization getting fragmented and to the marginizing of the non-Russian ethnic groups, to the deterioration of the Russian language and clogging it up with vulgarisms and Anglicisms. During the first five-year period after the collapse of the USSR Russia had got a deformed and biased pro-western focus in economy, the humanities and other domains. They started to get this bias straight when Y. Primakov became Prime Minister for a short term. Later on V. Putin took over during his eight-year presidency. As a result, Russia's domestic stability and its position in the world were strengthened. And this shows the constructive character of focusing on Eurasia.

More than once, in my articles and books, I had a chance to argue with Russian supporters of Westernization and with foreign champions of overall Westernization. The basic idea is: to provide for its prosperity in domestic and foreign issues, Russia should stick to the balance between and attach equal significance to both the Western and Eastern courses in its domestic and foreign policies. In other words, we should steadily pursue the Eurasian geopolitical identity of Russia, symbolized by the two-headed eagle on the modern Russian National Coat of Arms.

In the late 1990s in my book *Russia Faces Asia* I had a vigorous controversy with those people, who were giving up on Russia, who were cutting its territory into different pieces, who denied the originality of Russia's civilization, seeing the Westernization of Russia as an inevitable and necessary incorporation into some 'world civilization'. 'There is just no alternative,' they would declare, because, as they thought, the world was facing the clash of civilizations. On the contrary, I maintained that there *was* an alternative. 'It is the rebirth of

Russia through the rebirth of national identity of its residents, of its peoples and nations, through reinforcement of partnership, mutual understanding and friendship to focus the efforts on economic, cultural, educational and scientific development of our motherland. It is an incessant careful fostering of the native cultural background; because that is the only way for the enlivened democratic Russia to be not a pathetic imitator of the West, its unoriginal follower, but a strong respected partner to any country in Europe, or Asia, or Africa, or America.'³

In the past years, the expressed belief in the strength of our nation and our native country proved to be correct. In their statements and speeches Prime Minister V. Putin and President D. Medvedev consistently promote the idea that '...Russia is a global player. Realizing our responsibility for the Fate of the World, we are eager to take part in working out new rules. This is not due to the notorious 'Imperial Ambitions', but just exactly because we have both – adequate public opportunities, and relevant resources.'⁴

The concept of the Eurasian identity of geopolitical location of Russia and its civilization predetermines the country's strong development, its integrity and domestic stability. The Eurasianist idea takes into account historic roots, inner indigenous and outer civilizational components, the synthesis of which evolved as Russian culture. Due to its authority it has stimulated the recovery and development of culture in small nations of Russia, and the Russian language as a bridge for communication between all national cultures of Russia and the world civilization and culture. Disregard of this may result in a break of translational relations of smaller cultures and smaller nations with the world culture. It also slows down their development. The élite of these cultures will have to seek, consciously or unconsciously, an alternative for the Russian language and culture. Thus, they will be pushed towards Euro-American mass culture; and they will be encouraged to use English as a major tool to interact with the world culture. Therefore, ignoring the Eurasian essence of Russian culture will lead to the weakening of integrity and destruction of Russia's civilizational 'belt'.

Any strategic concept for the development of Russia and its regions should take into account the Eurasian core of our civilization. Economic and Social Development Plans for Russia up to 2020 and Development Plans for its regions should take into account Russia's Eurasian core. This means that Recovery and Development Plans should follow the single chessboard principle, a single integrated state. At the same time they should take into account the specificity, and also make it up for the extensively intensified pressure/stress on the Eastern regions of the country and harsh climate zone.

In the context of the developmental concept of Russia as a Eurasian state we need to reform the current system of economic management and methods for controlling regions from the centre. Rigid political monocentrism (stipulated by vast territories, local separatism and regional factors) has to take into account geographical, cultural and social backgrounds of the regions. From the economic perspective it should open up a significant potential of regional activities, guarantee the regions' rights to creative self-perfection and to adapt governmental instructions for the local context.

At the same time, the overemphasis on the smaller regions' specificity is a considerable problem. It has led to an extensive

³ Titarenko M. *Rossiya litsom k Azii* (Russia faces Asia), Moscow, 1998, p. 6. The ideas were further developed and improved in the books: Titarenko M. *Kitaj: tsivilizatsii i reformy* (China: Civilizations and Reforms), Moscow, 1999, Idem. *Rossiya. Bezopasnost' cherez sotrudnichestvo: vostochno-aziatskiy vektor* (Russia. Security Through Collaboration: The East Asian Vector), Moscow, 2003; Kuzhyk B., Titarenko M. *Kitaj-Rossiya 2050: strategiya sorazvitiya* (China-Russia 2050: Co-developmental Strategy), Moscow, 2006, Titarenko M. *Geopoliticheskoye znachenie Dal'nego Vostoka. Rossiya, Kitaj i drugie strany Azii* (Geopolitical Significance of the Far East. Russia, China and other Asian Countries), Moscow, 2008.

⁴ Statement by D. Medvedev at the 12th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, June 7, 2008. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2008/06/07/1200_type63377type82634type122346_202221.shtm

¹ Mendeleev D. *Zavetnye mysli* (Cherished thoughts), Moscow, 1995, p. 375 (emphasis mine).

² Ibid, p. 376.

number of regional administrative economic entities. Until recently we used to have 89 entities in Russia. The merge of regional entities is on the agenda; and the current management is solving them little by little. Major regional centres, with tight economic and financial links, should have their own administrative and financial tools to deal with problems at regional and local levels. The experience shows that while Russia's centre is congested with administrative and financial resources, its provinces are being made poor; and new quasi-colonial relations develop between the centre and the periphery.

We need to profoundly reform administrative and economic system and its structures for the further development of Russia as a Eurasian power. The experience of economic growth in the developed Western countries, the USA and Japan provides an illustration of how capital cities and provinces share economic management. The political and economic centres in the USA are divided in space (New-York, Philadelphia and Atlanta are on the Atlantic coast; Chicago, Detroit and Kansas-City are in the middle; San-Francisco, Los-Angeles and San-Diego are on the Pacific coast). The political and economic centre of China is Beijing. However it shares economic management with such major economic and cultural centres as Shanghai, Shenyang, Harbin, Changchun, Tianjin, Chongqing, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Taiyuan, Xi'an and Urumqi. In addition to Tokyo, the other Japanese centres of economic development are Osaka, Kyoto, Sapporo and Niigata. Germany has its economic management shared between Berlin, Hamburg, Frankfurt, Munich, Düsseldorf, Köln, Leipzig etc.

But here, in Russia, Moscow dominates not only over political, but also over economic and other spheres. It gets the major part of the country's money supply; the major banks have their headquarters here. The other prominent regions, even St. Petersburg, the 'Second Capital of Russia', are de-facto supporting actors. The significance of major cities of the Urals and Siberia is generally limited to their inherent economic capacities. Due to their limited financial resources, Siberian and Far Eastern banks cannot play to capacity investing into social and economic growth of these regions. It would be reasonable to consider the development of three region-wide centres for economic and political management – in Western, Eastern and the Far Eastern regions – for a more efficient social and economic growth of Siberia and the Far East. This process should be coordinated by a statesman of authority in the rank of the first Deputy Prime Minister.

The USA, Japan, Australia, Canada and some Latin American countries have special state structures and ministries to manage the development of their backward regions. For example, Japan used to have a minister for Development of Hokkaido for a long time. Today we have the President's representatives in the regions of Russia. This is a move in the right direction which needs to be further developed and improved from administrative, political, and also economic perspective.

Some ardent supporters of Westernization, the critics of the Eurasianist idea as a paradigm for the development of Russia refer to the history of Eurasianism, which emerged after World War I and was explicitly hostile to the West. However, it should be emphasized that modern Russian Eurasianism is not strictly pro-Western or pro-Asian:

1. The main characteristic feature of the new Eurasianism: it acknowledges the specificity of geographic position and international position and historic roots of the civilization of Russia, with Russian culture as its core and the Russian language as the basic tool for communication.

2. Both the Eurasianism of the 30s and the new Eurasianism are aware of horizontal polycentrism, interactive and complimentary character of cultures, their reciprocal influence and learning. The Eurasianist idea holds that relations between all cultures are developed horizontally according to conciliarism, equal rights, symphonic relations and the recognition of unique cultures even of the smallest ethnic groups.

3. The Eurasian model of interaction of cultures is based on their harmonious communication. In this respect, Eurasianism is identical to the Confucian approach to cultural development with its 'harmony without intrusion of unity', dialectical interaction of cultural opposites and their synthesis: 'merge into a single unit' and 'split of unity'.

4. Eurasianism has a number of characteristic patterns for the making of cultures on the basis of synthesis, reciprocal influence and learning and synergetic co-development. Its structure is a laminated multiethnic and multicivilizational unity, which provides for the coexistence of diverse ethnic groups and cultures within a single state (empire, federation, confederation etc.). Eurasianism, in its essence, comprises components, inherent in many cultures. From this perspective, the term 'Eurasianism' is inaccurate, as in its context the very essence of these relations is determined by their Eurasian location.

5. Unlike Eurocentrism, Eurasianism proceeds from the notions of equal rights and of the horizontal character of interaction between diverse cultures. And Eurocentrism proceeds from the vertical character of cultural interaction, and the recognition of a single superior culture, while other cultures are recognized as inferior. Eurocentrism sees assimilation of diverse cultures and extinction of original indigenous smaller cultures as a natural and inevitable situation. The slogans of Russian liberal proponents of Westernization actually denied Russian culture, and meant to assimilate it with Western-European and American countries. It was a hard blow not only for the culture, but for Russia's domestic stability, for its integrity, leading to the confederacy state or even to the disintegration into dozens of new entities. Such ideas, wide-spread in the 90s, were, in fact, breeding localistic tendencies and separatism. They were covering the attempts to disrupt Russia.

Eurasianism presents an alternative to Eurocentrism and to vulgar Westernization for domestic consolidating Russia as an integrated multinational state. It also can help in international issues. Eurasianism opposes the levelling of national cultures and denies unipolarity. It provides ideological, theoretical, political and civilizational (cultural and civilizational for the first place) basis for a polycentric world and for the well-being of the global civilization as a symphony of diverse cultures.

If only Russia relies on the Eurasianist paradigm, it can succeed in its rebirth, in keeping its territorial integrity, in reviving the cultures of all its residents, and in making the Russian culture flourish, as a core for integrity and interaction of civilizations.

If only Russia relies on the Eurasianist paradigm, it can be a significant player within such international frameworks as SCO, RIC and BRIC, that can dialogue within APEC, or the ASEAN regional safety forum or the Asia-Europe Forum. It can also take an active part in CICA (Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia) and the East Asia Summit.

It is only the Eurasianist approach that will ensure the most efficient Russian diplomacy within SCO and APEC. It will also guarantee Russia's contributing to bridging the divides in Asia-Pacific and to promoting equal cooperation within G-20.

It is only the Eurasian Russia that can achieve recognition of equal rights and mutually beneficial relations between herself and the European Union and the USA, establish relations with the fastest growing economies, integrate into a regional framework.

The Eurasian Russia does not impose her views or practices on anyone. Our country is open for a functional dialogue with Western and Eastern cultures. The maintenance and further development of Russia's Eurasian identity will promote consolidation within the country, strengthen its territorial integrity, and make it a reliable and long-range partner for all other countries in the world.

Mustapha Tlili¹

THE NEW MEDITERRANEAN ORDER IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION

At the time of this writing, the Mediterranean space is experiencing the kind of turbulence not seen since the historic days of decolonization. Popular revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt have already swept away entrenched authoritarian regimes that dominated the scene for decades. Political leaders in Algeria and Libya are scrambling to maintain authority and their regimes might not survive the upheaval.

What role might a new governance system in the countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea play in the construction of a Mediterranean space nurtured by shared democratic values, interests and hopes?

And in the age of globalization, what would be the strategic impact of such an outcome on the region, Europe and beyond?

The Mediterranean space today is home to 475 million people – 272 million Europeans, including 20 million European Muslims, and 200 million non-European Arabs and Jews. Given the recent upheaval, it now seems possible that the Union for the Mediterranean (U.F.M.) – the regional mechanism set up in 2008 at the initiative of French president Sarkozy to increase cooperation between the region's peoples – may step up to the challenge of reclaiming the region's past as the cradle of reason, tolerance and humanism, and offer a more hopeful model of living together to a world injured by both the dark side of globalization and the constant fear of Islamic fundamentalism.

Among President Sarkozy's main interlocutors present at the birth of the new mechanism were two authoritarian heads of state – Tunisia's president Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak. Neither remains at the helm, and gone with them is their limited and limiting vision for international dialogue, based almost exclusively on state-to-state relations without any significant input from civil society. How might the Mediterranean space re-construct itself in the years ahead with input from both governments and civil society?

Because of the rising tensions over the last few years in Europe over what has ominously crystallized as 'the Muslim Question,' it is tempting to forget that there was a time when Islam was fully part of European life and a more tolerant and inclusive civilization than it appeared to be in the post-September 11th West.

Today no less than yesterday, Mediterranean people and their leaders on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea – Muslims, Christians and Jews – share inescapable geopolitical, demographic and economic realities. They must address issues plaguing their coexistence from a historical perspective and remind themselves that demonization, exclusion and division are not the only options – and they are not the region's destiny.

It is sad to note that European leaders sometimes adopt positions that seem to respond more to the narrow, short-term demands of election politics than to the difficult but inspiring challenges of long-term strategic thinking. Even President Sarkozy has fallen prey to this trend.

Speaking on the subject of Islam in Europe, the French President – and godfather of the U.F.M. project – declared on February 10th of this year that multiculturalism was a 'failure,' adding, 'The truth is that in all our democracies, we have been too concerned about the identity of the new arrivals and not enough about the identity of the country receiving them. This raises the issue of Islam and our Muslim compatriots. Our Muslim compatriots should be able to live and practice their re-

ligion like anyone else... but it can only be a French Islam and not just an Islam in France.'²

Mr. Sarkozy did not provide a definition of what he called 'French Islam.'

The French President's comments were in fact largely interpreted as an echo of similar pronouncements few days earlier by Marine Le Pen, the new leader of France's far-right National Front party.

Cooler heads would admit that from the 8th to the 15th century, Muslim Spain, or Al-Andalus, shined in Europe not only as a great moment of cultural brilliance that paved the way for the Western Renaissance, but also as an inspiring paradigm of *convivencia*, or living together, shaped collectively by Muslims, Christians and Jews – an experience that could serve as a model for any modern vision of Euro-Mediterranean integration.

Integrating the Mediterranean space into a tolerant community for the peace and prosperity of all its peoples *can* happen today – because it has happened before, and it lasted for almost seven centuries. Such an achievement in our time would offer the world a needed alternative to the increasingly questionable model of economic globalization.

The U.F.M – the new framework for cooperation between the 27 countries of the European Union and the countries of the southern Mediterranean – produced at its first summit in Paris on July 13, 2008, a declaration that says, under a section titled *A Strategic Ambition for the Mediterranean*: 'Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography, and culture. More importantly, they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding. To achieve these common objectives participants agree to continue with renewed dynamism the quest for peace and cooperation, to explore their joint problems and transform these good intentions into actions in a renewed partnership for progress.'³

Looking at Europe from a distance, it is tempting to see a continent receding from the world stage and in conflict with itself and with its past. Yet the reality is more nuanced. Today's Europe is a continent full of potential, provided the region harnesses the forces and the wealth encapsulated precisely in such initiatives as the Union for the Mediterranean – an initiative in which the metaphor of *convivencia* would find its clear expression.

Indeed, the challenge for a re-invented Europe is, I believe, to find an answer to the question of how to make the Mediterranean space once again a community of reason, tolerance, progress, and prosperity for all, in the image of that 'Ornament of the World,' to quote the beautiful title of Maria Rosa Menocal's book on Al-Andalus.⁴

Of course, it will not be simple to create a new Mediterranean *convivencia* in which the 475 million residents of the Mediterranean space today may find solutions to issues of peace and security, maritime safety, energy, transport, agriculture, urban development, environment, information and communication, tourism, health, human development, education and research, dialogue between cultures, justice and law, strengthening the role of women in society, youth, migration, and so forth.

¹ Founder and Director of the New York University Center for Dialogues. Diplomat. Author of books: *Le Bruit Dort, For Nelson Mandela, La Montagne du Lion: Roman, La Rage aux Tripes: Roman, Un Apres-midi dans le Desert: Roman*, and others.

² MacCormac R. Sarkozy denounces multiculturalism as 'a failure,' *The Irish Times*, February 12, 2011, accessed February 22, 2011, URL: <http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/world/2011/0212/1224289636274.html>

³ Joint Declaration of the Summit of the Union for the Mediterranean, July 13, 2008, Paris, France. URL: <http://www.info-france-usa.org/spip.php?article1043>.

⁴ Menocal M. R. *Ornament of the World: How Muslims, Jews and Christians Created a Culture of Tolerance in Medieval Spain* (N. Y. : Back Bay Books, 2002).

The domains that I just listed are the focus of the final statement¹ adopted by the member states of the Union for the Mediterranean at their meeting in Marseille on November 3–4, 2008, in which they translated into more practical terms their ‘strategic ambition for the Mediterranean,’ quoted earlier.

To correctly assess the chances for success of a re-invented U.F.M, two important features of both the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions need to be underlined.

In both cases, the bright side of globalization represented by digital media, principally social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, played a significant part.

Also both Tunisia’s and Egypt’s revolutions were by most accounts predominately secular – more so in the case of Tunisia, due to its large and educated middle-class and to the country’s century-long history of interaction with Europe dating back to the Enlightenment.²

The large and effective use of social media in both countries revealed a remarkable degree of technological savvy and creativity among the young, but more significantly it displayed this generation’s unprecedented level of political awareness and activism – a trend that needs to be taken more fully into consideration in the strategic calculations of the original designers of the U.F.M.

Indeed, the test of success of any new structure intended to tackle the problems of the Mediterranean region will be the degree to which it meets the aspirations and scrutiny of this young, politically-aware generation on both shores of the Mediterranean Sea.

It may well be that ‘digital democracy’ is the last chance for democracy to shake off its apathy, particularly in Europe, where conventional politics seems increasingly to have lost its credibility with the citizenry. Facebook-driven democracy is no longer a theoretical fantasy of a digital lab researcher – the Tunisia and Egyptian revolutions proved its reality. This may be a turning point for the whole world in the age of globalization.

For the same reasons, the new U.F.M. and the Mediterranean space that it seeks to construct, could be a framework for a new moral vibrancy informed by the same universal values that mobilized the young in Tunisia, Egypt and beyond – freedom, individual responsibility and accountability, transparency, tolerance, solidarity with the weak and oppressed, justice, gender equality, and other fundamental human and democratic rights.

Neither the philosophers of the Enlightenment nor Emmanuel Kant would hesitate to endorse the moral consciousness expressed in the postings that flooded cyberspace during

the Tunisian revolution. Moral secularism at its best was in full display from the rugged streets of Sidi Bouzid to the imposing refinement of Avenue Habib Bourguiba in Tunis -- and this renewed sense of belonging to the same human family and the same moral universe resonated profoundly with Mediterranean Europeans who found, in the claims and expectations of the other shore, echoes of their own unfulfilled claims and expectations.

By creating a renewed sense of the universality of the democratic ideal, Twitter, Facebook and other digital platforms largely compensated for globalization’s dark side (increases in prostitution, terrorism, financial crimes and other societal ills) by offering a forum for an emerging global moral conscience. It is likely to remain, for the foreseeable future, a sign-post not only for the Muslim-world revolutions to come, but also for social and political changes in a drifting Europe in search of its soul and new forms of living together.

In light of this hopeful trend, how long can Europe’s obsession with Islamic fundamentalism hold sway? How long can the so-called ‘Muslim Question’ be used as a tool to defeat political adversaries? Young European voters who may by now know better, would not look kindly at such opportunistic tactics, particularly if the unfolding democratic experience in Tunisia and Egypt reaches its successful secular outcome.

In that case, one would imagine Islam in Europe as both a faith that every citizen is entitled to practice in accordance with the principals of liberal democracy, and as a culture and civilization that irrigated Europe for more than seven centuries, profoundly shaped its identity, and launched the continent into the path of modernity. It could, in fact, be the bridge between the two shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Perhaps the same people who in Tunisia, Egypt and maybe tomorrow in Algeria and Libya, defeated entrenched tyrants and inspired the world with their courage and generosity, will defend Europe and the West against the scourge of anachronistic ‘Islamic’ political terrorism.

Finally, one would hope that these same people, together with all the actors of the Mediterranean space – Muslims, Christian and Jews, Israeli and Palestinians – could re-imagine solutions to the centuries-old conflict in the Middle East and astound the world with their sense of fairness, moral integrity and human decency. Belonging to the same Mediterranean family, may they reject extremisms of all sorts, as well as ‘politics as usual,’ and offer Palestinians and Israelis alike the healing that both peoples have searched for and deserved for so long, but which the dying old Arab order failed to achieve.

¹ Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean ministerial conference Marseille, 3–4 November 2008 Final declaration. URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/103733.pdf

² Tlili M. Whither Tunisia’s ‘Jasmine Revolution’? Project Syndicate, January 20, 2011, URL: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/mtlili1/English>; John Timpane, ‘Arab world shaken by power of Twitter and Facebook,’ *Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 27, 2011, pg. A01

J. Toshchenko¹

CENTAURIST CULTURE: MODERN FACES

There is a hummock of view and a point of view. These must be distinguished.

Maxim Gorky

Modern spiritual life and culture as its nucleus, which determines the semantic content of it, are undergoing complex and varied processes. The analysis of changes which take place in it is usually dominated by: (a) attempts to single out positive and negative phenomena and processes; (b) analysis of problem situations; (c) comparison between the historical experience of development and the functioning of culture. While we admit the importance of such approaches, in our view, some peculiar new formations of culture are left lacking in attention and analysis; paradoxical though it may seem, such new formations combine features that are incompatible at first sight, but nevertheless these formations keep existing and developing.

This situation reflects a widespread phenomenon which affects almost every scientific field and, consequently, the activities inherent in them. In the 20th century surprising, paradoxical processes were discovered by natural, social and human sciences. They (these phenomena and processes) were referred to in different terms (notions), thus their nature for a long time seemed to be different and they incomparable and specific. However, as time passed it turned out that despite their seeming incomparability, they surprisingly demonstrated some unity, which allowed speaking about a unique phenomenon which has one common though paradoxical nature and basis. Experts from different sciences referred to the phenomenon using different names: physicists referred to it as wave-particle and space-time; biologists as phenotype-genotype; psychologists as the conscious and the unconscious; linguists as synchrony-diachrony; mathematicians as binary numeral system; writers as stream of consciousness, a new novel; painters as collages, installations, assemblage; musicians as classical-light music; experts on art as renaissance-baroque and iconology-iconography; historians as variable-non-variable history; philosophers as phenomenology-structuralism; lawyers as copyright and freedom of speech.² In an attempt to comprehend these different definitions of the phenomena already discovered or being discovered, science returned to a

forgotten term which used to be applied mostly in mythology and literature which described or interpreted it. The matter is the unique term of the centaurist problem, which allows uniting (embracing) into one concept the diverse classes of processes and phenomena which can be found both in cognitive and transforming human activities.

The phenomenon of centaurism was for a long time neglected, or this issue was only occasionally mentioned, mostly when analyzing the issues of mythology. In our opinion, it has become relevant not only for the sciences mentioned and for scientific activities, but also for culture, spiritual life of the society on the whole.

Causes and Threats of Centaurism in Culture

To reveal the common and the specific in the new formations, tendencies and phantom phenomena of spiritual life, let us first of all answer a question: Why did it become possible for centaurs to emerge in the sphere of culture?

In our view, the basis for centaurism both in the Russian society and in the sphere of culture was indeterminacy and indistinctness of the vector of social development, vagueness and indefiniteness of ideas of what kind of state was being built, what was in store for Russian people in the near future, what they should aspire to. This situation is exacerbated by the discredit of all the prior Soviet experience, including the historical experience. At the same time it turned out that the suggested and so enthusiastically declared means of development, such as the market, democracy, globalization and others, failed to give an answer adequate to social demands. This vagueness is supplemented with the absence or the rejection of ideals, guidelines for social and personal development. Besides, there was complete disorganization of public consciousness, which emerged in the course of realization of the worst way of transforming social relations as a result of transition from Soviet to post-Soviet Russia. 'One of the main "achievements" of Russian liberalism is that people have been broken of a habit to trust seriously any idea, any word, any leader.'³ Among the reasons for centaurism blossoming or to invading the sphere of culture are: renunciation of constructive activities, false innovations, ambitious claims of being the final truth. These objective reasons are often supplemented with subjective factors – lust for fame, striving to show one's worth up to actions in Herostratus's style.

Let us start this analysis with reminding of the universally recognized statement: culture is activity aimed at creating, transmitting and consuming material and spiritual values, the code for reproduction of a people's spirituality. Within this approach its forms and methods are determined: high and folk, general, local and regional, world and national, public and personal culture is subject to analysis. Culture can be studied in the context of its different functions: economic, political, legal, aesthetic, etc.⁴ There are real attempts to iden-

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, editor-in-chief of "Sociological Research" ("Sotsiologicheskie issledovaniya") journal, Head of Sociology Department and Head of Chair of Sociology at the Russian State University for the Humanities (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of more than 400 scholarly publications, including 18 monographs: *Social Infrastructure: Essence and Ways of Development* (Sotsial'naja infrastruktura: sushchnost' i puti razvitiya), *Social Planning in the USSR* (Sotsial'noye planirovaniye v SSSR), *Social Planning* (Sotsial'noye proektirovaniye), *Paradoxical Man* (Paradoksal'nyy chelovek), *Three Peculiar Images of Power* (Tri osobennykh lika vlasti), *Ethnocracy: History and Modernity* (articles on social studies) (Etnokratija: istorija i sovremennost' (sotsiologicheskije ocherki)), *Social Studies of Labour: Experience of New Interpretation* (Sotsiologija truda: opyt novogo prochtenija), *Theocracy: Phantom or Reality?* (Teokratija: fantom ili real'nost'?) and of manuals: *Sociology* (Sotsiologija), *Sociology of Labour* (Sotsiologija truda), *Political Sociology* (Politicheskaja sotsiologija), of ideoglossary – reference book *Thesaurus of Social Studies* (Tezaurus sotsiologiji). Professor Toshchenko edited 12 issues of publications devoted to the research of problems of intelligentsia in present-day's Russia, including: *Intelligentsia and Power* (Intelligentsija i vlast'), *Intelligentsia in the World of Modern Communications* (Intelligentsija v mire sovremennykh kommunikatsij), *Intelligentsia in Ethno-Confessional World* (Intelligentsija v etnokonfessional'nom mire) and others. Head of Research Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences 'New phenomena in public consciousness and in social practices'. Member of the editorial board of *Social Sciences* (Sotsialnyje nauki) journal of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Member of Scientific and Advisory Council under the Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Full member of the Academy of Social Sciences of the Republic of Belarus and the Republic of Kazakhstan. Professor honoris causa of the Institute for Social Studies at the Russian Academy of Sciences, Lomonosov Moscow State University, the Russian State University for the Humanities. Mr. Toshchenko is Laureate of M. M. Kovalevsky Prize of the Russian Academy of Sciences; he is decorated with P. A. Sorokin medal.

² Chuchin-Rusov A. E. The Return of the Centaurs (Vozvrashchenije kentavrov) // *Social Sciences and Modernity* (Obshchestvennyje nauki i sovremennost'), 2004, No. 4, p. 164.

³ Prilepin Z. Grannies Call Their Grandchildren My Name (Babushki nazyvajut mojim imenom vnukov) // *Izvestija*, 2010, 19th March.

⁴ See: Ikonnikova S. N. History of Culturological Theories: Ideas and Destinies. (Istorija kul'turologicheskikh teorij: ideji i sud'by). St. Petersburg, 2001; Kogan L. N. Sociology of Culture (Sotsiologija kul'tury). Yekaterinburg, 1992; Dynamics of Values of the Population in Russia under Reforms (Dinamika tsennoy naselenija reformirujemoy Rossiji) / edited by N. I. Lapin, L. A. Belyayeva. Moscow, 1996; Manheim K. Excerptum. Sociology of Culture. (Izbrannoje. Sotsiologija kul'tury). Moscow, 2000 [in Russian]; Mezhuzyev V. M. Culture and History (Kul'tura i istorija). Moscow, 1997; Shendrik A. I. Sociology of Culture (Sotsiologija kul'tury). Moscow, 2008, and others.

tify the notions of 'society' and 'culture' as it was done in the works of famous American sociologist J. Alexander¹ and partially in the works of Russian researcher L. Ionin,² though it is not always declared directly by them, but it is maintained that everything that exists in society is culture and its 'products'. But there comes up a question of why we need these two notions – 'society' and 'culture', if they coincide in their essence?

At the end of the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century considerable amount of attention was paid to analyzing new trends in spiritual life. However, if we integrally analyze the attempts of studying the whole range of processes of the development of culture, we can draw a conclusion that the main trend of different approaches is the wish to speak about positive changes and pay little attention to what threatens people's spirituality, its morals.

