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ST. PETERSBURG INTELLIGENTSIA CONGRESS

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ST. PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

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# DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE: Vol.1  
12TH INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

May 17–18, 2012

*The Conference is held in accordance with  
the Decree of President of Russia V. V. Putin  
'On perpetuating the memory  
of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov'  
No 587, dated from May 23, 2001*

*The conference, originally called 'The Days of Sci-  
ence in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities  
and Social Sciences' is the 20th in number  
and the 12th in the status of the International  
Likhachov Scientific Conference*



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The book presents the proceedings of the 12th International Likhachov Scientific Conference that is due to take place on May 17–18, 2012 at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences in accordance with the Decree of President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin ‘On perpetuating the memory of D. S. Likhachov’.

The authors are prominent Russian and foreign scholars, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Academy of Education: A. A. Akayev, U. V. Arutyunyan, O. T. Bogomolov, S. Yu. Glazyev, A. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, A. S. Zapesotsky, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, V. L. Makarov, V. V. Naumkin, V. S. Styopin, T. Y. Khabrieva, N. P. Shmelyov and others; heads of research centers, well-known political figures, statesmen and public officials, clerisy representatives: the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S. V. Lavrov, Judges of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation G. A. Hajiyeu and M. I. Kleandrov, Chairman of the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation V. Ye. Churov, Deputy Ministers of the Russian Federation A. E. Busygin, G. M. Gatilov and A. L. Safonov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland A. V. Yakovenko, President of the Bar of Moscow H. M. Reznik, writer A. A. Likhanov.

Among foreign guests of the Conference are HRH Michael of Kent (Great Britain), Member of Parliament of India M. M. Joshi, Director of the Secretariat of the Alliance of Civilizations of the United Nations Organization M. Scheuer; representatives of foreign Academies of Sciences: F. Unger – from the European Academy of Sciences and Arts, Yu. S. Shemshuchenko – from the Ukrainian National Academy of Sciences, A. N. Nysanbayev – from the National Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Kazakhstan, V. Prodanov – from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, G. Xing – from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences; German political analyst A. Rahr, French slavist R. Guerra and other outstanding persons.

The papers of the participants of the 12th Likhachov Conference are devoted to the burning issues of the modern age. The role of the Conference was highly estimated by V. V. Putin: ‘The meeting devoted to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations will become another step in the development of inter-faith and inter-ethnic communication, will promote the rapprochement of peoples’.

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**DECREE OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
'ON PERPETUATING THE MEMORY  
OF DMITRY SERGEYEVICH LIKHACHOV'**

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Given D. S. Likhachov's outstanding contribution to the development of the home science and culture I enact:

1. the Government of the Russian Federation should:

- establish two personal grants in honour of D. S. Likhachov at the rate of 400 roubles each for university students from the year 2001 and to define the procedure of conferring them;
- work out the project of D. S. Likhachov's gravestone on a competitive basis together with the Government of St. Petersburg;
- consider the issue of making a film devoted to D. S. Likhachov's life and activities.

2. the Government of St. Petersburg should:

- name one of the streets in St. Petersburg after D. S. Likhachov;
- consider the issue of placing a memorial plate on the building of the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Science (Pushkin's House);
- guarantee the work on setting up D. S. Likhachov's gravestone in prescribed manner.

3. According to the suggestion from the Russian Academy of Science the Likhachov Memorial Prizes of the Russian Academy of Science should be established for Russian and foreign scientists for their outstanding contribution to the research of literature and culture of ancient Russia, and the collected writings of the late Academician should be published.

4. **According to the suggestion from St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress the International Likhachov Scientific Conference should be annually held on the Day of the Slavonic Letters and Culture.**

**VLADIMIR PUTIN**

**President of the Russian Federation**

Moscow, the Kremlin, May 23, 2001



**GREETINGS OF PRESIDENT  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
DMITRY MEDVEDEV  
TO THE PARTICIPANTS  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV  
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

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**To the participants and guests  
of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends!

Congratulations on the opening of the Likhachov Scientific Conference, which has brought to St. Petersburg prominent scholars, figures and experts on culture from more than 20 countries of the world.

You are about to discuss some key humanitarian issues of the contemporary age, the main of them being the development of the dialogue of cultures. The current Conference's special feature will be an opening of the unique exhibition of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov's works, which will be of interest to both the participants of the forum and a wide audience outside. I am certain that your meetings will henceforth promote humanistic values and ideas. And the initiatives set forth at the Conference will become a significant contribution to improving international and inter-confessional relations.

I wish you every success and fruitful work.

*President of the Russian Federation*  
**D. A. MEDVEDEV**



**GREETINGS OF CHAIRMAN  
OF THE GOVERNMENT  
OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION  
VLADIMIR PUTIN  
TO THE PARTICIPANTS  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL  
LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

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**To the participants and guests  
of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear Friends!

I would like to welcome participants, hosts and guests of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Your forum, traditionally gathering the cream of the Russian intellectual community, prominent scientists and public figures from all over the world in St. Petersburg is an outstanding and remarkable event in the international scientific and cultural life. It is crucial that the topics of the Conference precisely reflect the most urgent and acute humanitarian issues, the main of them being promotion of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in the modern world, establishment of moral and spiritual foundations of the society. And certainly, one of the priority tasks for you is preserving the invaluable legacy of Dmitry Sergeyeovich Likhachov, which is as relevant and significant as before.

I wish you fruitful and constructive discussions, interesting and useful meetings.

*Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation*  
**V. V. PUTIN**



**GREETINGS  
FROM DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF UNESCO  
IRINA BOKOVA  
TO THE PARTICIPANTS  
OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV  
SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE**

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**To the Organizing Committee  
of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference**

The theme of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference, 'Dialogue among Cultures in the Context of Globalization,' carries special meaning for UNESCO.

The Organization was created in 1945 to build peace through cooperation in education, science, culture, communication and information. Our Constitution declares that if wars start in the minds of men and women, then it is in the minds of men and women that the defences of peace must be built. Ignorance of each other's ways, and prejudice against the 'fruitful diversity of cultures' are identified as causes of mistrust, tension and conflict. The world has changed since 1945, but this mandate remains as relevant as ever.

Globalization has opened unprecedented opportunities for understanding, contact and exchange. At the same time, new questions are emerging about how to manage the deepening diversity of our societies. Increasing contacts has been accompanied by heightened anxiety from individuals and communities facing new pressures. In a context of economic austerity, it is vital for public policy to build new platforms for understanding and respect. Globalization covers the world, but it starts at home — it must begin with finding new ways to deepen understanding between peoples and to live together.

Promoting cultural heritage — from monuments, natural sites, and works of art, to intangible heritage, cultural industries and cultural expressions — lies at the heart of UNESCO's work. The Organization has developed groundbreaking international legal instruments — including the 1972 World Heritage Convention, the 2001 UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, and the 2005 Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. At the operational level, UNESCO leads innovative projects to promote better understanding as the basis for respect and dialogue. The Silk Road, the Slave Route and our General Histories provide strong examples of this work. In 2010, UNESCO led the International Year for the Rapprochement of Cultures, which set the framework for more than a thousand activities across the world, involving young people and heads of state.

In all of these activities, UNESCO relies on close cooperation with our Members States and with partners in civil society and the academic community. In this respect, I wish to pay special tribute to Professor Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, the founder of this cycle of conferences. I congratulate also the organizers of the Likhachov's conferences and the University of St. Petersburg for their vision and efforts in mobilizing the international scientific community to explore pressing contemporary issues.

I wish you every success in your debates and look forward to your conclusions.

**Irina BOKOVA**

# ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE Information

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The International Scientific Conference at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences first took place in May, 1993. It was timed to the Day of Slavonic Letters and Culture. It was initiated by academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov. Since then the conference has been held every year. After academician Likhachov had passed away this academic forum received the status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference from the government (by the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin 'On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov' No. 587, May 23, 2001).

The co-founders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Education, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress (founders: J. I. Alferov, D. A. Granin, A. S. Zapesotsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, D. S. Likhachov, A. P. Petrov, M. B. Piotrovsky). Since 2007 the conference has enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Traditionally, the most universal debatable challenges of the present time are put on the agenda of the conference: 'Education in terms of the new cultural type formation', 'Culture and global challenges of the world development', 'Humanitarian issues of the contemporary civilization' etc.

Every year greatest figures of Russian and foreign science, culture and art, public and political leaders take part in the conference. The following academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken part in the conference in recent years: L. I. Abalkin, A. G. Arbatov, N. P. Bekhtereva, O. T. Bogomolov, V. N. Bolshakov, Yu. S. Vasilyev, R. S. Grinberg, A. A. Guseynov, T. I. Zaslavskaya, M. P. Kirpichnikov, A. A. Kokoshin, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, I. I. Lukinov, D. S. Lvov, V. L. Makarov, V. A. Martynov, N. N. Moiseyev, A. D. Nekipelov, Yu. S. Osipov, A. M. Panchenko, N. Ya. Petrakov, V. F. Petrenko, E. I. Pivovarov, M. B. Piotrovsky, N. A. Plateh, V. M. Polterovich, E. M. Primakov, B. V. Rauschenbach, Yu. A. Ryzhov, N. N. Skatov, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Tishkov, J. T. Toshchenko, V. A. Chereshev, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov, B. G. Yudin, V. L. Yanin and others. Academicians of the Russian Academy of Education who have taken part in the conference are the following: S. A. Amonashvili, V. I. Andreyev, G. M. Andreyeva, A. G. Asmolov, A. P. Beliayeva, M. N. Berulava, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, A. A. Bodalev, E. V. Bondarevskaya, G. A. Bordovsky, V. P. Borisenkov, G. N. Volkov, Yu. S. Davydov, A. V. Darinsky, E. D. Dneprov, S. F. Yegorov, V. I. Zagvyazinskiy, I. A. Zimniaya, V. G. Kineliyov, I. S. Kon, A. S. Kondratyev, V. G. Kostomarov, V. V. Krayevsky, A. A. Likhachov, G. V. Mukhamedzianova, V. S. Mukhina, V. A. Miasnikov, N. D. Nikandrov, A. M. Novikov, O. A. Omarov, A. A. Orlov, Yu. V. Senko, A. V. Usova, Yu. U. Fokht-Babushkin, G. A. Yagodin, V. Mitter (Germany) and others. Such public and state figures as A. A. Akayev, A. E. Busygin, G. A. Hajjiyev, G. M. Gatilov, S. L. Katanandov, S. V. Lavrov, Ye. I. Makarov, V. I. Matviyenko, V. V. Miklushevsky, K. O. Romodanovsky, A. L. Safonov, A. A. Sobchak, E. S. Stroyev, V. Ye. Churov, M. V. Shmakov, A. V. Yakovenko, V. A. Yakovlev have also participated in the conference. Among the figures of culture and art who have taken part in the conference are the following: M. K. Anikushin, A. A. Voznesensky, I. O. Gorbachov, D. A. Granin, N. M. Dudinskaya, Z. Ya. Korogodsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, A. P. Petrov, M. M. Plisetskaya, M. L. Rostropovich, E. A. Riazanov, G. V. Sviridov and others.

Since 2007 in the framework of the Conference there has been held Likhachov forum of senior high-school students of Russia, which gathers winners of the All-Russian Contest of creative projects entitled 'Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity' from all over Russia and abroad.

Since 2008, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Programme of the conference 'International Dialogue of Cultures' has been implemented. Ambassadors of foreign states present their reports and give their opinions on acute challenges of present time.

Since 2010 the complex of Likhachov events has been supplemented with an All-Russian cultural-educational programme for senior high-school students entitled 'Likhachov Lessons in Petersburg'.

In 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009–2011, the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation D. A. Medvedev and V. V. Putin, in 2008, 2010 and 2011 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin.

Every year volumes of reports, participants' presentations, proceedings of workshop discussions and round tables are published. The copies of the volumes are present in all major libraries of Russia, the CIS countries, scientific and educational centres of many countries in the world. The Proceedings of the conference are also available on a special scientific website 'Likhachov Square' (at [www.lihachev.ru](http://www.lihachev.ru)).

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S. R. Abramov<sup>1</sup>

## EARLY CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTICS AS A MODEL AND RESULT OF CULTURAL SYNTHESIS

1. *Introduction.* Despite the voluminous evidence of near-contemporaries and more distant writers, the times when the Roman Empire was facing its decline were far from being just an obscure period of clashes between nations. The Early Christian theoretical treatises contained the elaborate synthesis of ideas rooted in hitherto autonomous cultural traditions. After all, the whole of Christian ideology – its science, art and culture – perceived and maintained its universal ('catholic') nature, which means that they opened their gates to the interaction and mutual enrichment between diverse cultural traditions. It was the original 'dialogue of cultures' (to use a modern metaphor) that gave rise to the Early Christian cultural synthesis embodied in the phenomenon of Christian civilization.

This synthesis had been preconditioned by the very existence of the Roman Empire, multinational and multicultural by nature. However, only the rise of Christian spirituality, with its rejection of prejudice, seclusion and narrow-mindedness of previous traditions, made such a synthesis possible at all. Arguing that 'there is no longer Jew or Gentile, slave or free, male and female... bond nor free: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus' [Colossians 3:11], Paul thereby discarded particular priorities of both Greek and Hebrew cultural traditions and their categories.<sup>2</sup>

The Early Christian cultural synthesis had a universal, all-encompassing character; it probed into all sectors of society and the whole of spiritual sphere. It was displayed not only in the dominating ideology and teaching of the Church, but also in diverse heretical doctrines.<sup>3</sup> And this cultural synthesis had a tremendous impact on hermeneutics – a science that originates in theology, philosophy and philology.

2. *The New Testament as a conceptual source of a Christian hermeneutical tradition.* Assimilating Greek and Hebrew traditions, Early Christian hermeneutics was imaginative: their cultural and historical as well as methodological narrow-mindedness was rejected; the New Testament hermeneutics 'was not Greek, nor did it wish to be Hebrew; its meaning was universal' [Troubetzkoy 1994:403]. Eschatologically, its finite goal is to understand the ultimate meaning of life, trying to introduce meaning into every minute of existence. Hermeneutics is of applied nature. While the early Christian writings (*Didache*, *The Epistle of Barnabas* etc.) interpret the Old Testament as prophecies about Messiah and search it throughout for any indications of Christ, the early Christian apologists – Justin the Martyr (c. 100–165 AD) and, especially, Tertullian (c. 160 – c. 225

AD) – make a clear record of principles for a new hermeneutical tradition. Highly educated and brought up by the Hellenistic culture, they knew Aristotle's *Peri hermēneias* and used his principles in their treatises; at the same time, with biblical agenda as a predominant issue, the Christian apologists were also making use of the Hebrew heritage, especially of their technique for the comparative analysis of biblical texts: *analogy* and *application*.<sup>4</sup>

Christian hermeneutics was distinctive for its pioneering theory of the Logos, as well as for its elaborate *typology* and *allegory* – constituent elements in the New Testament hermeneutics. The very text of the New Testament carries the seeds of the new hermeneutics. The architects of the hermeneutical revolution are apostles John and Paul. The two brilliant figures symbolize a breakup with both Greco-Roman and Judaic value systems, which also means a break-off from their scholarly paradigms.

John, the disciple and evangelist, abruptly divorced himself from the Old Testament Judaic tradition, fearlessly using the term λόγος from the 'pagan' philosophy. And his concept of the λόγος was totally different from Heraclitus' or Philo's,<sup>5</sup> or that of the gnostics. The New Testament uses the word λόγος more than once in its common, non-terminological sense; but it was John who endowed it with a special meaning and used it in a totally different context, distinct from the discourse of Ancient philosophy – the context of the Near Eastern writings, in which John's λόγος comprised, in its entirety, the semantics of the Hebrew *Memra*.<sup>6</sup> John was fully aware of himself breaking off from the Old Testament tradition when he made a deliberate use of an explicitly 'pagan' term, though with a totally different meaning. He realized that the term was 'charged' with connotations; however he dared to use it to denote the second person in the Trinity, Jesus Christ, God-man; thus, the two hermeneutical traditions – ancient and Judaic – seemed to come together for a moment; and this time it was not for some mechanical synthesis, like Philo's, but for an immediate annihilation, producing a completely novel phenomenon.

3. *The concept of the Logos in the Gospel according to John.* Terminologically, John's Logos is not at all a 'pagan' term with a broader meaning, nor is it a Greek equivalent for the Old Testament Hebrew term; it is a sign that marks a new tradition in hermeneutics (or, more generally, in spirituality), which divorced itself from Ancient, Old Testament and gnostic traditions. This term carries the essence for the new theoretical thinking, the quintessence of the whole of the New Testament thought: the idea of incarnation, the incarnation of Christ and the doctrine of god-manhood. To appreciate the very intensity and unexpectedness of the semantic change introduced by the Gospel according to John into the theory of the Logos, we should trace the evolution of the term throughout the ancient hermeneutical tradition.

In the Greek language of the early Christian era the word λόγος used to mean: (1) work, action; (2) reason; (3) sense, concept, idea; (4) teaching (philosophic); (5) contract, condition; (6) news, message; (7) book, story (written); (8) word,

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<sup>2</sup> It is well known that the Greeks (and the mentality of the Antiquity, in general) as well as the Jews used binary oppositions to split up the world into the positive 'us' and the negative alien 'them' – into Hellenes and barbarians in the first case, and into Jews and pagans, in the second. However, Paul the Apostle rejected both paradigms in favour of the Christian one (interpreted as universal and pan-human), that levelled all possible oppositions, be they racial, national, material class etc. Saying that 'his mission is to be a herald of his faith not "with wisdom of words" (οὐκ ἐν σοφίᾳ λόγου) [Corinthians 1:17], Paul the Apostle made a four-word rejection of philosophy and rhetoric as a single system of antique oratory' [Averintsev 1971:240].

<sup>3</sup> For instance, Manichaeism was an unequivocal synthesis of ancient ideas and oriental religions, of Zoroastrianism in particular. The orthodox teaching of the Early Christianity as well as numerous heresies have received a detailed scrutiny. However, the extent of contributions made by diverse spiritual traditions is still a question open for the research.

<sup>4</sup> The term 'analogy' goes back to logic where it denotes similarity of links or relations: 'application' may be its variant. Application, or mapping, is a characteristic technique to unfold the chain of events, especially in criminal investigations: one event is being mapped onto another, but the set of characters is the same, surprisingly. In philology, application maybe characteristic for vast text excerpts, i.e. it shows through composition, by parallel narratives of the same events, or narratives from different narrators – author or characters,' notes N.O. Guchinskaya [Guchinskaya 1994:18]. The Gospels, in general, are a definitive example of application, and the whole New Testament is the application of the Old Testament.

<sup>5</sup> For details of Philo's understanding of the Logos see [Abramov 2010].

<sup>6</sup> 'Memra', a technical term used in the Judaic tradition to refer to the divine and life-giving Word, which was translated as λόγος in the Septuagint.

expression, phrase (spoken). The very structure of the word enables John the Evangelist to come up with a number of fundamentals for hermeneutics: unlike for Greek philosophers, the Word of God is no abstract notion for him, but an operating foundation for all things and existence, the ultimate cause of space and man, *raison d'être* of the world (in terms of nature, individual, society and history), the embodiment of Truth and the symbol of it, and, finally, the symbol for the New Testament itself (i.e. contract) between God and man, implemented through the connection of the two natures in Christ – the God-man, Kerygma<sup>1</sup> (*evangelium*, the good message), revealed in the Gospel according to John. So, here John introduces the whole paradigm of semantic relations – a starting point for subsequent reflections in hermeneutics – which unfolds in the gospel narrative as well as in the history of its interpretation. Immediately, we find out that a number of crucial meanings within the semantic structure of the lexemes that refer to the concept of the Logos are missing from the modern European languages. The English 'word' and the German 'Wort' and the Russian 'слово' have lost the idea of providential (i.e. active, constructive and creative) character of the Logos – the cornerstone point in John's hermeneutics; the meaning of the Logos as a spiritual fundamental principle for the universe is not implied anymore; on the other hand, the English 'word', unlike its Russian equivalent, preserves the concept of news (a message) and the concept of contract, agreement (Testament).

Using it three times in a strong position in the opening sentence of the Gospel, John emphasizes the key meaning of the word λόγος: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.'<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the first verse of the first chapter is an anaphoric counterpoint construction to the first verse of the first chapter in the Book of Genesis, the Old Testament (i.e. as a parallel construction to the opening words of the whole Hebrew Biblical canon): 'In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth...'<sup>2</sup> Eventually, we get a meaningful progression: the beginning of the Old Testament, which is, essentially, the whole Hebrew Bible, and the beginning of the New Testament – Christian sacred canon – do coincide. John was working on his Gospel in the times when there was no established Christian Biblical canon, in the times when there were no so-called Synoptic Gospels (the gospels according to Matthew, Mark, and Luke), in the times when numerous writings were circulating among scattered Christian communities. So, the Gospel according to John was standing up as a self-sufficient entire text of the Christian Kerygma.

4. *The Early Specimens of Christian Hermeneutics.* It is essential that early Christian hermeneuticians were more profound in their interpretations of the Old Testament. It is likely so, because they had to carry their theory on, invariably fighting through paganism, Judaism and Christian heresies. Hermeneutics owed the Christian spirituality a lot of its achievements, because this spirituality was resisting Antiquity not only in its sense, but also in its sensibility. Justin the Martyr's interpretations are substantially different from Barnabas's somewhat unrefined allegories. He derives religious principles from the text interpretation, rather than declaring them *a priori*, before a philological analysis. Highly educated Tertullian and Irenaeus

<sup>1</sup> Kerygma (Greek: 'statement', 'declaration', 'piece of news', 'preaching'), a preaching of the Christian news on the salvific mission of Jesus Christ. Within the New Testament, kerygma may refer to preaching itself as well as to its content matter. As opposed to the 'Didache' – a teaching which presents Christian revelations through conceptual and logical doctrines, assertions and theological notions, the meaning of kerygma is defined through public preaching and immediate effect that the salvific event has on the man. 'Scholarly literature on the New Testament uses the term "kerygma", following its usage in the New Testament texts, with reference to oral preaching of Jesus as Messiah and Saviour, which preceded first writings that later entered the New Testament Canon. The content matter of the kerygma in the early Christian communities was the very Gospel that Paul "reminded" the Corinthians: the news of Christ's death and resurrection as of a salvatory event (cf. 1 Corinthians 15:3–5).' [Lyozov 1992:8].

<sup>2</sup> The initial position in the text was so significant that traditionally books were entitled by the first words in the text: thus, the Hebrew word for the Book of Genesis is בְּרֵאשִׁית, or Bere'syt, which means 'in [the] beginning'.

of Lyons were compelled to debate not only traditional Hebrew Hermeneutics, but also Christian heresies, and, in particular, Marcion, who cherished the doctrine that rejected the Old Testament completely.<sup>3</sup> Gnostic dualism drew a lot of sharp criticism from Irenaeus of Lyons who strongly supported the both Testaments. He argued that the advent of Messiah (Christ) had been prophesied in the Old Testament, that the salvation that God promised to Abraham was, in fact, promised to all people, i.e. following Paul the Apostle, he interpreted the Old Testament from a universal, pan-human, general Christian perspective. Tertullian transferred the debates with Marcion from ideological into philological domain: Marcion's close (literal) interpretation drew his just criticism; and, to the contrast with Marcion, he came up with the spiritualistic approach. Thus, he gave reasoning of the metaphorical character of some passages of the Holy Scripture: he maintained that, though that language of the Bible is essentially human, it by no means meant anthropomorphism of God:<sup>4</sup> He has no 'right hand', He doesn't have 'heels' either; He does not depend on passion or emotion – which drew him to the conclusion that the language of the Bible should not be taken literally.

The cornerstone of the early Christian orthodox hermeneutics was that it was the same God who created the whole of the visible world with any of its smallest part and conferred commandment of the Old and New Testament: laws of nature and laws of morality are of the same origin, then why shouldn't morals be explained by nature? (cf. 1 Cor. 1:19–32) The same idea had earlier been put forward by Philo of Alexandria, who maintained the harmony of 'cosmos' and 'nomos'.

There is good reason to believe that the authors of the early core of the New Testament were introduced to the Qumran literature, alternatively, their traditions were very close. As we know, the methods practised in hermeneutics by the authors of the New Testament and the authors of the Qumran writings were identical. However, alongside with astonishing matches there are striking differences as well. Thus, the New Testament scriptures are quite original and independent: making its authentic literary forms – epistles and gospels – it didn't borrow or use any Qumran literary forms or genres. The New Testament has no traces of Pesharim – a traditional Qumran form of exposition. Another significant point is that the New Testament hermeneutics contained criticism against the Judaic hermeneutics, in general, and against the Qumran one, in particular. Joseph D. Amusin, the Dead Sea Scrolls researcher, makes a special notice: 'The texts of the New Testament carry traces of anti-Qumran controversy on the problem of esotericism and religious missions'; 'the spots in the New Testament, which maintain a Christian morality of universal love, appear to be a purposeful debate against the Qumran points'; 'the Qumran and early Christian communities were also different in their rituals and ceremonies' [Amusin 1983: 219–222].

5. *Concluding Remarks.* Due to its overwhelming significance, the new tradition in hermeneutics became a constituent element in the history of the formation of the New Testament Canon and the Christian doctrine. Born from a creative synthesis of several cultural traditions (of the Greek Antiquity and Hebrew discourse, for the first place), the Early Christian hermeneutics was upholding theoretical principles for a scholarly interpretation and the core of Christian theology in both ways: through controversy with alien ideas, and through reflection on its own antinomies.

<sup>3</sup> Among other things, Marcion believed that the creator of the visible world was a cruel tyrant, and such a god could not have been the father to Jesus Christ. Thus, following his logic, Jesus was a son to another god, the creator of the invisible world; and Jesus also was a part of the invisible world and only took the form of a man (but was not born as such, because it would have meant that he was connected to the visible world, i.e. to the world of the cruel tyrant) and then died to save the mankind from its dependency on the cruel god.

<sup>4</sup> The Early Church was already aware of God's transcendental nature as opposed to anthropomorphism and zoomorphism (highly typical of pagan notions of gods).

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## EURASIAN INTEGRITY IS REQUIRED BY HISTORY

World history, as well as Eurasian history, proves that unity of forces has always been one of the most effective forms of the peoples responding to historical challenges. There is no end to the examples of this kind. The threat of fascism, h of the unique task. The overcoming of post-war difficulties, the aspiration of the Europeans for the chance to be on equal terms with America in an attempt to compete on the international markets and on the international arena led to the creation of the European Union. This complicated way to integration already walked by the Europeans can be viewed as an example for Eurasia, which is still experiencing an economically and politically transition stage, making the attempts to find the best ways of further development. The recent statement 'New Integration Project for Eurasia — the future, we are building up today' on the pages of *Izvestiya* by Vladimir Putin, the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, who is the most authoritative state and political figure on the post-Soviet space, has become very encouraging for the Eurasians [1]. Despite a widely spread opinion among international community, which, unfortunately, finds support also among the Eurasian political élite, the Russian leader confidently showed that a present-day political disunion, which takes place on the Eurasian territory, has a temporary character. The USSR collapse did not put an end to Eurasian history, which dates back to ancient times and poses glorious pages of nations unity in the fight with foreign invasions, this is also a history of creative attempts and assertion its own cultural values and national traditions.

Having dedicated 14 years of my life, as the first President of Kirgizstan, to the development of state independence of my country, I received a clear vision of a strong influence of intergovernmental border lines between the people in Eurasia, which have always been tightly economically and spiritually united. Two decades after the USSR collapse taught the nations, which were its members, distressing lessons and made remember their recent past. In all the corners of a united country, in all its social stratum the participation in the achievements of the great Soviet State awoke pride. Moscow has always been a attractive symbol. To receive education in the best universities of Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Tomsk and Kiev, as well as the other cultural Soviet centres became an

achievable dream for young people from the Soviet republics. Friendship between nations was a reality which showed itself in all its might during the years of the Second World War. Nostalgia for the passed times lives in the consciousness of millions of people, who nowadays are scattered by fate in various national apartments. Here we are not speaking about the recovery or reincarnation of the Soviet Union in its former format. International political experience knows some other (not less effective) forms of national unity, and the aspiration to it is growing in Eurasian society. This tendency has been revealed in the ideas expressed by Vladimir Putin.

### Metamorphoses of history

At the turn of the twentieth century on the huge territory from Lisbon to Vladivostok geopolitical processes, which are vital for the continent and astonishingly contrasting in its character, were developing. While in the West there was a dynamic tendency to integration and interstate unification, in the East there was breaking into numerous pieces of a great state, the Soviet Union, which inherited by the will of destiny the history of the country, which had been created on the Eurasian territory by labour and blood of our ancestors for many centuries. If we look back at the European history, it can seem at first sight that the way to unity of European nations was forever blocked by bloody battles of the previous epochs. There are no nations in this region, which had no wars with each other at a certain historical stage. Interstate factions in Europe were almost permanent, bringing in the relations between the nations hostility and animosity. Among such examples the following events can be mentioned: wars, taking place during the reign of Karl the Great, the Hundred Years' War, the Thirty Years' War, Napoleonic wars. In the past century two world wars originated from Europe and the scars from them in the history of mankind have not been healed so far. Here misanthropic ideology of fascism was born, the struggle with which took away tens of millions of human lives. Characteristic in the past of many European countries the cult of force, militarism, the bet on "fire and sword" revealed itself in the expansions in Africa, Asia and America. The 17-19th century coming of Europeans to these countries was often followed by genocide of indigenous people. Actually,  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the planet was turned into the colonies of several European states, to which the USA joined later. The strong-arm division of the world into the areas of domination and influence took place. On overcoming grave challenges and the burden of totalitarian past Europe radically transformed at the end of the twentieth — the beginning of the twenty first century and has become the region of peace and prosperity. Wars and colonies faded in the bygone past, although militarist mentality, which expresses itself in the action of NATO, still remains and is perceived as a global threat. The excursus to the past

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can be quite risky as it is said in the Russian proverb 'let bygones be bygones'. However, I imply positive meaning here. The events, happened in Europe and led to the creation of the European Union, from my point of view, are a manifestation of deep laws, immanently inherent to human communities everywhere in the world.

This is the angle from which the modern stage of Eurasian history must be viewed. The fact that the collapse of the Soviet Union became a global geopolitical catastrophe and had an incredibly negative impact on the lives of its former states is universally recognized. The attempts to explain this cataclysm by merely internal drawbacks inherent to the Soviet system are quite shallow. The external factors, which during a number of years were negatively affecting the socialist social system, are purposefully shadowed. The Soviet government was initially vied as an inimical power in the West. A direct military danger was impending over a young Soviet state both from the West and from the East. The diplomatic recognition of the USSR by Washington occurred only in 1932, 15 years later after the October Revolution. If there had not been outward destructive influence on the Soviet Union during the crucial '80s–'90s of the past century, this great state (and I am sure of it) would withstand nowadays. My personal presidential experience of the year 2005, when the 'tulip revolution' in Kirgizstan took place, gave me the understanding of what such outward destructive impact is. The republic has not overcome the situation of chaos and instability even today.

The musings on Eurasian history persuaded me that Russian statehood was developing on a proper natural foundation, on the aspiration neighbouring nations for friendship with a powerful state, which would be able to give support in the time of hardships. As an example here an episode from the Kirgiz history can be drawn. Under the threat of enslavement of aggressive neighbours our wise rulers under the leadership of Atake Biy sent a diplomatic mission to Catherina the Great in 1785 with the request to give citizenship to the Kirgiz people. This request was heard and put an end to the hostile attempts of all the states which dreamed about conquering the Kirgiz lands. One hundred and forty years later, during the Bolshevik territorial division in the Central Asia those events, which seemed to have been by-gone, were not forgotten. At first the Kara-Kirgiz Autonomous Oblast was created within the Russian SFSR, which preserved our nation from the dissolution in a single Turkestan kettle.

Later the Kirgiz Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic was formed on this basis. In 1783, two years before the events described above, King of Georgia, Heraclius II addressed Russia with a request for protection as Georgia was living under the threat of a foreign enslavement. The Treaty of Georgievsk saved Georgia and ensured its national survival. If Russia had not received that request at those times, where would the Georgian nation be today? The legendary glory belonged to the Lenkoran Land in Azerbaijan in the Soviet times. Even nowadays it is considered a national pearl. In 1795 Khan Mir Mustafa sought Russia's protection in connection with the outward threat. According to the Treaty of Turkmenchay this state was taken under protection by Russia in 1828. The Russian protectorate ensured the survival of the Armenian nation, whose existence was endangered by Turkey. The Ukraine had to find itself in a complicated situation in the seventeenth century. The claims of a Western neighbour endangered the survival of the Ukrainian nation. The legendary hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, anxious for the Ukrainian people, made a decision which ensured Ukrainian security for many years after. On the 8th of January, 1654 the reunion of Ukraine and Russia was announced in Pereyaslavskaya Rada. The Kazakhs voluntarily sought for Russian protection trying to ensure their national survival after many-century aggressive invasions followed by slaughterers organized by the Dzungars. On condition that there had been no such a constraint as Russia in

Eurasia in the previous centuries, it is very probable that numerous post-Soviet states existing today would have no chance to live. Mostly probably people inhabiting these territories would speak in different languages, sing different national anthems and raise different national flags. The appearance of Russia, for example, in Central Asia in the nineteenth century was determined by the character of the processes which were developing on the international arena at that historical epoch and connected with the participation of great states in the territorial division of the world. If it had not been for Russia, then, most probably, that would have been Great Britain, if it had had a chance to avoid its defeat in Afghanistan. Otherwise it could have been the darkest feudal powers which could have led Central Asia to the civil and interethnic murderous revolt. Acting outwardly as a colonizer, in fact, Russia at the same time saved the region from the self-destruction. In this concern it is worth mentioning the words of a great writer and a thinker Chinghiz Aitmatov: 'Sometimes our ultra-nationalists start expanding on how Moscow enslaved us. I always answer them: you must be grateful that it happened, otherwise we would not be better than Afghanistan.'

When we start recollecting the previous centuries we can not but see that Russian tsars were not humanists and did not keep aloof from applying to force in the solution of territory related matters which was quite a common practice in Europe at those times. A number of territories became a part of Russia after military campaigns of Ivan the Terrible. There was a period when Russia made attempts to take away by force the Black Sea straits, having paid for it by many thousands of soldiers' lives. However, in the majority of cases the territories and nations became a part of Russia not by force but it was the result of their search for protection from alien invasions. Peaceable principles were also applied on the territory from the Urals to Vladivostok. The main role in this process belongs to selfless activity of Russian pioneers — manufacturers, merchants and military men, endeavouring to discover and develop the lands of Siberia and the Far East and involve the nations inhabiting on this huge territory into the civilizational flow. Sharing here my personal vision of the historical process connected with the place and the role of a great Russian state I would like to outline the fact that till the end of the '80s of the twentieth century it was an inwardly stable state, which left in spite of the side effects of the Stalin epoch a positive heritage. The fluctuation had a place in a huge and complicated system on a difficult turn of history. In properly functioning systems such fluctuations can be easily localized due to the stabilizing endogenous factors. Unfortunately, the whole system was very soon drawn into the post-perestroika turmoil and found itself in the condition close to the chaos. The events of that historical period are well-known and there is no necessity to dwell on the details.

#### **Time to make a choice!**

The period which followed the USSR collapse is called a transition stage in a customary way. Here the idea of a transition from Soviet authoritarianism to a more progressive system of values traditionally associated with the Western world is implied. The nations' hopes were connected with the development of democracy and a quick progress in the socio-economic sphere. However, two decades after the Soviet collapse did not bring the expected changes. Some political scientists still connect the collapse of the Soviet system with the empty shelves in the stores and endless lines. Nowadays the supermarket shelves have loads of goods, and at the same time poorness of a considerable amount of the population as well as life dissatisfaction still remain. Now new reasons, revolutionarizing the people, have emerged. In the autumn of 2011 a new movement 'Seize Wall Street' appeared in the US and spread to other countries — especially developed ones. The movement is about a mass protest against social injustice which strengthens the social stratification. The abundance of goods

does not seem to give an adequate answer to modern challenges. Thinking over the present concerns of a post-Soviet human-thill ('cheloveinik', A. Zinoviev's term) one can easily see that the breakup of an integrated territory, which for many centuries connected close nations, is more and more perceived as a significant loss. Numerous hardships in people mentality are connected with the stated fact. Such a situation also contradicts human nature. It has always been inherent in Homo Sapiens to tend to create certain communities (a family, a kin, a tribe, an ethnos) which ensured a survival in conditions of nature and the whole environment challenges of a human being. It was a basis for nations' and state emergence, which today answering the challenges of globalization have a tendency to move in the direction of integration and consolidation of different forces. In the sphere of science the huge role was played by the discoveries of I. Newton, A. Einstein, a number of outstanding mathematicians who worked individually. One of the present examples is Petersburg mathematician G. Perelman. However, current scientific and technical progress is provided by the integration of scientists' efforts in major scientific research institutions and academies of Sciences under the governmental aegis. Writers, composers, actors, intellectuals create unions, guilds, associations to bring more stimuli into their creative life. Politically conscious citizens organize parties. Working people join trade unions. This natural tendency in the life of a human society has reached its ultimate peak in creation of the United Nations Organization.

There is no ground to suppose that the post-Soviet world did not make any active attempts towards a full-fledged integration after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The evidence of it is the creation of the CIS, which was almost simultaneous with the time of the dissolution of the Union. The complications, which arose immediately in the actions of the CIS gave birth to the ideology of a various-speed and level integration, which in its by-turn revealed itself in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community, the Customs Union, the Union State of Russia and Belarus, and in the military and political sphere — in the creation of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Russia became the generator of the integration process, and its cementing attempts allowed to escape the danger of unavoidable demolition on the post-Soviet territory. But what stumbles a seemingly obvious natural way of the development on the post-Soviet territory? I do not see here any objective insurmountable obstacles. On the foreground there are subjective factors connected, mainly with very shallow nationalistic motives of some post-Soviet leaders, with their expectations of some 'soon-would-to-come-events' which will miraculously transform misery in their countries into marvellous pictures of abundance and prosperity like in Russian folk fairy tales about a magic tablecloth. However, there are no miracles in the modern world. The hopes of some post-Soviet countries on the communion with Europe, on equal membership in the European economic structures, as well as in the NATO remained nothing but a mirage. Even before the present economic crisis it had already been obvious that the way to the EU was almost closed for them. From the point of view of its territory and membership the EU reached its maximum. The crisis discovered serious complications in its activity: *Drang nach Osten*, especially in the direction of Ukraine, turned out to be quite pernicious for the EU. To say so, this piece is above its bend. In this concern I would like to add some more words. If a membership in the EU of certain post-Soviet countries is theoretically probable, such a choice is absolutely excluded for the states of Central Asia. But for a seemingly fine program 'Eastern partnership' the EU has nothing to offer. Is it not in this case the role of 'international outcasts' awaiting for them? There is no alternative for the post-Soviet states, but unite their efforts and develop within their geopolitical space, which has been for many centuries built on the territory of Eurasia. This

is not a tribute to historical inertness. Only a union opens new horizons for their dynamic development.

### Is the idea of a Eurasian union achievable?

The search for the best forms of regional integration on the post-Soviet territory has already been going on for twenty years in various forms and various directions. At the present stage with the abundance of vast experience taken into the account the aim of achieving a higher goal is set, which was indicated by Vladimir Putin. The Eurasian Community can become the most appropriate form of the unity of the post-Soviet countries. This idea naturally combines the experience of European integration, the result of which is the creation of the European Union, as well as regional specificity of Eurasia, which nations have peacefully coexisted as good neighbours within one state during many century history. I can not but mention in this concern the event of December, 1991, which still ache in my consciousness. On signing the Belavezha Accords by the leaders of three Slavic republics the dissolution of the Soviet Union became an indisputable fact. The future was seen as if through the mist. There were no theoretical schemes or, moreover, practical plans how to act in such an emergency situation. Saparmurat Niyazov — the future Turkmenbashi, told me on those days that we would do without Russia, create our own union in Central Asia, as to say so we had more than enough resources. My objections as President of Kirgizstan were perceived by him with bewilderment. Despite the incredible rapidity of those events and impossibility to predict their consequences common sense prevailed after all, and a pernicious turn was prevented. For the former Soviet republics the Commonwealth of Independent States became the fastening tier of the chain. In the eyes of the people of these countries it was a salvation from the coming misfortune. However, every signer of the treaty on the CIS creation put into it his own understanding, which brought discord and later negatively influenced the actions of the Commonwealth. I can not but appreciate the wisdom of the Russian government in the solution of integration problems on the post-Soviet territory. Moscow did not apply either to pressure or bending through the knee. Even in the years of hardships Moscow responded to the calls for help of partners with fraternal feelings. There emerged an opportunity along with a careful studying of the integrative processes in Europe, South-Eastern Asia (ASEAN), North America (NAFTZ) and etc., to deeply analyze our own experience, to understand anew and estimate the role of Russia. There is hardly any necessity to repeat the reasons given by Vladimir Putin in his *Izvestiya* article. Some additions were made by Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan in 'Eurasian Union: from the idea of creation to the history of the future' in the same newspaper [2] and by Alexander Lukashenka, President of Belarus 'On the destiny of our integration' [3]. It is worth reminding here that the idea of the creation of the Eurasian Community was expressed by Nursultan Nazarbayev in March, 1994 in his statement in Lomonosov Moscow State University. This idea did not disappear in nonexistence. There was a process of its ripening before it was represented as an actual platform for the creation of the Eurasian Community. There are numerous historical examples which prove that great ideas always bring with them a powerful practical charge. On November, 18 in the Kremlin during the Moscow summit Presidents of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus signed the documents on establishing the Eurasian Economic Community. Its actions will be based on common free market zone. The organizational part is implemented by the Eurasian Economic Commission. The documents signed by presidents were immediately by sent to the Parliaments for the ratification.

Rendering the on-going events into the familiar language of Physics, I see in the creation of the Eurasian Economic Community, which began in the sphere of Eurasian integration, a dynamic process of crystallization. The first local cell of crystallization connected Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Its emer-

gence and further activity will make a strong magnetic influence on the other parts of Eurasian regional system. The reviving effect of a new integration union will be perceived not only on the post-Soviet territory, but in the other parts of the world. I am convinced that with the increasing number of members and the expanding of its sphere of activity the Eurasian Economic Community will acquire new qualitative facets and in the perspective it can politically and economically achieve the level of the European Union in its magnitude and international influence. Instead of an economically and politically ill-organized huge Eurasian space there will emerge a geopolitical integrity within a decade, in the near future, which will become a fastening tier between Europe and Asia and, in general, between the West and the East. All the given facts mean that two post-Soviet decades were not spent in vain. The nucleus of the Eurasian states with the leading role of Russia was preparing an integration breakthrough. It is being implemented on your eyes.

It is quite understandable why there is such a big number of hot discussions with the 'sparks' following them around Vladimir Putin's idea of the Eurasian Community creation. This idea was supported by two other locomotives of post-Soviet integration — Kazakhstan and Belarus. As far as it known from the scientific field, the strife of opinions is the motive power of the scientific development. I believe that this point is applicable to politics and state management. It would be much better if the critics offered some alternatives, introduced new ideas which would allow to improve and correct the initial project. Unfortunately, the situation does not always develop in this direction. Among the most ardent critics of the ideas on the creation of the Eurasian community is quite respectable a figure in the Russian scientific and public circles — Vladislav Inozemtsev. In his articles with scathing titles 'The Blank Shots' and 'Minuses of Integration Pluses' [4] he seemed to set a goal to raze to the ground the ideas of Eurasian integration. The point on a low status of the integration project introduced by the Russian leader arises disapproval. Vladislav Inozemtsev considers that 'a new project of the post-Soviet integration is based on the feeling of weakness and low status of each of its members'. In the composition of forces of potential members of the Eurasian Community the scientist does not observe any prospects in achieving qualitative changes. I will not conceal the fact that I, as a former President of one of the post-Soviet republics, feel pain for my country, which together with the other states is actually thrown to the side of the road. In the Soviet Union, no matter how much it is blackened today, it has always been emphasized that all its republics were equal and even sang: "There are no strangers at our table". The composition of national potentials goes far beyond mere arithmetic rules of addition and subtraction, bringing a multiple synergetic effect. The might of the Soviet Union as a great power in the best years of its existence was in many cases based on the application of the nations' diversity. For example, in Kirgizstan, which is satiated far away from the seas and oceans, there was organized a production of world's best ultrahigh-speed torpedoes for the navy. The torpedoes were tested on our famous Lake Issyk Kul. I find unnecessary to speak about the role which the republic played in the development of engineering industry and in the creation of nuclear complex, not to mention the agriculture. The only way out, which Vladislav Inozemtsev sees for the CIS members, is 'the way to Europe', also giving an idea that 'the most straight way to Europe is an individual one'. In this case the mind involuntary draws a sad picture: one by one Eurasian presidents follow each other like poor petitioners, they are going with their petitions to Brussels boyars in Europe. The successful ones bow low and thank for mercy. The ones who failed come back home with the heads low, acknowledging their guilt. Turkey has been trying to open the door of the European Union for several decades. All the attempts have been fruitless so far! The background of the Eur-

asian nations is characterized by centuries of coexistence on the common territory, they also share the same history. Why should they look for salvation and mercy on a foreign land, where no one is waiting for them? The opinion expressed by Vladislav Inozemtsev is the way to Eurasian stagnation. Among other articles on Eurasian integration my attention was attracted by the article by Georgy Bovt 'We will build up our own Union...' [5]. The author of the article believes that: 'That's not reasonable to try to create at least a relatively stable integration union acting only in terms of pragmatic convenience — tariffs, prices, discounts, preferences. A really stable union can not exist without common values. After all, people are not calculators for the accounting of profits and losses. That's why creating the Eurasian Community we should try to realize what common values we chose to unite the countries of the former Soviet Union.' At one of the Kremlin meetings President of Russia Dmitri Medvedev also said that unity is connected not only with economic opportunities: 'Common cultural space also ensures unity.' My personal opinion is that there is no and there can not be higher values in the human society than friendship of nations. Eurasian integration will breathe in new life to multinational community, which has been developing in Eurasia for centuries. Its genuine nature was proved in the years of the Second World War. Many-century tiers will meet the present day hardships. Judging by my own presidential experience and studying many-century Eurasian history I find Vladimir Putin's ideas on Eurasian integration timely and implementable. My opinion on this theme is revealed in the *Izvestiya* article 'Eurasian integration is an answer to people's aspirations' [6]. The implementation of this project would be a historical even of a global significance. The people of Eurasia are expecting that the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, standing at the very roots of the Eurasian Community idea, manifest their political will in its implementation and will not allow the ferment in certain intellectual circles to distract the society.

#### **'Pros and cons' of the Eurasian integration**

In the modern world when statesmen and politicians set significant goals they have to take into the consideration all the positive and negative consequences of the aims implementation. However, at crucial moments an arithmetical approach should give a way to higher mathematics, where integral equations dominate. Undoubtedly, united together through the integration Eurasian countries would become considerably stronger — this is what we can observe nowadays. The dissolution of Eurasian (post-Soviet) territory contrasts with the on-going integration processes in the other parts of the world. For example, there is an emergence of such an interstate union as BRICS, which tied up big states of different continents with no common borders. The present situation is, probably, convenient to some external forces, otherwise, nobody would put a spoke in Eurasian integration wheel. Being myself from Central Asia I am, probably, able to comprehend like no other how important it is to strengthen the connections between the East and the West, figuratively speaking, to revive them in the new epoch and in the new conditions of the Silk Road. I am convinced that the creation of the Eurasian Community would be highly estimated in China, which is gaining the equally prominent positions with the USA with the prospects to soon outperform this country. We can not but should also pay attention to the other side of the whole matter, the one, which is particularly connected with security. From this angle the East and the West of the continent find themselves in different situations. In the Western part the system and the structure of security, which appeared in the period of the Cold War, have been not only preserved, but also have significantly increased their potential. The NATO borders have directly drawn nearer to Russia. The calls to struggle with international terrorism justify the decisions made in September, 2001 on creation the Anti-Terrorism Coalition with the active involvement of military

potential of the NATO, which actually is just a shield for the global expansion covering. The dark shadow of the NATO is hanging over the East. In the 'post-Soviet' part of the continent there is no consolidating structure of military and political security, as well as there is no unique regional effective system of economic integration, which will be able like the EU or the NATO to protect the interests of their members on a collective basis. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) does not to the full satisfy the needs of the region from the point of view of a military-political potential and the number of the state-members. The process of finishing the construction of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is far from being over. The shield of the SCO will later become a source of powerful protection, but the target goal of this organization aims at broader tasks of a global character. The need for the creation of own regional instruments providing military-political and economic security, together with the creation of the system of comprehensive cooperation which meets modern requirements has matured on the post-Soviet Eurasian territory. If we do not create a regional system of cooperation in Eurasia, which would be equal to the European one in all its major parameters, the disintegrated post-Soviet world would be predestined to fall behind. The 'Russian locomotive' alone would hardly be able to pull it out of the swamp.

Continuing the theme of 'pros and cons' I would like to make some additions. In the modern globalizing world the ultimate success is achieved by major systems, which are above the national frames and acquire transnational character (banks, aviation, space, automobile industry, electronics and etc.); another example is the association of scientists, which were formed in the so called Silicon Valley. The theory of systems proves that the most stable and viable social systems are characterized by diversity of their structural elements. The movement to the Eurasian Community is the way to the most optimal combination of various national, natural, economic, social, intellectual and other resources of our countries to create a unique system. There is no other way to progress in the modern world. The disputes about the 'pros and cons' allow to bring forward clarity in the alignment of forces. It is very likely that 'cons' are the option of sceptics and whiners, the majority of whom are dropping out on the way. Success is only achieved by optimists.

#### **Does the integration harm sovereignty?**

As it is well-known, the concept of sovereignty is historically related with 1648, when the Thirty Years' War was over and the Peace of Westphalia was signed. Since that time sovereignty has become an attractive symbol for the nations, struggling for independence. New countries, which emerged on the collapse of the Soviet Union, quite naturally consider sovereignty the uttermost purpose, the basis of strengthening statehood and equal integration into the international community. In this concern Henry Kissinger's idea about 'the outdated of the doctrine of the national sovereignty', expressed at its time in the geopolitical circles, is perceived painfully. It is likely to serve the USA's cynical justification of 'humanitarian interventions', i.e. foreign military invasion on the territories of sovereign states under the motto of democracy and human rights protection. In case of misrepresented and narrowed sovereignty interpretation the entry of the state into the integrated union can be falsely rendered as the way to blurring of sovereign rights. However, sovereignty is not 'shagreen leather'. That would be a mistake to perceive states participation in the integration processes, as well as their membership in the international organizations as a detriment to their sovereign rights, or, moreover, as a complete or partial loss of the given countries their sovereignty. On the contrary, their membership in the political and economical unions will significantly increase that part of sovereignty, which is given to the collective authority of the correspondent intergovernmental unions. Actual

increase is proportionate to the might of such unions. The protection of economic interests within the frames of the European Union, and the protection of the territorial integrity of the alliance members within the NATO frames is provided by the total might of these unions and collective actions of their members. It actually means multiple increase of own national opportunities of member-states. On the absence of the 'multiplication effect' the existence of integration unions would lose its sense in many situations. There would be no many-year lines, longing to enter the gates of the European Union and the NATO.

It is not a mere coincidence that the birth of the myth about a possibility of national sovereignty loss in case of entry into the post-Soviet intergovernmental unions happened after the collapse of the USSR, which became preventative measure against the CIS strengthening and development on its basis integration processes in Eurasia. This myth must be universally debunked, giving as a contrary example the member-states of the European Union and the NATO, which show the increase of national potentials, influenced by corporate authority. If it were not for the European Union, Greece, and later Italy would have been affected by the crisis and found themselves in the situation of default, which would have economically set them to the bottom. Together with them 5–6 other European countries would also have drowned, and what is interesting, France is altogether mentioned in this list. While insurgent moods against limitation actions of the European Union towards Greek budget policy are flaring up in Greece, the European Union did its best to save Athens, applying to all its might (writing off a national debt, granting big loans etc.). It is characteristic that the main agent in these circumstances is Germany, which gives considerable amounts of national resources to save Athens. Being in euphoria after obtaining state independence some of the post-Soviet countries included in their Constitutions articles concerning neutrality, nonparticipation in the unions, especially those unions, which create supranational authorities. It does not prevent Ukraine from making attempts to enter the European Union with its obvious supranational character, on the one hand, while at the same time Ukraine avoids to participate in the post-Soviet integration projects. In the first case the advantages are questionable, in the second — they are obvious. In the article of a Ukrainian scientist Sergey Tolstov 'The prospects of the Eurasian integration project' in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* the author emphasizes: 'From the economics point of view the participation of Ukraine in the Customs Union and CES seem to be advantageous and reasonable. The existing obstacles are of a political and international legal character.' [7] What is the matter then? Is it not high time to overcome the given obstacles? Here I would like to emphasize once again that to overcome the obstacles on the way of Eurasian integration and creating the way to the Eurasian Community there is a need in a political will, which would be able to give the legislation of the countries a character, which would open them a way to freedom in their integration search. One must not turn sovereignty into a bugbear. On the contrary, it is an instrument, providing the national interests, which in modern conditions are inseparable from the tendency to unite on the basis of integration.

#### **Natural-historical laws of Eurasian integrity are invincible!**

From my point of view, in the dispute about the 'pros and cons' of Eurasian integrity there is a necessity to apply to a broader approach and objective natural-historical laws. Destiny has eternally given our nations their own natural habitat on the ancient land of Eurasia. Many generations of our predecessors made a home and fostered this land, they left it to us as a heritage. We will never have another land. There were clashes and conflicts. However, friendship and good-neighbour laws have always prevailed. I am convinced that deep factors, connected

with the geographical position of our common cradle, its history, mentality of people, distinctive features of their culture, folk traditions and customs, centuries-long interethnic connections and friendship, along with the blood shed in the struggle with foreign invasions and etc. will prevail in modern conditions. The two past decades have taught us many things. The greatness of Russia has expressed itself in all its might on realizing its historical mission. Moscow saved post-Soviet Eurasian world from the dissolution and degradation. The guidelines offered by Vladimir Putin open the door to the future. Current Eurasian discordance is in many cases connected with the aspirations of some of the post-Soviet states to join — at least as stepsons- to Europe. The advantage is almost given to European alternative over the Eurasian one. Europe, indeed, has shown a convincing example of the integration processes development. The countries and nations of the European continent, after centuries of mutual animosity, after the deaths of millions of people in bloody internecine wars, after the unleashing of two world wars in the twentieth century were able to overcome centuries-long discord and achieve unity within the European Union frame, which finds its basis on the NATO potential in the military and political sphere due to the political will of farseeing statesmen. However, the present turn of the international financial and economic crisis vividly showed that the European Union has lost its safety factor mainly because of the haste in the forming of its membership. On December, 1 Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France, together with Germany offered to begin immediate development of a new basic European agreement. It means a radical revision of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which for 20 years determined the actions of the European Union. It is absolutely obvious that the requirements of membership in the EU will become more severe. There is a question whether some of the present member-states will remain within the EU structure. At the same time I do not find actual some pessimistic opinions about the destiny of the European Union and doubts concerning its survival prospects. The only thing, which remains clear is that the entry of some of the post-Soviet countries to the European Union is tabooed. In the West Russia and its close neighbours are always considered civilizational strangers. Eurasian countries have an opportunity to make their own choice. The combination of our unique geographical position together with the rare natural, intellectual, scientific-technical, industrial and spiritual riches can lead to the creation of a powerful potential within the Eurasian community framework, and will be equal to the European Union in its magnitude and brilliant prospects to flourish. This will open the way to the cooperation development of Eurasian

countries with Europe from the point of view of equality and mutual benefit. It is better late than never. What we can implement today must not be left to our descendants. They will find their own concerns. As far as I have already written, our generation is still to find solutions to numerous issues, connected with the 'interests of Eurasia', along with the problems of Eurasian security [8]. Musing on the historical life of Eurasian nations I constantly recall the expression, describing the emergence of a stable 'common social destiny' on the territory, which was occupied by the Soviet Union; the expression belongs to a famous historian and Sovietologist Nicolay Vert. The USSR collapse did not destroy this society. Spiritual connections, the craving of Eurasian nations for union do not know state borders. In this concern I cannot but remember the precept of a great son of Russia, outstanding scientist and thinker Lev Gumilyov, who called upon our nations: 'Unite, not to disappear.' I fully support the ideas expressed by Vladimir Putin to create the Eurasian Union. They respond to innermost aspirations of Eurasian nations. The Russian leader is right — that is the behest of the time.

#### Notes

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## ON INTERETHNIC INTEGRATION IN RUSSIA'S ENVIRONMENT

The problems of interethnic understanding have become considerably sharper in Russia, the country, which is far less multinational than the USSR. This obvious paradox can easily be explained. It is connected not only with the weakening of the mechanism of a rather authoritarian system of the past, but also with absolutely new environmental circumstances.

The tendency to ethnic separatization, which is sometimes revealed in our society as coming from certain ethnic groups, and is dictated by the aspirations of some elitist groups of various magnitude to increase their spheres of influence in the society. Trying to achieve this goal they apply to the ethnic paradigm of a great State, as well as to a local parochial one. These hidden initiatives, which are not infrequent among mono-ethnically-oriented groups of population, find some 'understanding' among certain social groups, but they do not correspond to real interests of the society. In this concern the realization of interethnic social cultural processes is acquiring special importance; the final goal of this realization must be understanding of the objective necessity of integration which is to level the elements of ethnic tensions in all the situations.

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Integration is not a synonym to identification. It is quite obvious from a linguistic point of view. However, this fact is realized not deeply enough in the process of interpretation of ethno-social processes.

Integration is unity; perhaps it is partial or multi-phased, but in the long run it is always real in case of favourable dynamics. Identity means similarity, equalization, which does not exclude, but sometimes even implies and provokes competition and confrontation between the 'levelled' groups in their expectations and complaints.

It is undoubted that identification and integration can vary in different socio-ethnic environments. The diagram of integration processes and phenomena has a certain 'distance scale', where the positions vary depending on time, region, and what is more important, on the precise ethno-social organism.