What dangerous phenomena in the development of culture threaten society's spiritual and moral health?

First, there still are some attempts to turn phenomena of culture (and of arts) and most of its results into commodities. These are the grounds from which products of culture are considered by managers, administrators, officials who are growing in number. As a result, the number of museums has declined, libraries have been closed down, especially the ones in rural areas, the number of cinemas has fallen dramatically. Consequently, the work of many creative folk teams (amateur talent groups), Palaces of Pioneers, children sports clubs has stopped as they do not make any profit but, on the contrary, they need subsidies, material and financial support.³

Second, cultural activities to produce, transmit and consume are gaining features of aggressiveness, persistence, up to actions which do not avert from any means of imposing low-grade opinions, tastes, preferences. Attacks of various kinds of glamour, kitsch and trash culture have become so commonplace for spreading vulgarity and snobbery that they are supplanting everything sensible or bright that makes a man think about his life, the life of people surrounding him and of the society. Attempts are made to reduce the interpretation of culture to ideas of their own exclusiveness, achieved not so much by talent and people's understanding but by the place on the ratings of such-like figures. The dominance of near-art works makes a profound impact on the outlook of the young generation, on educating them in the psychology of consumerism and indifference.

Third, under the deformed types of public consciousness and social practices culture is beginning to assume a character of pantophagy, lack of restraint, when there are no restrictions, no forbidden or dubious topics and questions. As a result we have 'culturalization' of schizophrenic or just psychopathic actions, up to glorification or just demonstration of perverted behaviour of people (A. S. Zapesotsky).⁴

Fourth, there is a conscious focus on the fact that the promoted products of these cultures should not only justify but also propagate primitive tastes and preferences torpedoing all the efforts undertaken to elevate moral guidelines to the highest standards of spiritual and moral behaviour.

¹ Alexander J. K. *Promise of Cultural Sociology: Technological Discourse and Sacred and the Sacred and Profane Information Machine // Context of Modernity 2: Relevant Problems of Society and Culture in Western Sociological Theory (Obeshchaniye kul'turnoj sotsiologii: tekhnologicheskij diskurs i sakral'naja i profannaja informacionnyje mashiny // Konteksty sovremennosti—II: Aktual'nye problemy obshchestva i kul'tury v zapadnoj sotsial'noj teoriji): Chrestomathy / compiled and edited by S. A. Yerofejeva. Kazan, 2001; Alexander J.K. Senses of Social Life / Cultural Sociology (Smysly sotsial'noj zhizni. Kul'turnaja sotsiologija). St. Petersburg, 2003.*

² Ionin L.G. *Sociology of Culture: Way to New Millennium (Sotsiologija kul'tury: put' v novoje tysjacheletije). Moscow, 2000.*

³ Zapesotsky A.S. *Metamorphoses of Mass Media: New Quality or New Diseases? // Sociological Research (Sotsiologicheskije issledovanija), 2010, No. 7, p. 7–17.*

⁴ *The Philosophy of Russian Corporality (Filosofija rossijskoj telesnosti): Collected articles. St. Petersburg, 2009.*

'How can the man [Viktor Yerofejev and his TV programme "Apocrypha"] who advocates foul language and pornography evaluate modern literature?', protested Savva Yamshchikov.⁵

Fifth, there undergoes the preparation of works of literature and art that transforms them beyond recognition when there is no trace left of the initial essence but outer sheath which is often also broken according to 'a new view' or 'a new interpretation'.

And, finally, creators of these forms focus not on achieving understanding, mastering conventional values, not on achieving the truth, but on accepting the promoted patterns which are sooner aimed at disorientation than at enlightenment and teaching information, values. And then the carnival turns into foul language.

This is why, from our point of view, in the conditions of indeterminacy and ambiguity of the development of culture in the Russian society there flourished various centaur-like formations which could, for convenience, be referred to as ersatz-, pseudo-, quasi-, counter-, and para-culture, which have not just occupied a certain niche, but which claim to become if not the main, leading ones, then to embody further steps taken to develop culture. This is not even mass or pop culture – this is much more dangerous and worrying than it seems at first sight. In our opinion, there is being created a unique phenomenon which can be referred to as the centaur of a culture, of a centaurist culture. Its essence is that with the help of these phenomena in the development of culture (and arts) there are created processes which embody incompatible substances but which are overcome by its creators and which quite successfully compete with the real culture, not excluding folk culture.

These centaur features are noticeable, in the first place, in the shape of ersatz-culture. The essence of this phenomenon is creating surrogates, defective substitutes which make life primitive, reduce it to excesses and eventually create the world of a man in the image of some verisimilitude with the complete absence of not just ideals but even basic respect for people and their spirituality. Many promoted literary works awarded various prizes are just the product of 'degenerative ideas', 'mockery, grimaces and leaps, throwing bodies of the diseased at each other merrily', 'ritual orgies with engorging corpses in the morgue', with infinite use of foul language and drinking 'Madeira from a chamber pot'.⁶

Ersatz-culture is often an eclectic combination of problems existing in reality which, united artificially, make up mechanistic formations consisting of components that are incompatible either in terms of artistic content or in terms of artistic style. Its functioning is accompanied by rejecting moral guidelines, which allows glorifying and considering it natural to describe defecation of a human body, considering full nakedness of a human body on a theatrical stage to be a norm. The attempt at justifying it with the idea that human life must be shown fully, including all of its wretchedness, real ugliness, creates these 'patterns' of culture which contradict the source of any culture – folk culture – and its traditions. Those who think it a norm to use foul language in everyday life can also be rated among this group (at that, these figures often pose themselves as true intellectuals). A. Kalyagin, Chairman of the Union of Theatrical Workers says: 'Now even on the most renowned and well-known stages of the country anything is possible, from a naked bottom to coarse foul language.'⁷ As a result, there are created samples of culture which are an-

⁵ Yamshchikov S. From 'Conscience' to 'Shit' (Ot 'sovesti' k 'der'mu') // *Argumenty i fakty*, 2006, No. 3.

⁶ Chudinova E. P. Mother and Father Write in Foul Language (Mama s papoj pishut matom) // *Nashe vremja*, 2006, No. 18, 8–14 November.

⁷ Kalyagin A. Theatre on Sale (Teatr, vystavlenyj na prodazhu) // *Nezavisimaja gazeta*, 2006, 3 March.

ti-aesthetic production, which have stopped being moral guidelines.

In the second place, pseudo-culture is becoming of more and more importance in the life of the society; pseudo-culture focuses on large-scale falsification of reality and its cultural constituent, on fully imaginary and often perverted world of man, social groups, society. The range of this centaur of a culture is very wide – from cynicism to primitive phantasmagorical works, from idealizing the past to justifying vice and rejecting their own culture. Production of this culture can be at best referred to primitive or perverted imagination. This culture is based on distortion, loose and biased interpretation of displays of human mind and real human activities. Among them are creations of new discoverers of Russia's history and world history (Fomenko and his followers), who base upon the use of exterior features (in this case, the use of real events of astronomic character, sun and the moon eclipses) and disprove the knowledge of real history of the mankind accumulated by many generations of historians.

These displays are particularly numerous in the sphere of science. This is why the Russian Academy of Sciences thought it necessary to establish a special Commission Against Pseudoscience and Falsifications of Scientific Research, as various excogitations are propagandized under the lee of science, pseudo-problems having no reference to science are persistently imposed. Besides constant attempts at solving urgent problems by implementing various perpetual motion, we can refer a certain Petrik's fibs, having a degree in psychology, to such pseudo-discoveries; Petrik together with the State Duma Speaker Gryzlov proposed a device purifying water from radioactive contamination. By the way, his invention would make the state spend 15 trillion rubles. And so far the result is Gryzlov's opinion that 'obscurants sit' in the Academy of Sciences, because they turned down this 'invention' as unsound, basically illiterate.

Such phenomena as pops and glamour are embodiment of pseudo-culture. As for pops, in the first place, its basic characteristic feature is absence of good taste. In the second place, it is tinted with dullness in trying to understand what worries the people, the society, the world. It is supplemented with laziness of thought, as pops restricts itself to primitive comparisons, images, it strikes with bareness of understanding the changes which take place around. Pops does not call anywhere – it plays on vile feelings of people, because the excessive amount of syrup or 'nightmare approach' to what is going on is its most popular method. In the world of pops even human pain looks like something farfetched, incidental, transient, something that is not worth paying attention to. Pops focuses on 'satisfying' the demands of a limited circle of people while it stays itself indifferent to genuine feelings and suffering. It is characterized by farce, neglect, absence of elementary taste. And the main thing in it is the absence of the sense of proportion which is constantly confusing the exalted with the vile.

As for glamour, it manifests itself as a declared social demarcation – belonging to a certain social stratum. This form of pseudo-culture does not contain anything instructive. In it, the most important thing is outward correlation of oneself and the surroundings with those who use opportunities which are inaccessible for the majority of people; those opportunities are mostly connected with considerable financial spending on supporting one's status. The latter in most cases is expressed in specific clothes, equipment of one's home, servicing of vehicles, use of fanciful services and demonstration of participating in get-togethers of various calibres.

Both pops and glamour abound with pretentiousness coming up to tedium, artificiality of the environment created by

them, absence of basic feelings ennobling a man, striving to realize the idea bequeathed by Kozma Prutkov 'Seem more important than you are' or 'Be more important than you seem'. They do not presuppose achieving such heights as the expression of the moving elevation of feelings, understanding of sacrifice, the responsibility for the fates of people around (except themselves and, perhaps, certain close people, who are close only for some reasons). They are often accompanied by snobbery, wish to rise over the surrounding world, pathologic wish to be the select one in this world. Focus on rattling nerves, self-glorifying, listening to extolling speeches and even accepting toadyism, – these personal vices achieve such heights that their bearers completely lose contact with the culpable everyday life. They would like to see themselves on an eminence, which would be a sign of their advantage over the crowd, 'trash', and they are ready to sacrifice anything for it in order not to be deprived of the achieved status and of equally dubious social position.

Irresponsibility is inherent in pseudo-culture, as it does not bear and is not going to bear any responsibility for the consequences of the patterns of its so-called cultural behaviour which it promotes; nor is it going to take responsibility for the deformation of moral and spiritual progress of the society.

In the third place, another face of the centaurist culture is quasi-culture that embodies false sham phenomena mostly of imitative nature, which could become only more or less verisimilar copy of what existed before and what was even significant. Within this centaur-like formation fiction, importance, blowing soap bubbles and constant claim for innovation are glorified and raised. According to S. Yursky, in the modern theatre, Russian or world theatre, a process of decay is going on, when there are no ideas, and if there are they are just 'outer ideas' which can be compared to sweet wrappers containing either 'plain and simple caramel' or perfect classical stuff. Quasi-culture is the concentration of such characteristics as similarity, likeness, claim to be near but not beyond the preceding culture. Not in a lesser degree ambitions, pretensions, attempts to form its own mission in the modern cultural world are inherent in it. At the same time pseudo-culture does not stand apart from glorifying immorality passing it for natural reasons of human emotional impulse.

Quasi-culture is also being intensively created in literature. According to many people involved in literary work (and not only according to them), in post-Soviet Russia works describing lives of ordinary people – teachers, engineers, workers, peasants – have almost totally vanished. They have been supplanted with reasoning, stories and discussion of well-off people's lives, their environment, description of get-togethers, and 'suffering' of owners of castles, personal aircrafts, foreign cars together with adventures of artistic elite and sports stars mixed with different kinds of 'shooters'. It is obvious, as writer A. Makarov states, that there is political glamour in journalistic or literary design which, in its essence, is bourgeois journalism and bourgeois literature, which 'in a queer freak of nature are called democratic though not in the least propagating and glorifying innocence, naturalness, general availability, modest claims and absence of privileges'.¹ Isn't it the latter-day centaur trying to combine serving the establishment with the wish to embody loyalty to democracy?

In the fourth place, one of the displays of centaurism is para-culture which constantly makes attempts at creating exceptionally new reality in no way linked to the spiritual values accumulated and tested by the mankind. It is based on astrology, mysticism, paranormal phenomena like witchcraft and quackery. It is particularly harmful when it pretends to

¹ Makarov A. Dress Code at the Journal Front Door (Dress-kod u zhurnal'nogo podjezda) // Literaturnaja gazeta, 2010, May 17.

use methods like sessions of mass hypnosis provided by such healers as Kashpirovsky, Chumak or prophetess Djuna who was sensationally popular in the 1990s. A great share belongs to the absolutization of mysticism which is based on ethnic or religious sources. Propaganda of vice and perversion is also typical of it.

And finally, it is necessary to speak about counter-culture which realizes absolute rejection of or ultimate opposition to the culture that exists in reality and which is shared by the major part of the population. Its mission is to contrast itself with the existing culture, to reject it, which is reflected in sectarian, monstrous doctrines, some of them being of a religious character. Odiousness, antihumanistic orientation, nihilism of counter-culture parasitize on the rejection of preceding culture and try to create a new artificial image of culture. Counter-culture cultivates confrontation up to violence over all those dissenting. It is manifested in certain sectarianism. It is characterized by dual moral in the fashion of ideology of one of the governors from *A Town's History* by M. Saltykov-Shchedrin, whose slogan was: 'It is necessary to introduce science and enlightenment to the people, and it is better to do so without bloodshed.' It is this culture, like none of the previous ones, which shows its centaurist essence in proclaiming some values and guidelines but adhering to absolutely different ones.

Thus, all these forms of the centaurist culture are aimed at creating spiritual and moral monsters and at uniting elements which are incompatible in their essence. But their danger is so big not so much because they commercialize culture, but because they make provisions for the civilizational collapse of the country, destroy moral values of the people, aim at bringing down and impoverishing people's spirituality.

Modes of Action of the Transmuted Cultures

A large-scale making of the centaur-like cultures (ersatz-, quasi-, pseudo-, para- or counterculture) within the Russian society is accompanied by application of methods that reflect plans and intentions of people who have little to do with creative work. These methods include attempts at organizing consumers' audience, as numerous as possible, at gaining large-scale participation, at attracting as many of the plebes who will lap it up as possible. To do so they use the hooks that appeal to dream state, to arousing the things in the human that are under moral ban. Thus, sex, always an intimate and private matter, has now got open publicity with every little detail, up to perversities. This is the very slogan for the romantics of amorality. There is no other word for the incessant manifestation of different moral taboos that are revolting not only to the ideas of morality, but also to the generally accepted customs and traditions. There was considerable bewilderment when Andrei Malakhov was awarded a TEFI Award (an annual award presented by the Russian Academy of Television) for his programme 'Let 'em Talk', which defies fundamental moral concepts. So, it is little surprise that public opinion, in contrast to the Academy's decision, is taking this as an act of recognition of vulgarity.¹ Together with the processes targeted at the public scarcity of morals, a situation is being unfolded, which G. Krasnikov referred to as the mental debilitation of the population.²

The transmutation of massive expression of the culture into one endless show has become another significant method. A show has the right to exist as a way to deliver culture to public consciousness; however, when all types of culture are reduced to a single mode – show – the culture becomes not only

bound and commercialized, but also deformed and distorted. This is the very purpose of the officially stimulated and supported sponsored literature, and theatre productions, filmmaking industry and pop music.³

Another widespread method is the game with the focus not on getting people involved into making cultural values, but on turning them into compassionate viewers, who, by some secret way, become co-participants of such shows. 'Warming up the audience' and other tricks are possible, but they have their restrictions and taboos. It results in the alienation of people from culture's social orientation, in disregard of the true concerns of the society and of the people. Distress and need, social cataclysms and national tragedy that every person in our country had to do with in the 1990s are put aside. Even such method as efficiency becomes another way of making money that pushes 'people of culture' to pseudo-imitation, pseudo-symbolism, up to grisly gores and thoughtless borrowings of what 'they' have.

The 'fun and games' method is being widely used in accordance with the post-modernist attitudes. This is an attempt to cover anything holus-bolus – from baking pancakes and stories about pets' whims up to individual reflections with indecent insinuations about private lives of certain characters, or scandalous episodes like, for example, the works of the notorious Sorokin or the outrageous Yerofeyev, who are, according to Saltykov-Shchedrin, 'mysterious people, naturally covered with slippery substance'.⁴

Another method – barbarization, accurately called so by writer Yu. Polyakov, is quite frequently used, too. It is when under the slogan of 'struggle against the cursed Soviet past', 'imperialist patriotism' and in rejection of the national culture, when 'Parnassus turns into the Bald Mountain', in sullyng tales about the Great Patriotic war or mocking lies about our allied Byelorussia. Prevarications and simple slanders are penetrating almost all (without exceptions) spheres of Russia's history and reality – be it the events of the Civil War and the first five-year plans, or such facts as deportation of peoples, the Komsomol (the Young Communist League of the USSR) construction projects, or even space exploration. These things are accompanied by the devaluation of cultural production – everyone becomes a singer: Shifrin, and Zhirinovskiy, and Lolita; every Tom, Dick and Harry becomes a writer, especially because they can upload their pulp fiction to the Internet.⁵

Methods, with their emphasis on struggling against everybody around, against predecessors, against those with their own personal viewpoints on what is going on in the present-day culture, have become widespread. It is a peculiar message – 'We know what we are fighting against, but we don't know what for', which means that they avow their joy of fight, without turning their attention to what they are going to get in the end. There is a vast number of sceptics, unable to do or create anything themselves, but really keen on criticizing (quite convincingly at times) everything around them. As a result, a group of characters emerged who denounce all old and, at the same time, new achievements in literature and arts.

Myth-making, which includes black mythology,⁶ is considerably significant among the methods of modern cultural activities. Its target is a new different interpretation of historical as well as ongoing events. It used to be trendy (to some extent the trend still lingers) to bring back the mem-

³ Polyakov Yu. Writers and Peeps // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 6, Jan. 6–14, 2006.

⁴ Salutsky A. Pop-Culture and Peep-Crap // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 6, Feb. 6–14, 2006.

⁵ Polyakov Yu. What Are You After, Masters of Culture? // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 29, Jul. 20–26, 2005.

⁶ Polyakov Yu. What Are You After, Masters of Culture?; Osipov G. V. *Sociology and Social Myth-Making*. Moscow, 2002.

¹ Breeding Vulgarity // *Izvestija*, Nov. 21, 2005.

² Krasnikov G. Shock Renaissance // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 1. Jan. 17–23, 2007.

ories of the Soviet time's hardships and oppression of culture workers. I call such practices 'scratching mosquito bites into wounds of war'. That is why it is quite fair what Ernst Neizvestny, a world-known sculptor, once said about the scandal of 1962 at the meeting between Nikita Khrushchev, First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and the representatives of artistic intelligentsia. According to him, it is difficult, almost impossible, to tell the truth from fantasies and distortion, because this event has accumulated a lot of myths.

Centaurist phenomena in culture are largely promoted by thoughtlessness, flippant imitation of foreign (western, as well as eastern) cultural patterns. Globalization should not put significance and values of national cultures into the background. Unfortunately, the thing that is taking place in Russia now is not an intensive blending, but rather a displacement of national identity in some abstract civilizational way, impersonal and thoughtless at the same time. In other words, such methods lead to spiritual colonialism. Under its slogans alien cultural standards are imposed instead of being reconsidered and implemented in a creative way, as done by cultured elite in Japan, China and India – the best achievements of the world's culture undergo an interpretation which is based on national mentalities; it enables them to create unique works of national art and literature.

The analysis of methods of activity in different cultures gives an opportunity to distinguish between them in sociology and cultural studies. In my opinion, cultural studies are focused on comparing different phenomena of culture in its variety, on genesis of ideas, on finding correlation between its various elements – from arts to infrastructure. It means that every side of culture gets into the focus – from concepts to stock, from traditional methods to exploratory innovative ones. Cultural studies also analyze centaurist points with the focus on their nucleus and content, which need understanding and explaining, and their potential evaluated and their place within the spiritual life of society determined.

Sociology addresses social aspects and consequences brought by these phenomena, by the representation (understanding) of the imaginary world through the images that include incompatible elements (sphinxes, mermaids, angels, wood goblins etc.). Analyzing the centaurist phenomena, sociology focuses on the way the phenomenon was taken by readers (listeners, spectators), on what people were feeling, on the ideas and concepts that the authors of these works were guided by. Sociology is interested in such real public life phenomena that manifest themselves through centaurist events, centaurist processes, centaurist images, centaurist personalities; they can be studied and measured with sociological tools (e.g. a capitalist, who is a Communist party member, a corrupt judge, witchcraft, clairvoyance, state corporations etc.).

Centaurist Culture Ideologues

It is impossible to examine a centaurist culture without analysis of its makers, hosts and ideologists. Basically, it means that a scrutiny should be given to the phantom characters, which manifest themselves at turning points. Russia's society is one of such points.

As a rule, an unhealthy yearning for fame and publicity is a characteristic feature of centaurist culture ideologues. Often, when such phantom characters fail to make themselves known by methods and tools typical of culture, they switch to shocking behaviour, scandals and other actions that can make the public pay attention to them and, perhaps, to their work. They are highly sensitive to a current situation in the country. When Yeltsin was in office, it was quite a profitable and popular business to denounce the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet power. Then, there came the

period when the longing for 'vertical power' had to be taken into account or, on the contrary, ignored, the period of grants for work, when the assistance of those, who, from abroad, were consistently fighting for the development of democracy in Russia. Among those successful people there were quite a lot of representatives of the 'offshore literature'.¹

In this connection, I would like to notice that a special social group is being formed – pseudo- and pop-experts, who, due to their foray into television and other mass media, persistently impose their own vision of the deformed and distorted forms and products of culture. Furthermore, many of these people have generated a specific social stratum within Russia's society – a herostratum, aimed, voluntarily or not, at the destruction of the Russian civilization. They have implemented such activities that are very much like 'black fantasy', for their framework suggests that there is nothing bright or worthy in the country's history and culture. Some constructed centaurs become obscure, like an officially set up special fund to improve Russia's image abroad. It includes mostly those who have been discrediting Russia, who, throughout the post-Soviet period in Russia, have been doing nothing but making the country's image worse in the eyes of the world. Writer Yu. Polyakov asks: 'Who came up with the idea to hire, figuratively speaking, ferrets to protect a henhouse?'²

This situation is getting more complicated, because pseudo-experts have television and the Internet at their disposal. It provides them with an opportunity to get feedback from consumers at their choice and preferences, thus making up another ersatz-symbol with the reference to 'links with the nation'. Such interactive links impose standards of their own and their own interpretation by different techniques, known from Harold D. Lasswell's theory of political propaganda: who, whom, how and with what results delivers information to consumers.

The analysis of diverse mass-media content, especially that of television programmes that appeared at the end of 1980s and 1990s, shows that their coverage and tone were provoking 'a cultural trauma'.³ This 'trauma' brought about such phenomena as 'moral panic', increased anxiety, denunciation of the past and its abandonment. These phenomena were being made and implanted into the public consciousness through various printed matter, programmes and projects, the most impressive of which were Eugeny Kiselyov's 'Current History' and Leonid Parfyonov's 'The Other Day. Our Era. 1961–1991'. The archive footage that made up the background for these productions was exaggerated, it was of an openly accusing character and full of righteous anger.⁴ Eventually, the reality was monstrously distorted, and it caused not only cultural, but also social trauma, leaving millions of people disoriented and disorganized in their lives.

Among the ideologues of the centaurist culture there is quite a substantial group of characters à la Dunya Smirnova or 'writers like Aksyonov, once a brilliant Soviet author, who have written themselves out';⁵ they possess a powerful ideological weapon – television, newspapers, radio, arts. They are vulgarizing the culture, distorting its role and mission, forming up a generation of 'the plebes who lap up' low-quality stuff, produced by themselves and the like.

¹ Rybas S. From 'Offshore' Literature to National // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 10, Mar. 15–21, 2006.

² Polyakov Yu. The Insufficiency of State // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 37, 2004; of the same author What Are You After, Masters of Culture? // *Literaturnaja Gazeta*, No. 29, Jul. 20–26, 2005.

³ Shtompka P. *Sociology. An Analysis of Modern Society*. Moscow, 2008, pp. 84–85.

⁴ Novikova A. A., Dyulo E. A. 'Soviet Matter' on Television at the Modern Stage as a Manifestation of Glocalization // *Moscow State University Bulletin, 'Journalism' series*, 2010, No. 1, p. 25.

⁵ *Izvestija*, Nov. 27, 2007.

And the most dangerous thing is that 'you can find no chink in their armour of morals, because they have no morals'.¹ Alongside with them, there are utterly ungifted figures that have penetrated into television, newspapers and magazines just because they have money; these are the people whose 'hands are made itchy by conventional units' because they are eager to fulfil their wives' fantasies;² they are the people who were born into the families producing spiritual values, and used to sit on Roland Bykov's laps;³ they are the people who rushed to please homosexuals, who abound in artistic circles, especially on the variety stage.⁴ However the result is stunning – a new stratification is being formed of those who have money. And such ways of forming new strata block the progress for other social groups, especially for those from the lower strata. 'Yet another appalling feature of the country's artistic life' has emerged and is now in progress – 'a stunning optionality of talent... Desacralization of the gift fits into a new hedonistic model of the world. You want to be talented? No problem! For a start, hire a PR-manager and a stylist.' An utterly different situation has emerged: talent is no longer a pass into the broadcast; the broadcast itself sort of certifies a talent, of which there is none.⁵

It is a sad fact to acknowledge, that *corruption* is a characteristic feature of the ideologue of modern culture. And I don't mean their lust for money, royalties, grants and sponsorship; I mean their readiness to be involved into any low-quality film or to take on some very doubtful offers and to write sponsored articles. I am referring to the 'Triumph' award founded by B. Berezovsky, which is awarded, as Savva Yamshchikov puts it, to 'the cultural elite of the nation' that regularly attend 'receptions hosted by the man accused of swindle and large-scale theft, and who cooked large-scale fraud'.⁶

There are also such 'masters of culture' to whom Alexander Karmen, Roman Karmen's son, referred to as scavengers and bastards, because of the slanderous film they made about his father. Such pseudo-authors and pseudo-directors, accumulating gossip, guesswork and slander under the pretext of freedom of speech (Yu. Polyakov's apt remark is 'debauchery of speech') when 'the whole ultimate truth' is supposed to be uncovered, 'out to the vile crowd spill the things that decent society prefers not to talk about; such people don't even think of the damage that their lying is doing to the image of their "idol".' This idea can be applied to the films about Vysotsky, Bunin, Landau, Esenin, Natalya Gundareva and even Brezhnev.⁷

Thus, a conclusion can be made: A vigorous destruction of world culture, and particularly of national culture, is taking place – they are being displaced, intensively and openly, by a centaurist culture. Its main hazard is that it mingles the truth and lies, hypocrisy and sincerity, longing for truth, and substituting it with different scum. Genuine culture islands, concentrated at individual establishments and seats of culture, at some educational institutions, do not make much difference, all the less so, as many of them are, more or less, infected by ersatz-, quasi- and pseudo-culture. It is these symptoms that make it possible to call them ochlocratic, when the logics and methods of cultural policy are dictated by drives and desires of the crowd. Resisting a centaurist culture is hard, because it is blended with real life and parasitizes on the social striving for spiritual values, on a natural desire to broaden the horizons and views of the visual environment. It is made of the elements that present contradictory processes in the cultural development, which it exploits without a clear opposition to unnatural manifestations, to different low-quality tastes, strivings and trends.

As a result, the nation's spiritual and moral well-being is at stake. A.V. Kiva writes: 'The most severe consequence of Yeltsin's regime may well be the undermining of national spirit, the deterioration of people's social well-being, the moral decay of the least steadfast people. It was actively promoted by the immoral conduct of the top circles and an aggressive policy aimed at libelling everything around which was being practised by a substantial portion of mass media, by television in the first place. In fact, they started to mock truly human values – goodness, unselfishness, compassion, etc. These values have been replaced with ultimate egoism, individualism, a cult of elitism and the oneness, permissiveness for the sake of individual benefit, money, power, sex, an aggressive popularization of "new values" – from chewing gum, sanitary pads and beer to expensive cars, jewellery, and so on.'⁸ Perhaps, in this connection, it is worth mentioning that the truth is: a solid and reliable background of our existence is made up by rather fragile yet eternal values, such as conscience, culture and faith. Russian poet and writer Mikhail Lermontov reminisced: 'When I was three, there was a song that made me cry... My mother would sing it for me.' G. Krasnikov comments: 'We will never know which song it was, but one thing is sure – in those blessed tears of a boy, enchanted by his mother's singing, the gem of his forthcoming genius was laved and polished.'⁹

¹ Chudinova E. P. Ibid.

² Yurikov A. Give Me a Million! // Izvestija, Feb. 22, 2000.

³ Polyakov Yu. What Are You After, Masters of Culture?

⁴ Yampolskaya E. Sodom and Uproar // Izvestija, May 15, 2006.

⁵ Polyakov Yu. What Are You After, Masters of Culture?

⁶ Yamshchikov S. Ibid.

⁷ Karmen A. Scavengers' Sabbath // Literaturnaja Gazeta, No. 13, Mar. 29 – Apr. 4, 2006; Petrovskaja I. There Is No Truth on TV // Izvestija, Nov. 26, 2005.

⁸ Kiva A.V. Non-Systemic Regime // Free Thought (Svobodnaya mysl') No. 9, 2004, p. 102.

⁹ Krasnikov G. Ibid.

Felix Unger¹

ON GLOBAL CULTURE

Our world becomes really more and more a global village. The only hindrances are the time differences. In growing together many problems are occurring due national continental traditions which have to be overcome. One of the most important vehicles to overcome the hindrances are our media including the whole information technology in all levels within the daily life. How quick information can be transformed is to be seen on the example of the recent nuclear disaster in Japan where the whole world is observing with fear the future and the destiny of those nuclear plants. The information gives us the tool observing radionuclide clouds and to make prevention locally. This is only one example how the transformation is within seconds in the whole world spread out.

We are living in a certain given area and on a continent. This area is embedded in a nation which has developed systematically over centuries. There are many inherited behaviour aspects to consider. First at all how the people are dealing together in a nation, how the people is sharing the environment. In this context of the living together we have immediately our heritage born out of the religions which have an enormous impact of globalisation. Spreading out from a local point there are major religions as the Christian religions, the Islamic reli-

gions and Hindu, Buddhists. They have indeed a severe impact in the future destiny of our globe. It is evident that in the past many problems can be solved. Those problems can be solved by a mutual dialogue developing a common position, bridges, so that in the spirit of tolerance the conditions of Globalisation can be flourishing.

Another factor is the whole environment. We all together have to share our globe and we have to preserve our globe in good shape especially when we face an explosion of the population while the environment is endangered. To master all such environmental difficulties is also sourced by a constant mutual dialogue by a constant discussion so that we will find a basis ensuring our children and grandchildren a flourishing world.

On the globe are indeed many cultures and subcultures. But the main cultures are driven by this spiritual impact of the religions. Therefore it is indispensable having a constant mutual discussion leading to tolerance.

Task of academies: the task of education is to foster and to train people in taking part in the discussions of all the problems starting by the next personal finally, by the nations, the continents. We have to keep in mind, we live all together on the globe which is becoming indeed a global village.

O. Vinogradov²

BALLET AS DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Academician A.A. Guseynov in his presentation at the previous 10th International Likhachov Scientific Conference makes a right statement that the process of globalization, transformation of the mankind into an integrate whole is fraught with contradictions economically and technologically.

One of them is the separation of spirituality and culture.

For globalization not to block the process of isolation as peoples' natural striving for preservation of their self-identity, we suggest introducing the concept of 'superculture' into the complex of the category of the dialogue of cultures.

The sphere of the world ballet phenomenon has in fact existed in the space of 'superculture' for several centuries.

This is proved by the history of our Russian ballet.

French dancers and choreographers Didelot, Saint-Léon, Perrot transferred to the fertile soil of Petersburg stage the best achievements of the Western culture while developing our national traditions.

Later their ideas were advanced and improved by another great Russian Frenchman, Marius Petipa, who worked at Mariinsky Ballet for over 60 years.

¹ President of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg, Austria), Professor, Dr. Unger is Head of University Hospital for Cardiac Surgery at the private Paracelsus Medical University. Dr. Unger was the first European surgeon to make a heart transplantation. He is honorary member of the Russian Academy of Arts. Author of works: *Cardiac Reconstructions, Coronary Artery Surgery, Coronary Artery Surgery in the Nineties, Wucht des Ganzen: Pulsstheorie statt Chaos?*

² Choreographer, ballet director of the Russian Academy of Folk Dance, Professor of the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, People's Artist of the USSR. From 1977 to 1996 Mr. Vinogradov was Chief Choreographer of Kirov Ballet (Mariinsky Theatre, St. Petersburg). He staged the following ballets: *Assel, The Knight in a Tiger Skin, The Hussar Ballad, The Enchanted Prince, Cinderella, Romeo and Juliet, Revisor (or The Inspector General)* and some others. Since 1989 to present day he has been Head of the Kirov Academy of Ballet (Washington). Since 1992 to present day Mr. Vinogradov has been the head of the Universal Ballet School (Seoul). Author of books: *Choreographer's Confession (Ispoved' baletmejestera), My System of Ballet Education (Moja sistema baletnogo obrazovanija)*. He is Laureate of the State Award of the Russian Federation, Marius Petipa Prize, Laurence Olivier Award, Picasso Award and others. Mr. Vinogradov was conferred the highest French award in literature and arts – 'Chevalier'. He is decorated with the Order of Lenin and the Order of Friendship.

His brilliant works that have become an adornment of stages of Petersburg, Moscow and other cities still delight ballet-lovers worldwide. It is impossible to imagine the fate of the world ballet without 'The Swan Lake', 'The Sleeping Beauty', 'The Nutcracker', 'The Temple Dancer' and other ballets of his genius; it is equally impossible to overestimate the significance of the Russian academic ballet school which has synthesized the best traditions and achievements of the world culture. Russian text-books by A. Vaganova, A. Shiryayev, V. Kostrovitskaya, N. Bazarova and other Russian teachers are still used in instruction in all countries of the world.

Our ballet has made an enormous contribution to the 'superculture'.

Ballet, as aesthetics, appeared in aristocratic salons of Italy and France where it was formed on the basis of folk elements and national characteristics. Transforming and developing interrelations in ballroom dancing, adjusting them to the real life of the society, to its etiquette, manners — the simple movements and plastic arts turned into an intellectual complex of culture.

Uniting into different compositions, adding plots and content, the court entertainments turned into performances with dramatic and philosophic meanings.

Education and intellect made up the intricate, rich complex of ballet theatre with vast opportunities of affecting a spectator, the fact being clearly understood by an educated and cultivated government.

It became evident that any ideas could be realized with the help of theatre and, more importantly, the nation could be educated and brought up.

Any kind of art that has a certain level of impact becomes a tool of ideology and politics, and both of these concepts form the artistic criteria.

Strange as it may seem both the Imperial Russian Ballet and the Soviet ballet were supported by the state due to the

specificity of the character of the genre itself, its characters and plots.

In the images of poetical conventional generalizations which are made understandable without using a single word, without concrete determination of emotional impact ballet expressed the main philosophical categories of the good and the evil, and later of high literature.

The absence of the linguistic divide when elevating the beauty, the unity with music and the arts, with theatrical opportunities and effects made this genre popular and in demand.

The secret of the phenomenon lies in a spectator's wish to get distracted from hardships of real life and at least for a moment to overcome its monotony and aggression with the extraordinary beauty of the human body.

The system of classical dance is the only perfect system in the world. It has been preserved and developed for 300 years and still retains its original appearance.

Sergei Diaghilev who opened the Russian ballet to the world proving its superiority, laid the foundation for the continuing Russian cultural influence on all Ordered art.

After almost 15 years of admiring Russian ballet, music, painting, the fashion for Russian ballet appeared in Europe soundly and for long. This fashion continued Diaghilev's traditions in the face of his Seasons' participants and gave rise to the generations of choreographers and artists of the Soviet period of the 30s and 40s who promoted further advance of Diaghilev's gains. The brilliant ballets created in those years enraptured the European audience again with performances of the Bolshoi and the Kirov Ballet in the mid-50s in the dialogue of cultures.

The impact of our aesthetics became clearly evident at the performances of Western troupes which were on tour in our country. The London Royal Ballet developed mostly holding to the traditions of the Russian school.

Paris Opéra which was for a long time headed by Russian choreographer S. Lifar had some Russian teachers and was constantly inviting Russian ballet masters (Yu. Grigorovich, V. Burmeister and others). For a long time the troupe was headed by R. Nureyev who brought fame to Petersburg school and its traditions like no one had before. Later his triumph was followed by triumphs of N. Makarova, M. Baryshnikov, V. Panov who were at the top of the world ballet. Nobody has progressed to their level so far in the West.

My life can serve as an example of the dialogue and interaction of cultures.

Having got the best choreographic education at A. Vaganova's School and graduating from the Theatre Institute in Moscow, over the 50 years of my artistic career I worked my way up from a ballet dancer to the art director of the best troupe in the world which I was in charge of for over 20 years.

It was with the troupe of the Mariinsky Ballet that we proved the superiority of our system of education in ballet. From Japan, Korea and China to America and Australia we showed the achievements of our culture evoking sincere admiration.

The purity of style, strict discipline, poetic spirituality and physical beauty of our artists in academic forms of expression was for a long time carefully preserved in our theatres.

Being in charge of one of the best troupes in the world I understood that while preserving we should enrich our opportunities. I was the first to start inviting leading Western choreographers whose aesthetics and trends were similar to ours.

Ballets by A. Bournonville, M. Béjart, J. Robbins, P. Lacotte, A. Tudor and others extended the range of our means of expression and enriched the audience. Our school proved its superiority every time, we could easily dance any ballets by any choreographers.

Working in different ballets of the world, directing and giving lectures in Sorbonne, Yale, in universities of Japan, Korea

and Germany I proudly shared my experience with young artists and choreographers, which I keep on doing now at St. Petersburg Conservatoire and at St. Petersburg University for the Humanities and Social Sciences.

I experienced the most significant results of the dialogue of our cultures during the foreign tours of the troupes which I was in charge of. For 5 years I was in charge of Maly Opera House in Leningrad and for 23 years of the Mariinsky Ballet.

Later I headed the Seoul Ballet in South Korea.

Spectators of all continents, in dozens of countries and cities admired our art.

We participated in the coming political and cultural events.

Kings, princes and presidents visited our performances. In America, President Ronald Reagan commented on our show of 'The Swan Lake' on national TV. President G. Bush, Senior sent me a personal letter inviting to set up a ballet academy in America; this is what I did and I have been living and working in America for 21 years.

The Kirov Academy of Ballet in Washington has become an oasis of the Russian culture where students from all over the world come to study.

It is the results of such mutual influence which are important and necessary. They enrich all the participants of the dialogue.

It is important to understand what influences and what impact is necessary.

Not so long ago, on the 1st of February 2011 I was absolutely shocked a French production of Ballet Preljocaj shown on the renowned stage of Mariinsky Opera House which had brought fame to the Russian ballet; in these ballets absolutely naked artists dance showing inventive ways of rape...

This takes place on the stage where famous Frenchman Marius Petipa created his brilliant performances to the music of another genius, Tchaikovsky.

Who did the executives want to influence when they put Russia's main stage at the disposal of those perverts?

Do we need such influences?

The most interesting thing is that this choreographer was immediately invited for staging and she is already working on the stage of Mariinsky Ballet.

One of the most outstanding western choreographers Maurice Béjart whose views were shared by another leading choreographer John Neumeier said: 'The world community must pay Russia for the preservation of classical ballet.'

Russia itself is losing everything today. After the collapse of the Soviet Union classical ballet has lost dozens of brilliant opera houses, ballet schools, artists, choreographers and teachers.

Life is not long enough to resist the outrageous breach of all limits at the local level, and outside Russia I can choose where I feel better.

But I love St Petersburg. This is my city to which I owe everything. I want to be helpful to it and to those who love real, beautiful, pure, poetic ballet.

I know how to create it, but...

Beautiful performances have not been created by anybody for many years.

Aerobics, brainless fitness ballets, street amusements with absurdity of the primitive and fatuity of musical noises (not music)...

The wantonly propagating singers use ballet artists as backup dancers and the pay is much higher than salaries in opera houses, thus ballet dancers leave the professional stage for the variety art losing their professional skills.

Classical ballet is contraindicative to pops, but pops is everywhere and artists try to adapt themselves to this primitive.

There is nobody to deal with this problem.

If we do not immediately pay attention to it, classical ballet will die out in a few years.

Now that sports and games and championships have become the supernational idea, it is necessary to make our ideologists in the government come back to the real land of culture, upbringing and education, as a sound body cannot be imagined without them.

I feel particular responsibility taking part in this conference as I believe that I am incredibly lucky to have worked with D. S. Likhachov in the mid-70s... on a ballet.

By that time I had been studying his materials concerning 'The Tale of Igor's Campaign' for 7 years while creating a libretto for the ballet.

Composer Boris Tishchenko, director Yuri Lyubimov and I were planning to create a new type of a ballet performance on the historical topic and subjects of 'The Tale of Igor's Campaign' which seemed very up-to-date and timely.

The concept of 'Prince Igor', N. Borodin's famous opera, was not suitable for us and to become firmly convinced of our concept, where Igor is an anti-hero who brought immense suffering to his people, it was necessary for me to meet Dmitry Likhachov.

Yuri Lyubimov arranged this meeting for me, as I felt very shy and did not even hope that he would receive me.

The meeting dispelled all my fears and uneasiness because Dmitry Sergeyeovich projected kindness and light. He was surprised at the very idea of creating a ballet on this difficult topic and even more surprised at the fact that his works were familiar to me.

He accepted my offer to become the official advisor to our ballet, and we started working.

I wrote variants of the libretto, brought them to him, he suggested changes, and the work advanced. A little later remarkable writer Fyodor Abramov joined us too.

In this company we created an extraordinary ballet which amazed the public, but the ballet's fate was extraordinary, too. After the first performance it was immediately banned and a special ideological commission of the Party's Regional Committee was called.

Dmitry Sergeyeovich and Kirill Lavrov spoke to this commission in defence of the performance and called its creators real patriots.

The performance was released and its triumphant life began. For over 10 years it enjoyed full houses at every performance in Russia and was shown in many countries at prestigious music festivals proving the highest level of our culture.

Joerg Wolf¹

THE RESET: HOW GERMANY CAN SET A NEW TONE FOR WESTERN-RUSSIAN ENGAGEMENT

Relations between Moscow and the West suffer from a lack of trust. Berlin can play a key role in overcoming this by 'resetting' foreign policy discourse and facilitating greater civil society engagement as well as economic and security cooperation.

Introduction

Current relations between Russia and the West are marked by a lack of trust on the one hand and narrowly-focused cooperation on some issues on the other. Obsolete language and thinking along the lines of the Cold War have dominated Russian-Western relations for far too long and diverted attention away from successful cooperative efforts against threats of terrorism, nuclear proliferation, resource shortages, poverty and natural disasters. They will remain common challenges in an increasingly multipolar 21st century world. Only in working together will the West and Russia be able to tackle them.

One field where increased collaboration should prove beneficial to both sides is the area of civil society exchange and education. A continued deterioration of human rights in Russia will only move it farther away from Europe and deprive the country of the social and economic benefits of open discourse and innovative collaboration. The EU and Germany in particular, should therefore work to strengthen Russian civil society and open up new fora of dialogue between the Russian and German peoples, as well as greater European populace.

Closer cooperation with Russia has also been among the top priorities of the NATO Summit 2010 in Lisbon, which marked the widening of cooperation spheres and stressed will-

ingness for changing mutual perceptions. This should prove relatively easy where Russian and Western interests are largely congruent, as in the questions of international terrorism, narco-trafficking, cyber attacks and conflict resolution in crucial hotspots. For example, both sides fear the destabilizing effects of Afghanistan as a failed state, which might spread to the Central Asian countries, and an arms race in the Middle East rekindled by Iran attaining nuclear power status.

The economic sphere equally offers vast potential for mutually beneficial cooperation. Although the level of economic interdependence is remarkable, a more stable economic integration is highly desirable as the recent gas conflicts have shown. Endemic corruption and the volatile judicial system in Russia have led to a significant decline in foreign direct investment. Furthermore, Russia's WTO accession has been continuously blocked. In short, there has been an overlap of political and economic concerns, with oftentimes devastating consequences.

However, despite these strong incentives for cooperation, the process of greater reconciliation between Russia and the transatlantic community requires painful compromise and should not be regarded a sure success. A comprehensive strategy should therefore include all available instruments to foster positive development and to contain negative outcomes. The following policy recommendations give decision-makers flexibility while pointing firmly towards closer cooperation between the West and Russia.

Germany is especially well-positioned to lead such efforts because of its close economic ties to Russia, its historic foreign policy maxim of *Wandel durch Annäherung* (change through rapprochement) and its traditional connection to the 'East', resulting from its position at the very center of Europe. However, for too long now Berlin has been following a policy aimed at primarily strengthening its own economic position with little regard for the interests of its European neighbors. What the German government now needs to do is to reset its priorities and revive its vision of a united Europe and spearhead a common EU approach to Moscow.

¹ Editor-in-Chief of www.atlantic-community.org (open think tank 'Atlantic Initiative e.V.') in Berlin (Germany). Political scientist, research associate for the International Risk Policy project at the Free University's Centre for Transatlantic Foreign and Security Policy. Mr. Wolf carried out research work at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore and Washington D.C. and worked for the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Cairo and in Berlin.

Co-authors: M. Levitsky, student at University of Munich; B. Hanke, student at University of Leipzig; G. Babadyanova, master's student at the Philipps University of Marburg; M. Conrad, student at Free University (Berlin); A. Vasiljeva, master's student at the Free University (Berlin); F. Grosse, University of Bonn.

Policy recommendations

1. 'Reset' Foreign Policy Discourse

1.1 The EU and Russia need to 'reset' their relationship in a similar manner as Washington and Moscow have done. Given inner-EU cleavages with regard to Moscow, it is crucial to develop an approach that unifies EU member states in order to successfully reconcile clashing foreign policy discourses between Russia and the West. Historically rooted hostilities between Eastern European capitals and Moscow have caused severe conflicts within Europe and with Russia. In order to tackle this deeply rooted mistrust, an approach is needed that acknowledges the common past while pointing out ways to a common future. Thus, the establishment of joint committees of Russian and Eastern European historians should be encouraged to assess this common history together. Germany could provide assistance by drawing on its similar initiatives with Paris and Warsaw to lay the discursive foundation for a shared future in Europe.

1.2 Germany should convince fellow EU members and the US of the benefits of a change in rhetoric. Russia and the West are ready to regard each other as partners, not as belligerent adversaries. This has to be reflected in the language. Also, the West has to clearly signal that it wants to treat Russia as an equal partner, instead of the 'teacher-pupil' rhetoric which still partly prevails today. In its discourse towards Russia, Germany and the West should not question the legitimacy of the current Russian leaders. Moscow, in turn, has to abstain from populist rhetoric targeted against the West for domestic purposes. Respectful interaction beyond the sometimes blunt criticism of today is much more likely to foster mutual trust and to improve the Western-Russian relations.

2. Support Civil Society and Promote Democracy

2.1 Cultural and educational exchange programs are the best way to achieve protracted cooperation, to convey democratic values and good governance practices and thus support and promote the nascent civil society in Russia. This should include an institutionalized exchange program between Russian and German students (modeled on those already in place between Germany and France and Poland), an increased number of scholarships for incoming Russian students and increased cultural cooperation between twin cities. Initiatives such as 'culture days', youth concerts and sports events could broaden the base of understanding between people of different backgrounds.

2.2 To this end, the overdue relaxation of visa rules is paramount. Moreover, research pacts between German and Russian universities and an increased dialogue between small and medium business owners in both countries – for instance through already existing business associations – can facilitate a transfer of innovative technologies and new ideas. Emphasis should be on tangible benefits for citizens and consumers, not political show effects.

2.3 Germany should promote the advantages of an open society by engaging both the elected leaders of the Russian people and civil society actors outside of the incumbent administration. While respect for sovereignty should be the leading principle in Russian-European relations, a deeper understanding of each other will facilitate mutually beneficial relations. Thus, non-governmental institutions like the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung should be supported in their operations in Russia, strengthening Russian civil society through advocacy and projects like seminars for Russian journalists and financial support for local grassroots organizations. These efforts have been very effective in other post-Soviet countries and the former Soviet satellite states that are now part of the European Union.

2.4. The German government should appropriate funding for the *Deutsche Welle* to expand Russian-language broadcasts

to provide outside perspectives for Russian audiences and to neutrally inform the Russians about events in Western Europe and the rest of the world.

3. Increase Security Cooperation and Integration

3.1 Due to budget restrictions and demographic decline, EU member states' armies will need closer integration to provide all necessary capabilities in the future. This is a chance for addressing Eastern Europe's demands for protection while at the same time providing opportunities for even closer cooperation with Russia on matters such as airspace control, combating drug trafficking and responding to natural disasters. In this respect, NATO's new approach to missile defense could serve as a model for other areas of cooperation.

Germany's government should heed calls for a conference involving all members of NATO, Russia and the states from Eastern Europe to discuss the Medvedev proposal of comprehensive European security architecture, and evaluate the possibilities for further cooperation. While the original proposition must not be easily dismissed, European leaders are right to view it critically in light of it undermining the transatlantic alliance and altogether ignoring the area of human rights. Considering the oftentimes negative correlation between a dire human rights record and the stability of a state, it becomes clear that they also would need to be given adequate consideration at such a conference.

Moscow needs to understand that a reconceptualized European security system requires not only the approval, but also the help of Washington. Comprehensive European security architecture, when finally agreed on, could be based on a modernized OSCE and include aspects of a military pact such as NATO. It would have to overcome the current OSCE's ineffective decision-making procedures. By replacing the consensus principle by an EU-inspired 'qualified majority vote', the OSCE could regain political significance. Besides alleviating concerns of those states that, based on historic experience, still feel threatened by Russia, it could become the ultimate guarantee for a lasting peace not only in all of Europe, but beyond.

3.2 In the case of Georgia, for example, a general agreement on European security would facilitate engaging the Georgian and Russian governments in a common dialogue that also includes members of the South Ossetian and Abkhazian de facto authorities. A Security Council-mandated and UN-led neutral Transitional Authority in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, modeled on those in Cambodia, East Timor and Kosovo, could be a way out of the deadlock.

3.3 Europe and Russia should cooperate to bring lasting stability to Central Asian countries as well, especially Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. A firm Russian commitment to logistical support for ISAF through its bases in Central Asia would render NATO bases like the German air base in Termez on the Uzbek-Afghan border superfluous and engage Russia in the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Officially supporting a Russian peace-keeping operation in Kyrgyzstan could be seen as a vote of confidence on the part of NATO towards Russia's ability to solve conflicts.

3.4 Germany should encourage the Baltic States to better protect the minority rights of Russians. As long as distrust and discrimination prevail, Western demands for human rights protection in Russia sound hollow and give Russia a lever to interfere with the Baltic States' sovereign affairs. If integration and civic loyalty – not cultural assimilation – is demanded from Russian citizens in the Baltics there is a real chance for improving the political climate and alleviating security concerns between the Baltic States and Russia.

4. Promote Economic Integration

4.1 Emphasizing above all the modernization of the energy sector, Moscow's revised 'Energy Strategy until 2030' offers a

unique window of opportunity: Russia envisages massive FDI to make better use of its resources and to diversify in the long-term toward renewable energy sources. Climate-change induced risks for the Russian energy sector are likely to further propel Moscow in that direction. This coincides with the EU's attempts to reduce CO₂ emissions and develop markets for its green technologies industry. However, foreign investment will only flow into high-tech industries and services if the Russian state is perceived as a reliable guarantor of property rights and personal liberties. Western governments should therefore put emphasis on fair procedure and accountability of public servants as a matter of Russia's own interest.

4.2 Moreover, Russia's goal of WTO membership will serve a good basis for increased emphasis on trade and economic reforms. Within the framework of WTO talks, consultation and technical assistance should be offered to the Russian government. As an intermediate goal, the creation of a free-trade zone with the EU including Belarus, Ukraine and Russia as well as the South Caucasus states within a decade would be desirable.

4.3 Drawing on the experience with the European Coal and Steel Community, a similar European energy community should be developed that equally reflects the interests of consumer and producer countries. A revised Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) should serve as a vantage point in this endeavor. Given the levels of interdependence, diversification efforts by either

Russia or the EU are unlikely to have serious detrimental results on the relationship.

Developing alternative supply routes, like the Nabucco, Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, South Stream or Russo-Chinese pipelines, innovative delivery systems like LNG terminals, or new energy sources such as the expansion of solar power capabilities through the Desertec program are thus unlikely to prevent a mutually beneficial energy community in a greater Europe.

Conclusion

It is clear that for cooperation to intensify and generate sustained impact, both the West and Russia will have to move from positions they have long grown accustomed to. Furthermore, the EU and NATO need to find a common voice. Also, Russia needs to decide on its future course: To what degree does it want to become a close partner to the West? Or does Russia seek an alternative option of loose cooperation on specific policies only? A true change in relations will and can not be achieved by one side alone. Germany in its unique role as the most significant Russian economic partner and important member of the European Union and NATO holds the key to unlocking the door between them. However, this requires Berlin to recognize the historic chance and act upon it in a truly European manner. The policy recommendations presented in this article will, where of a general nature, point the direction which diplomatic initiatives will have to take and, where precise, lay out the first steps for action.

Guangcheng Xing¹

BETWEEN EUROPE AND ASIA: RUSSIA'S CHOICE

Each time, in an epoch when history changes, there emerges a question among the Russian political, social and philosophical élite as to the place of Russia in the world. Does Russia belong to the East or to the West? Each time Russian thinkers speculate whether Russia is a European or an Asian country, or a country with dual characteristics? This is how in the history of Russia debates between the 'Westernizers' and the 'Slavophiles' started and still continue. After the collapse of the USSR, during dynamic and profound historical changes, oscillations between 'Westernism' and 'Slavophilism' started again among the Russian intellectual élite.

On the whole Russia belongs to Europe, but the biggest part of its territory is situated in Asia. However, the main processes in the state's activities take place in the European part of the country, and the Asian part, just like a giant's left hand, is in a subordinate position. Relations between Russia and China, strategy and trends of their development depend to a great degree on this geopolitical asymmetric quality. The two great neighbouring states sharing a common border of great length face an urgent task of organizing and developing cooperation in the frontier regions.

At the same time, Russia has initiated this year yet another turn to Europe proclaiming this position to be its strategic choice. According to statements made by the Russian élite it is necessary for Russia to accomplish the country's modernization. Relations between Russia and the EU seem especially promising under the conditions of the world financial crisis, which Europe and Russia suffered from to a much greater degree than the USA, let alone still thriving China.

¹ Deputy Director of the Centre for History and Geography of Border Regions of China (the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), LL.D., Professor. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including books: *Relations of China with New Independent States of Central Asia, Process of Making Decisions by Soviet Authorities over 70 years, On Russia's Parliaments, Putin and Medvedev: Tandem of Supreme Power*; articles: *Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Priority Directions* and others. Vice-President of the Association for Promotion of Sustainable Development in China's Western Regions. Vice-Director of the Research Centre of Shanghai Cooperation Organization at the Academy for Social Sciences of the People's Republic of China.

And still, is Russia Europe or Asia?

If ethnic genesis of the titular ethnic group is taken into consideration, then Russia belongs to Europe. Russian culture also has a European character. Famous Russian philologist and thinker D.S. Likhachov noted that Russia is a European country, that 'for the Russian land, its position between the North and the South was of much greater importance'. Having analyzed the sources of Russian traditional culture D.S. Likhachov concluded that 'Russian culture tends to be characterized as being an intermediate between Europe and Asia, between the West and the East, but this borderline position is only seen if one looks at Russia from the West. As a matter of fact, the influence of Asian nomadic peoples was insignificant in settled Russia. Russia's spiritually-Christian character springs from Byzantine culture, and the military-armed forces system originates mostly from Scandinavia'. Likhachov analyzed the role of these factors in Russian culture at length: 'The appearance of Russian culture the decisively originated by the Byzantine Empire and Scandinavia apart from its own folk heathen culture. Over the vast multiethnic space of East European plain, currents of the two distinct influences have been spread, and these currents played a determining role in creating Russian culture. The South and the North, and not the East and the West, the Byzantine Empire and Scandinavia, but not Asia and Europe.'² Likhachov also remarked that 'we are a country with a European culture' because 'Christianity made it possible for us to get used to this culture'.

Nevertheless, taking into account geography, geopolitics and economics, Russia is a typical superpower connecting Europe and Asia. Due to this geopolitical position of connecting the two continents Russia plays a universalizing role. The best proof for the correctness of this assumption is Russian culture itself. Russia is a European country which has taken in elements of different cultures. Likhachov frankly admitted that

² (俄) 德·谢·利哈乔夫:《解读俄罗斯》北京大学出版社2003年版第21页。

'Russian literature progressed by way of learning from other civilizations'. As for St Petersburg, Likhachov said that this city belongs neither to the European type nor to the Eastern type, but to the Russian type which is able to absorb and transform heterogeneous civilizations. The 'heterogeneous civilizations' mentioned by Likhachov certainly contain elements of the East.

To our mind, Russia today is assuming a Eurasian character and occupying the place between developed Europe and dynamically developing Asia, so the most adequate focus would be on consolidation of integration factors which allow uniting all elements of Europe and Asia for their mutual progress and prosperity. As for Russia, it should play a universal strategic role in this context.

Proceeding from history and the present-day situation, the roots of Russian spirit are in Europe, but the biggest part of its tree is in Asia. Lengthy Siberia and the Far East are the strategic area for the future development of Russia. Russia's real recovery depends not only on modernizing the European part of the territory but also on the development of Siberia and the Far East. And at last, the most important point.