To realize and comprehend modern ethno-social phenomena in the Russia's environment we will apply to their expressive manifestation in relatively auspicious capital environment. For us to avoid excessive theoretical debates we will use the

facts — some ethno-statistical information, which reveals the abovementioned processes and phenomena, if not completely then in close connection and dynamics. These data show, on the one hand, a relatively quick integration of major other-ethnic groups (let's define them as non-Russian) in the capital environment, while, on the other hand, the statistic facts indicate the existence of complications and relative stability of the ethnic features in the studied groups, which forms are rapidly transformed, which is finally fixed by the ethnic self-consciousness. All social groups, including the Russian population, have a revealed ethnic self-consciousness. It is worth mentioning that the Russians (in comparison with other ethnic groups) have quite stable self-consciousness which is not dependent on the time of inclusion in their 'own' Russian environment. Self-consciousness transforms considerably in other-ethnic groups (without any exception) with the time and depends on the adaptation to new conditions. Traditional ethnic self-consciousness gives place to 'citizenship' when the priority of the latter is gradually increasing (Table №1).

Table 1

**The priority of citizenship (and/or ethnic) self-consciousness of the Russians and people of other national origins (among the Muscovites)<sup>1</sup> (the percentage is given to each stated ethnic group)**

ETHNICITY	respondents with the prevailing self-consciousness of all-Russian unity, the 'all-Russians'	respondents with the prevailing self-consciousness of their 'own' ethnicity, the 'ethnofores'	among them those who have been living in the capital of Russia for		
			less than 19 years	over 20 years	born locally
Russians	40	44	46	46	41
Ukrainians	65	23	41	17	6
Tatars	75	27	36	36	16
Armenians	44	32	40	31	26
Georgians	54	21	31	17	10
Azerbaijani	32	27	34	25	16

Source: U.V. Arutyunyan. Muscovites. Ethno-sociological research. Moscow, 2007, pp. 41, 85, 119, 150, 180, 217.

<sup>1</sup> The question was asked: Who do you consider yourself from the point of national identity? The following answers were implied: a person of the world; European; Russian; Ukrainian, Tartar and etc. Approximately 500 respondents were surveyed in each ethnic group. More information on the programme and methods of research is available in U.V. Arutyunyan. Muscovites. Ethno-sociological research. Moscow, 2007, pp. 3–11.

The identification and sometimes even the domination of the idea of 'citizenship' among the non-Russian group of the society is indicated in the table and accounted for by various reasons. Among them, a particular interest in the integration into the Russian environment of non-Russian groups can be stated, which is not typical of the Russian population, which does not face this necessity, as being 'at home' — rooted. The integrative metamorphosis of ethnic groups' self-consciousness is linked and followed by numerous changes in their socio-ethnic life, intensive familiarization with Russian culture, in many cases there is a situation when the Russian language begins to be perceived as a native tongue,

there also are intensive interethnic contacts, including miscegenation and many other examples that form multiethnic entities. The changes are more and more revealed with time in the process of the ethnic rootage, especially among the natives (Table 1).

The survey gives an opportunity to evaluate the intensity of significant changes in the socio-cultural life of the stated ethnic groups, which in many cases is connected with the duration of their existence in the Russian environment. To have a clearer realization of the ethnic transformation of these groups we give some data showing the changes in their culture and interethnic contacts (Table 2).

Table 2

**The symptoms of ethnic transformation of non-Russian Muscovites (%)**

Characteristic features	Ukrainians	Tartars	Armenians	Georgians	Azerbaijani
Those who consider Russian their native language					
All the respondents including those who have been living in Moscow for	76	24	53	44	25
less than 19 years	72 30		34	30	14
over 20 years			48	39	24
born locally	100	37	83	73	57
Those who have Russians among close friends					
All the respondents including those who have been living in Moscow for	69	58	53	48	40
less than 19 years	57	58	30	39	34
over 20 years	70	59	55	49	40
born locally			67	60	50

Table 2

Characteristic features	Ukrainians	Tartars	Armenians	Georgians	Azerbaijani
Those who have mainly Russian spouses					
All the respondents including those who have been living in Moscow for	55	27	50	59	30
less than 19 years	58	22	24	34	14
over 20 years			62	69	45
born locally	64	40	75	78	57
Those who consider Russia their Motherland					
All the respondents including those who have been living in Moscow for					
less than 19 years	30	59	22	14	9
over 20 years		64	39	27	10
born locally	59	73	63	57	30

Source: U.V. Arutyunyan. *Muscovites. Ethno-sociological research*. Moscow, 2007, pp. 86, 91, 93, 100, 120, 125, 127, 134, 184, 187, 190, 194, 219, 221, 224, 225.

As far as Table 2 indicates the changes of the stated ethnic groups of the Muscovites despite all the differences between them are connected with historical, cultural and religious factors which are quite alike. All the ethno-cultural changes in these surveyed groups are developing in one direction — interethnic integration. However, in spite the clarity of these results they must not be viewed as absolute. The idea is that despite widely spread opinions, the given data do not reflect the assimilation of ethnic groups which are included in the integrative processes, although this interpretation can often be met. Even the ethnic groups which are actively involved in the integrative processes, preserve their own ‘root system’, connected with blood relations and a quite stable ethnic identification, and self-consciousness. This fact must be mentioned here as

some theorists and observers treat the notions ‘citizens of Russia’ and ‘Russians’ as synonyms. However, social consciousness does not only perceive them in a different way, but creates different associations: in one case it is ethnic, while in the other — mainly civil.

The data given here do not reflect interethnic integration in all its diversity in the Russian society. The situation in this concern will vary, especially ethnically, in different regions of the country. The survey indicates specific features typical of internationally developed groups of the capital’s population, which is quite an integrative environment in our society. However, it is interesting for the realization and estimation of the processes of interethnic integration, their specific features and prospects in the developed Russian strata.

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## MOSCOW AS A MULTINATIONAL MEGALOPOLIS: THE ROLE AND PLACE OF MUSLIM PEOPLES IN THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAPITAL’S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

There is a popular belief that large cities are unique accumulators of history where what is called civilization has been created throughout centuries through the dialogue of various cultures and religious traditions. The above said concerns Moscow, whose history can reflect the depth and peculiarities of the Russian civilization. In recent years, the academic interest to the past of the Russian capital has grown to a principally new scale and to a new historical and cultural dimension. It can be explained by both historic discovering and attracting more and more new archive materials and by expanding the boundaries of the research of the problem in question, which is connected, among other things, with studies of the life of Muslim peoples who, together with others, significantly influenced the establishment of the historical image of Moscow. Modern Moscow is a multi-layered social institution that bears the impress of various epochs and, at the same time, is the source to create time-proved spiritual values, a place where a huge cultural

and historical heritage is accumulated and where the historical memory of Eurasian peoples, who have long been inhabiting it, is kept. Turning to the Muslim past of Moscow emphasizes one of primary peculiarities of the historically multinational city that can reflect the depth and diversity of the Russian civilization, special features of its establishment and its further evolution process. Ancient Moscow implicitly included various cultures of Eurasian peoples of the vast country, as well as its both Western and Eastern neighbours — Greeks, Poles, Italians, Dutchmen, Germans, Englishmen, Armenians, Finno-Ugrians. Multiethnic structure of citizens determined the variety of confessions that, in its turn, had an impact on spiritual life of the community and on the peculiar image of the city, which accumulates a number of socio-cultural layers and their specific functioning on every stage of its historical development. Moscow has always been (and still remains) the scene for the most important historical events as well as the centre of attraction of dozens of peoples that belong to the Arab Muslim area. ‘Historical settlement’ of Eurasian peoples who are ethnically and spiritually connected with Islam, whom the Russian chronicles traditionally called ‘besermen’, ‘pecheneg’, ‘aganian’, ‘ismailian’, ‘basurman’, ‘turchenya’ and so on, started, as the evidences of archaeological diggings show, long before the creation of the Muscovite state and those towns that were eventually included within the borders of Moscow.

Ancient Rus’ making acquaintance with the Islamic civilization and the beginning of its establishment on the Moscow land dates back to the early Medieval time. It was caused, on

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the one hand, by flourish of international trade contacts with the Arab Muslim world, whose centre in the 8th century was located in the Baghdad caliphate, and, on the other hand, by the famous trade route 'from the Varangians to the Greeks' that crossed the territory of the ancient Rus' state and connected Scandinavia and the Byzantine Empire. Long before the time when the settlement called Moscow appeared on the map of medieval Rus', on the vast territories of Eurasia in the 7th – 8th centuries there had appeared local Islamic civilizational grounds gemmed from the Arab caliphate, with centres in Derbent (South Dagestan) and later, in Bulgar, the capital of Volga-Kama Bulgaria. Original spiritual religious traditions and cultural social lifestyle of the peoples living within the newly developed centres of the Muslim oecumene were closely connected with Islam, which determined, to a large extent, the nature of their relationships with the neighbouring tribes and peoples, and couldn't pass without leaving a trace in the process of formation of historical and cultural image of the Russian state and its capital-to-be. Contemporary researchers point out that, in general, the contribution of Muslim peoples into the original development of Russia can not only be matched with the achievements of the Russian Christian people, but in the early stage the Muslim civilizational centre was developing more dynamically, and the Turkic Muslim culture was a donor for the Russian Christian one.<sup>1</sup>

Feudal Moscow, which in the early 12th century was only a small settlement – a fortress on the Borovitsky hill in the estuary of the river Neglinnaya, as the archaeological research of famous Soviet historian M.M. Gerasimov (1907–1970) proved, was inhabited by various Eurasian and Northern tribes who differed in ethnical background and anthropological appearance. V.O. Kluchevsky noted, 'In the 12th century this region was non-Russian rather than Russian.'<sup>2</sup> The same opinion is supported now by contemporary historians. Basing on a huge number of analyzed materials, A.A. Formozov, who advocates the theory of migrationism, argues that in the Moscow region there lived tribes of 'various background, they mingled together and it's impossible to find a pure racial type here'.<sup>3</sup> Alongside with the Finno-Ugric, Baltic tribes and the Eastern Slavonic tribes – the Vyatichy and Krivichy and other peoples – the population of ancient Moscow, which was a part of Vladimirsko-Suzdalskoye principedom, consisted of the Turkic-speaking Polovtsy (the Kipchaky) and the Volga Bulgarians, who were familiar with the world of the Islam either directly or indirectly.

Applying local Moscow history can affect, from our point of view, generalizations of a 'higher' macro-historical level,<sup>4</sup> as well as dramatically add to or clarify certain episodes of the establishment of the Russian state, that, in general, can prove the statement of the famous Russian historian N.M. Karamzin: 'He who visited Moscow, knows Russia.' This thesis being salient is emphasized by the fact that nowadays in Moscow there live 10% of the total Russian population and the city focuses and reflects diverse life of the Russian state with its intensive type of social, political and cultural changes. Multiethnic character as a constant feature of the Russian history, with Moscow having always been the epicentre of almost all events, is not only paid attention to by national scholars ranging from V.N. Tatishchev to M.P. Mchedlov, but by prominent and famous contemporary foreign researchers as well.<sup>5</sup> Historical materi-

als concerning Moscow enable us to consider in a different way the role of the Muslim peoples who became in the stage of establishing the Ancient Rus' 'spiritually leading peoples' of the Russian state. 'Few peoples manage to bear an individual spiritual act and create a unique spiritual culture,' wrote prominent Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin. 'Peoples who succeeded in it are spiritually leading peoples; those who failed are spiritually subordinate ones.'<sup>6</sup> This complex and multi-layered cooperation of various ethno-confessional and ethno-cultural communities, in which two dominating spiritual traditions rooting in Islam and Christianity prevailed in different epochs towards the leading and subordinate peoples, which makes the core of the Russian civilization.

Oriental Asian type of the capital that arrested attention of many national and foreign researchers of Moscow antiquity nowadays has considerably been reinforced due to modern discoveries in the historical science and created conditions for new scientific generalizations, and first of all, for the realization of uniqueness of the multinational Russian civilization. 'Actually, Asia can already be anticipated in Moscow,' as wrote famous Russian religious thinker and publicist G.P. Fedotov in 1926. 'A European who has visited it for the first time and a Russian who returns there from his wandering in the West are both pierced by the Asian soul of Moscow.'<sup>7</sup> This very important observation of a fine researcher of Russian history can easily be illustrated by well-known examples of Moscow life in the past and present of the capital, for instance, by Moscow toponymy that has kept through the centuries almost all traditional Turkic Muslim names of the streets – Kitay-gorod, Balchug, Ordynka, Ostrozhenka and Arbat and the types of cult and urban architecture that bear the impress of the East.

In the capital of the new millennium among 160 nationalities inhabiting it, more than 30 are Islamic, that is ethnically, culturally or spiritually they associate themselves with Islam: ranging from the city-forming Tartar people, whose origin dates back to the time of establishment of the capital, and to dynamically developing communities of the Azerbaijanis, the North Caucasian peoples, peoples from Central Asian states — Tajik, Kirgiz, Uzbek and Kazakh, as well as Turks, Arabs, Persians, Afghans and Bosnians. Modern Moscow, as any European megalopolis, is ethnically and culturally a very diverse institution with a noticeable element of Asian peoples, amounting from 1.5 to 2 million.

Looking around, it is easy to notice that the Muslim East, just like it used to be in the time of dynamical development of the Golden Horde (14th - 15th centuries), has become an integrate part of the capital reality and our everyday life. But unlike other European capitals, where the phenomenon of Islam in its social, religious and cultural manifestations evolved on a large scale only in the second part of the 20th century, Moscow as the capital of a multinational state, initially originated as a multinational and multi-confessional city, at any rate, as Turkic-Slavonic and Christian-Muslim.

Attraction of poorly investigated and new materials about the life of the Muslim ethnic groups of the capital can create a more objective and adequate picture of the lifestyle of the peoples who have strong historical, spiritual and cultural traditions of Islam and the Islamic civilization, in general. Multilayered and multi-factored Moscow history might be a key to understanding the complex and contradictory nature of the Russian civilization on the whole, the Islamic element of which has undoubtedly a scientific and cultural importance.

<sup>1</sup> *Religiya v samosoznaniiji naroda* (Religion in Self-consciousness of People) // ed. M.P. Mchedlov, The Institute for Sociology of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008, pp. 130–131.

<sup>2</sup> Kluchevsky V.O. *Istoricheskiye portrety. Deyateli istoricheskoy mysli*. (Historical portraits. Figures of Historical Thoughts). Moscow, 1990, p. 41.

<sup>3</sup> Formozov A.A. *Issledovatel drevnostey Mosky i Podmoskoviya*. (Researchers of Antiquities of Moscow and Moscow region). Moscow: Rukopisnye pamyatniki Drevney Rusi (Manuscripts of the Ancient Rus'), 2007, p.68.

<sup>4</sup> Arkhangelsky S.I. *Lokalny metod v istoricheskoy nauke* (Local Method in the Historical Science) // *Krayevedeniye* (Country Studies). 1927. No. 2, pp. 181–194.

<sup>5</sup> A. Kappeler. *Rossiya – mnogonatsionalnaya imperiya*. (Russia is a Multinational Empire). Moscow, 'Progress-Traditsiya', 1997; J. Hosking. *Rossiya:*

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<sup>6</sup> Ilyin I.A. *Sochineniya* (Collected Works) in 2 volumes. V.2 Medium, 1994, pp. 236–237.

<sup>7</sup> Fedotov G.P. *Tri stolitsy* (The Three Capitals) // *Novy mir* (The New World), 1989, pp. 209–217.

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## TIMES OF MULTICULTURALISM ANTI-MANIFESTO OR COMPETITION OF ALTERNATIVE MODELS?

An appeal of West-European leaders to return to the discussion of multiculturalists' ideas became a new test for the national-cultural identity of different countries. Today they run through the world's political and mass media discourse. While some people criticize them and urge to condemn multiculturalism to oblivion because of the negative experience of its implementation and its mismatch to the modern situation; others urge to study more profound the essence of the theoretical patterns postulated by the multiculturalism, to analyze the practices of people's coexistence formed in different countries within the common territory of the bearers of different cultural traditions and religious values.

The urge to the political debates on European cultural identity based on the principles of the cultural pluralism and conservation of ethno-cultural identity amid the common cultural area, was raised by the processes of globalization and social conflicts following them. In our view, they proved something that would seem obvious: multiculturalism cannot be treated from one side only from the point of right to cultural values and traditions, to ethno-cultural identity, for it is not implemented without acknowledgement of liability for involvement into multicultural environment, for observing the principles and rules of social conduct.

Moreover, the tension is involved into the process of identification itself, which is defined by Merleau-Ponty as the process of self-awareness of oneself and one's place in society and at the same time as the awareness of the simultaneousness of the life of one person with the life of another representative of the same society, increasing the difference between the ordinary world and value judgements of the people from other groups (or other strata). As a result, the social space starts to get polarized, enforcing the unity of each group,<sup>2</sup> they will either enter a positive cooperation or go to a direct confrontation.

If we turn to what was going on in Europe during the last decade, when the second and the third generations of the European countries' population (former migrants from other countries) isolated (or keeping itself aloof) from the processes national-cultural identity shaping (including its civil part) entered into a stage of marginalization, social destruction and instability. Its characteristic is destruction of ethno-cultural codes, alteration of style and ways of living, which happened far too faster than one could have predicted. Analyzing the picture of a collective identity crisis in different countries, one inevitably comes to a conclusion: identity matrices formation as a spontaneous process of self-determination, set aside without society and government's attention, proceeded along the wrong value paths, which allegedly were built in a target perspective of cultural policies of different European countries.

As a result, these past events influenced the reputation of culture within the declared strategy of sustainable development

in which the culture was seen as one of the major resources. Finally, on the basis of not always scientifically and professionally grounded political judgements, multiculturalism as a conception was criticized. We should note that it is quite reasonable in relation to negative scenarios of its implementation, but not to the positive practices of its realization in the Canadian model, that makes it possible to support cultural diversity for a long time.

Let us ask ourselves natural questions for the discussion of this controversial problem:

Can it be so that the problem is not only in the principles of such and such conception?

Is the result of coexistence meant in the theoretical model bound to be by all means positive in the reality?

On what principles is people's cooperation in non-integrated society based, if it is manifested in different forms — open competition and conflict, 'hidden' confrontation within one state, compromise and the search for balance of power and interests of groups and communities?

In our view, the answers to these questions should be in the concepts of the state cultural policies, by the instruments of which it is possible to adjust the strategies of different social groups in the society. The most difficult part of this process is to agree on the 'rules of the game' or general principles which could be accepted by the society in spite of the existence of particular opposing views and approaches.

In our view, *the vitality of any conception* put into the cultural policy strategy and included into the social practice is rooted in the possibility of its adaptation to the changing conditions. Variability and diversion of the communicative practices and models of social interaction of people as the bearers of different cultural traditions and religious values reflect *the difficulty of realization of multiculturalism concept* at present, which cannot but be considered in the cultural policy strategy aimed at the collective identity construction.

During different historical periods different ideas were offered as the alternative ideas in the basis of this or that type of multiculturalism ('boutique multiculturalism', 'neoliberal', 'critical', 'rebellious', 'polycentric' multiculturalism, 'multiculturalism of fear' etc.): ideas of 'cultivating' and exploiting of exotic cultures; of levelling the freedom's individual criteria of cultural diversity and commercialization of interaction system between cultures; acceptance of cultural diversities aimed at the prevention of violence in the sphere of spiritual representation; of substantialization of hidden political motives of social character cultural demonstration.

In a number of multiculturalism models there were developed the provisions about the cultural diversity connection to the history of world colonization; about the possibility to lessen or to ease the threat of interethnic wars, intercommunity violence and/or state's violence towards those people, communities or cultural minorities that try to betray or to deny their former cultural identity. During the last decades there were spread ideas of priority of the personal freedom of cultural self-determination over the social with the simultaneous proclamation of the freedom of the ethno-cultural group, where the subject identity is faded, which are the characteristics of the 'liberal' multiculturalism.<sup>3</sup>

So what type of multiculturalism is spread in the European countries and was estimated as a negative in its influence on the socio-cultural stability?

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<sup>2</sup> Merleau-Ponty M. *Phenomenology of Perception* / trans. revised by I.S. Vdovina, S.P. Fokina – St. Petersburg: Yuventa Publishing house, 1999. P.561.

<sup>3</sup> See: Toktosunova A.I. *Ethno-cultural identity and dialogue in the context of globalization*. – Bishkek, 2007. – P.79.

Finally, there is a model of 'communitarian' multiculturalism in its Canadian variant, where the priority of the society over an individual and preferences in the solution of the problem of cultural diversity are based on the society's priorities.<sup>1</sup>

But this 'basic layout' of the Canadian model of multiculturalism is supplemented and specified annually. In the official governmental reports about the practical implementation of the Bill on Multiculturalism (1971) open to the society the authorities (civil servants, scientists and experts) during many decades evaluate the level of tolerance and mutual understanding, adequacy of the measures and resources used to maintain ethno-cultural uniqueness of the immigrant and native peoples, to conserve the whole spectrum of cultural diversity in the Canadian society. They also discuss existing guarantees of protection of immigrants' individual rights and ethno-cultural communities' collective rights; detect new problems such as prevention of racism and different forms of inequality. Thus the base for collective identity is formed.

Spreading of the concept of multiculturalism and its meaning within the development of globalization increases, because today it is one of the factors which influences the potential of the intercultural dialogue in the time of territorial mobility, along with the acknowledgement of cultural diversity, the necessity to teach tolerance to the society, to form collective (civil) identity, to develop democracy and civil society.

The ideas of multiculturalism correlate with the model of cultural policy in the context of globalization, their dominant being the informational-communicative nature of the social interaction and the creative potential of the cultural behaviour. However, the public consciousness is still anxious about the real perspectives of the conservation of peaceful coexistence inside the integrated space of people sharing different cultural and religious values.

Is the multiculturalism paradigm arisen at the time of migration processes intensification, only a good intention of highly-qualified communities of experts, scientists and politicians to remove a conflict-stress from the society?

How well is it backed by law? Are the rights of a person and a citizen secured regardless of his/her ethno-culture and religion in full according to the modern civilized level?

The construction of multifactor culturological models, comprising adaptational, identificational and communicative components, is connected with the large-scale tasks solution, conditioned by the intensification of the migratory flows, concentration of the social tension factors in the countries which accept the basic principles of the free self-development of cultures within one territorial space.

The processes of democratization in Russia, on the one hand, contribute to the cultural pluralism consolidation (the growth of diversity of forms of cultural manifestation, acknowledgement of diversity of socio-cultural development etc.), but on the other hand, the existing difference between the manifestations of the equality of cultures and the opportunity to recognize the values of one culture as equal to the value of another culture is revealed.

More and more often the main point in discussing the problems of cultural diversity is the detection of the *boundaries of conventionalism and universalism* as the explanatory models of interaction at the time of globalization that activates the problem of 'cultural abuse' which is connected with the reverse side of the cultural tolerance in the context of social inequality.<sup>2</sup> And in the foreground of the discussion there is the problem of the improvement of practices of multiculturalism introduction as far as there are distortions of its principles both within the theoretical and mass media fields. In our view, the acceptance of the diversity of cultures preserves its status of the crucial condition of people's existence in the world, and the allotment of this principle with the moral connotations can enforce the humanistic component of the culturologist discourse of the public policy.

Thereby the spread of the multicultural approach led both to the positive and to the negative results. the revision of multiculturalism is connected with the refusal to declare blankly the old statements, in the development of the real mechanisms for the governments of the multicultural states to give each person *a chance to overcome social and cultural inequality, to gain equal rights for the creative self-development and self-realization*. If there are no options for social protection and material backing, no access to cultural values and information resources, then the achievement of positive results is problematic.

<sup>1</sup> See: Toktosunova A.I. Ethno-cultural identity and dialogue in the context of globalization. – Bishkek, 2007. – P.79.

<sup>2</sup> See: Barry Brian. Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. – Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2002. Pp. 279–291; 324–325.

O. T. Bogomolov<sup>1</sup>DIALOGUE NEEDS RELIABLE CRITERIA FOR COMPARISONS<sup>2</sup>

People believe that we tell lies and falsify facts.  
And they have reasons to believe so.

*Nicolas Sarkozy, President of France*

What we measure affects what we do... If we don't measure correctly, we don't get the correct result...

*Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize Winner*

The dialogue of civilizations which has been enriched and developed within many years through Likhachov Conference sees its aim to experience exchange concerning social development of different countries, information about economic achievements, state structure and culture. Internationally compared results of social and economic development become more and more demanded. They gain relevance in terms of cultural and civilization interaction and competition. Those who achieve higher results, become more internationally authoritative and influential. Nowadays moral and intellectual authority of the leading nations becomes a crucial factor of peace and progress on the planet.

As an economist myself, I am very concerned about the information we use in terms of international comparisons. Aviation knows to its own cost what troubles we can face when navigation tools fails. But defects of economic indicators can lead to more serious and massive consequences because they are taken into account while making important decisions. Mistakes in economic policy, rooted in wrong or even falsified statistic index, come especially expensive. Moreover, they shatter confidence in the government; they also harm nation's mutual understanding. The divergence of statistic data and real life become the source of conflicts and misunderstandings.

It stands to reason that French president appealed to Joseph Stiglitz and Amartya Sen, two Nobel Prize winners, in order they worked together with French statisticians and puzzled out the validity of statistic indexes. All the specialists came to a conclusion that many figures cannot be considered representative and gave their voices for the additional set and the improvement of economic development indicators. Primarily it concerns the index of volume and dynamics of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is most often used in the official statements and the mass media. This comprehensive indicator is often used to judge about both the decline and the rise of economic development of the countries. The global crisis and the efforts to overcome it made the issue concerning reliability of the statistic measurement of economic processes extremely crucial.

First of all, it is important to take into account GDP characteristics. It measures a newly-created value of products and services plus the sum of annual amortization charges. That is why it does not comprise the cost of the so-called 'intermedi-

ate product', the one which had been used in the inquiry period but produced in previous years. Meanwhile, GDP is considered by many people to be an estimated value of all products and services produced within the inquiry period. For example, it takes several years to build a bridge. Annual expenses to its building (labour, materials, transport and other services) would influence GDP of a certain year. That is why when the bridge is finished GDP would include only part of the expenses to its construction corresponding to that particular year. If shops sold the bread made of the last year's flour then GDP would include only baking expenses but not the whole value. Thus, this index is a little conditional being a kind of virtual dimension. It does not measure the cost volume of all the made products and services of the country, so it cannot reflect the real economic condition of the country. As the barometer sometimes shows 'fair', and it is raining outside.

As an indicator of the volume and dynamics of economic growth, GDP has significant faults which should be remembered. For example the GDP of Russia consists of services by 60% including not only transport, telecommunication, banking, wholesale and retail, but also education, science, health-care, all the administrative sector, the armed forces etc. Not all the services included in GDP are comprised by 'real economy sector' concept which is usually mentioned in economic books, although there is no confirmed definition of it and its quantitative measurement.

The main meaning of the term is to point out *the production of the material wealth and the services that people and the country cannot live without, and which makes wealth of the country, its population security and welfare*. Some of the services reflected in GDP are not connected with accession but mainly with exemption from the essential material wealth of the society. For example, advertisement which makes consumers buy things they do not need or low-quality goods and services. The same might be said about fake dealers who pump up the prices and consequently the GDP volume. A huge army of private guards also contributes to it, although it is a product of a sick and criminalized society where law and police systems are not efficient and public mores are in decay. In these terms the growth of administrative bureaucracy, police services, prisons, penal institutions counted statistically as GDP growth would be actually considered as an waste from the viewpoint of real economy sector.

Speculative operations at the stock exchange and in the bank sector also contribute to GDP growth. But population of the country does not become richer and economy does not become stronger. Thus, there is a gap between GDP growth and indicators of fix capital increase and its renewal, employment improvement, birth and death rates, population health conditions, retirement coverage, living standard increase of population majority, inflation dynamics, progress of culture, science and education, crime and corruption decline. Meanwhile, the condition of those issues must be one the main indicator of crisis or economic growth. If there is divergence between the volumes of GDP and *the real economy sector*, then there is a necessity to assess the results of economic activity not only by GDP dynamics but also by some other indexes. Danilo Türk, President of Slovenia, thinks that the understanding and

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<sup>2</sup> The author wishes to thank Vassily Mikhailovich Simchera (Doctor of Economics) for his assistance in gathering information and for consultancy in terms of statistics.

measurement of economic development roots in 'the well-being in its general sense but not only in the production... The corresponding instruments must be developed to measure progress, well-being and development of the country.' And we also need reliable indicator of real economy sector. Unfortunately, there is no clear understanding of the need of it. That is why Russia Statistic Committee would not measure its volume and dynamics. In this respect science owes practical knowledge. But government also does not set it as a mission for science. Official data, especially concerning inflation, population income, unemployment rate, poverty size, capital outflow, brain drain, demography, physical and psychological health of population, corruption, turn to be unreliable, inadequate to reality and thus prevent effective decision-making process to improve the situation on the whole.

Limited representativeness of Russian GDP can be accounted for by some other defects. So, to indicate the growth pace within several years, the comparison must be made on the bases of constant prices to eliminate the price increase during this period. Official statistics usually uses an deflator (adjustment rate of the price growth in comparison with the basis). But its size is disputable. Thus, in 2010 Russian Statistic Committee when adjusting the prices to 2009 level used the deflator of 10.3%, while the prices of the production sector grew in 16.7% during the year, in the agricultural sector in 23.6%, and in the service sector in 33.1%. Such generalization of sectoral inflation rates at the deflator level of 10.3% may only be the result of wizardry. But 2010 was not an exception. In 2011 preliminary official assessment of GDP dynamics has also seen a deflator of 15.4%. GDP of 2010 was calculated as 44.5 trillion rubles, and of 2011 as 54.4 trillion rubles. In terms of changeless prices the growth within the year, according to the official information, was 4.3%. But if the deflator is 15.4% (54.4 divide by 115.4 %) then GDP of 2011 is 47.1 billion rubles. It means that annual GDP growth was 5.84% ( $47.1:44.5 = 105.84\%$ ). However, we are being very modest announcing that the growth is only 4.3%. The problem is that such growth corresponds to the deflator of 17.5% but not to the one of 15.4%. The first number seems to be very close to the real inflation level. There is an obvious mismatch of indicators because the deflator, showing the adjustment to the price growth of all the produced products and services, is highly connected with the consumer price index. The growth of the former, according to the official data, was 6.1% in 2011. Such a gap (3 times more) between the deflator and the consumer price index might be only the result of pure magic. There seems to be a great understatement of general and consumption inflation together with GDP growth overstatement. Western countries usually have a very small gap between consumption goods inflation and GDP deflator. In 2011 the USA saw GDP deflator as 2.1% and consumption prices growth was 3.0% meaning 43% higher. In the developed countries excluding the US, the EU and Japan, both indexes were 3.5% in 2011.

It is obvious that the stated indexes are calculated with great errors by the Russian statistic office. The results of calculations of inflations rate depend on which set of products and services is taken into account, as well as the chosen specific gravity of different goods and services in this set. Any voluntarism and anarchy may falsify the deflator and consumption inflation index to the desirable size. A lowered deflator and consumption price index increases GDP growth. Taking into account social and political meaning of GDP dynamics indexes, their calculation must be pure with the participants of great scholars and independent experts.

GDP statistics also needs the correction because the fact that not all the activities which give real benefits and consequently GDP increase are registered and calculated. Shadow economy, for example, is never taken into account but gains, according to different sources, from 20% to 40% of the GDP

in Russia. It includes the salary paid in cash without the accountant's statements. According to some sources, the rate of such salaries gains 40% of the whole salary paid in Russia. It is very difficult and sometimes even impossible to calculate the income received from the farmlands, housekeeping, suburban gardens, private builders, mechanics, fix men, tradesmen (including tourist traders) and other workers of different professions who have additional and even main income without being registered by tax inspection and other offices. The volume of its huge add-value is officially added to GDP as 20%. But this is a voluntary estimation without any scientific research, social opinion polls and random checks. It might lower the share of the shadow sector including clandestine production, and consequently the amount of GDP.

There is also one more problematic issue concerning the duplication of Value Added Tax (VAT) which artificially raises GDP. VAT is included into the price of products and services by the producer and then it is declared together with a salary and revenue as the produced additional cost. But at the same time when the product or service is being sold VAT is taken again. The duplication of this tax is calculated at GDP and makes it higher by 2-3 percentages. Is that right? There is one more issue of criminal kind that leads to GDP increase when a fake export agreement is fulfilled and VAT was paid without the factual product supply, and then VAT is returned to the supplier on their demand. Amortization charges included into GDP might not be authentic, too. In order to force self-sufficiency of the main funds they might be overstated and charged from the consumers as additional taxes.

On the other hand, a great part of GDP is lost due to substantial losses of products and services provided by the lack of responsibility, natural disasters, smuggling export, capital outflow, rusty technology etc. According to the calculations made by V.M. Simchera, the volume of the losses in 2010 could actually reach half of GDP, or readjusting to the parity rate of purchasing power it would be about 1250 billion dollars. It is not so disputable as it may seem because to make 1000 dollars of GDP Russia spends power recourses 8-10 times as much as any developed western country. The same concerns the usage of metal, wood etc. Legal and illegal capital outflow was not less than 80 billion dollars in 2011 and during 20 years of market reforms capital outflow from Russia might reach 1-2 trillion dollars. It is surprising how the country could endure such bleeding.

However, in order to control and stop such losses, it is necessary to start with securing a reliable statistics of capital outflow, including expert assessments of the capitals missed by official calculation. It is the only way for the country to measure its real exemption from GDP. Today we face different (sometimes extremely different) evaluations of capital outflow and brain drain, and, correspondingly, different evaluation of economic damage connected. It is only natural that Russian influential, comprador bourgeoisie that merged with government should be satisfied with the situation. It is easier to dodge taxes, save and hide the loot not only at the accounts of international banks but also by investing to football teams, yachts, palaces, villas, hotels, restaurants, houses and flats in London, New York and other attractive places. At the same time it matters for Russia and its population feeling the crisis burden and the market reforms gravity. Soviet slogan 'socialism is calculation' was forgotten by us, though in civilized market economy accurate accounting and calculation together with independent and fair audit are still key issues of economic functioning.

Inflation indexes deserve special attention in terms of Russian consumer market as well as wholesale market and markets of construction, shares, loans and other lending markets. It is natural that accuracy of such indexes influences GDP representativeness. Consumer goods inflation is a highly sensitive process for the population. The announced indexes of consum-

er prices growth are rather different to the reality and are considered by people as deliberate falsification of the real social and economic situation in the country. It is clear that government is interested in positive results as well as it wishes to have a 'controlled' statistic service. That is why it became subordinate to the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. But managerial effectiveness at all levels requires independent and fair statistics which is not imposed from above. It is also essential for the population who wants to know the truth in order to trust the administration. Yet such independence might not be reached. It might be proved by the fact that the report on privatization results made by formally independent Audit Chamber has not been discussed at the State Duma session due to its acuity. And all the revealed breaches were left with no further effects.

Population losses due to inflation which is actually a hidden consumption tax are covered partially, if they are covered at all. Besides, independent scientific researches show that if based on the price rise of the consumer goods and services basket used by poor and disadvantaged people then annual inflation would reach 20-25% within the past 5-7 years. Though the official index of consumer inflation calculated for the rich and for the poor together at the level of 8-12% could be compared with the indicator of the average temperature of all patients in a hospital. Thus, the population has the right to demand fair data based on the clear scientific methodology and proved by independent experts.

There is no need to prove social importance of such indexes as subsistence level, average income, average wage, minimum hourly wages, poverty line, decile indexes of income inequality, degree of people education productivity, flairs, qualifications of labor power, product quality. They are being the main characteristics of economic progress or decline. But mainly this sphere sees a considerable lag of the state statistics and statistic science.

According to the economic theory, salary and social transfers made from the state budgets must provide normal reproduction of working-age people taking into account qualifications, labour complexity and intensiveness, and health influence. It means that not only essential needs in food, clothes and shelter should be met but also the ones in culture, health care and recreation. Moreover, work force reproduction and what is more its improvement charges information and new knowledge, social integration, family maintenance, children education and upbringing. It is obvious that work force reproductive expenses would be different in certain countries depending on the level of economic development, age-old traditions and customs, climate etc. But in any case, if the expenses of work force reproduction are not covered (at least to its minimum) by the salary volume and the whole income, then labour and intellectual potential of the country might degrade.

Unfortunately, administrative guidelines and standards especially in terms of the subsistence level and adequate incomes are voluntary and far from the ones in terms of scientific criteria. Such important criterion as minimum hourly wages is not implemented at all. Public limited company 'Vserossiyskiy Centr Urovnya Zhizny' (Russian Centre for Living Standards) calculated minimum consumer budget providing reproduction of unqualified labor force in the third term of 2011. It was 16.5 thousand rubles - 2.6 times higher than the official subsistence level. These numbers might be considerably corrected if the more substantial investigation would be done.

There is a great underestimation of labour value apart sometimes completely corrupted data of remuneration of complicated qualified labour compared with the middle-complexity labour. For example, labour capacity measured by GDP for one working hour in Russia is 4 times less than that in Italy and hour salary is 10 times less. It is interesting that 33% of

Russian GDP falls to the salary, 31% to the profit and capital income, 36% to taxes, yet developed Western countries salary share reaches 60% of GDP. Because of the lack of reliable methodology of statistic comparisons the numbers may prove even less suitable to assess labour payment in Russia.

If the size of average salary in market systems varies depending on the development level of appropriate countries, but the proportions of the salary depending from complexity, qualifications and intensiveness of labor are still quite similar. A scholar, an engineer, a surgeon and a teacher are usually paid more than a worker, a clerk, an officer, and a supervisor. In Russia these correlations can be the reverse and completely different from the world practice. Many socially important professions and kinds of qualified labour have become low-paid. It leads to social breach and tension in the society, provokes corruption and has negative influence on working efficiency. Moreover, it deals with the sense of the social justice. World Bank report on 'Equity and Development' states that 'high level of economic inequality usually makes economic institutions and social conditions act in the interests of more influential groups. Such unfair institutions can lead to economic losses... Social services are distributed among the rich and the talents of middle and poor population are left behind. Society in general becomes less effective and loses an opportunity to invest and innovate.' It can actually be proved by the situation in Russia nowadays. The crisis resulted in the reduction of production and consuming in Russia which was much higher than in many other countries, but the number of dollar billionaires, according to *The Forbes*, increased by 70%. In this respect we take the third place after the USA and China.

More alarming in terms of social, political and economic consequences for the Russian society is that the gap between the rich and the poor is growing. And again official statistics tries to neutralize the real situation, quoting lowered data of social differentiation and poverty scale. According to the data, an average income of the poorest 10% part of the society is 15 times smaller than an average income of the richest 10% part. But the research made by the Russian Academy of Sciences shows that the gap cannot be less than 30 times, and 50 times in Moscow, when it is 7-10 times in the EN and 15 times in the USA. Unprecedented inequality of income distribution and lack of the necessary measures have negative consequences for the economic growth and improvement of a demographic situation. Statistical analysis shows that with the European level of inequality here we could have 30-50% growth of Russian GDP in 2000-2007. And annual growth of real income of the main population (main, not all the population) in 10% would lead to overcoming depopulation.

Lowered retirement payments and social payments which could hardly cover public utility charges and medical service of the poor population are considered to be social inequality and undeserved underestimation of their contribution to the national welfare. Such future at the retirement cannot inspire active population of Russia to work effectively, initiatively and hard.

To improve the situation we have to switch from flat to progressive taxation scale together with other measures to support the poor. In the USA it allows to reduce inequality between the extreme ten-per-cent groups of population to 15 times, otherwise it would reach 68-times difference. Should the American administration cancel the progressive taxation, as we did, the country will face a severe difficulties.

It is obvious that we do not have reliable state statistics and moreover a substantial social and economic analysis of living standards and social stratification based on it. It may also be said about the economic statistics in general. The ship of government sailing in the white waters of national and global crisis lacks a reliable navigation system, which prevents it from choosing the right course. They ought to be put in order. Before

the 1917 Revolution and within the Soviet period economic statistics had a good reputation and was represented by great scholars. There was academicians S.G. Strumilin (1877–1974), V.S. Nemchinov (1894–1964), associate member V.N. Starovsky. Those great traditions of Russian statistics must be restored. To change and update Russia without true statistic in-

dexes would be impossible. Its renewal requires fair and real evaluation of the situation, fair information concerning economic and social spheres and easily available for the population. And this requires the development of statistics as science and close connections of the reformed statistic service with scientific analyses.

## Heinrich Bonnenberg<sup>1</sup>

### EUROPE IS BOUND TO BE

I'm delighted with the opportunity to present you my ideas about EUROPE of the future.

#### What is EUROPE?

Speaking further about EUROPE, I will not refer to geographical Europe with the border along the Urals. By EUROPE I will rather understand cultural and economical space that includes whole greater Russia. EUROPE as cultural and economical space stretches from Gibraltar and Iceland in the west of the European continent to Russian Chukotka in the east, thus from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean. Some politicians and journalists discern differences between Europe, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other. These people either do not have sufficient education in culture and geography, or wish to force a wedge into relationships between Europeans. The fact is that Russia is a part of EUROPE, and EUROPE is more than the EU. The European Union needs Russia, and Russia needs European Union. All together they need a mutually developed EUROPE, no matter how it may look like. This EUROPE should gain its identity and its own myths, as well as summon up all strength to survive in the global world of the future.

The primary task should become elimination of vexatious prejudices between citizens and between states in EUROPE. For this purpose it is necessary to carry out a dialogue between educated people, who are not afraid of the truth that shows itself through at the open judgement of the historical past.

#### Competitors

Competitors of EUROPE are China, India and America.

According to the UN estimates, in 2025 the world population will reach the 8 billion, while in 2050 almost 9.2 billion. The plane, cargo transporter and microchip have made our world smaller; people, cargos and information can reach any place of the world any time very quickly, sometimes instantly.

More and more advanced information technologies encourage people to set up a claim to the decision-makers and administrative bodies to provide transparency of their work. The mass media will require a new code of behaviour that will take into account a great variety of information technologies.

In the future there may appear large projects connected with such topics as preserving natural diversity, use of outer space, development of genetic engineering, cross-continental energy supply, use of world ocean, modernization of Africa.

The demand of advanced machinery is great. Who will produce it?

The competition rises in producing machine tools, equipment and primary production to manufacture industrial goods and consumer goods.

I would like to make a few remarks about our rivals, because it ultimately concerns the future of EUROPE.

Regarding China, one should be aware of traditional Chinese features that are determinative in any time and under any circumstances.

For me, the most important features of the Chinese are:

- 1) restless desire to analyze everything foreign and adopt the best from it;
- 2) ability to make the most of the obtained;
- 3) courage, risk-taking and
- 4) incredible zeal

The People's Republic of China has an outstanding labour potential, unmatched with any other country. That country needs work, and first of all, the work that makes additional cost in order to provide peace inside the country. The agriculture is totally disable to provide it. China is cornered. The only way out is to manufacture the industrial and consumer goods.

The Republic of India also needs work, as it is the country that lacks resources and serious market. That is why the Hindu created unique call-centres operating all over the world for foreign entrepreneurs and companies as well as a huge industry of producing software that creates products, first of all, for logistics and planning. Having a large amount of knowledge about Europe and America, India just like China is on its way to become an important platform for high-tech industry.

In regards to America it may be said that president Obama has put an end to a unilateral policy of the USA and its thrive to be the sheriff of the whole world. Now the USA and other countries of the American continent will have a fresh start in developing a common market on basis of more equality within the frames of American zone of free trade — from Alaska to the Land of Fire.

#### The European CIS and the European Union

In order to stand out in the future competition with China, India and America, Europe should, on both informative and organizational levels, focus all its efforts much stronger than it does nowadays, it concerns both Eastern and Western Europe. Soft cushion of national vanities and complacence should give way to a tough bedding that will not tempt to rest and relax, but will rather force to get up and start work.

Our EUROPE of the future, Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean, numbers 46 countries. However, I didn't include in this figure the European parts of Turkey and Kazakhstan, but put Cyprus onto this list, although it does not belong to Europe geographically, it is a member of European Union.

Four countries of the Eastern Europe, Russia, the Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia entered together with other republics of the former Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States, the CIS. Hereinafter I will refer to the European part of the CIS that includes Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldavia as to the 'European CIS', being totally aware that there is no such legal association of states, however its existence can be recognized in cultural context.

27 countries of the Western and Central Europe are united into the European Union. The population of this enlarged EUROPE totals about 740 million people.

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Territorial proportions are also worth noting. Russia with its total area of 17 million square km is the largest country in the world, almost twice as big as China. Even if the area of Russia is only considered within its European part, up to the Urals, Russia will still remain the top country of the enlarged Europe not only because of its population, but because of its territory, too.

The European CIS with its four Eastern European members, just like the European Union with its 27 members of Western and Central Europe should gird for competition with China, India and America. Both groups should join forces and stand out together as EUROPE in any possible alliance mode.

For the European CIS this suggestion means that it will gain its identity of a common cultural and economical space that respects the interests of its citizens.

As far as the already existing cultural and economical space of the European Union is concerned, this suggestion means that it will start to take the opinion of its citizens into account.

The European CIS could not set itself up as a common cultural and economical space and present a united front yet. In the same way, the members of the European CIS have not yet been able to play together on the European Union platform.

If truth be pointed out, some external reasons prevent the countries concerned from gaining their identity, too.

However, the European Union does not stay in step with the European CIS. Its so-called 'Eastern partnership' implies equal approach to European countries Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia and Asian countries of the Southern Caucasus Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan — not including Russia — in respect to the issue of their further associate membership agreement. It is not very courteous towards Russia, all the more so as the EU promises membership to these six countries including Georgia, however only by words. Russia feels isolated and, at any rate, deceived.

Everyone who puts a spoke in EUROPE's wheel, commits an offence against it. The European Union is an association whose governing bodies and ways of taking decisions, much as we would like to, do not correspond to ideas of democracy known to us. In fact, the European Union is governed by a supranational body with an attached administrative council, the European Council, that comprises the heads of governments of member-states. In the bodies where representatives are delegated rather than elected, there is a tendency to fight for seats.

Although the European Union has succeeded in equitable relationship to factual knowledge of the member-states, which is its strength, its weakness is poor emotional involvement of the citizens.

Reconciliation and ability to fight were the motives that enhanced the formation of the European Union. Reconciliation and ability to fight will be crucial to create our EUROPE from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean: reconciliation between Eastern and Western Europe and ability to fight with economic rivals that, to a large extent, means the fight for making added cost.

What about the citizen of the European Union, mentioned above? He, the European Union citizen, does not yet exist. At present, the European Union is characterised with consensus between member states of the European Union rather than between the citizens of the European Union. The community of the European Union has not evolved yet. However, we in the European Union urge the community, just like we need one in our enlarged Europe. In that case the needs of the people in the regions will be met better. Identification of the European Union, and eventually, of the enlarged Europe would be tangible for the citizens.

#### **On the way to EUROPE**

Membership in the European Union makes the member states surrender their rights. The Russian Federation with its

vast territory, resources and its sense of dignity is hardly eager to surrender its sovereign rights, to say nothing of yielding them to the non-democratic institution, which can be less and less influenced by some of its member states.

If EUROPE of the future is to be established, as we plan it here, it is necessary to find the mode complying with the requests of both the European Union and the European CIS, and, ultimately, of the Russian Federation.

It is imperative for the NATO to stay away in the quest for EUROPE and not be involved in this process.

When I was young, EUROPE looked different. At that time EUROPE witnessed the so-called 'iron curtain' drawn between the ideology of 'equality and planning' in the East and the ideology of 'freedom and competition' in the West. In early history, however, Eastern and Western Europe faced another separation. It happened in the middle of the 13th century and was initiated by the Orthodox Church in the East, triggered by Cyrillic script development. Originally, it was the response of the Orthodox Church to the aggressive politics of the Roman Catholic missionaries in the north-west of EUROPE. The separation had lasted for 450 years. It led to the fact that both parts of Europe outlined different trends of their development.

Russian tsar Peter the Great about 300 years ago overcame the 'Iron curtain' of the Middle Ages, to the utmost degree, against the will of the Church. He founded St. Petersburg and created the Academy of Sciences there, based on the Western European principles.

Peter the Great, who overcame Russian isolation, serves, actually, as father for the enlarged Europe from the Atlantic to the Pacific ocean. He maintained a close contact with German philosopher and natural scientist Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Leibniz suggested many new projects for Russia, related to minerals extraction, improvement of transport infrastructure, establishment of factories, swamp drainage, and many other projects, among which was a new judicial system.

#### **Requirements**

The Europeans have to speculate on the identity of Europe in order to survive the competition fight with the rivals mentioned above. The mandatory requirement in this situation is the collective self-perception of EUROPE. The élite of EUROPE is called to create identity and values of EUROPE. It is necessary to re-think national and regional self-centrism critically. So far, peace has in EUROPE been established and military and ideological threats remained in the past. The trade is flourishing, there is an opportunity to travel almost with no hindrance, mutual investments are being made. Communication beyond the borders of states has become a reality.

The élite of EUROPE should try and preserve or return partially lost public culture of holding discussions, mostly, on the topics of common interests and prospects in order to overcome potential or real prejudices and misjudgements.

The youth should be provided an example to follow in ambiguous situations.

The élite should see to the discussion on EUROPE complying with interests and requests of its citizens.

#### **The identity of EUROPE**

Identity describes an individual or a social group as a recognizable member of a community. Mutual experience, in particular, mutual sufferings stimulate this feeling. The basis of identity is awareness of one's personal difference from other individuals or groups in respect to views on cultural values, language, customs and traditions and other aspects.

Collective identity generates from mutual experience in the past, present and future. It means that the Europeans should analyze their history, take the current events into account and implement mutual projects of the future. Thus, they can discover

themselves the identity of EUROPE. I would like to state some important EUROPEAN identities.

### **The Mediterranean region**

An important element of collective memory of EUROPE is the Mediterranean basin, the cradle of EUROPE.

The Ancient Greek civilization, the heart of EUROPE, emerged on the Eastern coast of the Mediterranean sea about 2500 years ago. The ancient Greek city-state, polis, presents democracy to EUROPE: first and foremost, governance of law and equality of everyone before the law.

The myth of Europe is a part of Greek mythology.

The Roman Empire appeared on the Western coast of the Mediterranean sea about 2500 years ago. It presented EUROPE with Roman law and ideas how to carry out policy and govern a large state effectively.

Trade and migration were the links to connect Greek and Roman civilizations. Greek culture made a favourable impact on Roman civilization.

The East of ancient Europe spoke Greek, while the West — Latin. In the East, Greek intellectualism was respected, while Roman state pragmatism dominated in the West.

Christianity also originated in the Mediterranean basin and soon spread over Western Roman Empire and Eastern Byzantine Empire.

The European civilization on the coast of the Mediterranean sea comprises Greek, Roman and Christian ambience. Greek ambience provided this combination with the idea of freedom, justice and beauty, Roman ambience provided it with the idea of state and law, while Christianity — faith and charity.

*The Mediterranean is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **Conversion to Christianity**

The Roman Empire was losing its influence. In the West, German leader Clovis I adopted Christianity in its 'Latin' form in about 500. In the East, Vladimir I Rurikovich adopted Christianity in the 'Greek' form in about 1000.

The conversion to Christianity involved engagement of cultural heritage of Germans, Celts and Slavs in the rituals of both churches. Monotheism in both cases testifies legitimating central authority alongside with state adaptation of methods of church governance.

*Conversion to Christianity is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **The schism of the Church**

In about 1000 the churches were split into Roman Catholic and Orthodox ones, mostly due to the policy of the churches, but dogmatic and liturgical differences also played their role.

*Schism of the Church is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **The 'Russian Land'**

In the 13th century the Turkic-Mongol invasion of EUROPE began. The Kievan Rus' breaks down into smaller princedoms.

This split of the 'Russian Land' is rooted deeply in the collective memory of most people in Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus. The Russian call the 'Russian Land' their 'Motherland'. Grand princes of Russia and, later, tsars, manage to unite the provinces of Kievan Rus' again. It took them 450 years to do so. An important role belongs to Grand Prince Ivan III, Tsar Alexis and Tsarina Catherine II. In 1918 the Great Empire collapsed, but later it was resurrected as the Soviet Union that fell apart again in 1991. The present Western border lies where it was established by Tsar Alexis, father of Peter the Great, about 350 years ago.

Extreme delicacy in relations between the Russian Federation, Belarus and the Ukraine can be explained, largely, by an unsatisfied desire to get united again. Western Europe-

ans should respect the tragedy of the 'Russian Land' split into brotherly states of Russia, the Ukraine and Belarus and with all their heart assist in the thrive towards real friendship in order to relieve this pain.

*The 'Russian Land' is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **Colonisation**

In the middle of the last millennium Europe became too small for Europeans both in territorial and spiritual dimension. The conquerors set forward. Western Europeans conquer the overseas lands, while Russia conquers vast territories of Asia. Europeans, accompanied by missionaries, colonise the world. Enormous colonial empires emerge, but later collapse in the 20th century, as none of them were able to create a stable identity.

*Colonisation is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **Enlightenment**

The major centres of spiritual enlightenment were England, France, Holland and, later, Germany. The basic requirement of the Enlightenment was freedom instead of autocracy and equality instead of hierarchy of classes. Scientific knowledge succeeds the by-gone prejudice, tolerance succeeds dogmatism. In Russia Peter the Great starts to put into practise the ideas of the Enlightenment. He founds the Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg.

The influence of the Enlightenment on EUROPE can be compared with that of Christianity. Some contemporaries ascribe even a greater prominence to it.

*The Enlightenment is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **Calamities**

For the last 100 years military and ideological conflicts have made a great impact on EUROPE. They were linked with tremendous calamities: during two bloody world wars the peoples of EUROPE lost millions of lives.

The first world war swept off almost 17 million people, resulted in a system of state changes in Russia and Germany and a shift of borders in Eastern Europe, primarily, at the expense of the split of the 'Russian land'. The second world war claimed 55 million of the dead, injured and missing in Europe and Eastern Asia, of which 39 million were in EUROPE.

Unprecedented crime was the genocide committed by the Germans and in their name, that carried out 6 million lives, mostly of Jews of Central and Eastern Europe. This terrifying world war begets the wars of ideologies 'Equality and Planning' and 'Freedom and Competition', as interpreted ideals of French revolution. The NATO and the Warsaw Pact contradict each other, equipped with nuclear weapons. Historical re-thinking of those events is crucial for relieving EUROPE of painful memories and for strengthening trust between the countries of EUROPE.

Calamities of the 20th century are a significant emotional element of a collective memory of EUROPE.

*Calamities are part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### **Overcoming disunion**

After the Berlin wall fell down on November 9, 1989, the two states that had originated after the Second World War, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, reunited. The Germans are grateful to the history for that. Other regions that Germany had had to surrender, were annexed to the long-suffering Poland that had experienced great calamities for more than 200 years. Those regions are nowadays parts of the European Union, and for the Germans they are part of the European fatherland, our common native land.

*Overcoming disunion is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### Social market economy

An important aftermath of ideological war is approval of social market economy by both sides. In the context of social market economy the state determines the limits of activities, especially in the field of economy. An important principle of these framed conditions is solidarity towards socially unprotected strata: the strong help the disabled, the rich help the poor, the young help the elderly.

*Social market economy is part of the EUROPEAN identity.*

### EUROPEAN myths

EUROPE needs its myths. They affect it emotionally, bring forward the sense of solidarity, social cohesion. Myths are devoted to figures who presented common interests and who are identified with outstanding events and certain spiritual movements. Apart from that, there exist myths that remind of important events. In this case, national myths are rather a hindrance than an aid.

I would like to name a few important EUROPEAN myths.

#### EUROPEAN myths devoted to certain figures

##### *Faust*

Faust embodies the condition of the spiritual turmoil caused by the conflict of strong faith and sound scientific knowledge to the extent of making a deal with the devil.

##### *Don Juan*

Don Juan embodies masculinity to the extent of making a deal with the devil.

##### *Peter the Great*

Peter the great impresses with his titanic energy. He embodies unification of the Western Europe and Russia. He is the founder of St. Petersburg, the first real centre of EUROPE. Peter the Great serves as father for *the* EUROPE that I am talking about, the EUROPE that temporarily, until the collapse of the Berlin wall, had been under the debris. The significance of Peter the Great for EUROPE has not received proper recognition yet.

##### *Napoleon*

Napoleon impresses with his rise from a revolutionary to a French emperor. Napoleon protects the achievements of the French revolution and presents the French society with modern administrative, legal and cultural basis. He established the new order in Europe and becomes father of emancipation of the minorities, in the first instance, of the Jewish minority.

##### *Karl Marx*

In 1999, the BBC made the poll of the millennium to figure out 'the greatest thinkers of the millennium', the majority gave their preference to Karl Marx.

Karl Marx stands on the shoulders of European philosophers and mobilizes social-reformatory and social-revolutionary forces. The Soviet Union 'exports' Marxism all over the world.

##### *Peter Ustinov*

Peter Ustinov impresses with his outstanding talent in the field of cinema, theatre, literature and culture. He calls prejudices the greatest evil of the humanity. If one traces his genealogy tree, his Russian, French, Swiss, Jewish and Italian back-

ground becomes obvious. Peter Ustinov embodies globalization that 'rests' upon the EUROPEAN culture.

### Myths related to some EUROPEAN events

#### *The Battle of Leipzig*

The Battle of Leipzig is one of the largest battles in the world history. All great powers of EUROPE took part in it.

#### *The Soviet flag over the Reichstag in Berlin*

This event of May, 1945 symbolises the victory over the scariest curse of mankind, the fascism. Never before in EUROPE had the laws of peaceful coexistence been broken on such a large scale as Hitler did.

#### *The fall of the Berlin Wall*

EUROPE lives reunited again.

### Projects

The rivals, China, India and North America wait for none. The global competition is in full swing. EUROPE should find its own self, and bring itself in a stand-by position.