What is Russia's role in Asia?

Russia should play an important political, economic and diplomatic role, which is natural and timely. Analyzing the main

trend of the Eurasian continent we can see that Europe is gradually going towards unity and integration for the purpose of searching for common political, economic, diplomatic and strategic decisions. Asia is also developing dynamically having such mechanisms of cooperation as ASEAN, APR, China–South Korea–Japan, SCO and so on. Asia is thriving like never before. And this raises an acute question for Russia: Should Russia play a role in the economy of APR, and what that role should be? Unfortunately, the Russian economic élite and the government have not used all the opportunities for organizing a full-scale cooperation in the Asian region so far.

In the countries of Asia and the Pacific region (APR, the USA, ASEAN, Japan, China, South Korea, Australia), modern effective mechanisms of economic partnership are forming. Russia's participation in this network could considerably promote the development of the launched integration processes.

Russia as a member of the APEC could play a role of the promoter of cooperation between the border regions of Asia and APR. At the 2010 ASEAN Summit, Russia and the USA acted as observer states, which brought Russia to fundamentally new positions in Asia.

China, for its part, expresses a compelling interest in consolidation of Russia's role in APR and will actively promote and support all efforts of the Russian government aimed at preserving prosperity, stability and progress in this region.

A. Yakovenko¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE GLOBALIZATION CONDITIONS

The first decade of the present century was marked by further world consolidation and integration, and these processes have encompassed all spheres of the social life of the global community: political, economic, cultural, scientific, educational, humanitarian and others.

Some issues of economy, politics, new technologies, spiritual life, activities of transnational corporations that defy national boundaries, improved systems of infrastructure and transport, updated communication and information technologies, wide-spread expansion of the Internet are common for many countries, which makes it possible to speak about the beginning of another stage of globalization. This reality is an item on the world agenda and it rapidly unites people, countries and continents disengaged before. Humankind acquires universal features of a qualitative certainty at a quicker rate, exploring new manifold forums and mechanisms and shifts to higher levels of self-consciousness, self-organization and interaction.

Tendencies toward consolidation of states on the basis of universally recognized humanitarian and democratic values are becoming a leading paradigm of the world development and allow to accumulate previously fragmented resources to counter economic crisis, to solve acute global problems of humanity — climate change, increasing emission of harmful substances into atmosphere, pollution of the environment, as well as starvation, poverty, shortage of natural resources.

Centripetal forces that integrate and bring people closer together allow them to enhance their cumulative industrial and intellectual potential, to withstand more powerful and destruc-

tive challenges and threats that create a danger of confrontation, terrorism, growth of organized crime, bordering on mediaeval prejudices of national and religious hate and intolerance.

Uneven development of different countries and regions, failure to build rule-of-law states there; weak civil society, deep civilization discrepancies more drastically necessitate dialogue of cultures that would bring understanding and cooperation between people up to a new level.

The evidence suggests that all favourable and positive processes in the world arena are based, as a rule, on equal and mutually beneficial dialogue and cooperation, while outbursts of violence and confrontation occur in the areas where negotiations and diplomatic procedures fail to overcome growing conflicts and discords.

It is no coincidence that dialogue appeared as one of the first forms of man's reflection on his mission and place in the world, correlation between the material and the ideal, motion and rest, life and death. Socrates, Plato, Sophists, Aristotle and other thinkers who were the first to shape these eternal issues also wrote in their dialogues about the possibility to create better ways of designing social structure, achieving harmony in the communication between people and nations.

Today the dialogue between different cultures is an intrinsic feature of a search for the common ground and of building a new level of relations between countries.

Dialogue, as most Russian and foreign researchers rightly assume, involves equality of parties, their openness and desire to understand the partner, desire to establish the truth. These are characteristics that distinguish to the full extent the events on international agenda, which are based on the interaction of cultures and on the exchange of values of art, science and education. Mutual influence and interpenetration of cultures is intended to be one of the most powerful factors contributing to the achievement of goals, to overcoming underdevelopment and poverty, to the realization of the objectives of the millennium in humanitarian sphere.

¹ Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, LL.D., Professor. Since 1976 Mr. Yakovenko has taken various diplomatic positions in the central office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs including Foreign Policy Planning Department and Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UNO in New York. At present he supervises Russia's participation in international organizations, international law issues, international economic, humanitarian cooperation, as well as human rights. Author of monographs: 'International Space Station', 'Progressive Development of International Space Law', 'Current Space Projects: the International Legal Problems', 'Space Projects: International Legal Problems', a series of articles on international law and foreign policy, co-author of the textbook 'International Space Law' and others.

That is why we are opposed to such ways of propagating globalization that deny or belittle the significance of national culture and identity, impose on the people the need to follow blindly the rules and ideas alien to them. Attempts to dominate in international relations, to deny universally accepted norms and rules of conduct in the world, to impose one's own will on other countries have repeatedly entailed serious disasters that must not happen again.

We attach increasing importance to the fundamental international legal mechanisms that have been developed by the United Nations and allow to take into consideration the views of all the leading players in the world arena over the crucial issues of our time, including the area of international security, protection of human rights and freedoms, etc.

Established principles of international law that have proved their efficiency appear to be going to play an increasingly important role in the world as globalization advances in the course of time and their relevance is certain to grow in the process of reforming the UN activity, too.

In enhancing international cultural cooperation, the work of UNESCO is of greater importance today. Interaction of Russia and this organization is actively developing in accordance with UNESCO's six-year medium-term strategy for 2008–13, as well as with UNESCO's Programme and Budget for the biennium (2010–11).

Our Ministry ensures the participation of Russia in UNESCO's programme activities aimed at exposing broader intellectual circles of the country to innovative practices and latest achievements.

The most significant UNESCO's programmes in which Russia participates are meant to preserve and develop cultural heritage of all countries, pursue development of their cooperation based on shared values of art, science and education.

Increased cooperation between Russia and its foreign partners in the field of culture in both bilateral and multilateral forms is one of the priorities to be pursued on the international stage.

Policy in the sphere of international cultural and humanitarian cooperation, focused on reciprocal enrichment of cultures and integration of Russia into the global cultural space, active and full-bodied presentation of Russian culture abroad involves providing mutually equal opportunities for our partners to demonstrate their national cultures in this country. This mutual process is of great importance as it not only introduces cultural heritage and cultural values of other countries and people to the Russian public, but also maintains universally recognized Russia's reputation as a liberal democratic state, open to dialogue with other cultures.

As an important component of cooperation in the humanitarian sphere, we have taken a number of measures to facilitate the opening of Russian scientific and cultural centres in the CIS countries, Baltic and foreign member-states, we give priority to the worldwide promotion of the Russian language and culture.

Over seventy such centres are already operating in the world and more are to be opened in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the near future. Intergovernmental agreements on cultural cooperation with Venezuela, Nicaragua and other countries have been worked out and will soon come into force.

Sustained efforts have also been deployed to promote abroad achievements of our country's culture and art through a number of large-scale integrated programmes. In 2010 they included celebrating the 65th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–45, the Year of Russia in France and the Year of France in Russia, with leading Russian artists participating in numerous most engaging events.

In 2010 alone over 4,000 Russian cultural events were held abroad, including performances of our best artists, photo exhibi-

tions, solo and group exhibitions of modern masters of fine and applied arts, thematic film shows, concerts, poetry and music events, presentations of Russian publishing houses.

Thus, relying on international experience and achievements of the best scientists and experts, we keep working on the issues of Russia's active participation in the dialogue of cultures, we ensure equal conditions for all interested partner-countries to access Russian cultural domain. This promotes spiritual protection of cultural identity of the Russian society, allows to share true values of our cultural heritage with the peoples of the world, to meet the latest challenges of the age of globalization.

In a globalized world, one of the most important juridical issues, both theoretical and practical, primarily concerned with the national sovereignty, is the balance between international and national law. As a rule, Russian and foreign works on the subject highlight two traditional features of state sovereignty: the supremacy of state power over other social powers within the state and the state's independence of the other nations.¹ The category of 'sovereignty' proposed by Jean Bodin in the 16th century was defined as a 'sovereignty granted to the autocrat' to 'perform with his sovereign powers a just governance of the multitude of families and their common possession'.² Later on, sovereignty was regarded as one of the principal characteristics of the state proper.³

Characteristically enough is that even J. Bodin was aware of the practical intangibility of establishing and realizing absolute sovereignty, and stressed the objective existence of its certain limits. 'In no way does the absolute power of sovereigns and sovereign rulers,' elaborated J. Bodin, 'apply to the laws of God and nature.'⁴ In the late 19th and early 20th century, having studied the historical experience of European states, Georg Jellinek came to some convincing results: (1) 'sovereignty is not an absolute but a historical category', (2) history 'indisputably proves that the states which were long considered sovereign, had never had this characteristic'.⁵ Hans Kelsen, in the middle of the 20th century, agreed and developed the concept of relative state sovereignty, justly stressing that absolute sovereignty of one nation inevitably 'rules out the sovereignty of any other nation'.⁶ Finally, in the early 21st century, M. N. Marchenko soundly stated: further on, 'theoretically and practically, sovereignty increasingly evolved from absolute sovereignty (at least nominally) toward relative sovereignty...'⁷ Thus we can conclude that from the 16th century to the present day, national sovereignty has theoretically and practically existed and has been studied predominantly as relative but not absolute. Therefore, national sovereignty can be limited at the national level by the state itself, by other nations or suprastate institutions.

International legal capacity of the individual under globalization is another relevant theoretical and practical issue. As A. I. Kovler rightly remarks, international recognition of an individual's legal status should lead to the international recognition of its subjectivity. Moreover, the well-known provision of the law theory stating that the basis of the notion of a legal subject as of having rights and obligations of the one engaged in social interaction is applicable to the international law, since it

¹ See, for example, Marchenko M. N. *The State and Law Under Globalization*. Moscow: Prospekt, 2008, p. 69; *Legal encyclopaedic dictionary* / M. O. Buyanova [et al], ed. by M. N. Marchenko. Moscow: TK Velby, Prospekt Publishers, 2006, p. 691.

² Bodin J. *Six Books on the State // History of Political and Legal Doctrines: A Reader*. Part 1. Compiled by V. V. Yachevsky. Voronezh University Publishers, 2000, p. 334–335.

³ See, for example, Marchenko M. N. *Theory of the State and Law: A Textbook*, 2nd revised ed. Moscow: Prospekt, 2009, p. 58.

⁴ Bodin J. *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

⁵ Jellinek G. *General Theory of the State*. St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 356.

⁶ Kelsen H. *General Theory of Law and State*. N. Y., 1995, p. 86.

⁷ Marchenko M. N. *The state and law under globalization*. Moscow: Prospekt, 2008, p. 84.

features legal relationships bearing specific forms.¹ Opponents of the individual's international legal personality claim that if a legal subject is to have not only rights but obligations too, this individual in the international law is considered to be a defective legal 'personality' without any obligations or any responsibility for the violation of the international law. Among the most known Russian lawyers specializing in the international law and supporting this point of view, S. V. Chernichenko should be mentioned. 'Under no conditions can individuals,' he says, 'be subjects of the international law.'² This point of view is shared by many other scholars, including N. A. Ushakov and Yu. A. Reshetov. S. V. Chernichenko reaffirmed his position in 1999: 'If we stick to the dualistic idea of correlation between international and national law, then we have to come to the inevitable conclusion that human rights and basic freedoms are granted to individuals and groups (collectives) by states by means of the internal law alone. In other words, individuals and groups do not get any rights directly from the international community.'³

A half-way point of view was expressed by V. A. Kartashkin, 'International law tends to evolve not only in the direction of regulating multifarious relations between nations, but in strengthening the role of the individual who has become one of the parties in the international relations and legal subjects of the international law. One should note that the primary subjects of the international law, the states, do not only have rights and obligations but unlike individuals, they build its norms and principles. Thus we can conclude that the individual is a subject of the international law with restricted legal capacity. With the development of international law and international relations, however, the amount of rights and obligations of the individual will increase, and his role on the international arena will be more important.'⁴ At the same time R. A. Mullerson,⁵ N. V. Zakharova,⁶ G. V. Ignatenko⁷ and many other scholars are consistent proponents of the international legal capacity of the individual.

The denial of international and legal personality of individuals seems to be grounded, first, on legalism presupposing the restraint of the law 'as a whole' by the national regulatory and legal acts, by the 'legislation'. Second, the individual in certain legal relationship with the authorities, physical and legal entities, has certain obligations and responsibilities established not only by national but international law as well. Third, the case of those who deny the individual of his international legal personality looks at least as debatable as the claim that he does not establish norms and principles of the international law. In this case in the framework of the established legal relations of a certain legal status, its subjects (both states and individuals) act not as law-making bodies or persons but as parties of certain legal relations having rights and obligations previously established by national or international law. Fourth, the arguments presented by the opponents of the individual's international legal capacity are in apparent contradiction with a number of articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (e.g. P. 4 Art. 15, P. 1 Art. 17, 18, P. 3 Art. 46).

Various foreign and Russian authors highlight three directions in which globalization affects law.⁸ When analyzing national systems of law and the system of international law, some

of them convincingly stress 'the inadequacy of investigating each systems separately, for they should be viewed as parts of a whole.'⁹ Formerly dominating dualistic and monistic theories which gave priority to national law over international law and which were based on the 'self-sufficiency of the national law' while international law was thought to be applicable only to regulating international relations, are at odds with reality.¹⁰

In fact, there are two concepts regarding the relation between national and international law in the doctrine of international law: monism and dualism. Within the concept of monism there are two trends: monism stating the priority of national law ('inverse' monism) and monism stating the supremacy of international law.¹¹ The 'inverse' monism (I. Moser, A. Zorn, and others) is theoretically rooted in Hegel's works regarding international law as an 'outer' law of the state, while the state's sovereignty was an utmost international and legal asset. 'Outer law of the state, according to Hegel, arises from the relations between independent states; hence what it has in itself and for itself is moulded as necessity, because its reality depends on different sovereign volitions... The principle of international law as a universal law, which in itself and for itself has to be meaningful in relations between states, is, unlike the special contents of the positive treaties, in the fact that the treaties formulating liabilities of states toward one another must be fulfilled. Since the relations between nations are based on the principle of sovereignty, these nations are in their natural state with regard to each other, and their rights are executed not by a universal power constituted above, but by their special will.'¹² As V. L. Tolstykh correctly notes, 'in the modern doctrine this position does not enjoy acceptance. At the same time, states often try to ensure in practice the priority of national legal norms over their international obligations.'¹³

The majority of Russian and foreign scholars and practitioners adhere to the dualistic concept (G. Trippel, D. Anzilotti, and others) which treats international and national laws as those regulating various social relations. International law regulates relations between states. National law regulates relations between persons. Consequently, there must be separate systems of international and national laws. At the same time, separate systems of international and national laws must 'interact', 'agree', 'be harmonized' etc. For example, N. A. Tsvivadze, a contemporary Russian author, writes, 'A guideline, formulating the relation between international and national laws has become a necessary element of modern constitutional legislation. The issue of the correlation between international and national laws is resolved in favour of rapprochement of the norms of the two systems with the view of their effective interaction.'¹⁴ I think, however, that the notions of 'interaction', 'harmonization' and 'rapprochement' etc. traditionally used by Russian and foreign specialists do not denote the scientifically based contemporary concept of relation between international and national laws.

There seems to be no definite answer to the question of relation between international and national laws in the Constitution of the Russian Federation either. It features, as I take it, some legal norms worked out on the basis of the dualistic as well as moderately monistic concepts. For instance, on the one hand, Article 4 Part 2 of the Constitution specifies that 'the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall be considered supreme throughout the whole territory of the Russian Federation'. Second, there is no regulation in the

¹ Kovler A. I. *Anthropology of Law: Textbook*. Moscow : Norma, 2002, p. 382.

² Chernichenko S. V. *The Individual and International Law*. Moscow : Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 1974, p. 149.

³ Chernichenko S. V. *Theory of International Law // Old and New Theoretical Problems*. Moscow : NIMP, 1999, p. 384.

⁴ *General Theory of Human Rights*. Moscow, 1996, p. 493.

⁵ See: *A Course of International Law*. Moscow, 1989, Vol. 1, p. 181.

⁶ See: Zakharova N. V. *An Individual as a Subject of International Law // Soviet State and Law*. 1999, No 11, p. 112-118.

⁷ See: Ignatenko G. V. *International and Soviet Law: Problems of Legal Systems Interaction // Soviet State and Law*. 1985, No. 1.

⁸ See, for instance, Marchenko M. N. *Op. cit.*, p. 267.

⁹ Twining W. *Globalization and Legal Theory*. L., 2000, p. 51.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ See, for instance, Tolstykh V.L. *A Course of International Law: A Textbook*. Moscow : Walters Clover 2010, p. 202.

¹² Hegel G. W. F. *Philosophy of Law*. Moscow : Mysl 2007, p. 425-426, 428.

¹³ Tolstykh V. L. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

¹⁴ Tsvivadze N. A. *Application of Norms of International Law by Courts of the Russian Federation: dissertation abstract*. Moscow, 2005, p. 8.

Russian Constitution regarding the relation between generally accepted (basic, fundamental) principles of the international law and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Third, the Constitution reads: 'Courts are independent and report only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law', which is not 'in line' but contradictory to Part 4 Art. 15 and Part 1 Art. 17 of the Constitution. This leads a great number of Russian scholars and practitioners to a conclusion of a supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation over international law in all its forms. Typical in this respect is the opinion of B. L. Zimnenko: 'The Constitution of the Russian Federation in the framework of the legal system of Russia, exercises utmost juridical power with regard to all national regulatory acts and regulations of the international law which have become part of the legal system of the state. In case of conflicts between constitutional regulations and those of international law, state agencies have to follow the guidelines set forth by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.'¹

On the other hand, Part 4 Art. 15 of the Constitution specifies the supremacy of only one form of the international law – of international treaties over federal laws only – that is of the legal and regulatory acts, which in turn constitute one of the forms of Russian legal system. Second, Part 1 Art. 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states: rights and freedoms of man and citizen are guaranteed by court, first and foremost in accordance with the generally acknowledged principles and norms of international law. Third, Part 3 Art. 46 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees: 'Every person in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation can appeal to international agencies ensuring human rights and freedoms if all existing national means of legal protection have been exhausted.' It is obvious that 'international agencies dealing with human rights and freedoms' will take their decisions in accordance with international law. Fourth, Art. 18 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not reduce national law to 'legislation', regulatory and legal acts of law-making bodies only: 'The rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be directly operative... They determine the essence, meaning and implementation of laws, the activities of the legislative and executive authorities, local self-government and shall be ensured by the administration of justice.' So I believe we can come to the conclusion that the Constitution of the Russian Federation contains some dubious and even incompatible concepts reflecting those of the dualistic theory and of moderate monism.

The relation between outer forms of international and national law is an issue of utmost theoretical and practical significance, which has drawn inadequately little attention of researchers. Only a few specialists endeavour to study this vital and scarcely explored subject. E.T. Usenko, for instance, mentioned that 'in the hierarchy of international law, the guiding and system-building place belongs to its main principles constituting ideological, regulatory and legal basis of the system... Without these main principles of international law or outside them, there can be no international law itself as a legal system. The main principles of international law supplement the connection between its elements according to the homogeneity of its features by a content link, thus giving the whole system a character of content wholeness.'²

At the same time, I think that it is more grounded theoretically and is more accurate to refer the guiding principles of modern international law to the outer form of international law *jus cogens*, obligatory for governmental institutions and other authorized persons, passing or administering legal acts, con-

taining legal norms, or working out or applying legal and regulatory treaties that contain legal norms. Besides, it would be theoretically grounded and practically obligatory to establish the following hierarchy of forms of modern international law applied in Russia: (1) guiding principles of international law; (2) international treaties including legal norms; (3) common practice of international law. This conclusion can be based, in my opinion, on the systemic interpretation of Art. 103 of the UN Charter, Art. 53 and 71 of the Vienna Convention 'On the Law of International Treaties' and Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court.

Art. 103 of the UN Charter states: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.' According to Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, 'Treaties conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law (*jus cogens*)', 'A treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.'

Considering the above-cited theoretical and legal arguments, I find theoretically grounded Sec. 9 of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 10th October 2003 No. 5 'On the application by court of general jurisdiction of generally accepted principles and norms of international law and international treaties signed by the Russian Federation.' According to the decree, 'courts in administering justice are to take into account that in line with Part 4 Art. 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation... incorrect application by the court of generally accepted principles and norms of international law can be a reason for a repeal or amendment of judiciary act.'³ Literal interpretation of this section of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation can lead to at least two conclusions. First, international law as well as national law is binding for the courts of general jurisdiction. Second, failure to apply international law on a par with national law is a reason for appeal and revision of the case.

Besides, I think it theoretically debatable and practically ineffective from the position of reality and effective protection of rights and legal interests of legal and physical entities to reduce 'all' national law to 'legislation', regulatory and legal acts containing norms of law. I believe that outer forms of Russian law, apart from regulatory and legal acts containing legal norms, can be supplemented by the fundamental principles of Russian law, regulatory and legal treaties and common practice of Russian law containing norms of law.⁴

In keeping with the outlined legal and other arguments, I consider it more theoretically convincing and practically necessary to explore international and national law not in separate, but in a single system of forms of international and Russian law consisting in their turn of outer forms of international and Russian law. It seems possible to include in them fundamental principles of international law, international treaties and international common practice containing norms of law; fundamental principles of Russian law, regulatory and legal acts, regulatory legal treaties and common practice of Russian law containing norms of law.

³ Rossiyskaya Gazeta: No. 224, 02.12.2003.

⁴ See for more details: Yershova E. A. The Nature, Sources and Forms of Labour Law in the Russian Federation. Moscow : RAP, 2008; Yershov V. V. Fundamentals of Theoretical, Civil and Legal Principles of Law. Moscow : RAP, 2010.

¹ Zimnenko B. L. International Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation: Abstract of the LLD dissertation, Moscow, 2006, p. 11.

² Usenko E. T. Op. cit., p. 105–106.

Kan Yao Yao¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Mr. President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences,

Madam Chairwoman of the Executive Council,

Your Excellences the Ambassadors,

Distinguished representatives of the University society,

It is immense pleasure for me to come back here, to Russia – a magnificent country, on the occasion of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference dedicated to the topic ‘The Dialogue of cultures in the context of globalization’ which is held in the prestigious University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

On behalf of my country, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, I would like to thank the Russian authorities and namely President of the University for the traditionally warm reception.

First and foremost, let me express respect for the one whose name outstandingly lights up this conference. I will certainly speak about a promoter and defender of Russian identity, with whose death the world has become an orphan. His intense work and constant combat for the preservation of the Russian language made him one of the greatest spiritual leaders of our times. I am convinced that the annual holding of this conference is a tribute which Dmitry Likhachov could be proud of, since the conference is a continuation of his labour and ideas.

The issue which is being discussed on the agenda today would have been undoubtedly interesting for this distinguished scholar. A connoisseur of people’s traditions and mores, Dmitry Likhachov realized that culture is an indispensable force of any society. However, in the last decades it seems that all the identifying features of the nations are being diluted which makes cultures uniform for the purpose of pseudo superiority of the Western lifestyle.

Thus, on the one hand, globalization promotes the advancement of knowledge and arts and the growing spread of cultures; on the other hand, it is accused of dissolution of national identity which, unfortunately, is not far from the reality in Africa. This continent, faithful to its traditions and symbols, is witnessing how its cultural treasures are gradually being absorbed by a destroying tendency of imitation Western models.

It is an undeniable reality: poorly controlled globalization can be harmful and dangerous for Africa.

However, the purpose of my statement is not only to describe the dangers of the process of globalization which are obvious for everyone, but to outline its advantages for our world.

Actually, I am convinced that globalization can turn into a real vector of the dialogue of cultures in regard to numerous conflicts in the world, the existence of which is a sad sign of the absence of an effective dialogue leading to mutual understanding.

Suffice it to examine the influence which had new communications technologies, social nets in particular, on the recent events in the African world.

It is a challenge for an intercultural dialogue to fit in the process of assimilation of those so-called universal values that are cultivated in Côte d’Ivoire in such initiation schools as Poro in the North, masks in the East and age classes in the South of the country.

I remain convinced that a solution to many crises, which, in particular, shake Africa, can be more effective in the frame of constant strengthening of the dialogue and youth exchange programmes rather than in relying on the efforts, however necessary, to resolve the conflicts after they have been started.

Thank you for your attention.

N. Yaroshchuk²,
K. Gezalova gyzy³

NATIONAL CULTURAL CHALLENGES IN EDUCATIONAL PROCESS

Academician Dmitry S. Likhachov had a subtle sense for the value of national cultures. ‘Every national culture and every cultural type is invaluable. The world contains a variety of infinities, and each infinity is incommensurable with another.’⁴ He did not support nowadays fashionable ideas of the so-called

global culture whose aim is to level national peculiarities. ‘To tell the truth, many national cultures of Europe are preserved within the all-European culture. Europe thoroughly studies all cultures (I’d say, cultures from all over the world); it enjoys and benefits from all cultures, and also enriches other peoples.’⁵

It is worth mentioning that dialogue of cultures spreads beyond European borders to the cultural space of ‘the whole world’. We are talking about dialogue of cultures between the East and the West.

Joseph Rudyard Kipling, an English writer and a Nobel Prize winner (1907), author of *The Jungle Book*, a touching story about animals and a man-cub living together, claimed nevertheless that ‘East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet’. Man and animal shall, but man and man shall not. This position turned out to be fairly well-established for the Western picture of the world and it was expressed in Eurocentric views. Philosophers and culture figures of Russia in the shade of the bicephalous eagle could not support this one-sided position. Russian national consciousness grew more and more interested in history and culture of the East.

While anti-Westernism was conspicuous among the Slavophiles and some other ideological movements, anti-Easternism, anti-Asianism was almost never to be traced at a serious level. Empathy with Asia was manifested in various ways ranging from literary images like ‘Yes, we are Scythians! Yes,

¹ Ambassador, Permanent Delegate of Côte d’Ivoire to UNESCO.

² Professor at Derzhavin International Slavic University, Professor of the Chair of Economics at the Institute for Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, associate professor of the Department of Sociology at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including books: *Why Nationalism Is Doomed to Failure (Pochemu natsionalizm obrechon)* and others, *Manual on Logics (Logika)*; articles on philosophy of science, social philosophy, ethnic social studies: *On the Place of the Slavophile Approach in the Russian Philosophy (O meste slavjanofil’stva v russkoj filosofiji)*, *East–West: Oncoming Movement in Philosophy (Zapad — Vostok: vstrechnoje dvizhenije v filosofiji)*, *Nation and Politics in Civil Society (Natsija i politika v grazhdanskom obshchestve)*, *Ethnic and National Relations: Political and Cultural Aspects (Etnonatsional’nye otnoshenija: politicheskiy i kul’turologicheskiy aspekty)*, *Globalization and Ethno-Confessional Peculiarities (Globalizatsija i natsional’no-konfessional’nye osobennosti)* and others. Executive Secretary of the Bulletin of Russian Philosophic Society (Vestnik Rossijskogo filosofskogo obshchestva).

³ Researcher at the Institute for Philosophy, Social Studies and Law of the Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, intern of the Institute for State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Scientific Secretary of department ‘Issues of Eastern philosophy (Islamic world)’ of the Russian Philosophical Society. Author of a number of scholarly publications, including books: *Acquittal and the Not-Guilty Verdict in the Legal Criminal Procedure of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Opravdanije i opravdatel’nyj prigovor v ugovolno-protsessual’nom prave Azerbajdzhanskoj Respubliki)*.

⁴ Likhachov D. S. On the National Character of Russians // ‘The Issues of Philosophy’ journal (Voprosy filosofii), 1990. No. 4, p. 3.

⁵ Ibid.

we are Asians' (by A. Blok); 'Golden somnolent Asian entities are reposing on temple domes' (by S. Yesenin) to fundamental scientific analytical projects by founders of Eurasianism. No one ever defined East with a pejorative term like 'the corrupted West', which was the Slavophile verdict of Western culture as decaying. 'Our sincere, close, friendly relations with the West do not allow us to notice that we deal, as it were, with a person afflicted with a severe catching malady, a person with a bad infectious breath. We kiss him, embrace, share meals, ideas, drink a cup of love (...) and do not notice venom in our careless communication, do not smell a future corpse in the merry feast.'¹

At the same time, generally speaking, Russian national consciousness has never intentionally cultivated antagonism and hate towards Western culture. Founders of the Slavophile movement, despite their critique of vices of Western European civilization, respected Western cultural achievements. Quoting from Ivan Kireyevsky (Kireyevsky Conference is annually held in Kaluga and at Optina Monastery where his remains repose): '... affection for both European education and that for ours coincide at their highest peak of development and converge into one common affection and common aspiration for living, absolute, all-human and genuinely Christian Enlightenment.'² European culture and Russian culture should not repudate each other, otherwise they are destined to be one-sided. Aleksey Khomyakov, following Kireyevsky, treated Europe in a critical manner, but still called it a treasury of spiritual values.

Russia directs her eyes to the East without breaking off with the West. Suffice it to remember creative activities of the Roerichs: Nikolai Konstantinovich (1874–1947), philosopher, painter, writer; his wife Yelena Ivanovna (née Shaposhnikova, 1879–1955), philosopher, essayist, cultural anthropologist; his son Yuri Nikolayevich (1902–60), philosopher, orientalist. The spiritual teaching proclaimed by the Roerichs and their family's principal work is called Agni Yoga (or 'Living Ethics'). It states that a universal synthesis of Western and Eastern cultures as well as of science and religion is to become the basis for spiritual progress of the world civilization. Y. I. Roerich underscores the central role of Russia as 'the New Country' in the evolution of the entire humanity.

Founders of the Eurasianist movement played a remarkable role in validating cooperation between Russia and the East. Among them were Prince N. S. Troubetzkoy (1890–1938), philosopher, linguist, cultural anthropologist; P. P. Suvchinsky (1892–1985), philosopher, essayist, musicologist; P. N. Savitsky (1895–1968), philosopher, economist, geographer; G. V. Florovsky (1893–1979), philosopher, scholar, religious thinker. The Eurasianist idea as an independent trend of public and political thought originated from the collection of papers by those authors published in Sophia in 1921 under the title of *Exodus to the East: Anticipations and Achievements. Consolidation of Eurasianists*, commonly known as *Exodus to the East*. The quintessence of the Eurasianist idea (P. N. Savitsky) can be rendered as follows: Russia is neither Europe nor Asia, it is a unique cultural world, laying between Asia and Europe, historically developing either in cooperation or conflict with both Europe and Asia. P. N. Savitsky and N. S. Troubetzkoy acknowledged Slavonic base of the Russians and gave credit to the Byzantine Empire for the progress of old Russian culture. Alongside with that they paid great attention to the role of other, especially Eastern, peoples and tribes settled on the vast Eurasian territory of Russia, mostly Turkic-Tartar and Mongolic.³ The main challenge for Eurasianists was Russia's self-identification in terms of the world history. Relations between the East and the West were analyzed to the extent of

Russian issues of its past and future, of its self-identity and self-concern with the challenge of the 'East–West' issue.

Some assertions are incorrect that claim that the Eurasianists had adopted an irreconcilable attitude towards the West. They just rejected the Westernizers' idea that did not recognize distinctive and unique Russian Eurasian culture. 'We flatly reject the principles of Westernism, that is its denial of uniqueness and even existence of our culture.'⁴ The Eurasianists did not cherish isolationism, and positively welcomed achievements of Western European culture. They did not deny the fact that Russian culture shaped under the impact of both the West and the East, in interrelation of those cultures. The main task for them was to study uniqueness of Russian culture and to define the role and place of Russia in the Eurasian civilization.

It is common knowledge that the Eurasianist movement underwent three evolutionary stages. The first stage (1921–23) was philosophical and cultural reasoning in support of uniqueness and anti-Westernism. The second stage (1924–29) was re-direction of the ideas. The third stage (1930–39) was a slow decline and summarizing. It is not quite correct. Many philosophers and ideologists advocated the Eurasianist ideas at different times. Nowadays we witness the rise of interest in the Eurasianist ideas, which is due to many reasons. The so-called Neo-Eurasianism has emerged at present. The modern Eurasianist idea is aimed at performing a historical mission of active cooperation between Western and Eastern cultures, between Western, Russian and Eastern philosophy at a new level.

Let us recall a French amateur philosopher of a Russian origin, Alexander Vladimirovich Kozhevnikov (1902–68), hardly known in Russia, but well-known in France under the name of Alexandre Kojève. Sharing the Eurasianist ideas, Kojève was keen on both Western and Eastern philosophy, knew languages such as Russian, French, German, English and Ancient Greek together with such oriental languages as Chinese, Sanskrit and Tibetan. In *Eurasia* newspaper (Paris, 9, March 1929) he wrote: 'Philosophy has been stagnating since Hegel's times. By the early 19th century Western thought, as it were, had stopped in its progress: philosophy had encompassed itself in its own concepts, lost direct links with reality and turned into a school philosophy, into 'scholasticism' in its popular and negative meaning... Heidegger... demands to reject any stereotypical concepts that had lost operational significance, he tries to find again the ability to see things immediately.' One of the ways to achieve it, according to Kojève, is 'studying Eastern philosophy together with Western one, as the former operates with absolutely unique concepts, comparing these two different forms of defining the world, penetrating into the genuine reality independent of forms of description.'

The World Philosophical Congress in Seoul was the first congress to balance representatives of Western and Eastern philosophy. It represented a large step away from Westernization of philosophical thought. It is a confirmed fact that Western philosophy had so far prevailed at all previous congresses. As if there were no Eastern philosophy with its more ancient traditions than those of the Western philosophy. Chairperson of the Organizing Committee Professor Lee Myung Ryun said the following: 'Asia has not been integrated so far into the 'world philosophy', that's why the concepts of 'philosophy' and 'Western philosophy' were regarded as synonyms. In many parts of the Western world Philosophical Congress played the role of the place to exchange views on the Western philosophy. It is the first time that the intellectual community of the East, an outsider of the world philosophy, has at last officially entered formal structure of the latter.' Let us hope that the coming World Philosophical Congress in Athens, the cradle of European philosophy, will sustain the turnaround in cooperation of Western and Eastern philosophical thoughts. The recip-

¹ Shevrev S. P. A Russian View of European Education // 'Muscovite' magazine ('Moskovityanin'), 1841, No. 1, p. 247.

² Kireyevsky I. V. Complete Works, Moscow, 1911, vol. 1, p. 162.

³ Cf.: Novy Zhurnal (New Review), N. Y., 1968, vol. 92, p. 274.

⁴ Eurasianism: An Attempt of a Systematic Exposition. P., 1926, p. 33.

rocal West–East movement in the world philosophy is a claim of our times.

Speaking of challenges in education and cultural development in multinational Russia the following should be taken into consideration. In accordance with Article 19 Part 2 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, ‘the state shall guarantee the equality of rights and liberties regardless of sex, race, nationality, language, origin... Any restrictions of the rights of citizens on social, racial, national, linguistic or religious grounds shall be forbidden.’ It means that the state by means of its institutions has to create all required conditions (economical, social, political, legislative and others) for citizens regardless their nationality to enjoy their rights and liberties, interests and needs. Culture of every nationality is valuable, it requires care and attention. The aim of the state is to provide rights and guarantee a real opportunity for free progress of every national culture. Citizens of any nationality should have freedom to chose education, access to mass media, to means of production and consuming of cultural values according to their national traditions.

Due to the fact that interests of every nation or national group, national minority are not sufficiently considered in the state national policy, the matters of national culture are settled by communities. Last year the states of the CIS (the Commonwealth of Independent States) saw the rise of cultural national associations and assemblies that successfully operate and perform their activities, first of all, in the field of education, culture, historical and national education. Those national consolidation movements are growing more and more large-scale. They perform important functions of spiritual communication, development of national culture and sometimes other vital functions. They can settle many problems of the Russian-speaking people in the states of the CIS and the republics of the Russian Federation, as well as problems of national groups in an alien national environment.

The State Duma of the Russian Federation passed the Federal Law ‘On National Cultural Autonomy’ in May, 1996, and came into effect in June, 1996. The Law is not ideal, but there are no ideal laws. The problem is of another kind: several stipulations of the law fail to be fulfilled (just like with other laws). Still, other stipulations are gratified. In accordance with this law, the national-cultural autonomy is the form of the national-cultural self-determination which is the social association of citizens of the Russian Federation who consider themselves to belong to certain ethnic communities on the basis of their voluntary self-organization with the aim of the independent solution of the issues related to preservation of their identity, development of language, education, and national culture. Among other rights, the national-cultural autonomy can enjoy the right to create educational, scientific and cultural establishments and to provide their functioning according to the legislation of the

Russian Federation. The national-cultural autonomies can be local (town, district, village), regional and federal. Citizens of the Russian Federation who consider themselves to belong to certain ethnic communities have the right to receive basic general education in the national (native) language and are free to choose the language of instruction within the opportunities provided by the system of education. To ensure the right to the basic general education in a national (native) language and the choice of the language of instruction, the national-cultural autonomies can submit proposals to bodies of power in view of establishing: classes and groups with instruction in a national (native) language in the state, municipal educational institutions as well as municipal educational institutions with the instruction in Russian and with an extended learning of a national (native) language, national culture and history.

To ensure these rights, 115 national associations operate in Moscow. To illustrate their variety, it suffices to name a few of them: Moscow Gypsy Cultural Enlightenment Society ‘Romano Kher’, Society of Chechen-Ingush Culture ‘Daimokhk’ (Fatherland), Moscow Chuvash National Cultural Autonomy, Society of Estonian Culture.

Thus, the Law on National Cultural Autonomy must operate in full force. If all the CIS states (the Commonwealth of Independent States) passed similar laws, if these laws acted in full force, if they were thoroughly coordinated, they could assist in creating an integrate national cultural legal space that would enhance progress of national cultures and their fruitful cooperation.

Well thought-out education and upbringing oriented at national studies that starts at homes and nursery schools, goes through secondary schools and continues in higher education institutions can play its role to help overcome the spiritual crisis of society (which is mostly in a spiritual national sphere). Such education and upbringing contributes to creating culture of international communication with the respect for other peoples and the devotion to one’s own nation, which frames international relations when free progress of every nation determines free progress of all other nations. It cannot be achieved by several once-only events, natiologic approach should be employed all through the system of education and upbringing.

Then D.S. Likhachov’s anticipation will come true. ‘I can imagine the 21st century as the century of advancement of humanitarian culture, of kind and upbringing culture that makes ground for freedom of choice of profession and creative work application. Education subject to tasks of upbringing, a variety of secondary and higher educational institutions, revival of man’s dignity that prevents talents from serving the criminals, revival of human reputation as a sublime something that everyone should appreciate, revival of conscientiousness and honour: these are the things we need in the 21st century.’¹

¹ Likhachov D. S. ‘On the National Character of Russians’ // ‘The Issues of Philosophy’ journal (Voprosy filosofii), 1990. No. 4, p. 6.

V. Yershov¹

INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LAW UNDER GLOBALIZATION

In a globalized world, one of the most important juridical issues, both theoretical and practical, primarily concerned with the national sovereignty, is the balance between international and national law. As a rule, Russian and foreign works on the subject highlight two traditional features of state sovereignty: the supremacy of state power over other social powers within the state and the state's independence of the other nations.² The category of 'sovereignty' proposed by Jean Bodin in the 16th century was defined as a 'sovereignty granted to the autocrat' to 'perform with his sovereign powers a just governance of the multitude of families and their common possession'.³ Later on, sovereignty was regarded as one of the principal characteristics of the state proper.⁴

Characteristically enough is that even J. Bodin was aware of the practical intangibility of establishing and realizing absolute sovereignty, and stressed the objective existence of its certain limits. 'In no way does the absolute power of sovereigns and sovereign rulers,' elaborated J. Bodin, 'apply to the laws of God and nature.'⁵ In the late 19th and early 20th century, having studied the historical experience of European states, Georg Jellinek came to some convincing results: (1) 'sovereignty is not an absolute but a historical category', (2) history 'indisputably proves that the states which were long considered sovereign, had never had this characteristic'.⁶ Hans Kelsen, in the middle of the 20th century, agreed and developed the concept of relative state sovereignty, justly stressing that absolute sovereignty of one nation inevitably 'rules out the sovereignty of any other nation'.⁷ Finally, in the early 21st century, M. N. Marchenko soundly stated: further on, 'theoretically and practically, sovereignty increasingly evolved from absolute sovereignty (at least nominally) toward relative sovereignty...'⁸ Thus we can conclude that from the 16th century to the present day, national sovereignty has theoretically and practically existed and has been studied predominantly as relative but not absolute. Therefore, national sovereignty can be limited at the national level by the state itself, by other nations or suprastate institutions.

International legal capacity of the individual under globalization is another relevant theoretical and practical issue.

¹ President of the Russian Academy of Justice (Moscow), LL.D., Professor, *Scientist Emeritus* of the Russian Federation, Honoured Lawyer of the Russian Federation, honorary worker of judiciary system of the Russian Federation. Member of Scientific-Advisory Board of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. Chairman of the Judicial Qualifying Examination Panel at the Supreme Qualification Board of Judges of the Russian Federation. Author of over 100 scholarly publications, including monographs: *General-Theoretical and Civil Guidelines of Law* (Osnovopolagajushchije obshcheteoreticheskie i grazhdansko-pravovye printsipy prava), *Status of Court in Rule-of-Law State* (Status suda v pravovom gosudarstve), *Theoretical and Practical Problems of Applying Labour Law* (Teoreticheskie i prakticheskie problemy primeneniya trudovogo prava), *Judicial Enforcement* (Sudebnoje pravoprimeneniye), *Labour Contract* (Trudovoj dogovor) and some others. Member of editorial boards of journals: *Russian Justice* (Rossijskoe pravosudije), *Russian Judge* (Rossijskij sud'ja), *Russian Justice System* (Rossijskaja justitsija), *Human Rights* (Prava cheloveka), *Foreign Legislation and Comparative Jurisprudence* (Zarubezhnoje zakonodatel'stvo i sravnitel'noe pravovedeniye). V.V. Yershov is decorated with Anatoly Koni Medal, First Degree Medal for Services on Protecting Rights and Freedoms of People, First Degree Badge of Honour of the Judicial Department of the Russian Federation and some others.

² See, for example, Marchenko M. N. *The State and Law Under Globalization*. Moscow: Prospekt, 2008, p. 69; Legal encyclopaedic dictionary / Buyanova M. O. [et al], ed. by M. N. Marchenko. Moscow: TK Velby, Prospekt Publishers, 2006, p. 691.

³ Bodin J. *Six Books on the State // History of Political and Legal Doctrines: A Reader*. Part 1. Compiled by V. V. Yachevsky. Voronezh University Publishers. 2000, pp. 334–335.

⁴ See, for example, Marchenko M. N. *Theory of the State and Law: A Textbook*, 2nd revised ed. Moscow: Prospekt, 2009, p. 58.

⁵ Bodin J. *Op. cit.*, p. 335.

⁶ Jellinek G. *General Theory of the State*. St. Petersburg, 1908, p. 356.

⁷ Kelsen H. *General Theory of Law and State*. N. Y., 1995, p. 86.

⁸ Marchenko M. N. *The state and law under globalization*. Moscow: Prospekt, 2008, p. 84.

As A. I. Kovler rightly remarks, international recognition of an individual's legal status should lead to the international recognition of its subjectivity. Moreover, the well-known provision of the law theory stating that the basis of the notion of a legal subject as of having rights and obligations of the one engaged in social interaction is applicable to the international law, since it features legal relationships bearing specific forms.⁹ Opponents of the individual's international legal personality claim that if a legal subject is to have not only rights but obligations too, this individual in the international law is considered to be a defective legal 'personality' without any obligations or any responsibility for the violation of the international law. Among the most known Russian lawyers specializing in the international law and supporting this point of view, S. V. Chernichenko should be mentioned. 'Under no conditions can individuals,' he says, 'be subjects of the international law.'¹⁰ This point of view is shared by many other scholars, including N. A. Ushakov and Yu. A. Reshetov. S. V. Chernichenko reaffirmed his position in 1999: 'If we stick to the dualistic idea of correlation between international and national law, then we have to come to the inevitable conclusion that human rights and basic freedoms are granted to individuals and groups (collectives) by states by means of the internal law alone. In other words, individuals and groups do not get any rights directly from the international community.'¹¹

A half-way point of view was expressed by V. A. Kartashkin, 'International law tends to evolve not only in the direction of regulating multifarious relations between nations, but in strengthening the role of the individual who has become one of the parties in the international relations and legal subjects of the international law. One should note that the primary subjects of the international law, the states, do not only have rights and obligations but unlike individuals, they build its norms and principles. Thus we can conclude that the individual is a subject of the international law with restricted legal capacity. With the development of international law and international relations, however, the amount of rights and obligations of the individual will increase, and his role on the international arena will be more important.'¹² At the same time R. A. Mullerson,¹³ N. V. Zakharova,¹⁴ G. V. Ignatenko¹⁵ and many other scholars are consistent proponents of the international legal capacity of the individual.

The denial of international and legal personality of individuals seems to be grounded, first, on legalism presupposing the restraint of the law 'as a whole' by the national regulatory and legal acts, by the 'legislation'. Second, the individual in certain legal relationship with the authorities, physical and legal entities, has certain obligations and responsibilities established not only by national but international law as well. Third, the case of those who deny the individual of his international legal personality looks at least as debatable as the claim that he does not establish norms and principles of the international law. In this case in the framework of the established legal relations of a certain legal status, its subjects (both states and individuals) act not as law-making bodies or persons but as parties of certain

⁹ Kovler A. I. *Anthropology of Law: Textbook*. Moscow: Norma, 2002, p. 382.

¹⁰ Chernichenko S. V. *The Individual and International Law*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodniye otnosheniya, 1974, p. 149.

¹¹ Chernichenko S. V. *Theory of International Law // Old and New Theoretical Problems*. Moscow: NIMP, 1999, p. 384.

¹² *General Theory of Human Rights*. Moscow, 1996, p. 493.

¹³ See: *A Course of International Law*. Moscow, 1989, Vol. 1, p. 181.

¹⁴ See: Zakharova N. V. *An Individual as a Subject of International Law // Soviet State and Law*. 1999, No 11, p. 112–118.

¹⁵ See: Ignatenko G. V. *International and Soviet Law: Problems of Legal Systems Interaction // Soviet State and Law*. 1985, No. 1.

legal relations having rights and obligations previously established by national or international law. Fourth, the arguments presented by the opponents of the individual's international legal capacity are in apparent contradiction with a number of articles of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (e.g. P. 4 Art. 15, P. 1 Art. 17, 18, P. 3 Art. 46).

Various foreign and Russian authors highlight three directions in which globalization affects law.¹ When analyzing national systems of law and the system of international law, some of them convincingly stress 'the inadequacy of investigating each system separately, for they should be viewed as parts of a whole.'² Formerly dominating dualistic and monistic theories which gave priority to national law over international law and which were based on the 'self-sufficiency of the national law' while international law was thought to be applicable only to regulating international relations, are at odds with reality.³

In fact, there are two concepts regarding the relation between national and international law in the doctrine of international law: monism and dualism. Within the concept of monism there are two trends: monism stating the priority of national law ('inverse' monism) and monism stating the supremacy of international law.⁴ The 'inverse' monism (I. Moser, A. Zorn, and others) is theoretically rooted in Hegel's works regarding international law as an 'outer' law of the state, while the state's sovereignty was an utmost international and legal asset. 'Outer law of the state, according to Hegel, arises from the relations between independent states; hence what it has in itself and for itself is moulded as necessity, because its reality depends on different sovereign volitions... The principle of international law as a universal law, which in itself and for itself has to be meaningful in relations between states, is, unlike the special contents of the positive treaties, in the fact that the treaties formulating liabilities of states toward one another must be fulfilled. Since the relations between nations are based on the principle of sovereignty, these nations are in their natural state with regard to each other, and their rights are executed not by a universal power constituted above, but by their special will.'⁵ As V. L. Tolstykh correctly notes, 'in the modern doctrine this position does not enjoy acceptance. At the same time, states often try to ensure in practice the priority of national legal norms over their international obligations.'⁶

The majority of Russian and foreign scholars and practitioners adhere to the dualistic concept (G. Trippel, D. Anzilotti, and others) which treats international and national laws as those regulating various social relations. International law regulates relations between states. National law regulates relations between persons. Consequently, there must be separate systems of international and national laws. At the same time, separate systems of international and national laws must 'interact', 'agree', 'be harmonized' etc. For example, N. A. Tsvadze, a contemporary Russian author, writes, 'A guideline, formulating the relation between international and national laws has become a necessary element of modern constitutional legislation. The issue of the correlation between international and national laws is resolved in favour of rapprochement of the norms of the two systems with the view of their effective interaction.'⁷ I think, however, that the notions of 'interaction', 'harmonization' and 'rapprochement' etc. traditionally used by Russian and foreign specialists do not denote the scientifically based contemporary concept of relation between international and national laws.

There seems to be no definite answer to the question of relation between international and national laws in the Constitution of the Russian Federation either. It features, as I take it, some legal norms worked out on the basis of the dualistic as well as moderately monistic concepts. For instance, on the one hand, Article 4 Part 2 of the Constitution specifies that 'the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws shall be considered supreme throughout the whole territory of the Russian Federation'. Second, there is no regulation in the Russian Constitution regarding the relation between generally accepted (basic, fundamental) principles of the international law and the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Third, the Constitution reads: 'Courts are independent and report only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal law', which is not 'in line' but contradictory to Part 4 Art. 15 and Part 1 Art. 17 of the Constitution. This leads a great number of Russian scholars and practitioners to a conclusion of a supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation over international law in all its forms. Typical in this respect is the opinion of B.L. Zimnenko: 'The Constitution of the Russian Federation in the framework of the legal system of Russia, exercises utmost juridical power with regard to all national regulatory acts and regulations of the international law which have become part of the legal system of the state. In case of conflicts between constitutional regulations and those of international law, state agencies have to follow the guidelines set forth by the Constitution of the Russian Federation.'⁸

On the other hand, Part 4 Art. 15 of the Constitution specifies the supremacy of only one form of the international law – of international treaties over federal laws only – that is of the legal and regulatory acts, which in turn constitute one of the forms of Russian legal system. Second, Part 1 Art. 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states: rights and freedoms of man and citizen are guaranteed by court, first and foremost in accordance with the generally acknowledged principles and norms of international law. Third, Part 3 Art. 46 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation guarantees: 'Every person in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation can appeal to international agencies ensuring human rights and freedoms if all existing national means of legal protection have been exhausted.' It is obvious that 'international agencies dealing with human rights and freedoms' will take their decisions in accordance with international law. Fourth, Art. 18 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation does not reduce national law to 'legislation', regulatory and legal acts of law-making bodies only: 'The rights and freedoms of man and citizen shall be directly operative... They determine the essence, meaning and implementation of laws, the activities of the legislative and executive authorities, local self-government and shall be ensured by the administration of justice.' So I believe we can come to the conclusion that the Constitution of the Russian Federation contains some dubious and even incompatible concepts reflecting those of the dualistic theory and of moderate monism.

The relation between outer forms of international and national law is an issue of utmost theoretical and practical significance, which has drawn inadequately little attention of researchers. Only a few specialists endeavour to study this vital and scarcely explored subject. E.T. Usenko, for instance, mentioned that 'in the hierarchy of international law, the guiding and system-building place belongs to its main principles constituting ideological, regulatory and legal basis of the system... Without these main principles of international law or outside them, there can be no international law itself as a legal system. The main principles of international law supplement the connection between its elements according to the homogeneity of

¹ See, for instance, Marchenko M. N. *Op. cit.*, p. 267.

² Twining W. *Globalization and Legal Theory*. L., 2000, p. 51.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ See, for instance, Tolstykh V. L. *A Course of International Law: A Textbook*. Moscow: Walters Clover 2010, p. 202.

⁵ Hegel G. W. F. *Philosophy of Law*. Moscow: Mysl 2007, p. 425–426, 428.

⁶ Tolstykh V. L. *Op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁷ Tsvadze N. A. *Application of Norms of International Law by Courts of the Russian Federation: dissertation abstract*. Moscow, 2005, p. 8.

⁸ Zimnenko B. L. *International Law and Legal System of the Russian Federation: Abstract of the LLD dissertation*, Moscow, 2006, p. 11.

its features by a content link, thus giving the whole system a character of content wholeness.¹

At the same time, I think that it is more grounded theoretically and is more accurate to refer the guiding principles of modern international law to the outer form of international law *jus cogens*, obligatory for governmental institutions and other authorized persons, passing or administering legal acts, containing legal norms, or working out or applying legal and regulatory treaties that contain legal norms. Besides, it would be theoretically grounded and practically obligatory to establish the following hierarchy of forms of modern international law applied in Russia: (1) guiding principles of international law; (2) international treaties including legal norms; (3) common practice of international law. This conclusion can be based, in my opinion, on the systemic interpretation of Art. 103 of the UN Charter, Art. 53 and 71 of the Vienna Convention 'On the Law of International Treaties' and Art. 38 of the Statute of the International Court.

Art. 103 of the UN Charter states: 'In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.' According to Art. 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of International Treaties, 'Treaties conflicting with a Peremptory Norm of General International Law (*jus cogens*),' 'A treaty is void if at the time of its conclusion, it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law. For the purposes of the present Convention, a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.'

Considering the above-cited theoretical and legal arguments, I find theoretically grounded Sec. 9 of the Decree of the Plenum

of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation of 10th October 2003 No. 5 'On the application by court of general jurisdiction of generally accepted principles and norms of international law and international treaties signed by the Russian Federation.' According to the decree, 'courts in administering justice are to take into account that in line with Part 4 Art. 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation... incorrect application by the court of generally accepted principles and norms of international law can be a reason for a repeal or amendment of judiciary act.'¹ Literal interpretation of this section of the Decree of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation can lead to at least two conclusions. First, international law as well as national law is binding for the courts of general jurisdiction. Second, failure to apply international law on a par with national law is a reason for appeal and revision of the case.

Besides, I think it theoretically debatable and practically ineffective from the position of reality and effective protection of rights and legal interests of legal and physical entities to reduce 'all' national law to 'legislation', regulatory and legal acts containing norms of law. I believe that outer forms of Russian law, apart from regulatory and legal acts containing legal norms, can be supplemented by the fundamental principles of Russian law, regulatory and legal treaties and common practice of Russian law containing norms of law.²

In keeping with the outlined legal and other arguments, I consider it more theoretically convincing and practically necessary to explore international and national law not in separate, but in a single system of forms of international and Russian law consisting in their turn of outer forms of international and Russian law. It seems possible to include in them fundamental principles of international law, international treaties and international common practice containing norms of law; fundamental principles of Russian law, regulatory and legal acts, regulatory legal treaties and common practice of Russian law containing norms of law.

B. Yudin³

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AS MULTIPLIER OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Advance of modern science and technology is usually regarded as one of the main driving forces of globalization if not the principal one. Argumentation evolving with regard to it can be presented in the following way. New technologies, let us say information and communication (mobile phones, the Internet, etc.) or biomedical (preventive, diagnostic, therapeutic, etc.) are spreading worldwide, unevenly but quite fast.

On the one hand, all kinds of technology include certain devices, gadgets, equipment, in short, everything that can be called the 'tangible' aspect of technology. However, speaking of 'tangible objects' we should not simplify things, since this section of technology comprises also so-called software in the broad sense of the word.

¹ Rossiyskaya Gazeta: No. 224, 02.12.2003.

² See for more details: Yershova E. A. The Nature, Sources and Forms of Labour Law in the Russian Federation. Moscow: RAP, 2008; Yershov V. V. Fundamentals of Theoretical, Civil and Legal Principles of Law. Moscow: RAP, 2010.

³ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Head of Department of Integrated Study-of-Man Problems at the Institute for Philosophy of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of over 400 scholarly publications, including books: *Creating A Trans-Man* (Sotvorenije transcheloveka), *Human Potential as Russia's Critical Resource* (Chelovecheskij potentsial kak kriticheskij resurs Rossiji), *Human Health: Fact, Standard, Value* (Zdorov'je cheloveka: fakt, norma, tsennost'), *Ethics of Science: Issues and Debates* (Etika nauki: problemy i diskussiji) and some others. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Committee for Bioethics at the Commission of the Russian Federation for UNESCO. Editor-in-Chief of 'Man' ('Chelovek') journal. Member of the editorial board of *Ideas and Ideals* (Ideji i idealy) journal, member of Research Council in the project of Fundamental Research 'Economy and Sociology of Knowledge' of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

On the other hand, each technology also includes ways of human interaction with its tangible content, i.e. certain behavioural schemes and patterns. As people get exposed to technology and master it, these schemes and patterns become routine.

Starting from here, further speculation on the relationship between technological development and globalization can follow two different lines. Either we believe that the tangible content of technology unambiguously dictates all that a man equipped with it can do, i.e. forms and norms of interaction between man and technology. From the standpoint of this unusual technological (or rather, tangible) determinism the global advance of new technologies inevitably results in the worldwide expansion of not just a tangible sphere of these technologies, but also of accompanying behavioural models and patterns. In other words, technological progress leads to unification of cultures; it consistently crowds out everything that distinguishes them from one another. When we find ourselves in some huge international airport, where people from different corners of the planet without any apparent difficulty use personal computers and mobile phones of the same vendors, the unifying power of scientific and technological globalization is conspicuously exhibited before our eyes.

Let us try changing the course of our reasoning. We can now pay attention to the fact that as soon as man gets more familiar with technology, it plunges into the world of the meanings and values that have been developed and supported by

culture. To put it differently, new technology is exposed not to some *tabula rasa*, but to man rooted in one or another of numerous existing cultures of the contemporary world. When people start using technology, they do so, focusing not only (and not as much) on its instrumental opportunities, but on their own expectations, values, interests, everything they have been indoctrinated with by their culture.