An important demand is the elimination of existing prejudices and lack of trust inside EUROPE. In this respect, the following projects can be proposed:

1. The 'EUROPE' Conference on needs of EUROPE and its prospects on the future. The place to hold the conference is outside the European Union, the Russian Federation and the NATO, for example, in Switzerland, where democracy is practically applied *par excellence*.

2. Filling in the values with scientific contents in order to research the values canon of society, state and economics of EUROPE of the future, approximated to the values of the European Union and the Russian Federation.

3. Round-table panels devoted to the issue of identity and myths of EUROPE, held in turn in EUROPEAN cities of St. Petersburg and Berlin.

4. Projects of innovation technologies, inclusive, in recognition of the theory of big cycles of economic conjuncture formulated by the Russian economist Nikolai Dmitriyevich Kondratiev, the ones stated by the centres for science and development of the European Union and brotherly states — the Russian Federation, the Republic of Belarus and the Ukraine.

5. The project to turn EUROPE into the centre of education, scientific research and development, using the intellectual potential of EUROPE.

6. Educational exchange of school pupils, students of vocational schools, students of colleges, young specialists in order to study important languages of EUROPE and to upgrade qualifications; organization of a network among the students and the youth.

7. Including the subject of 'EUROPE' into the curricula of all EUROPEAN schools.

### Conclusion

It is necessary to overcome mutual prejudices, first and foremost, mistrust towards EUROPE. It is a crucial prerequisite for EUROPE to face the global competition.

In the first place, these challenges should be recognized by the younger generation. The youth should not be afraid to put pressure on the older generation, should not be embarrassed with its links to EUROPE for its future's sake.

A. E. Busygin<sup>1</sup>

## RUSSIAN CULTURE AS DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

The back bone of the culture of the Russian Federation is the Great Russian culture. It influenced the development of cultures of many peoples and arise interest in the world. First of all, it is the Russian literature, music, painting i.e. Russian Art. Russian culture has clear-cut national traits. How was the phenomenon of the Russian culture formed and developed? Does its development continue and in what way?

Recently they often speak about the necessity to pay special attention to the Russian culture. There are concerns about its conservation. In the time of modern globalization the same questions worry the representatives of other national cultures. Indeed, if we proceed from the J.M. Lotman's definition of culture that it is a 'non-genetic' memory of the society [1], then the conservation of the culture is only possible as long as the moral, intellectual and spiritual life of the ethnos as the whole continues.

In the modern conditions the boundaries of the 'Russian world' expand, but at the same time the influences on the Russian culture from other peoples' cultures and from the more internationalizing 'urban culture' become much stronger. There is a danger of 'ethnic fading', that of the loss of many trades of national culture, and that of the replacement of its important components from everyday life to the museums and stage. It happens before our eyes — we watch the dying of the national costume, of the historic folklore... That is why Russian culture needs a special attention.

In the past, Russian culture was also developing under the influence of other peoples' cultures. For centuries it had been absorbing elements of cultures of other peoples. As a result of the continuous dialogue of the many national countries on the one side, and Russian culture on the other, Russian culture had been formed by the beginning of the 19th century. Why do we talk about the beginning of the 19th century? Here we refer to J.M. Lotman. In his view, 'this was the time when the traits of the new Russian culture were being formed, the culture of the new time, and whether we like it or not — we also belong to it.' [2] It is true that the language of Alexander Pushkin is the modern Russian language. Mikhail Glinka initiated the Russian opera, the way of life of Russian nobility was formed, and that gave birth to the constellation of the great cultural figures of the 19th — the beginning of the 20th century.

The beginnings of the Russian culture were formed as a result of an interaction between Slavonic tribes and other peoples. Famous historian K. Bestuzhev-Ryumin already wrote the century before last in his *Russian History*: 'Russians, as all great historic nations — the Romans, the English, the French — represent a mixed nation. Slavonic civilization of the North and North-East which had started in the historic time [probably a misprint, must be 'prehistoric' — A.B.] little by little succeeded in identifying separated Finnish tribes with itself.' [3]

These tribes were dissolving among the Slavs and inevitably brought the elements of their own way of life, the elements of the material culture into their way of life. Such mutual interference of cultures takes place very often. It was observed in the Middle Volga Region during 16th–19th centuries while the Russians were colonizing this region where the ancestors of modern Tatars, Bashkirs, Maris, Mordvins and Udmurts had lived since the earliest times. These nations grasped the elements of culture (firstly of material culture) of the Russians,

and Russians borrowed from these peoples. Moreover, the Russians moved to the Volga Region from the North and South, from the central parts of Russia. In these different regions the Russians had different dialects, different elements of material culture (the placement of the building on the peasant's yard, the layout of the *izba*, clothes etc.), different elements of the spiritual culture (wedding rituals, traditions etc.). In the middle of the 20th century the ethnographers could reconstruct the history of the settlements of the region and to define clearly from what regions of Russia the inhabitants of this or that village of the Middle Volga Region originate by the remaining differences. By now these differences have practically faded.

We will continue to quote the work by K. Bestuzhev-Ryumin: 'No chronicle, no legend tells about general extermination of the Finnish tribes on these places, where they were known to the first chronographer, or about their moving out of those places, meanwhile the modern ethnographer cannot find them on these places, which means that they had not moved out, had not been exterminated, but regenerated. This regeneration had started, as we have noticed, in the prehistoric time and was going on slowly and gradually; this slow motion says much for the comparatively peaceful nature of our ancestors.' [4]. Consequently, the ancestors of the Russians absorbed the Finnish tribes, but no doubt that at the same time they grasped the elements of their culture, which gradually turned into their own. As for the peaceful character, later on the nature of our ancestors became not that peaceful. Obviously, it was influenced by the Tartar Yoke.

One of the characteristic traits of Russians is the ability to perceive the elements of culture of other peoples and to turn them into their own. When quite young, I already noticed how easily Russian film-makers reconstructed the foreign life of any epoch — from the Middle Ages to the contemporary history. At the same time it was amusing to watch the attempts of foreign film-makers to represent the Russian reality. This is the quotation from fundamental *Essays on the History of Russian Culture* by famous Russian historian and politician P.N. Milyukov: 'Such observers and judges as Belinsky and Dostoevsky have finally acknowledged that the most basic trait of the Russian character is the ability to grasp different traits of any national type. In other words, the most prominent trait of the Russian national character turned out to be uncertainty and the absence of its own clear-cut national appearance. It is often possible to find indirect proof of this conclusion abroad. Out fellow-citizens are often recognized as the Russians only because people cannot notice any clear-cut peculiar national features in them that could characterize the French, the English, the Germans or representatives of any other European cultural nation. If you like, there is not only negative, but also a positive characteristic in this observation.' [5]. Today the time has changed. Modern Russians are more than recognized abroad and in most cases are identified unmistakably. P.N. Milyukov is right when saying that the ability to grasp the traits of other 'national types' is a positive trait rather than negative. This trait nourishes the national culture, enriches it, and gives new dimensions and new glitter to it.

In connection with this let us pay attention to the discussion about why it was Moscow that became the capital of the Russian state. The wide-known point of view is that Moscow had a lucky geographical location and trade routs crossed in it. Metropolitan Johannes, the head of an ecclesiastical province, in his *The Russian Symphony: Essays on the Russian Philosophy of History* insists, that 'it was the transformation of Moscow into the centre of Russian Orthodoxy that defined its destiny which had not differed from the destinies of other

<sup>1</sup> Deputy Minister of Culture of the Russian Federation, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, class I Active State Adviser of the Russian Federation. Author of monographs and articles on issues of economics, economic issues of federalism, a series of articles on civil service and civil policy in culture, the book *On the Role of Culture in the Development of Modern Russian Society* (O roli kul'tury v razviti'i sovremennogo rossijskogo obshchestva) and others. Professor Busygin is decorated with the Order of Honour. He is recipient of a Certificate of Merit from the President of the Russian Federation.

Russian cities before that.' [6]. And here is the point of view of L.N. Gumilyov — the author of a disputable, but still interesting concept of the historical process: 'The reason why Moscow rose is in the fact that it was Moscow that engaged a number of *passionaries*:<sup>1</sup> Tatars, Lithuanians, Rusiches, Polovtsians — all who wanted to feel confident about the future and social status according to their merits. Moscow was able to use all these newcomers in accordance with their talents and to unite in common Orthodox faith... The ethnic synthesis in the phase of the passionate rise took place on the land of Moscow and was the crucial factor. Moscow's passionate potential "prevailed" over the riches of Novgorod, the daring of Tver' and the dynastic reclamations of Suzdal.' [7]. We should agree that it was one of the most important factors that influenced the rise of Moscow.

During its centuries-old formation Russian culture was influenced globally by other cultures. These impacts can be called civilizational. First of all, let us define what period is mentioned. The starting point will be the formation of the Russian statehood, 1150 years anniversary of which we are celebrating this year. The date is quite relative, but it is generally acknowledged.

Next year we will celebrate 1025 years of the Christianization of Rus'. Thus, the adoption of Christianity follows the beginning of the statehood formation. This process (and it is a process that lasted many years) laid the foundation for the modern Russian culture. This is the process of perception of Byzantine and Ancient Greek cultures, the process of the formation of the Russian Orthodox culture. The celebration of Christianity, religious instructions, and explanation of the basics of the faith became the important tasks of the Russian religious art that was much more evident compared to the other countries of the Byzantine world [8].

The second global influence on the Russian culture was by the Turkic world through the Tartars. There are incomparably more negative traits rather than positive in this influence. First, let us deal with the latter. Some basics of the state culture were brought by the Tartars to Rus' — the compulsory system of taxes and duties — very exact and precise. Then, the population census, which the Tartars borrowed from China. And finally, the first lessons of diplomacy taken by the Russians from the Tartars. It is known that Europeans perceived Moscow diplomacy as Eastern rather than Western. It goes without saying that each of these pluses includes also a minus: if it had not been for the Golden Horde, the Russian intercourse with Eastern peoples could have been straighter and more direct. And the diplomacy would have been more European.

Many Turkic words came into the Russian language at that time. This influence on Russian culture is beyond debate, but it can hardly be considered valuable. The Yoke led to the custom to lock up daughters and wives in order to protect them from the eyes of the Tartars who viewed the Russians as their property and could enslave any woman that caught their eye. Slyness, resourcefulness, distrustfulness, cautiousness, cruelty — these are the traits of character born inevitably in the conditions of life under the Yoke. Though, they were not able to change the Russian national character. On the contrary, in the conditions of the Yoke and with the urge to break free from it, the desire for unity was strengthening. L.N. Gumilyov writes: 'The ethnic meaning of the Battle of Kulikovo in 1380 was enormous. People from the Russian cities Suzdal', Vladimir, Rostov, Pskov went to fight on the Kulikovo field as the representatives of their principalities and returned as the Russians though living in different cities. That in why in the ethnic history of Russia the Battle of Kulikovo is considered to be the event after which

the new ethnic community, The Moscovian Rus', became the real fact of world and historic importance.' [9].

The third global process of the influence of the foreign culture onto the Russian is the process of 'Europeanization' of Russia, which started in the times of Peter the Great and continued during the following decades. Though, if Peter the Great borrowed things and production technologies with practical purposes, Catherine the Great imported ideas. It was during her reign when Mikhail Shcherbatov was advocating pre-Petrine way of life. In his view, the result of the borrowings was that morals and manners in Russia were damaged; the sincere devotion to the faith was vanishing, giving way to the impudent flattery; 'luxury and voluptuousness put the grounds for the new power'. However, Europeanization created modern Russian culture and helped to finish with the Russian Middle Ages. Cultural horizons were expanded, new meanings and symbols appeared.

Russian culture 'digested' foreign influence, turned the elements of the foreign culture into its own and strengthened high-society cultural component. There is no need to enumerate everything that appeared in the Russian culture as a result of Europeanization. It is important to emphasize only that it was this process that modernized the Russian culture and led it to the world stage. The process of Europeanization continued later on and it has been going on since the 18th century continuously, intensifying or slowing down at times. However this has not torn up the fundamental foundations of the Russian culture until now.

Russia's closer relation with the Caucasus started as early as in the period of Europeanization. That is why the culture of the Caucasian peoples influenced the Russian culture firstly not at the 'lower' level of influence on the material culture (clothes, food, utensils etc. — though this also occurred, for example, among the Cossacks), but at the 'higher' — meaning literature, journalistic, painting. 'Caucasian theme' became a noticeable event in the cultural life of Russia. How can we imagine Russian literature without Pushkin's *Kavkazsky plennik* ('The prisoner of the Caucasus') and Tolstoy's *Hajji Murad*, and Russian music without Rubenstein's *Demon*, and Russian art without Vrubel's *Demon Overthrown*?

Let us return to the understanding of culture as the 'non-genetic' social memory. If there is a society which has such memory, foreign cultural influences will never kill the national culture. Let us remember Pushkin's Tatiana whose 'Russian was as thin as vapour, she never read a Russian paper, our native speech had never sprung unhesitating from her tongue'.<sup>2</sup> But at the same time — 'Tanya was a profoundly Russian being'.

And this is a quotation from Tolstoy's *War and Peace*, Book Two, Chapter Four, when Natasha Rostova is dancing in her uncle's house after a hunt: 'Where, how, and when had this young countess, educated by an émigré French governess, imbibed from the Russian air she breathed that spirit and obtained that manner which the *pas de châte* would, one would have supposed, long ago have effaced? But the spirit and the movements were those inimitable and unteachable Russian ones.'<sup>3</sup> Yes, if there is 'the Russian air' (and within the text of the cited classical works of the Russian literature it is nothing else but the Russian cultural environment), then the Russian society is not threatened to fade under a foreign influence. But we cannot only trust in the inner strength of the Russian culture. Today it needs support. The modern dialogue of cultures is not only a conversation between people who are being nice to each other. The reality is also a competitive struggle between cultures for the leadership. That is why Russia's cultural policy should be aimed at the creation of such a cultural environment that could permit the conservation of the glory of the Russian

<sup>1</sup> *Passionarism* is Gumilyov's term for the inner urge to renovation unique for each ethnic group regardless of the external factors. *Passionaries* are such individuals in the ethnic group who realize this urge, which results in conquests, state reforms, artistic achievements etc. — *Editor's note*.

<sup>2</sup> Translated by Charles H. Johnston.

<sup>3</sup> Translated by David Widger.

culture within the constellation of other cultures of the contemporary civilization.

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3. *K. Bestuzhev-Ryumin*. Russian History. Volume I, St. Petersburg, 1872, p. 64. V.O. Kluychevsky wrote about the work by K. Bestuzhev-Ryumin: 'Which of those who study the Russian History can afford to take this book from the table and put it on the shelf! You need it every

minute, as you need a guide-book when you look round the city.' [*V.O. Kluychevsky*. Writings in 9 vols. Volume VII, Moscow, 1989, p. 370.]

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Xinxin Chang<sup>1</sup>

## CULTURAL EXPANSIONISM AND CULTURAL PROTECTIONISM IN THE CONTEXT OF GLOBALIZATION

As is known to all, globalization not only touches on economy. Exchanges of values and clashes of cultures are multiplying as a result of the economic globalization. Such phenomenon is also exemplified by continuous widening scope, increasing frequency and enlarging extent of the cultural communication. In the contemporary world, culture has become one of the most important forces to influence nation's and global affairs overall. The end of the Cold War, as one of the other reasons, led to the increasing importance of economy, technology, society and culture involved in global politics. Peace and development have dominated the world trend; while peaceful competition and negotiated coexistence are the characteristics of global relations post-Cold War. In addition to the political and military power, economic and cultural powers are becoming the main target and vehicle to realize national interests.

American scholar Joseph Nye put forward the concept of hard power and soft power. Nye refers the culture and ideology as the soft power, in contrast with the hard power obtained from the use of military and/or economic coercion. He also suggests that the traditional power structure has been reformed with the emergence of political, economic, cultural and technological globalization. Culture, one of the soft power functions, cannot be replaced by any hard power. However, the importance and function of culture had been weakened before the Cold War ended owing to the dominance of the hard power such as political and military forces in the international relations. During the post-Cold War era, the rises in globalization and deepening of interdependence among nations have become universal. Then, a nation's security cannot be guaranteed only by hard power; the importance of soft power is fairly reflected, even in an amplified form. As a consequence, each nation has stressed the importance of culture in the struggle of power, protected or enhanced nation's power by utilizing the role of culture interaction. The expansion vs. anti-cultural expansion and penetration vs. anti-penetration in culture are one of the most critical characteristics in global political struggle in the post-Cold War era. Such characteristic is embodied in cultural expansionism and protectionism.

Cultural expansionism is reflected in the situation where western countries take advantage of their predominant positions to constrain or influence global affairs by means of cultural exportation and extension. The United States is perfectly representative of countries using cultural expansion as its important foreign strategies. After the Cold War ended, the United States has become the only superpower in the world and paid more attention to cultural expansion as a strategy to achieve its mission that cannot be accomplished by political, economic and military forces. Given its superior status in the world, the United States is trying to use its cultural values to influence or determine the global trend. Mass media in most countries and regions around the world is dominated or monopolized by the U.S. and other western news agencies, even though American population only makes up 5% of the world population. The volume of news released by western media is as 100 times as the one released by other countries in total. Cultural products of the U.S., including Hollywood movies, entertainment shows and broadcasting have already dominated the media around the world. By using mass media and e-media, the United States makes its culture widespread. The U.S. culture groups continuously promote American values and moral standards to the world. It exports not only its cultural products to generate high profits, but also its political views and cultural values. On one hand, the United States enhanced its superior position in cultural industry. On the other hand, its cultural expansion has great impact on other countries by changing the latter's cultures, values and even life styles. The United States considers its political development mode as a benchmark to promote democracy of other countries. In other words, it is trying to unify diversified ideologies to the ideology valued by the U.S. so as to realize its global hegemony.

Other than western countries (the U.S. as the representative), part of the third world countries also present a complex of cultural expansion as a foreign strategy which should not be omitted. For example, those radical Islamic countries such as Iran and Sudan in the name of promoting Islamic culture export "Islam Revolution" aggressively with an attempt to establish international cooperation mechanisms based on Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, Pan-Turkism, Pan-Mongolianism, Pan-Slavism and so on. Also take on cultural expansionism after the Cold War. No matter how the cultural expansionism takes form, it has negative impact on global peace.

Besides the cultural expansionism, cultural protectionism is another form in global struggle for power. Cultural protectionism is reflected in the situation where some developing countries defend their own cultures and resist foreign cultures as one of the foreign strategies. In the post-Cold War era,

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western countries with power politics and culture hegemony have exerted more pressure on developing countries, creating more fierce conflicts between oriental and western value systems. In many third world countries and regions, modernization led by Pro-West leaders has been frustrated which leads to the decline of their own traditional values and social institutions. Identity crisis and legitimacy crisis are more and more obvious. Therefore, the complex of “looking for cultural root” is strengthened, which is a phenomenon that exists in many developing countries’ during their transformation processes. They “use cultural identification as their weapon to defend their nations’ cultural values, resist foreign cultural expansions and protect their own cultures as a symbol of existence.” Those developing countries oppose and fight back western countries in terms of values, beliefs and life styles. Nearly all types of

nationalism advocate cultural protectionism, using culture to fight with pressure and challenge given by the western countries. Positive cultural protectionism does not rule out all the elements coming from alien cultures. It both inherits its own tradition and absorbs the essence of other cultures. In contrast, passive cultural protectionism refuses healthy interaction with other countries and once becomes radical cultural nationalism will bring adverse effect to global peace so that it needs close attention from global society.

With the emergence of globalization, we should encourage peace, cooperation, harmony in the new global economic, political and cultural orders, resist cultural expansionism and extreme cultural protectionism in any form and promote world peaceful development and co-prosperity of diversified cultures.

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## INTERNATIONAL CULTURE OF EXTERNAL INFLUENCE ON THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS

1. In fact the concept of the international law has disappeared. Which has led to the fading of the notion of national sovereignty itself. Quite an appropriate term ‘sovereign democracy’ invented in Britain more than 100 years ago is being criticized. However, any patriot, any citizen of his/her country will agree, that only him/her and other state’s citizens through the system of democratic elections can take part in the forming of government body i.e. to build their own, still sovereign, democratic state.

2. A peculiar international culture of external influence on the national elections was formed as an instrument of the national sovereignty limitation. The first signs of this culture became apparent during the elections in the post-war Europe: from one side – in West Germany, France, Italy, Greece, from the opposite block – in the countries of Eastern Europe. Then, at the beginning of 1990s – in the Baltic States, almost in all the countries of the CIS, Serbia and North Africa.

3. The above mentioned cultural institute consists of a number of organizations and programmes, acting both from the outside, i.e. out of the boundaries of the sovereign state, and within its boundaries. Both types closely interact. The basic task is ‘legitimization’ or ‘delegitimization’ of the elections, and therefore - of the government in the sovereign state – juggling with these notions in the interest of another state or a group of states.

4. Traditional instrument is the institution of international observation. At the same time, many so-called ‘old democracies’, including the United States and Great Britain, do not officially recognize or recognize only partially the institution of international observation on their territory. The main organization is the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

5. The European Union and European Parliament create absolutely illegal election monitoring groups in the non-EU countries. For example, for Russia it is the so-called Ojuland’s group’.

6. The Council of Europe and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe authorise the Venice Commission to check the legislation on elections and political parties. Russia has already got rather politicized opinion of this Commission.

7. European Court of Human Rights accepts without solid grounds the complains against the voting in the national states.

8. The experts of the ‘Group of States Against Corruption’(GRECO) are employed to search for political corruption in the legislation and practice of political parties’ financing, in particular during elections (i.e. to dig up dirt).

9. At the same time the supplementary instruments used are not only assessment and monitoring, but also provocations during organization of voting in a sovereign state, and adding the officials of the Central Election bodies to the proscription lists.

10. Of course, the activities of the institutions mentioned above, require a wide network of non-governmental organizations financed from the abroad, including the organizations engaged in the sphere of ‘civil rights advocating’, legal support, organization of rigging results, allegedly obtained from the polls and also organizations and groups radically blocking the election process.

11. The functions of these organizations are the following:

Abroad:

- to oppose the state bodies officials at international conferences and seminars;
- to hand over the information;
- propaganda activities at forums and meetings on a high level and in Parliaments;
- to apply to the organizations, including European Court of Human Rights.

12. Inside the country their functions are the following:

- to collect and disseminate unreliable and unverified information about irregularities in elections;
- to create opposition coalitions in regions;
- to offer the mediator services in the disputes between parties during elections;
- to publish provocative handbooks for the participants of the election process, instigating the observers and journalists to violate the legal framework during the elections;
- to work out alternative campaign materials;
- to make and publish critical commentaries;
- to send the observers to the polls, in the guise of the reporters;

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- to prepare and to collect information about possible, but unverified financial violations and corruption in the electoral system;
- to publish in mass media the appeals to the Federal Antimonopoly Service of Russia and courts only as means of propaganda without preliminary verification of grounds;
- to organize acts of hooliganism in the state bodies premises;
- to prevent the normal work of the state bodies before and on the voting day;
- to put pressure on and to make provocations against members of election commissions and members of their families, and the same on candidates;

- to attempt to falsify ballots;
- to call upon the voters to damage and take away the ballots;
- to organize actions and concerts calling to boycott the elections.

13. These organizations offer their services as substitutive to the state bodies' functions, and in case of a 'revolution', are ready to fulfil their duties.

14. Thus, we are watching with interest the birth of the new kind of international institutions and their development. I wonder whether it will have any perspectives in regard to the United States of America and other so-called 'old democracies'.

**Piotr Dutkiewicz<sup>1</sup>**

## MARKET, MODERNIZATION AND DEMOCRACY. INTER-CIVILIZATIONAL DEBATE

### Who needs democracy?

It seems apparent that everyone loves democracy in Europe. Heads of states, politicians, NGOs, business, and obviously the people. Who does not claim today that democracy is a good thing? Those who have their system labeled as "democratic" are those who are "civilized" and "like us" by contrast to the "non-civilized" part (actually the majority) of the world. "Democracy" has become the gold standard by which all things political are measured. It is a sort of western liberal religion. But as often happens with religion, as Jonathan Nitzan has remarked, the greater the belief, the fewer the questions. That is why I start with the basic question of who needs democracy. Then I will discuss the process of how democracy has become a sort of "commodity" and show the implications of this process for power relations within the political economy of Eastern Europe (as represented by key vectors of development: market – society – state relations). I arrive at the conclusion of this chapter with a proposal of how to make "democracy" work for both society and the market.

This chapter is not a place to fine tune the meaning of democracy as this has already been done; it will be sufficient to say that democracy as we know it today has many faces and the idea is much more complex than any one "obvious" meaning one might think of at first.<sup>2</sup> A lot depends on the content we put into a word.<sup>3</sup> One possible set of definitions of the term

focuses on this system's guarantees of freedom from arbitrary political power. This approach can lead us in the most common direction of looking at citizens' rights from the individualistic liberal perspective. Another way is to see democracy as a specific form of governance (a way to administer citizens). Yet another point of view suggests democracy should be considered exclusively in the context of economic development. Indeed, primarily within the classical liberal tradition, democracy seems inextricable from a capitalist market system.<sup>4</sup> But even among these different viewpoints, there is the underlying notion that democracy – as a project, idea, or fact – is a good thing and, while imperfect, the best alternative.

Let me begin by attempting to outline an interest-based understanding of who needs "democracy" and how the notion is manipulated to shape individual and collective interest and needs in its practical implementation. The main subjects in the process are "the people" and the ruling groups in the region. Let's examine then what they actually want from democracy:

1. *The first group: The People (citizens of East/Central Europe)*

I fully recognize how valuable individual rights are, in particular when they are subjected to constraints or become unavailable. Yet there is another serious but under-discussed dimension within the debate about how democracy should be understood and measured, as we are reminded by Immanuel Wallerstein in the *Decline of American Power*: It might be that for the majority of the population in Eastern Europe – as well as in most transitional societies – the quality of governance and of the political process is somehow measured differently.<sup>5</sup> The issues that are of primary concern to most people hit by enormous social and economic dislocations, and accordingly their primary political priorities and values, are focused predominantly on their and their children's (a) prospects for material well being (and a fear of the consequences of growing material inequalities), (b) corruption, and finally their (c) the opportunity to be equal citizens within the state (by eliminating sources of discrimination based on age, disabilities, gender, ethnicity, etc.). Popular demand for democratization for the "average person" is in large part a demand for a fairer redistribution of access to health, education, income and economic and personal security. There is nothing wrong with the fact that people are concerned for themselves and their families and

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<sup>2</sup> From among the enormous literature on the meaning of the term, for this chapter the following works were the most useful: Archibugi, Daniele, *The Global Commonwealth of Citizens. Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy*, Princeton University Press; Becker, Peter, Heideking, Juergen, & Henretta, James A. (2002). *Republicanism and Liberalism in America and the German States, 1750–1850*. Cambridge University Press. Birch, Anthony H. (1993). *The Concepts and Theories of Modern Democracy*. London: Routledge.; Dahl, Robert A. (1991). *Democracy and its Critics*. Yale University Press.; Dahl, Robert A. (2000). *On Democracy*. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0300084559; Diamond, Larry & Marc Plattner. (1996). *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*. Johns Hopkins University Press. Halperin, M. H., Siegle, J. T. & Weinstein, M. M. (2005). *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*. Routledge.; Held, David. (2006). *Models of Democracy*. Stanford University Press.; Inglehart, Ronald. (1997). *Modernization and Postmodernization. Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. Princeton University Press.; Lijphart, Arend. (1999). *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries*. Yale University Press.; Putnam, Robert. (2001). *Making Democracy Work*. Princeton University Press.; Sen, Amartya K. (1999). "Democracy as a Universal Value". *Journal of Democracy* 10 (3): 3–17.; Whitehead, Laurence. (2002). *Emerging Market Democracies: East Asia and Latin America*. JHU Press.

<sup>3</sup> See: Wallerstein suggests to see democracy via lenses of an "average" citizen's rather than elites. Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Decline of American Power*, The New Press, 2003, p. 150.

<sup>4</sup> I refer to some most interesting ideas on that approach in recent years by Mancur Olson. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *The American Political Science Review*, Vol.87, No. 3 (September, 1993), pp. 567–576, Ha-Joon Chang, *Bad Samaritans*, Bloomsbury Press, 2008 and Sheldon S. Wolin, *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*, Princeton University Press, 2008.

<sup>5</sup> Civil liberties are seen consistently as socially valuable, desirable, and important – for instance, more than 55% of Russians declare their support for "democracy" over last 15 years.

would like to prolong their lives in good health, arrange education for their children to improve their life opportunities, and worry about the stability of their incomes. On all these fronts, we have witnessed mixed results across Eastern Europe, with a massive retreat in Russia in 1991–2001, and a meager and uneven improvement since 2001–2011. The unequal participation in “transitional rent” seems to me to be the main cause of the growing gap between the democratically elected elite and the public and the root cause of the growth of a new breed of radical populism.<sup>1</sup>

Thus, it seems that “democracy” has strong support among the citizenry, but its benefits are defined rather in terms of social safety, system stability, and “fairness” on top of basic freedoms; democracy is seen as a function through which to achieve social dignity secured by decent conditions of living and safety. As most of the states in the ECE fail to deliver on these, there is a growing level of cynicism and withdrawal from politics (and hence from the democratic project itself).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The results of The Life in Transition Survey II conducted in 2010 in cooperation between the EBRD (the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) and the World Bank reveal that health and education are the first and second priorities for extra government spending. Two out of three people in 39,000 households in 34 European countries in transition said that health care and education should be the top two areas their governments should spend more money on. For example: about 40 % of Albanians consider additional spending on education the biggest priority. Health care was the most important expenditure for 33 % of respondents. All other countries in transition and the Western countries used for considered health care the top priority. Two thirds of Estonians who participated in the survey said that their government should spend more funds for education and public health systems. About one fifth believe that additional spending should be addressing poverty, and about 80 % responded that more money should be invested in reducing the gap between rich and poor. Half of people surveyed in Poland wish their government would spend additional funds on health care. About 25% would prefer that their government focus on education and 12% would prefer more funding for pensions. About half of Slovak respondents favour additional spending for health care and about 25% would prefer if their government would provide more funds for education. One third of Slovenians wish more government spending for health care and one fifth prefer focus on education. Improved pensions and support for the poor were priorities for about 15% of Slovenians. Almost one third of the surveyed Russians were in favour of more funding for the public health system. Education, housing, pensions, and support for the poor were also high priority funding areas. In a 2009 Eurobarometer survey, 44 % of Europeans said that respect for human life is the most important personal value, followed by peace (42 %) and human rights (40 %). According to this survey other personal values considerably lag behind: democracy (24 %), individual freedom (24 %), the rule of law (20 %), etc. Respect for human life has replaced human rights value, which was indicated as the most important one in a similar survey conducted in 2008. The Russian Public Opinion Research Center conducted in August 2010 a public opinion poll about what Russians were afraid of or more worried about. The majority, about 41 % of the respondents, worry about the standards of living, 28 % about health care, 26 % about the problems with the youth and only 11 % are worried about democracy and human rights. Further empirical support for that statement can be found in extensive EBRD research, the Life in Transition Survey I and <http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/publications/special/transitionII.shtml>

<sup>2</sup> In response to the question about political and economic system preference, the survey Life in Transition Survey II: After the Crisis shows less positive attitude towards democracy in all European countries in transition except Bulgaria. Eurobarometer 72 Public Opinion in the EU survey conducted in October and November 2009 shows that less than one third of Europeans have trust in their national political institutions: 29 % trust their governments and 30 % have trust in their parliament, while 65 % and 63 % hold the opposite opinions. What is more significant is that the trust level has fallen since the previous survey conducted in the spring 2009. Less than 10 % of respondents in Latvia and Lithuania have trust in their country's political institutions. The percentage is a little better (20 %) in Ireland, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the United Kingdom. In France, 73 % of people do not trust the government and 64 % do not trust their parliament. An overwhelming majority (79 %) of Europeans distrust their political parties, a 3-point drop since the previous survey in the spring of the same year. These polls show the increasing dissatisfaction people have with the way their national democracies work. The question about how people perceive national and EU democracy has been asked in a survey conducted in autumn 2007. The dissatisfaction with national democracy has apparently grown between the two surveys. The most dissatisfied nations are Lithuania (79%), Romania (79%), Bulgaria (77%), Latvia (76%) and Hungary (76%). People in Nordic countries show much better opinion of their national democratic system. In Denmark, 91 % of people are satisfied with their national political institutions, as well as 81 % of Swedes, 69 % of Finns, 76 % of Austrians and 68 % of Germans. The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy of 2010 reports that the democracy score declined in 19 Eastern European countries between 2008 and 2010. Confidence in national governments dropped from 38 % in 2006 to 43 % in 2009 among Eastern European countries. Public trust in the national political parties is particularly low in 12 Eastern European countries (10 new EU states, Croatia, and Macedonia), with less than 10 % of people trusting their parties. Only one fifth said that they trusted their governments and parliaments. According to the Russian Public opinion Research Center, which conducted a survey in April 2011 about the interest of Russians in politics, their preferred sources of information, and whether they discuss politics with their friends, Russians are becoming increasingly depoliticized. The number of people interested in politics dropped from 48% to 39% over the recent six years. The Initiative Russian Opin-

## 2. Ruling groups<sup>3</sup>

What democratization meant in practice in the ECE was basically the liberation – “liberalization” – of the narrow business/political elite from almost any legal or social control. Only quite a small group was able to fully benefit from the benefits of “democracy.” So the main problem of the mid- and late-1990s in the ECE and Russia in the introduction/consolidation of democracy was that only a few were able to fully take advantage of the fruits of the developing democratic opening created by leaders such as Walensa, Havel, and Yeltsin.

The process of “hijacking democracy” was pretty simple. Most influential people of the day were buying access to the political process, to the redistribution/privatization of property, the media, elections at any level, and decision makers and politicians (in other words, they purchased an un-representative share of the pool of civil liberties). Thus a select few were able to “instrumentalize the law” to protect themselves and their property and thereby became the de facto owners of the state and thus a select group of beneficiaries of democracy. Politically speaking, this meant the liberation of the elite, made up mostly of political and business figures, from the state, from the executive powers that it represents, and from the rest of the population. Russia is an interesting case as the process of “democratization for a few” reached an uncanny level even by the not very demanding standards of the ECE by the end of 1990s. Buying/influencing elections became notoriously possible. With change in leadership in 2000 (the beginning of eight years of Putin's presidency) the Kremlin's reaction was to develop a hybrid of “sovereign democracy.”<sup>4</sup> This notion – if deciphered rather than judged – tells us a lot about both the elite's fears and goals, both international and domestic. “Sovereignty” in this approach means a regime's capacity (economic independence, military strength, and capacity to withstand global pressures and “foreign influence”) to be non-dependent and thus non-subordinated on the international stage, but also “independent” *from its own population*.

“Democracy” here means opening for a change, creating a space for the ruling group to govern via reformist strategies, to have some societal support (as most Russians support the notion of democracy) but not to put too much trust in society; to create an illusion of political pluralism without giving a chance for the development of politics to become a hostage of dominant capital and – simultaneously – the political will of its own citizens; thus elections are “free and democratic” but the electoral outcomes are fully predictable as they are practically controlled.

These regimes put a pragmatic spin on the deeply ideological term that “democracy” usually is in order to merge – as Richard Sakwa insightfully observed – this group's simultaneous belief in economic liberalism and political conservative authoritarianism.<sup>5</sup>

In *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money*, John Maynard Keynes noted that, in the final account, people are ruled by ideas and hardly anything else. But the main question then arises: Whose ideas and who benefits from them? The notion of “democracy” is hardly contested in the ECE, but

ion poll asked Russians in January 2010 what they considered more important: democracy or order. The majority – 72 % – consider order more important. When asked what they thought order was, the majority answered that it is ‘political and economic stability of the state’. The second most popular answer was ‘end of power struggle, disintegration of the country’ and the third ‘social protection of low-income people.’ When asked in June 2011 by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center ‘why in their opinion people get tired of politics,’ 62 % of Russian people said that they were tired of the lack of real action, while 41 % were tired of politicians deceiving ordinary people. Also see the data at <http://www.newsland.ru/news/detail/id/729820/cat/42>.

<sup>3</sup> As defined by those who hold power (power understood here as garnering a high level of social and economic obedience); such power in the region takes the form of almost un-differentiated social – political and economic power (three in one).

<sup>4</sup> Kommersant, June 29, 2006, [http://www.kommersant.com/p686274/r\\_1.html](http://www.kommersant.com/p686274/r_1.html).

<sup>5</sup> Richard Sakwa, *Putin Russia's Choice*, 2007, p.97.

a) the meaning of and practical implication of its implementation have been quite divisive socially and economically; instead of being an ideological and social unifier, democracy has become an area of domestic contestation, mainly along three cleavages: access to liberally defined rights, access to re-defined socio-economic collective rights by most of its citizenry, and maintaining power relations by legitimization of the elite-driven access to power, property, and politics; b) “real democracy” in the ECE has so far served a few who are manipulating it; and c) such democracy has legitimized the consolidation of social and economic power of the ruling group of the day to create an undivided social power and a *capitalization of democracy*.

From the political economy perspective - and addressing the main theme of this book (*democracy and modernization*) - what we see in the ECE is a process of the notion of “democracy” being redefined by a politico-economic-bureaucratic elite for the consolidation of their unified social power. Thus “democracy” serves the state (and its elite) and has become an indispensable tool for its development as far as it serves “its purpose.” Thus the second question becomes: Democracy for what purpose?

### Commodifying /Capitalizing democracy

I will start this section with a brief overview of the main approaches to analyzing the relationship between democracy and the market. I then will outline the main theoretical argument of this chapter, which is the process of “capitalization of democracy through its commodification,” to end up by linking democracy with power (that will be the main theme of the next section).

Ha-Joon Chang in *Bad Samaritans* summarized the debate about free market-democracy relations by locating it within the triangle of those who suggest that democracy is “essential for economic development as it protects citizens from arbitrary expropriations by the rulers”<sup>1</sup>; those who think that if the market is going to “suffer from too much of the democracy” are of the opinion that “democracy may be sacrificed if it becomes necessary in defense of the free market”<sup>2</sup> (economic supporters of Chile under Pinochet are placed here) and the “constructivist camp” representing those who are of the opinion that democracy is a natural byproduct of the market because it will “produce an educated middle class that naturally wants democracy.” Despite significant differences, Chang asserts, there is a strong consensus among liberals that democracy and economic development reinforce each other in the spiral of mutually supporting relationships of democracy supporting and promoting “free markets, which, in turn promotes economic development, which then promotes democracy.”<sup>3</sup> For Chang, that is the main misunderstanding of the whole debate as “unlike what neo-liberals say, market and democracy clash at a fundamental level. Democracy runs on the principle of “one man, one vote”. The market runs on the principle of “one dollar one vote”. I have used Chang’s argument quite extensively as it confronts two schools of thought – those whose operational paradigm is anchored in neo-liberalism and those (the rest) that is critical of it. For me “democracy” is neither “naturally linked” with the market nor it is something with a specific “intrinsic value” (as Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen suggested) that should be one of the criteria to evaluate and/or create development.<sup>4</sup> To me, the new mutation of “democracy” in ECE reflects closely its historical archetype coming back to its roots after centuries of development elsewhere. In essence, today’s democracy in ECE has become a domesticated (but still useful if not indispensable)

*element of the market* and there are profound social, political, and developmental consequences of that (I will discuss these a bit later in the chapter).

But to reach that conclusion, we need to start by making a small detour to Karl Polanyi’s *Great Transformation*. His central thesis in this seminal work is that “for industrial society to work, all factors of production must be for sale.”<sup>5</sup> In other words, in order for the market system to function, everything that can be turned into a commodity is turned into a commodity, given value through transactions realized on the market. Everything is for sale and everything is for buying – the free market has entirely transformed society as instead of the economy being “embedded” in other social relations, social relations are embedded in economic system.<sup>6</sup> Globalization (or internationalization of global proportions) enlarged the scale and depth of that process, making globalization equal to worldwide commodification of social relations.

Democracy and democratic institutions, then, are functioning within this frame (or – if you wish – within the market economy). As such, there is a question that arises: Given that all social relations are to some extent commodified, can democracy itself be a commodity? There are two sub-questions involved: what “kind of commodity” might a democracy become and whether democracy can be “treated as a commodity” in a real market environment. The first answer – to me – is related to the market’s immanent tendency to commodify everything including health standards, human rights, welfare, the environment and, yes, democracy as well. In a real market environment, “democracy” during the 1990s became a commodity in ECE and Russia like anything else (a “thing” that one could buy and sell on the “democratic market”). Let me repeat. By buying access to the political process, property, the media, buying/ influencing elections at any level, and decision makers and politicians, influencing courts and police (in other words, the purchase of civil liberties), a select few were able to become the *de facto owners* of the state and enjoyers of democracy. In other words, all aspects of liberal democracy were parceled off and sold with the result of commodification of the entire structure of democracy as we know it.

I have called this process *commodification of democracy*.<sup>7</sup> The obvious criticism here will be that – even if historically not unique – buying and selling “democracy” (its institutions and rights) is an aberration that is caused either by high-level political and social corruption or distorted regimes (mostly authoritarian ones). My position is that though partly true, such arguments do not reveal the whole picture of intimate relations between the “free market” and “democracy.” I will argue below that first being embedded in the market system, then being commodified, democracy is a minor twin-sister of the free market (and thus indispensable for the modern state and, by extension, development / modernization). To prove it, I shall take the third step to look at *democracy as commodity* within the larger picture (market frame) of capital–market–society relations.

In Bichler and Nitzan’s recent book *Capital as Power*, they make a very compelling argument about relations between capital and power that I am going to emulate – to some degree – to advance the “democracy as commodity” argument.<sup>8</sup> Let’s start with a quite lengthy but useful quote from that book: “The capitalist mode of power is counted in prices and capitalization, working through the ever more encompassing price sys-

<sup>5</sup> Karl Polanyi, *Great Transformation*, p. 43.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* p. 60.

<sup>7</sup> Obviously it is not regionally specific phenomena – buying elections (see recent *Citizen United v. Federal Election Commission* (558US 08-205) landmark decision by the US Supreme Court holding that corporate funding of independent political broadcast in candidate elections cannot be limited), access to policy makers (lobbying in US in 2008 was taxed as 4 billion dollars business); some politicians commodifying US senate seats (Rod Blagojevich scandal) etc.

<sup>8</sup> Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, *Capital as Power. A study of order and creorder*. Routledge, 2009.

<sup>1</sup> Ha-Joon Chang, *Bad Samaritans*, Bloomsbury Press, 2008, p.171.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Amartya Sen, *Democracy as a Universal Value*, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 10, no 3, 1999.

tem [...]. Capitalization discounts a particular trajectory of expected future earnings. [...] Note that this is not 'economic power'. Neither is it 'political power' that somehow distorts the economy. Instead, what we deal with here is *organized power at large*. Numerous power institutions and processes – from ideology, through culture, to organized violence, religion and law, ethnicity, gender, international conflict, labor relations, manufacturing and accounting innovation – all bear on the differential level and volatility of earnings. When these earnings and their volatility are discounted into capital values, the power institutions and processes that underlie them *become* part of capital. And since capital is a vendible commodity, available for purchase and sale on the stock and bond markets, its relative value represents the *commodification of power*. From this viewpoint, we can no longer speak of 'economic efficiency' versus 'political power,' or distinguish 'economic exploitation' from 'political oppression.' Instead, there is a single process of capital accumulation/state formation, a process of restructuring by which *power is accumulated as capital*.<sup>1</sup>

Thus – *per analogiam* – democracy as “fictitious commodity” or “commodified non-commodity” is an inseparable part of capital, and thus an inseparable part of the market, and thus an inseparable part of the state–market machinery. In other words, democracy is not only the legitimizing tool for the power group (that is her peripheral task); the main task is to serve capital and the state by providing property rights and stability and legitimacy for capital. In that sense, there is no longer market development without at least a certain level of democracy; there is no long-term modernization without at least a certain level of democratization of the system. That is why democracy as idea and democracy as practice have become part of the “organized power at large” as Nitzan and Bichler remarked. It is time to *analyze democracy as power*.

To summarize and respond to my question at the beginning of this section: Democracy for what purpose? “Capitalization of democracy” makes democracy an indispensable part of capitalist long-term development as it – in particular in the ECE – is a miraculous tool for the markets (modernization, growth, development, etc.) Let me explain. The turbulent transformation years from the early 1990s until the end of that decade created a classic set of markets (capital, commodity, labor, and information). Two crucial issues are at play here. The first is that due to rather weak institutions and states (thus law and courts), property rights (a pillar of market development) are weak and weakly defended; they are politically manipulated and unstable. Secondly, due to the specific process of privatization in ECE and Russia (some would name it “robber privatization” or “criminal privatization” where massive state assets were given for a song to a select few with national/regional political access and knowledge of the government’s intentions before they became public) these are obviously seen by the public as illegitimate; thus not only is there weak protection of property but there is also weak respect for property by a majority of the population.

For the bureaucratic-cum-political-cum-business ruling group, the life or death question is how to stabilize property, how to legitimize their own existence and avert social turbulences (or – God forbid – popular talks about a review of the privatization practices of the 1990s) from within and from outside. Here comes democracy to the rescue. “Democracy” was presented by domestic and international elites as the only solution to social and economic challenges of the transformation. But from that seemingly all-embracing remedy, only certain aspects (or “ingredients of the remedy) were picked up and implemented (sometimes sloppily) – such as “free elections,” freedom of movement, and support for private property (in particular full endorsement of privatizations schemes, even

the most murky ones. Thus democracy served as an enormously important economic tool supporting the formation of markets and providing basic legitimization for the new ownership class.<sup>2</sup> As part of the package of civil liberties, democracy provided first of all a guarantee of a set of private property rights and legal assurances of the indispensability of the due process of law (and thus became as important in economic transformation of the region as its economic policies).

Earlier I asked: Democracy for what purpose? I hope that the answer is clearer now. It provides legitimacy to property rights and makes those in power more powerful and – yes – it provides citizens with basic rights and freedoms (even weakly endorsed ones) to “bring them in” (as the “democratic citizen” is usually not a mutineer, but rather, first of all, a perpetual consumer). Thus capitalization of democracy also means including this “project” into a process of development and modernization (by those who currently control the process).<sup>3</sup> Thus democracy being commodified became part of the capitalization process (being transformed into a kind of capital itself) and – logically – subjected to similar processes of accumulation; however, not of money or treasury papers, but rather the accumulation of power.

### Democracy as power

Political economy perspective on democracy is a rather unexplored theme so far. That is a pity as seen from that angle democracy seems to be involved in a plot in which she is captured by the market/state, transformed by the ruling groups into a commodity, and serving – predominantly – state and private interests as part of the power grid. A rather sad story

<sup>2</sup> For instance, in the case of Russia the dominant pattern of Yeltsin’s ruling group’s accumulation (1991 – 2000) was conditioned by a symbiosis between oligarchs (big, Russia-based business), higher echelons of state (central/regional) bureaucracy, and the Kremlin’s elite, resulting in a sort of a super-amalgamated power structure. The mechanism of accumulation was complex and dynamically changing to reflect the internal (political) power structure and the changing strength of dominant capital. The main contradictions (and changing interests that reflected the dynamic reality of the domestic and international market) between political-cum-bureaucratic power and dominant capital vectored the system’s dynamics. In the first phase (in the period before the voucher privatization of 1993–94 and the “loans for shares” auctions of 1995–96), political access was exchanged for profit and security of spoils (on the trading block were import/export licenses, all kinds of permits, privatization of real estate, quotas and state contracts). Russian capitalists started to consolidate their position as early as 1992–93 by using an innovative, cross-sectoral merger and acquisition strategy called FIGs (Financial Industrial Groups). They increased their profit simply by not paying taxes and secured their gains – in a highly volatile market environment – by sending money abroad and stripping domestic assets of their “real” value. This scheme was significantly modified as new dynamics were introduced by the “loans for shares” auctions – an indigenous invention of the Russian business-cum-political elite that legally, de facto, transferred to the Kremlin’s “trusted seven” (plus to the only non-banker, the Kremlin’s confidant, Boris Beresovsky) a massive chunk of state property, including the jewels of the Russian economy. The logic of the capital expansion at this stage was nothing short of “to penetrate and alter the nature of the state itself.”

They were, however, caught in an existential dilemma – to have a weak state was good for business (no taxes, corrupt officials, etc.) but to have a too weak a state was bad for business (their main problem was that the state was too weak to secure/protect the gains of the dominant capital and to secure property rights). In a truly Hegelian spirit, they solved this seemingly deep contradiction by evoking the notion of politics. The oligarchs, then, “had to take things into their own hands” by engaging in a collective political action. The process of “privatization of the state” was helped by their “all hands on deck” support for the re-election of the guarantor of their position, Boris Yeltsin (in July 1996). The rest was just a matter of socio-technology. By the purchase, tight control, and effective use of the national media, the oligarchs offered a one-dimensional explanation of reality. They took control of the regional bosses. They consolidated their position in the security apparatus. Operation “Privatizing the State” was well under way by the time of the financial collapse in 1998. From the time of the “shares for loans” scheme and the re-election of Yeltsin, politics (still indispensable) became, however, secondary to capital in the process of accumulation. But everything was not enough, and as early as the mid-1990s, Russian oligarchs were actively looking for international capital backing. They were seeking transnational ownership to, on one hand, gain access to international capital (in order to gain more power domestically) and, on the other, to secure their access to safer investment abroad. Having advanced the “privatization of the state”, Russian oligarchs were getting ready to make a real deal: to merge with international capital and put the Russian economy on the trading block. Twice in the last fifteen years – in 1994 and 1996 – one could have bought one third of Russia’s assets for between 3–4 billion dollars.

<sup>3</sup> The very notions of “development,” and “modernization” require special attention as they seem so obvious that a few – - bother to have a closer look at their meaning; for an uniquely insightful overview of the issues involved see: M. P. Cowen and R. W. Shenton, *Doctrines of Development*, Routledge, 1996

<sup>1</sup> Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, *Capital as Power. A study of order and creorder*, pp. 9–10.

for a fine idea and a very humane ideal. But there is another, more positive part of it; that is that democracy – particularly in times of economic downturns and increased uncertainty – is more welcomed by the ruling groups as it may absorb some social and economic shocks and provide the system with continuing justification for its continuity.<sup>1</sup> Thus the good news is that basic citizen's rights are guaranteed by extension as part and parcel of systemic stability. As Olson observes, economic development and democracy require the same pre-conditions: "Interestingly, the conditions that are needed to have the individual rights needed for maximum economic development are exactly the same conditions that are needed to have a lasting democracy. [...] the same court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and contract rights. As the foregoing reasoning suggests, the only societies where individual rights to property and contract are confidently expected to last across generations are the securely democratic societies [...] On the other hand, democracies have the great advantage of preventing significant extraction of social surplus by their leaders. They also have the extraordinary virtue that the same emphasis on individual rights that is necessary to lasting democracy is also necessary for secure rights to both property and the enforcement of contracts. The moral appeal of democracy is now almost universally appreciated, but its economic advantages are scarcely understood."<sup>2</sup>

In other words "democracy" is not, as Slavoj Žižek has asserted, a "necessary fiction."<sup>3</sup> Instead it is a very real, *commodified non-commodity* within the market, which by secur-

ing rights and legitimizing the system helps it to continue to act with certain level of confidence in obedience.

### Conclusions

By increasingly becoming a mere servant of the economic-political ruling group, democracy is losing its original appeal and its broader, previously unquestionable, social support, and this has profound consequences on the way the contemporary market system works (for instance by de-politicizing the economy, thus making it less socially accountable and responsive; the state being less involved in social welfare; the system becoming less transparent and more autocratic, etc.).

There are obviously social consequences as well – ranging from the "Arab Spring" to the riots in London – manifest in forms of lack of social participation and basic responsibility, increased seemingly aimless social anger, disrespect for law and regulations, violation of property rights, erosion of the "liberal class"; but also – on the positive side - in taking huge risks in replacing dictators, raising issues of a fairer future for the youth, turning attention to protecting the environment, exposing elite inertia etc.<sup>4</sup>

*So the picture is worrisome but not bleak.* The fundamental question is: can we still make democracy work by dissociating "democracy" and "market" while preserving freedom and addressing social concerns? Surprisingly the answer is yes, it can be done without harm to the market, but it will "necessitate a reordering of basic power arrangements and a different understanding of civic commitments from that of a spectator."<sup>5</sup>

At the moment, global and national political elites are not yet ready for this task.

<sup>1</sup> For Nitzan and Bichler that process is intermediated by process of accumulation: In the final analysis, power is *confidence in obedience*. It expresses the certainty of the rulers in the submissiveness of the ruled. When this confidence is high, the rulers *actively* shape their society. They view its trajectory as customary and natural, while treating revolts, uprisings – even revolutions – as mere disturbances. By contrast, when this confidence is low, the rulers tend to *react* rather than initiate. Social development loses its coherence, while revolts, uprising and revolutions suddenly become manifestations of systemic chaos. In our own epoch, the central relationship between confidence and obedience is embodied in capital. The process of accumulation represents the changing ability of *dominant capital* – namely, the leading corporations and key government organs at the epicentre of the process – to control, shape and transform society against opposition. Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler, *Capital as Power. A study of order and creorder*. Routledge, 2009, p. 17.

<sup>2</sup> Olson, *ibid.*, p. 572-574.

<sup>3</sup> Slavoj Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, London, Verso, 1989, p. 148.

<sup>4</sup> Among other see Chris Hedges journalistic account on the process in Chris Hedges, *Death of the liberal class*, A.Knopf, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Wolin Sheldon, *Democracy Incorporated: Managed Democracy and the Specter of Inverted Totalitarianism*, Princeton University Press, 2008, p. 43.

Evelyne Enderlein<sup>1</sup>PERCEPTION OF RUSSIAN LITERATURE IN FRANCE:  
FORTUITIES AND REGULARITIES (THE SECOND HALF OF THE 19TH CENTURY)

The first translations of Russian fiction appeared in France in the second half of the 18th century. At this time an image offered by the reality enters the mentality of the French. Then the number of coming Russians was so significant that Voltaire wrote a satire *A Russian in Paris* (1760), and writer and publicist Louis-Sébastien Mercier considered it to be a characteristic of the Parisian life at the end of the 18th century.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, it is possible to ask how well the French knew Russian literature, what works had been translated, by whom and what for. What was their influence on the shaping of the *image* of a Russian in France? How were they perceived? My research led me to the issue of the relations between the literary translation and other factors of social-historical life. This is a recurrent problem and can be referred to any epoch. The time distance will let us view this phenomenon of the 19th century more impartially.

Till the end of the 18th century the French viewed Russia as a very distant barbarian country.<sup>3</sup> Only at the turn of the century can we notice any changes in the attitude towards it. At the same time the first signs of cultural interest towards Russia appeared.<sup>4</sup> The first Russian grammar book in French was *La Grammaire russe* by Jean Soyer in 1724. The French public was still sure that Russia had no literature of its own and that its language did not deserve to be learnt. In 1800 a book was published, *The Best Works of Russian Literature from its Birth to the Time of Catherine II*, it was a collection translated into French by M.L. Pappadopulo, a Greek living in Russia, and Mr Halle. If Pappadopulo had to hire a French assistant, that was only because he knew Russian, but practically no French! But the interest of the French educated people was growing, and impatient Parisian publishers having no original books in French started to publish foreign researches, as for example, *A Historical and Statistical Chart of the Russian Empire* by the German Heinrich Storch in 1800 and *The Russian Empire under Catherine II and at the End of 18th Century* by the Englishman William Took, published in French in 1801 in six volumes.

From the death of Paul I to the Battle of Austerlitz (1801–1805) there was the time of benevolent propaganda. French newspapers were praising publications favourable towards Russia (Alphonse de Beauchamp), and were silent about the hostile ones (Sylvain Maréchal, 1802).<sup>5</sup> Of all the writers, Karamzin seemed the most eminent to the French, according to the translations.

But soon the changes started. England renewed the war (Trafalgar, 1805). Alexander was worried with the Napoleonic Eastern projects and had hostile feelings towards him. In October of 1805 the Russian Army entered Vienna. Then the mech-

anism of the second coalition was on again. Being forced to refuse, at least for some time, from the French-Russian agreement, Napoleon played in two years a card of Western power against Russia. At that time *Bulletins de la Grande Armée* restored an image of the wild hordes of Tartars. The literature about Russia of those times lacks objectivity, because Poland was in the centre of interest and drew attention of the publicists. The effect of hidden Russophobia from the time of Suворov's campaign became stronger after the military campaign of 1812 and especially after the fall of the Empire it provoked.

Since then the ideological rivals of Napoleon became popular. Indifference and hostility towards Russia had stopped. As far as in 1814 Chateaubriand who did not know Russia before that time wrote in his brochure *De Buonaparte et des Bourbons* (1814) about the gratitude of aristocracy to Alexander and praised him in his *Mémoires d'Outre Tombe*. He was followed in 1821 by the work of Joseph de Maistre, who was appointed at the age of 50 to the post of Ambassador in St. Petersburg by the King of Sardinia, and where he discovered a second homeland for himself. The delayed Russophilia encouraged him to write his best pages of his *Soirées de Saint-Petersbourg*, at the same time he never left his anti-Napoleonic and antirevolutionary beliefs. In the same year of 1821 a book *Dix années d'exil* by Madame de Staël was published, she was mostly positive towards Russian people, whom she discovered during her trip to Russia without knowledge of the Russian language. In the years of Restoration at the beginning of 1821 in the magazine *Revue encyclopédique*, for the first time the name of Alexander Pushkin was mentioned accompanied by a favourable review of his poem *Ruslan and Lyudmila*. That publication became possible thanks to Küchelbecker, a friend of the poet, who was at the time in Paris for the conference about the Russian literature in the Royal Athénée. In 1825, 25 fables by Krylov were published in Paris, they were printed in the original with French and Italian translations, thanks to Count Orlov, one of the Russian settlers in Paris.<sup>6</sup> We should also mention the arrival of the scientific book in 1834: the annotated translation of *Nestor's Chronicles* in 2 volumes was done by Louis Paris who was sent out of Russia for his liberal ideas.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless we should admit the limitedness of these attempts.

And at the beginning of 1837 the news of Pushkin's death shifted attention to the literary Russia. At the same time, during the last years of Louis Philip reign a new category of Russians appeared on Parisian boulevards, they had been ignored by the French until then: revolutionaries had come, having fled from Nikolai's persecution. Bakunin, Lavrov and Sazonov, Herzen's friend, stayed in the French capital where they met Louis Blanc and Proudhon. Herzen joined them shortly afterwards. They were followed by Plekhanov, Kropotkin and others. From that time Russian immigration appeared, close to the French opponents of Russia, from whom it unexpectedly gained support. The Russian question became the reason for many debates in press and book trade. Thanks to the translations of Prosper Mérimée who acquainted the French reader with Pushkin, Lermontov, Gogol and was able to evaluate the artistic quality of the authors translated by himself, the literary Russia became the focus of attention more extensive that it used to be at the times of Napoleon and the Restoration.

During the time of the second Empire, of all the Russian authors in France it was Turgenev who occupied the first place.

<sup>1</sup> Head of Slavonic Languages Chair at the University of Strasbourg (France), Doctor of Philology, professor. Author of 50 scholarly publications, including: *Russian – French Idioglossary of the Contemporary Language* (Russko-frantsuzskij tematicheskij slovar' sovremennogo jazyka), *Women in Soviet Russia (1945–1975)* (Zhenshchiny v sovetskoi Rossii (1945–1975)), *From Hussar to Comrade: Two Examples of Travesty in the 18th and 20th Century Russia* (Ot gusara k tovarishchu: dva primera travestirovaniia v Rossii XVIII i XX vekov), *The Russian Language in the post-Soviet Area* (Russkij jazyk v postsovet'skom prostranstve), *An Amazon on the Russian Land* (Amazonka na russkoj zemle), *Reflections on the First All-Russian Women's Congress of 1908* (Razmysleniia o pervom zhenskom vserossijskom sjezde 1908 g.), *Cultural Importance of Strasbourg for the Russians in the 18th Century* (Kul'turnoje znachenie Strasburga dlja russkikh v XVIII veke) and others.

<sup>2</sup> Louis-Sébastien Mercier, *Paris pendant la révolution*, Paris, 1962, 244.

<sup>3</sup> Michel Mervaud, Jean-Claude Roberti, *Une infinie brutalité, l'image de la Russie dans la France des XVI<sup>e</sup> et XVII<sup>e</sup> siècles*, Paris, Institut d'Etudes slaves, 1991.

<sup>4</sup> Historians Levesque in 1782, then Le Clerc in 1783–1784, published in *Histoire de la Russie*.

<sup>5</sup> See: Charles Corbet, *L'opinion française face à l'inconnue russe 1799–1894*, Paris, 1967, 55–56.

<sup>6</sup> Pyotr Vyazemsky, *Zapisnyje knizhki*, June, 26, 1826.

<sup>7</sup> Louis Paris, *La chronique de Nestor*, 1834, the book had been considered a competent source before the translation and interpretations of Louis Leger, the first French Slavist, was published (1884).

*La Revue des deux mondes* went on publishing the translations of his short stories (*Faust, Annushka, The Diary of a Superfluous Man, Three Meetings*), but in 1861 these publications stopped, because the magazine supported Poland in the upcoming conflict. Everything looked as if Turgenev had been the only eminent Russian writer! French readers did not do justice to Gogol, did not recognize Tolstoy either, his *Sevastopol Sketches* were published in 1854 and 1855 and appeared unnoticed. The same applies to Dostoevsky's *Notes from the Dead House* (1862) which was long left untranslated. The two giants of the Russian novel were only to be discovered after 1870. It was in 1870s that the break-up in the French mentality started, after a humiliating defeat of the French from the Prus-

sians. Russia appeared to be the power that could help France out.<sup>1</sup> Finally, in 1886 the ultimate acknowledgement came: a famous collection *Le roman russe* of the Viscount Melchior de Vogüé, a diplomat and a literary critic, revealed Gogol, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy for France, which entailed a considerable flow of Russian novels and serious scientific works (Anatole Leroy Beaulieu and Louis Léger) in France at the end of 19th century.<sup>2</sup>

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that it is not only artistic criteria that condition the number of translations and their perception. In the report, there is the whole complex of factors presented that generate the meta-language serving as the foundation for the historical dialogue of cultures.

G. M. Gatilov<sup>3</sup>

### INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN THE ERA OF GLOBALIZATION

The challenges of the early 21st century and ambitious tasks in international relations in the era of globalization make interaction of cultures a growing priority. In this we can see that the 12th International Likhachov Scientific Conference has a timely and urgent character. World-wide processes acquire cultural and civilizational dimension. They are not only accompanied by interconnection and mutual benefaction of cultures, but also put identity of countries and peoples in jeopardy. One can't help but wonder if American historian and political thinker Samuel Huntington can have been right in his *The Clash of Civilizations*. Will his alarming predictions prove true?

The danger of intercivilizational split does exist. In the Middle East the relations between the Sunnis and the Shites have become more strained, the Christians have found themselves in a vulnerable situation, too. But there is a viable alternative, that is an aspiration for harmonious dialogue-targeted relations, for reducing conflicts. Common efforts to establish intercultural dialogue are becoming crucial. Timing questions emerge as to how involve actively the principles of morality and culture into foreign policy issues. In this regard, the role of civil society, of such forums as the International Likhachov Scientific Conference, that annually gathers political, academic and expert élite from both Russia and abroad keeps rising.

We are witnessing a deep transformation of the geopolitical landscape. The region of the Middle East and North Africa has entered a period of dramatic changes.

Recession effects in the world economy keep growing. Accumulation of alarming factors is accompanied by intensification of social, interethnic contradictions and extremist outbursts. Cross-border challenges and threats to security that demand a collective response keep calling on louder and louder. An imperative task of practical politics can be determined as a necessity to avoid intercivilizational conflicts, collisions on interethnic, intercultural and interreligious basis.

The aforesaid brings into focus the task to consolidate the efforts of international community on the basis of international law governance, carefully following the principles of the UN

Charter, and adjusting ourselves to bringing the positive unification agenda into life.

The UN remains a supporting structure for international relations and equal multifaceted cooperation for the benefits of all member states. The UN possesses unique legitimacy and full powers required to react adequately to a variety of modern risks and threats. It is the UN that is supposed to provide political, legal, moral leadership in the struggle with global challenges, to set fair principles and standards of cooperation, to control how they are realized, to lend all necessary support and assistance to the states in need. Drastic changes in the world demand that the role of the UN be enhanced, and the Organisation be adapted to the up-to-date reality, fully preserving its interstate nature and firm character of its Charter.

Mutual consolidating efforts of the international community are needed in order to keep control over the situation in the world economy and finances. As a natural reaction to misbalance in the system of global governance a new architecture of the aforesaid system is being formed, in full possession of collective leadership of leading states and, at the same time, reinforcement of regional governance. Positions of dynamically developing countries are bolstered. The G20, BRICS, APEC, and various other formats are important elements of such a framework.

Current global shifts promote creation of a more flexible, non-aligned mechanism of multifaceted cooperation, multi-vector and net diplomacy based on equal rights and mutual benefits of the participants united by shared goals. These shifts lead to changes in the paradigm of international relations: from confrontations and conflicts to a constructive *modus operandi*. Thus a new 'window of possibilities' opens in the world of political development, on the basis free from intellectual inertness of the past, devoid of an ideological bias in creative approaches for mutual response to common challenges. The life itself imposes a unification agenda on us, with an overlap of national interests being an adjusting starting point.

The logics of mutual consolidating activities should prevail, in particular, in the issues of security and in eliminating excess weapons from the world. Russia is open for dialogue in further steps in nuclear disarmament. This aim can be achieved through practical implementation of the START Treaty. It is crucial to ensure its effectiveness and viability, to see how its basic establishing principles are put into life. At that, we take as a premise that further nuclear disarmament is only possible on multifaceted basis.

The progress along these lines is inseparable from the task of providing a coordinated thrust forward in all aspects of enhancing international security and strategic stability, which includes generating universally acceptable approaches for creating systems of the Anti-Ballistic Missile defence, preventing

<sup>1</sup> See: Michel Cadot, *La Russie dans la vie intellectuelle française*, Paris, Fayard, 1967.

<sup>2</sup> J.L. Backès, «Le roman russe et l'esthétique du roman», in: *Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé: le héraut du roman russe*, sous la direction de M. Cadot, Paris, Institut d'Études, 1989, 29–36. Eugène-Melchior de Vogüé, *Le Roman russe*, éd. Jean-Louis Backès, classiques Garnier, Paris, 2010, 57–70.

<sup>3</sup> Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Author of a number of publications, including: 'Peacekeeping UN Blue Berets' ('Golubye kaski' OON na sluzhbe mira), 'Results of "The Great Gathering" at the UN General Assembly' (Itogi 'bol'shogo sljota' na Genassambleje OON), 'Results of the UN Doha Forum' (Itogi foruma OON v Dohe) and some others. G.M. Gatilov is decorated with the Order of Friendship.

deployment of weapons in space, elimination of quantitative and qualitative misbalance in conventional weapons, considering an impact of strategic conventional weapons.

Unilateral deployment of strategic anti-ballistic missile defence components in various regions of the world alters the general mode of international security. Claims that building-up capabilities of global ABM cannot undermine the basis of strategic stability will not replace firm and clear guarantees that its potential should be adequate to the declared aims and should not break global and regional strategic balances. It is true both for Europe and Pacific Asian Region where the ABM factor begins to influence strategic situation as well.

Let us take as a premise the principle of indivisibility of security that provided the basis for Russian Initiative to conclude the European Security Treaty, practical implementation of which would enable us to close the books on 'the post-cold war era', to direct the potential of European states to solving common tasks in security and development areas, and to settle effectively such problems as ABM and arms control.

Let us lay emphasis on enhancing the non-proliferation regime and on universalizing its main instrument, that is, the Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty. We support the steps towards strengthening the system of guarantees of International Atomic Energy Agency and entry the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force.

The goals of strengthening the non-proliferation regime might be propelled by speedy settlement of nuclear problems of Iran and the Korean Peninsular. We see no alternative to their political diplomatic resolution and we are undertaking certain measures to create opportunities to resume negotiations.

Among other issues of priority, we devote our attention to Iran's nuclear programme, around which an international tension preserves. We advocate Iran's close and full-scaled cooperation with experts of International Atomic Energy Agency in order to restore the international community's trust in a peaceful character of their nuclear programme. We feel sure that only the dialogue and negotiations, on conditions of providing a reliable non-proliferation regime and respect towards right and duties of Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty members can settle the issues of Iran's nuclear programme. Attempts to increase pressure for tougher sanctions, to re-direct the situation from a negotiation mode to a direct confrontation with sabre rattling are unacceptable for us.

If past experience were any guide, methods of pressure, introduction of unilateral sanctions cannot be a cure-all in search for solutions of various conflict situations. We advocate cease of all acts bypassing the UN Security Council, be it unilateral sanctions against Cuba, Iran, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Syria or any other state. Involvement into cooperation rather than isolation is the method to be guided by when handling conflicts in the 21st century.

I have already mentioned the role of a regional level of guidance in the world economy and finances. Speculating on this topic, I'd like to emphasize that in a poly-centred world an efficient international architecture can only be created on condition that it is founded on regional elements. In other words, enhancement of a regional level of global guidance and growth of regional organizations' impact are indispensable attributes of modern stage of development of international relations. These processes are contributed to by integration association and organizations that operate on the territory of the CIS. In financial and economic sphere it is the Eurasian Economic Community with its Anti-crisis fund of 10 billion dollars. Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has been established, Common Economic Space is being formed and the goal of creating the Eurasian Union has been set.

The Collective Security Treaty Organization is the key instrument to provide security and stability in its area of responsibility. Joint declaration on cooperation between the United

Nations and the Collective Security Treaty Organization signed in March, 2011 has become an important step towards enhancing cooperation of the two organizations, first of all, in the field of peace-making.

We advocate cooperation between regional organizations for the benefit of building global stability based on inviolability of the UN Charter's goals and principles. Common tasks for everyone should be the following: equal and indivisible security, predictability, transparency, mutual respect, accommodation to each other's interests.

Stabilization of international situation could be promoted by resolving regional conflicts. Special attention is drawn to the situation in Arab world. The events happening in its vast geopolitical space and the new reality forming now touch upon the security and stability maintenance not only in individual states, but in the whole region.

Russia treats declaration of will of Arab states and their thrive to new life with respect. But, however acute internal political problems may be, they should be solved in a peaceful way, through national dialogue encompassing all political forces and social groups and targeted at building public concord in order to find the ways out of the crisis. This is the only way to escape violence and conduct the changes much longed for in the legal sphere under the conditions of general civil consensus.

Loosening the situation from the outside can be favourable for utterly destructive elements whose aims are contrary to the ones of the majority of population in Arab countries. Encouraging the opposition in uncooperative behaviour is a dangerous way that leads to escalation of chaos in international affairs. Attempts to go beyond the mandates issued by the UN Security Council are unacceptable in both legal and humanitarian areas.

We want to see the countries of this region, that traditionally have friendly and peaceful relations with us, flourishing, democratic and modern wherein the interests of all citizens shall be secured despite their religion, ethnic, clan or tribal origin. We are ready to expand our partnership based on the principles of mutual respect, equal rights and mutual benefits, respect of traditions, history and culture of these countries.

Improvement in the situation in the Middle East could be encouraged by the advancement of the process of Middle East issues settlement, basic standards of which are defined and established in resolutions of the UN Security Council, Madrid principles, and Arab peaceful initiative. The only sensible basis for settling it is a close side-by-side coexistence, in peace and security of both the Israeli and the Palestine states.

We call on every party concerned to work on ensuring the restart of Palestine and Israel dialogue based on internationally acknowledged legal platform. The leading role here belongs to the established mechanism of monitoring peaceful process, that is Middle East 'quartet' of international mediators.

Henceforward both bilaterally and in the 'quartet' mode Russia will use every means to encourage the restart of the negotiations. In the present situation a lawful universal and solid settling of Arab-Israeli conflict could become the best guarantee of the regional stability and of prevention of new negative case scenario. The final goal should become creation of the independent, viable, territorially integrate, sovereign Palestine state coexisting with Israel in peace.

Russia provides considerable support for international efforts in stabilizing military and political situation in Afghanistan, in particular, the constant transit traffic by air and train is provided through Russian territory to carry cargos for international armed forces contingents in that country.

The situation with Afghani drugs is growing more and more dangerous, their production and export keeps rising. In relation to Central Asia and Russia we can speak about a 'heroin aggression'. That region has long become the main transit

corridor to deliver Afghani drugs to the CIS, first to Russia and further on, to Europe. The profits from Afghani drug traffic are the basic source to finance the extremist underground in that region, and to trigger the rise of the organized crime.

The sphere of our attention also covers the package of problems of the African continent, in particular, a complex humanitarian situation in the Horn of Africa. We positively evaluate multilateral efforts of the international community to fight against sea pirates near Somalia coasts. It is a good example of the consolidated approach of states in order to resist global challenges, in this case arising from Africa.

Russian navy sailors carrying duty in the area of the Horn of Africa, like representatives of other states, provide round-the-clock security of navigation in this part of the world ocean. We advocate creation in that region of an international anti-piracy legal mechanism in accordance with the resolution of the UN Security Council adopted under the initiative of Russia.

Among the factors that generate instability both within the states and on the international arena, more and more distinctly there emerge difficulties of an interethnic, intercultural, intercivilizational character. It is confirmed, in particular, by chronic problems of 'multiculturalism' in some European countries.

Tragic events in Norway, turmoils in England, youth protest demonstrations in other countries, appeals to oppress Christian minorities in the Middle East and North Africa result from the loss of fundamental values based on moral norms, weakened restraining moral and ethical principles, which leads to crash of democracy and social degradation, aggression and chaos. It is obvious that there can be no freedom without responsibility and no democracy without self-restraint.

In the situation when fast development of information technologies promotes breaking rigid interethnic walls, when interstate borders become transparent and migration flows grow, a completely new meaning is given to the issue of preserving ethnical confessional identity, especially in the midst of the decreasing influence of secular ideologies that dominated in the 20th century. Cultural diversity is an integral part of a new reality of the modern world. It is important that it should serve

as a development factor rather than a source of discrimination and separation.

Complicated and accelerated changes in modern international relations push forward a global priority, that is the task to activate and enhance the efficiency of dialogue between cultures, religions and civilizations targeted at formulating universal values approaches to the challenges of the modern world. It can be encouraged by such mechanisms as UNESCO, the Alliance of Civilizations, as well as multiple organizations, institutions and structures that represent international civil society.

I would like to say a few words about the Alliance of Civilizations. In December 2011 Doha, the capital of Qatar, hosted the forth Forum of this international structure that was devoted to the analysis of issues of how to boost development through intercultural dialogue. Among the participants there were many representatives of Russian non-governmental organizations. Moreover, many of them were not actors with non-speaking parts but assumed the role of organizers of individual events in their own right. The Doha Forum has confirmed the demand for the Alliance as the largest global movement aimed at consolidation of efforts of states and civil society in order to establish harmonious intercultural relations.

Effectiveness of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations can be propelled by multiple initiatives of Russian civil society, in particular, such as annual sessions of World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations' held on the Greek island of Rhodes, as well as the International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

In the last years this Conference has justly become a milestone event in intercultural and intercivilizational dialogue. This event does not only reflect global efforts to stimulate the dialogue of cultures, but also responds to fundamental problems of the world's current political and public life. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia knows this powerful international platform well, looks forward to the next conference, and I can assure you, intends to render all possible assistance to the success of this conference.

I wish everyone fruitful discussions, success and send my best regards.

**David Gillespie<sup>1</sup>**

## ANDREÏ MAKINE'S FICTIONAL WORLDS: THE INNER DIALOGUE OF RUSSIAN AND FRENCH CULTURES

At the beginning of Andreï Makine's *Le Testament français* the young narrator Alesha and his sister listen enthralled as their French grandmother Charlotte recounts to them the glories of France as remembered from her own childhood, the magnificence of its culture as represented by Marcel Proust, the sensuousness of its language, the resplendence of Paris. Then she shows them the menu for the banquet given in honour of the visit of Tsar Nikolai II and his wife Alexandra on their visit to France in 1896: fifteen courses, dominated by 'roast bartavels and ortolans, garnished with truffles'.<sup>2</sup> The narrator Alesha is transported to another world, one incomparably more graceful

and majestic than the dreary life of provincial Saranza (presumably a conflation of the actual cities of Saratov and Penza).

The children are thus made aware of a land and a culture far away, and one that jars with the humdrum provincialism of their own environment. This provincialism, emblematic of the communal paucity of Soviet life, is nowhere better exemplified than the borshch mothers make for their families in the beginning of *Confession d'un porte-drapeau déchu* (*Confessions of a Fallen Standard-Bearer*). Certainly, for Makine the juxtaposition and contrast of France and Russia in his fictional worlds produce a kind of literary border consciousness, an awareness that two lands and cultures may be separate and discrete, but are nevertheless bound by myriad links and associations. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the many contrasts between East and West, Russia and France, in Makine's work, and thus to consider the role and status of Russia and Russian literature in French culture today.

Andreï Makine is the author of a dozen or so novels and a play, although some novels are short enough to be designated novellas. Though born in Krasnoïarsk in 1957 and raised in Soviet Russia, he has since 1987 been a resident of France, and French is the language in which he works. While he is extremely well-known and celebrated in France and elsewhere,

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<sup>2</sup> Andreï Makine, *Le Testament français*, London: Sceptre, 1997, p. 27. All page references to Makine's works incorporated in the text subsequently are to the English-language editions included in the Bibliography at the end of this article.

winning prizes and with his novels translated into dozens of languages, he remains virtually unknown in Russia, with only one work, the 1995 novel *Le Testament français*, translated into Russian (published, some would say ironically, in the journal *Inostrannaia literatura* in December 1996). He is coy about his Soviet past in interviews, and so relatively little is known of his early life in the Soviet Union. It is known, however, that he was a research student of French literature at Moscow University in the mid-1980s, and, on a teachers' trip to France in 1987, decided to stay in that country.<sup>1</sup> According to his own account, several years of penury and virtual homelessness followed, before he achieved literary success. The abiding motif of Makine's writing is that of escape – just as his heroes 'escape' from the horrors of the Soviet Union, so the author, by writing exclusively in French, 'escapes' from the restriction of his native language. Thus, in Formalist terminology Makine establishes a personal idiom that serves to distance what is signified from the means of its signification.

Makine's works owe much to the classic Russian literary tradition of interrogating the tension between the false and the real, the abhorrent and the beautiful, barbarity and culture, as perceived in the works of Nikolai Gogol', Fedor Dostoevskii, Lev Tolstoi and Anton Chekhov, to name a few. Whereas in the nineteenth century literary characters can be hopelessly embedded in a sordid social reality, in Makine's fiction they both dream of escape, and do escape. The added dimension to their consciousness is the expectation of something better, richer and beautiful, as represented by France and French culture. The multiple dichotomies between Russia and France symbolize past and present, travesty and beauty, tyranny and freedom. Of all the writers of Russian origin living and working abroad in the post-Soviet world, Makine's works are most obviously structured around the tensions emerging from the 'trans-border text'.<sup>2</sup>

Makine has been fêted in his adopted country as its most successful 'bilingual' or 'translingual' writer, and his linguistic and creative talents have been recognised in the unprecedented award in 1995 of both the Prix Goncourt and the Prix Médicis, an event that transformed his literary fortunes.<sup>3</sup> Unlike the works of other linguistic migrants such as, for example, Joseph Conrad, Elsa Triolet, Milan Kundera and, of course, Vladimir Nabokov, his writing does not engage with his adopted country, but rather remains focused on Russian life and history, especially the Second World War, the ravages of Stalinism and their tragic consequences for the Russian psyche in the modern world. Of his own place in the Russian literary canon, Makine wryly notes that he is happy to be among the great names, having once seen his work in the alphabetically arranged East European Literature section in a French bookshop: 'My first books were there, sandwiched, and at the risk

of inspiring giddy megalomania in me, between those of Lermontov and Nabokov'.<sup>4</sup>

Makine's works are concerned with the Russian historical condition and Russia's place in the world. Half of his works have definite French subtexts, where France, its language and culture serve as symbols of elegance in contrast to the brutality of Russia. Because his works are so abundantly constructed around contrasts, almost every detail has a symbolic signification of good or bad, beautiful or ugly, benevolent or barbaric. Makine's use of French has more to do with the classical literary idiom of the nineteenth century and *fin-de-siècle* than with the modern idiom, as the Russian translator of *Le Testament français* Leonid Tsiv'ian and numerous French critics and Francophone scholars have noted. Makine rejects modern French with its multi-cultural borrowings and youth slang, both of which are subjected to a withering critique in *La terre et le ciel de Jacques Dorme* (*The Earth and Sky of Jacques Dorme*).<sup>5</sup> This conscious embrace of the language of the past, therefore, is also a clear statement of the author's cultural preferences, and a rejection of the present.

Because Makine writes first and foremost for a French readership (and thereafter for translation into other languages), he thus significantly departs from the Russian literary tradition of direct engagement with his native country, especially pronounced during the twentieth century with the banishment of entire generations of writers abroad, and perhaps best embodied by the case of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. Although his works were banned in the Soviet Union, Solzhenitsyn always believed that they would be read by his compatriots, and never doubted that his word as a writer of truth would eventually have a profound effect on Russia itself.<sup>6</sup>

Makine's picture of war as pitiless and bloody is not a new one for Soviet literature, and equally gruesome and harrowing accounts can be found in the works of such writers of 'war prose' in the 1960s and 1970s as Vasil' Bykov, Bulat Okudzhava, Grigorii Baklanov, Viktor Astaf'ev and many others. All these writers wrote with first-hand knowledge of combat, and so their descriptions bear a grim authenticity. Educated in a Soviet school in these years, Makine cannot but have known many of these works, and his description of the War is therefore no doubt largely influenced by writers who had experienced it at first hand. The cruelty of collectivization and the relentless vigilance and brutality of the secret police, as described in several novels, are also hardly new to practitioners and consumers of twentieth-century Russian literature (especially the works of Solzhenitsyn). But whereas Soviet writers would emphasise the collective heroism of the War effort, and the sacrifices made for a better future, Makine makes it clear that men suffer, are maimed and die in vain, their terrible wounds subsequently ignored by the authorities.

The most harrowing of Makine's war images is that of the 'samovars', embittered legless war veterans who engage in drunken knife fights, charging at each other on their custom-

<sup>1</sup> When asked about his biography by a correspondent from the Russian émigré newspaper *Russkaia mysl'* in 1998, Makine was typically evasive: 'Well, let him exist, this Makine! Why should anyone know? You see, when he dies, biographers will sit down and quietly compose his life story. I think that it is dangerous when a man who is still alive adopts the pose of a classic and begins to say: I was born in such and such a year, I did this and that. Let's wait calmly. In about 50 years, when a man is no longer alive (and I generally give myself a long life!), then someone can calmly do this.' ('U kazhdogo svoe dykhanie... Interv'iu s Andreem Makinyim', *Russkaia mysl'* 9-15 April 1998, p. 13).

<sup>2</sup> Ray Taras commented in 2000 that 'the identity of many of Makine's principal characters, above all Charlotte [in *Le Testament français*: DG], is transposed to a border space between the cultures of Russia and France. [...] In this respect Makine can be regarded as the author of the "border text", simultaneously highlighting the importance of and deterritorializing the border between East and West.' Ray Taras, "'A la recherche du pays perdu": Andrei Makine's Russia', *East European Quarterly*, 34, 1 (March 2000), 51-79 (p. 75). This is one of the first studies of Makine's work to appear in English, and as such merits some credit, but it does contain some factual errors and dubious assertions.

<sup>3</sup> According to Nathalie Heinrich, the award of the Prix de Goncourt 'transformed' Makine's life: 'il émergeait d'une obscurité aussi profonde que sa gloire fut vive, auréole d'un récit déjà légendaire où figuraient la solitude d'exilé russe [et] la pauvreté de la chambre de bonne.' Nathalie Heinrich, *L'Épreuve de la grandeur. Prix littéraires et reconnaissance*, Paris, La Découverte, 1999, p. 137.

<sup>4</sup> Andrei Makine, *Le Testament français*, London, Sceptre Books, 1997, p. 250.

<sup>5</sup> Tsiv'ian comments on Makine's French: 'Makine writes in the good, pure literary language of the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And it is here, I think, that he has succeeded in returning us to paradise lost – the paradise lost of language: Leonid Tsiv'ian, 'V poiskakh utrachennogo raia', *Zvezda* (1996: 4), 228-29 (p. 229). On the language of *Le Testament français*, Larisa Zalesova-Doktorova notes: 'Andrei Makine's French is refined and polished, rejecting everything colloquial, with a note of melancholy characteristic of great literature. One wants to linger over his phrases. This is not a novel where you can't turn the pages quickly enough. In this novel language is king.' Larisa Zalesova-Doktorova, 'Mezhdru Frantsiei i Rossiei', *Zvezda* (1996: 4), 210-212 (p. 211).

<sup>6</sup> In describing the continuing existence of the Gulag in post-Stalinist Russia, Solzhenitsyn believed his words of truth would have consequences: 'For them, for today's zeks my book is no book, my truth is no truth unless there is a continuation, unless I go on to speak of them, too. Truth must be told – and things must change! If words are not about real things and do not cause things to happen, what is the good of them? Are they anything more than the barking of village-dogs at night?' (*The Gulag Archipelago 3, 1918-1956: An Experiment in Literary Investigation V-VII*, trans. H. T. Willets (Collins/Fontana, London, 1978), p. 478).

made trolleys before being unceremoniously thrown into the back of police vans. In *Le Testament français* this signifies not only the terrible price paid by the War's survivors, but also, and more tellingly, their subsequent abandonment by the regime they helped to save.<sup>1</sup> Any foreign visitor to the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s can testify to the fact that amputees and invalids had very few amenities, and wheelchairs were unheard of. The 'samovars' and their knife fights may be more the product of imagination than fact, but the shameful treatment of the war wounded and amputees generally by the Soviet regime is not a revelation for a Russian reading public. Such official negligence was attacked by the very Soviet writer Iurii Nagibin in his 1983 novella *Terpenie* ('Patience'). Makine may bitter the pill further, but his fiction is based on very clear fact.

Makine's Russia is generally a barbaric and sordid moral wasteland, his heroes determined to leave once they discover the corrupt reality under the surface. The depressing truth of Soviet life when its exterior packaging is peeled away has been a theme beloved of Russian writers of the 'third wave' of emigration as diverse as Vasilii Aksenov and Sergei Dovlatov, and was also touched on, albeit only partially, in the 'official' prose works of writers such as Iurii Trifonov, where truth and falsehood are never absolute. There will be more to say about the work of Iurii Trifonov.

Makine's Russia is not the Russia of the great cities of Moscow or St Petersburg; rather, his text describes the frozen wastes of Siberia, where life may be tough and death all too easy, but where personal dignity, innate goodness and a communal harmony are possible. Anna's Siberian family in *L'amour humaine* is almost impossibly good, non-materialistic, polite and racially tolerant, as if unaffected by twentieth-century prejudice and vice. Again, there is a clear Russian literary context here, for both the nineteenth-century Slavophiles and the twentieth-century 'village writers' extolled the virtues of the rural spaces of Russia, and especially Siberia (Valentin Rasputin and Viktor Astaf'ev, for instance).

Indeed, it is with the evocation of rural Russia that Makine's affinity with Russian literature is clearest. His novel *La femme qui attendait* (*The Woman Who Waited*, 2004), is set largely in a northern Russian village, and reads very much like a work from the 1960s 'village prose' movement. Vera, 'the woman who waited', is the central female character, and has a clear lineage of proud and morally unblemished female characters.

The symbolically-named Vera ('faith') is approaching middle age and lives alone, for the past thirty years waiting for her beloved to return from the War. Although the reader is initially led to believe that he died, we later learn that he is in fact living a relatively comfortable family life in a neighbouring town. We do not know if Vera knows this, but the fact that she has sacrificed her youth for the man she loves is proof of her inner strength and sense of duty.

Makine's world is above all one that posits literature as the only 'real' reality, for Russian literary tropes, characters even individual words define and dominate the worlds he has created. His picture of Russia is one put together from literary, not historical sources, but 'made strange' by being evoked in a different language. This is even more true of *La vie d'un homme inconnu*, which self-consciously foregrounds the Chekhov short story 'Shutochka' ('A Little Joke', 1886) as a framing device for the exploration of a relationship between a middle-aged Russian writer living in Paris named Shutov – clearly self-referential – and his younger French girlfriend Léa. The novel juxtaposes past and present in a bitter attack on the commercial priorities of the new capitalist Russia. The novel makes clear that Makine is as disgusted by the new realities of Russia just as he is with modern France, suggesting that immersion in literature now remains the safest refuge.

In conclusion, Makine's 'Russianness' is evident in his unconscious references to the Russian literary tradition in his analysis of Soviet and post-Soviet ills, his eagerness to show the rottenness beneath society's surface, and his depiction of women. He very consciously cites the genres and concerns of the Soviet literature of the 'stagnation' period with which he grew up – war prose, 'village prose' and the work of Iurii Trifonov – in his love-hate relationship with the France-Russia dialectic. Also, his idealization of female inner purity as contrasted to male baseness is clearly within a defined classical Russian tradition, and in his latest work he reaches back to Chekhov as a framing device for the working of human memory and a statement on the transience of the human experience. Ultimately, of course, Dostoevsky is never far from the surface of Makine's prose, as it is only beauty that can save the world. Furthermore, although he writes in French for a foreign audience, Makine is keenly aware of the importance of the writer in Russian society. He, like seemingly disparate modern Russian writers such as Vladimir Sorokin and Evgenii Popov, asserts the importance and vitality of the written word and the writer as the ultimate indicator of values and stability in a rapidly changing environment.

<sup>1</sup> Helena Duffy sees the abuse and dismemberment of the human body in Makine's prose in terms of his broader lament for the denigration of the body politic: 'Whilst mutilations are undoubtedly inseparable from the socio-historical landscape of Makine's novels, the writer's quasi-obsessive interest in amputations, wounds and scars may be also interpreted as metaphorizing his narrators' sense of loss issuing from the disintegration and eclipse of an empire, be it Tsarist or Soviet.' Helena Duuffy, 'The Veteran's Wounded Body before the Mirror: The Dialectic of Wholeness and Disintegration in Andreï Makine's Prose', *Journal of War and Culture Studies*, 1, 2 (2008), 175-88 (p. 176). I would refine this point by referring to Makine's comprehensive rejection of Soviet imperialism, though in *Le crime d'Olga Arbyelina* there is a nostalgic affection for a vanished way of life, if not for an empire.

## EURASIAN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN THE CONDITIONS OF GLOBALIZATION

Under the current structural changes in the world economy, the formation of the Eurasian Economic Community Customs Union and the transition to the agenda of deeper integration within the Common Economic Space (CES) are a timely and economically motivated moves. And these moves can help overcome artificial (due to the political realities, set up after the collapse of the USSR) disintegration tendencies and also establish conditions for joint economic development with a new technological background and with no impediments or bureaucratic delays. As a matter of fact, working with no waivers, the Customs Union with a harmonized system of foreign economic activity regulation has become a powerful union of the states that are not only going after improved social and economic standards of living for their citizens, but are also laying claims to become regional leaders. The overcoming of fragmentation and confident progress towards economic integration promise considerable advantages in the short and in the long run. The economies of the Eurasian Economic Community Customs Union (EAEC or EurAsEC) member-countries are mutually complementary, and are, in fact, united within a joint reproduction framework. Russian raw materials and component parts alone make up about half of the cost of Byelorussian finished goods. The cooperation ties between the economies of Russia and Kazakhstan are tight as well.

The collapse of the USSR resulted in the breakdown of cooperation between enterprises. Being parts of a single cooperation chain, separately they failed to perform the whole production cycle – from design to mass production. Severe curtailment of mutual supplies of materials and components, termination of qualified personnel exchange weakened a lot of industrial enterprises and blocked their means to preserve the potential they had; not to mention their development.

By various estimates, a quarter to a half in an average two-fold drop in production (in the post-Soviet space) was due to the termination of cooperation ties, as the result of the disintegration of the country. And engineering industry and other high-tech industries were most sensitive to this, because their general scientific and production cycle used to involve thousands of enterprises and agencies. Now that Russia and other EurAsEC member-countries are striving for innovative development, for quitting a dependent position of raw-material donors, for getting back into the list of the world's developed countries with high-tech industries and diversified economy, the common economic space recovery and elimination of impediments for cooperation and specialization in production have become an objective necessity.

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The popular criticism against the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space in the EurAsEC framework, as some people believe, is the speed of integration. We often hear the references made to the EU experience, which is the only current successful example of a regional economic union. It took Europe almost half a century to create the EU; at the same time, there was more than a fifteen-year period between the time when the Customs Union was set up and the Common Economic Space was built. On this basis, the conclusion is made about the undue haste in promoting the Customs Union and the CES within the EurAsEC framework. In fact, there are considerable historical and economic differences between the EU and the EurAsEC; and these differences make it impossible to use the EU experience as a pattern for the post-Soviet economic space integration. The most significant and obvious difference is: the EurAsEC economy, unlike the EU economy, has been developing as a single complex of the national economy within a single-state framework. While European states have been competing and conflicting for centuries, the EurAsEC member-states' economies have supported and supplemented each other for the last two centuries, and they used to develop as a single unit through the Soviet times.

As far as the EurAsEC is concerned, it would be more correct to speak about the CES recovery (not a construction), on a completely new market economy background, though. Consequently, this process can be much more rapid, because the impediments to meet are objective, not subjective, in nature. The major of them are represented partly by the interests of national bureaucracy who lose the sovereign independence of their agencies and monopolies aimed at blocking competition. Therefore, the political will of state leaders was enough to break the stalemate and to accelerate integration dramatically.

The Customs Union of Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan offers significant cost savings, expansion of production and growth in marketability of the national economies joined in a customs territory.

According to the estimate by the Institute for Economic Forecasting of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the total integration effect, measured by additional manufacturing of GDP, will make up to \$400 billion in the next 10 years. That basically means that, due to integration, the Customs Union member-states will get an additional 15 per cent GDP growth within this time interval<sup>2</sup>. These calculations were made before the global economic crisis struck. With respect to the current GDP level will grow even more significantly in the result of integration processes.

At the same time, the calculations of our colleagues from the institutes for economics in Kiev and Minsk are pretty much the same. The case in question is an opportunity for a 1.5–2 times increase of economic growth due to the cooperation and common economic space recovery.

Besides other things, the calculation of alternatives for macro inter-sector model showed that Russian economy dynamics is considerably influenced by Russia's country-oriented foreign-trade policy. It is an important factor for economic growth that the economic integration trend in Russia's economic policy is reinforced. It also provides additional resources to overcome the dependence of the Russian economy on fuel and raw materials.

The accelerated development of Russia's manufacturing industries (with their uncompetitive production, as a rule) is

<sup>2</sup> S. Glazyev, F. Klotsvog. The CIS Economical Perspectives with integration and inertia scenario for member-countries (Perspektivy ekonomičeskogo razvitija SNG pri integratsionnom i inertsionnom scenariyakh vzaimodeystviya stran-uchastnits) // Russian Economic Journal (Rossijsky ekonomičeskij zhurnal). – 2008. – Nos. 7/8, pp. 24–34.

only possible if Russia's common domestic market over the post-Soviet space gets a boost.

The first three years of the Single Customs Territory indicated the high performance of the Customs Union and the Common economic space, predicted well before the global financial crisis struck.

Over the first six months of 2011 the total value of *foreign* trade between the Customs Union member-states and the third countries makes up USD 430.8 billion, of which export amounts to USD 280.8 billion and import – to USD 150 billion. The 2011 total value of the foreign trade of the Customs Union member-states outnumbered considerably the 2009 rates, and, more importantly, the pre-crisis rates of 2008.

Compared with the same period in 2010, the turnover increased by 34.9 percent, export – by 30.9 percent and import – by 43.1 percent.

Besides, the trade value increased, for the most part, due to the increase in amount of costs of export of goods. For the six months of 2011, the foreign trade surplus for the Customs Union made up USD 130.8 billion, which is USD 20.8 billion up against the first six months of 2010, and USD 50.8 billion up against the second six months of 2010.

For the first six months of 2011, the bilateral trade volumes in the Customs Union, calculated as an arithmetic sum of the trade volumes for the member-states (which is consistent with the approaches of the CIS Statistical Committee), made up USD 58.1 billion, which was the increase by 40.7 per cent against the first six months of 2010, and by 15.7 per cent – against the second six months of 2010. The volume of mutual trade between the CU member-states, calculated as the sum of exports of each country (which is consistent with approaches used by the Eurostat ruling out the possibility of double counting of the same flow of goods) for the first six months of this year reached USD 29.1 billion, which is 39.9% higher than in the first six months of 2010, and 20.7% higher than in the second half of the last year. Besides, border territories are experiencing rapid growth in mutual trade.

Thus, a successful CU set up, which met the target date, contributed to the mitigation of the decrease in international trade during the global crisis, and it also considerably improved the post-crisis economic revival.

After a few failures to create a multilateral integration association in the 1990s, the three states became the integration core when they established the Customs Union Commission – the first supranational agency in the post-Soviet history. The Commission was delegated the decision-making authority in trade policy and customs regulations. Besides, all the decisions were executed over the whole single customs territory, automatically, without any need for further national legislative acts.

Having concentrated the trade controls in the Customs Union Commission, and having abolished all border controls on the borders between the states, the CU member-states made a rapid progress along the path of integration development, establishing common border controls for movements of goods.

After the border controls had been eliminated, sanitary and epidemiological, veterinary, and phyto-sanitary quarantine types of control were eliminated as well, and new uniform technical regulations were introduced. As soon as the common customs territory was a fact, the member states entered upon the establishing of the Common Economic Space. On January 1, 2012 they enacted a set of agreements on common market regulations that establish regulations for goods, services, labour and capital. Simultaneously, the formation of the Eurasian Economic Union was announced.

The CU formation was a powerful incentive for integration throughout the post-Soviet space. Kirgiz leaders expressed their desire to join the CU. In October 2011, the multilateral free trade area agreement was signed, eventually. In addition

to this, the CU member-states established free trade relations with Serbia and Montenegro. The Ukraine is facing a historic choice: there is a conflict between the intentions of Ukrainian leaders to develop free trade relations with the EU and the orientation of the Ukrainian economy at the integration with the CU.

Inspired by the positive changes in the CU member-states, the integration trends in other CIS countries intensified – despite the crisis of 2008–2009, the volume of mutual trade in foreign trade turnover was high, with slightly decreased rates in certain countries.

In compliance with the decisions, adopted and implemented throughout the common customs area, customs and technical barriers in mutual trade have been removed, as well as other economic limitations – export duties, safety and equivalent measures included. Thus, a *common market of goods* was formed.

The formation of a common market for services provides for national treatment for resident enterprises of the Parties in rendering of services, for uniform requirements, for reciprocal recognition of licenses for the licensed activities, for removal of agencies' monopolies and for harmonization of national legislations.

The first stage implies this to be implemented for the services in the sphere of wholesale and retail trade, transport and forwarding services, financial, insurance and banking services, information services (communications and telecommunications); the next stage – for educational, engineering, judicial, building, housing and communal services, medical services and geological exploration services. For the rest of the services, except for national security and public services, this work will be completed later.

The first-order conditions for an effective common market of services are harmonization of regulations, rules and mechanisms for running *antitrust* policy, along with the regulation of natural monopolies, enforcement of *intellectual property* rights.

The formation of common labour market provides for free movement of labour force throughout the CES zone, legal status of nationals who are long-term residents of other CES member-states, free access to education, recognition of foreign studies of secondary education and academic recognition of a foreign diploma of higher education, uniform regulations and requirements for workforce and access to labour market.

The formation of the *common capital market* guarantees mutual market access for financial services, banking and insurance services, as well as provides for harmonization of exchange control regulations, the transition to settlements in national currencies, the creation of a single payment and settlement system, the formation of a common currency market. Implementation of the above-listed measures in the CES formation will create a common market for goods, labour and capital. To complete the CES formation there is a need to ensure harmonization, up to unification, of *economic regulations*, as well as organizations of institutions to carry out a *single economic policy*.

To achieve these goals, the procedures for strategic planning and prediction of socio-economic development have to be worked out; they will provide for the choice and implementation of common priorities, the development and implementation of interstate target programmes. At the same time, development and control should be kept as simple as possible. The project transition to a coherent macroeconomic policy provides for the establishment of common guidelines on the main macroeconomic indicators, including inflation rate, refinancing rate and budget deficit.

The implementation of the above-listed projects is highly demanding for the institutional support of integration processes. The Eurasian Economic Commission, which replaced

the Customs Union Commission and has successfully implemented all the projects of national governments, should become a decision-making authority without mandatory coordination with national governments. It leads to the practicability to endow supranational agencies with responsibility to carry out those functions, which implies the formations of the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) to control the following key activities:

- customs tariff and non-tariff regulation;
- customs administration;
- technical regulation, and application of sanitary, veterinary and phyto-sanitary measures;
- enrolment and distribution of customs duties;
- establishing common trade regime with third countries;
- foreign trade and mutual trade statistics;
- competition policy;
- industrial and agricultural subsidies;
- energy policy;
- natural monopolies;
- public and/or municipal procurement;
- bilateral trade in services and investment;
- transport and transportation;
- labour migration;
- financial market (banking, insurance, foreign exchange market, securities market).

Despite the solid integration core of the three states – Belarus, Russia and Kazakhstan – the CU and the CES are open for other states to join, for the EurAsEC member-states for the first place. The EurAsEC and the CU basic treaties provide for all legal requirements for the latter (Kirgizia and Tadjikistan). The current Kirgiz government has officially applied for accession to the CU Supreme Body. Objectively speaking, the Ukraine is vitally interested in being a part of the CU and the EurAsEC, because its economy is connected to them through most important markets and thousands of ties.

Thus, the macroeconomic research shows that the Ukraine's participation in the CU and the CES will intensify the macroeconomic effect of its operation by half and will substantially extend opportunities to develop high-tech industries, created in the single economic framework of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. It will increase the Ukraine's gross domestic product by

about a third in a 10-year perspective; it will also provide for the recovery and development of its machine-building, agro-industry and chemical metallurgy – the core of the Ukraine's economy.

The Ukraine's economy remains in a critical condition, fraught with a social explosion. The current external payment position and state budget doom the Ukrainian population to a further decline in living standards and its government – to a further increase of public debt. At the same time, its domestic economic growth opportunities are scarce, and the available investment potential is inadequate for modernization and competitive economic recovery. So, the government is compelled to seek for sources to maintain and develop their economy outside their own country. Unlike the EU, the CU of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan can supply these sources immediately, giving access to their markets and provide loans to balance the budget. Joining the CU, the Ukraine will improve its terms of trade by USD 7–8 billion per year; it will also make possible large-scale joint projects in aircraft, space-rocket and atomic industries, in chemical metallurgy and agro-industry, which will be a powerful incentive for the economic growth. An access to Russia's energy and raw materials markets will bring the price ratio for the Ukrainian economy back to normal. And vice versa, the current export duties and contract gas price, together with barriers in trade condemn new branches of the Ukrainian economy to bankruptcy, and the majority of population to unemployment and poverty, and the political leadership to the inevitable loss of power.

Remaining aloof from the integration processes, the Ukraine proves to be the most damaged European country, one of the world's leaders in the falling of GDP and production industry volumes. Up to now, unlike the CU member-states, the Ukraine has not yet approached the Soviet times rates. While Belarus, with its more vulnerable economic structure, exceeds the same rates almost twice, taking active part in all integration processes. These conclusions are supported by the latest research of integration processes economic efficiency over the post-Soviet space based on the post-crisis statistics. And this only demonstrates an objective practicability to enlarge and extend the core of the single Eurasian economic space, based on the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia.

**A. A. Gromyko<sup>1</sup>**

## MULTICULTURALISM<sup>2</sup> IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Multiculturalism is becoming more and more apparent in international relations. It emerges in a situation when throughout the world ideas of multiculturalism have made themselves known both in lives of separate countries and in relations between them. There appears interaction of different civilizations, diversity of the world is becoming evident. Cultural differences of a civilizational nature are telling.

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<sup>2</sup> The word 'multiculturalism' is not the only variant to refer to the processes of interaction of ethnic and cultural values within one state and international relations as a whole. Other terms which are close to the Russian language are also possible: 'multi-culture', 'co-existence of cultures', 'diversity of cultures' and others.

These processes are taking place in a situation when uncertainty and tension grow, and danger of new conflicts of different degrees of intensity emerges. The 21st century world is becoming more complicated than the 20th century world when the bipolar environment was dominated by the ideological struggle. Its demands were the borderline between the two worlds – capitalist and socialist. Today the proneness to conflict in international relations is reflected in the fact that some political élites are trying to introduce their ethnic and cultural values into lives of other countries. As a result, the conflict potential grows in the world, the processes of globalization clash with identities.

Much is known about the distinctive character of cultures. Each culture is a facet of one huge human civilization, in many respects it is unique. It is reflected in literature and art. Culture and morals of one civilization can considerably differ from those of another civilization. However, they interact with one another, they influence one another, and universal values appear.

Millions of people from Asia, Africa and Latin America study at universities of the West and Russia, become familiar

with the culture of a different civilization, from poor countries to the countries of the Old World, America and Russia. Multiculturalism becomes not only a phenomenon but a challenge.

In international relations, multiculturalism becomes apparent according to the circumstances. In the middle of the 20th century when the horrors of the war shook foundations of the European civilization, as a reaction to the crimes of Hitlerism and fascism *the universal civilization was established, its values came to stay. It found expression in the formation of the United Nations Organization, a fruit of collective human mind.*

Human values were engrossed in the United Nations Charter, especially in its purposes and principles. They came to the international life to stay not for a year or two, or for decades, which has been proved by time, but for centuries. These purposes and principles were broken by neither the Cold War, nor the series of power conflicts. They withstood and prevented the third world war. It remains absolutely necessary to protect them, as the risks of the ebbing of influence of the UN Charter on international relations are too high and, most importantly, cannot be justified.

International relations are passing through more than troubled times. Many people, including scholars, are becoming not only concerned but anxious about the future of the mankind. These are not just words, this is the present-day reality. The foundations of the world law which were established after the Second World War are showing signs of strain and are deteriorating.

The mankind's historical practice, including the negative experience, especially the consequences of the militarist consciousness and actions, tends to sink into oblivion.

The organization of people's lives in our common home – on the planet Earth – suggests that *it is necessary to preserve and consolidate the Historical Consciousness based on universal values.* Such positive actions lay the foundations for *the Paradigm of agreement and tolerance* of humans to one another. Multiculturalism in international relations is a real positive force when it speaks the language of common sense, and not the language of bombs and missiles.

The examples of India, France, Great Britain, Germany, the USA and many other countries are indicative of the fact that there is no easy way of maintaining cooperation between different ethnic groups and cultures. A particularly spectacular example is that of the Middle East. Their cooperation was at its best in Russia. Tsarist Russia was an example of co-existence of different civilizations and cultures. This policy was also successfully implemented in the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation is having hard times developing multiculturalism within the multi-ethnic state in the formation of a new social and economic community.

In all countries, multiculturalism is ensured within the legal framework, on the basis of constitutions and laws of the states. If they do not take effect the society plunges into social and political chaos, it breeds new wars and revolutions.

In international relations, the legal framework is provided by the classical international law, civilized behaviour under the conditions of tolerance.

Legitimizing the behaviour of different civilizations and groups of states in international relations, as well as the behaviour of every separate state is still more complicated than establishing multiculturalism in a separate state.

The history of the establishment of the United Nations Organization and the development of its institutions within the agreed principles and norms is conspicuous – the level of tolerance in the UN is higher than in any state. When taking important decisions, the mechanical majority is impossible here. The legal framework of the UN Charter makes states search for compromises rather than use methods of force as instruments

of politics, up to sanctions and wars. And this is a rational and civilized situation. It must be kept and preserved.

Among the acute problems to be solved by the world community are the following ones:

- global destitution and poverty;
- famine and food shortages;
- shortage of drinkable water;
- epidemics;
- spread of weapons of mass destruction;
- drug trafficking;
- preservation of man-friendly environment;
- readiness for climate changes;
- dangers from the outer space.

These problems cannot be sorted out by way of military force – bombardments, invasions, use of weapons and military equipment.

As the Permanent Representative of Russia to the UN Vitaly Churkin repeatedly emphasizes in his speeches and this was what he told me when we met in New York in July, 2009, the international community has drawn a moral from the dramatic events of the previous decades and has become aware of the fact that attempts to cut 'the Gordian knots' by using force in defiance of the UN Charter lead to a dead-end. There is just no alternative to solving political, economic and other problems by joint efforts on the basis of international law.

On the occasion of its 25th anniversary, on the 24th of October, 1970 the General Assembly of the UN adopted the Declaration. This Declaration with a renewed force reaffirmed the basic principles; observance of these principles is essential not just for maintaining the World Order in international relations (for it can be based on force) but for maintaining a democratic and just World Order. Seven principles form the basis for it; without observing these principles, the international law and many of its clauses cease being a rule, all the more so a standard, they just become an unnecessary matter of form.

Here are these Principles:

- refraining from the threat or use of force;
- settling international disputes by peaceful means;
- not intervening in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any state;
- states cooperating with one another in accordance with the UN Charter;
- equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- sovereign equality of states;
- States fulfilling in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the UN Charter.

Today there appear a lot of politicians and even newly-minted diplomats who once heard something about the basic principles of the UN but consider them to be outdated and inapplicable. They seem to ignore the historical experience and the heritage of the victors of the Second World War. They are attracted by the 'new' reality where the philosophy of mob bosses runs the show: 'might is right' and 'he who is not with us is against us'.

Russian foreign policy will not be as effective as it should be without Russian scholars taking an active part in working out the Russian foreign strategy and tactics in struggling for the Democratic World Order. When unwise people were at the helm of Russia it had to face bitter consequences. There is no excuse for us having lost the Crimea.

Scholars are certainly not prophets or oracles. They do not expect their advice to be taken as gospel. But their voice must be heard. Scholars have vast specialized knowledge; they are able to adopt systematic thinking and as a rule, before certain events in particular they evaluate the events more objectively than politicians. Implementing a foreign policy is the prerogative of people who are in power. The latter often demonstrate a habit which is harmful for correct actions – they make haste without thinking of consequences.

If morals, law and the cultural heritage of the mankind are ignored in international relations, then powerful states, especially superpowers are allowed to do anything. International relations are turning into jungles where political adventurers and financial profiteers run the show. While the international law – this institute of political culture – is being diluted and while it is deteriorating some countries will have to yield to the dictatorship of other countries. The

world politics will prove to be dominated by the ‘might is right’ principle. It will mean the end of the United Nations Organization. The Democratic World Order will not take effect. There will come the Big Disorder, no one will care for the Global Management. Another policy will be established in this world – every man for himself. And who will take a sin upon his soul to say that this course of events is impossible?

René Guerra<sup>1</sup>

## RUSSIAN CONTRIBUTION TO THE ART OF BOOK ILLUMINATION IN FRANCE IN 1920–1970

Russian post-revolutionary emigration is a unique cultural phenomenon both in scope and in significance. The phenomenon of Russian émigré culture which developed between the two world wars has no analogy in history, and in recent decades this subject has come into focus of scholars first in Russia and then in other countries.

The Revolution tore the most eminent Russian artists from their native land. They found themselves on the other side of the border but did not cut off their ties with the Russian tradition. They only considered it their debt of honour to cast aside contemporary ‘new’ Russian life — the *Soviet* life.

The French capital had always attracted Russian intellectuals, and at the beginning of the twentieth century Russian *passionaries* (the term was coined by Lev Gumilyov to describe extraordinary people endowed with vital energy and power) were flocking to Paris. They longed for Paris and when they happened to be on the banks of the Seine, the city seemed to them the dream that had come true. Many visited the French capital before the revolution and perfectly fitted into the artistic scenery of pre-war Paris. Some stayed there long, others short: V. Serov, K. Korovin, M. Voloshin, E. Kruglikova, S. Yastrebtsov (Fehra), L. Survage, E. Ettingen, N. Tarkhov, A. Shervashidze, N. Roerich, Yu. Annenkov, A. Ekster, I. Puni, M. Chagall, V. Baranov-Rossine, O. Tsadkin, A. Arkhipenko, M. Vasilyeva, S. Sharshun, L. Bakst, K. Somov, A. Benois, O. Braz, B. Grigoryev, D. Stelletsky, S. Solomko, R. Tyrtov (Erté), A. Zinovye, O. Sakharova. Many of them attended workshops by Félix Vallotton and Maurice Denis, Jean-Paul Laurens, and L.O. Meyerson, studied in various academies — those of Henri Matisse, Fernand Cormon, Rodolphe Julian, Maria Vasilyeva and in Grand Chaumière, La Palette, exhibited in salons, such as *Salon des Indépendants*, *Salon d'Automne*, *Tuileries*, *Champs de Mars*.

After 1924, Paris became a *de facto* artistic and literary capital of the Russian emigration. The vast majority of Russian artists settled there; they belonged to different schools and trends: members of *The World of Art* movement, Neo-Classicalists, Symbolists, Impressionists, Expressionists, Cubists, Dadaists, abstract artists.

Artists felt more at home there than Russian émigré writers and poets did who were deprived of their mother tongue.

Fine arts as well as music are supranational and do not need to be translated staying above ideological barriers. Artists from Russia established creative and business contacts with less effort and could easier overcome the complexity of the adaptation process. Despite objective difficulties in a foreign land, their talent and skills helped them manage not only to get involved in the Western artistic environment but to develop new trends in painting. Having lost their homeland, they were struggling for a new place under the sun, using all the achievements of European culture at that. Without losing their identity and while keeping their in many respects unique Russian mentality, language and high spirituality, they gained recognition in the country acknowledged by the world as a model of fidelity to the cultural traditions and became stars in the artistic galaxy of Paris. But Europe and even France that gave them cordial refuge could not, of course, replace the fatherland lost by the émigré artists and yet the reality of European and Western way of life was very valuable and instructive for Russian intellectuals’ cultural baggage.

While the dialogue of cultures between Russian writers and French literary world could hardly be called successful, things were different for artists who managed to get the drift of the French spirit almost at once. They were lucky to become part of the French artistic life in a period hard for Europe, between the two great wars. From the very beginning, the bridges were successfully built, partly perhaps because, as mentioned, many of them had been to Paris before 1917. Once again a range of questions arises: how did the relationship and understanding develop between artists, between Russian immigrants and their counterparts, how painful was their appropriation of European art treasures, how did they happen to make a weighty Russian contribution to the French culture? All these questions have a clear answer: the art of the first wave of emigration was not isolated, it provided a powerful impact on adjacent spheres, and, in its turn, was opened and grateful to an in-coming influence, which enriched its uniqueness. Parisian art is impossible to imagine without Russian artists who triumphed and demonstrated great achievements there and, in particular, in the field of book design and illumination.

To start with, almost all *The World of Art* artists of the first generation moved to Paris, including A. Benois, L. Bakst, N. Roerich, K. Somov, K. Korovin, I. Bilibin, M. Dobuzhinsky, D. Stelletsky, S. Sudeikin, A. Shervashidze, N. Kalma-kov, S. Chekhonin, N. Goncharova. A younger, second wave of their associates joined them later: B. Grigoryev, A. Yakovlev, V. Shukhayev, Z. Serebryakova, S. Sorin, Yu. Annenkov, D. Bushen. Thanks to Diaghilev’s glorious pre-war *Saisons Russes*, as well as their professional skills, mastery, experience, refined taste, creativity, sense of a period style and unique skills in the theatrical art, such as designing path-breaking decorations and costumes, Russian artists quickly took a worthy place in theatrical and musical Paris. *The World of Art* painters were joined by such artists as P. Chelischev, N. Milliotti,

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M. Vasilyeva, R. Erté (Tyrtov) L. Zak, E. Berman, F. Goziason, B. Bilinsky, A. Brodovich, H. Isayev, A. Alekseyev, G. Shilytan, A. Zinovyev, S. Lisim, M. Andreyenko, G. Pozhedaev, A. Serebryakov, G. Vakhevich and others. Most of them famed themselves not only in theatrical designs but as book designers. In Paris 150 Russian artists successfully engaged in book graphic art. They designed and illustrated more than a thousand of French and Russian books. The most popular French publishing houses were eager to collaborate with them: La Pléiade, Gallimard NRF, Arthème Fayard, Trianon, Au Sans Pareil, Flammarion, Fernand Nathan, A. Ferroud — F. Ferroud, J. Ferenczi & Fils, Chez A. & G. Mornay, Edition d'art H. Piazza, Stock, Desclée de Brouwer and others.