Following this position, it is easy to see that new technologies are able not only to even cultural differences, but, on the contrary, to reinforce and multiple them. Thus, new technologies open undreamed-of prospects that help discover (and sometimes even elucidate) existing cultural distinctions, which hitherto were not particularly conspicuous.

Modern biotechnology gives particularly many examples of this trend. So, the technology of prenatal (pre-birth) diagnostics, which developed a few decades ago, allows determining a baby's sex on the embryonic stage of its development. Obviously, the diagnosis itself features no culturally determined character, and it can be very useful when it comes to genetic defects associated with sex. There are some genetically induced diseases, like, say, Duchenne muscular dystrophy, which only boys are subject to. If one of the parents in the family happens to be a carrier of a defective gene and an embryo has been diagnosed with a male-specific gene, then appropriate timely measures, including abortion, can be taken to preclude the child's severe sufferings. In this case, the purpose of the diagnostic technology can be regarded as medical.

In some cultures, however, technologies of prenatal diagnosis of baby's sex are now applied for quite different purposes, namely, to have an abortion to avoid the birth of a baby of

the unwanted sex. Most often, female is the undesirable sex. This is due to the fact that existing cultural norms and traditions make it rather difficult for girls to arrange their future; it may often involve great costs as well. As it is known, the ratio set by the nature is as follows: 105–106 boys are born per 100 girls. As girls are the fitter to survive, the ratio is levelled when boys and girls enter their reproductive age. Today, however, in some Asian countries (and not only in them), the ratio varies considerably; it can be 110:100, 115:100 and even 122:100! In general, detection of embryo's sex has now become standard technology in nearly every country in the world. We can see, however, that the way it is applied depends on the norms of the culture in question.

Another example is the technology of human organs and tissues transplantation. In this sphere the following questions arise: Who do human organs belong to and what does that possession mean? Who has the right to dispose of the organs of the deceased? Where can we draw the line between life and death? All these questions are understood and addressed differently in different cultures, and technological advances in the field of transplantation fully manifest these differences.

Advance of modern science and technology equips people with more and more powerful tools. They can not only be used to achieve the goals that are already within the boundaries of human expectations, but can also serve as the grounds which give rise to people's awareness of the objectives that only recently seemed utopian or unimaginable. It is necessary to note that these tools of the cutting-edge technology are only the foundation of the knowledge, the architect of which belongs to the world of culture.

A. Zapesotsky¹

HISTORICAL CONTROVERSY BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM AS DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

I

Twenty years after the USSR and the global socialist system collapsed, it seems obvious that the historical controversy between capitalism and socialism is not over. On the contrary, it proceeds in a most interesting way in lives of many countries of the world – from China and South Korea to the European Union and Canada.

The study of history presents this controversy as uninterrupted dialogue between the two complex cultural systems. One of these systems is being unfolded with the idea of personal gain at the core; it impels one to hard work and the spirit of enterprise. It is based on competition, and appeals to primitive biological human instincts. The other is based on the concept of public good, and appeals to the humanist

essence of man, to his spiritual and moral distinction from animals.

F.B. Vlasov in his book *The Evolution of Moral Consciousness and Socio-Economic Progress*,² which was released by our University Publishing House, provides an interesting survey of how these cultural systems, through the historical development of Europe since the 16–18th centuries, came to evolve into capitalism and socialism. However, cultural background of capitalism and socialism can be easily traced back through the sands of time in different countries and continents – they are present in different versions in all traditional religions and national cultures.

In the 20th century capitalism and socialism diverged from one another as two autonomous, competing and, in the second half on the century, hostile systems, as kind of alternative types of civilizational development. Thereupon the socialist system cultivated isolationism, tended to ignore what had been achieved by capitalism, and gradually fell into decay. In the final analysis, it was ruined by ultra-socialism into which it had degenerated: a complete negation of the role and capacity of market mechanisms, absolutization of state regulation and subordination of private interests to the public good. In contrast to that, capitalist system, carefully examining what had been achieved by socialism, was implanting these achievements into its culture, and turned out to be more efficient in the end. However, socialism as a phenomenon in the world's cultural development hasn't vanished.

At present, the dialogue between capitalism and socialism is unfolding in the context of common global culture, and it af-

¹ Academician and member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Education, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Head of Philosophy and Cultural Studies Chair, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor. Mr. Zapesotsky is Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia. He is Deputy Chairman of the Board of Rectors of St. Petersburg universities.

Author of more than 1550 scholarly papers and essays on the problems of culture, education, mass media, trade-union movement, social and youth policy, international relations. He is a script-writer and film-director for more than 30 popular-science films and for more than 300 shows on Russian television. Member of the board of Russian Children's Foundation, member of editorial boards of the journals: 'Pedagogika' (Pedagogy), 'Voprosy Kulturologiji' (Issues of Culture Studies), 'Literaturnaja Uchoba' (Literary Education), 'Filosofiya i Kul'tura' (Philosophy and Culture).

Awarded the Russian Federal Government Prize in Education, Laureate of the Gorky Literary Prize. Decorated with the Order of Friendship. Prof. Zapesotsky is holder of the Ushinsky Medal, the Gold Medal of the Russian Academy of Education. He is decorated with Leo Tolstoy Big Gold Medal of the International Association of Writers and Essayists (Paris). He is Doctor *honoris causa* of universities of the USA, Ireland and the Ukraine. Member of Paris Academy of Sciences and Arts, of European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg).

Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation and Artist Emeritus of the Russian Federation.

² Vlasov F. B. *The Evolution of Moral Consciousness and Socio-Economic Progress* / Ed. M. S. Motyshina – St. Petersburg: SPbUHSS, 2011. 302 p. 'New Trends in the Humanities' (Novoje v gumanitarnykh naukakh, Vol. 51).

fects, in its own way, every national culture developing in the framework of globalization.

II

The concept of a welfare state is in my opinion one of the most interesting and promising products that this dialogue has brought to the humankind. On-growing interest, demonstrated by different scientific domains to the agenda of a welfare state today, is, without doubt, connected with practical needs and is stipulated by the logics of historical progress.

In the global space the élites, which manage activities of different states, have been forming and strengthening understanding that sustained development and competitive advantage cannot be provided for by private economic profit, an entrepreneur's desire to maximize his profit.

The involvement of enormous masses of population into the developmental process is becoming increasingly important, with the motivation not limited to material incentives. At the same time, the ineffectiveness of ultra-socialist models of the state and its activities, revealed in the 20th century, encourages general advance to the Convergence Theory. The turn to the Convergence theory has become a major trend in global economic science.¹ The so called Chicago Economic School, and research centres of the Ministry of Economic Development in Russia remain among those rare strongholds of ultra-liberalism advocates, which is out-of-date today. All the rest are searching for social and economic patterns to neutralize disadvantages and synthesize advantages of liberal and socialist models.² Their search is focused on the social law-governed state.

At the same time, the world experience tends more and more to interpret progress as a relative value – the value of the means, but not of the result. Economic development is not an end in itself. It is the truth, achieved through centuries upon centuries of philosophical quests, in a broader context – of humanitarian quest of the mankind: wealth only gets its value if it helps further promote social progress, moral and spiritual development of the society and of man; according to Andrey Voznesensky, Doctor *honoris causa* of our University, 'Any progress is reactionary as long as man is ruined.'³ Successful economy is not the target of human existence; it is one of the conditions for human development, for revealing and fulfilling the human's humanitarian potential and essence. This point also focuses the researchers' attention on the theory and practices to create a social rule-of-law state.

Nowadays Russia has her own local reasons to be especially interested in this subject matter. For the first place it is the collapse of ultra-liberal social and economic formation that came to change the ultra-socialist formation, which proved to be disastrously inefficient over the last 20 years.⁴

The crushing defeat of market reforms in Russia was not only marked by the economic slowdown, degradation in the domestic production sphere. The country's vital subsystems were being broken down: armed forces and law enforcement agencies, judicial structures, medicine and health care, education, mass communications, etc. Food quality was get-

ting dramatically low. Social diseases: alcoholism, drug addiction, prostitution etc., were continuously growing. Almost all domains of socio-economic practices were suffering acute staff shortage. Professional skills were rapidly sinking, especially those of the officials. Russia's economy was gradually coming to the 'profit-splitting' of the budgets at different levels by the officials and businesses, and to the notorious kickback technologies. All these things were a payback for the absolutization of private interest, for the adoption, by the ruling élite, of the supremacy of individual success, material profit over morality, justice, honesty and public good.

All this accounts for the interest with which Russia is searching for the 'third path' as 'the happy medium' in between ultra-socialist and ultra-liberal socio-economic formations. It also accounts for the awareness of the importance of finding a reasonable and efficient balance between private and public interests, the search, and maintenance, and 'polishing' of which have been conferred on a social state. According to E.A. Lukasheva 'the principle of a social state is explicit, in one way or another, in constitutions of Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, Turkey, Spain, Greece, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and other states'.⁵ According to our Constitution, Russia must be a social state.

Characterizing a social state, E.A. Lukasheva states that 'it should keep balance between free market economy and particular ways of influencing distribution processes in conformity with justice, with 'social inequalities balance'. The state, without playing 'a night watchman', striving for a decent standard of living for its citizens, should not step over the line and blatantly interfere into economy, and suppress initiative and free enterprise. Taking care of raising the status of its citizens, the state should remain within limits to prevent the relief of an individual from his personal responsibility for his fate, or for the fate of his relatives. The state should not use strict administration means in its attempt to build up 'a public welfare society'. It is supposed to use such economic methods as taxation, budget, social and ecological establishments.'⁶

And further: 'The quest for such balance that could make it possible to combine sustained economic development with the expansion of state functions, is one of the major trends in social thought of the modern world, where new situations and humanitarian ideals cannot find support in the previous doctrines. This fact accounts for the extraordinary interest in this problem, shown by modern science, where, alongside with the adherence to neoliberal conceptions for relations between the state and its citizen in the context of free market, there are some clear-cut approaches, based on the desire to establish principles of justice within society. The latter suggest a theoretical background for the course of social reforms, 'social quality of life', which could contribute to humanizing the relations within modern states, and to establishing of moral fundamentals.'⁷

It is only characteristic and not incidental that the image of an entrepreneur, a pioneer capitalist, so skilfully depicted by Jack London and Theodore Dreiser, is fading together with such figures in history as rulers and warlords. The same is true for revolutionary leaders, whose images have been losing their charm for the last decades. None of them can be heroes at the age of a social state.

Besides, it appears that the faculty of private commercial initiative and entrepreneurship is a very specific and rare talent; for economic development, this talent is absolutely necessary, but not as a major one – just one in the list. It is essentially

¹ See, for example: Abalkin L. I. Reflections on a Long-Term Strategy, Science and Democracy // Issues of Economy (Voprosy ekonomiki), 2006, No. 12, p. 16–17; Cheberko E. U., Bobrov A. V. Improving Public Sector Management, St. Petersburg, SZAGS, 2005, p. 18–21 etc.

² Bogomolov O. T. Lessons of the Global and Russian Crises // Non-Economic Facets of Economy: Reciprocal Influence Unknown: Social Scientists' Scientific and Journalistic Notes / Russian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Science; Chief of interdisciplinary project and scientific editor O. T. Bogomolov; Assistant chief of interdisciplinary project B. N. Kuzyk. Moscow : Institute for Economic Strategies, 2010, p. 10–36.

³ Voznesensky A. A. Uzzah: A Notebook, Found in a Bedside Table at a Dubna Hotel // Voznesensky, A.A. Rhino's Jack-Plane: Selected Works on Modern Culture. SPb. : SPbUJSS, 2008, p. 54.

⁴ Non-Economic Facets of Economy: Reciprocal Influence Unknown: Social Scientists' Scientific and Journalistic Notes / Russian Academy of Sciences, Centre for Social Science; Chief of interdisciplinary project and scientific editor O. T. Bogomolov; Assistant chief of interdisciplinary project B. N. Kuzyk. Moscow : Institute for Economic Strategies, 2010. – 796 p.

⁵ Cited from 'Human Rights and Social Rule-of-Law State in Russia' / Lukasheva E. A. [at al.]; ed. by E. A. Lukasheva. Moscow : Norma, 2011 (*in print*).

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ *Ibid.*

important that vast, dominating in number socio-professional categories within the framework of the post-industrial society are comprised of scientists, engineers and technicians, workers of culture and arts, media workers, doctors, secondary school teachers and higher school professors, judges, the military etc.; their activities, at the core, are far from being entrepreneurial. Economic efficiency cannot be a major criterion of success in these activities; and any attempts at prioritizing self-profit and making it the ultimate goal of one's activities lead to disastrous deformities.

The wider the involvement of these participants in the socio-economic development, the more important is the social function of the state, which distributes quotas of gross national product, collected from the parties of economic activity. The more important still is the distribution of the portion of the total wealth of a country, concentrated by the state, in accordance with the policies, recognized by the society as fair. In the majority of the world's leading economies the percentage of gross national product, collected by the state from its economic players through taxes, and distributed through the budget, has been over 50 per cent of GDP for a long time now. Here, a new function of research and social institutions becomes more and more evident: working out a just and fair state policy for this sphere. In this case, justice is both a moral, humanitarian category, and a rational precondition for sustained and efficient functioning of the economy. Relevant goals are also set for law. Justice becomes the precondition for efficiency, and it should get an adequate legal background.

In this respect, the social state may be seen as the result and prospect of the global cultural progress. Its formation is preconditioned by human history – a process of human activities, getting more and more sophisticated, giving rise to a varied and ramified system of social institutions, supported and justified by law. However, human activities are always preceded by goals which correlate with values. Values make up the nucleus, a kind of basis, of human personality. Man matches with them the goals of his activity. It means that values 'sanction' the choice of one or another goal.¹ Thus, the implementation of the concept of a social state is contingent on establishing a certain system of values.

III

Along with the world's historical progress, the centre of gravity in human activity is gradually being transferred from material values, which ought first of all to provide for biological vital functioning of man, to the values of spiritual character. And even wealth as a value is less and less connected in public consciousness with satisfying biological needs, 'migrating' along with the value of power to the group of 'status' indicators, which provide for social recognition. However, in the developed societies altruism, conscience, social responsibility and a similar set of qualities based on humanistic values, 'brought up' by the history of spiritual progress of the mankind, are more and more actively competing with striving for wealth and power. The question of the priority of humanistic values has a long history in the Russian society, and is acutely brought up by its pillars in modern conditions.²

Thus, the appearance of the social rule-of-law state as a new type of state structure can be regarded as the realization of certain conformity to the laws of history. On the one hand, it is more effective economically – at the expense of efficient redistribution of public wealth to the advantage of innately non-market segments of social production, with market economy

¹ See, for example, Styopin V. S. *Philosophy in the Age of Change* // Moscow University Bulletin, Series 7, Philosophy. 2006. No. 4, p. 18.

² See, for instance, Granin D. A. *Personally I Need Simple Human Values* // *Book of Knowledge: Talks with Outstanding Thinkers of Our Time* (Mne lichno nuzhny prostyje chelovecheskije tsennosti // Kniga znaniy: besedy s vydajuschimisja mysliteljami nashogo vremeni) / [the project planned and realized by K. von Barleben, G. Naumova; translated from French by G. Naumova]. Moscow : Progress-Traditsiya. 2010, p. 148–167.

being unable to function without these segments. On the other hand, the social state is a new legal form of realization of human qualities which are changing fast and which are embodied, first of all, in humanitarian values of human existence. The human base is more and more developed in modern man, and the social state meets the requirements of this new situation.

The fact that the idea of a rule-of-law state is becoming more mature can be boldly traced in the overall context of Western European cultural development influenced by the Russian revolution of 1917. For fear of such a large-scale disruption, the ruling élites in Western European countries adopted the idea of a social partnership between the state, trade unions and employers. There was created the International Labour Organization which disseminated ideas of tripartism all over the world and implemented the mechanisms of their realization.³ Initially it looked as a wish to give the oppressed, exploited masses of working people a bone to pick. But very soon compassion, self-restriction and humanism became real part of basic values of the society, began to be cultivated as pan-European values. They also, to a considerable degree, gave rise to the European integration from nation-states into the EU.⁴

The modern West has laid it down as an axiom that any members of the society who are capable of functioning by no means can and have to be involved in competition, that production growth is impossible without social infrastructure properly improved and social issues solved, that one of the state's functions is to limit the 'free' impetuous enrichment, which is done for the public interests, that economy cannot be completely subordinate to the ideology of individual gains: 'The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the child's rights.'⁵ As these beliefs developed evolution took place from the idea of minimum social protection and standards to the idea of universal social protection of citizens, and the concept of social quality was formulated.

Equity as moral category proved to be of utmost importance for the development of economy, and the question of a state's purpose has become more a question of sense of life: to consume material benefits or to use them in creating Man.

IV

In view of indigenously European character of the Russian culture, the approach to establishing the social state as it is realized in the European Union seems attractive enough to be adapted to Russia's realities. But transferring this experience mechanically to the Russian soil seems hardly ever possible. And the point here is not only in the necessity to take into account the peculiarities of Russian culture. Western Europe made its way to this type of socio-economic and socio-political formation in an evolutionary way. As for our country, it experienced in 1917 and 1991 two radically ruinous turning points.

In this context there is little to gain from comparing our country with Eastern European countries – after the disinte-

³ See, for instance: *International Labour Organization: Conventions. Documents. Materials* (Mezhdunarodnaja organizatsija truda: Konvenciji. Dokumenty. Materialy): A Handbook / [Compiler and author of preface and introduction Ž. S. Bogatyrenko]. Moscow : Delo i servis, 2007. 751 p. : ill., tables.

⁴ *Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe* (Dogovor, ustanavljujushchij Konstitutsiju dlja Evropy) / transl. and notes made by A.O. Chetverikov // *Constitution of the European Union: Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe with Commentary* (Konstitutsija Jevropejskogo Sojuza: dogovor, ustanavljujushchij Konstitutsiju dlja Evropy s kommentarijem). Moscow : INFRA-M, 2005, p. 1–2. Values of the Union, p. 99.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1–3. The Union's Objectives, p. 99.

gration of the socialist camp they chose the way of losing national sovereignty, accepting unconditionally the EU standards, which is unacceptable for Russia for many reasons. But taking into consideration the experience of other countries, which survived after disastrous cataclysms and found their way of sovereign development, can be quite instructive. In the first place, it can be applied to the Republic of Korea and China.

Korea was freed in 1945. Thereupon rapid progress from backwardness and feudalism was made. The country became one of the states with rapidly developing economy. This way was not an easy one. The republic went through a 45-year period of authoritarianism and military dictatorships. Military rule was long and antidemocratic, but at the same time it was quite successful in socio-economic terms.

Korea answered the question whether modernization should simultaneously start in all spheres of socio-economic life, or be advanced in some spheres.

One should bear in mind that Mikhail Gorbachev started *perestroika* in the USSR in the late 1980s, and spiritual and moral sphere was the first to be restructured, as it 'granted' freedom to the whole society. At the same time the objective of faster development at the expense of technological progress was proclaimed. But technological modernization failed, and democratization and *glasnost* led to disintegration of the society and the state. In about the same period of time China suppressed the protest movement in Tiananmen Square and got down to modernizing the country's economic life with the spheres of ideology and morality being strictly controlled by the Communist party. In Yeltsin's Russia freedom of morals was proclaimed, the state withdrew itself from supporting public morals. Culture of the Soviet period was rejected, the traditional folk culture happened to be almost completely supplanted by imitations of Western pop culture.

Despite the assurances of modern Western theorists that development of democracy is undoubtedly connected with economic progress, economic upsurge of modern Korea was in no way connected with democracy, it took place in the conditions of authoritarian regime, of military dictatorship. And it was the result of reasonable state policy. Though, it took time to work out this policy.

It is common knowledge that we had our 'Slavophiles' and 'Westernizers' in Russia. Since early '80s of the 19th century the Koreans created two movements in social life, which are very similar to the Russian ones, *yu-seng* and *he-hwa*. Adherents of the *yu-seng* doctrine, which was a variety of Confucianism, were against the reforms. They believed that the culture of Korea is superior to any culture in the world, that the West is pernicious, that they should not take a step backwards protecting their culture from external influence. They fought against advocates of *he-hwa* – advocates of Korea's modernization. Some thought that the nation's way to eminence lies in the development of national economy, while others demanded that national self-consciousness be awoken by drawing on cultural roots.

The epoch of Japan's colonial dominance put an end to these debates from 1910 to 1945. Coming to power, the first president of the country Syngman Rhee promised to turn Korea into a melting pot for the doctrines of Confucius and Christ to be fused. But he had difficulty determining the nation's basic set of values.

From 1948 to 1960 the state's tough policy in the sphere of culture was guided by Western patterns. Cultural cooperation with the USA promoted rapid familiarization with culture of the West. Great progress was made in improving the resource base of institutions of culture and art, in training the personnel working in institutions of culture, in developing various professional associations of intellectuals. Along with it some negative trends also took place: the country was flooded with low-grade mass culture from the West, while traditional national culture began to decline.

In the period of Syngman Rhee's rule mechanisms of tough state control over all aspects of social and economic life were practised; these mechanisms are still in effect. Park Chung-hee who rose to power in 1960 was convinced that excessive worship of alien culture does irreparable harm to the nation; that Western values can only be brought to Korea after going through filters of its own national and cultural experience. He put solving economic problems on the basis of Korean historic heritage while consolidating the national ethics. Park Chung-hee's line meant fundamental modernization of the economy basing it on traditional values of the Korean people. And this line was realized with the help of the methods of dictatorship.

In 1966, the country adopted a number of important regulatory acts which restricted the negative influence made by alien cultural values through cinema, advertising, etc. On the other hand, the state then took a number of material and moral measures aimed at promoting folk arts and artistic crafts. It is significant that for people of art, who made the greatest contribution to the development of national culture, there was introduced the honorary title by the special presidential decree: 'The man as a living cultural treasure'. Great attention was paid to objects of material culture of South Korea, to promotion of culture in the provinces. Thus the new in the country's life began to develop in reasonable balance with the support of fundamental traditional values of the society.

President Chun Doo-hwan, who began to rule the country in 1979, continued this line. Further economic growth, people's enrichment were subordinate to traditional Confucian ethics: the cult of duty, family, attitude to ancestors, filial piety, subordination to the state and the chief, and others – all these multiplied by the use of real technological innovations of the West and export-oriented economy became the basis for the phenomenal blossoming of the Republic of Korea.

Economic achievements went hand in hand with the rise of national self-consciousness of the Koreans. The society was becoming more mature. In 1988 there were held democratic elections in the country. Moral renewal and progress in culture paved the way for the freedom of speech and art, for the uplift of creative intelligentsia. At present the Koreans believe that the country should be strong, first of all, in its spiritual resources, that its development depends primarily on the nation's moral health. This may be the main lesson taught by the Republic of Korea to the modern world.

Today millions of people in our country ask themselves a question: Why did reforms succeed in China, why did they bring brilliant results, why did they fail in Russia? In this context it should be noted that China, as opposed to Russia, conducts economic reforms not to the advantage of a close circle of people (who seized power in 1991), but aiming at improving all people's and the whole country's well-being. It is about the long (approximately since 1977, after Mao Zedong's death), gradual and careful implementation of market mechanisms in the socialist management system accompanied by stops and correcting the route in difficult moments of development. According to A.V. Kiva, in doing so, the following principle should be observed: 'Reforms by no means should make people's life worse, on the opposite, life should be made better. This is what was put into practice. If, for instance, over the first 10 years of reforms the economy increased more than threefold, this is about the figure by which people's well-being improved.'¹

Analyzing this experience in detail the author quite rightly states: 'The objective law is that it is only where economic and social bases are skilfully combined that rapid progress takes place. 'The German economic miracle' was created under the slogan of eminent economist and manager L. Erhard 'Well-being for all!' These were also about the same principles

¹ Kiva A.V. China and Russia: Different Models of Reforms – Different Results // Non-Economic Facets of Economy... p. 354.

on which 'the economic miracle' in Japan grew; in that country even today the decile coefficient (1:4) is one of the lowest among the developed countries. In Russia it is officially 1:16, unofficially 1:30, and in Moscow it is 1:100.¹

The ruling élite of the USA, the stronghold of liberal culture, has recently been paying attention to the social issues as well. The latest economic crisis encouraged leading American theorists (at the level of Nobel Prize winners Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman and others) to problematize and reconsider the basic sections of economic science (in its modern Anglo-Saxon understanding). Fundamental flaws are found in the American model of capitalism and the necessity to intensify government control over economy is stated. A new strategy of progress has been planned, based on large-scale investment of money collected by the government from taxpayers into non-production spheres.

In this context it is significant that Barack Obama states: 'We will offer people jobs in building schools, laboratories, libraries...' ² These are investments in the level of education, in the development of people's intellectual abilities. In his speech at the National Academy of Sciences he declared: 'Today science is more than ever before necessary for our well-being, security, health, preservation of the environment and quality of life.'

Thus, almost all leading states in the world, which are capable of conducting independent policy (from China to the USA), in different ways and with due regard to historical peculiarities of their development are searching for their models of a balanced state, economic and social order. The controversy between capitalism and socialism in these countries acquires the character of a constructive dialogue. It is obvious that this is the direction in which the strategy of Russia's further progress should be corrected.

V. Zapevalov³

THE ROLE OF THE REPRESENTATION OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN ST. PETERSBURG IN THE INTERNATIONAL DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen, dear colleagues,
On behalf of the Diplomatic Mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in St. Petersburg allow me to welcome you at the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

It is remarkable that along with such well-known names of St. Petersburg as 'Northern capital', 'Northern Palmyra', 'Culture capital of Russia' and many others one more name has been recently coined: 'Diplomatic capital'. Thereupon, I would like to dedicate my statement to the defining of the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and, in particular, the Diplomatic Mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in St. Petersburg in the international dialogue of cultures, and, thereby, to pay special attention to the influence of diplomacy on the development and strengthening of humanitarian connections in the globalizing world.

Today the consular community of St. Petersburg is represented by 33 career consulate generals, 22 honorary consuls, the department of the Embassy of Byelorussia and three diplomatic missions of the international organizations. The geography of consular establishments is quite wide and represents all regions of the world – from North America to South-East Asia and Australia, from Northern Europe to the south of Africa and Latin America. It is necessary to note that, unlike diplomatic establishments which work with political issues, consular establishments are to be basically engaged in economic and consular activities and, not in the last instance, in cultural affairs.

The consulates of foreign states accredited in our city actively participate in the cultural life of St. Petersburg and at the same time they promote their culture on the banks of the Neva. As it is a fact that the year of 2010 began in Russia and in France symbolizing the 'crossroads' of two cultures thanks to what the citizens of St. Petersburg and the visitors to the Northern capital had a unique chance to take part in various projects of the cultural and informative programme.

This year St. Petersburg has become an arena for holding different events organized in the frame of the launching

projects, such as 'The Year of Russia in Spain' and 'The Year of Russia in Italy'.

Moreover, such annual events as the festival 'Flavour of Korea 2010' have already been considered traditional. In 2010 it was held in connection with the 20-year anniversary of establishing the diplomatic relations between the Republic of Korea and the Russian Federation. 'Japanese Spring in St. Petersburg' festival comprises about 30 to 40 events directed at the popularization of Japanese culture, sports, science, and economy. 'Window on the Netherlands' festival consists of a number of business, cultural, scientific and public events.

The celebration of the 300-year anniversary of St. Petersburg in 2003 became a culmination of the humanitarian interaction development and an indicator of the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the international dialogue of cultures. In connection with the anniversary celebrations, the G8 summit, the Russia–EU meeting, as well as an informal meeting of the CIS heads of state took place in the Northern capital. Profound diplomatic work, including the participation of the staff of the Diplomatic Mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in St. Petersburg, preceded the abovementioned events. Long before the celebration our diplomats who are, on the one hand, employees of the federal body, and, on the other, patriots of the city, began active preparatory work: they brought to the notice of foreign colleagues the great importance of this event, as well as the city's position, which was ready to accept the contribution of their countries in preserving their national memory on the history pages of Russia's Culture capital. Memorable gifts to St. Petersburg on its 300-year anniversary came as the result of this work. The city received busts of four Italian architects as a gift from Italy, they were installed on Manezhnaya Square; Chinese 'Garden of Friendship' was received from the People's Republic of China and later installed on Liteyny Prospect; the Kingdom of the Netherlands completed the restoration of the inspection gallery and dungeons of the Tsar's Bastion of St. Peter and St. Paul's Fortress; the Government of Japan contributed with the planting stock of Japanese cherry trees, etc.

Besides these facts, it is noteworthy that the Diplomatic Mission of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in St. Petersburg carries out not only its official functions, but also performs the function which has not been its formal duty – namely, that of preserving the best diplomatic traditions which are an essential component of cultural life of the society. The Diplomatic Mission prepared and organized the celebration of the 200-year anniversary from the date of birth of Alexander Pushkin's lyceum

¹ Ibid, p. 354.