Interestingly enough, works by Russian writers have taken a considerable place in French bibliophile publications. These were works not only by classic writers, such titans as Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoyevsky, Tolstoy, and Chekhov, but by modern masters of prose and poetry, such as Gorky, Kuprin, Bunin, Pasternak. Never before had the interest in Russia, Russian literature and Russian art been so great in France, never before had it drawn such great public attention of wide circles in the West as in the twentieths of the last century. The 1920s were a true 'golden' decade for Russian émigré artists working in French book-publishing. In this they owe much to Jacob Schifrin, the founder of the famous publishing house 'La Pléiade'. Publishing collectible books became one of the principal trends in its publishing activity. Born in 1882 in the Russian Empire, Schifrin loved and knew the works of Russian artists who settled in Paris, and as soon as the opportunity presented itself he invited them to cooperate. Besides, being himself a translator of classic Russian literature, he and his work at the publishing house aroused interest of well-known French artist André Gide and prominent music and literary critic Boris de Schloezer. It is in 'La Pléiade' that in 1923 Alexander Pushkin's *The Queen of Spades* was published in French in 345 numbered copies, and, in 1925, 445 collectible copies of *Boris Godunov* illustrated by Vasily Shukhayev were published. At that time these books were real masterpieces, a revelation and a triumph. Alexander Benois also worked with Schifrin and designed *Les souffrances du Jeune Werther* by Andre Maurois (365 collectible copies). No less a sensation was the book *A Madman's Diary* by Nikolai Gogol with illustrations made in the technique of engraving (276 collectible copies, in 1927) and *The Brothers Karamazov* by Fyodor Dostoevsky with a hundred of lithographs made by renowned Russian graphic artists Alexander Alekseyev (118 collectible copies, in 1929). In 1931, the translation of *Taras Bulba* by Nikolai Gogol with coloured etchings made by Alexandra Grinevskaya, A. Alekseyev's wife, was published in a limited number of 110 copies.

French bibliophile journals repeatedly noted J. Schifrin's publications as wonderful examples of artistic book publications and stressed their value as examples of excellent typography. French critics paid no less favourable compliments to the high quality of illustrations in Schifrin's publications praising their originality and the novelty of artistic techniques used. Thus, *The Queen of Spades* was distinguished not only with Shukhayev's illustrations but also with the design of the pages imitating the Alexandrine period, the fact not missed by experts. The illustrations of *Boris Godunov* by Shukhayev who employed the *pochoir* technique and designed them in the manner of primitive icon painting made a considerable impression on the fastidious public who were fascinated with a beautiful decorative pattern and a well-chosen delicate palette.

Besides publishing these exquisite purely collectible books in limited numbers, Schifrin considered it to be his principal task to familiarize French readers with some works by Russian writers who had not yet been translated into French. These books were opulently illuminated, yet they were quite understandable for the public. In the 'Classical Russian Authors' se-

ries he published eight volumes of Dostoyevsky, Turgenyev, Gogol, Tolstoy, Pushkin and Leskov. They were published in limited edition of numbered copies, first 2750 copies and later 1600 copies. Later on, he added three more volumes of Gogol, Pushkin and Dostoyevsky in two-toned Elsevier on vellum paper with headpieces and colophons. For that same series, from 1924 to 1926 Shukhayev (also the author of the publishing trade-mark) made some ornamental designs for Turgenyev's *First Love*, Dostoyevsky's *Eternal Husband*, Leskov's *Enchanted Wanderer*, Gogol's *Petersburg Stories*, Chekhov's *Boring Stories*, Lermontov's *Hero of Our Time*. Alexei Brodovich did the same job on Pushkin's *Tales* (1928), Dostoyevsky's *Fantastic Tales*, *The Meek One*, *The Dream of a Ridiculous Man* (1929), and Alexander Alekseyev on Dostoyevsky's *Portrait. The Diary of a Madman* (1929).

Russian artists who worked as book illustrators saw their mission to familiarize the French public with the major achievements of Russian culture. Only Russian drawers raised on the powerful Russian literary tradition were able to convey the subtle nuances of Russian classical works. These works were translated in France in many respects thanks to Russian émigrés.

From 1923 to 1927 Marc Chagall was commissioned by Ambroise Vollard, an art dealer, to produce some etchings for Gogol's *Dead Souls*, which was only published by Eugene Terriad in 1948. These illustrations brought Chagall the Grand Prix at the 24th Biennale in Venice as well as the fame of one of the greatest book illustrators.

I. Lebedev, S. Solomko, V. Le Campion, Yu. Cherkesov, S. Fotinsky, S. Ivanov, A. Arnshtam, A. Grinevskaya, A. Belova, I. Kolskaya, S. Levitskaya, A. Staritskaya, A. Feder, L. Zak, K. Tereshkovich, L. Survage, A. Lanskoj, N. de Staël, S. Sharshun illustrated books by French classic writers, too: Jean-Baptiste Racine, Charles Baudelaire, Alfred de Vigny, Arthur Rimbaud, Alfred de Musset, Théophile Gautier, Voltaire, Stendhal, Anatole France, Ernest Renan, Antoine-François Prévost, Charles Péguy, Guy de Maupassant, as well as by prominent contemporary writers: Henri de Régnier, André Maurois, Paul Valéry, Pierre Louÿs, Georges Duhamel, Pierre Benoit, Edmond Rostand, Collette, Francis Carco, Jean Cocteau, Maurice Maeterlinck, Marcelle Aymé, Jean Giraudoux, Paul Éluard, R. Chard, Michel Butor, Joseph Kessel, Louis Aragon, R. Istrati, André Malraux. For instance, in 1927–41, Lebedev and Le Campion made wonderful wood engravings for twenty seven books published by Arthème Fayard in the *Le livre de demain* series of books for the broad public. For yet another series of books, *Le livre moderne illustré*, published by Ferenczi & Fils, Yu. Cherkesov made illustrations for eleven books.

The fact that Russian artists were often commissioned to make illustrations for French books testifies to the final and complete recognition of their talent. Even today we are fascinated by their masterly skills, their command of line and colour, their prolificacy and assiduity. By the way, the vignette which is the signature trade-mark of the above-mentioned publishers of *Le livre de demain*, was produced by I. Lebedev. It shows black ivy leaves against the dark yellow of the publishers' cover, and it has been widely used in the French art until now. In 1932 Lebedev was awarded Grand Prix at the 7th contest *Meilleur artisan de France* (the Best French Artisan), and Yu. Cherkesov received the Gold medal at the World Exhibition in Paris for his illustrations for *Hamlet* in the technique of wood engraving.

Russian book illustrators Ivan Bilibin, A. Shervashidze, B. Zvorykin, F. Rozhankovsky, N. Parain (Tchelpanova), H. Gertic, N. Altman, A. Ekster, H. Ivanovskaya, A. Serebryakov, A. Duchain (Volkonskaya), Yu. Cherkesov, O. Kovalenskaya, S. Vishnevsky and N. Mengden in many senses influenced the development of the art of children's books in France and certainly played an important role in this process. They

were equal to none in penetrating into the spiritual world of the child and bringing the unique child mentality to the canvas.

Starting from 1930, thanks to Schiffrin's project, the Gallimard publishers began to produce books for children illustrated by Natalie Parain. The first of them, *Mon chat* (My Cat) by André Beucler was to become a remarkable example of the constructivist aesthetics in children's books. The second, *Baba Yaga* (1932) retold by Nadezhda Teffi, was published simultaneously in French and Russian and later in English in New York in 1935. The third book was Chekhov's *Kashtanka* with the illustrations by Parain (1934), the fourth was Leo Tolstoy's *True Stories. The Stories in Four Books for Reading* (1936). In 1937–1958 the artist was busy working on over a dozen of books by Marcel Aymé titled *Les Contes du chat perché* which earlier was designed by Nathan Altman for the Gallimard publishing house after 1934 (Parain died in 1958).

Illustrations for one of the most popular series of children's books in France, *Albums du Père Castor* and *Petits Père Castor* produced by Russian artists and published by Flammarion have become their most significant contribution to the French book design. The publishing house began this famous series in 1931. On the invitation of Paul Fauchet, a well-known publisher and teacher, Natalie Parain designed and illustrated five craft books including *My Masks* and *I Am Cutting Around* and eleven more albums, in which Parain used Russian avant-garde techniques. Three albums of the same series were designed by I. Bilibin: *The Golden Fish* (1933), *The Magic Carpet* (1935), *A Little Mermaid* (1937). At different periods of time, other artists were employed to work for the same series: F. Rozhankovsky — 27: *Daniel Boone. The True Adventures of an American Hunter among the Indians* (1931); *In the Family* (1934); *Bunny Frou* (1935); *Mallard Pluf* (1935); *The ABC* (1936); *Brown Bear Borou* (1936); *Fisherman Martin* (1938); *Cuckoo* (1939); *Mishka* (1941) and others; H. Gertik — 11: *Fairy Album* (1933), *Animals I Love* (1934) and others; Yu. Cherkesov — 3: *Songs to Play* (1933), *Things Change* (1934) and others; A. Shem (Shemetov) — 2: *Three Bears* and *Home for Each One* (1933); A. Ekster — 4. Let me mention that *My Garden* (1936) by Ekster is not a conventional picture book but a set of strips for cutting around; she also designed three accordion-folded panoramic books composed of 8 or 10 square paper sheets: *The Panorama of a River* (1937), *The Panorama of a Mountain* (1937), *The Panorama of a River Bank* (1938). Many of these works were later reissued in millions of copies.

Here is what Ariadna Efron writes in her article 'On Children's Books': 'In France, the first attempt to publish a broad series of good books for young children was made by the Flammarion publishing house. It issued a series of *Albums du Père Castor*, which included, in addition to a variety of richly illustrated books to read, all kinds of sets to play, to cut out, to paste for preschoolers. It was the first attempt to extend the boundaries of the book, to make it even more accessible, to reformat it into a kind of a toy-book.' ('Our alliance', No. 7/8, Paris, 1936, p. 19–21).

It is significant that books illustrated by I. Bilibin, F. Rozhankovsky, A. Exter, N. Parain, A. Serebryakov were published almost simultaneously in Paris, London and New York. They became classics of not only French but also of the world literature for children. They have become part of the 'golden font' of French and world publishing.

In 1941 N. Parain was decorated with the Centennial Award of the French Academy of Painting and Sculpture for her contribution to the children's book publishing when collaborating with the Gallimard and the Flammarion publishers and in 1944 she received the award of the Academy of Fine Arts. In 1956 F. Rozhankovsky was decorated with the Randolph Caldecott Medal, the highest award to American artists of the most distinguished picture books for children. Rozhankovsky illustrated over 130 books for children in France and the USA.

Russian masters excelled in yet another creative area of the fertile field of book publishing, namely frivolous and erotic books. Many artists became famous for erotic illustrations: Yu. Annenkov (L'abbé de Choisy's *Histoire de madame la comtesse de Barres*, 1945; *Histoire de madame de Sancy*, 1946), B. Grigoryev (*Bui Bui*, 1924), S. Cherevkov (*Aphrodite* by Pierre Louÿs, 1928), F. Rozhankovsky (*Manuel de civilité pour les petites filles à l'usage des maisons d'éducation* [Handbook of behaviour for little girls to be used in educational establishments] by Pierre Louÿs), 1926; *Théâtre érotique sur le Sante rue* [The erotic theatre on Sante Street], 1932; R. Radige. Free verse, 1935, Théophile Gautier's *Lettre à la présidente* [The letter to a lady president], 1935; *Printemps idylle* [Spring Idyll], 1936; Examination of Flora, no date; Pierre Louÿs's *Poésies érotiques* [Erotic poems], 1937; Pierre-Jean de Béranger's *Gallant Songs*, 1937; Spaddi's *Impudence*, 1948), S. Ivanov (Jules-Amédée Barbey d'Aureville's *Les Diaboliques* [The She-Devils], 1925, B. Marquart's *Star Arabesques*, 1926; Claude Prosper Jolyot de Crébillon's *An Incident by the Fireplace*, 1936), I. Grekov (*Tiresias*, 1954; *Erotopaegnia*, no date), Ye. Klementyev (Andrea de Nuerciat's *Le doctorat impromptu*, 1956), Zh. Minash (*The Kama Sutra*, 1960; Diderot's *Les bijoux indiscrets*, 1964), D. Solozhev (Théophile de Viau's *Parnasse satirique*, 1963).

In early 1930s hand-printed books became available, they were as a rule issued in a small number of copies by bibliophiles' requests or given as gifts. Books by A. Ekster are most notable for their innovative colour palette and original ornamental pattern. The author of the calligraphic writing was Guido Kolutchiy, who stylized his handwriting making the text look like a medieval document. His calligraphy was also employed in the following books: Arthur Rimbaud's *Poems* in 1936; Omar Khayyam's *Quatrains* in 1936; Horace's *Ode to Bacchus* in 1937; Aeschylus's *Seven Against Thebes* in 1937; *Sacrament of Blood* by Anatole France in 1941; François Villon's *Le, or a Short Will* in 1942; Horace's *Odes* in 1942; Sappho's *Poems* in 1942; Pierre de Ronsard's *Poetry* in 1946.

More books were printed with Kolutchiy's calligraphy and I. Lebedev's illustrations: *Flowerpot* by A. Bayon, *A Piece of String* by Guy de Maupassant, *Pilgrimage* by Paul Claudel. L. Zak illustrated Jean Racine's *Phèdre* by in 1941; N. Isayev designed *Lorette, or a Red Stamp* by Alfred de Vigny; *Bou-bouroche and Other Tales* by Georges Courteline. D. Solozhev's illustrations appeared in Charles Baudelaire's *Spleen and Ideal* in 1959 and *Les fleurs du mal* in 1961; Verlaine's *Wisdom* in 1966. F. Rozhankovsky made original illustrations for a number of books in one single copy. Anna Starytskaya designed dozens of books of leading French poets in the same genre (Pierre de Ronsard, Michel Butor, Eugène Guillevic, Michel Seuphor). The artist copied poems by hand, letter by letter doing her best to efficiently arrange the book space. She designed several hand-printed collectible books with etchings, including *An Intimate Diary of Michel Seuphor* (1971) and others. Poet Michel Butor dedicated his poem 'The Song for Don Juan' to her.

Hand-printed illuminated books by writer and artist Aleksey Remizov take a very special place. Remizov was an unexcelled and unequalled master of graphic arts and calligraphy. Starting from the second half of the 1920s, his graphic works transformed and stylistically turned to those of surrealists. The genre of illustrated albums with collages is typologically close to a traditional surreal 'novel-collage'. Here follows the most part of these albums with French texts: *Menhir* (Sur les corniches), 1932; *Under the Car* (Sur les corniches), 1933; *Artamoshka and Epifashka* (Cum Sole), 1933; *Interpenetration* (Sur les corniches), 1933; *Bear-Man* (Cum Sole), 1933; *Coachman* (Cum Sole), 1933; *From Afar* (Lion's head), 1934; *Esprit: c'est bien lui* (Sur les corniches), 1935; *Solomonie* (1935); *Nestorych*

(Sur les corniches), 1935; *Here Comes the End* (Sur les corniches), presented to Jean Paulhan (1935); *In the Air Ocean* (Le maître de musique), 1935; *Legend of Kitovras*, 1937 presented to writer René Chard.

There is another important aspect. All those hand-printed books were French and the problem lies not only in the fact that the text was written in the French language. The point is that they became part and parcel of the graphic book art in the French traditions, which manifested itself in the 1930s in France more than wherever and whenever because it was marked by the masterpieces and such names as André Lhote, Jean Lurçat, André Derain, Henri Matisse.

We must not forget that Russian painters N. Goncharova, I. Bilibin, D. Stelletsky, Yu. Annenkov, M. Dobuzhinsky, B. Zvorykin, N. Millioti, F. Rozhankovsky, B. Grosser, A. Serbryakov, R. Dobuzhinsky, A. Staritskaya considered it a privilege to produce jackets and illustrations, often as a friendly favour, for the books of Russian émigré writers.

In Soviet times, the popular opinion was that the artist who had defected to the West, away from his root, is doomed to miserable existence, degradation, inevitable decline and, in a word, artistic infertility. In fact, in emigration, the artist received dou-

ble residence, both in Russian and in French cultures as well as in the world cultural environment.

Russian book artists embody a remarkable and unique alloy of the two cultures, Russian and French. As I have said, they were appreciated by French publishers and were often in the limelight of art critique. In all French books on book graphics, the names of Russian artists take leading places, their works are still classified as greatest achievements in this field. It is hard to overestimate their contribution to the art of book-making in France.

It is only a catalogue and an exhibition of books illustrated by Russian émigré painters that can trumpet about their role and place in the art of the book in the West so that this theme could sound loud and clear not only in Russia but in the whole world.

Russian painters in France have proved that book illumination as an individual art form is not secondary or just applied. It can level with many other established forms of visual art. In this connection, the words by Nikolai Roerich would be to the point: 'Among all arts which decorate and improve our lives, it is the book that is one of the oldest and most expressive art forms.'

## A. A. Guseynov<sup>1</sup>

### NATION AND PERSONALITY

These abstracts are prefatory and not strict reflections aimed at considering the possibility of interpreting national problems and their theoretical generalizations in the ethical and regulatory aspect.

1. Among a great number of views on the nation in literature, two approaches to its understanding stand out. They can be described as realist and nominalist, in regard to the use of these concepts within the framework of the old philosophical controversy about the nature of general concepts. According to the first approach (realist), the nation is a historical community of people preceded by clan, tribe, ethnic group and it is characterized by a set of attributes: common territory, shared language, economy, culture, psychological qualities, self-consciousness. These attributes are generally expressed in the nation's striving for its state and political independence. Self-determination, sovereignty is a kind of the nation's telos. Modern states are national states: their foundation, their public basis is the historically established national unity, not class distinctions. Post-class states are democratic, but democracy in them is of a national nature, since they get legitimacy not by the divine approval, but by common will. The second, nominalist approach regards the nation as the union of citizens. The state is viewed as a determinative and even establishing basis of the nation rather than an expression and climax of its cultural development. The concept of a nation is identified with the political community, and is isolated from the ethnic and cultural base, which is considered crucial in the first approach. It appears to be a nominal identification of one of the many human groups, in particular, the one that includes citizens.

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According to these approaches, the concepts of the nation implied by them most often appear under the names of the cultural nation and civil nation. They focus on different aspects and stages of life of the nation and in principle could complement each other. But as complete concepts, they are alternative. The concept of the cultural nation and that of the civil nation differ in a number of criteria: the first regards the nation as a category of the philosophy of history, the second – as a category of political sociology. The first holds that nations create states and considers multinational states possible; the other believes that states create nations and, thus, the very concept of a multinational state contradicts its definition. The first concept aims at the cultural homogeneity of the state, while the second one admits and sanctions cultural diversity. There is still another criterion which, in my opinion, is neglected in scholarly literature, but which is very important for the understanding of national issues and could become an important argument in the debate over the essence of the nation. This criterion is particularly important today in comprehending an extraordinary topicality of the problem as it relates to the role of ethnicity in the moral self-consciousness of a personality, in other words, to the correlation between the national identity of an individual and other forms of his identity.

2. Different concepts of nations suggest and form different nature of the relationship of an individual and the nation; they embody, so to say, different anthropologies.

The theory of cultural nation comes from the fact that ethnicity is man's existential characteristic. Just as an individual cannot step out of physical parameters pointing out to the time and place of his existence in the world, he cannot but be a part of any nation in his social being. There is no individual outside a nation. In this sense, nation is not something to be chosen. Of course, national identity is not a natural, but a social characteristic of a person; it is mediated by the experience of the conscious activity of individuals. Besides, it includes the need for individuals to agree to their national identity and to form a certain attitude to it (this process certainly follows different paths depending on the individual, his degree of awareness and certainty). However, no matter how intrinsically free, critical and even detached the attitude of individuals to their national

identity is, it is always secondary and cannot change the fact of identity itself. For example, even when someone considers a national form of existence limited and wants to overcome it and become a cosmopolitan, he cannot do this, to begin with the fact that he has to think and talk about it in a particular national language. When we are told that a person is cosmopolitan, it is logical and natural to ask the cosmopolitan of what nationality he is. Presumably, a Russian cosmopolitan will differ from a Chinese or an Arab one. Cosmopolitanism may well be an expression of the national background; Vladimir Solovyov's all-encompassing unity shows more Russianness than ethnic narrow-mindedness of some flag-waving Russian neo-pagan of our time claiming the same. If you give free rein to imagination and picture individuals from around the world claiming and declaring themselves cosmopolitans who came together on an island in order to cultivate a new non-national form of living, they would not be able to implement their plan because they would eventually form a special cosmopolitan nation. In short, following the logic of the concept of a cultural nation, individuals do not choose their national belonging, they acquire it before they learn to choose.

The theory of civil nation comes to the opposite conclusion – it equates nationality to citizenship and thus it is included into such characteristics of a person that can be changed by an act of conscious choice. Of course, citizenship is also predetermined by the fact of birth in a particular state (or ethnicity in the case of those states in which it potentially means the right to citizenship), but first, an individual can change it and, secondly, the state itself can change, as was recently the case with the Soviet state, for example. At least in principle an individual retains freedom of choice regarding his national and civil status. He chooses to belong to a particular nation, and considers himself a member of that nationality.

3. Terminology is not an issue here. The problem, of course, is not whether the term 'nation' should refer to a person's ethnic and cultural belonging or to his belonging to a particular political community. The tradition of using the term 'nation' is really different in different languages and countries, which in its turn can be regarded as a consequence and proof of actual national differences. Recognizing the utmost importance of the efforts to define the term 'nation' more exactly and clearly, we should admit that they cannot be reduced to distinguishing various meanings and constricting their implications. We should focus on the content analysis intended to determine the actual place of this concept in the life of man and society. From this perspective, it is important to consider the position of the national component in ideology and in the value system and identities of an individual. Let us leave aside the question of nationalism as an ideology, and let us only mention that in the Soviet-period public consciousness, when nation was understood as a historical and cultural community of people, nationalism used to be seen primarily in a negative sense, while at present when nation is viewed as co-citizenship nationalism acquires a fairly positive meaning, coinciding with civil loyalty and patriotism. Let us consider the problem of national identity in the framework of individually responsible human existence.

4. When considering the place and role of nation in the individual's life, or even concretely in his self-consciousness, at least three factors seem essential. First, the individual always has a definite and clear point of view on the issue of his national identity. In any case, the modus of his social existence implies having such a view. In contrast to the question 'Who are we?' that suggests a vague and ambiguous answer, an example being the way all-Russian national identity is defined today, the question 'Who am I?' does not allow any ambiguity. It cannot but have a definite answer. Second, a person's self-consciousness necessarily involves awareness of their ethnic and cultural identity, including those cases where it is not customary to denote it as national due to the tradition of the word use. Third,

the national identity is not just something the person is aware of; it is a part of his or her 'ego-consciousness'. Within the individual self-consciousness, it is a more intimate and vulnerable structure than such forms of identity as social, professional, territorial and others. A special role and place taken by national identity are determined by the fact that as a rule it comes directly down to the sense of moral dignity. Unlike citizenship, which is certified externally and always involves a number of fixed rights and duties, the national identity is a mental and emotional structure of the individual and is an inalienable part of his personality's core.

5. Social existence of individuals has a national form: individuals are shaped as individuals in a particular national environment and, most importantly, the national motivation is a part of the meaningful basis of their life activities. The man's nationality manifests itself not only in his ethos, common forms of thinking and behaviour, but also in his beliefs. This is both a consequence and an indication that nation is also a qualitatively new stage of the society's spiritual development, and in a certain sense, it can be considered a post-religious form of spiritual life. The European experience of the New Age, corroborated, with certain peculiarities, by other cultural regions entering the modernity, suggests that national differences of peoples are greater than their religious unity, and that it is their national borders that happen to be contemporary borders of their spiritual unity and social solidarity. The national motivation of behaviour is often connected with a religious motivation, getting significantly intensified by this alliance, and to a certain extent it acquires a character of worship and faith. The notion of national sacred objects came into the language and culture just as the notion of sacred religious objects.

6. A special role of national identity in the lives of individuals, its profound personal rootedness, its revered and morally protected status in the value system, impose certain obligations and limitations on the public discourse on national issues.

When speaking of nations, the general rule is that nations should be discussed the same way as living people are spoken of – because it deals with the values directly connected with the dignity of concrete individuals. Primary considerations should be not those of truth, but of tact, courtesy and respect. In this regard, what is spoken is often of less importance than *who* the speaker is and in what regard, and the most important thing is if the speech itself could be accepted and approved of by those to whom it is directed. When the Soviet experience of relatively harmonious communication between people of different nationalities is recalled against the background of today's ongoing conflicts on the so-called ethnic grounds, one usually refers to the fact that national origin of people used to be of no interest then, that it was not customary to ask about it, if proper at all. It was indeed so, and not because the national aspect of life was underestimated. People did not draw attention to this, and the reason for it was very similar to the one by which they could not discuss very personal, intimate problems and aspects of their life in public. In this case, the same logic steps forward which suggests that the sacred should be kept concealed and the name of God should not be pronounced in vain. Discretion is a very important requirement in terms of public discussion of national issues, particularly in relation to specific nations, people, situations. This is the subject to be silenced rather than spoken up.

It is unacceptable to link specific actions of specific people to their national identity. This is essentially wrong and it is damaging to human communication. If an act committed by an individual should be considered to be done due to his national belonging, then he personally is not to be blamed in the case of a wrong deed, whereas his personal merit is not admitted in the case of a good deed. Besides, it means that all other members of the same nationality get their share of undeserved praise and undeserved blame as well.

National identity is indeed a personality's deep-rooted, intimate structure; but this means that it cannot be torn away from an individual, the latter is not at all a specimen of a national series of people, he is responsible for his actions as a specific personality. When a particular Daghestani commits a crime, he does not commit it because he is a Daghestani, just as when a human commits a crime, he does not commit it because he is a human.

While publicly discussing national issues, it is important to highlight key axiological points, proper vectors of censure and praise. A moral model of interpersonal relationships could serve here as a guideline; the essence of it is that one should judge oneself, but not the others. This model is based on the

belief that all people are equal in their moral dignity, though, of course, they differ from each other (and sometimes to a great extent) in their moral qualities. The same can be said about people's equality in their national dignity. Nations are different, but of equal value, none is better or worse than other, and each has its merits and demerits, its heroes and villains. Recognizing this leads to the conclusion that people's attitude towards their own nation can and, as a rule, should be critical, while their attitude towards other nations, on the contrary, should be emphatically positive. The norm, the criterion of a nation's health is determined by the same personal logic: judge yourself, and not the others. Needless to say, we tend to see the opposite, in fact.

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## REALPOLITIK, ESCOBARIANISM, CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND RUSSIAN ETHNIC CULTURAL TRADITION

1. Realpolitik that has recently become popular is usually connected with the name of a really efficient politician — Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, who based on military power and united Germany with 'blood and sword'. In papers on political studies this term is very often referred to the type of politics that is politically goal-oriented without regard to norms of morality, when politics is implemented by means of balancing on the verge of the acceptable and the unacceptable in legal and ethical spheres.

Realpolitik is autonomisation of political conceptual space and turning it into a closed world. Such an approach to politics can be relatively labelled as an internalist one, meaning separation of political space and ethical space. Under such an approach politics appears to be something external with regards to ethics and legislation.

The second possible approach to politics is politics carried out with strict orientation on constitutional principles. Such an approach can be called an externalist one, because in the space of politics both legal and ethical imperatives must be taken into account.

According to Realpolitik, it is difficult to survive in the world, only those survive who can go to any length: military and economical power must be gained by all means. In this respect, Realpolitik is a science how to survive in our dangerous world. (1) Russia faces a dilemma — either to use archaic forms of Realpolitik, when one lives by the rules of cynical realism that can provide immediate success, or turn to a more morally-sustained realism that does not bring political results within one electoral period, but rather becomes fruitful in a remote historical perspective. Philip Boobbyer describes two types of realism in politics, one stands for a more autocratic form of government in the name of stability. It revives Eurasian concepts of an ever-lasting myth about Russian identity that allegedly can only fit autocratic traditions. When choosing this variant of realism in politics the choice is made in fa-

vour of hierarchical, vertically oriented model of politics that proved fruitful in the times of both Peter the Great and Josef Stalin. There is no need to remind about the cost of such politics. In Russia there always existed thinkers who to a certain extent adopted this spiritual and ideological idea. One of them was Mikhail Bakunin. The essence of his ideas was truly formulated by T.N. Granovsky: 'There are no subjects for him, but rather objects.' (2) Bakunian anarchy was criticised by Marx and Engels who considered that his ideal was a sectarian merger of 'privileged representatives of a revolutionary idea', or better said, 'hierarchically' designed 'secret society', with an authoritative and even dictatorial order. Marx and Engels draw a very eloquent comparison with Jesuitism: 'Unity of thoughts and actions means nothing but dogmatism and blind obedience. *Perinde ac cadaver* — in the manner of a corpse — disciplinary principle formulated by Ignatius of Loyola, founder and ideologist of Jesuitism. This is a perfect Society of Jesus'. (3)

Jesuitism is a certain type of moral orientation (that is, amoral) in politics, that makes it kin with Bakunian anarchy and modern Realpolitik. Marx and Engels thought that that Bakunin with his sectarian revolutionary idea is a parody replica of such crucial principles of Jesuitism as inquisitors, the idea of Papal infallibility and Escobarianism, that is the rule 'The end justifies the means'.

The second model of politics has hardly ever been tried in Russia. Although it is based on a powerful philosophical (ethical) tradition that can also provide the basis for politics. This is Leo Tolstoy's views with his keen sense of truth, his credo 'I can't keep silent' echoing with Martin Luther and his saying 'Here I stand, I cannot do otherwise'. In the 20th century this branch of intellectual tradition of Russian society was continued by Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. This school might better serve for the benefit of Russia in a long-term perspective. Because politics shouldn't only be oriented on short-term electoral cycles based on the formula 'after us the deluge', but rather on remote prospects. At that, the aim should be the only one — to enhance trust between the society and the state. This is the main criterion to evaluate politics. Otherwise, the loss of trust to public power is the situation described in the philosophy of existentialism (as the culture of enduring and moral exploration of impassable life situations. (4) In social studies by Émile Durkheim such a condition is treated as anomie, when a moral potential shifts towards cynicism, soullessness and, later, apathy. In such society modernization is inherently impossible. Perhaps, this ethically-oriented politics is unreal and rather romantic, as it doesn't consider political culture of the Russian people.

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Then, as Philip Boobbyer showed, there is another model of realism, that was written about by Semyon Frank. His ideas are weird and unusual, but in some cases, the only possible, mixture of liberal and conservative principles. In one of his last books S. Frank said about the necessity to oppose Bolsheviks' Utopianism dominating in Stalin's Soviet Union against 'Christian realism' that he treated as a political philosophy that could combine reasonable gradualism and social changes.

Then the most important philosophical issue becomes the issue of rates, speed of gradual changes, that is, how quickly conservative elements in politics should be replaced and modernized.

2. Realpolitik was possible and fruitful in the 19th century, when the world didn't have constitutional legal intellectual space yet.

The basis of this ontological concept, in our view, is a special area of fundamental constitutional legal concepts. The concept of constitutional right is widely used in the fields of legislation. For instance, the concept of 'dwelling' is used in criminal proceeding, in family and housing law. But it is only in constitutional law that it has a very broad sense and thus, is independent from other legally synonymic concepts in other fields of law. Among one of the most important constitutional legal concepts are the following: 'people', 'people's will', 'state power', 'division of power', 'democracy', 'republicanism', 'freedom', 'justice'.

The basis of the structure of constitutional legal conceptual space is formed by fundamental constitutional legal values. I'm positive that the concept of 'constitutional legal conceptual space' offered here can serve as the basis for development of a new direction in researches, that is juridical ontology. A great methodological value of the concept in question is determined by the fact that it help to introduce a non-typical for legal studies *space-time thinking* that can provide new and unexpected results.

The reality is the past, the present and the future of being. Constitutional legal reality should also be considered as the three-fold of the past-present-future. At that the space of constitutional legal reality cannot be limited within the borders of one state. Virtually, it is the specified idea of G. Jellinek stating that the study of law can mortify itself should it be placed within the state borders and study only national law.

Constitutional values, and first of all, constitutional principles and the objective system of fundamental rights and freedoms, as the main contents of constitutional legal conceptual space, universal to all civilized people, are a common property for everyone. This is the real meaning of preamble of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, stating that we are aware of ourselves as part of the world community.

Alongside with that, a reality is the fact that the idea of constitutional principles and fundamental rights reflects special features of historical and cultural development. Bearing in mind these peculiarities of the historic fate of the nation, one can claim that the Constitution of every state does not only codify primary legal norms, but established social cultural traditions, and hence, relations to the past.

The ideas of constitutional principle are rather flexible, however, they cannot be compared with a weather vane that changes its directions depending on the wind. Stability in the ideas of constitutional principles should be provided, in particular, by mean of studying an objective nature of every of them. Constitutional law does not have as long history as civil law that contains a large number of legal principles reflecting objective ways of development of property relations which a legislator of any state should reckon with. However, constitutional right assisted by norms and principles manifests objective laws of society functioning.

Changes in ideas about constitutional principles result from constitutional policy carried out by all supreme bodies of the state.

In accordance with Part 3 of Article 80 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, President of the Russian Federation is to determine the guidelines of the internal and foreign policies of the State, part of which is constitutional policy, according to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and the federal laws. The main space of constitutional policy belongs, undoubtedly, to the Federal Assembly, a legislative body of the Russian Federation.

One of the most important aspects of the politics in a law-governed state is orientation of public authorities towards search of trust of their citizens. This idea of constitutional right concerns the fact that in a law-governed state power should be executed in the way that observes a constitutional principle of maintaining people's trust towards the law and activities of public authorities.

It is only possible to deserve loyalty if one rejects cynicism and lives in truth. Living in truth means, apart from other things, living in accordance with constitutional principles regarded as universal by everyone. Living in truth is only possible in a powerful law-governed state. The state that dramatically changes its ideas about the contents of constitutional principles, and, which is more dangerous, tries to adjust them to a current political situation, cannot be considered powerful. The state is powerful if it functions stably in accordance with bans, demands, commands that form the essence of democratic constitutional principles.

One of them is democracy, the other is republicanism that assumes a systematic 'sweeping' of corridors of power by means of elections.

The Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation in 2001 considered the case about terms of governors' service. In the 1990s when the Russian Constitution and legislative acts of constituent entities of the Russian Federation were adopted, a democratic norm was stated in all fundamental laws and statutes that governors are not allowed to serve more than two terms successively. Later, as the political situation was developing, those norms started to disappear from statutes and from the Constitution, they were withdrawn in order to ensure governors' carrying out their authorities for more than 8 years.

In 2001 an appeal reached the Constitutional Court, and judges started to analyze the issue and look for solutions. This appeal complained of the norm of the Federal Law of the Russian Federation 'On General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Authorities of the Subject of the Russian Federation' dated from 1999. The Constitution of the Russian Federation doesn't deal with the terms of governors' service, but there is a norm about the President's service terms that has a personalized character: it is only binding for the President of the Russian Federation.

A corresponding chapter of the Constitution of the Russian Federation states general principles of democracy, republicanism, and those are not mere words. All statements of the Constitution are interconnected systems rather than separate norms and statements. Every statement of the Fundamental Law is logically and legally linked with other statements. Respectively, the statement about the terms of service of the President of the Russian Federation is closely connected with the idea of democracy and republicanism.

The Constitutional Court put forward a speculation whether it is possible to find in the text of the article personally addressed to the President of Russia a general principle for all constitutional law in the Russian Federation, in accordance with which the authorities should be systematically changed (this is the practice of the whole mankind rather than of our country). When the same people hold power for a long time and carry out their authorities there can arise phenomena that

in the Soviet times used to be called stagnation and voluntarism, etc.

In respond to the appeal, the judges of the Constitutional Court decided: 'It is a general principle of Russian constitutional law, universally binding for all governors.' Respectfully, a decision was adopted that a governor cannot serve more than two terms successively. It should be considered that the acting federal law says nothing about the terms of service of governors. Later some amendments were introduced, and the procedure of granting power to governors was altered, but nowhere was the norm worded how many terms a governor can serve. Consequently, in the cases when a federal law omits certain norms, decisions of the Constitutional Court are applied that are based on the principle of democracy formulated in the Constitution.

3. The idea of a powerful law-governed state can be illustrated by a geometrical figure of an equilateral triangle. It has three equal edges: one of them is power, another is money, and the third is law. The state will be stable if the edges are equal. If the base of the triangle — law — is very narrow, while the other two edges are very high, the state loses its stability and firmness. Hypocrisy begins to run the day in this state. An obvious misbalance between the Constitution de-jure and de-facto appears. Such a misbalance is always a symptom of a disease or constitutional crisis. Such was the crisis that broke out in Russia in 1993. One can also detect some symptoms of the crisis nowadays. Catharsis is the way to come out of the crisis. I'd like to remind that this term was introduced by Aristotle in his 'Poetics' as a part of theory of tragedy, and it means exhaled fulfilment and cleansing that a viewer experiences when living through suffering together with the character of a tragedy and feeling a relief. The same meaning can be found in the concept of *metanoia* (see S. Bulgakov's article, 1911), that is self-condemnation, repentance, self-scrutiny.

Misbalance between the Constitution de-jure and de-facto as a critical phenomenon in constitutional legal conceptual space is one of the manifestations of anomie, the concept that well-known sociologist Émile Durkheim used to characterize the absence of values and norms, typical of transitional and critical periods in the development of the society, when old social norms and values cease operating while the new ones are not established yet. (6).

In 1993 the Russian people received a new Constitution by revising liberal constitutional legal norms. It is only natural that there was no required experience of having a civil society and the state based on those principles.

The society (or, at least, some regions) could elect a governor with a criminal past record (and even a present one). And then, public authorities rejected the idea of governor's elections, sometimes without thorough considerations, impulsively, reflectively, but they forgot that constitutional principles can't be treated as isolated and independent legal elements. The tradition to consider constitutional principles as an interconnected legal unity comes from America. Unfortunately, it has not rooted in Russian constitutional legal conceptual space, and causes constitutional crisis of power.

In can be explained by the following example. If governors are not elected, but rather appointed, other constitutional principles cease operating as well. Thus, a governor elected by the people will be more dependent on freedom of the press, pay more attention to critical judgements, including those from the opposition, than an appointed governor. Hence, the constitutional principle of free election is correlated with the constitutional principle of freedom of information and with the constitutional principle of political diversity.

Without attempts to adapt the contents of constitutional principles, without learning through the hit-and-miss method how to live following the Constitution, it is impossible to combine the Constitution de-jure and de-facto.

In practical constitutional policy it is impossible to advocate liberal constitutional principles and, at the same time, to implement old methods of governing public affairs.

Such an attempt turns into stagnation, there is no thrust forward. From the moral point of view it is hypocritical.

In constitutional legal conceptual space some parties keep struggling: the Power, the Truth and the Money. When the Truth is able to tame the Power and the Money, an astonishing prosperity begins.

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## BIBLICAL SCRIPTURES AS A MEANS OF CROSS-CIVILIZATIONAL AND INTRA-CIVILIZATIONAL COMMUNICATION: FROM THE ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY

The Russian civilization is a Christian civilization. It is destined to remain a one (and a one of a kind), but only if it manages to find an avenue to its revival in the times of the global cultural cross-insemination.

This civilization has always developed under the auspices of Biblical texts. Reflecting, interpreting and continually re-considering them were the signs of inner cultural adaptation, of communication with ideological forerunners and successors. At the same time this also resulted in an ability to maintain the spiritual links with other Christian and non-Christian peoples. Thus, ups and downs of the Biblical history in Russia reflect the ups and downs of the Russian cultural – and not only cultural – history.

Let us briefly trace the landmarks of this long and winding road. It is well-known that Biblical texts and the famous Old-Russian *Primary Chronicle* interact in a variety of ways. The influence of the Holy Scripture on the Russian chronicler is obvious.<sup>2</sup> The reasons are clear enough – the Bible on the whole and the Biblical history in particular were the starting point for the author of the *Primary Chronicle*; he looked back at the Bible and at the same time ‘connected’ the Russian history to the world history, he was making the Ancient Rus’ an integral part of the civilized mankind. This process has not yet finished to this day.

The matter transcends the historical concept of the chronicler, direct and indirect quotations from the Bible, which mostly originate from the author’s idea of the similarity of destinies of the Jewish and the Russian peoples; this similarity is also noted in other Old-Russian texts, for instance, in ‘The Sermon on Law and Grace’. From our viewpoint, the very physical events of the political history of Ancient Rus’ are finding their reflections in the biblical history of ancient Israel, encompassing the emergence of the state, the monarchy, and all timeless achievements and eternal problems related to these phenomena.

Let us also mention the motif of triumph of the younger sibling over the older one, which can be found in the early Russian historiography, and, furthermore, in all Russian – but not only Russian – folk culture. We should recall that the subject of a victory of the young over the old or, in the providential sense, of Christianity over Judaism, is steadily advanced in ‘The Sermon on Law and Grace’. Biblical parallels are obvious: Jacob and Esau, Joseph and his brothers, Rachel and Leah, the rise of the Tribe of Judah, etc.

This line is typical of early Christian texts of other European peoples, it is easy to notice it in the works of medieval literature and fine art; we can just remember the images of the Church and the Synagogue found in many great Gothic cathedrals. Here we can see the display of the problem of relations

between Christianity and Judaism, and in the narrow sense of the word – between Jewish and Russian nations, a problem which has not only survived to this day through many centuries and millennia but which revealed itself in a most terrible way in the recent European – and Russian – history. Later, we will mention (by all means, in a non-exhaustive fashion) a few ideological reasons underlying these sad phenomena.

The political history of the Ancient Rus’ is the history of the emerging state, the account of ‘who first ruled in Kiev and from which source the Russian land had its beginnings’. This paradigm was repeated in the Russian history several times (including the most recent epoch); therefore, the account of the origin of power and of its current state is still under re-consideration. Where is the foundation of Russia? And what is the legitimacy of the powers that be? These questions are as timely today as they were in the 11th century; these questions are literally fundamental, biblical (both in terms of scale and content).

It was evident to the historians, both of Ancient Israel and of ancient Rus’, that the world is ruled by God’s will and that it was the God’s will that has created new states. Thus, the question of appraisal of the recent past was decided by the Russian monk and the Hebrew priest in the same fashion – they ruled in favour of what will later be called the *historical progress*. Here lies the fundamental difference of their ideas with the philosophic concepts and myths of other times, which savour of nostalgia for ‘the glorious past’ or ‘the golden age’. But at the same time thinkers-in-question had no proximity to the dreams of an ideal world order, or to an idea that ‘the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence’ and other chimeras of a similar kind which are still present in the intellectual milieu of many nations, especially in those layers and latitudes where people have forgotten their age-old heritage and thus are only able to hear themselves, staying deaf to their neighbours’ pleas and concerns.

On the contrary – how easy it will be for the inhabitants of different countries and worlds to understand each other if they are current with their past, if they can grasp the continuity of times, if they are able to understand from where has the mankind ascended and where it may arrive to, if it forgets its cultural genesis (or, more precisely, how high a precipice it may fall from in this case). The ideological accord, which we, in particular, can see in the biblical history of Israel (the Book of Kings) and the *Primary Chronicle*, is based on the fact that for the authors of these books the history is always a progress, not degradation.

The Hebrew historian puts forward two factors of the emergence of monarchy: the will of the people and the will of God, *vox populi* and *vox Dei*. The elders of Israel say to the prophet Samuel: ‘...make us a king to judge us like all the other nations’ (1 Samuel 8:4–7). It is supplemented with a story of transferring the power from the prophet to the first king Saul, and then to David, by the Lord’s permission, which makes both of them the *Lord’s anointed ones*.

A similar situation is presented by the Russian chronicler, the only difference being that he could not *consecrate* the power of the pagan princes. There was only one ground to legitimise the dynasts – the expression of popular will, which was related in a widely-known form: ‘And they set out to govern themselves. There was no law among them, but tribe rose against tribe. Discord thus ensued among them, and they began to war one against another. They said to themselves: ‘Let us seek a prince who may rule over us, and judge us according

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to the law.' They accordingly went overseas to the Varangian Rus...', which is followed by the famous: 'Our whole land is great and rich, but there is no order in it.'

What is the alternative to the state? This is meticulously chronicled in the final chapters of the Book of Judges, which narrate the crimes and intertribal wars in pre-monarchy Israel. The concluding line of the Book of Judges is significant: 'In those days there was no king in Israel: every man did that which was right in his own eyes.' (Judges 21:25).<sup>1</sup> This line is an introductory remark to the narration of the mentioned discord and also the final verdict to the pre-state tribalism. The life without a king proved to be worse than the life with a king or, to be more exact, anarchy gave rise to lawlessness – to a total absence of any rules whatsoever.

It is clear that the stories of anointing Saul and of summoning of the Varangians may not reflect the real events. But can we declare as unlikely the internecine discord and the existence of popular will, which preceded the establishment of the king's power? The dialogical roll call over centuries leads us to the only conclusion. The loss of political stability is always accompanied by strife, decline in lawfulness and ends in the restoration of the previously lost undivided authority – with the support of a considerable part of the population. A deficient state deserves no praise, but an absence of the organized state is hundredfold worse. Since in this case everybody does *what they want*, and this life is unpredictable, without the slightest chance of escape for the vulnerable.

The state foundation of young nations is formed by two triads of kings, the founders of the nation: Saul – David – Solomon and Svyatoslav – Vladimir – Yaroslav. They appear consecutive to us (as if one took over from another, which is incorrect in all four instances). Here is another key to the analysis of political consciousness – we always long for orderliness, trying to simplify the complexities of history, politics and life itself instead of accepting its diversity at least attempting to encompass the non-linear nature of the objective reality.

The human endeavour to conceptualize history is almost three thousand years old; it starts from the Book of Kings while the knowledge of Russian history starts from 'The Primary Chronicle'. And it is of no surprise that the contemporary historical thought is impossible without the dialogue with classical authors, with the representatives of other epochs and worlds – but also of our own civilization.

In the most recent period of Russian history the impossibility of analyzing the religious and philosophical message of 'The Primary Chronicle' resulted in the annalistic accounts of military campaigns and victories over near or distant peoples – whether made-up or real ones – being put into the forefront. In this moulded and heavily cut version of the events of the 10th century with Christianization of Rus' being almost completely withdrawn from the public debate, the pagan prince Svyatoslav became nearly more important than Vladimir. The consequences of this *militarisation* of Ancient Russian history still have an impact – to some, the invasions and bounty raids of the prince-father are of a higher value than 'the enlightenment by books' brought by his son.

Throughout centuries the Bible continues to be the basis for Russian cultural progress, the basis for dialogue, which the young culture is carrying on with the older and more experienced worlds and civilizations. Foreign languages were being learned to translate and read biblical scriptures, people of learning have been invited from other countries with the same purpose (e.g., Maximus the Greek who is now considered a saint by the Russian Orthodox Church). The first Russian travelogue is 'The Pilgrimage' of Hegumen Daniil, the narrative of a 12th

century Russian monk's pilgrimage to holy biblical places in Palestine soon after its capture by crusaders.

For three centuries, the course of the state development of Muscovy is discussed invoking the biblical scriptures, starting from the argument between Josephites and non-possessors to the Church reforms of the 17th century. Beginning from the reign of Peter the Great the role of biblical scriptures becomes less important. This affects both the domestic Russian cultural milieu and also the dialogue with the outside world (ironically, at exactly the same time the latter becomes extremely intensive). There comes a secular period of the Russian history, which, on one hand, was marked by the highest political and cultural achievements, and on the other hand, has found its logical final in the disaster of 1917.

For two centuries the Russian educated class has led a dialogue with Europe (or with the Western civilization) using quite different text types: from Voltaire to Marx. Moreover, this class has begun to read the Bible itself in a foreign language. Although in 1712 Peter the Great ordered to print a newly collated text of the Church Slavonic Bible, it was published decades later (in 1751). Even at that time its language already could not be fully understood by contemporaries, and later the split between the text and the society became even more profound. This civilizational rift continued to expand from the both sides of the divide. The educated society was not anymore interested in the biblical tradition. The Church, in turn, was not able to stop this process. It needed over fifty years to present the society with a new comprehensible and scientifically substantiated text of the Bible (1816–1876). This process has been interrupted twice. First, in 1826 the Russian Bible Society was disbanded and later, in the early 1840s most copies of the Old Testament books translated by G.P. Pavsky were destroyed. It was not until the reign of Alexander II when it became possible to complete the Synodal translation.<sup>2</sup> Some authors have suggested that the relatively late appearance of the Synodal translation played a great role in the spiritual crisis which swept across the imperial Russia. Though new version of the Russian Bible has undoubtedly promoted the progress of the Russian philosophical thought (and stimulated the interest in pre-Petrine times), i.e. led to the resumption of cross-cultural and intra-cultural dialogue, the time was lost.

Starting from 1917 Russia faced a double civilizational break: with its own past and with the outside world. Biblical images and paradigms disappeared from the basic educational curriculum (three generations learned about them from museum paintings at best). Only the last decades saw a turning point – the Bible has come back to the Russian spiritual space and is gradually becoming an instrument of dialogue within Russia (including the dialogue between different peoples of Russia), and of communication with distant and close neighbours, it gradually regains its place as means of communication with contemporaries, ancestors and successors.<sup>3</sup>

In conclusion, let us remember one historical episode in order to demonstrate that drastic consequences may result not only from a plain break with the spiritual tradition, but also from a seemingly acceptable exercise in the intellectual freedom. The preservation of culture is a difficult job since it the former can be damaged in many ways. We have already mentioned the fact that elimination of the holy texts from the cultural milieu is detrimental to the latter. It is no coincidence that only after condemning the marcionistic heresy, which demanded the elimination of the Old Testament from the Scripture did Christianity become a historical religion linked to the thousand-year tradition; a religion capable of developing this

<sup>1</sup> Translated into Russian by M.G. Seleznyov. The Book of Joshua. The Book of Judges. Russian Bible Society Publishing House. Moscow, 2003. Translation into English from Webster's Bible Version.

<sup>2</sup> Chistovich I.L. *The History of Translating the Bible into Russian*. (Istorija perevoda Biblii na russkij jazyk) Saint Petersburg, 1899. Reprinted. Moscow, 1997.

<sup>3</sup> Desnitsky A.S. *Translation of the Bible as an Exegetical Dialogue // Scripture – Tradition – Today*. (Perevod Biblii kak ekzegeticheskij dialog // Pisanie – Predanie – sovremennost') Kiev, 2007. PP. 107–121.

tradition. 'To tell the truth, what a miracle, what a good miracle it is that in due time the Church managed to resist the temptation of Marcionism and against all odds continued to use the Old Testament!'<sup>1</sup>

Even today those belonging to the radical extremes of the intellectual society, those being out of touch with history suggest *correcting* the Holy Scripture or at least the Old Testament. Some dislike the archaism of the Old Testament norms and thus they would like to *modernize* them; others have no liking for the origin of these norms, their 'Semitic nature'. Not once or twice had the advocates from both camps found themselves on the same side of the ideological – and not only ideological – fence. Fascism has often been nourished by liberalism. For example, in the opinion of A. Harnack, one of the greats of 'the liberal theology' at the turn of the 19th–20th century, keeping the Old Testament 'was not good for the church in all respects; many of its pages spoke about different morals, not the Christian ones', and Jewish priests and scribes 'made religion a craft, – it is hard to find something more repulsive.'<sup>2</sup> The book that contained these words and abounded in unjust invectives against the most ancient of Christian denominations – Catholic and Orthodox – was so popular in Germany and abroad that since 1900 it has been reissued many times over and 'was translated into more languages than any other book, with the exception of the Bible, and the railway station in Leipzig was jammed with freight trains delivering Harnack's book throughout the world.'<sup>3</sup>

The following events were unlikely a coincidence. Almost all the pillars of the German liberal theology signed the appeal of August 1914 supporting the military policy of the Kaiser, and Harnack, in his turn, became the author of the Kaiser's appeal to the nation. According to the memoirs of a prominent theologian K. Barth, it was this event which made it impossible for him to follow the ethics, the doctrine and the interpretation of the Bible advocated by these people – bearers of the highest achievements of the German idealistic philosophy. It has also put an end to the so-called theological 'liberalism'. Or did it?

In the same period of time *Babel und Bibel* by German asyriologist F. Delitzsch was no less popular. The main point made by Delitzsch was that the Old Testament lacked in 'originality' – from his point of view all the major concepts were 'borrowed' by the ancient Jews from Babylonians. 'The historical criticism' led Delitzsch to conclude that on the one hand all superficial, 'not God-inspired' parts of the Old Testament must be withdrawn from it. The conservative cream of the German élite could not agree to the revision of the text of the Old Testament, so Delitzsch quite soon fell out of graces with the powers that were (Kaiser favoured him at first). Thanks to Delitzsch's wish to strip the history of the Old Testament from its creators he was naturally accused of anti-Semitism. The author, rather understandably, denied the charges though he thought 'Babylonian morals' to be superior to the Hebrew ones.

Delitzsch's suggestions were brought to the graveyard by both science and theology, however, but not by the society on the whole; they clung to too many minds, at least subconsciously. After the First World War he published yet another book; it was entitled 'The Great Delusion' or 'The Great Deception' (*Die große Täuschung*, 1920–21). There the author openly maintained that the Jews 'spoil' the Old Testament, argued that the Hebrew religion bore no relation to early Christianity and that Jesus Christ could not be a Jew. Almost at the same time (1923) Delitzsch's royal patron, who had lost the

throne and was living in Holland, wrote a brochure where he agreed to the views of his ex-protégé. Now the Kaiser in exile thought that except for some Psalms and Prophetic books there should be nothing Jewish in the 'updated' Old Testament: 'Down with the Jewry and its Yahweh.'<sup>4</sup>

Delitzsch's views had a great impact on the German society, especially among people of knowledge and learning, as he was a scholarly authority of his time. But we should not put the ultimate blame for subsequent events on Delitzsch – he reflected the historical epoch, and the latter itself appeared to be sensitive to the opinions of people of his ilk. The intellectual climate, which allowed suggestions of revising the Old Testament and even of rejecting it for one or another 'historical' reason (it was claimed that the ethical precepts found in it are not Christian), this climate gradually caused a considerable part of society to lose *all* the moral guidelines – both those of the Old and of the New Testament. The cultural dialogue was rejected in favour of cultural narrow-mindedness, spiritual *truncation*. Abandonment of the tradition, either conscious or subconscious, gave rise to utter *outculturing*. The historical fruits of Germany's spiritual development were ineffably bitter: '... At the close of German theology and philosophy there appeared the figure of Hitler... We became aware of the fact that if Hitler is a product of the German culture then something is wrong with our culture. If Hitler is the outcome and the result of what we thought to be true philosophy and the only theology, then both the philosophy and the theology were false.'<sup>5</sup>

We will dare to continue this line of thought. The Russian disaster of 1917, the consequences of which are far from being overcome, was also a fruit of the Russian culture, a sign of its severe crisis. Russian philosophical liberalism, unlike its German counterpart, resulted in an all-out war against the state, but the results of this *non-biblical* delusion were no better. Treating the past and the tradition loosely, juggling its smithereens nonchalantly or consigning it to oblivion could not but lead to consequences of the most fatal order. In the historical and cultural coordinates the absence of spiritual renovation is equal to the spiritual degradation of nations and even of entire civilizations.

The presence of texts created throughout millennia in an everyday life, our inescapable attempts to understand and to rethink them do inevitably lead us to the very roots of the civilization, to our spiritual cradle. And only by experiencing it over and over again can we be reborn. On no account does it mean a ban on the new, a prohibition of discussion, re-evaluation or of any different interpretation, signify a restriction of moving forward. On the contrary, one just cannot do without the other. And the communication with our neighbours – and today the whole world is a very small place – becomes easier when we remember about our often common spiritual basis, when we are able to use its notions.

If we do not follow some biblical norm, it does not mean that we can disregard the legal experts, philosophers and historians of the past – as we would not exist without them. If we repudiate them, we will cease to exist. The mankind abandoning the cultural tradition is equivalent to the complete loss of the cultural memory, this will make it impossible to carry on a dialogue neither with the past, nor with the present, or with a relative, or with a neighbour, or with a stranger. Any civilization treading down this road is deemed to be isolated and will have no future whatsoever.

<sup>1</sup> Averintsev S.S. The Old Testament as Foreknowledge of the New: The General Issue Viewed by the Translator // Collected works. Translations: Gospels. The Book of Job. Psalms. (Vétihij Zavet kak proročestvo o Novom: obščaja problema glazami perevodčika // Sobranie sočinenij. Perevody: Evangelija. Kniga Iova. Psalmy.) Kiev, 2004. P. 465.

<sup>2</sup> Harnack A. The Essence of Christianity // Early Christianity (Sushčnost' hristianstva // Ranneje hristianstvo). Moscow, 2001. Vol. 1, pp. 36–37.

<sup>3</sup> Tillich P. Theology of Culture // Selected Works (Teologija kul'tury // Izbrannoje). Moscow, 1995, p. 354.

<sup>4</sup> Trolle Larsen M. The 'Babel/Bible' Controversy // Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, pp. 95–106.

<sup>5</sup> Tillich P. *Ibid.*, p. 355.

Murli M. Joshi<sup>1</sup>

## DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

Globalization has economic roots and its attendant social, political and cultural consequences. While globalization tends to bind the economies and create a global system of market governance but the people and societies also tend to maintain their distinct cultural identities. Huntington had argued that the world was divided into some eight or nine major zones having cultural differences existing for a long time and having a history of hostility and even violence. He had also argued that these cultural fault lines will give rise to future conflicts. The question then is, can globalization resolve these conflicts? and lead towards a global culture. The idea, that there is an inherent and perpetual conflict among cultures, is central to the responses of nations and communities in dealing with each other, would undoubtedly lead to a violent and exploitative world-order. A world-order based on clash of cultures, would not allow any resolution of conflicts, rather would heighten them and is, therefore, unacceptable. For enduring world peace and harmony we must think about a new paradigm based on a serious and meaningful dialogue among cultures.

The conflict between economic integration and cultural separatism needs to be resolved through an interaction between globalization and cultures. We have also to discuss whether, or not, the way the globalization is working and is being managed today, it would be possible to have a global culture in the real sense.

It is now well recognized that some of the modern world's socio-economic conflicts have arisen more acutely after the present era of globalization took a road to unipolarism. The conflicts in the domain of value systems and different world views particularly between mechanistic and holistic world view have raised serious debate about the relationship between cultures and globalization. The events during the past decade have also raised disturbing questions regarding the efficacy of market fundamentalism. The serious limitations of markets have now been well understood world over. The effects of a highly consumerist culture produced by the unbridled market forces have been amply exemplified by the recent scams in USA. As a consequence the western or particularly the IMF-World Bank way of managing capitalism does not receive that recognition, of being the most effective model of economic prosperity to be emulated by the developing world, which it claimed to have over other contemporary economic systems. It has also been recognized that there may be other models of managing economy which suit a particular country in a much better way. Alternative forms of effective market management have shown better results in countries like Sweden, particularly for reducing inequalities. The assertion that unregulated markets are most efficient has also been belied and the assertion that they can survive without government intervention has also been proved as untenable. Market fundamentalists have also been arguing that globalization would lead to the evolution of one global culture and they have also floated concepts like 'superior' and 'inferior' cultures where affluence and prosperity are the attributes of a superior culture and that too is based on certain religious tenets. In other words this concept propagates monoculturalism based on Western value system. Recognising that there are different cultural zones we have also to examine in depth how a dialogue between different cultures on the one hand and glo-

balization and cultures on the other has to be organized under the present circumstances.

First, what do we understand from culture. By culture we usually understand the entire way of life of a society, its values, its practices, the way it defines its relationship with not only among the members of the society but also with the environment. Thus culture denotes the community specific ideas about what is true (Satyam), beneficial (Shivam) beautiful (Sundaram). Furthermore, these ideas are inherited and continuously brought into the socio-economic institutions. Culture, thus, to a great extent defines the goals, values and understanding of the environment. Obviously all of these are manifested in the language, customs, laws, arts and literature, and the institutions of the community and thus form the visible different ways of life and behaviour. Cultures, in this way, play a defining role in shaping the mind, behaviour and progress (intellectual, material, moral and spiritual) of any society. The clash of cultures is, therefore, rooted in the differences of the world view that defines their relationship with individuals and communities. These different cultures have to co-exist, if we want to have an enduring peace in the globe.

Secondly, about globalization. In the last decade of the twentieth century the globalization was enthusiastically accepted and adopted by many countries. It was vigorously argued that this new economic world-order would bring prosperity to all, would also lead towards creating a global consciousness. Unfortunately after two decades of globalization neither prosperity nor a world free from conflicts is seen anywhere. Globalization on the other hand has heightened the economic disparity and violence. The growing number of people living below poverty over the last two decades speaks volumes about the failure of the market driven economy in reducing economic disparities. Poverty in the developing world has gone up and in Africa it has almost doubled from 164 million to 316 million since 1981. Some 40% of the world's population live in poverty and about a billion live in extreme poverty, 3 percent more than in 1981. Stiglitz argues that globalization has exposed developing countries to greater risks and markets to insure against these risks are notably absent. Wealth is undoubtedly being created but too many people are not sharing it. Too few have too much and too many have too little, not sufficient even to survive. Globalization has created a world tormented between the culture of the rich and the culture of the poor (different from the culture of ascetics). If globalization degrades the quality of life and impairs the values and also imposes alien cultural practices then serious opposition is bound to develop against it. We have to examine the issue in greater depth.

The present recrudescence of the combustible flash points all over the globe have not only their economic origin but are also characterized by their cultural hue and shades. The situation demands that a two pronged dialogue- one among the various cultures and the other-between cultures and globalization must be organized if these conflicts are to be resolved and the world is to be saved from the looming dangers of widespread violence. Huntington and others in the West have divided the world into eight or nine zones based on different civilizations with cultural differences persisting from centuries. One of the defining components of these cultures is their religious tradition which even in this era of modernization continues to shape their world view. Islamic, Christian - Western and Orthodox, Buddhist, Hindu, Confucian, Japanese, African and Latin American cultures have been broadly identified as constituting the different zones which define the cultural fault lines.

Cultural pluralism is a fact of life. Is it contradictory to Universalism? If Universalism believes in uniformism then the

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contradiction will always persist. But if Universalism is without uniformity the conflict can be resolved through a dialogue. The trouble with globalization is that it leads not towards a unified world but towards a uniform world. It is possible to have economic progress without imposing one and only one culture generated by the market dynamics of globalization. Reputed cultural anthropologist Richard A. Shweder has argued that throughout history, whoever is wealthiest and the most technologically advanced thinks that their way of life is the best, the most natural, the God-given, the surest means to salvation, or at least the fast lane to well-being in this world. In the sixteenth century, Portuguese missionaries to China believed that their invention of clocks, of which they were very proud, was knock-down proof of the superiority of Catholicism over other world religions. He continues, "for all I know, their mechanical timepiece may have been counted as an argument in favour of absolute monarchy. Dazzled by our contemporary inventions and toys (e.g., CNN, IBM, Big Mac, blue jeans, the birth control pill, the credit card) and at home in our own way of life, we (*in the West*) are prone to similar illusions and the same type of conceits."

Schweder in line with Joseph Raz argues further, that moreover, many of us now live in nation-states composed of groups and communities with diverse practices and beliefs, including groups whose beliefs are inconsistent with each other. We will continue to do so, if for no other reason than the reality of global migration and the fact that community and divinity are essential goods and must be acknowledged for the sake of individual identity and human progress. Of course, life in such a world can be hazardous, especially for members of immigrant or minority groups living in multicultural states or for members of different civilizations or cultures who are in geopolitical conflict. In such a world, one hopes that it is not just culture that matters but also a particular pluralistic conception of culture because the right conception of culture can be useful in minimizing some of the risks associated with "difference" and with multicultural life.

This raises a very pertinent question about understanding the right comprehension of culture. If there is a Universal culture, then how is it related to the cultures of the different zones? Will these different zones remain always in perpetual conflict with each other and also with the global culture or there is a way for harmonizing these conflicts? This obviously leads us to revisit our over all world view.

The Western world-view has been profoundly influenced by the Cartesian thought. Rene Descartes's famous statement '*Cogito, ergo sum*' - "I think, therefore, I exist" is the foundation of the Western approach towards Reality. Descartes's *ergo*, as it is called, made mind more certain for him than matter and led him to the conclusion that the two were fundamentally different. It is this Cartesian divide between mind and matter which led to reductionism in science and the concept that all aspects of a complex phenomenon can be understood by reducing them to their constituent parts. According to Heisenberg this partition has penetrated deep in to human psyche during the three centuries after Descartes and it will take a long time

for it to be replaced by a really different attitude toward the problem of reality.

The widespread and pervasive distinctions between people (race, nation culture, family, profession. etc., etc.) which are now preventing mankind from working together for the common good, and indeed, even for survival, have one of the key factors of their origin in a kind of thought that treats things as inherently divided, disconnected, and 'broken up' into yet smaller constituent parts and each part (cultural zone) is considered to be essentially independent and self-existent.

According to David Bohm, because of this fragmentary approach society as a whole has developed in such a way that it is broken up into separate nations and different religious, political, economic, racial group, etc. Man's natural environment has correspondingly been seen as an aggregate of separately existent parts, to be exploited by different groups of people.

Bohm has further argued that man's general way of thinking of the totality, i.e. his general world view, is crucial for overall order of the human mind and consequently his relationship with individual, society, environment is shaped by this approach itself. If he thinks of the totality as constituted of independent fragments, then that is how his mind will tend to operate, but if he can include everything coherently and harmoniously in an overall whole that is undivided, unbroken, and without a border (for every border is a division or break) then his mind will tend to move in a similar way, and from this will flow an orderly action within the whole. This understanding of the phenomena leads towards the harmonious relationship between the Universal culture and the different cultural zones.

In the very early phases of the development of civilization, man's views were essentially of wholeness rather than of fragmentation. In the East (especially in India) such views still survive, in the sense that philosophy and religion emphasize wholeness and imply the futility of analysis of the world into parts. Why, then, do we not drop our fragmentary western approach and adopt these Eastern notions which include not only a self - world view that denies division and fragmentation but also offers the basis for a dialogue which can end the fragmentation both in the actual process of thought and in its application.

India provides a unique example of peaceful co-existence of all religions. Almost all major religions and a multitude of sects reside side by side in this country for centuries. All of them participate in the affairs of the State. This is perhaps due to the holistic approach of Indian philosophy and consequent shaping of a mind believing in the inherent unity of mankind. Multiculturalism is the law of nature and so is the universal spirit and there is no inherent contradiction in them. The divinity or the universality of spirit is the binding principle while the unbridled market is divisive. Markets have also to learn with different cultures which have existed since the very dawn of the civilization and will continue to exist. It is through the different cultures that the cosmic consciousness manifests itself.

T. Y. Khabriyeva

## ON THE HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE RUSSIAN MODEL OF RULE OF LAW STATE

### Between Scylla of the West and Charybdis of the East

The contemporary Russian model of the rule of law state has to reflect not only legal and social reality but also traditions the mentality of Russians, their attitude to the law, to the state and public institutions.

In general, Russia's historically established model of the rule of law state can be described as a peculiar legal-state type, approaching both the East and the West, which is not haphazard, for Russia geographically knits those two parts of the world.

During its long history the Russian state and society were influenced by many civilizations and cultures like Scandinavia and Byzantine Empire, the Golden Horde, Poland, France, Germany etc.

But the process of the Russian state and legal development was mainly defined by objective factors of natural and historical kind.

Firstly, a cost-based production together with extremely small surplus product in the areas of critical arable farming predetermined the centralized governing system

Secondly, the state boundaries almost always experienced a hard confrontation with other nations. In particular, there were 329 years of war from 1368 to 1893 (within the period of 525 years) which means that an average two years of war fell within one year of peace. In addition, there also were embroilments, revolts, riots, growing into the real wars, like the peasant movement of 1773–1775. It is obvious that such a heritage could not but affect economic, social, and political life of Russia. Established under the influence of historical environment militarization, mobilization, irregularity, force majeure became the features of the national life and legal culture.

Thirdly, the state boundaries expansion predetermined the use of stiff administrative policy in order to set up efficient administration of the country. Catherine II, a well-educated empress, defending constitutionalist Montesquieu wrote, 'An empire as great as Russia would die if it had a structure other than despotism set up because only despotism can assist with the needs of remotely located provinces as quick as necessary.'

Such conditions showed the need to search for in-house legal solutions, often as a counter to legal development patterns of other countries.

On the other hand, as Russia expanded its boundaries by including new nations, the influence of the new nations' legal systems on law establishment development grew. The legal system became an integration of various solutions reflecting peculiarities of legal cultures of nations comprised by Russia.

Thus, Russia moved to the East, establishing eastern elements of state and social life, i.e. the ruler's supreme right for land, which limited private land property. Authoritarian forms of government gained the momentum while quite developed forms of self-governing, such as popular assemblies, land assemblies etc., were committed to oblivion. That turning point happened during the reign of Ivan the Terrible when Russia rapidly expanded to the East. That was the time when a new pattern of autocratic and unrestricted power of a tsar was being established.

The imprint of the eastern traditions can also be found in the later history of Russia. While Europe experienced an active collapse of traditional institutions and a new social and state image forming (market relations, human rights, parliamentary system), Russia pursued the old pillar preservation policy (communal peasant agriculture, social enslavement, unlawfulness, and authoritarian administrative methods).

It has to be admitted that the mentioned tendency was preserved during the most part of the Russian history, even after the tsarism was overthrown. Thus, the resolution of the 7th congress of the Russian Bolshevik Party stated that the dictatorship of the proletariat 'destroys parliamentary system drawbacks, especially the separation of legislative and executive powers'. Subsequently, the 'drawbacks' of legitimacy were also varnished, which allowed mass purges, killing millions of people, to be conducted in the times of Stalin's rule.

At the same time the development of the Russian State was also influenced by western traditions. The impact enhanced by the beginning of 18th century, during the reign of Peter the Great. Western institutions were considered to be an instrument to overcome a century-long backwardness of the Russian society. A new administrative and governing system was introduced, where the Council of Boyars was replaced by the Senate (1711), with orders being eliminated and ministerial collegiums, Secret Office and Synod established. Later, there was also a switch to the principle of division of the country into provinces. The homestead tax changed into the head tax. School and university education was being developed. The Academy of Sciences was founded. However, those institutions, albeit similar to western, were often filled with some other content. They were perceived as state products, were controlled by the government, and kept connection with it. Such government impartibility made the institutions being of 'eastern kind'.

Note that in choosing between Scylla of the West and Charybdis of the East, the question was not one pertaining to the humanitarian plane, the social price for both 'Asian' reforms of Ivan IV and 'Western' reforms of Peter I was the drastic reduction of the population in the country (by 20 per cent during Peter I's reign). One consistent pattern was also confirmed, namely, successful development of the state was usually achieved at the expense of the drastic fall of the people's living standards.

Thus, the roots of the Russian model of the rule of law state were formed by the influence of the multidirectional ideological factors. In such conditions the combination of pragmatism and spirituality would have been ideal: western 'body' and Russian 'soul'. However, ideal combination of multidirectional ideologies is so difficult to find in real life.

As a consequence, there were constant contradictions and conflicts along the break-up lines, which divided the state and the civil society, the government and the person, market and directive forms of economic management, the law and the lawlessness.

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At the same time, as M. Speransky noted at the beginning of the 19th century, 'It would be strange to desire peoples different in their lifestyles, habits, education level, and industry to succumb to a single form of government with equal ease.'

#### On the Issue of the Main Features of the Russian Model of Rule of Law State

The model of rule of law state usually reflects a certain ideology and a level of legal consciousness, social, political, and legal development of the society. It does not remain static. It has always been developing under the influence of different factors – geopolitical, economic, social, political, religious and others, which predestined its peculiar features.

The Russian model of rule of law state can be characterized by the striving for the 'supreme' justice, for the legal ideal, and by being based on the religious fundamentals and ethical values.

The peculiarity of the Russian model of the rule of law state is still the domination of the community interests, revealed on different levels (national, regional, local) and in different social attitudes (including attitudes to property).

The Russian model of rule of law state can be characterized by the 'powerful' predominance in terms of governmental vs. personal. During a long period legal development tended to limit liberty, to confirm as unified order as possible in terms of using political, social and even civil rights by the citizens.

A peculiarity of the Russian model of rule of law state is also stipulated by 'paternalistic' ideology of public administration, instilling respect for the power authority, personalized mainly in the manager of any level. As a result, the main part of the Russian population was not accustomed to comparing their actions and social consequences of their actions. It may explain a great number of riots, revolts and embroilment in the Russian history.

The Russian model of legal state is also different in legal awareness. The law is associated with power, government, and authority. Historically it is connected with underdevelopment of personal rights and liberties, including private property, together with communal form of exploitation, which is one of the bases of the state. Such factors did not contribute to the civil fundamentals of social life. It was mainly formed by the laws of 'power hierarchy' but not on the legal procedures, providing equality of the parties.

When the Constitution of 1993 was adopted, the democratization, protection of private rights and liberties, and national unity got an impulse to develop. The conformation of these values is progressing by overcoming various problems inherited from previous centuries. A new pattern of rule of law state is forming, where the power is connected with the law, providing 'the power of law and the law of power along the area covered by the action of the Constitution of the Russian Federation'.

The outline of the new Russian model of rule of law state has been defined. The future will reveal what it will happen to become in reality.

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### CIVILIZATIONAL CONTACTS IN THE PAST HISTORY AS A PREREQUISITE FOR INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE IN ITS ACTUAL FORMS

If universal forms of contacts between civilizations are not taken into consideration, the conclusions concerning the dialogue of cultures in its actual forms will be incomplete and superficial. One of universal and still much determining factors is a contact between the Eastern world, on the one hand, and the ancient and later Western world, on the other hand. It is wrong to think that this universal contact has been evolving without conflicts. On the contrary, both in the past and in the present its evolution has been adversary. The dialogue of cultures as it is treated in Russia, being a topic of national philosophy, has come down to the dialogue between Russia and the West since the time of Peter the Great. But the involvement of that sort of dialogue into universal relationships, that is the background of relations between the East and the West is not usu-

ally taken into consideration. That is why important dimensions of the dialogue even between Russia and the West remain unidentified.

The necessity to raise the issue of dialogue of Russia with other countries in a new light, and in the first place, with the West became acute as early as at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and some phenomena of national art and philosophy bespeak that. However, the burning subject of the East in Russian art and philosophy can't be regarded as a specifically Russian one. The relevancy of the Eastern topic doesn't only results from the relations between Russia and the East, but also the West and the East.

The Western world is right in regarding themselves heirs and bearers of antique civilization, whose values, though perceived critically in the Middle Ages, were rehabilitated in the Renaissance period. As far as the ancient civilization is concerned, its uniqueness adopted by the West lies in its separation and alienation from the East. From impersonal nature to discovery and establishment of the individual principle. Throughout the history there has always existed a danger of losing independence and getting dissolved in the environment they had managed to tear themselves away. This idea was formulated by K. Jaspers. But there was no dissolution in the Eastern world. As is known, it didn't happen in the Hellenistic world, in the epoch of the Ancient Rome when Eastern influence appeared to be very active. All the more so, it couldn't have happened later on, in the epoch of flourishing development of the West. Not only the period of Renaissance, but, largely, the Modern period (started from the Enlightenment) excluded it.

The situation had changed by the early 20th century, considering that the crisis of Eurocentrism had been progressing since the times of Spengler. It was recognized that the concept of civilization goes beyond the values of Western civilization.

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There are many civilizations, and the Western is just one among others. When the crisis of Eurocentrism happens, the East becomes active again. Since the 19th century, the West has actively been assimilating the East. In the 20th century it became one of the most acute problems. But what is the catch in it? Either the West is trying to revitalize its culture by assimilating the East, or it testifies the beginning of dissolution in the East, which the West has always been afraid of. Considering these issues, K. Jaspers writes: 'Can we suppose that Europe will return to Asia again after having lost its peculiar features? Will it sink in its depths and unconscious levelling out?' (1). The question raised doesn't only concern the West, but Russia as well, that is viewed as part of the European world.

Russia is one of the countries that has had European oriented development in the last centuries. But in its culture Eurocentrism wasn't the only level, rather it was the latest level that has become Russian consciousness. The unconscious of Russia was formed by Byzantine and even more ancient, Eastern traditions. Russia presented itself as a Western state on the conscious level, but on the subconscious level it operated as a more complex civilizational body.

When Spengler's predecessor N. Danilevsky stated that the West had never trusted Russia in their mutual relations due to Russia's ever-lasting identity, he did not take into account another aspect that can serve as an argument in favour of this statement.

Trying to keep its identity, the West excluded its return to the Eastern world and dissolution in it. Following this complex, it did not trust and could not trust Russia to the full extent, because Russia remains to be a two-faced Janus. In some respects it appears a synonym of the East. Hence, Russia has been treated as a weak link in the confrontation between the East and West. Dissolution of the West in the East could have started from Russia. That was the reason for complications that arose in establishing the dialogue between Russia and the West.

The fact that Russia is a part of the East, can easily be proved by philosophers and historians of the Eurasian school (Vernadsky, Trubetskoy, Savitsky, Karsavin, Florovsky and others). It was they who raised the most acute issue that Russia's destiny is entwined with rather the East than the West. For instance, G. Vernadsky proved that historical process is spontaneous. It is operated by forces deeply rooted in it that are beyond people's control. On the territory of Europe development of those forces had several cycles. Every cycle was based on yet another attempt to call into being the state that can unite various ethnic groups and peoples and achieve peace in Eurasia. The first attempt of such a kind is associated with genesis of Scythian Empire that included the Slavs. Later it was followed by the Hunnic Empire and Mongolian Empire that also included the Slavs. The fourth attempt to achieve the unity of the Eurasian world was connected with the history of the Russian Empire that kept the relations with the East and included many ethnic groups who had nothing to do with the Christian world. That is why the Russians are often called the Scythians. Collapse of this fourth civilizational body as yet another form of uniting Eurasian ethnic groups was in progress at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, during the period when the Russian Empire found itself in the phase of crisis and collapse, and Russian culture went through the stage of Renaissance. According to Eurasian views, the Russian Empire should also be treated as a part of Eurasia, as Eurasian pulses keep governing later institutions that seem independent and pro-Western. Until the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries this circumstance had not been taken into consideration. Russia had been considered as a component of the Western world. The fact that Russia is a part of Eurasia had been edged out to the subconscious. Relations between Russia and the East and the Eastern core of Russia formed the contents of Russia's subconscious mind.

As a proof of this statement let's remember the reaction of critics on the novel *War and Peace* by Leo Tolstoy published in the late 19th century in France. One of the critics wrote that there was Eastern blood in Russian veins, and it meant that individual will made room for collective will. Describing the state of Pierre Bezukhov's soul, the critic compares it with the Buddhist nirvana. He considers those features of Russian psychology to be alien to the West. What stands out in the critic's reaction is the fact that he calls the Russians the Scythians. The conclusion can be drawn: the Scythian impends the Western world and tries to change it. There is some truth in calling the Russians the Scythians. There is some Iranian (Scythian) blood in Slavic veins. The historian of the Eurasian school G. Vernadsky states: historical subsurface of the Russian state was created by the Scythians. (2). The Scythian theme grows significant with a view to K. Jaspers' idea that the clue to the past and the present lies in pre-history, in pre-Axial Age. The crisis of Eurocentrism caused the activation of Russia's subconscious, i.e. the East, and the conscious, i.e. the West, of its culture, was pushed to the margins. Thus, the East became a burning topic for Russia. It happened at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries and still keeps going.

The poem 'The Scythians' by A. Blok, written in 1918, can be treated as a direct response to the critic who had found Russians Scythians in L. Tolstoy's novel. The poet records the dominance of the collective with the Russians, too, and what appeared negative for the French expert, became positive for him. That's true, Blok writes, we, Russians, are Scythians. What stands out here is the fact that Scythianism, Asianism is identified with the 'darkness', i.e. with something that had existed in pre-history, and according to K. Jaspers had existed before the Axial Age, this landmark of history that refined the 'darkness' by means of religious and philosophical ideas, new morality, which is the core essence of the Axial Age.

This acceleration of tensions by multiple repeating the word 'darkness' (something like an anthill, that is, a certain integrated unity where human specimen who failed to gain independence became soldered together), this picture is most likely to appear in the mind of a European who knows little of the roots of the matter. As K. Jaspers proves, the Axial Age concerned the East as well. The Axial Age isn't only presented by Christ, but Lao Tzu and Confucius. Apparently, this 'darkness' concerns the hordes lacking human individuality who couldn't enter the history with the Axial Age, and hence, irrevocably disappeared. The situation of the fear for the unknown and hence, something terrifying, bears the fear of the Europeans, and provokes both the repulse and attraction.

In this poem A. Blok keeps with the position traditional for Russian historiography. He treats Russia as a saviour of the West from a possible conflicts with the Eastern world that could turn out quite tragic, i.e. a saviour from absorption of the West by the East. Traditional historiography claims that but for Rus, the West would have collapsed under rush of the steppe peoples. The West could not have restrained the Mongolian aggression and would have dissolved in the world it had left in as early as the antique epoch, meaning in the East. In this case the identity that was the greatest achievement of the antique and, later, the European world would have disappeared.

But the poet warns that there can be a different situation in history when Rus will not stand as a safeguard. It is not only Rus or Russia, but a unity that among other elements includes Russia, i.e. the East, or to be more precise, the Scythians who symbolize the East. In this case, feeling in the creative rage the unity of Russian and the Eastern worlds, A. Blok anticipates, as it were, later ideas that would be brought to life by the Eurasians who consider the history of Russia as a part of a common Eurasian space.

It would be wrong to reduce the theme of the East only to this point of view. Other thinkers and artists are noticed to

emphasize the fact that Russia belongs, first of all, to the Christian world, hence to the West. This fact intensifies in relation with the Eastern challenge. Realization of a possible conflict inspires fear of the East. This complex was typical for another Russian poet, more known as a philosopher, V. Solovyov. The poem 'The Scythians' by A. Blok is preceded by an epigraph from the poem by V. Solovyov written in 1894 'Pan-Mongolism! The name is monstrous / Yet it sounds tender to my ear.' Both A. Blok and V. Solovyov emphasize the idea of hostility of the faceless East. For Solovyov the East is a 'a swarm of waking tribes', 'an unknown and alien people', and in the lines similar to those of Blok, 'a host of regiments'.

But why is the East, 'unknown and alien', impending to Rus? The poet considers it to be a retribution. It is a vengeance for then Christian, here Russian, world that neglects 'love's legacy', that is a Christian ideal. It happened once in Byzantium. Everything in this world is connected. When 'the altar of God lay cooling' in the second Rome, it provoked 'a swarm of waking tribes' in the East that led to its collapse. But neglecting 'love's legacy' can also lead to the collapse of the third Rome, that is Rus.

V. Solovyov cannot be reproached with anti-Westernism. On the contrary, his fear of the East can be explained as an idea cropped up in his mind about vanishing of Christian world that unites Russia and the West. The philosopher prophesies clash with the West that will result in vanishing of the values brought to life by Christianity, in particular, the individual principle.

So, in the Russian art and Russian philosophical thought we can detect both enthusiastic and pessimistic perception of the East. What do we mean by the term East? Does it include Islamic world, China, India and Russia that nowadays tends to affiliate itself to this world? Russian thinker L. Karsavin helps to settle out this matter. Reflecting upon the growing fashion of the East in Russia, he tends to include in the term East everything that is beyond the Christian cultural world. Within this concept of the East geographical boundaries recede into the background. L. Karsavin draws all humankind diversity into two worlds. He suggests that it was the Christian world where the synthesis of Hellenism, Judaism and Eastern religions with the Western piety took place. As far as the East is concerned, it is the territory of Islam, Buddhist culture, Hinduism, Taoism, ancient naturalistic cults of Hellenic, Roman and Barbarian religions (3).

So, as early as at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries there were in Russia two completely different concepts re-

garding the East. A century has passed since then. Which of the concepts has appeared more viable from the modern point of view? Mostly, the situation remains the same. In the ongoing turmoil caused by the crisis of Eurocentrism it would be more reasonable to stay detached from chaotic attitudes and pay attention to the reality of cultural synthesis evolving in history. First and foremost, of cultural synthesis of the East and West.

In the history that presents the history of various civilizations, this cultural synthesis has never ceased to exist. The Eastern element has always been a constituent of cultural synthesis. It could be observed even in the ancient world that strove to gain independence from the East. Obviously, the modern mentality excluded active Eastern element. But it was the Modernity in the early 20th century that encouraged the opposition in the form of romanticism. If the Modernity excluded the East, the romanticism rehabilitated it. The most striking page of the new and more sound attitude towards the East was 'West-Eastern Divan' by Goethe that had appeared under the influence of romantic attitudes and the comments on the novel in which Goethe called to reject a superficial exoticism and deepen into comprehension of Eastern spiritual worlds. This romantic tradition made a great impact on the Russian art of the 19th century. The works by Pushkin, Lermontov, Tolstoy and others prove it.

Later on, the tradition of romanticism that became active in symbolism at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries supposed to have an active attitude towards the East. However, the ideas of the Modernity appeared to be stronger than traditions of romanticism. Romantic tradition was revived in Russian art only in the period of the Thaw, that is in the middle of the '50s of the 20th century. However, as far as the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries is concerned, it is crystal clear why symbolists who made their aim to break the existing culture and create a new one, were deeply read in A. Schopenhauer and then plunged into quotes by Lao Tzu and Confucius. As early as then, all those things encouraged evolution of a great cultural synthesis in the Russian culture.

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## JUDICIAL COMMUNITY OF RUSSIA IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

If one takes for granted the statement that legal culture is an integral part of general culture of the humanity (which is really so), it may as well be said safely that court culture is a crucial part of legal culture. On the whole, the concept of the 'court culture' is multi-layered, multi-notional and to a large extent subjective. But there are no doubts that the basic agent to put this concept into effect is a judge, a direct bearer of judicial power in any state.

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The structure of modern judicial system of Russia is complicated, it consists of two subsystems, general jurisdiction courts and arbitration courts, as well as of constitutional statutory branch of judicial power that does not form the system; the system has lots of instances, its activities are regulated by several procedural codifying acts; a vast judicial practice has been formed and is still being improved, and so on, but the main driving force is 35 thousand judges who annually read into 25 million cases in court.

In accordance with Article 12 of the Federal Constitutional Law 'On the Court System of the Russian Federation' all judges in Russia shall have unitary status and shall differ among themselves solely by powers and competence.

It is quite natural that these 35 thousand judges possessing a unitary status, performing very similar professional judicial activities and constituting the judicial manpower of the country, have long felt the urge to have an organization that

could express their various and multiple interests. It is not the least natural that in foreign countries with their totally different forms of government and types of judicial systems, the judges face the same problems. And it can be a matter of course that in the present context of globalization national governmental issues of association of direct representatives of the judicial power are solved on the international legal basis.

What is the judicial community of our country? Is the concept 'judicial community' a synonym to the term 'judicial manpower'?

It goes without saying that the whole judicial manpower consists of the judges who, despite their unitary legal status (this is a law aspect), have a common or, at least, very close professional ideology, a common legal culture, and so on (this is a cultural aspect in its broad sense). In contrast to it, judicial community of the Russian Federation, as is formulated in Article 1 of the Federal Law 'On Bodies of Judicial Community of the Russian Federation' dated from March, 14, 2002, is constituted from judges of federal courts of all types and levels, judges of the courts of constituent entities of the Russian Federation that form a court system of the Russian Federation. And this judicial community, in order to express the interests of judges as agents of judicial power, makes bodies of the judicial community, and the basic ones are the following bimodal (federal and of constituent entities) bodies: the All-Russian Congress of Judges and conferences of the judges of constituent entities of the Russian Federation; the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation; the Council of Judges of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and councils of the judges of constituent entities of the Russian Federation; the Supreme Qualification Collegium of Judges of the Russian Federation and Qualification Collegium of Judges of the Russian Federation (hereinafter QCJ); the Supreme Examining Board of the Qualification Exam for a Judge and similar boards of constituent entities of the Russian Federation; and also general assemblies of court judges (this list is classified).

The Federal Law mentioned above enshrines the basic tasks of the bodies of the judicial community, among which are the following: to protect the rights and interests of judges, to provide judicial activities with organizational, personnel and resource support, and so on. Obviously, the judicial manpower itself is not targeted at solving those issues, the non-judicial-community judges are not able to solve them.

Thus, one can conclude that the judicial community of the Russian Federation differs from the judicial manpower by self-organization in order to solve the issues stated above. The judicial community as such was gradually, rather than spontaneously, evolving in Russia, and at its beginning it was initiated in the late '80s of the last century, at least, the first bodies created by the judicial community on the regional level date back to that time. Undoubtedly, Russian judges of that period were influenced by the slogan that was stirring up all strata of society: 'Everything which is not forbidden is allowed.'

Both in the past and present neither the whole judicial community of Russia nor any of its bodies can be considered as either the bodies of judicial power or elements of the court system or the structures that provide delivery of justice, and so on.

At the same time both judicial community of our country and its elements and bodies constitute the institute of the civil society, and in this context, its has sound prospects for development. The Constitutional basis in this case is, first and foremost, articles 13 (part 4), 19 (part 2), 30 (part 1), 32 (parts 1, 5) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation that declared the following: the right to association; public associations shall be equal before the law; the equality of rights and freedoms of man and citizen, regardless of membership of public associations; the right to participate in managing state affairs both di-

rectly and through their representatives and the right to participate in administering justice, and so on.

But it is imperative that neither judicial community nor its element and bodies belong to either bodies of the government, or federal bodies or the ones of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, they can neither belong to the bodies of municipal power. Although they perform certain quite serious governmental function on the legal basis. And in some issues, such as employment of the judges, the role of the bodies of the judicial community cannot be overestimated, for example, according to governmental authorities of one of the most important bodies of the judicial community of the Russian Federation – QCJ, none of the state judges in the country, excluding the judges of Constitutional statutory branch of judicial power, can be benched by anyone without a positive reference from QCJ.

Are they public associations in the classical sense?

They aren't either, as membership of judges in the judicial community isn't optional in our country: the judges do not enter the community, but are automatically included in it after the oath of judges' abjuration, and under no circumstances can they leave the community on their own accord as long as they serve as judges (including retired judges), while voluntary participation in any social association is its corner stone. However, elective governing bodies typical to social associations, are present here, too – all bodies of the judicial community, as well as governing structures of those bodies, are formed on elective basis, mostly by secret ballot. Neither the judicial community and its elements, nor any body of the judicial community have either a Charter, or membership fees, they are not a legal body, but all these are integral features of a public associations.

How does the judicial community position itself? The decree of the second All-Russian Congress of Judges dated from June, 30, 1993 'On Judicial Reform of the Russian Federation' states: 'Judicial community is not a trade union, neither is it a social associations that complies with its own needs. Its role shall not be reduced to protection of rights and legal interests of the judges and to establishment of their independency, because the independence of judges is a means to establish independent, strong and fair court.' And the decree of the Presidium of the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation dated from February, 12, 1997 'In Connection with Establishment of Professional Holiday of the Judicial Personnel "Day of Justice"' stated: 'The judicial power is not a professional industrial facility or department, but is an independent entity of the governmental power of the Russian Federation, while the judicial community is not a professional union of the members, but a corporation of bearers of the governmental (judicial) power.'

Thus the judicial community in our country treats itself as a corporation of bearers of the judicial power rather than a public association; membership is through registration, without optional logging in and out; the rate of governmental functions in the content competence of the main bodies of the judicial community is large.

What is the situation with the judicial community like abroad? Various forms of the bodies of the judicial community are functioning there. It is not rare that exclusive functions of QCJ do not only belong to a single body of the judicial community, but to two or more structures, for instance, in the Republic of Armenia the Disciplinary Commission operates alongside with the Council of Justice; in the Republic of Kazakhstan together with the Supreme Judicial Council, the Qualification Collegium of Justice and disciplinary qualification collegia function, as well as the Commission of Judicial Ethics and so on.

The main difference between various forms of foreign structures of the judicial community that perform practically the same functions as, for instance, QCJ in our country, and Russian bodies of the judicial community, and, first and foremost, QCJ, is the fact that the foreign bodies are totally elected

or appointed by their parliaments, for example, in Romania all members of the Judicial Council, who are judges or prosecutors, are appointed by the parliament of the state; other bodies are constituted of a great number of representatives of legislative and executive branches of governmental power, for example, in Italy, Lithuania, Poland, France and so on; or among their leading members are President of the State or the Minister of Justice or Chairman of the Supreme Court. For example, the chairman of the Supreme Council of Magistrates in France is the President of the Republic of France on the basis of the fact that he is a guarantor of independence of a judicial power, while a vice chairman of the Council of Justice is the Minister of Justice.

Thus, in most cases, foreign structures of the judicial community cannot be considered, in the way we understand this term, the bodies of the judicial community itself, because, in one way or the other, the representatives of legislative and executive governmental power dominate there, apart from that, quite often the representatives of judicial power – the judges – are not elected to the bodies by other judges, but are appointed by the President of the State, or by the Parliament or any of its chambers. And even in the case when the number of the judges elected to the members of such bodies by other judges prevails, ‘common’ judges can hardly have the majority of votes during the discussion of and an open ballot on some issues.

For example, in accordance to the Article 187 of the Constitution of Poland, the National Council of the Judicial System of the country consists of: the Minister of Justice, First Chairman of the Supreme Court; the Chairman of the Supreme Administrative Court; the person appointed by the President of the country; four members elected by the Sejm from the deputies; two senators elected by the Senate and 15 judges elected from the body of judges of general jurisdiction, military and administrative courts, and it is hardly correct to consider ‘common’ judges equal to the heads of the Supreme courts of the country when discussing non-judicial issues.

It should also be pointed out that there is a more significant difference between Russian and several foreign bodies of the judicial community, as in our country their status is not enshrined in the Constitution, while in many countries abroad it is the other way around. For example, in the Republic of Bulgaria the Supreme Judicial Council is founded on Article 130 of the Constitution; in Italy the Supreme Council of Magistrates on Article 186 of the Constitution; in Spain the General Council of the Legislative Power on parts 2 and 3 of Article 122 of the Constitution; in the Ukraine the Supreme Council of Justice on Article 131 of the Constitution and so on.

But in terms of the issue concerned, the main difference is the fact that in most foreign countries among the bodies of the judicial community there exist public associations of judges with free membership.

What does international legal regulation with respect to the bodies of the judicial community declare?

First of all, we should point out clause 19 of the Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985, in accordance to which the judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional training and to protect their judicial independence. This statement, is virtually, duplicated by Principle of the Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States On Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges, adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on October, 13, 1994 at the 518th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies of the Council of Europe that states as follows: ‘Judges should be free to form associations which, either alone or with another body, have the

task of safeguarding their independence and protecting their interests.’

As far as QCJ is concerned in respect to its content competence, the European Charter on the statute for judges (Strasbourg, 8–10 July 1998), states in clause 1.3 as follows: ‘In respect of every decision affecting the selection, recruitment, appointment, career progress or termination of office of a judge, the statute envisages the intervention of an authority independent of the executive and legislative powers within which at least one half of those who sit are judges elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest representation of the judiciary.’ It should be pointed out that as is Explanatory Memorandum states, The Charter is therefore not an end in itself but rather a means of guaranteeing that the individuals whose rights are to be protected by the courts and judges have the requisite safeguards on the effectiveness of such protection. Hence, QCJ, first and foremost, is also a means of guaranteeing the individuals the effectiveness of rights to be protected by Russian judges.

Alongside with that, it is necessary to mark off that clause 1.4 of the Charter that states as follows: The statute gives to every judge who considers that his or her rights under the statute, or more generally his or her independence, or that of the legal process, are threatened or ignored in any way whatsoever, the possibility of making a reference to such an independent authority, with effective means available to it of remedying or proposing a remedy, – due to imperfection of corresponding administrative legal mechanisms in our country is difficult to carry out.

At the international level, in respect to international legal basis of organization and activities of national bodies of the judicial community, an important role belongs to international associations of national bodies of the judicial community. In this regard, one organization is worth mentioning, the International Association of Judges (hereinafter IAJ) that was founded in Salzburg (Austria) in 1953 as a professional, non-political, international organization, (clause 1, article 2 of the IAJ Constitution states: ‘The Association does not have any political or trade-union character’, and clause 4 of the same article claims: ‘All members of the Association must be apolitical.’) grouping national associations of judges, membership in which can be authorised by the Central Council. The object of the IAJ is to safeguard the independence of the judicial authority, as an essential requirement of the judicial function and guarantee of human rights and freedom.

It is worth noting that the IAJ, whose members number 77 national associations of judges and country judges teams from all over the world, has a consultative status both with the UN and the Council of Europe. The bodies of the judicial community of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine have recently become member of the IAJ. However, the bodies of the judicial community of Russia are neither members of this international judiciary association nor of any others. Why?

In the Republic of Kazakhstan, in accordance with the provisions of chapter 7 of the Constitution and a number of other legislative acts, the following bodies of the judicial community are founded and operating: the Supreme Judicial Council, the Qualification Collegium of Justice and bimodal disciplinary qualification collegia (republican and regional ones); the Union of Judges. The membership of the IAJ is admitted to the latter body, the Union of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan, founded on December, 19, 1996 by the first Congress of Judges of that country, operating under the Charter of the Republican Public Association ‘the Union of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan’. By authority of the Charter (registered in the Ministry of Justice) the Union of Judges is a non-profit organization in the form of public association with the republican status, established by the citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan and operating for the purpose of implementation and protection of the

interests of Judges Community. The Charter states that the Union of Judges shall operate based upon principles of voluntariness, equality of its members, democracy, self-administration, legality, accountability and publicity; that Union's Membership shall be voluntary. An individual willing to join the Union shall submit an application to the Council of branch and the admitted member of the Union shall be issued a membership card; that the Union is a legal body, has bank accounts, stamp with its own name and independent balance sheet and so on.

But none of legislative acts of the republic of Kazakhstan, not the Charter of the Union of Judges do not obligate the union with performing any governmental functions. But even these two basic original provisions did not provide the membership in the IAJ for the Union of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan instantaneously on the spot, in 2004 it was admitted as an extraordinary member (inferior, without a voting right) of the IAJ, and only in September 2011 in its 54th meeting as a result of secret ballot vote the IAJ admitted the Union of Judges of the Republic of Kazakhstan as an ordinary member (that is, a full one).

The same meeting of the IAJ admitted as its ordinary member the Association of Judges of the Ukraine, which is an All-Ukrainian Public Organization.

It is worth noting that the Association of Judges of the Ukraine is not included in the range of bodies of judicial self-government, listed in the Bill of the Ukraine from May, 31, 2010 No. 6450 'On the Judicial System and Status of Judges', however, neither the Supreme Council of Justice, nor the Supreme Qualification Commission of the Judges of the Ukraine that both possess governmental authorities in that country are on the list.

The IAJ also has regional structures – groups, for example the European Association of Judges (the Consultative Council of European Judges – CCJE – adopted a very important document – Report to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, dated from 19 November, 2002 'On the principles and rules governing judges' professional conduct, in particular ethics, incompatible behaviour and impartiality'), the Association of European Administrative Judges (AEAJ), whose charter was adopted on 24 March, 2002, and other groups. On 27 December, 1997 the heads of judicial communities of Central Asian states signed the declaration on Establishment of International Association of Judges of Central Asian countries, but this initiative had no further effect.

Why, then, regarding that the Russian Federation, its governmental bodies, public, cultural, academic, sporting, educational and other organizations and structures are oriented on membership in international organizations, non of the bodies of the judicial community is admitted as a member to international (worldwide and regional) associations of judges?

The reason is unlikely in the fact that the special 6th chapter, called 'Bodies of the Judicial Community' of a very important international legal act, the model Code on Judicial System and Status of Judges for the CIS Member Nations, adopted on the thirty sixth Plenary Session of the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS Member Nations (Provision No. 36–12 of 16 May, 2011) states nothing about possibility for national bodies of the judicial community to be adopted to international associations.

One should distinguish between the terms of the judicial community and the bodies founded by them in order to carry forward their aims. The judicial community of the country in itself is founded originally, automatically, without any declaration of judges' intention, without elections of judges by judges; that is a disorganized judicial manpower. But the associations of judges of courts of any level are organised in the same way, originally, without any declaration of judges' intention, without elections of judges by judges, and federal laws on the bodies of judicial community of the Russian Federation call these

associations, as was shown above, among others, the bodies of judicial community.

That's why general meetings of the judges of courts (any ones, including 7500 Justices of the Peace who have neither right nor a possibility to participate in general meetings, which is a serious problem) should not be considered as bodies of judicial community, but rather as its basic elements, and if to treat the whole all-national judicial community as a system, they will constitute its links. While the bodies of judicial community will be founded with the help and on the basis self-organized elements, by means of elections, quite often, multi-tiered ones and with secret ballot voting of either the whole judicial community of the country or of its elements (links) of a certain court within the structure, in order to solve the required tasks. The bodies of judicial community, in their turn, in order to solve more specific, particular tasks will found other bodies of the judicial community, and so on. For example, the whole Russian judicial community periodically, once in 4 years, elects delegates to the All-Russian Congress of Judges (there have been summoned 7 congresses with the first on October, 17-18, 1991, that is, long before the congress became legislatively enshrined); the congress elects the Council of the Judges of the Russian Federation; the Council elects the Presidium of the Council, the commissions of the Council etc.

It should be pointed out that, firstly, the judicial community (its basic elements) nowadays periodically initiates non-typical bodies, not enshrined in the Federal Law on the bodies of the judicial community, among such bodies one can name the Association of Justices of the Peace that has operated in Rostov Oblast since 2008; in the Republic of Khakassia the Council of Veterans – retired judges (this provision was sanctioned by the decree of the Council of Judges of the Republic of Khakassia No. 1-P dated from March, 27, 2009); in Tyumen Oblast the Centre of advance training for magistrates, which operates exclusively on a pro-bono basis and was founded by the judicial community of the region, and so on. But all these structures are regional rather than national and invariably (a) their foundation is initiated by the judges and (b) they do not perform any, even minimal, governmental functions.

Still, all-Russian bodies of judicial community, founded by the entire judicial community of the country, or by its regional links (that is, founded by the juridical community constituted by the judges-members on a registrative, non-voluntary bare vested by the state with considerable governmental functions, including standard-setting ones. In relation to which, the issue of the legal status of the judicial community has another stumbling rock: to what extent are the decisions taken by the bodies of the judicial community – with each body operating within the limits enshrined by the law and associative regulations of the judicial community – obligatory (a) for judges; (b) for heads of courts; (c) for the court clerks who are state or municipal officers; (d) for the public and public associations, including commercial structures; (e) for the authoritative bodies of other branches of governmental power and for the bodies of municipal authorities? To tell the truth, neither the legislative acts, nor corporate acts of the judicial community can answer these (and similar) question.

One of the basic features to characterize the legislative status of the judicial community and its bodies in our country, the feature that touches upon the problem stated above, is undoubtedly, the fact that decisions of all those bodies entailing legal consequences for citizens, including judges, can be appealed to the court. An important consideration is the fact that such decisions of the judicial community, which someone can qualify these decision as violating his rights and/or freedoms or as raising obstacles to carry out rights and/or freedoms, are not judicial acts; hence they cannot be reviewed in appellate instances.

Anyway, such considerate governmental authorities and registrative (non-voluntary) membership prevents our bodies of the judicial community from bearing the status of independent, based on free membership public associations of judges. It also prevents them from being admitted as members of the IAJ and other institutions.

Do the Russian judges have the objective urge to found public association of judges (a) based on free membership of judges; (b) on all-national scale; (c) without vesting them with governmental functions?

On the one hand, entirely for the purpose of becoming a member of the IAJ and/or other similar international structures the answer is negative. But, on the other hand, the fact that at least 77 countries (the number of the IAJ members) have this urge can't denote its absence with the Russian judges, on the contrary, national judges have the same opinion on this matter as foreign ones. What could public – voluntary – association of judges of Russian do for its members that can't be done by the present bodies of the judicial community for a variety of reasons? First and foremost, to perform the role that the trade unions once used to play and perform. Theoretically the trade union protects the interests of an employee from the employer; theoretically, the trade union of the court, as a part of the judicial manpower of the court, protects the interests of judges from their governing body (the chairmen of courts and their deputies). The chairmen of courts of corresponding levels cannot be elected to bimodal bodies of judicial community that perform governmental functions (the Councils of Judges, QCJ and examination boards); the fact that the deputies of chairmen of courts of corresponding levels take part in them discredits their carrying forward governmental functions and makes it impossible to protect of interests of the judges from the governing bodies of the courts where the judges serve.

However, in some cases, having favourable possibilities, the interests (and rights) of the judicial manpower of a regional court (protecting rights and interests of judges in disciplinary and other proceedings is out of question) are protected by a federal body of a judicial community, that is, not by a body of the judicial community of its own level. Meanwhile, the regional branch of the All-Russian Association of Judges (be it

founded as a public organization with free membership of exclusively 'common' judges and without vesting any governmental authorities to it) could cope with the task of protecting both the judicial manpower of the court and 'common' judges concerning their relations with the governing body of the court, and could perform a number of other functions that remain non-performed nowadays.

One should also bear in mind the amount of undeveloped opportunities of the judicial manpower of Russia, being a team of judges, it, in the name of the judges, possesses outstanding exclusive knowledge, experience, information and so on about drawback of judicial power and ways to eliminate them, about problems and ways to solve them. Who but the judges knows the real situation concerning both the present judicial system and with the established case law (and, in a broader sense, with law-enforcement practice) together with procedural gaps of legal proceedings and the compositions of the judicial manpower? Speaking from a methodological point of view, judicial activities of a judge are, in a way, scientific and research activities. That is, basically, the judicial manpower can create a scientifically-justified concept how to improve the quality and effectiveness of the system of justice, having created a corresponding system of standards, criteria, conditions, indicators and evidences.

The area of 'protective' and other activities of this All-Russian Association would also cover the justices of the peace who are not members of any court team, and hence, do not take part in general meetings of court judges, which at present limits their rights in matter.

But the outlet itself to the international level of associations of national judges is a crucial task to perform, too. Nowadays Russia actively takes part in judicial activities of a number of international courts, with its judges benching as part of: the International Court of the UN, the European Court on Human Rights (in Strasburg), Economic Court of the CIS (in Minsk), the Court of the Eurasian Economic Community (in Minsk). The all-Russian public association of judges should reach and operate on the same level (that is, both on an global level as a member of the IAJ, and on a regional international one by means of founding principally new structures, for example, the Association of judges alliances).

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## MULTICULTURALISM AND THE PROSPECTS OF STATE DEVELOPMENT

Nowadays the issues of multiculturalism become pressing because of the attempts to solve the bunch of problems connected with the necessity to form new principles of interaction between peoples and ethnic groups in Russia. The term 'multiculturalism' is understood by many as a 'poly-culture'. Poly-culture is immanently characteristic of Russia, which was initially formed as a union of many non-Slavic

tribes and unites today more than one hundred ethnic groups. Meanwhile, multiculturalism has a different meaning. It is not only a statement of diverse ethnic population structure of the country and equal rights for all its peoples, but also a specific political model. The phenomenon of multiculturalism was shaped in the USA, the country that declares most logically the necessity to follow the principles of liberalism and democracy.

These principles were stated in the very first US documents – the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence – that allowed this country to get over ethnic and socio-economic fragmentation of regions and citizens. These main-frame documents let America to develop intensively and to build one of the most effective economies based on the effective national-ethnic policy and its citizens to be involved into production process regardless of their ethnicity. Provision of all the US citizens – locals and newcomers – with jobs, possibility to profess its basic principles and to share predominant values became a significant social benefit that all migrants tried to get hold of, for it gave them an opportunity to integrate into this civil law system and to enjoy these rights.

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America has entered a post-industrial and information stage being one of the richest and economically successful countries. This aroused new political questions aimed to humanize the state system. One of these questions was multiculturalism which develops the principle of 'political correctness' and supports different minorities, including the ethnic ones. It is important to stress, that the idea of multiculturalism has replaced the model of the 'melting pot' aimed at involving members of all communities into a state-building process. In the situation of reaching economic sustainability, when it became possible for the state to support the unemployed population through the system of subsidies, part of the citizens used their right in order to follow their traditional way of life, keep their language, observe their rites etc.

This led to the creation of numerous migrant communities which had no desire to assimilate into American culture and were ready to continue their habitual way of life. There was a situation threatening the state integrity, because one part of the society compared their ideals not to the general civil ideals but to the ideals that existed inside these separate communities and reflected their traditional way of life. In practice it showed up in the weakening of the English language as a national language and in the possibility to communicate in Chinese, Indian, Spanish (the latter is the second official language in the Southern states); in the weakening of the institution of general education, when 60 million Americans are unable to read a newspaper's front page, and 37% of Washington citizens read at the level of a third grade schoolchild; in the validation of the right of 'double standards'.

At the same time some smaller peoples are authorized with the priority right to control the territory of their traditional residence, which can lead to their commercial use (taking part in the incorporation of the pipelines in Canada or casinos in the USA); legally privileged position (two members of the Aboriginal church in America were fired for taking hallucinogenic peyote and later on fully rehabilitated); the right to privatize spiritual inheritance of their peoples (the demands of Vernon Masayeva to the anthropological museums in the USA to prohibit the access to the documents about Hopi, which were supported by the Apache and Zia Pueblo tribes). Favourable decisions in a number of similar questions were received critically by the general democratic public because they undermine the basic principles of a liberal society.

That is why multiculturalism as a paradigm of state construction and solution of ethno-confessional problems was vigorously criticized by scientists and politicians. S. Benhabib was

the most consistent, she showed that multiculturalism breaks the principles of liberalism and the practice of giving rights and privileges on the basis of group belonging undermines economical, political and legal equality. Single-sided concessions of some groups of citizens to the others slackens the state, weakens it and gives birth to the phenomenon of cultural communities localization, which leads to their segregation.

All these can be traced in the political life of European states, at the time of the approaching second wave of the world crisis and European currency weakening, at the time of social conflicts in Northern Africa and Middle East, which intensified migration pressure on Europe, the first persons of these states have formulated a thesis about inadmissibility of localization of ethnic groups existing independently within the national state and not sharing values and the way of life dominating there. The localities which principle of existence is ghettoisation and cultural isolation bear potential risks of terrorist development and are aimed against the principles accepted by the majority. For Europe, these processes signify the loss of that feeling of European identity, common destiny and spiritual kinship that firmly existed almost since the Early Modern Period.

Thus, the inefficiency of the policy of multiculturalism signifies the necessity to search for another model which can meet the demands of the time because the model of the 'minorities' is one of the political means of their artificial supporting and suppression of the possibilities of not only dominating ethnic groups but of the state itself, where the civil unity starts to unity of ethnic groups, regions and confessions. Today some scientists and politicians offer an assimilation model, however this way cannot be viewed as an optimal either, because it presumes that one culture will be swallowed by another and the donor-culture will lose its meanings and values, they will be replaced by the values of the leading recipient culture.

To achieve the unity of civil society, the most effective way seems to be the model of a national state that has already been tested and is believed by many to have become obsolete. In my opinion, the national state based on the common national culture, involving all the ethno-cultural varieties equal in rights is still viable and is the only way to provide effective economical and social development of the nation. The ability of a national culture to refrain from the logic of hostility and to maintain the logic of compromise and cooperation, based on mutual acceptance of the ideologies and cultures, is aimed at preventing different confrontations between peoples and diverse social cataclysms, both local and global, and therefore correlates with such a notion as 'a new peace culture'.

**A. B. Kudelin<sup>1</sup>**

## LITERARY INTERRELATIONS OF THE WEST AND THE EAST IN THE 19TH CENTURY AND FORMATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 'WORLD LITERATURE'

The topic of literary interrelations has from time immemorial been paid great attention to by the world comparative stud-

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ies, i.e. by experts in comparative studies of literature. In their scholarly research into ways of solving the set problems and deciding specific questions scholars placed a priority now on the vector the West – the East, then on the vector the East- the West, thus they did not immediately become aware of the fact that both vectors are important in the opposition the East – the West. And only equal research interest in both vectors, i.e. interpreting relations as interrelations and interaction of the East and the West can provide grounds for gaining adequate understanding of the world literary process of this or that epoch. Thereupon I would remind the words of academician Nikolai Iosifovich Konrad which he uttered over half a century ago, in 1959. Noting the fact that theorists of literature of the countries of the East are well aware of the importance of literatures of the West penetrating into their countries in the 17th – 19th cen-

turies he insisted: 'The links were mutual, and this fact is not taken into appropriate account in works of Western theorists of literature when analyzing the process of development of literature in the mentioned centuries. 'The West-Eastern Divan' by Goethe is well known and has been studied, but is it properly appraised that a German poet turned to the East, and it happened not only in a very serious moment of his own life but in an extremely important moment of the entire history of the new European literature – the moment of its transition from the literature of the Enlightenment to the literature of the Capitalist age?'<sup>1</sup>

In this statement Konrad refers to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749 – 1832) and this reference is rather significant, as it was the great German poet who at the beginning of the 19th century in his works, like no one before, tried to show how important the literary heritage of the East was for the West. In May, 1815 he wrote to one of his correspondents: 'I have been studying the *Eastern literature* in silence for a long time (italics added. – A.K.) and to gain a deeper understanding of it I created many works being inspired by the East. My intention is to easily incorporate the West and the East, the past and the present, the Persian and the German for customs and ways of thinking to flow into one another'.<sup>2</sup> What is the point of my speaking about it? The matter is that in our consciousness we often come back to Rudyard Kipling's words, namely: 'East is East, and West is West, and never the twain shall meet, till Earth and Sky stand presently at God's great Judgement Seat.' Goethe's words run counter to what Kipling said. And it appears to me that Goethe's position is closer to us...

So, in 1815 Goethe said that he wanted to create many works in the spirit of the East. Reviewer of the 'West-Eastern Divan', the first edition of which came out in 1819, the famous Ludwig Kosegarten – a very good orientalist, points out: 'In its first part, mostly referring to the Muslim East "Divan" contains West-Eastern poetic works, i.e. partly these works relate eastern material in western forms, and partly western material in the forms of eastern poetry.'<sup>3</sup>

Goethe's reference to the East was not unexpected, as practically, theoretically and philosophically the foundations for this had been laid long before the poet was born. The famous Russian researcher, an expert in German literature Sergey Vasilyevich Turayev said: 'Goethe's ideas fell on the prepared ground: the process of their formation started as early as in the 18th century and to some extent it became visible even earlier, at the end of the 17th century.'<sup>4</sup> And here we should first of all remind of the prominent role of Johann Herder (1744–1803), in whose works there is a philosophical interpretation of the timeless ideological and aesthetic value of the culture of the East, the conceptual grounds of the idea of the 'world literature' are worked out, and, in particular, the statement of literary autonomy and equality, of the independence of the development of literatures with their interaction with one another. However, what has been said in no way detracts from the merits of Herder's contemporary and the follower of his ideas – Goethe who made a lot of efforts to open up the propaganda of the heritage of the East in West-European literary practice and who later formulated the concept 'the world literature'.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Konrad N. I. *Problemy sovremennogo sravnitel'nogo literaturovedeniya* (1959) // Konrad N. I. *Zapad i Vostok* (Issues of Modern Comparative Literary Studies) // N. I. Konrad. *The West and the East*: 2nd edition, amended and supplemented. Moscow, 1972, pp. 301–302.