² Citation from the article: Bogomolov, O.T. Russian Employee is 2.5 Times Underpaid (Rossijskomu rabotniku nedoplachivajut v 2,5 raza) [e-resource] / Interview with academician Oleg Bogomolov // Solidarnost. 2009. No. 41 (December 4). Available at: http://www.solidarnost.org/themes/politEkonomiya/politEkonomiya_6486.html.

³ Representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in St. Petersburg. In 1982 Mr Zapevalov was elected People's Judge. He has been working in diplomatic service since 1995. Deputy Chairman of Chancellor Gorchakov International Foundation. Chair of the Editorial Board of 'Consul' ('Konsul') journal.

friend – Alexander Gorchakov, who subsequently became Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the rank of the Chancellor and headed the Russian foreign policy from 1856 to 1882.

In Aleksandrovsy Garden the bust of the great Russian diplomat Alexander Gorchakov was installed, and a memorial board on the General Staff building, where there used to be Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs which moved there from the English Embankment, was also opened in connection with the anniversary celebration. These events were organized at the initiative of the Diplomatic Mission and its head, who at that time was Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Victor Lopatnikov.

The Diplomatic Mission acted as the initiator of the restoration of kindly commemorated Church of St. Mary Magdalene

in Pavlovsk, which was the house church of the imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where Russian diplomats received pastoral exhortations when going on service abroad. Later, well-known Russian diplomats, Nikita Panin and Alexander Kurakin, are buried there, whose gravestones are preserved today.

In conclusion, I would like to mention that the Diplomatic Mission is ready to contribute to the development of cultural interaction between the states. I wish all the participants of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference prolific work and every success in the matter of preserving rich cultural heritage of our Fatherland, to which ever memorable academician Likhachov dedicated all his life.

Yu. Zobnin¹

'WHEN NATIONS, FORGETTING FORMER STRIFE...': A RUSSIAN PROLOGUE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBALISM

The positive pathos of the idea of globalization – the striving of the humankind to set up a common objective reality based on shared, reasonable, fair and unaggressive moral, political and economic principles – has been inherent to the literary and social thought of Russia since the beginning of the 18th century. According to Rev. Vassily Zenkovsky, it was the time, when, incited by the reforms of Peter the Great, 'secular nationalism amalgamated with humanism'² became firmly established once and for all. Zenkovsky writes about Lomonosov and Derzhavin, 'the first significant Russian poets of the 18th century': 'No longer do they derive their inspiration from 'Holy Russia', but from 'Great Russia'; a national Eros, their delight with the greatness of Russia refer exclusively to Russia's empirical objective reality without any historiosophic explanations.'³

Zenkovsky notes that the intellectual and creative élite of St. Petersburg abandoned the historiosophic messianic mysticism of Moscow ('Two Romes have fallen, but the third – Moscow – does stand, and a fourth there shall not be'), they also perceived the post-Petrine Russia as subject to *political* but not to divine intervention; such abandonment by no means meant the abandonment of messianism as it was. At least in St. Petersburg an image of 'Great Russia' had always been perceived as an indispensable part of the European and – on a larger scale – global civilization. On the contrary, they saw Russia as a *superpower* that had been founded by Peter the Great; being such, it had no other options than to develop its ideology within 'global' categories. It is significant that the early poetry of V.K. Trediakovsky presents a special image of Russia – 'across the far-away lands' perspective:

I shall commence doleful songs on the flute,
Looking upon Russia across the far-away lands...
(*Laudatory Hymns to Russia*)

The country's grandeur, its 'might' and 'plenitude' are perceived by the poet through the juxtaposition of Russia with the countries of 'Old Europe'. The poem's key image of Rus-

sia – 'Russia as hope' – reveals itself against this kind of background:

Hail, Russia! Hail, cherished!
Hail, Hope! Hail, blessed!

Thus, Europe, as seen by Trediakovsky (and his contemporaries), is 'rich with its past', while Russia is 'rich with its future'; Russia brings something 'new' to older civilizations, gives them an opportunity to *rely* on her...

In the age of Catherine the Great, European social utopias were most influential in the circles of Russian creative élite; they were based on the idea of '*the common good*', abstracted from the objective reality of a nation. 'Morning Light' (*Utrenny Svet*) magazine, published by N. Novikov, carried a translation of the utopian tale on Troglodytes from Montesquieu's *Persian Letters*. M. Shcherbatov, historian and publicist in the time of Catherine the Great, <...> wrote his *Journey to the Land of Ophir*; a utopia, which presented his own ideal of Russia's future, inspired by François Fénelon, Morelli's *Braziliad* and Mercier's *L'année 2440*. <...> And finally, Radishchev's *Journey from St. Petersburg to Moscow* is another utopian tale...⁴. The Masonic Myth of the Golden Age, popular among representatives of Enlightenment in Russia (such as N. I. Novikov and I. G. Schwartz), should also be added to the list.

Utopian social 'dreaminess' lingered in the literary circles of St. Petersburg youth in the age of the Decembrists (*Dekabristy*). Thus, Pushkin, on returning from his exile to Mikhailovskoye, was talking to Adam Mickiewicz, one of his friends, about 'the days to come':

When nations, forgetting former strife,
Will in a family of friends unite.
(*'He lived among us...'*).

Prior to that, in 1821, Pushkin commented on the death of Napoleon and ended his poem in an unexpectedly paradoxical way (especially paradoxical for the author of 'Reminiscences in Tsarskoye Selo' and 'Freedom' (*Volnost*)):

Hail to him!.. He launched the Russian nation
Upon its lofty destinies
And augured ultimate salvation
For man's long-exiled liberties
(*Napoleon*).

In 1880, in his famous speech, Dostoevsky had a good reason to refer to 'the two major ideas', incorporated in Pushkin's works; they contained 'a prototype for the whole future destiny and the whole future goal for Russia': 'the first idea is Russia's

¹ Head of Chair of Literature and the Russian Language at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), professor, honorary worker of higher professional education of the Russian Federation. Author of over 100 scholarly publications, including monographs: *Nikolai Gumilyov: Poet of the Orthodox Christianity* (Nikolaj Gumil'ov — poet Pravoslavija), *Execution of Nikolai Gumilyov: A Clue to the Tragedy* (Kazn' Nikolaja Gumil'ova. Razgadka tragediji), *D. S. Merezhkovsky: Life and Deeds* (D. S. Merezhkovskij: zhizn' i dejanija), *Russian White-Emigré Poetry: The Unnoticed Generation* (Poezija belo emigratsiji. Nezamechennoje pokolenije) and some others.

² Zenkovsky V. V. A History of Russian Philosophy, Vol. 1, Part 1. 1991. P. 94.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid, p. 90.

universality, her responsiveness and her genuine, evident and deepest kinship of her own geniuses with the geniuses of all times and places. (...) Another idea by Pushkin is his appeal to common people, his only hope in their strength; and his moral is: it is only through common people that we can find our Russian genius and perceive its purpose.¹

It should be added that for Dostoevsky himself 'a moral ideal (...) is a social ideal at the same time: striving for 'a worldwide, brotherly unity of the mankind' can be nothing else but this ideal. A nation's orientation 'towards the whole world and its all-human character (*vsechelovechnost'*) are conceived as a natural form of social existence'.²

In the age of Pushkin the historiosophic thought of Russia was proceeding from eclecticism to the making of an original religious and philosophic system – in P. Chaadayev's works. Here, 'a globalist motif' is so explicit, that its inadequate estimate leads to the total distortion of the pathos, inherent to his 'Philosophical Letters'. This was the very situation when in 1836 the first Letter was published in the Russian magazine 'Telescope': the author was unanimously mistaken for a Rus-sophobe, which had grave consequences for both Chaadayev and Nadezhdin, the editor of 'Telescope'. In the meantime, according to the just observation made by D.V. Filosofov, Chaadayev 'loves Russia's future, not her present or past. (...) Chaadayev was the champion of common universal culture. He saw Christianity of the universe, but not Christianity of the Slavophiles or national Christianity, as a backbone of such unity.'³ N.O. Lossky writes: 'Chaadayev concluded that fruitlessness of Russia's historic past is to a certain extent its benefit. Russian people not being chained to petrified forms of life are spiritually free to complete the great tasks of the future. The Orthodox Church has preserved the essence of Christianity in all its initial purity. This is why Orthodoxy can revive the body of Catholic Church, which is too mechanized. Russia's mission is to accomplish the final religious synthesis. Russia will become the center of intellectual life in Europe in the event that it acquires everything that is valuable in Europe and begins to carry out its mission predestined by God'.⁴

Chaadayev's ideas were in great demand among both the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. 'Taking up the question of Russia's relation to the absolute and trying to decide it resting upon the strength of his own mind Chaadayev therefore put forward the philosophy of Russian history, he became the first Russian philosopher. In this sense we can refer to Chaadayev as well as to A. S. Pushkin: Chaadayev is *everything* of our thought, of our historiosophy and through it of anthropology and social philosophy. This is why debates over theoretical content and social status of Russian philosophy are still going on: is it, like the European thought, a special kind of knowledge or mostly the expression of national self-consciousness, these debates are also about Chaadayev, the true representative of Russian thought who proposed in his works a pattern of inseparable and non-confluent unity of these two natures of philosophy.'⁵

Thanks to Chaadayev's good graces both in Slavophile and Western thought of Russian 19th century Russia's image was always connected with some forthcoming global action on the

borderline between politics and eschatology, an action which will eventually result in a new epoch,

When nations, forgetting former strife,
Will in a family of friends unite.

The essence of this Russia's super-action in the world history was seen differently by the Slavophiles and by the Westernizers. The extreme points of view were most fully expressed by F. I. Tyutchev and V. S. Pecherin respectively, who, as well as Chaadayev, combined literary gifts with outstanding intellectual abilities.

Extreme Slavophile Tyutchev saw the 'Russian path' as dialectic overcoming of gross political will and pragmatic rationalism, Otto von Bismarck's line of policy being the most conspicuous impersonation of them in European politics of the second half of the 19th century:

'Unity,' so heralded a sage of this age,
'can only be welded with steel and blood...'
But we will try welding it with love,
and wait to see which lasts longer...

(Two Unities)

Thus, the Russian Empire, like the German Empire, created by Bismarck 'with iron and blood', was to 'make a plunge into Europe', however, as opposed to German Imperial aggression, *Russian (and broadly – Slavonic) aggression was to take a miraculous turn for the triumph of peace and love, which would transform civilization into a qualitatively new state.*

Radical Westernizer Pecherin considered destruction of Russia, its relegation to oblivion to be an essential condition for saving the mankind:

How delightful it is to hate one's fatherland
and avidly await its ruin!
And see one's homeland's destruction
as dawn of the world's rebirth.

('How delightful it is to hate...')

Here the sublime 'Russian value' in the world history is not existence, but non-existence: the Russian Empire must liberate the world from its presence, by this act of destruction (or self-destruction⁶) paving the way for the mankind to a qualitatively new, reasonable and happy existence. Certainly, for both the Slavophiles and the Westernizers who acted in the pre-Industrial Age, the global motives come across as intuitions or even as prophesies. There was no trace of objective historical prerequisites for processes of globalization yet, so even the image of 'universality' in its geographical scope was either limited in these works to Europe and some regions of the Middle East and Central Asia, or shrank to Slavonic territories which were in the zone of direct geopolitical interests of the Russian Empire.

Thus, it is even more striking that *both aforementioned intuitions proved out historically in the 20th century when global trends in the post-industrial world began to gain strength.*

For example, the march of the Red Army to Europe in the course of World War II in 1939–45 had initially been planned as aggressive export of communist revolution which was supposed to gain a universal foothold. In reality it turned into a war to free Europe from fascism, which the USSR was engaged in along with Great Britain and the USA. Eventually this approach led to setting up the UN and forming prerequisites for establishing radically new political and economic system of global relations between the allies in Western European countries and in the USA.

And the immediate self-dissolution of the USSR, which astonished the whole world in 1991, gave the go-ahead for the creation of United Europe into which parts of the former Soviet

⁶ It is unexpected that V. Soloviev shares the views of V. Pecherin. In his well-known article 'Russian Idea' V. Soloviev asserts that Russia's mission in history is sacrificing its spiritual originality voluntarily and consciously with the purpose of joining Rome, restoring the unity of Christian Church and turning it into the truly universal Church.

¹ Dostoevsky F. M. Omnibus Edition. Vol. 25, p. 199–200.

² Volgin I. Dostoevsky's Last Year: Historical Notes. Moscow, 1991, p. 253.

³ Filosofov D. V. Madman's Apology // Pyotr Chaadayev: pro et contra. SPb., 1998, p. 323.

⁴ Lossky, N.O. History of Russian Philosophy. Moscow, 1991, p. 71–72. It is this Chaadayev's futurology which was acknowledged by N. I. Nadezhdin (exiled for publication of the first 'anti-patriotic' 'Letter' to Ust-Sysolsk and trying to set himself right): 'Yes! We exist to teach a great lesson to the world! Our mission is not to be an echo of this decrepit, dying civilization...' etc. (See: Nadezhdin N. I. Two replies to Chaadayev // Pyotr Chaadayev: pro et contra. SPb., 1998, p. 93.

⁵ Yermichev A., Zlatopolskaya A. P. Ya. Chaadayev in the history of Russian thought // Pyotr Chaadayev: pro et contra. SPb., 1998, p. 9–10.

Empire 'dissolve' voluntarily. I believe that no sensible futurologist doubts that in the nearest future Russia will dissolve in the 'European standard' of universal values thus drawing nearer the longed-for day,

When nations, forgetting former strife,
Will in a family of friends unite.

However, returning to the Russian thinkers, it is necessary to note that at the height of scientific and technological revolu-

tion, when globalization has begun to turn from an intuitively perceived abstraction into a certain historical prospect, the new generation of thinkers – Vladimir Soloviev, Dmitry Merezhkovsky, Vyacheslav Ivanov and others – suddenly changed priorities in their reflections of the future 'great family' of peoples and began to speak quite convincingly of threats and dangers lurking in wait for the mankind in its new, 'uniform' capacity...

But this is a topic for another paper.

V. Zorin¹

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES VS. CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS: RUSSIAN REASONS

After the USSR collapsed and the confrontation between two ideological systems was eliminated that used to provide some integration, unification and stability, antagonisms between peculiarities of cultures and religions became more and more apparent in a way which is far from being harmonious.

In addition to the rising number of ethnic and religious conflicts there appeared a struggle for the common development model: a unipolar or multipolar world. In pursuit of the global geopolitical objectives, active subjects of modern international relations develop doctrines and strategies on the basis of some scientific ideology-driven theories.

Among such theories it is apt to mention Immanuel Wallerstein's world-systemic approach to global processes, Francis Fukuyama's liberal world order, Jacques Attali's geopolitical approach, Zbigniew Brzezinski's Grand Chessboard, Carlo Santoro's doctrine of multipolarity.

The most conspicuous attempt to reflect the processes existing in the world was S. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996). The author offers another integral view of the 'world order' and 'the picture of the world as a whole'. Huntington points out two viewpoints concerning the future of the development of cultures: that of the multiculturalists (advocates of ethnic pluralism and cultural diversity, according to anthropological terminology) and that of the universalists. The universalists are in favour of a new universal culture which was formed on the basis of the western culture (mostly that of the USA), which is to disseminate all over the world sweeping away all the barriers on its way and extirpate the unnecessary diversity of cultures, religions, etc. The universalists are convinced of the absolute significance of the Western culture. They sincerely think that 'people of all societies strive for acquiring western values, institutions and customs. If they happen to have no wish to do it and they are committed to their traditional cultures these people are considered the victims of 'false consciousness' comparable to the one which the Marxists believed proletariat supporting capitalists to have.'²

How does Huntington see the world? This is interaction of civilizations that can, for a number of reasons, turn into clashes and wars, local and global in character. In a sense, Huntington

revives the civilizational approach of Danilevsky, A. Toynbee, O. Spengler.

The main thesis upheld by Huntington is that there are enormous differences between civilizations, and this situation will remain unchanged for a long time. In his opinion, civilizations as metacultures are distinct in terms of their history, way of life, and, most crucially, their religion. People of different civilizations differ in their ideas of the world as a whole, of freedom, development models, of relation of an individual to the society, of faith and God. For Huntington as a political analyst, the pivotal point is that intercultural differences are more fundamental than political and economic ones.

As Alexander Zapesotsky emphasized, such a presentation of the problem led to the fact that 'he was perceived as an apologist of ideas of historical predetermination, the inevitability of a conflict between civilizations'.³ But by no means did all authorities in human sciences share this opinion.

The ideological concept of the clash of civilizations was calmly received by Russia's scientists and politicians, the theory did not come in for any serious criticism, and its hazard, to my mind, is still underestimated today. Though at the end of his life S. Huntington distanced himself from his main thesis, the theory itself is still living on and the reasoning of its creator continues its self-sustaining existence.

In a number of my works I wrote about theoretical inadequacy and practical harm of the concept of conflict of civilizations, in the conditions of our Caucasia and the Volga region in particular. I proposed to eliminate this term from the political lexicon.⁴

The popularity and universal recognition of S. Huntington's theory among politicians, public figures, scientific expert community gives grounds to regard it to a greater degree as a doctrine backing many of the steps taken by western political and military postures in the sphere of foreign policy, in the sphere of stimulating certain globalization processes. Huntington's position is most prominently reflected in the following statement: in the world where cultural identities – ethnic, national, religious and civilizational – are an integrate part they are supposed to make a determining influence on policies of all states, in the first place of the USA and the West.

In present-day Russia, which is enunciating its own point of view on many processes taking place on the international scene, we should largely take a critical approach to pretentiousness of western ideologists who promulgate 'universal approaches' to the current processes and the phenomena which occur in international life.

It is common knowledge that if an ethnic conflict is exacerbated by a religious factor it becomes particularly destruc-

¹ Deputy Director of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Candidate of Science (History), Professor. Author of over 90 scholarly and popular-science publications, including books: *Interethnic and Interconfessional Relations in the Russian Federation* (Mezhnatsional'nyje i mezhhkonfessional'nyje otosheniya v Rossijskoj Federatsiji); *Issues of Early Prevention and Deterrence of Destructive Phenomena* (Problemy rannogo preduprezhdenija i profilaktiki destruktivnyh javlenij); *The Russian Federation: Problems of Forming Ethno-Cultural Policy* (Rossijskaja Federatsija: problemy formirovanija etnoculturnoj politiki); *Ethnic Policies in Russia: History, Problems, Prospects* (Natsional'naya politika v Rossiji: istorija, problemy, perspektivy); *Russian People in Ethnic Policy: The 20th Century* (Russkij narod v natsional'noj politike. XX vek); *Ethnic Problem in the State Dumas of Russia: Practices of Law-Making* (Natsional'nyj vopros v Gosudartvennykh Dumakh: opyt zakonotvorchestva) and others. Member of the Writers' Union of Russia. V. Yu. Zorin is decorated with the Order of Honour and the Order of Friendship.

² Huntington S. *The Clash of Civilizations*. Moscow, 2003, p. 511.

³ See: 'Materialy 10 Mezhdunarodnyh lihachovskih nauchnyh chtenij', SPb, Izd-vo SPbGUP, 2010, p. 37 (Proceedings of the 10th International Likhachov Scientific Conference).

⁴ See: Rossijskaja Federacija: problemy formirovanija etnokul'turnoj politiki. M., 2002. Izd-vo 'Russkij mir', p. 44; 'Svobodnaja mysl' journal. M., 2003, No. 12, p. 4-15; Etnopanorama. Orenburg, 2006, No. 3/4, p. 2-14. (The Russian Federation: problems of forming ethno-cultural policy).

tive and hard to control. It is supposed to be theoretically justified by the point of view which has lately become fairly popular; according to this point of view the world development is seen as the development and cooperation of separate civilizations. Civilizations, at that, are represented by vast cultural units based on certain religious traditions: the Christian civilization, the Muslim civilization, the Buddhist civilization, etc. If such civilizations are regarded, as it often happens, as enclosed integrities incapable of mutual understanding and if we expect their interpenetration to be potentially evil, we can predict disastrous conflicts between them which pose the main threat for the entire humanity.

What is the essence of S. Huntington's predictions? Studying the interaction of civilizations the American scholar pays attention to the substantially reducing presence of the West in non-western societies. To his mind, soon 'there will come a period of geopolitical opposition along the borders of civilizations'. In a word, relations between civilizations boil down to opposition, clashes and conflicts. The author denounces the growth of inter-religious conflicts in the nearest future. It will happen, from his point of view, right at the intersections of the civilizations mentioned above.¹

According to Huntington, conflicts are most likely to take place along 'the cultural fault lines' or spatial borders of metacultural communities. His whole book is imbued with premonition of the forthcoming local inter-civilizational clashes. At times his formulations bear certainty of the battles which are to come. What is the reason for it? Basing on his research we can pick out several aspects of the contemporary epoch which can destabilize the situation in the world as a whole. According to Huntington's views, a prominent role in determining the character of the modern world is played by fundamentalism (the rigid observation of archaic norms, conservatism and retract to the old regime), first of all in the form of religious movements. Huntington puts the retract to traditional cultural values down to the reaction to the expansion of the western industrial culture into developing countries. This reaction is most clearly seen in Islam-oriented countries which play an important role in the modern age.

Suggesting his concept of 'the clash of civilizations' professor S. Huntington challenged many established ideas concerning the nature of the current and would-be global and regional confrontations, and offered a new paradigm for theoretic research and forecast of the world order at the turn of the 21st century. One can say with a considerable part of certainty that it is almost the most prominent of the concepts introduced over the previous decade where an overall picture of the world is shown.

Huntington's thesis stating that it is the civilizational model of interpretation of the modern and future state of the world that is able to become the generalizing or the main scientific paradigm of the post-Cold War age, met valid objections from the critically minded. For example, L. I. Abalkin disagrees with such a simplified statement of the issue. According to his theory of historic synthesis the impact of civilizational characteristics on the development of a society in every country is just one of the three mega-trends. 'There is an issue which is yet to be explored properly; this is a question of how the type of civilization is reproduced over several centuries, what is the genetic code with which a civilization is reproduced at a new stage? This is one of the most complex issues. It is almost entirely dependent upon the state of culture in the broadest sense of the word: traditions, systems of values, beliefs, motivation, family relations, family legends and many other factors.'²

¹ The most important works by S. Huntington are: *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations* (1957), *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (1961), *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), *American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony* (1981), *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (1991), *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (1996), *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (2004).

² See: Huntington S. *The Clash of Civilizations* // Polis. 1994. No. 1, p. 33–38.

But let us go back to considering the main theses of S. Huntington's theory of the clash of civilizations. By no means unimportant is the fact that S. Huntington is a political scientist, not a philosopher of history or a cultural studies scholar: his constructions are targeted not so much at scientific community but at incumbent politicians. The concept offered by him has resulted in practical conclusions, certain political forecasts are made, western politicians are expected to stick to the strategy based on the civilizational paradigm. Due to it the question of how reliable the construction offered by him is, gains in particular importance.

Ideology instead of economics. S. Huntington proceeds from the right assumption that the integrity of the non-Western world or the split along the West–East line is a myth created in the West. As a matter of fact, multiculturalism has always been inherent in human society. This situation still remains unchanged. For the first time in history the world is becoming politically multi-polar. Contrary to western political scientists' hopes there is no universal civilization emerging. But the three big blocks of the Cold War, as S. Huntington concludes, are being replaced by seven or eight world civilizations.

The author supposes that after the end of the Cold War people's lives are dominated by culture, identity and their symbols which have overshadowed ideology and political or economic interests. In S. Huntington's view, in the modern conditions not ideology but culture becomes the basis for uniting countries into blocks or civilizations. Speaking about the fact that relations between civilizations are replacing the ideologically coloured confrontation between the two systems of the Cold War age he sees them as a new phenomenon of the latest development period.

Most of all S. Huntington tries to prove that modernization has resulted in global politics changing its ways with regard to cultural differences. People and countries with similar cultures tend to keep together, and people and countries with different cultures drift apart. Unions that were driven by ideology and mutual relations of super nations are now replaced by unions that are predetermined by culture and civilization. Political borders become increasingly coincident with cultural, ethnic, religious and civilizational ones, cultural unions replace ideological blocks of the Cold War age.

However, proclaiming 'the human history to be the history of civilizations', S. Huntington should have elucidated this statement more thoroughly. One of his main ideas is that in the modern conditions civilization stops being the object of history and turns into its subject. And this point could be agreed upon. But this conclusion does not at all mean that the civilizational paradigm dominated historically.

There is no doubt that the civilizational approach is used by some historians to sort the knowledge of the world history, however while doing this they perceive civilizations as only or mostly cultural communities of the highest order, which cannot be applied to the world politics. Historically the war and politics were the lot of political communities (first of all, of states), which possessed central governance and common will. But cultural communities were alien to it.

Besides, experts are well aware of the fact that application of the civilizational approach is restricted due to the lack of commonly recognized criteria for picking out certain civilizations. Thus the list of such civilizations is one way or another different in works of various authors. All this does not stop historians from using the civilizational approach with some conditionality for some special aims. However, it cannot serve as the only dependable basis for serious political forecasts and, moreover, for working out the real political strategy.

Religion as a phantom. What then does S. Huntington do in this case? The main determining feature of the civilizations which are under his consideration is thought to be religion, though the author concedes that civilizations cannot possibly

have any precise criteria and borders. It is implied from the context of his book that civilizations are determined according to the dominating population and its religion. Thus, for instance, the Orthodox civilization includes the whole of Eurasia, including Kazakhstan, Georgia and Armenia, and a number of East European countries. So, it is conceivable that within one civilization there can be found fragments of other civilizations, as, for example, inclusions of Muslims in Russia, Georgia and in Kazakhstan. This is where S. Huntington sees the real hazard to these countries and supposes that they are threatened with an inevitable collapse, as it has already happened with the USSR or Yugoslavia. He appears to predict the same situation for Russia.

An attempt to pick out separate civilizations according to one rigid criterion, in this case the religious one, which was made by S. Huntington, proves the set task to be virtually impracticable. For example, he singles out Latin America as a separate civilization. To our mind, if we logically follow confessional affiliations we should unite Latin America with Spain, Portugal, France and Italy (and even with South Germany), contrasting them with Central and Northern Europe.

However, it would 'destroy' the harmonious image of the Western civilization, so fondly cherished by S. Huntington. Along with it, unwilling to divide the West into Protestant and Catholic parts, he takes the liberty of predicting, for example, the breakup of the Ukraine into two parts (Western and Eastern) according to the religious principle. Besides, drawing the divide between the Western (Catholic-Protestant) and the Orthodox civilizations S. Huntington represents the Islamic world as an integral civilization and does not divide it into Sunni and Shiite communities.

The enemy or the Other. Within the limited framework S. Huntington also interprets the universal 'us-them' dichotomy. To his mind, for people seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity, the image of an enemy is very important, so barbarism is often proclaimed as one. On the last page of his work Huntington claims that in the 'global' possible clash 'between civilization and barbarism, the great world civilizations... should keep together, otherwise they will die one after another.'¹ However, the author does not explain why the image of 'us' should be necessarily contrasted not with an image of 'the other', but with an image of an enemy. Apparently, the researcher is weighed upon by the widespread cultural stereotype.

Nevertheless, on the grounds of these dubious assumptions there are daring conclusions made that particularly dangerous hostility between societies appears on the fault lines between the basic world civilizations that look absolute antipodes and allegedly by definition are in antagonism.

Conflict of civilizations or conflict of ignorance. Reasoning further S. Huntington does not tell apart the causes of conflict and the mechanisms of mobilization and formation of unions. At that, it is not taken into account that culture creates prerequisites for solidarity much more often (though this circumstance should not be absolutized), than becomes the ground for conflict. In our view, S. Huntington excessively exaggerates the abundance of conflicts owing to the differences concerning the basic values in the modern world. Where he finds a 'religious conflict' (Ingush-Ossetian, Israeli-Palestinian, etc.) it most often refers to political and territorial conflicts which are only indirectly relevant to religion or culture.

For example, Russia's most prominent expert on Islam V. Naumkin emphasizes: 'For instance, let us consider the conflict between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis which developed over Karabakh... The confessional element is not

noticeable there – this is not a conflict over faith or moral values, it is not about cultural dissonance. This is an issue of politics, land, interests of power, resource availability, etc.'²

Culture for or against politics. S. Huntington considers the determination of the role and place of the cultural factor in the world politics to be his discovery.

Admitting the utmost importance of the cultural factor S. Huntington appears to distort its role, claiming that different potentialities of political and economic development of different civilizations originate from their different culture. For instance, he maintains that it is the cultural factor that causes difficulty establishing the democratic systems in East Asia. However, it takes only to compare North Korea with South Korea or, for example, Hong Kong and Taiwan with China to see that the point is not culture but the political regime. Blaming the Islamic culture for the failure of democratic experiments in the Muslim world sounds no less dubious, suffice it to compare Pakistan and Turkey with Syria or Iraq.

Diversity is even noted in the ex-Soviet Central Asia where Kazakhstan has made much more progress in terms of democratic development than, for example, Turkmenistan. Meanwhile, S. Huntington peremptorily maintains that development in post-communist countries is determined, first of all, by their civilizational underlying cause: progress can be seen where there is the heritage of western Christianity. In this connection there arises a question: can we say that, for instance, Western Ukraine has made more progress in its development than Eastern Ukraine?

In fact, S. Huntington turns 'civilizations' into incredibly stable societies incapable of working out any meaningful common cultural elements. Thus we can draw a conclusion of the misunderstanding and hostility which are allegedly immanently inherent in them. Consequently, tension between them is put down not to some real interests with their specific historical dynamics, but to cultural differences. This is why S. Huntington claims that 'the problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam as a different civilization'.

This statement is absolutely inaccurate and extremely dangerous for the future united Europe. It is even less acceptable for Russia where, according to the census of 2010, there live 14–16 million citizens representing peoples which adhere to the Islamic tradition. The entire historical experience of our country testifies: it is possible not only to conduct a dialogue between Christianity and Islam but to cooperate.

We can observe that in S. Huntington's rhetoric there is also an argument of cultural incompatibility that has been actively used by new racists in Western Europe over the last twenty years. Like them he reproaches immigrants for their unwillingness to assimilate and for the obstinate commitment to their own cultures – it allegedly creates a threat of breakup for host countries, undermining their Christian bases. In fact, this supposedly 'cultural' conflict, as a rule, is caused by many factors, including the practices of discriminating against immigrants.

As a matter of fact, S. Huntington's concept proclaiming cultural homogeneity to be a panacea for all problems encourages ethno-nationalism and ethnic purges, i.e. crystallization of the society.

In a word, the civilizational approach as described by S. Huntington is an armchair scientist's original view, which is quite distant from reality. To understand this point it only takes to appeal to the recent history of post-Soviet countries. As for Russia, in it owing to the uniting role of the Russian people the unique unity and diversity, spiritual commonality and the union of different peoples have been preserved. They have played a historic part in forming the Russian civilization which has a complex nature and which has been able, historically chang-

¹ See: Huntington S. *The Clash of Civilizations*, M., 2003, p. 532.

² See: 'Aktual'nye problemy gumanitarnoj nauki–2008'. Vyp. 89, SPbGUP, 2009, p. 68 ('Live issues of the humanitarian science – 2008'. Issue 89, SPbUHSS, 2009, p. 68).

ing its political borders, to preserve and maintain the profound bases for socio-cultural unique identity of its member communities. Their interaction, which does not exclude conflict as a most important form of development, was based, nevertheless, not on attempts to totally impose their principles upon one another but on cooperation, particularly and first of all right between these ethno-confessional communities as subjects of civilizations. There are widely known historic facts of this sort connected both with international communications of horizontal character (for example, between the Russians and representatives of Muslim and other confessions of ethnic groups from newly joint regions), and with the state policy of providing economic and political benefits for the population of 'civilizationally alien' western and eastern outlying districts, for example, from the times of Alexander I and up to the *perestroika* of the 1980s of the 20th century.¹

In Russia, despite some extremist attempts from both sides they failed to provoke a split between the Orthodox and the Muslims. Meanwhile, Chechen separatists, who in every way possible emphasize their commitment to Islam and Islamic solidarity, managed to attack Dagestan and were decisively repulsed by local Muslims who did not wish to become a part of a new Caliphate.

Counting on solidarity in the Muslim world Chechen separatists were disappointed at receiving no powerful backing which they had expected. This failure overtook the Balkar and the Karachai radicals. Also we cannot but admit that Wahabis do not enjoy the warm support from the Russian Muslims.

The facts from our recent past refute American political scientists' assumptions. Events which took place in Georgia in August 2008 pose another argument in favour of inadequacy of clash of civilizations. Orthodox Georgia exercised an act of genocide against Orthodox South Ossetia, but at the same time over the previous years it has established normal relations with Muslim countries of Azerbaijan and Turkey. By the way, the fact that S. Huntington did not once mention Georgia is revealing! He keeps overlooking it in his reasoning, in particular, about the fact that new catholic and protestant countries are striving to join the EU and NATO. But this is what Georgia has for a long time been striving for, being neither a Catholic nor a Protestant country. It is hard to believe that such an experienced professional as S. Huntington was unaware of the situation in Georgia. In our opinion, this failure to mention is programmed as Georgia's policy in no way fits into the picture he creates. Besides, the author also gave no explanation to the fact that Orthodox Georgia gets on with the Western civilization and does not aspire to joining the Orthodox civilization. No less demonstrative is the fact that Armenia, in its turn, though being in confrontation with Azerbaijan, was on friendly terms with Iran and then managed to establish quite close relations with Turkey.

In Central Asia the so-called 'Muslim solidarity' did not at all hinder the slaughter in Fergana in the late 80s of the previous century, or the Osh conflict of 1990 and the tragic events of 2010.

The thesis of solid Muslim solidarity also does not work on an international level. There still remains some antagonism between republics in Central Asia, unsettled territorial disputes are present. The pan-Islamic cultural underlying cause does not at all promote regional integration in these regions. For exam-

¹ See, for example: Kappeler A. *Rossija – mnogonacional'naja imperija*. M., 1997 (Russia is a multiethnic empire); Nacional'naja politika Rossii: istorija i sovremennost'. M., 1997 (The ethnic policy of Russia: the history and the present); Nacional'nye ukrainy Rossijskoj imperii: stanovlenie i razvitie sistemy upravlenija. M., 1998 (Ethnic outlying districts of the Russian empire: formation and development of the system of control); Martin T. *Imperija pozitivnogo dejstva: Sovetskij Sojuz kak vysshaja forma imperializma? // Av. imperio*. No. 2/2002 (The empire of positive action: the Soviet Union as the highest form of imperialism?); Organizacija političeskogo prostranstva imperii i nacii // Av. imperio. No. 7/2002 (Organization of the political space of the empire and the nation) and others.

ple, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are much more inclined to become close friends with Russia than with Uzbekistan.

An outstanding Russian scientist N. N. Moiseyev wrote: 'Toynbee who maintained that religions shape civilizations (S. Huntington upholds the same views) is hardly right. As civilizations are older than any religion, I believe that in this case everything goes the other way round: civilizations choose a religion and adapt it to their traditions justified by their historical experience. I think characteristics of civilizations are determined, first of all, by life conditions, characteristics of the territory, its landscapes, and climate.'²

'Accepting this statement by N. N. Moiseyev,' Y. M. Primakov remarks, 'it appears necessary to add that religions are a most important constituent of civilizations which make a truly great impact on them.' And further Primakov quite rightly points out: 'This is a fact that Islam, as well as Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, is engendered by 'its own' civilization and makes a considerable influence on the course of its further development. However the historic truth is interdependence, interpenetration of civilizations and their most important constituents – religions.'³

In present-day ethno-political conflicts the religious factor is not the cause but the background, which can either exacerbate the conflict or, on the contrary, reduce tension. As it has been mentioned above, despite the seeming revival of interest in religion, it is converted from the symbol of faith to a cultural phenomenon, and more and more people mainly see the symbol of their ethnic identity in it. Cultural symbols are the important resources which, in contemporary conditions, conflicting parties, as a rule, appeal to. And still, using religion as a political instrument or an ideological tool in the regions under consideration can be seen less often than it could be expected with regard to the logics of 'the clash of civilizations'.

The real hazard is caused not by the split of the world into several so-called civilizations but the fact that politicians appeal to the image of 'civilizations'. As detractor of the concept of 'the clash of civilizations' G. Mirsky rightly remarks, after the slogan of class struggle became out-of-date a number of politicians are tempted to justify violence by means of ethnicity and religion. In this case the threat of interethnic and interreligious conflicts considerably increases. Fortunately, realizing that such conflicts are rather dangerous, leaders of ethnic movements tend to abstain from mobilizing the religious factor. The clergy are even better aware of it.

So, we have quite a successful provocation for the discussion, the final aim of which is the search of an answer to an eternal question of the grounds for differences concerning the socio-economic development of countries and peoples, which boil down to the conclusion of permanence of cultural differences and the aggressive nature of their bearers. However, this answer, even for its 'refined' simplicity cannot be recognized as satisfactory. Suffice it to appeal to the forecast of a cultural anthropologist R. Schweder who, having linked the two variants of predictions with concepts of F. Fukuyama and S. Huntington, still insists on his own, third variant seeing it as the most probable one:

- the West, being superior to everyone and globalizing, will disseminate all over the world;
- other civilizations (cultured ones) are doomed to struggle for preserving their cultures;
- the world will transform into a liberal post-modernist analogue of the Ottoman Empire with a system of religious communities and two basic 'castes' – the global élite of liberal cosmopolites in the Centre and non-liberals at the local level. At

² Moiseev N. N. *Sud'ba civilizacij*. M., 1998, p. 42. (The destiny of civilizations)

³ Primakov E. M. *Mir posle 11 sentjabrja i vtorzhenie v Irak*. Moscow, 2003. (The world after the 11th of September and invasion of Iraq).

that, the transformation of the underlying archetypes of culture even in the conditions of globalization is impossible.¹

Apparently, any speculative construction confirms its validity only after it has undergone a test of reality. A foreteller's trade is a thankless job. However, political experience and socio-cultural practices prove that the 'west-centrist' thinking as a monopoly for ideas of the ways and means of human progress is becoming obsolete giving way to a cultural diversity.

Another approach is based on treating every culture as a value, a source of mutual cultural enrichment. For many participants of the annual International Likhachov scientific conference it is personified in the figure of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov.

According to D. S. Likhachov, 'there are no borders for culture and it is enriched by developing its characteristics, enriched by communicating with other cultures. Ethnic reserve inevitably leads to impoverishment of culture, to the loss of its distinct character'.² The Cathedral Epistle of the 10th Russian People World Council which was held in Moscow in April 2006 emphasizes that 'an important part of Russia's mission in the 21st century is active development of the dialogue between religions, cultures and civilizations'.³ It is our Homeland which is a unique example of a plastic, elaborate system of intercultural interaction, which adequately stands the strength tests and makes a creative contribution to the world history.

The dialogue of cultures, partnership of civilizations today involve not only theoretic constructions of a higher level but everyday lives of millions of people. It is this dialogue of cultures that is particularly characteristic of Russia and, first of all, of the Caucasian and the Volga regions. According to Huntington's definition these territories refer to zones of civilizational fault lines where conflicts are supposed to take place in the first turn. The practices of this region's population are the best argument against the advocates of the clash of civilizations.

I would like to illustrate this thesis using a concrete experience of the interaction and mutual adaptation in interethnic settlements of the Volga-Urals region.⁴

The area of the Volga Federal District is one of Russia's multiethnic regions. It is inhabited by Finno-Ugric (Mordovians of Erzya and Moksha groups, Udmurts, Besermians, Maris); Turkic (Chuvashs, Bashkirs, Tatars, including Chryashians and Mishars) and East Slavonic (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians) inhabitants, which differ in their language and culture. The ethnic palette is completed by migrants of the end of the 19th or the beginning of the 20th centuries: Letts, Estonians, Germans, Jews, Poles and modern migrants from Central Asia and the Caucasus.

The multiethnic population structure of the Volga-Urals historical and ethnographic region also predetermined its multi-confessional character. Here there live followers of traditional ethnic religions (Udmurts, Maris, Chuvashs), Sunni Islam (Bashkirs, Tatars), Orthodox Christianity of the Newer Belief (Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Mordovians, Chuvashs, Chryashians, Maris, Udmurts, etc.), Orthodox Christianity of the Older Belief (Russians, Mordovians), Catholicism (Poles, Letts), Protestantism: Lutherans (Germans, Estonians, Letts), Baptists, Mennonites (Russian, Germans, etc), Judaism (Jews). At present various Oriental doctrines and Protestant denominations have become quite common.

Different ethnic and religious groups keep in close touch with one another. There is an intense interaction between them, both on an ethnic and on a religious level, especially in the con-

ditions of living together in one and the same population aggregate. Lately there have appeared a number of works where interethnic relations are viewed first of all in the context of studying conflicts. Meanwhile, the experience of the mankind suggests that conflicts do not by far tend to appear between groups of people who belong to different peoples and differ in terms of their language and culture. Moreover, their peaceful co-existence is rather a rule than an exception. But this is not the only point. While contacting and interacting they learn the language and elements of culture of one another, in some cases changing their ethnic identity.

Processes of such peaceful co-existence have been paid much less attention to of late than problems of interethnic conflicts. In particular, the vast positive experience of such an interaction that has been taking place on the territory of Russia over centuries has not been studied and mastered thoroughly. Apparently, the population aggregates where representatives of different ethnic groups live together represent the social environment where processes on interethnic and intercultural interaction are intense. It is in this environment where many tendencies and mechanisms of ethno-cultural interaction manifest themselves in a most conspicuous way.

Fieldworks conducted by scholars from the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Science in 2006–08 showed that residents determine the state of their interethnic relations as stable and friendly. To confirm it they cite such facts as blended families and labour collectives, mutual help and even shared holidays. Both groups note community in religion and community in the key elements of holiday culture. For instance, both the Chuvashs and the Mordovians have New Year holidays with fortune-telling, Shrovetide, Easter, the Semik-Trinity cycle, some elements of funeral and commemoration rites (distribution of gifts, threads, obligatory commemoration days) on their calendars.⁵

There is no doubt that ethno-cultural convergence of different peoples is promoted by interethnic marriages, the share of which has been increasing steadily since 2000. In population aggregates of the Volga Federal District when arranging blended marriages the cultural dialogue starts with the process of marriage brokerage. In the village of Naumovka in the Republic of Bashkortostan, for example, if a Mordovian male proposes to a Chuvash female, the rite follows the Mordovian tradition, i.e. they bring a pie with cottage cheese *ava lovtso*, which is eaten at the bride's home after the prayer is over. In case the Chuvash male proposes to a Mordovian girl they can also bring a pie, but most often a cake is bought in a shop. At the funeral repast of the Chuvashs, the Mordovians also take part in the rite *hyvni*, i.e. they crumble and put pieces of the commemoration food to special tableware.⁶

In the village of Maximovo in Yanaulskiy district in Bashkiria where Udmurts and Tatars live, peoples adhering to different religious traditions, besides the marriage sphere, friendly and neighbourly relations are maintained through household help and visits. The Udmurts visit the Tatars to celebrate Muslim holidays. The Tatars are well aware of the rites of the Udmurts. There are holidays celebrated by both peoples. For example, Sabantuy, including going door-to-door of the village before the holiday to collect gifts, where teenagers and young men take part irrespective of their nationality. They visit all houses, collect eggs for a wrestling contest, towels, headscarves, cloth lengths. The Udmurts consider this holiday to be Tatar, but over the last years they have been celebrating it together. Sabantuy has entered the circle of the seasons of the Udmurts and other villages of the republic. The Tatars' custom of *kaz*

¹ See: Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, N. Y., 2000, p. 169–171.

² See: Likhachov D. S. Zemlja rodnaia. Moscow, Prosveshchenie, 1983, p. 45–49. (The Homeland).

³ Zhurnal Moskovskoj Patriarii. 2006, No. 6, p. 77.

⁴ See: Opyt vzaimodestviia i vzaimnoj adaptatsii v etnicheski smeshannykh seleniakh Uralo-Povolzhja. Moscow: IJeA RAN, 2009, p. 10–11, 26–27. (The experience of the interaction and mutual adaptation in ethnically blended villages of the Volga-Urals region).

⁵ See: Jagafova E. A. Chuvashi v kontekste mezhetnicheskogo vzaimodestviia v Pribel'skom bassejne Bashkirii // Opyt vzaimodestviia i vzaimnoj adaptatsii v etnicheski smeshannykh seleniakh Uralo-Povolzhja. Moscow, 2009, p. 119. (The Chuvash in the context of inter-ethnic interaction in Pribelskiy basin of Bashkiria).

⁶ Op. cit., p. 127.

omese (goose help) – female autumn help aimed at processing geese has already become a part of the holiday culture of the Udmurts, when female relatives, neighbours, colleagues help each other. The event becomes a place for communication, a holiday and meals with dishes made from poultry.¹

In the material culture of the peoples of the Volga Federal District today there are more similarities than differences. Nevertheless, clothes, objects of religious worship, some everyday and ritual dishes preserve their ethnically specific character. At the same time the design of farmsteads, the architecture have a lot of features in common and bear a common regional character.

Multilingualism when the population can speak several languages has become a fact of the population's everyday life. For example, according to the census of 2002, 98 per cent of Russia's population speak Russian,² and over 50 thousand Russian inhabitants of the Republic of Bashkortostan know Tatar, Bashkir, Chuvash, Mordovian, Mari and other languages of neighbouring peoples.³ In Tatarstan over 80 thousand Russians know the languages of neighbouring peoples.⁴ The level of bilingualism is also high in Mordovian–Chuvash and Udmurt–Tatar settlements.

The 'Declaration of Volga Forum' drawn at the international conference of the Council of Europe 'The dialogue of cultures and interreligious cooperation' in Nizhny Novgorod

noted: 'Participants rejected the thesis that the instability of today is caused by the 'clash of civilizations'. It is to the advantage of all cultural, ethnic and religious communities for such deceptive and provocative ideas not to be used as a factor of political mobilization.

Participants of the conference also noted meaningful intercultural and interreligious cooperation on the local and regional levels in the Volga region and in Russia as a whole. The Council of Europe welcomed Russia's contribution to working out the policy and practical endeavours of the Council of Europe, which place their experience and the valuable mechanisms for the dialogue of cultures at the disposal of the participating countries.⁵

Along with it, as the latest fieldworks of the Institute for Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of Sciences have shown, interethnic relations did not always develop well from the very beginning, and the good, neighbourly and friendly relations of today result from a long process of gradual convergence and mutual adjustment of representatives of different cultures.⁶

The present-day ethno-political situation in Russia shows that the problem of interethnic relations invariably remains one of the most complex ones and is hard to control. Thus, we as scientists see our task in summarizing the positive practices of intercultural cooperation, promoting the dialogue of civilizations in the conditions of globalization.

Ljubomir Zuković⁷

CULTURE OF SERBS IN THE WHIRL OF HISTORICAL CHANGES

I believe that by the 'dialogue between cultures' we mean something similar. The dialogue between cultures has taken place in one form or another since different nations, their respective cultures and languages came into existence. This dialogue depended on many circumstances, some of them were favourable, others slowed it down or even made it impossible (at least for some time).

One circumstance cannot be questioned – contacts, interaction and interpenetration of different cultures have always been fruitful and desirable. Of course, there was a condition that they were voluntary and equal. Relations between different cultures can be more visibly presented between neighbours and nations whose languages, those important tools of culture evolution, are similar, which, together with economic factors, promoted some other types of relations and contacts. For the process we are discussing, religious identity is particularly important, or at least similarity between certain nations, which does not necessarily mean their geographic closeness. These factors

are favourable and desirable for mutual cultural influence and enrichment which at any times must be guarded and strengthened.

Mutual cultural influence and enrichment occurs in two directions even in the case of conquering one nation by another. At times the conquered nation triumphed over its conquerors due to its more developed culture, which permits to conclude that culture is a more powerful weapon than the sword and the gun. History knows this type of confusion of cultures of different nations, but it is undesirable because it is accompanied by numerous acts of antagonism and resistance and often by violence in different forms. It is neither cultural nor democratic, and directly threatens the rights and freedoms of individuals and peoples.

A less painful and less violent form of conquering one nation by another is an economic conquest, which does not necessarily results in the cultural conquest of the defeated nation, but which creates premises for cultural links, influence and gradual cultural and economic dependence of economically weaker nations. It demonstrates numerous and important links between economy and culture which have existed at all times and which are particularly vital today.

Considering the aforementioned, I would like to outline the situation with the Serbian people to which I belong, first and foremost the situation with those who live in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Republika Srpska (the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

In the Serbian tumultuous and not particularly happy historical past, there was a silver lining. On having settled in the Balkans, they got the Greeks as neighbours who had already become Christians and to whose culture and civilization not only Europe but the whole world are indebted. The Greek influence on the Serbs was obvious in all spheres of life, particularly in the sphere of culture and spirituality. The decisive event in this process took place in

¹ Popova E. V. *Sovremennye processy mezhetnicheskogo i mezkul'turnogo vzaimodejstviya u udmurtov – zhitel'ej smeshannyh selenij// Opyt vzaimodejstviya i vzaimnoj adaptacii v etnicheskij smeshannyh selenijah Uralo-Povolzh'ja*. M., 2009 g., S. 137 (The modern processes of inter-ethnic and cross-cultural interaction of the Udmurts – residents of blended settlements)

² *Itogi Vserossijskoj perepisi naselenija 2002 g.*, Moscow, 2004 g. t. 4, vol. 1, p. 20 (The resume of the population census of 2002)

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 133–134.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 153–154.

⁵ See: *Itogovye dokumenty konferencii 'Dialog kul'tur i mezhdunarodnoe sotrudnichestvo'*. Nizhny Novgorod. 7–9 sentjabrja 2006. (The resulting documents of the conference 'Dialogue of cultures and international cooperation').

⁶ The project 'Ethnically Blended Settlements in the Volga–Urals Region: Historical and Ethnological Research' was conducted with the financial aid of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Foundation (grant 06-01-00204a). The project 'Ethnically Blended Settlements in the Volga–Urals Region: the Experience of Mutual Socio-Cultural Adaptation' was conducted with the financial support from the Programme for fundamental research of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences 'Adaptation of peoples and cultures to changes in environment, social and anthropogenic transformations'. The both projects headed by A. D. Korostelyov.

⁷ Vice-President of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina).

the 9th century when brothers Cyril and Methodius invented a Cyrillic script and translated the Bible into Serbian. It was the most significant event which had far-reaching consequences for the development of Serbian culture and spirituality as well as for their common life and later historical fate. The Serbs became Christians, and their written language, which was to be used in church for many centuries, became a powerful tool of the development of literature and translations from foreign languages, predominantly from Greek.

Spiritual affinity and other ties between Greek and Serbian languages facilitated the fact that both nations remained acolytes of the Orthodox religion after the schism of Christianity into the Western Roman Catholicism and the Eastern Orthodoxy. This mutual influence continued over centuries and manifested itself not only in literature, historiography, art, religion, legislation but also in architecture and construction. It was dominating in character but not the only one. Serbian culture was under the influence from Northern neighbours, Hungarians, as well as from Western neighbours from coastal towns. This led to the mixture of different styles in architecture and painting and later in literature. This is how a special Moravian style of Rastki was born. No wonder that the first Serbian archbishop, St. Sava, affirmed that Serbia was the West of the East and the East of the West.

In the second half of the 15th century the splintered parts of the once powerful Serbian principality turned out to be under the Turkish yoke. Ivo Andrić told about the consequences of these events for the spiritual life of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina in his doctoral dissertation and particularly colourfully in his novels and stories. He did it so artfully that he became the first Serbian writer to win the Nobel prize in literature. Serbian culture, as Dobrica Ćosić aptly remarked, developed 'in continuous ruptures'.

The influence of the Ottoman empire, despite being undesirable, continued in spiritual and, consequently, in cultural life of the Serbs for a few centuries. Its traces can be seen in many spheres, first of all, in the language, architecture, folklore, and, particularly, in the lyrical folk songs and their music components. The continuous presence in Serbia of the Turkish army which also included representatives of the defeated Islamic nations – Persians, Arabs and others – left its stamp on Serbian culture.

Of course, this has nothing to do with cultural dialogue since in fact it was slavery and violence, the long-lasting and hard consequence of which was Islamization (both voluntary and enforced) of the majority of the Serb population. At the same time Islamization was in the close cause-effect connection with conversion into Catholicism of the part of Serbian people who fled from Turkey to Austria-Hungary and Venice. The persistence of the Serbs seems particularly astounding. Against all the odds they enshrined in memory their old glory and the faith that they would free from the slavery sooner or later. The decisive role in that was played by the Serbian Orthodox Church and epic folk poetry that glorified the once powerful Serbian state and paid tribute to those who had perished fighting for faith and freedom.

All the aforementioned factors had serious consequences in Bosnia and Herzegovina, first, because the area was the last to be liberated from the Turkish slavery, and, second, because the process of Islamization was the most extensive and durable here. When it comes to the Ottoman impact on Serbian culture, unfortunately, it is necessary to mention some adverse cultural 'scars' that are hard to heal, and even today they disintegrate and cause conflicts between once united peoples.

As time went, the fraternal Orthodox Russia came into existence – a powerful state the relations with which constantly strengthened and which provided assistance and support to Serbia. Awareness of kinship between the Russian and Serbian people grew stronger, and so did the understanding of these nations that they had the same foes. In their search for freedom and support more and more Serbs, sometimes whole Serbian families headed for Russia. In the 18th century migration of the Serbs to Russia was particularly active. Having arrived in Russia some Serbs took high positions in the army and the diplomatic sphere, grew wealthy and got the opportunity to help their fellow countrymen. They contributed to the promotion of cultural relations between Serbia and its newly acquired homeland, Russia. Russian religious books penetrated Serbian churches and monasteries, which indicated the closeness of their spiritual roots, language and Orthodox faith. In those days, a firm foundation of friendship was laid between the Russian and Serbian peoples.

Their relationship received a new impetus in the early twentieth century, especially during the First Serbian Uprising and has been advancing for the next one hundred years. The 'Golden Age' of Russian literature significantly contributed to the development of Russian-Serbian relations. Many Russian writers were widely translated, and the Russian language was taught in all schools. As a result, Russian culture and literature gained ascendancy over the Serbs. Serbian students came to study in Russian universities and the first universities in Serbia used mainly Russian textbooks for instruction. The Serbs were open to cultural and spiritual influence of Russia.

The October Revolution of 1917 brought chaos in the relationship between the two countries, and it became particularly evident at the political level, rather than in relations between the Russian and Serbian people. Those events even facilitated to some extent the increasing spiritual influence of Russia on the Serbs. Many opponents of the new order in Russia, mostly educated people, such as doctors, engineers, teachers, and artists moved to Serbia and found their new home there. Their artistic legacy can still be found there. Their contribution is yet to be studied and recognized in full.

In this connection, I cannot help mentioning the teacher Ignatius Poderyogin, who taught at a secondary school in Kraljevo during World War II. When Germans captured his students, he voluntarily exposed himself to be shot with them. This vivid example is an evidence of the spiritual togetherness of the Russian and Serbian people, the similarity of their historical destiny. Neither Russians in Serbia nor Serbs in Russia feel alien. And it is not surprising. It is strange, though, that some people should be worried about it. Their concern is due to the fact that relations between our two nations are beyond their understanding, as they only believe in relationships between people based on some practical interest.

In the 21st century numerous cultural ties between Serbia and Western Europe, particularly Austria-Hungary, Germany and later France began to develop, which played a significant role in the spiritual revival of Serbia.

Since the beginning of human history different people have exchanged cultural values and developed cultural interaction. This process is of a controversial nature, but on the whole it is mutually beneficial, if it is based on free will and goes in line with the respective culture. Problems never arise unless the influence is imposed through diverse forms of force and blackmail, which involves the use of violence against existing cultural traditions, customs and faith of a nation, and in the first instance against its language. A person's native land is not only and not just

hills and valleys, rivers and streams, but primarily his culture, language and spirituality in the broadest sense. If we deprive people of all this through force and coercion, it means that we violate their rights and freedoms.

It is desirable that neither violence nor blackmail be means of cultural dialogue, interaction and exchange of cultural values, and that cultural institutions play a major role in it, acting in accordance with generally accepted principles and standards. Apparently, cultural interaction should result from a free choice of free people under favourable conditions. Each nation must be aware of the advantages and disadvantages (or even hazards) posed by globalization to every culture, especially to smaller poor

countries. We need a mechanism that would allow us to use effectively the beneficial impact on culture and spirituality while restraining harmful and menacing one. Globalization is inevitable in the modern world. However, when it comes to culture, it should not be allowed to impose any kind of unified culture model by means of pressure and coercion. It is only by creating conditions for equal dialogue and free exchange that culture will become richer, more diverse and interesting.

In my opinion, the most dangerous trend for the society today is to make culture a 'servant' for profiteering. True cultural values go along with high morals. If culture becomes a 'servant' for profiteering, its purpose is discredited.

Scientific edition

DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Volume 1. Proceedings
of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference
May 12–13, 2011

(**ДИАЛОГ КУЛЬТУР В УСЛОВИЯХ ГЛОБАЛИЗАЦИИ**

XI Международные Лихачевские научные чтения
12–13 мая 2011 года
Том 1. Доклады)

Выпускающий редактор *И. В. Петрова*
Художественное оформление *В. Б. Клоков*
Технический редактор *А. Ю. Ванеева*

ISBN 978-5-7621-0618-4



Подписано в печать с оригинала-макета 27.04.11. Формат 60x90/8
Гарнитура Schoolbook. Усл. печ. л. 25,0. Тираж 300 экз. Заказ № 60

Санкт-Петербургский Гуманитарный
университет профсоюзов
192238, Санкт-Петербург, ул. Фучика, 15

Отпечатано в типографии СПбГУП