<sup>2</sup> Cit. from Mikhailov A. V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan Gjote: smysl i forma* // Gjote I. V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan by Goethe: the sense and the form // Goethe J. W. *The West-Eastern Divan*.) Moscow, 1988. P. 713.

<sup>3</sup> Kosegarten J.G.L. *Recenzija 'Zapadno-vostochnogo divana' Gjote* // Gjote I. V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The Review of Goethe's 'West-Eastern Divan' // Goethe J.W. *The West-Eastern Divan*. P. 502. (The review was published in 1819).

<sup>4</sup> Turayev S.V. *Gjote i formirovanie koncepcii mirovoj literatury*. (Goethe and formation of the concept of the world literature). Moscow, 1989. P.5.

<sup>5</sup> For details see: Braginsky I.S. *Zapadno-vostochnyj sintez v 'Divane' Gjote* // Gjote I. V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern synthesis in

In 1827 basing upon the experience of his work on 'West-Eastern Divan' Goethe interprets the conditions which, according to him, are necessary for this concept to emerge. I am quoting here Goethe: 'What I call the world literature appears mostly when the distinctive features of one nation are levelled out by way of getting to know other nations and forming opinions about them.'<sup>6</sup>

In their works numerous researchers determine the stages of formation of Goethe's concept of world literature, its main points and its complicated destiny is the history of world culture.<sup>7</sup> The concept 'the world literature' first appears in Goethe's conversation with J.P. Eckermann, his secretary, on the 31st of January, 1827. There even exists a specific work by J. P. Eckermann, *Conversations with Goethe in the Last Years of His Life*. And four days before Goethe wrote to Berlin to advisor Schtepfus: 'I am convinced that the world literature is under formation and that all nations are inclined to it, so they will take friendly steps.' In the selection of Goethe's quotations one comes across the notion 'the world literature' 20 times.<sup>8</sup> However, Eckermann's papers were published four years after Goethe's death, so it took a long time for his concept of the world literature to become part of the world study of literature.

I would like to specify what the term 'world literature' is currently understood to be. For instance, a Slovak expert D. Durisin can see three meanings of this term. The first meaning is the whole range of histories of separate national literatures; the second one is the selection of the most significant works created within national literatures; the third one is the whole set of works which are interconnected or identical for all literatures.<sup>9</sup> The latter is Goethe's interpretation.

It is known that Goethe had become interested in the East, Eastern Literature, first of all in Arabic and Persian literature, long before 'Divan' was brought out; this interest was roused by the common philoorientalist atmosphere of that time, i.e. the atmosphere of love for the East. Goethe's passion for the East was so great that it even involved Eastern calligraphy. In 'Goethe's Eastern papers' there is a typical note of 1817. I am quoting: 'As the art of writing is so important in the East, it is unlikely to seem strange that without studying languages properly I busied myself with calligraphy and thoroughly reproduced Eastern manuscripts available to me for fun and in earnest.'<sup>10</sup>

On the whole, the Arab art of writing, which Goethe took so seriously, echoed in 'The West-Eastern Divan'. For example, as early as on the 23rd of January 1815 Goethe wrote to Friedrich Christoph Schlosser about the Arab culture: 'Probably, there is not another language in which the spirit, the word and the writing are so inherently composed in a single body.'<sup>11</sup>

Goethe's 'Divan' // Goethe J.W. *The West-Eastern Divan*. PP. 572-573; Turayev S.V. Op. cit., pp. 51-53.

<sup>6</sup> Cit. from Mikhailov A.V. Op. cit., p. 668. For details see: Turayev S.V. Op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>7</sup> We will only mention some works of Russian scholars: Kessel' L. M. *Gjote i 'Zapadno-vostochnyj divan'* (Goethe and the West-Eastern Divan). Moscow, 1973; Braginsky I. S. Op. cit. Mikhailov A. V. *Gjote i poezija Vostoka // Vostok-Zapad*. (Goethe and the poetry of the East // The East – the West). Moscow, 1985. Col. 2; Idem. *'Zapadno-vostochnyj divan' Gjote...* (The West-Eastern Divan of Goethe...); Turayev S.V. Op. cit. There you can find bibliographic references to works of foreign scholars.

<sup>8</sup> Turayev S.V. Op. cit., p. 4.

<sup>9</sup> Durisin D. *Teorija sravnitel'nogo izuchenija literatury* (Theory of Comparative Studies of Literature). Moscow, 1979. P. 83.

<sup>10</sup> Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan. Iz vostochnyh bumag Gjote* (The West-Eastern Divan. From Goethe's Eastern papers). P. 450. It is known that Goethe ordered some eastern manuscripts from Weimar Library (Ibid. Notes. P. 951). The verses (*ayats*) from the Koran copied by Goethe and his other experiments in Arabic calligraphy are published in various editions of 'Divan'.

<sup>11</sup> Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). P. 649. Later this Goethe's idea was developed in the world science (for details see: Mikhailov A.V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan Gjote...* (The West-Eastern Divan by Goethe...) P. 650; Kudelin A.B. *Srednevekovaja arabskaja graficheskaja kul'tura: ot izobrazitel'nyh figur k risunochnomu pis'mu // Arabskaja literatura: Pojetika. Stilistika. Tipologija. Vzaimosvjazi*. (Medieval Arab graphic culture: from graphic figures to picture writing // Arabic literature: Poetics. Stylistics. Typology. Interconnections). Moscow, 2003.

The German poet tried to realize this idea yet in the first edition of 'The Divan' in 1819.

However, it should be mentioned here that to a certain extent Goethe was led to philoorientalism by his authoritarian predecessors. In this context one of the first names to mention is the name of the orientalist Joseph von Hammer (1774 – 1856). His 6-volume fundamental work 'Treasures of the East' (Vienna, 1809-1856), the full translation of 'The Divan' by Hafez (1813), 'History of the fine rhetorical arts of Persia' (1818) and other works on the history of literature of the East in that period made a great impact on the author of 'The West-Eastern Divan'<sup>1</sup>.

For instance, it is known that J. Hammer's epigraph to 'Treasures', which he borrowed from the Koran, determined a lot in Goethe's work and became its tenor as it turned out to be absolutely in tune with the frame of mind of the German poet in that period. J. Hammer's work has the quotation from the Koran on its cover: 'Sag: Gottes ist der Orient, und Gottes ist der Occident; Er leitet, wen er will, den wahren Pfad' (translated from German: 'Say: To God belongs the East and the West: He guides whoever wills in a straight path'<sup>2</sup>).

J. Hammer's influence also was reflected in the appearance of Goethe's work. The Austrian scholar's work mentioned above, besides the German title 'Fundgruben des Orients' (The Treasures of the East) on its front page also had a spectacular Arabic title on a separate page. The Arabic title was made in the spirit of classical Eastern poetry with the use of rhymed, metrical prose:

Mahzan al-kunuz al-mashrikiyya  
Va-ma'din ar-rumuz al-ajnabiyya.<sup>3</sup>  
(The storage of Eastern treasures  
and the fount of outlandish symbols).

Goethe followed this example and also gave his work two titles – German 'West-östlicher' (according to the edition of 1819, later – östlicher) Divan' (The West-Eastern Divan) and Arabic:

Ad-Divan ash-sharkiyyi-l-mu'allif al-garbiy.<sup>4</sup>  
(Eastern Divan // by a Western Writer.)

So, Goethe's 'West-Eastern Divan' edited in 1819 had two titles, which, in his view, were of equal worth, and it also had two beginnings. You know that an Arabic book does not open in the same way as a European one: Arabic script is written from right to left, not from left to right, that is why there also is another title, with which the book opens as though 'from the end'.

So, Goethe's work had an Arabic title: 'Eastern Divan by a Western Writer'. It is an easy matter to notice that neither in the first, nor in the second case the Arabic title is identical to the German one. That is neither Hammer nor Goethe has identity in the two titles. Notably Hammer knew the Arabic and Persian languages perfectly, and he deliberately chose this title; Goethe spoke Arabic a little worse, but he consulted orientalists. You know that when foreign books are adapted titles can change. Then the finding that the titles are not identical becomes a start-

<sup>1</sup> See the article and notes made by Goethe about Hammer and the commentary on the contents by A.V. Mikhailov in: Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). P.p. 321-324; Ibid. From Goethe's Eastern papers. PP 462-464; Ibid. Notes. Pp. 804-805, 851 and elsewhere. In particular, A.V. Mikhailov remarks that 'History of the fine rhetorical arts of Persia' gave 'the decisive momentum for completion of the 'West-Eastern Divan' (Ibid, p. 851).

<sup>2</sup> Translated into Russian by A.V. Mikhailov (Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). Notes. P. 727); compare it to the modern translation from Arabic (The Koran: 2; 142): 'Say: And God's is the East and God's is the West: He guides whoever wills in a straight path!' (The Koran / transl. into Russian and commented on by I.Y. Krachkovsky. 2nd ed., Moscow, 1986). See important notes in this context: Braginsky I.S. Op. cit. P. 581, 584.

<sup>3</sup> Our breaking the title into two lines corresponds to the Arabic title of J. Hammer's work. The rhymed clauses in the Arabic title are given in bold. These clauses (along with the isometric quality of the lines of the text) are one of the two constitutive elements of the poetics of rhymed, metric prose (Saj').

<sup>4</sup> In this case we also break the title into two lines and it corresponds to the title of Goethe's work. The rhymed clauses are also given in bold.

ing point for further asking a question: 'What were the possible limits and quality characteristics of translation, to be more precise, interaction between literary traditions of the West and the East in Goethe's times?'

Now it is necessary to consider the statement which was in due time put forward by Iosif Samoilovich Braginsky. According to this statement 'publishing Goethe's "West-Eastern Divan" in 1819 was evidence of forming in the Modern Age a most interesting phenomenon in the world culture – West-East literary synthesis'<sup>5</sup>. In the context of this interpretation and in the proper sense of the word 'synthesis' Goethe, according to the scholar, in his 'West-Eastern Divan' is 'no longer an on-looker, but a creative successor of the highest achievements of Eastern, and first of all Farsi-language poetics'<sup>6</sup>. A perfect expert on Goethe's works and a creator of the Russian translation of 'Divan' (in cooperation with I.S. Braginsky) Alexander Viktorovich Mikhailov to a large extent supports this opinion: 'It is right to speak about 'synthesis' of Western and Eastern bases in Goethe's 'Divan' (I. S. Braginsky), about the unique apposition of German and Persian poetry and about interpenetration and integration of their principles.'<sup>7</sup>

The statement made by I.S. Braginsky brings us back to the necessity of studying interconnections and interactions between literatures of the West and the East, with equal attention paid to both vectors: the East – the West, the West – the East.

Let us see how well the statement of West-East literary synthesis in the interpretation mentioned above fits the facts at our disposal.

Owing to the works of orientalists of his time which were in the focus of Goethe there were Arabic authors (in alphabetical order): Amr ibn Kulsum (6th century), Antara (the second half of the 6th century), Al-A'sha (d. 629), Jamil (d. 701), Zuhayr ibn Abi Sūlmā (6th century), Imru' al-Qais (6th century), Labīd (d. 661), Luqman<sup>8</sup>, Majnun (Qays ibn al-Mulawwah) (7th century), Al-Mutanabbi (915–965), Taabata Sharran (6th-7th centuries)<sup>9</sup>, Tarafah (6th century), Al-Harith Ibn Hillizah (6th century), Hatim al-Tai (the second half of the 6th century), and 'the seven basic', according to J. L. G. Kosegarten's classification, Farsi-language poets<sup>10</sup>: Firdousi (circa 940 – circa 1020), Anvari (d. circa 1190), Nizami (circa 1140-1209), Rumi (1207–1273), Sadī (Saadi) (circa 1213–1219 – 1292), Hāfez (circa 1317–1326 – circa 1389–1390), Jami (1414–1492); these must be supplemented with Unsuri (d. 1039) and Hakani (circa 1106–1199).

This list shows that the creator of 'The West-Eastern Divan' is separated from the earliest of the mentioned authors by over 1200 years, and from the latest – by a good of 300 years. That means that Goethe while creating an imitation of Eastern poetry bases upon the best representatives of Arabic and Persian poetry of the classical period. Other European writers and poets of that period characterized by love to the East also drew on Eastern authors who were quite temporally distant from them. The orientalist W. Freytag (1788-1861) translated into Latin the famous poem (qasida) of Taabata Sharran,

<sup>5</sup> Braginsky I.S. Op. cit., p. 572. For the first time this opinion was expressed before publishing 'Divan' in Russian.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. P. 574.

<sup>7</sup> Mikhailov A.V. *Gjote i poezija Vostoka*. (Goethe and Poetry of the East). P. 85. This idea with different shades of meaning is repeatedly expressed in this work (P.116, 118 and others). In the commentary on the contents of the Russian edition of 'Divan' A.V. Mikhailov prefers, however, to put it in a somewhat different way: 'Goethe's 'East' is an experiment', 'creative synthesis obtained by analytical means' (Mikhailov A.V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan' Gjote...* (Goethe's 'West-Eastern Divan') P. 613).

<sup>8</sup> The legendary ancient wise man that is mentioned in the Koran. Quotations, proverbs and fables are attributed to Luqman (for details see: *Mudrost' Hikara i basni Lukmana* (The wisdom of Hikar and fables of Luqman) / preface by I.Y. Krachkovsky. St. Petersburg, 1920. P.5-13.; Piotrowsky M.B. Luqman // Islam: encyclopaedia. Moscow, 1991. P. 147-148).

<sup>9</sup> At the beginning of the 19th century it was already known in Europe that the most famous of his works, which is mentioned in 'Divan', was also attributed to another author – a poet and connoisseur (rāwī) of ancient poetry Halaf al-Ahmar (d. circa 796) (J. L.G. Kosegarten. Op. cit. P. 511)

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. P.514.

the poet F. Ruckert (1788–1866) published maqamas ('picaresque' novels) by al-Hariri (1054–1122) translated into German. A. Lamartine (1790–1869) in his 'Recollections of the East' (1835) gives high praise to the medieval folk novel 'Biography of Antar' (a pre-Islamic poet). And later H. Taine (1828–1893) in his 'Philosophy of Art' (1865–1869) admires the same character.<sup>1</sup> A list of similar examples is much longer.

It is important to emphasize that at the same time Europeans – pragmatists who were not involved in creative work, on the contrary, were genuinely interested in contemporary East and its representatives. The interest was so great that the words of a Frenchman Clot-Bey (a personal physician of Muhammad Ali – the man who ruled Egypt at the beginning of the 19th century after the expedition of Bonaparte) will not seem to be an overstatement: 'Never before has a work about Egypt been so timely as it is now that the current state of Egypt and its future are talked of daily and draw attention of entire Europe.'<sup>2</sup>

So, we can state the fact that European writers up to the middle of the 19th century when searching for a source of inspiration in the East first and foremost drew on masterpieces of literature of Eastern Middle Ages. The extensive use of oriental motifs in their works was mostly due to Romanticism which was under formation in European countries at that time. 'Business' Europe in the same period had practically-oriented interest in the East; this interest was largely stimulated by the needs of colonialism, of colonial expansion, and thus 'business' Europe strove to witness and participate in the most significant events of the Early Modern and Contemporary period.

But let us come back to the idea of West-Eastern synthesis and let us ask ourselves: 'Did Europeans of the early 19th century understand classical literary works of the East adequately? Was it possible at that time for European authors to correctly recount 'the Eastern material in Western forms'? Naturally enough, I have no intention of denouncing anybody here and saying that Goethe failed to understand the East, this is not the point. It is clear that Goethe is a genius of the world literature and his works are a valuable contribution to the world treasury. A different matter is in question now: how well did Goethe understand the East when thinking that he understood it? And this is not an offensive remark for Goethe; there is no wish to depreciate the role of the German author. It will be recalled that Goethe himself thought that he wrote 'in the spirit of the East' intending to 'incorporate the West and the East, the past and the present <...> for customs and ways of thinking to flow into one another'. That is he practically 'levelled out the distinctive features of one nation <...> by making them aware of other nations' and thus he contributed to creating conditions for the development of 'the world literature'.<sup>3</sup>

Certainly, Goethe's attitude to the East was largely conditional on the level of Oriental studies of his time.<sup>4</sup> It is quite natural that Goethe, though studying Arabic, was not able to read complicated works of medieval Arabic and moreover Persian literature in the original. This is why he relied on the works of his contemporaries – orientalists. It must be said that both German and English schools of Oriental Studies at the time, as well as Russian school, were the best schools in the world,

<sup>1</sup> For details see: Krymsky A.Y. *Istorija novoj arabskoj literatury (XIX – nachalo XX v.)* (The History of the New Arab Literature (the 19th – the beginning of the 20th centuries)). Moscow, 1971. P. 51, 59, 60–61.

<sup>2</sup> Clot-Bey A. *Egipet v prezhnem i nyneshnem sostojanii* (Egypt in its Past and Current State): 2 volumes. St. Petersburg, 1842. Vol. 1. P. 4.

<sup>3</sup> It seems to us that S.S. Averintcev provided a powerful impetus for continuing research into this issue. Following the German poet, the researcher identified two poles within the influence of which lies the conceptual basis of Goethe's understanding of 'the world literature': while understanding the diversity of civilizations as deeply as it was possible in his time the German poet on the other hand preserves the clear feeling for the unrelativisable unity of the mankind (for details see: Averintcev, S.S. *Gjote i Pushkin* (Goethe and Pushkin))// Averintcev, S.S. *Sobr. soch. Sjjaz' vremen*. (Collected works. Continuity of Times). Kiev, 2005. P. 271, 275 and others. First published in 1999).

<sup>4</sup> For details about Oriental studies which Goethe was familiar with see: Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). Notes. Pp. 766–767.

and they had remarkable achievements. For example, it was the 6-volume work by Hammer, which I have mentioned, that was an achievement of West-European Oriental Studies and opened Europeans' eyes to Eastern literature. Goethe's work rested upon Oriental Studies, so, the level of his ideas of the East to a large extent was dependent on them.<sup>5</sup> These were historical and cultural studies, philological, literary and literature proper ones. This is where Goethe drew the factual material for the historical part of 'The West-Eastern Divan' from. There are sort of historical insights into culture, history and literature of the peoples of the East – not only of the Arabs and the Persians, but also of the Chinese, of the ancient Hebrew and others, translations, biographical information, etc.

As with the historical and cultural research the author of 'Divan' owes orientalists of his time not only the considerable merits but also a certain historically conditioned narrowness of his work. The merits of the work are well-known. The main sign of narrowness is evident: the stadal typological discrepancies and even incompatibility of medieval literature of the East and European literature of the beginning of the 19th century, which the messengers of European Romanticism were not conscious of. Indeed, when Goethe writes 'in the spirit of the East' and draws upon Eastern works as temporally distant from him as 1 thousand and more years I need hardly say that inconsistent understanding of these works is possible. The Arab, Persian patterns which Goethe appealed to were created in the lap of a different type of imaginative consciousness, met different poetic requirements,<sup>6</sup> followed different philosophical systems and, consequently, often had a different notional interpretation from the one offered by the author of 'Divan' who based on Oriental Studies of his time. What has been said in no way depreciates the role of Goethe's masterpieces from 'The West-Eastern Divan' but again makes one consider the fact that their 'Oriental character' is of a certain 'European type'. These are European works in relation to which in many cases it would be more appropriate to speak not about the synthesis of literary traditions of the East and the West but about Oriental elements which mostly play a role of Eastern gloss.

I will give a few examples. In 'The West-Eastern Divan' Goethe speaks a lot about love of the Arabs and the Persians. It is rather natural that he relies on medieval works and thus tries to imitate their 'spirit' on the European ground. The medieval Arabic and Persian works which he draws on are based on the so-called code of the Udhrite poetic love, and there is a number of authors who wrote within this code in Arabic and Persian poetry. Goethe does not mention the code itself and even the Arab tribe of Banu Udhra, though the Udhrites as such were known in his time.<sup>7</sup> Of the mentioned above Arab authors

<sup>5</sup> As far as the details of the history and culture of the East were concerned Goethe was not always on a level with his contemporary Oriental Studies, which drew criticism from authorities in this field (see: Mikhailov, A.V. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan Gjote...* (The West-Eastern Divan by Goethe...) PP. 642–645). Occasionally, however, on a number of important issues he was disoriented, probably, by professional orientalists. This might be the source, for instance, of the well-known inconsistency of Goethe's treatment of the role of Muhammad. 'Divan' contains both a rather reasonable attitude to the Muslim prophet (Goethe, J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan. Mahomet. PP. 163–168)) and hardly compatible with it words about Mahomet who 'threw <...> dark covers of religion over the life of the Arabs and managed to conceal from them every prospect of a purer development' (Goethe, J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). PP. 143–144). At the same time let us thereupon remark that even the modern Oriental Studies do not always succeed in providing us with exact characterizations and information: some of them have become a source of a number of factual errors, disappointing faults and contradictory commentaries to the Russian edition of 'Divan' (1989).

<sup>6</sup> A great number of works on this topic have been published. We think it possible to confine ourselves to referring our reader to books which are still up-to-date: *Tipologija i vzajmosvjazi literatur drevnego mira*. (Typology and interconnections of literatures of the ancient world) Moscow, 1971; *Tipologija i vzajmosvjazi srednevekovykh literatur Vostoka i Zapada*. (Typology and interconnections of medieval literatures of the East and the West) Moscow, 1974; *Istoricheskaja poetika. Literaturnye jepohi i tipy hudozhestvennogo soznanija*. (Historical poetics. Literary epochs and types of creative consciousness) Moscow, 1994.

<sup>7</sup> Kosegarten speaks about them as about a tribe which has earned itself 'among the Arabs, in preference to all others, the name of the sons of love' (Kosegarten, J.G.L. Op. cit., p. 506). Later the Udhrites became well-known in Eu-

from Goethe's work the Udhrite poets are Majnun and Jamil who in the German poet's work are considered along with other couples of Eastern lovers who are 'examples of infinite love':<sup>1</sup> Rustan and Rodavoo, Jussuf and Zuleika, Ferhad and Schirin, Medschnun (Majnun) and Leila (Layla), Dschemil (Jamil) and Boteinah (Busainah), Solomon and the Queen of Sheba.<sup>2</sup> In medieval Arab tradition Majnun, Jamil and two other poets not mentioned by Goethe – Qays Ibn Zarih (circa 626–689) with his beloved Lubna and Kuthayyir (circa 669–723) with his beloved Azza constitute the main body of Udhrite ghazal focused on hymning exalted platonic love.

The theoretical footing for Udhrite love belongs to the theologian Ibn Dawud Al-Isfahani who in his 'The Book of the Flower' created 'the first poetic system of platonic love'. Ibn Faraj al-Jayyani (d. 976) in imitation of 'The Book of the Flower' wrote his work 'The Book of the Gardens'. Particular recognition was gained by the work of the famous Arab scholar and writer Ibn Hazm (994–1964) 'The Ring of the Dove' which contains a full treatment of the ideas of Udhrite love.<sup>3</sup>

The works of Udhrite lyric poetry represent an image of a man in love who rigorously follows the code of exalted love in his behaviour. According to Ibn Hazm this code runs as follows: love is a weakening but a longed-for disease, love is joy and suffering, love is slavery, love is life. This is why a man in love should be slavish to his beloved woman, utterly devoted to the vow of love even if the woman he loves has broken it; he should content himself with even minor favours from his beloved one, keep the secret of love, ignore the slander of calumniators and envious people who try to discredit his beloved one; he should display determination and endurance in natural troubles which fall to his lot when he is separated from his beloved one<sup>4</sup>.

Farsi-language poets comparatively early reconsider the Udhrite code of love in relation to the statements of the Sufic doctrine and it gains new (compared to the Udhrites) overtones, which considerably complicates interpretation of their works. Knowledge of 'Divan' shows that Goethe, as well as his contemporaries – orientalist, in the early 19th century did not yet have definite ideas about the code of Udhrite love, the Sufi doctrine and their reflection in the works by Arab and Persian poets.

In relation to this let us consider an example from Goethe's 'Divan' – a poem 'Geheimstes' ('Most secret') included in 'Uschk Nameh' (The Book of Love) (Usch [1819; later corrected Uschk] Nameh. Buch der Liebe). It ends in the following quatrain:

Darum war's der höchste Jammer  
Als einst *Medschnun* sterbend wollte

rope owing to a relatively late Heine's poem 'Der Asra' (1846), which is not, however, beyond the scope of earlier European ideas. The work finishes with the following lines:

Und der Sklave sprach: Ich heiße  
Mohamet, ich bin aus Yemmen,  
Und mein Stamm sind jene Asra,  
Welche sterben, wenn sie lieben.  
And the slave answered: 'Mahomet,  
that's my name. My homeland is Yemen.  
And my tribe is the Asra  
Who die when in love.'

<sup>1</sup> Goethe J. W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). From Goethe's Eastern papers. P. 448.

<sup>2</sup> For details see: Kosegarten, J.G.L. Op. cit., pp. 505–507. The spelling of Eastern names in European works has changed a lot since Goethe's times. The name of Majnun's (Medschnun's) beloved one differs. Its spelling depends on its belonging to the Arabic (*Layla/Leila*) or to the Farsi-language (*Layli/Leili*) tradition.

<sup>3</sup> The theory of platonic love of the Arabs and its spread in the world of Islam is studied in the works of West-European researchers (for details see: Kudelin A.B. *Klassicheskaja arabo-ispanskaja poezija (konets X – seredina XII v.)*. (The classical Arabic Spanish poetry (the late 10th – the middle of the 12th centuries). Moscow, 1973. Pp. 80–83 and others). The work by Ibn Hazm has been translated into Russian: Ibn Hazm. *Ozherel'e golubki* (The Dove's Necklace) / translated from Arabic by M.A. Salye; edited by I.Y. Krachkovsky; preface by Y.E. Bertels. Moscow, 1957.

<sup>4</sup> Kudelin A.B. *Klassicheskaja arabo-ispanskaja poezija* (The classical Arab Spanish poetry), pp. 81–82.

Daß vor Leila seinen Namen  
Man forthin nicht nennen sollte.  
Hence grief supreme it was what time  
The dying Medschnun spoke the word  
That before Leila from that hour  
His name should nevermore be heard.

[Translated into English by Edward Dowden]<sup>5</sup>

I will not go over the statements of researchers who decoded this brilliant Goethe's work, found out who and what is meant there, this is a specific issue which biographers deal with.<sup>6</sup> I will just draw your attention to one detail in the quatrain mentioned above; this detail, however, reveals considerable discrepancies in the way the German poet understood Eastern love and the way love was understood by the Farsi-language poet Nizami who became a model for Goethe. Goethe knew Nizami's poetry, considered him to be one of the best Farsi-language poets, but the works of Nizami had not been translated by then and Goethe, certainly, did not know the fragment which I will recite now. For comparison I will cite a fragment from Nizami's poem where Majnun's actions are diametrically opposite to the actions which he was to have performed, according to the logic of European Majnun and 'The West-Eastern Divan'.

I offer a word-for-word and very accurate translation:  
Once from those steppes, where misfortunes take refuge,  
He came to the land where his beloved woman lived.  
He saw what had been created by a qalam of faithfulness —  
'Layli Majnun' – the two names were put together.  
He stuck his nail and scratched that sheet,  
Left his name and erased his beloved one's.  
The witnesses asked: 'What does it mean  
That of the two inscriptions [only] one is in place?'  
He said: 'Let one inscription disappear  
As for the two of us one inscription is enough.  
If you look into the man in love  
The beloved woman will show through.'  
They asked: 'Why is she concealed  
Inside, and you are seen outside?'  
He said: 'It does not befit the one  
Who has lost his heart to be the nut and her to be the shell,  
It is better for me to be a cover for my beloved one,  
Or to be a nutshell.'<sup>7</sup>

Let me remind you that Goethe wrote: 'That before Leila from that hour his name should nevermore be heard.' And, according to Nizami he left his name and erased the name of his beloved one. What would Goethe have done if he had read this thing?

In Nizami's poems Majnun performs actions which are explicable within the Sufic interpretation of the code of Udhrite love. It is clear that Goethe was unaware of this episode from Nizami's poem and the German poet's reconstruction rests upon the European ideas of Eastern love. It is hard to imagine that the Farsi-language Majnun erasing the name of his beloved one and thus as if selfishly extolling himself at the expense of Layli (this is a likely interpretation for his conduct in the European consciousness) could naturally be introduced into the lyric plot of 'The Most Secret'. He would distract from the goal set by Goethe and lead to philosophical constructs.

I will briefly render the plot of 'Layli and Majnun' for you to understand what happens next. From his childhood Majnun

<sup>5</sup> Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). Translated into Russian by V.V. Levik. P. 36.

<sup>6</sup> See the commentary by A.V. Mikhailov to the poem: Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). Notes. Pp. 737–739.

<sup>7</sup> Nizami. *Lajli i Madzhnun* (Layli and Majnun) / introduction, translated from Persian and commentary by N.Y. Chalisova, M.A. Rusanov. Moscow, 2008, p. 412. 'Created by a qalam of faithfulness' – this must mean a sheet of paper with Majnun's poems about Layli or just with names written by one of 'the faithful lovers', followers of Majnun on the way of love (note made by the translator into Russian). In his poem Nizami uses the metaphor: shell (external, insignificant) and the kernel (internal, full of meaning) at least one more time (Ibid., p. 515).

was in love with Layli (in Arabic – Layla). They were separated and stopped from getting married. Majnun lost his senses after he had not been allowed to link his life with Layli. He escaped to the desert and lived among wild beasts. He started thinking about Layli only when somebody came to him and began to tell him about her. Finally, he dies of the love for Layli, and Layli dies of the love for him. This is the story to which a lot of research is devoted, including mine. So, the first episode where he erases Layli's name and leaves his is the first discrepancy. Let us go over to the second discrepancy.

In his letter on the 29th of January 1815 the German poet, while explaining the key moment of 'The Most Secret', just aggravates the difference between the points of the code, which Nizami's Majnun was guided by, and the West-European ideas of them.

I cite Goethe: 'In the East where I am now as usual, it is thought to be greatest happiness if the name of the humble slave is mentioned at least once in the presence of the lady and she tolerates it. How many times the one who she mentioned herself would fall on his knees.'<sup>1</sup> It is absolutely contrary to the code of Udhrite love, according to which lovers must keep secret the names of their chosen ones. Otherwise, they are immediately deprived of the opportunity to meet. For instance, this is what happened in the story of Majnun and Layli. Because of the violent passion the man and the woman in love cannot conceal their feelings to each other, and they are separated. Layli is made to marry another man, it all ends in the death of those in love.

In the Sufic interpretation (this is a mystic dimension of Islam) in Farsi-language literature this story gains quite a mystic shade. In the poem by Jami (who Goethe rates among the greatest Farsi-language poets) 'Layli and Majnun' written in 1484, the following episode attracts attention. I will cite it in the rendering of the brilliant scholar Yevgeniy Eduardovich Bertels: 'Once Majnun meets Layli in the road and falls in a dead faint. She puts his head onto her knees and brings him to. Bidding good-bye she promises to return by the same road. When a long time after it she comes to their meeting place she finds out that since then Majnun has been standing there so motionlessly that a bird managed to weave a nest on his head. Layli starts speaking to him but he does not recognize her. When she finally is able to explain to him who she is Majnun makes her go away, as he is so engrossed in love that he no longer needs the external form of his beloved one.'<sup>2</sup>

Can you imagine what would have happened to Goethe and his interpretation of this Eastern love in 'The West-Eastern Divan' if he had ever been to learn this thing? It would have broken all ideas of the Eastern love depicted by him. At that, I mean that we are not intent on downgrading Goethe or depreciating his role. It is hardly necessary to say that the Sufic interpretation, had it been known at the beginning of the 19th century, could not have satisfied Goethe and the Western reader at the time when Romanticism was under formation. Besides, the Eastern tradition, which Goethe appeals to, being multi-dimensional, makes another interpretation of the story of love of Majnun and Layli available to us, and this story is not romantic at all either. In his time yet academician I.Y. Krachkovskiy found in medieval Arabic sources a remarkable contradiction between the Udhrite story of love of Majnun and Layli and the folk idea of it.

In the work by Ibn Qutaybah (d. 889) it goes that 'Majnun has posterity in Najd'. Other authors cite a poem which also brings down the high pathos of the Arab legend about Majnun and Layli whose premature death was caused by their unhappy

love: 'Layli's children grew up, and her son's children grew up, but the affection to her in my heart remains unchanged.'<sup>3</sup>

One way or another in the quoted instance the medieval Arab and Iranian traditions strikingly differ from Goethe's ideas and European Oriental studies of his time.

It appears that what has been said can also lead to more sweeping generalizations. Giving credit to Goethe and other enthusiasts of studying and exploring the culture of the East one should, nevertheless, be extremely careful in evaluating the results of their activities in terms of the adequacy of their rendering the spirit of the medieval East. With the scope and quality of knowledge of the East available in Europe at the turn of the 19th century it is hardly appropriate to speak about a possibility of a full-fledged synthesis of literary traditions of the West of the early 19th century and literature of the medieval East in the works of the German poet and his contemporaries. It is particularly inappropriate to speak about the direct contact of European literature of the turn of the 19th century with literature of the East of the same period, as none of the authors of the East who Goethe appeals to is separated in time from him by less than 300 years.

The previous statement requires considering the issue in a different light. Let us ask ourselves questions: 'Were classical medieval works by Arabic and Farsi-language authors perceived as ones which adequately render the Eastern spirit and answer the vital questions of the time in the East of the early 19th century? Was it possible to create new works at that time within the medieval tradition without thinking it over in the light of new requirements?'

Let us now turn to the vector the East-the West in the same period of the first half of the 19th century and let us pay particular attention to the region which was of soul interest for Goethe – the Middle East.

The rising interest felt by the East in the West and, in particular, by Arab countries in Europe in the first half of the 19th century was first of all due to political, economic and social reasons. Encountering the dynamically developing West, for instance, an important event of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt in 1796–1801 had far-reaching consequences for the East. In particular, it speeded up the processes which were in effect or were beginning to take shape in the depths of the Eastern society; it created new conditions in which cultural and literary contacts between the two regions were realized.

By the beginning of the 19th century the lag in the speed of development was apparent for such farsighted political figures of the Muslim East as the Turkish Sultan Mahmud 2 (1826–1839), the Egyptian Pasha Muhammad Ali (1805–1849), the Algerian Emir Abd al-Qādir (1832–1847) and others. However, in their view this lag was not yet hard to overcome. They were still certain that there was a possibility of catching up with the dynamically developing Western countries by implementing advanced technologies. Hence – the desire to adopt, first of all, the technological practices of Europe and a less keen interest in its spiritual culture, focus on achievements of the bourgeois civilization only to later understand that it is based on other ideological grounds. It is typical of many Eastern countries to wish to separate one thing from the other: to adopt the European preoccupation with technical aspects and to preserve unchanged the traditional ideological superstructure. Moreover, ideologists of the East contrasted their own traditional ideology with the 'vices' of the Western way of life. It must be said that here they were helped though unintentionally by Western Romanticists who condemned the pragmatic rationalism of

<sup>1</sup> Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). Notes. P. 738. Certainly, here we do not mention the concrete biographical events which also made Goethe interpret the Eastern ideas of love in this way. (for details see: Ibid).

<sup>2</sup> Goethe J.W. *Zapadno-vostochnyj divan*. (The West-Eastern Divan). P. 284.

<sup>3</sup> Ibn Qutaybah. *Kitab al-shi'r wa-al-shu'ara* (The Book of Poetry and Poets). Beirut, 1969. P. 476; Al-'Askari. *Diwan al-Ma'ani* (The Divan of Poetic Motifs): 2 volumes. Cairo, 1933. Vol. 1. P. 281; Al-Walibi. *Diwan Majnun Layla* (The Divan of Majnun and Layla). Cairo, 1939. P. 90; Krachkovskiy I.Y. Selected works. Moscow; Leningrad, 1956. Volume 2. P. 615. Quotations from the works of Ibn Qutaybah and al-Walibi are cited in the translation into Russian made by I.Y. Krachkovskiy.

Europe and glorified the Eastern spirituality.<sup>1</sup> To a certain extent the inconsistency and contradictoriness of 'West-oriented' ambitions of Eastern ideologists and writers can be put down to these reasons.

For instance, it is typical of even the most developed Eastern literatures of the first half of the 19th century to preserve on the whole the medieval genre system and medieval principles of creative work<sup>2</sup>. At the same time in this period more or less pronounced enlightening tendencies become apparent in them. One of the main stimuli of Eastern enlightenment was the understanding that it was necessary to oppose Europe, which was often due to anti-colonialist feelings. However, the anti-feudal acuteness of European Enlightenment was often deadened in works of Eastern enlighteners, and the ideals of Enlightenment gained a peculiar tinge. Traditionalists and later religious reformers, who were aware of the necessity of change in the Eastern society, also were directly involved in the popularization of these ideals. This is why it is impossible, as a rule, to find in the least marked anti-clerical ideas in the works of even the most consistent enlighteners in the Middle and the Near East: ideas of freedom and equality, popularization of the principles of advanced social and political structure by European sample could be combined with the ideas of Muslim reformism no better than respect for the ideas of the French Enlightenment could be combined with satires to Gallomania.

To illustrate everything that has been said let us give an example of the most powerful and dynamic Arab country of the first half of the 19th century – Egypt. The key figure in its new history is Muhammad Ali who has been mentioned before. As a rule, when evaluating his activities particular attention is paid to his wish to renew the country, to re-equip it technically. Indeed, in the course of his ruling foreign trade was established, new textile factories and big workshops were built, printing industry was developed, irrigation channels and roads were constructed, army was reorganized, arsenals were built, etc.

Along with it, it is necessary to say that the treatment of Muhammad Ali as a 'westerner' needs considerable specification. Taking his radical economic and administrative steps the ruler of Egypt was not at all going to turn it into a country of Western type. Having settled down to a course of reforms before Turkey, Muhammad Ali refused to support its rulers in introducing the so-called Tanzimat (*tanzimat* = reorganization. – A.K.) reforms; the epoch of Tanzimat reforms started in Turkey when Mahmud 2 (1808–1839) ruled the country and Abdülmecid (1839–1861) continued them. Muhammad Ali rejected many Turkish innovations seeing nothing but imposition of Christian customs on Muslims and harmful imitation of bourgeois institutions of Europe in them. Implanting interest in European technical achievements Muhammad Ali adhered to protective tendencies when it came to European philosophy, fiction, etc.<sup>3</sup>

Clearly realizing the lag of East behind the West in terms of the speed of technical and scientific progress Muhammad Ali promoted the expansion of contacts with the Europeans: many Egyptians were sent abroad to study and to improve their

knowledge. One of them, sheikh Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi (1801–1873) was sent by Muhammad Ali to France in 1826 as a head of one of the training groups. Being in France where al-Tahtawi stayed till 1831 he began making notes 'An Overview of Paris' (published in Egypt in 1834).<sup>4</sup> Researchers are unanimous at recognizing the wish to promote the progress of Egypt and other Eastern countries by all means possible, among other things by way of popularizing the ideas of French enlighteners (Voltaire, Russo, Montesquieu) as a remarkable peculiarity of the 'Overview'.<sup>5</sup> Al-Tahtawi continued this trend of his activities after his comeback to Egypt when he headed 'The School of Languages' which dealt, among other things, with translations of European historical literature.

Analyzing the Arabic translations of *History of Charles XII* by Voltaire and *History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great* (published respectively in 1841 and in 1850) made under the aegis of this 'School' I.Y. Krachkovskiy shows 'how much work and efforts' popularization of philosophical views of the French enlightener required in the first half of the 19th century.<sup>6</sup> The dominating idea of the attitude to works of French enlighteners was still the pragmatic interest in momentarily useful things as, for example, the inventions of the European scientific and technical progress. The translator of *History of Charles XII* in his preface 'focuses on the military subjects of work'<sup>7</sup> knowing how much the Egyptians are interested in this aspect of European civilization. Another translator (from the same 'School of Languages') of *History of Charles V* (translation published in 1842) by a famous English historian W. Robertson (1721–1793) states the pragmatic value of the work in its title (the translation was published in two parts with different titles): *The Gift for the Tsars of the Time on History of the Social Order in the Countries of Europe and The Gift for the Tsars of the Time on History of Emperor Charles V*.<sup>8</sup> For the same reason al-Tahtawi along with translations of books on military and mining practices and all that studies the tragedies by Racine, prepares the translation of *The adventures of Telemachus* by Fénelon (1651–1715). Appealing to the French spiritual culture of the 17th–18th centuries, which he had good reason to consider one of the sources of the progress of Europe in the late 18th – early 19th century, al-Tahtawi is left indifferent (does not even mention in his 'Overview of Paris') to Lamartine and Hugo (1802–1885) who were his contemporaries and who he could not but hear about while staying in Paris.

In all probability we can suggest that Hugo, Lamartine and other European Romanticists of the first half of the 19th century were not perceived as objects of pragmatic and educational interest by the Egyptian sheikh, and as for the ideological and imaginative aspect they were absolutely alien to his consciousness. Along with it al-Tahtawi was clearly aware of the necessity to continue the dialogue with European culture; the dialogue which was interrupted in the late Middle Ages.

In the first half of the 19th century the art practices of the West and the East are characterized by considerable stadia typological divergences which were particularly noticeable against the background of 'the clear tendency towards synchronization of the literary process', 'the spread of the world ideological and imaginative phenomena' in the countries of Western

<sup>1</sup> To be more exact, the sources of such West-Eastern 'relations' are to be searched for much earlier. It was yet Montesquieu (1689–1755) in his *Persian Letters* (1721) who introduced 'the figure of an idealized Muslim in the role of a critic of European preconceptions'. Voltaire repeats this method in the entries of his pocket 'Philosophical Dictionary' (1764) (for details see: Averincev S.S. Op. cit., p. 274). Later the same way (with conceptual inversion) was used by Arabic authors: a foreign traveller will be surprised and perplexed by the incongruities which he will see – naturally with the eyes of Eastern enlighteners – in Arab countries.

<sup>2</sup> For details see: Terterjan I. A., Rifin B. L. *Vvedenie // Istorija vseмирnoj literatury* (Introduction // History of the World Literature): 8 volumes. Moscow, 1989. Vol. 6. P. 9–10.

<sup>3</sup> Contrasting Egypt with Turkey the son of Mohammed Ali spoke out against the order given by the Turkish Sultan Mahmud 2 to his subjects to wear European clothes: 'Instead of starting with clothes Porte should have tried to enlighten minds' (for details see: Levin Z.I. *Razvitie osnovnykh tekhnicheskovo-politicheskoy mysli v Sirii i Yegipte* (The development of basic trends of social and political thought in Syria and in Egypt) // *Novoje vremja*. Moscow, 1972.

<sup>4</sup> We give the short adopted in science title of this remarkable monument which the reader can now go through as it has been fully translated into Russian: Rifa'a Rafi al-Tahtawi. *Izvlachenie chistogo zolota iz kratkogo opisanija Parizha, ili Dragocennyj divan svedenij o Parizhe* (The Extraction of Gold or an Overview of Paris) prepared by V.N. Kirpichenko. Moscow, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Levin Z.I. Op. cit., pp. 28–29.

<sup>6</sup> For details see: Krachkovskiy I.Y. *Arabskij perevod 'Istorii Petra Velikogo' i 'Istorii Karla XII', korolja Shvecii' Vol'tera* (The Arab translation of *History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great* and *History of Charles XII, the King of Sweden* by Voltaire) // Krachkovskiy I.Y. Selected works. Volume 3. P. 374; and others.

<sup>7</sup> Krachkovskiy I.Y. *Arabskij perevod 'Istorii Petra Velikogo' i 'Istorii Karla XII, korolja Shvecii' Vol'tera* (The Arab translation of *History of the Russian Empire Under Peter the Great* and *History of Charles XII, the King of Sweden* by Voltaire). P. 373.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. P. 372.

Europe, Russia, America in the first half of the 19th century.<sup>1</sup> So, the dialogue of the two large regions, which started in the early 19th century when European writers drew inspiration from the achievements in art of the Eastern Middle Ages, at the time when Eastern writers who were almost completely in the depths of medieval tradition appealed to the works of European enlighteners, was noted for peculiarity concerning the interrelations between literatures of the East and the West in Ancient times and in Middle Ages.<sup>2</sup> The latter followed the classical scheme of interrelations between literatures, which could be defined in the words of academician V.M. Zhirmunsky. Speaking of the fact that 'influence is not an accidental mechanic push from without', he emphasizes: 'For a phenomenon to become possible there must be a need for such an ideological import, there must exist similar trends of development which have more or less taken shape in this society and in this literature.'<sup>3</sup>

In the first half of the 19th century 'the trends of development' of literatures of the West and the East cannot be described and 'similar'. In that period in both vectors (The West-the East, the East – the West) the phenomena of literature which got in touch with one another were separated from one another by a considerable temporal distance. This is why in this case, prob-

ably, it would be more appropriate to speak about a new kind of relations. To characterize them I introduce a concept '*non-synchronous literary relations*'. They were new because they were exercised not on the synchronous level of corresponding literatures of the East and the West, but via mediators; the role of the mediators was played by anachronistic, stadial and typological 'substitutes' of those literatures in touch. Nevertheless it is important to emphasize that in the first half of the 19th century the impulse went both from the West to the East and from the East to the West.

The historical achievement of Goethe and other enlightened European minds is that the heritage of the East again becomes an active part of the world culture. Owing to the most far-sighted Eastern thinkers, the literatures of the Near and Middle East along with regional links begin to gain inter-regional ones, there appear signs of the gradual overcoming of their past detachment from the main trends of the world literary process, there appear prerequisites for eliminating the stadial and typological differences between them and literatures of the West in the future. Synchronization of the literary process in countries of the West and the East will take a visible shape at the turn of the 20th century.

S. V. Lavrov<sup>4</sup>

## GLOBALIZATION AND DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF A TRANSFORMATION OF A GEOPOLITICAL LANDSCAPE

The role of the Likhachov Scientific Conference cannot be exaggerated. It has already become a good May tradition of the promotion of dialogue of cultures in the modern globalizing world. The attempts of your Forum to spread the ideas of Dmitry Sergeevich Likhachov — the great Russian scholar and humanist — among the Russian and the foreign public at large deserve a high appraisal. The offers and initiatives that are being discussed at the sessions have a practical value and help increase the efficiency of our work in elaborating the approaches that allow for the vital necessity to strengthen the moral basis of the international relations.

In the past years the Likhachov Scientific Conference has become the important part of the international discussions on the backbone problems of the development of human civilization. At the same time the intellectual foundation laid by D.S. Likhachov has an enduring meaning. Many of his statements are not only still actual now, but they acquire new meanings in the time of international agenda modernization.

Developing his principle of the humanity's ethical progress Dmitry Sergeevich spoke at the turn of 1980s–1990s about the importance of the constant learning of the cultural values

and advancement in creating the new ones. He wrote: 'We live in the world of the ever more complicated ethical problems, which are set in front of us by the more complicated science and technology.'

The elected President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin means the same from the today's point of view in his series of articles published in January and February this year. He says about the serious system crisis our civilization has collided with and about virtual, not real values and assets which define the model based on the life on credit and wasting of the future, and about the moral-legal vacuum which appears in the international relations.

Such interrelation of the times is proved by the wisdom of Likhachov's foresight of the mainframe tendencies of culture development. No doubt that culture plays an important role in the formation of new ideas, which reflect the spirit of time, and is one of the global development drivers; it helps to come to the important general conclusions in the process of understanding of the dynamic and deep changes that go on in the world today.

These transformations are accompanied by the growing turbulence at the global and regional levels. The pace of the international life is speeding up. We are witnessing a sharp turn of history, which is in fact a new stage in the world's development that can lead to the radical changes of the geopolitical landscape and the appearance of its unexpected configurations.

Before our very eyes a new, more democratic polycentric system of international relations is being formed. Russia is interested that the new architecture be reasonable and stable, and rest upon the cooperation of the leading states and integral unions of the modern world giving opportunities for the wide international interaction based on the respect for the international law principles, equality and mutual benefit. One of our interests, of course, is to consolidate Russia as one of the leading centres of power and influence of the modern world. This is what the efforts of the Russian diplomacy are aimed at together with the provision of the favourable external conditions

<sup>1</sup> Terterjan I. A., Rifting B. L. Op. cit., pp. 11–12.

<sup>2</sup> We think it possible to refer to the works which are still up-to-date and which focus on this topic: *Tipologija i vzajmospjazi literatur drevnego mira* (Typology and interrelations of literatures of Ancient Times); *Tipologija i vzajmospjazi srednevekovykh literatur Vostoka i Zapada* (Typology and interrelations of medieval literatures of the East and the West).

<sup>3</sup> Zhirmunsky V. M. *Problemy sravnitel'no-istoricheskogo izuzhenija literatur* // V. M. Zhirmunsky. *Sravnitel'noje literaturovedenje* (Issues of comparative and historical studies of literatures // Zhirmunskiy V. M. Comparative literary studies).

<sup>4</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, member of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Since 1972 Mr. Lavrov has been working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (later Russia). In 1992–1994 he was Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. In 1994–2004 he was permanent Russian envoy to the UN. Since 2004 he has been Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Author of numerous publications, including a collection of reports and articles *Between the Past and the Future. Russian Diplomacy in the Changing World* (Mezhdru prošlym i budushchim. Rossijskaja diplomatija v menjajushchemsja mire). S. V. Lavrov is decorated with the Orders of Honour, the Orders for Services to the Fatherland of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th degrees.

for the dynamic development and integral modernization of our country.

The world today is becoming more mutually dependent — challenges and threats that are common for everyone have come to the foreground. The spread of the weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts and crises, international terrorism, drug traffic, organized crime, security of the energy supply, climate change, natural and anthropogenic catastrophes have a transboundary character and affect the interests of all states. We are sure that the teamwork for the benefit of the strengthening of global safety and stability, sustainable development, conflict situations resolution and the growth of the productive international partnership serves everyone's interests.

It is important to take into account the fact that the making of the modern world's polycentric structure is mostly determined by the competition of the different 'civilizational blocks'. The obvious case is represented by the events which started last year in some countries of the Near East and North Africa and had a serious impact on the world processes.

We were following and continue to observe closely the transformations going on in the Arab East. From the very beginning we supported urge of the peoples of the region to a better life, to the democratization of their states' political systems, to the extension of their social and economic rights. We are sure that Arab countries can and should identify their destinies themselves, taking into consideration their civilizational traditions without the outer imposition of the ready-made recipes and scripts.

In practice, however, these principles are not always observed, the flagrant example being the actions towards Libya, where we witnessed the gross violation of the principles of the United Nations Charter and the UN Security Council Resolutions. Following 'the Libyan model', in other words supporting one of the sides in the civil war, leads to the undermining of the regional and international stability and does not correspond to the tasks of the present stage in the world's development. The stake on the force is not realistic at all — the examples of Iraq and Afghanistan indicate convincingly that it is impossible to solve the problems forcefully.

The foundation of our approach to the resolution of any conflicts including those in the Arab world is the strict observance of the basic principles of the international law enshrined in the UNO Charter. First of all, it means the respect for the states' sovereignty and territorial integrity, inadmissibility of interference in their internal affairs, peaceful adjustment of the arguments. The task of the external players is to assist the political solution of the problems via universal dialogue between the government and the opposition.

This approach yields results. For example, in Yemen we are one of the 'witness'-states and guarantors of the implementation of the inter-Yemen agreements approved by the UN Security Council that helped settle the situation. Their core was the initiative proposed by the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf and supported by the international community.

As for the crisis in Syria, Russia does its utmost to ensure that the internal problems of this country or any other country be solved by the citizens of this country through the inclusive political dialogue without outer instigation, to say nothing of military intervention. We firmly uphold this position on all the international forums including the UN Security Council. It is set in the well-known five principles that my colleagues from the Arab League and I agreed upon during our meeting on March 10, 2012. We expect that the mission of the UN-Arab League envoy Kofi Annan will lead to the end of violence and the adjustment of the situation.

Russia has always supported independence and free development of the peoples of the area. And now we are trying to

help them come through this period of hardships with the minimum loss, because our country knows from its own experience the price of wars and revolutions, measured by the millions of innocent victims and broken lives. Yes, the reforms in almost all Near-Eastern countries are brewing, but it is better to implement them in the non-violent evolutionary way.

Our aim is to support stability and safety at our borders, to search for long-term solutions to the conflict situations, including the prolonged Arab-Israeli Conflict, not to allow of an inter-confessional explosion at the Middle East, both between the Muslims and religious minorities and inside Islam between the Sunni and the Shiite. We are no doubt preoccupied by the plight of the Christians in this region, including the Orthodox communities.

Thereupon, the importance of the promotion of the process of democratization of international relations, expansion and improvement of the overall intercultural, inter-religious, inter-civilization dialogue cannot be exaggerated.

Dialogue of cultures is, first of all, communication between nations and ethnic groups, correlation of history and traditions, mutual enrichment of languages and educational standards. D.S. Likhachov once noted: 'National diversity brings nations together, it does not separate them. We turn to other nations to see their distinctness, "otherness" and see the eternal beauty in this "otherness".' As the processes of globalization gather pace it becomes more and more obvious. Today it is impossible to develop cross-cultural exchanges without taking into account the unique identity of nations and confessions which form the unity of our civilization. Consigning this principle to oblivion is fraught with negative consequences.

The work on promoting cross-cultural dialogue is drawn on the fact that most of our partners on the international arena have come to realize that civilizational and cultural diversity of the modern world is not a separating factor but a resource for its development. We act on the premise that respect for values of other cultures and civilizations enables us to promote a more full-fledged and friendlier dialogue and cooperation with other states — certainly, as far as our partners find it acceptable, — on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. And thus, it provides further opportunities to ensure the growth of our own economy and the rise in the living standards of our citizens. This is why our international policy will continue to be balanced, active and constructive.

An important tool of developing cross-cultural and inter-civilizational dialogue is the Alliance of Civilizations under the aegis of the UN. Its fourth forum was held in Qatar in December last year under the slogan 'Intercultural Dialogue to Boost Development'. The Russian delegation and a whole number of eleven Russian non-governmental organizations, including the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, A.M. Gorchakov Public Diplomacy Fund, the world public forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations' took an active part in it. Representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church were also present there.

For the first time did Russian non-governmental organizations deliver their own events within the framework of the forum — P. Sorokin — N. Kondratyev International Institute held a roundtable 'Long-Term Strategy for Global Sustainable Development Based on Dialogue and Partnership of Civilizations', and International Foundation for the Survival and Development of the Humanity made a presentation of a project entitled 'Generation 2030' aimed at raising children in the spirit of mutual respect for cultures.

The Alliance continues to attract interest as a unique global movement which joins forces to establish harmonious cross-cultural relations — both with the support of the state and with the civil society participating. Last year, Russian delegations took an active part in the meetings held by the Alliance of Civilizations. Among them was the World Cross-Cultural Dialogue Forum (Baku, April), an international seminar 'The Situation

of Christian Communities in Islamic States' (Florence, June), the Lisbon Forum on the 'Arab Spring' topic (November) organized in cooperation with the North-South Centre of the Council of Europe. On the initiative of President of the 66th Session of the United Nations General Assembly N. Nasser and with the support of the Alliance in the format of the General Assembly in March this year there was held a discussion 'Fostering Cross-Cultural Understanding for Building Peaceful and Inclusive Societies'.

The next forum of the Alliance of Civilizations is to take place in Vienna at the beginning of 2013. The period between the forums will be full of various youth, women and cultural festivals, meetings, conferences. Russia's representatives are intent on taking an active part in them.

We will continue our work in the Group of Friends of the Alliance using the available opportunities to promote Russian approaches to forming the modern paradigm of inter-civilizational communication, to expanding international links of structures of the Russian civil society, to helping them obtain experience of working in the broad international format. Certainly, we proceed from the assumption that the universal status of the Alliance will be preserved and its activities will be carried out in the course of the humanitarian mandate, without politicization and shift of the focus to interrelations between certain groups of countries.

Establishing and improving cooperation with institutions of the civil society is an important part of work in the cross-cultural, inter-civilizational area of Russia's foreign policy. Here the energetic, active spirit, aspiring to expanding links with international partners, involving them actively in the events carried out are of utmost importance. It is this course which is typical of the work carried out by many Russian non-governmental organizations.

We value highly the work of the World Public Forum 'Dialogue of Civilizations', which has already been mentioned above. It is the biggest international non-governmental organization of this kind with the leading Russian participation. In October last year on the island of Rhodes, its 9th session was held. It was devoted to the moral-value dimension of civilizational development under the global crisis; about 600 people from 72 countries took part in it. We see this forum as a reputable place for exchanging views on the acute issues of the present day, for searching for answers to the challenges which the humanity faces today, for working out common value guidelines.

The efforts of P. Sorokin – N. Kondratyev International Institute are necessary today. This Institute regularly holds various events on partnership of civilizations and their interconnection with the aims of sustainable development, and since January last year it has been bringing out the *Partnership of Civilizations* international journal. We can only welcome the intention of P. Sorokin – N. Kondratyev International Institute to take an active part in the work of the non-governmental segment of the Summit on Sustainable Development 'Rio+20', which is to take place in Rio-de-Janeiro in July this year.

We expect Russian non-governmental organizations to make a more considerable contribution to ensuring inter-con-

fessional rapport, realizing projects aimed at uniting countries and peoples. In particular, we are interested in stirring up the participation of representatives of our country's basic confessions in the work of the Trilateral Forum of Interfaith Cooperation for Peace, and in events within the framework of the Interfaith Harmony Week. We think it important to continue to join efforts to promote the idea put forward by us to form a High-Level Group on interfaith dialogue under the UNESCO's Director-General.

On the whole, we proceed from the assumption that the role of religious factor in the world politics in establishing inter-civilizational dialogue is rising. The peacemaking potential of the leading religions is getting more and more sought-after to prevent clashes in interrelations between civilizations and to overcome various forms of extremism.

And it manifests itself no less frequently. Even in the relatively problem-free Europe we can more and more often see cases of anti-Semitism, racism, xenophobia, which result in people's deaths. The wide response drawn by the murder of a few pupils of the Jewish school and a rabbi in French Toulouse on the 19th of March this year is evidence to the fact that the problem is acquiring an all-European nature. It is a serious reason to start thinking what the loosening of moral values common for all faiths can lead to. Marches of the former SS-soldiers and neo-Nazis in some member-states of the European Union also rank with this case. These marches need consistent treatment — according to the verdicts of the Nuremberg Trials, which are not subject to statutes of limitation.

In his time, D.S. Likhachov emphasized: 'Every nation should be judged by the moral heights and by the ideals which make the life of the nation. Goodwill to every nation, even the smallest one. This position is the most correct, the noblest one.' This should be remembered by those who are not aware of the dangers of threats connected with the displays of radicalism, nationalism, inter-ethnic and interfaith discord no matter wherever they take place — in Europe, in Africa or in the Near East. All of these are phenomena of the same order which deserve the strongest condemnation. In the modern world, there should be no place for intolerance and encroachment on one of the basic human rights — the right for the freedom of faith.

Russia will continue to foster in every way possible the development of a broad cross-cultural and inter-civilizational dialogue. This policy is based on the peculiarities of Russia's path of history, which involves the centuries-old experience of peaceful co-existence of different cultural traditions and co-development of a great number of peoples within a single multiethnic state. President D.A. Medvedev in his speech at the World Political Forum in Yaroslavl in September, 2001 emphasized that the Russian Federation is an example of a unique social, cultural and political diversity. Our country is ready for the most extensive cooperation with partners to find appropriate answers to the challenges of today, to determine the most effective ways of joining efforts so as to create a stable international architecture meeting the needs of the 21st century.

V. A. Lektorsky<sup>1</sup>

## WORLD UNITY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

It might seem that the entitled topic does not contain any particular problem. It is common knowledge that there are a lot of different cultures in the world and along with it these cultures are interconnected one way or another, i.e. form a certain unity. It is clear for everyone that the unity of cultures is desirable as today the mankind faces problems which concern all people inhabiting the Earth. Along with it their diversity is also important as it forms the basis for any development. A complete cultural homogenization would threaten the future.

However, on closer examination it turns out that there is a number of problems behind the seeming clarity of the formula 'unity in diversity' or 'diversity in unity'; the problems which are not easy in terms of concepts and difficult in terms of practical solution. As both the unity and its constituents can have different character and can be interpreted in different ways. With it we should bear it in mind that in different historical periods the issues concerning the unity of the human world and the diversity of cultures were different and were solved in different ways. Some of them did not exist before. Today they have become particularly acute.

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To begin with, every culture is connected with other cultures one way or another. In the past there were cultures which seemed absolutely isolated from the rest of cultures (today such cases are unlikely to be found). But anyway every culture correlates with other cultures at least by contrasting ('us' and 'them'). Famous Russian philosopher M.M. Bakhtin in the context of his dialogical interpretation of man, consciousness and culture formulated a thesis stating that culture exists 'on the border'. This thesis is sometimes interpreted as a statement meaning that every culture always and necessarily interacts with others. I believe that M.M. Bakhtin's idea should be interpreted somewhat differently. It means that every culture always correlates with other cultures one way or another. Certainly, in actual history cultures usually interacted with other cultures. But there were times when at least some of them tried to isolate themselves from this interaction.

World empires were peculiar attempts to create cultural and social unity and to overcome the local isolation of certain cultures. But this unity was created artificially and was imposed by force and it was composed by suppressing different cultures in favour of one culture – the dominating one. No empire managed to achieve cultural unification and within some of them there was fruitful cultural interaction (for instance, the interaction between Greek and Roman cultures in the Roman Empire). However, the imperial way of creating cultural unity was historically doomed as it was not aimed at cultural diversity but at cultural homogenization.

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Today, the problem of relations between the unity of the world and cultural diversity appears in a new context. It is the phenomenon of globalization. It means the spread of market economy all over the world, appearance and development of transnational corporations, existence of world political organizations. New information and communication technologies (the Internet, television, mobile telephone communication, etc) play a particularly important role in this process. Globalization does not only create new economic and political links between different regions of the world but it also gives rise to peculiar global culture, the so-called 'popular culture' being the most explicit form of it. Not long ago it seemed that the new global culture was supposed to supplant the cultural diversity existing today. Today it is clear that it did not and cannot happen. Man who is autonomous in his decisions and responsible for his actions is impossible without individual self-identification. But the latter does not exist without group and cultural identification. In this case global identification is not sufficient. The idea of cosmopolitanism can seem attractive. But it does not exclude the importance of cultural identification. Besides, involvement in the global culture can be different: it is enough to compare in this respect a clerk of a transnational corporation and an African peasant. Despite globalization as an opposition to it and probably as a result of it, cultural diversity in the world is not decreasing but increasing. There has appeared a new term 'globalization' (combination of globalization and localization). The idea of multiculturalism is becoming popular. But in this context there emerge a number of problems.

How can different cultures interact with one another provided that they are based on different ways of understanding the world and man, different value systems and norms?

Relations between cultures can be interpreted and practised in different ways.

First of all, it is tolerance. There are at least two ways of interpreting it.

1. Tolerance as indifference to the fact that there exist different values, ways of understanding the world and cultural practices, as these differences are considered to be insignificant in the face of the main problems which civilization deals with. According to this interpretation of tolerance the true ideas of the world and rules of social life can be rationally grounded and thus they should be accepted as something unquestionable for every sensible man. But people also have some ideas, the truthfulness of which cannot be accepted unquestionably. First of all these are values and ideas of the world which are specific for one culture or another. They are accepted on extra-rational bases and play an important role in self-identification. As for true statements, the rationally grounded moral and legal norms, we cannot be tolerant to the ones who do not accept them or violate them. But even in this case we should take into account the fact that truth cannot be imposed: by physical or propagandist influence. A man should agree on the truthfulness of a statement or on the rational norm of behaviour only as a result of his own considerations. So it is necessary to stop actions which violate the reasonable norms of social life and at the same time tolerate unreasonable views to a certain degree. It is also a good idea to create such conditions for those who share unreasonable views which would encourage them to abandon their views and accept what is undoubtedly reasonable and grounded. According to this interpretation of tolerance the diversity of cultural values will gradually decrease in the course of the development of the civilization – it will result from interaction between different cultures, the need to solve common practical problems.

2. But tolerance can also be interpreted in a different way: as respect for a different culture which is impossible to understand and which cannot be interacted with. According to this interpretation of tolerance, specific values and ideas of the world of one culture or another are not insignificant for human activities and development of the society; they determine the means and ways of these activities and this development. Pluralism of cultural values and ideas of the world cannot be avoided as they take root in the human nature and are connected with the need for self-identification. According to this interpretation, cultures are incommensurable. There is no dominating system of views and values. The only exception is the idea that all human beings irrespective of race, sex and nationality have equal rights for physical being and cultural development. Different cultures are not contiguous to one another as they exist in different worlds.

So, one interpretation of tolerance proceeds from indifference to other cultures, the other from the impossibility to understand them. But these two interpretations have something in common. They both mean maintaining the cultural differences which are now in existence and do not concede their change or development.

The idea of multiculturalism, which is popular nowadays, is often identified with tolerance. As it has become clear by now that tolerance and multiculturalism interpreted in this way do not work in practice, moreover they can have unpleasant social consequences (this is what the leaders of Germany and France are speaking about today) both of them have come in for criticism. But the point is that multiculturalism can be interpreted in different ways. If different cultures are seen as self-secluded ones which do not interact with one another then multiculturalism coincides with simple tolerance and, as well as the latter, turns out to be lame. But if the idea of multiculturalism emphasizes the open character of culture and means cross-cultural interaction and interpenetration then this idea is interpreted not as the one identical to simple tolerance but as an idea of cross-cultural dialogue. And the dialogue goes beyond tolerance.

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The peculiarity of dialogue is that it results in different cultures being able to develop, i.e. to change in some respect.

Dialogue means taking into account the point of view of the other participant. And it does not mean a non-critical acceptance of another viewpoint. It only means that it is unnecessary to see something alien in a different culture and in a different value system; it is possible to see in it something that can help solve some common problems. Not only individuals but also cultures can develop their self-identity in this dialogue.

In this context I would like to give two explanations.

First. Cultures on the whole cannot start a dialogue. 'The dialogue of cultures' is a metaphor. Only individuals, groups, communities, social establishments can participate in the dialogue.

Second. As a rule, dialogue is not carried on about value systems, fundamental ideas of the world or religious doctrines. As all of these constitute cultural identity and form the basis for identity of individuals who belong to different cultures. Thus if a culture does not destroy itself (it sometimes happens) its basic values are not discussed in this process. For example, it is impossible to carry on a dialogue concerning religious views which can be connected with cultural self-identity. If some religion entertains a possibility of its doctrine being discussed from outside viewpoints (atheistic viewpoints or viewpoints of a different religion) it loses its right for further existence.

The dialogue between different cultures is possible and can be fruitful in the context of solving certain practical problems and in the context of understanding these problems and the offered ways of solving them from the viewpoints of different

values and ideas of the world. Every culture has its own perspective when viewing one problem or another. It is possible and practically fruitful to compare these perspectives. But with it, the ways of solving these problems offered within different cultural perspectives can be not just different but different from one another in terms of their fruitfulness in a certain situation. And besides, this fruitfulness can be estimated differently due to the change of the situation.

There are three possible results of cross-cultural dialogue.

A. Synthesis of different cultures or some features of different cultures.

B. Development (i.e. change in some respects) of one or both participants of the dialogue.

C. Refusal of one of the participants to carry on the dialogue, emergence and development of hostility to a different culture.

There is an important condition of participation in a cross-cultural dialogue. It is the commonality of understanding of the existing problems by the participants (though different participants can see different angles of these problems) and certain economic and political conditions allowing all participants to influence the process and the result of the dialogue. Thus, participants of the dialogue have equal rights. Otherwise, all the talking about multiculturalism looks hypocritical: it can be a way of maintaining the status-quo which makes an unfavourable impact on the development of some cultures. A fruitful cross-cultural dialogue is only possible within universal political and legal institutions, in particular, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the system of international law, etc. These are important constituents of the modern world unity.

But due to it there appear certain problems.

The matter is that some clauses of the Universal Declaration run counter to others, such contradictions can be found between individual and collective rights (for example, the right of an individual to travel and the right of a culture for self-preservation, and others). International law is yet to be developed and this is why in a number of cases it cannot regulate the relations between countries and cultures. Besides, there is an issue of interpreting the clauses of the Universal Declaration and the clauses of International Law. In some cases they are interpreted in favour of certain countries. Such cases shake the role of the Declaration and the International Law in creating the world unity and obstruct cross-cultural interaction.

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Different cultures are meant to be participants of the dialogue. But these cultures can exist at different levels. There are national cultures. But there also are ethnic, regional and local cultures. Some social groups can be seen as carriers of their own subcultures. Individual identity is based on belonging to some collective ones. Every culture deserves respect and can participate in the dialogue. But in this context we should bear in mind two factors. Firstly, the role of cultures of different types and different levels is different when it comes to shaping individual identity. Besides, it can change in different concrete situations. An individual can at the same time belong to different cultural identities not only of different levels but also of one level (be poly-identical). Secondly (and this is particularly important), the point of the dialogue is not to cultivate and conserve differences and the existing cultural identities but to create conditions for their mutual change – as a result of which the differences do not disappear but change (some differences merge in the unity, some old differences are replaced by new ones).

Today, important changes are taking place in the cross-cultural dialogue. The point is not only that cultures taking part in the dialogue are changing. An individual's attitude to culture is changing. Certainly, an individual bases his individual identity on several collective ones. But today (in contrast to

what was common in the recent past) the problem of changing an individual's belonging to one or another cultural identity has become much simpler. The society is becoming more individualized. Cultures used to bear mostly national and ethnic character; today they are much more diverse. There appear new forms.

Another significant addition to what has been said.

It would be incorrect to think that all cultures existing now take part or can take part in the cross-cultural dialogue. In fact, some of them have been cast away to the margins of civilizational development by the process of globalization itself, others cannot find their place in this process. In this case, we should speak not about the cross-cultural dialogue but about escalating hostility of one culture to another (others). This is why cultural isolationism, fundamentalism and nationalism can also be interpreted as by-products of globalization.

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There appears a new situation in international relations today. It is connected with the modern stage of the world globalization, which is often called transition to 'the society of knowledge'. The latter is characterized by a special role of science and technologies based on it (information, communication, biological, nano- and cognitive technologies) in social, cultural and personal life. Scientific knowledge and technologies are universal. Their spread caused by globalization cannot but lead to universal homogenization. However, it is important to bear in mind that universal technologies are used to solve local problems. Information nets which have spread round the globe mean involving different local net communities. So the very fact of the development of 'the society of knowledge' does not mean that it is necessary to suppress or supplant the existing cultures with their differences.

However, the situation is yet more complicated, in fact. The point is that the emerging global culture is not just being built over the existing cultures without interacting with them. To a certain extent it challenges the cultures which are in ex-

istence today, including the Western culture (by the way, globalization until recently was perceived as westernization). The point is the challenge to the existing ideas of man, his abilities and limits, freedom and dignity.

Due to the development of information, biological and nanotechnologies it becomes possible to ultimately modify the physical qualities of man, to influence his brain and psyche. On the one hand, it opens up new opportunities. On the other, it cannot but influence culture as in all existing cultures the image of man means those physical and psychic qualities of his which are historically traditional.

The rising involvement of man in the global information and communication net is not only an opportunity to maintain contacts with other people and cultures, but it is also a rising net of dependences. There expand opportunities to manipulate with consciousness, to control man, to produce misinformation on a large scale.

The communities which appear within global information nets are quite different from the ones which exist on the basis of traditional cultures. A net community can appear in a flash and break up no less quickly. It is not linked to any territory and is not guided by an established tradition. Relations between such communities are not hierarchical and the whole range of them cannot be presented as a systemic whole. Involvement in such communities and belonging to one of the existing cultures based on historical traditions and presupposing spatial localization can come and often do come into collision.

I do not think that global culture can supplant traditional cultures. It is rather the fact that the existing cultures have to react to the challenges of 'the society of knowledge' and adapt to these challenges by way of self-changes. It can turn out that different cultures will have different resources for such adaptation (for example, some traditional ways of arrangement of work in China and Japan proved to correlate well with the modern forms of chain enterprises). And it will lead to a new change in the interrelation of cultures within the global whole.

A. A. Likhanov<sup>1</sup>

## GLOBALISM AS CAUSE OF SCHISM

Do you not think, dear colleagues, that globalization itself reduces at first the importance of dialogue, and afterwards rejects it as some unnecessary drawback interfering into the matters of globalization?

In my opinion, disavowing of different types of dialogues contributes to the nature of globalization, i.e. liquidation of the multidimensional world, reduction to common denominator, to uniformity of economic and financial goals, suppressing any originality, when it comes to economic resources, and especially financial leverages.

Globalization destroyed multipolarity. Having spent much strength on the liquidation of the USSR, globalization, which is

constantly changing its face, does not let countries with population over a billion to become the second centre of the world civilization. No matter how impressed we are with the development of China, it is only an extremely fast developing appendage of globalization. If you take away its enormous, gigantic orders from the USA, Europe and Russia, China will start to decline because of the lack of the demand for abundant Chinese goods. As for India, I respect its people, but the country has turned into a source of manager service staff not only for the USA, but for all developed countries of the world.

As the force, globalization formed long before economic unanimity. Starting with events in Yugoslavia, the USA attaches satellites, some of them ridiculous such as Estonia or Ukraine, demonstrating new centre of force beyond the UN control. On winning the recognition as the most powerful army in the world – one cannot but see that they were not defensive, but offensive technologies of NATO countries (the USA in the first place) that had been seriously strengthened, renovated and developed over the years of oppressing Iraq, Afghanistan and the bouquet of the countries in Northern Africa. The USA realizes their policy without any supervision, without looking around.

To improve one's military equipment, one has to use it. That is to say, one has to be at war. Military equipment of NATO countries' armed forces (mainly American but not only)

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professes launching the most effective attacks with the minimum risk both to the equipment and to the servicemen operating it. Yes, sometimes people do die. But these deaths become less and less significant, they are covered with the considerable payments to the families and overpatriotic recognition of the perished. That is, to die in an expeditionary military operation is a justified and economically protected risk.

So the latest reminiscence let us understand: no one asks Russia anymore whether to start or not military operations against anyone (that was not possible right after the creation of the UN and in the time of the USSR).

The last real sage of communistic views, Fidel Castro has not once warned the world about the approaching Third World war and showed the place where it will break out – Iran. The head of that state Ahmadinejad proves the right of his country to use nuclear energy for economic purposes, but they do not believe him. The situation reminds of that in Iraq. Shadows of the Iraqi president hung with impunity and Gaddafi killed in public, no matter how they are depicted by politically committed TV, comfort no one, stop no one, warn no one. Iran is the next, though the Afghan fire has not been extinguished and will not.

However, Iran seems to be differently organized. And the centre of power can definitely pay for its geopolitical recklessness. According to the known texts of Fidel Castro, the constellation of the main centres of force can expect the events similar to those of 9/11.

It is useful to remember that roughly speaking many satellite-countries of the US (here I mean NATO countries with strong armies) were invaded by the outlanders long ago. Those outlanders come from the states where these countries ruled.

France and Italy are overcrowded with the refugees from Libya, who are, naturally, poor, unqualified and unwanted. Germany is stuffed with Turks. According to the mass media reports, most people crossing American-Mexican border illegally are no longer Mexicans but Hindus.

Most incredible national enclaves are rooted inside developed countries and define the significant parts of their life. What would they do under the circumstances of the Third world war? Let alone the unpredictable actions of the new Egypt, which is turning into the centre of militant Islamism right next to Israel.

Experts in geopolitics will find thousands of arguments against and questions to globalization as the newest way of world order. It is not a secret that for someone war is more profitable than peace, provided that the arms burnt are renewable and 'promote' economics, and the children killed are not yours. And when the war is not on your territory and you are perfectly safe. Added to this, after the war there is redistribution of control of high-priced raw materials, which become cheaper.

Many times, in different states and at various times, the humanity or rather its ruling élite tried to lead its peoples and the world into the temptation to win with perfect impunity. But no one has ever succeeded!

Now, frankly speaking about the dialogue of cultures, it does not exist. What kind of dialogue can the Libyans have with the Italians and the French, who got the US permission to destroy a more or less organized system of the Libyan state?

When Gaddafi was alive, he seemed to me to be a wild, incongruous and unworthy person, a North African madman. His fight for the country where (as it suddenly became known in Russia) almost all social problems were solved and all people to some extent used national oil wealth, his direct war with bandits who were destroying the country, his murder and anonymous villains humiliating him, all these facts made him a hero for me. He died for his country. Being neither a president, nor a monarch. And my feelings are shared by many.

Having observed indifferently the Egyptian president and his work, now I am watching with shudder and sympathy an 87-year-old man's trial, demolition of all his deals and the upcoming execution.

Do NATO countries want to tell anyone about their impartiality in these situations?

The latest decades of the world practice are marked by violation of not only interstate values. Have a look: Libyan money has been assigned, as the Gaddafi's money for reimbursement of the costs of military operations against him and his former country by the other states. What is it? Is it a dialogue of civilizations? Or just a robbery? Why does the UN keep aside from it?

This organization, which is supposed to be a peace talks organizer, has turned into an American assistant. Our 'vetoes' do not seem to mean much.

'The strong always blame the weak', as Krylov or, perhaps, La Fontaine noted. Today the strong oppress the weak, without listening to the reasons or protests.

I usually speak as an advocate of childhood. Though being forced to talk about globalization as the only nail which holds the whole world, including my dear and now feeble Russia, first of all I think about childhood.

New generations enter the world always carrying the inheritance of their predecessors. First of all, of their parents. What inheritance will the modern children get? Not only the children of Russia.

Children of the poor countries – India, all African countries, Latin America, former Southern Soviet republics, and speaking frankly, the majority of Russian children, come into this life with the desire to adjust to it, to have at least a piece of bread and a plateful of soup.

The number of the poor is growing, so is the number of the super-rich and the so-called middle-class.

Economic stratification growth and racial, national and interethnic demarcation are not stopped in spite of all efforts to tolerant reconciliation.

Smoothing out does not work, which means that all the preconditions for the mutual help and for the rich to give partially away their wealth to the poor are reduced.

The conclusion is: inequality contradicts tolerance, as tolerance contradicts inequality.

The Russian Children Foundation records demarcation of the children's world in Russia. Today we have not only children of the rich and children of the poor, but also rich children and poor children. It naturally dictates their unnatural behaviour at school, on the play-ground, on the streets.

Our world is like ice that has cracked on a river in winter: it does not grow together into one field but falls out into blocks which come one over another. Force against force, and there is no reconciliation.

V. N. Lipsky<sup>1</sup>

## VLADIMIR SOLOVYOV ON PATIENCE AND ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY

The world's civilizations have gone along different paths. Thus, the American civilization was set up by those who came to North America as to the Land of Opportunity. Nowadays we call them immigrants. The Russian civilization took a different path. For centuries, it has been developing as a multinational state. And it was fastened by patience – the Russian national characteristic feature, and by moral empathy of hundreds of the neighbouring ethnic communities, but not by the legal regulations of European tolerance.

The Russian civilization is unique, for a lot of nations have been living here side by side for centuries, and the principles of international cooperation have been developing for centuries, based on the integral value system. Quite often it is being said that Russians are alienated unlike their less numerous neighbouring ethnic communities. Indeed, a clan structure is not typical of Russians. Though, this is due to a different cultural code, but not to their alienation. Russian people are a uniting nation, a state-forming nation. This code possesses some qualities that can be referred to as genetic. Here, I am going to write about 'patience', which is one of such factors.

In this respect, in Russia's philosophic thought, Vladimir Solovyov's ideas are of interest. The idea of patience is most likely to have been derived from Solovyov's conception of absolute unity, since even in his reflections on the reconciliation between the 'East' and the 'West' through integration of Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic Churches, the philosopher comes to patience, without which no reconciliation is possible.

First of all, we should consider the conceptual side that received Solovyov's special attention, and that 'programmed' his understanding of the phenomenon of 'patience'. Solovyov prefers 'patience', opposing it to 'tolerance', which in Latin is '*passivum pro activo*' (susceptible to action). In *The Justification of Good* Solovyov writes that 'patience (as a virtue) is only a passive side of the spiritual property, which in action is manifested as generosity or the courage of the spirit.'<sup>2</sup>

According to Solovyov, patience is revealed through ethical basics – 'suffering, compassion, reverence for the supreme'. Suffering, compassion and reverence enable a human being to review internal and external existence by sense perception. In this case, patience for Solovyov is a synergy of psychic properties or some ethical trend, directed at Faith. Solovyov mentions different types of patience; nevertheless, according to him, not all of them are virtues: 'One can undergo physical and psychic suffering with patience due to one's high resistance to stress, stupidity or apathy – it is no virtue in such a case. Alternatively, one can undergo physical and psychic suffering with patience owing to one's internal spiritual force, which doesn't give way to external influence – and then, it is an ascetic virtue (which brings us back to our first ethical platform). Also, one can do so owing to one's meekness and love to one's neighbour (*caritas*), not willing to repay evil with evil or insult with insult –

then, it is an altruistic virtue (which brings us back to our second ethical platform – compassion, even to one's enemy or offender). And finally, patience is rooted in obedience to the Supreme Will which predetermines everything that happens in the world – and then, it is a pious or religious virtue (which brings us back to the third ethical platform).'<sup>3</sup>

The first type of patience is addressed at the human himself, and is based on suffering. Resisting external influence, a human stands up for what he or she believes to be so fundamental that it makes him or her prepared for any suffering. It can be secular or religious hermits, who, with patience, stand up to challenges or even tortures for the truth that they adhere to (Giordano Bruno, Nikolai Vavilov, and Christian martyrs).

The second type of patience takes us back to the Christian doctrine of non-resistance to evil by force. It should be mentioned that Solovyov indicates that this virtue is 'altruistic', which presupposes readiness to be patient for the sake of one's neighbour, when the latter is understood in the broadest sense. This kind of patience has a wide scope, which includes parents who do not reject their 'hopeless' children (though patience is not the only motive); it also includes those who offer their personal and financial support to orphans and cripples, and also saints who are so abundant in the Russian Orthodox Church etc.

The third type of patience is characterized by locality. In contrast to the previous two types, which are more related to sense perception of the world, this very type is sensory-rational. The unconditional acceptance of the Truth, on which depends a person and everything that happens to him or her, determines the awe-patience; and this is how the supreme justice is displayed. All the three types of patience are active and creative in nature, and they are also interconnected. With different features, they have the same core – patience is the display of a personality's best qualities. Methodologically, spiritual dominance is a measure of patience. Suffering, compassion and awe spring from a nation's spiritual and psychological habits, lifestyle and history. And this is an underlying structure, and no political or ideological influence can destroy it by its deforming influence.

Solovyov analyzes the total unity as a manifestation of patience, using concrete material. In particular, it is connected with his reflections on ethnicity issues: 'The body of Christ, being a flawless organism, cannot be just a sum of simple cells, but should include more sophisticated and important organs, which are represented here as different nations... and if Christianity does not require *impersonality*, it cannot require *un-ethnicity* either.'<sup>4</sup>

Using substantial historical material (Italy, Spain, France etc.), Solovyov demonstrates how different nations in their cultural set-up 'were implementing the ideal of pan-humanity'. For instance, together with the unequivocal success they made in national art, Italians were getting more prominence among other nations. The most distinguished manifestations of Italian national spirit became (and remain to be) models, for European culture. Addressing Italians (Spaniards, Germans etc.), Solovyov observes that 'this celebrated nation happens to be just a specific form of the universal content-matter, which is embedded in it, filled by it, and is implementing it not just for itself, but for all.'<sup>5</sup>

The more prominence national spiritual achievements get, 'the more of the pan-humanity ideal they implement'. Most national in their attitude are Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy, who

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<sup>2</sup> V. Solovyov. *The Justification of Good*. Complete Works in 2 volumes. Vol. 1. Moscow, 1990, p.194.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p.195.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p.365–366.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p.369.

expressed Russian sorrows and strivings of the Russian spirit, became worldwide famous, as well as Petrarch and Leonardo da Vinci. Vladimir Solovyov comes to the conclusion that all nations, as they prospered, were establishing their nationality not within their own boundaries *in abstracto*, but within something universal, hypernational... they were implementing it in their creative work – national in its source and manner, but universal in its meaning and outcome.<sup>1</sup>

What does national interaction originate in? It may only originate in an activity targeted at spiritual endeavour. Some separate historical characters may twist the ‘national-universal ideal’ (Solovyov). But ‘wicked interpretation’ goes, while the idea stays and clarifies itself in its new and better displays, only ‘if it is truly embedded into the soul of the nation.’<sup>2</sup> That is the reason why Solovyov cannot accept nationalistic intolerance. For the same reason, he cannot accept cosmopolitanism either:

‘The topmost ethical ideal requires that we love all people as we love ourselves. However, as there are no people outside nations... the only logical conclusion is that we should love other nations as we love our own nation.’<sup>3</sup>

Patience towards other nations and their cultures originates in the affinity of souls, ‘ethical equality’, ethical love, since the true good ‘is common and indivisible’ (Solovyov). Ethical willpower can help overcome nonsensical national hostility. But at the same time, one’s own nation is still ‘the starting point’. For Solovyov, patience is a moral phenomenon that requires a substantial spiritual effort. Thus understood, patience has a more profound and solid background than the ethics of law, which, being very important and necessary, is still just a habit to comply with the law. Besides, it is mostly in Christianity that Vladimir Solovyov regards this phenomenon as realized.

V. L. Makarov<sup>4</sup>

## QUANTITATIVE MEASUREMENT OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY CONTRIBUTES TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM

The issue regarding the reasonable degree of cultural diversity has been discussed more intensively at different levels. Obviously, the existence of one culture worldwide would mean an essential unification of people’s mental life. But it is also bad when there are many cultures. Every single one is not supposed to have one’s own culture, different from others.

Thus, all the people with mathematic reasoning would naturally ask the question: what is the optimal (reasonable, rational) number of cultures that should exist in the contemporary world? But this question immediately evokes many additional questions. What are the criteria which describe a certain culture? How should one deal with the hierarchy of cultures, with the notion of subculture? Are the data we have concerning the number of cultures accurate? And, finally, what is the level of cultural diversity and, accordingly, how can this diversity be measured?

The last question is crucial, as when the optimality is spoken about – the criterion which measures ‘optimality’ is usually meant. Let’s consider the classic problem by J. Buchanan (a Nobel Prize winner in Economics) concerning the optimal number of people in the club. It has a natural criterion which is joint complacency of the club members. What might a criterion for the number of cultures be? Whatever criterion is considered, it may be argued at once. The solution is rather to substitute the direct criterion with some indirect one, such as *stability*.

Let’s refer to cybernetics where diversity is connected with stability. A well-known Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety can

be formulated as ‘the managing variety should prevail the managed variety in diversity’ in order to make the management efficient. So, the question is: What does the culture manage? What should it prevail in diversity to be efficient? It is likely to manage people’s social behaviour, using the method of so-called soft power. As the society varies immensely, culture should vary even more.

Let’s refer to another principle (Fisher’s theorem) about the population stability. The more diverse the population’s environment is, the more diverse the population has to be in order to resist the environment. Population in our case refers to the mankind, and culture is the criterion of diversity which is essential for the mankind not only to survive as a biological species but also to gradually develop in spiritual and moral sense. Spiritual and moral development is such a delicate and complicated topic that I can only mention it without considering the essence of it and without giving it accurate definitions.

Let’s get back to the topic of the presentation which is quantitative measurement and, particularly, the need of quantitative measurement of cultural diversity. It would be natural to connect culture with other concepts which might be easier measured such as religions, languages, and nationalities.

There are fewer religions than cultures. Languages, conversely, outnumber cultures, and their life cycles are approximately the same. No doubt that culture and language are tightly connected with each other, influencing one another in their development. Language cannot be considered to be part of culture, and the opposite is also wrong. Nowadays there are about 7,000 languages in the world. Only Nigeria comprises 327 languages. Refer to Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber (2011). It is obvious that cultures are much fewer in number.

I say all these things to demonstrate that there are no concrete indicators related directly to the culture, although there is a large number of indirect ones. These indicators, measured carefully and accurately, may be very useful while analyzing problems of culture.

Let’s consider the problem of interaction of languages, their mutual interference and their mutual enrichment. There is abundant statistics of translations from one language to another, of readers of different literary works including the readers’ ranking. The above-mentioned factors help estimate the degree one culture influences another. Linguists with the help of mathematicians have learned to calculate the quantitative distance between languages. It is the quantitative measurement

<sup>1</sup> V. Solovyov. The Justification of Good. Complete Works in 2 volumes. p.376.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., p.378.

<sup>4</sup> Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute (the Russian Academy of Sciences), Head of the Economics Department of the State Academic University for the Humanities, Director-Organizer of the Higher School for the State Administration at Lomonosov Moscow State University, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor. Author of over 300 scholarly publications, including: *Mathematic Theory of Economic Dynamics and Balance* (Matematicheskaja teorija ekonomicheskij dinamiki i ravnovesija), *Intangible Assets and the Intellectual Property Value Assessment* (Otsenka stoimosti nematerial’nykh aktivov i intellektualnoj sobstvennosti), *Russian Science and High Tech at the Turn of the Third Millennium* (Nauka i vysokije tekhnologii Rossiji na rubezhe tretjeg tysyacheletija), *Russia in the Globalizing World. Modernization of the Russian Economy* (Rossija v globalizujuschemsya mire. Modernizatsija Rossijskoj ekonomiki). Editor-in-chief of ‘Economics and Mathematical Methods’ (Economika i matematicheskije metody) journal. Member of the editorial boards and panels of the journals: ‘Economics of Planning’, ‘Social Sciences’, ‘Cybernetics and the System Analysis’ (Kibernetika i sistemnyj analiz), ‘Economy of Modern Russia’ (Economika sovremennoj Rossiji), ‘Science of Science’ (Naukovedenje), ‘Optimization’ (Optimizatsija) and others. Laureate of the USSR Council of Ministers Award and others.

that is of importance, as it has always been intuitively clear that Russian and Ukrainian languages are close and Russian and Chinese are far from one another. And their quantitative closeness might be calculated now. I refer to the book by Ginsburgh Victor and Weber Shlomo (2011), which I am going to refer to regularly.

Standard and relatively simple data which can be found in the statistic books in such sections as Population, Religion, and Culture are little used in the quantitative research so far. This is in significant dissonance with economic academic literature, where computer modelling and quantitative measurements are widely used.

UNESCO always emphasizes that cultural diversity preservation is its main mission. We have *UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity*. It is an official document which all the countries have to stick to. There is also a substantial definition of cultures there, which seems to be absolutely correct: 'Culture should be regarded as a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of a society or a social group, that encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs.' UNESCO (2001).

The *UNESCO Framework for Cultural Statistics* (2010) is being conducted at a very good level. The universal classification is adopted. This classification will allow the use of various national statistical data and to make cross-national and interstate comparisons.

The statistic data are structured due to a cultural cycle: Creation – Production – Distribution – Demonstration (Acquisition) – Delivery – Consumption (Participation).

The statistic divisions are as follows:

- A. Cultural and natural heritage.
- B. Festivals and celebrations.
- C. Arts and workmanship.
- D. Books and Mass Media.
- E. Audio, visual and interactive means.
- F. Design and creative services.

There are additional cultural features in other statistic divisions. Thus, there are enough data to make a substantial scientific research.

The example of such research is the book by Victor Ginsburgh and Shlomo Weber (2011), where diversity of languages is measured with the diversity index. The standard index of language diversity is the probability that two accidentally chosen people of the population speak different languages. The authors of the book have significantly corrected the index introducing the phenomenon concerning the distance between languages: the probability that two people speak different languages must be multiplied by the distance between their languages. This new number measures the level of language diversity in a society (or a country) much more correctly.

My judgement might be disputable but I suppose that diversity lessens the probability of armed conflicts and wars. A greater diversity lessens the opposition and hegemony strivings. The dialogue emerges in the foreground.

Well-known and worldwide influential Turkish preacher M. Gülen wrote dozens of books popularizing his main idea to arrange a dialogue between cultures, between regions based on educating large numbers of common people. In particular, he organized a chain of schools in more than 50 countries of the world where cultural diversity and essentials of many regions are taught.

The Dialogue of Civilizations, an international forum held in 2002, gained worldwide popularity. The forum turned to be a successful discussion platform on various issues mainly concerning religion and culture.

That is why when there is enough quantitative data in terms of different cultures and their diversity in historical terms, the

research might be held which *could prove* the connection between the level of cultural diversity and armed conflicts. There is a rich statistics concerning wars, so computer modelling of econometric kind might easily be used.

Nikita Nikolayevich Moiseyev wrote several books about humankind's destinies where he emphasized the importance to preserve cultural diversity. For example, in his book *To Be Or Not Be For The Mankind* (1999) he writes, 'Civilizational diversity is as necessary to provide stability of the mankind as the genetic diversity is.' (p. 231)

Another statement in favour of great cultural diversity is connected with measurement of the mankind's happiness level. In recent years the economics of happiness has actively been developing, where the so-called happiness index is put to the foreground. It is not an economic indicator which is normally used to measure successful development of the country, like GDP or per capita income, economic development pace etc. According to the index of happiness, the leaders are not the countries with the most developed economies (a well-known paradox of R. Easterlin (2001): 'money does not make one happy'). There is an international database of the index of happiness (see <http://worlddatabaseofhappiness>).

And the connection with a diversity is as follows: a person is striving to play a leading part in the group which is important to him. Then he feels satisfied. For example, there are more than 3,000 Halls of Fame in the United States. Imagine a sport competition consisting of high jumps only. Obviously, people would not enjoy going in for sport. It is clear that the diversity of sports would make people more people happier who go in for bowling, curling, sitting in a sauna etc. It is the same with culture in its broadest meaning. By the way, it is worth saying that the civil society that we have been trying to establish for many years without much success is based on the diversity of human individuals and, particularly, on their cultural preferences.

I think it doubtless that attracting statistic data on culture the reliable connection between the level of happiness of the mankind and the level of cultural diversity might be found.

The relation between material welfare and complacency is versatile. For example, at the beginning of 2012 Italy met with a very interesting phenomenon. The government introduced additional taxes on corporations and especially on the citizens. It led to a reduction of business activity and increased the activity of consumption of cultural production. Attendance of museums, exhibitions and libraries increased.

In conclusion, I would like to note that a large portion of measurement of cultural phenomena with the help of market mechanisms is omitted here. There has appeared such a notion as the cultural capital, which means availability of cultural potential as measured by the market (see Throsby, David 2001). But this is another topic.

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Juan A. March<sup>1</sup>

## A WORLD IN COLOURS NOT IN BLACK AND WHITE: THE VALUE OF DIVERSITY

The economic crisis that started mid 2008 has proved us how important and fragile is our economic global structure and it has reinforced the idea that the world has become much more polycentric than before. The solid position of the most advanced nations has appeared to be much more dependent of the growth in the new emerging powers (the BRICS) and more fragile on their internal markets that could be thought before 2008. Highly respected regional groupings like the European Union, which existence is the result of a very meticulous work of more than half a century, have experienced serious difficulties to keep its cohesion and continue to act with full independence. Other areas like Africa, Latin America and Asia have re-emerged as promising poles of development, bringing hope for new opportunities in a changing world.

So to a certain extent the crisis has worked in favor of the recognition of diversity and even of decentralization of power, as the key element of the XXI century

Most of the outstanding progress of mankind have come after some hard setbacks. Maybe we are experiencing again this phenomena. Only 10 years ago the dominant idea was the end of the history and the global convergence in a single new model; the liberal western model. Big failures like the intervention in Irak, the excesses of the deregulation in the financial markets, the difficulty to adapt the welfare States to the new Era in the western area, have brought us just the contrary: the need to build a global world under the basis of global tolerance and the respect of the diversity. Nothing can be simple in this complex world.

For the survival of our standards we need to keep the world open and the nations with a clear determination to trade and to interact. So it is crucial to keep a global climate of mutual understanding and respect as a prerequisite to guarantee the right development in our era.

By the end of the second World war, Europe was looking at new emerging countries as new comers and the United States were trying to design a new world order in which its values and interests would be the predominant ones. But history has evolved in a much more complex direction: it has given birth to globalization, the common universe of all the existing nations. The world has become really global for the first time and it becoming obvious that it will be easier to be ruled through the pattern of diversity than by trying to reduce it to a single or unique model. Because of the growing complexity of our world, of our societies, of the new economy driven by creativity and technology, cooperation and not domination is the only reasonable path for the future.

So the big challenge ahead of us is how to manage diversity, how we can act to make of diversity a sum game for all, and how we can do of it the fundamental pillar for good global governance.

An important element in this context is human attitude towards diversity. It is important to expand in all nations and societies the perception that diversity is extremely positive and it is a factor of strength not of weakness. To put the benefits of diversity in the day to day thinking of people is a must if we want to make successful our complex world of the XXI Century. We have had too many examples in our history of countries

and leaders who have worked in the opposite direction: trying to eliminate diversity and create a monolithic world. Too many empires based on the idea of expanding the religion that was at the basement of its culture or expanding a project based on the elimination of different cultures, from the rationalist empire of Napoleon to the destructive and racist attempt of Nazism, have worked in that disastrous direction. We have learned from the suffering and misery that all these dynamics have caused, how limited is the road of monolithic approach to life.

In this effort to make of the concept of diversity a predominant positive idea in the world, we have to recognize the important contribution of the Project of the United Nations known as the Alliance of Civilizations. Although in its origin it was a Spanish-Turkish initiative it has evolved now to become a core United Nations activity with more than 130 countries belonging to the group of Friends and all regional groupings accepting to organize in different years the annual Forum.

On the 3<sup>rd</sup> August 2011 the High Representative of UN for the Alliance of Civilizations, Dr Jorge Sampaio, presented to the Secretary General Ban-Ki-Moon the 3<sup>rd</sup> Action Plan for the Alliance covering the period 2011 to 2013. This Plan will focus the debate in five areas:

The new opportunities existing in some Arab countries for evolving towards more open societies as a result of the so call "Arab Spring"

The need to make more evident in Europe that diversity and cohesion are compatible principles.

The influence of religion on peace, security and development in the new global world.

The reinforcement of the Alliance of Civilizations as a soft power, as an effective instrument of preventive Diplomacy to consolidate dialogue and peace across the world

So attending to these areas of activity we can consider than the strategy of the Alliance is well in place. We have, however, in front of us a huge task consisting in making the Alliance operational. In this respect the Forums of the Alliance, the one organized in Doha last year and the one that will be held in Vienna this year are important gatherings for identifying roads of action for the ideas connected with the intercultural dialogue that these big meetings represent.

So in my view the effort of reinforcing the idea of diversity as a positive thing for all societies is well on its way. We have now to continue working in this direction and supporting the activities of the Alliance.

A new effort is however needed to make progress in two areas:

First the need to encourage a more effective connection between education and the preparation for successful professional activities in the design of the new educational schemes. We need to make successful the new generation and we will only do it by a serious adjustment in the educational schemes. The great value of the modern economy is that is based in the power of creativity not in using the mechanical aptitudes of humankind. In 1912, in the developed countries there were large factories of 5,000 people out of which only 25 were performing decisional activities. The rest were performing like machines. In 2012, just a century later, in those countries these large factories have been replaced by 200 enterprises of just 25 people in which most of them are performing decisional functions. So the world economy is moving towards giving every and each day more and more value to the intelligence and to the creative role of the man. Nations need to ensure that the new generation will be prepared in this direction, making of each individual a driving force of the economy. For that it is important that every person can have a high value of exchange thanks to

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being specially performant in an specific activity. So the value of diversity has also to be very present when designing the new patterns of education for the new generations.

The second area is, obviously, the political one. The great task ahead of us is to make fully successful the United Nations in this century. In this perspective the reform of the Security Council will be crucial to combine decision power and diversity in the global governance. A new Security Council with 20-25 members in which of half of the members having permanent status would reinforce the value of the. We can nor forget that UN is the only global political organization we have

successfully put in motion. Effectiveness is the great challenge for us in this field but we count with the positive reality of the existence of the organization.

To sum up I would say that the course of action is well established to go for a smooth evolution in the world. We are consolidating the value of diversity in our world. We should now reinforce the main global political body to guarantee the necessary openness and stability in the world and to push for a radical change in the models and structures of education to take full profit of the potential of the new generation in the new decentralized economy.

V. L. Matrosov<sup>1</sup>

## RUSSIAN PEDAGOGICAL EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Pedagogical education has historically evolved and established under classical universities and followed the model of higher education. The history of Russian pedagogical education speaks how creatively the first higher pedagogical establishments adopted ideas of classical universities, not only of Russian ones, but foreign (European) ones as well. It is also obvious that it was in Russia (later on, in the USSR) where a unique system of higher pedagogical education originated that carried out governmental tasks to train and re-train human resources for educational establishments of all levels (ranging from pre-schooling to higher education).

It is a well-know fact that history of many colleges is history of transforming a teacher's training institution into a classical university, and vice versa, from a classical higher educational establishment into a pedagogical university. In recent years, the former tendency has prevailed again, the number of pedagogical colleges has been reduced to 50. However, the system of pedagogical education in the context of its modernization and entry into the world educational space, continuing to master the ideas of classical universities, introducing innovative approaches and modern educational technologies, may as well be based on its own positive background and achievements of academic schools and trends.

Moscow State Pedagogical University originated as Women's High Courses, academic activities of which were based on a university principle. It stands to reason that in the first years after the revolution (Moscow Women High Courses had become one of the largest educational establishments in Russia) it was called the second Moscow State University. Nowadays it is the largest pedagogical university in the country that has kept fundamental academic training, and reputable academic schools and trends. Moscow State Pedagogical University has one of the most competent system of Dissertation Boards in the country, being the third on this list after Moscow and St. Petersburg Universities.

Learning process in Moscow State Pedagogical University (used to be called Moscow State Pedagogical Institute named

after V.I. Lenin) has always targeted at practical requirements for highly-experienced human resources, including managerial staff in higher education. Accounting for multinational type of the state (the former Soviet Union and the present Russian Federation), as well as close economical, political, cultural relations with neighbouring states, the learning process in the university has always been marked with an international tendency, dialogue of cultures that was put into practice both in learning activities and scientific and cultural spheres.

The concept of dialogue of cultures that has become very popular in modern academic papers and in pedagogical activities has originated, to a large extent, from fundamental works of academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov. His works on ancient Russian literature, essays 'Ecology of Culture' (1979), 'Russian Notes' (1981), 'Literature – Reality – Literature' (1981) marked out the main directions for experts in education and pedagogy, too. The value of his works for national pedagogical education is predicated upon the fact that the author not only took into account a long-dated history of Russian culture and education, but also suggested learning positive lessons from it. As relevant as ever are the lines of Likhachov's work about the necessity of a special scientific discipline (direction), the ecology of culture. [1].

The issue of dialogue of cultures has recently become especially topical in many European countries and in Russia in the respect to the new phenomenon of multicultural environment, mostly in large megalopolis, that resulted from mass migration, re-settlement of people from Asian and African states. The term of 'multicultural education' has been more and more often circulating lately, it is treated as a certain reflection of models of cultural pluralism in education. [4]

In 2010 the draft of the Concept of Multicultural Education in the Russian Federation was published, that especially emphasizes that the document was created to meet 'the state needs, national and ethnical features of the population, terms of intercultural dialogue and tasks of setting out interethnic and inter-confessional harmony'. The authors of the document, in particular, consider the Russian language an 'active mediator and effective catalyst for dialogue of cultures'.

It is the concept of dialogue of cultures that is acknowledged by the majority of contemporary researchers as a compromise that can overcome the polarities of monoculturalism and multiculturalism. It is worth noting that is some researches not only the USA, but the USSR was claimed an example of monoculturalism with its idea of convergence and unity of nations. However, they do not take into consideration that in Soviet humanitarian researches the term 'unity' was always alongside with the concept of 'national identity', and that while the Russian language was overspread as a language of interethnic communication, the development of national cultures and learning national languages kept alive, anyway.

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One cannot but agree with the statement by D.S. Likhachov: 'Russian science did not become a losing party when Russian scientists took part in organisation of national research centres in our country and national higher educational establishments. It has been enriched and keeps doing so by studying the fructified ideas that return to Russia from Yerevan, Tartu, Tashkent, Alma-Ata, Tbilisi, Baku, Kiev, Minsk, Petrozavodsk, Vilnius, Riga... The point is not in enumerating all of them, but in understanding to the full extent what role the national exchange of scientific ideas between peoples plays.' [1]

It should be pointed out that science in the former republics of the Soviet Union was enriched by new ideas and researches of Russian scientists and Russian academic schools, too. To continue or (in some cases) to restart academic contacts with the former republics of the Soviet Union is a positive factor of development on the post-Soviet educational and academic space. Dialogue that had been cultivated for decades and either was terminated due to certain reasons, or lost its efficiency and fruitfulness, is obviously leaning towards intensification and consolidation of academic groups, towards joining efforts together in order to face the mutual challenges of education and upbringing, moulding of personality in the context of modern information society.

In the system of pedagogical education with a direct participation of institutions and laboratories of the Russian Academy of Education and large pedagogical colleges, there appeared new instructional technologies and directions concerning the issues of making curriculum and courseware, didactic materials and study guides that take into account specific features of teaching under the conditions of various national cultures and in multicultural environment. In Moscow State Pedagogical University (former Moscow Pedagogical State Institute named after V.I. Lenin) the Uzbek division of Philological Department has been operating for many years. Its graduates have, so far, succeeded in the areas of education and culture of that Republic, taken the leading chairs, promoted internationalization of learning process in secondary and higher educational establishments of Uzbekistan.

What directions for pedagogical colleges activities in light of internationalization of learning process and effective intercultural communication should be supported, evolved and promoted nowadays?

First and foremost, we should *keep and develop traditions of scientific and instructional schools concerning theories and methods of education in multicultural environment, including promoting and advancing the Russian language as a language of interethnic communication.*

For many students and post-graduates, young researchers who come to Russian universities from different countries, it is very important to realize that Russian is not only the language of the great Russian classical literature, the language of A. Chekhov, F. Dostoevsky, L. Tolstoy, M. Bulgakov. Though some of them decided to take up studying Russian to read *The Seagull*, *Anna Karenina* and *Karamazov Brothers* in the original. However, their personal literature (and, even a wider, cultural) interest does not dominate. Most of foreign students, post-graduates and interns are targeted at, first and foremost, working with original academic texts written in Russian by prominent scientists, well-known all over the world, founders of academic schools and trends. Among such scholars there are many experts in pedagogy and psychology, personal applied techniques. It is suffice to name L.S. Vygotsky, P.P. Blonsky, L.V. Zankov, A.N. Leontiev, V.V. Davydov, A.A. Leontiev, I.T. Ogorodnikov, V.V. Golubkov, M.T. Baranov and others [2].

For example, in the 1970s–1980s in Moscow State Pedagogical University an academic school of professor T.A. Ladyzhenskaya, who founded the Department for Rhetoric and Speech Culture of Teachers, was established. The programme 'Pedagogical Speech Studies' offered by a prominent expert

in methods of teaching Russian influenced both Russian and foreign methodical educational researches, and the courses of rhetoric and speech culture were entered into curricula of almost all departments of pedagogical colleges. This is a valuable experience to share with colleagues from foreign educational pedagogical establishments.

This kind of ideas exchange is being widely practised now. For example, the seminar on teaching gifted children held by Moscow State Pedagogical University in concert with the University of Cologne (Germany) arises a great interest with teachers, post-graduates and students. The participants of this seminar not only deliver reports, presentations and work in task groups, but also get acquainted with teaching methods of teachers in secondary schools of Moscow and Cologne.

Secondly, we should continue to *develop new educational programmes that involve special learning packages directed at providing facilities for students to carry forward their personal educational strategies and obtain the necessary knowledge, professional and cultural competence in the context of academic mobility*, including overcoming the language barrier.

A lot has recently been said about another direction for internationalization of learning process, that is making packages and courses in English, as it is the language of international communication. Undoubtedly, such work is essential, because it will allow:

- involving foreign students who intend to get education in Russian colleges into learning process.

- presenting international scientific and pedagogical community with researches of Russian scientists, including experts in the field of psychological and pedagogical training.

Another, none the less important, direction of academic courseware for learning process in a pedagogical college should include special optional packages and courses targeted at mostly foreign students. The primary task of such packages and courses is not only to assist foreign students to adapt to Russian colleges and learning conditions, but to provide opportunities for elimination of gaps in education (taking into account different curricula of secondary education in different countries) and to help carry forward their academic interests. Apart from that, a specific task of such packages and optional courses will be mastering Russian Studies (language, literature, history, culture).

Under the Federal Target Programme 'The Russian Language' a whole number of projects is being implemented, the projects promote and boost the Russian language, literature and culture in the countries of the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Such projects contribute to

- promoting Russian language, literature and culture in different countries;

- enhancing a favourable Russian image and its strength in the world community;

- providing facilities to study Russian language, literature, history and culture;

- cementing educational and cultural relations with fellow countrymen living abroad, with Russian expats.

Taking into account the experience of Russian pedagogical colleges in training, re-training and skills upgrading of human resources to teach Russian as a foreign language, as well as teaching Russian in national (non-Russian) schools, it is worthwhile to create a special coordination academic methodological council that will carry out methodological support of the aforesaid projects.

The modern information society creates favourable conditions for dialogue of cultures. New forms of communication have appeared. A new culture of communication is being evolved, actually. It is crucial that this culture should be the one D.S. Likhachov wrote about. Analysis of contents and forms of

statements of participants in various forums and blogs in the Internet testifies that there exist serious problems in this sphere. I am talking about both severe violation (or obvious transformation) of language norms while transiting to form of communication based on other characters, and about non-compliance with ethical norms.

Researchers from Russian and foreign universities are actively working on the issue of successful intercultural communication as the most important humanitarian issue of globalisation epoch. [3] On the one hand, teaching tolerance has become one of the most significant elements of educational system policy in many countries, on the other hand, leaders of many large European countries (for example, Germany, the UK and France) openly acknowledge the failure of attempts to create a model of multicultural society under present-day conditions.

Russian academics and public figures, on the contrary, more and more often speak about prospects of multicultural development under Russian conditions, referring to successful attempts of organizing intercultural relations in the Soviet society.

Undoubtedly, general atmosphere, the process of education, modern school environment can become the basis to establish civil society where ideas of national identity and patriotism are combined with respect towards other nations and with readiness to carry out dialogue, not just peacefully co-ex-

ist, but cooperate, mutually searching for the ways to overcome conflicts, antagonism, violence.

Only referring to such a society can we speak about prospects of academic mobility, working out mutual educational programmes, carrying out individual strategies of education. So much important the role of teacher becomes, who faces the tasks of spiritual and moral development of the personality, upbringing a good citizen and patriot of his fatherland. Let's refer to the work of D.S. Likhachov, who formulated it as follows: 'Real patriotism means enrichment of others, while enriching oneself spiritually. It is not a sense, it is the most important part of both personal and social culture of spirit, when the individual and the whole nation rise above themselves, as it were, and set supra-personal aims.' [1].

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## DIALOGUE AS MEANS OF CROSS-CULTURAL COMMUNICATION IN MODERN WORLD

Acknowledging the idea of dialogue as the best means of cross-cultural communication in general, we should come to a deeper understanding of the nature of this type of communication. Things are not so obvious here as they may seem at first glance. What should we mean by dialogue? Which type of communication can be thus named? Does any culture welcome dialogue and is ready to engage in it? And what should be done to make such dialogue possible? My objective is not to render and comment on all existing views and opinions in this respect, instead I will try to explain my own point of view taking into account what has been said by others.

If dialogue is meant as an entire spectrum of relations between people – from confrontation to cooperation – then there is nothing to discuss. At all times, people have somehow co-existed and interacted with one another; they have been bound by treaties and agreements, exchanged goods and gifts, borrowed useful inventions and shared knowledge. But can we call all these contacts dialogue? Until now, even if dialogue existed somewhere it has taken place within one and the same civilization, namely the Western one. The idea of dialogue was born in the West itself, it is a Western idea. The Greeks were the first to bring up the subject of dialogue. All the concepts of dialogue I know (from Martin Buber to Mikhail Bakhtin and

Jürgen Habermas) are limited by social and spiritual boundaries of the West, and, as a rule, do not run beyond them, for it is only in the West that the necessary conditions can be found to join in the dialogue. What are these conditions?

The prerequisite to a dialogue is that all parties denounce the priority in knowing the truth. The dialogue occurs when they are unaware of the truth; it must be concealed from people. Socrates' expression 'All I know is that I know nothing' frames the prerequisite to entering the dialogue. According to Socrates, truth is born out of arguments. Things known in advance do not arouse a debate. Sages and prophets of the East, bestowed with heavenly truths, did not enter a dialogue with one another, and therefore could easily get along with tyrants and despots, who denied the right of the rest to have their own opinion. Eastern wisdom that existed in the form of prophecy, revelation, and knowledge inspired by God, sought for the dialogue with God alone, if any. Only the Greeks realized that the truth was the result of a complex and lengthy process of learning, which required participation of different people. No one in this process can monopolize the truth. Any claim to it can be immediately challenged and refuted by the opposing party.

In fact, all that caused the birth of philosophy. Unlike a sage, a philosopher is not a judge of the truth, but its friend, searching after it via mutual exchange of opinions. In the dialogue, all are equal in the face of the truth. Dialogue does not admit of any hierarchy of ranks, status and authority. Even a dialogue between a teacher and a student does not evolve in the form of lecturing, instructing, or moralizing but in the form of evidence-based discussion, debate, conversation, known as a Socratic dialogue. Hence, another prerequisite to a dialogue is the presence of free people able to think independently, to think for themselves without picking somebody's brains.

Dialogue is not a mere verbal exchange; it is an exchange in the form of a systematic, extensive and evincive discourse. It suggests interaction of rationally minded people in the quest for the truth. Though they are unaware of the truth, they never

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doubt its existence. Refusing to search for the truth makes the dialogue senseless.

In any case, dialogue is communication of people who live in a free milieu. It is only for free people that dialogue becomes a social and moral norm. The form of dialogical thinking itself appeared in the time of Greek poleis – the first and earliest form of democracy. According to Ancient Greece pundit Jean-Pierre Vernant, polis is a place where ‘knowledge, moral values, and mental techniques are all exposed to critique and refutation right on the square. Being a guarantee of power, they are no longer covert ancestral traditions; revealed for the public, they involve various interpretations, elucidations, objections, ardent disputes. Henceforth, discussions, argumentation, polemics become maxims of an intellectual as well as political play. The society keeps under constant control both creations of inspiration and state institutions. Contrary to absolute power of the throne, the rule of polis requires equal “subjection” of the former and the latter... The laws cannot be imposed through personal or religious authority any more; their validity should be proved by dialectic reasoning’ [Vernant 1988: 70-71]. Truth is no longer an exclusive domain of religious sects and a separate caste of wise men. ‘Thus, everyone can participate in the quest for the truth, and the truth alongside with political issues is subject to public discussion’ [Vernant 1988: 70-71].

Thus dialogue is not just an idle conversation on any subject, but a way to the truth. It complies with certain rules and laws of thinking, which can help debating parties come to a mutual agreement. They will never reach the agreement if people give different meaning to words and notions, if they contradict themselves and if they are not able to prove the thesis they stand by. The correctness of thought and speech is provided by logic, formal and dialectical. Without starting a discussion here about the differences between them, we will note that the dialectics, of course, was born out of the need for the dialogue, one that can facilitate harmonizing alternative opinions. For Plato and Aristotle, the ability to engage in a dialogue, to take part in a discussion is much more important than to obtain certain results. And the art of dialogue is dialectics proper.

The drawback of dialectics, however, lies in the fact that being directed at receiving some ultimate knowledge (Hegel even called it the Absolute), it removes the initial opposition of the thesis and the antithesis in some final synthesis. As a result, dialectics turns out to be the logic of identity, equality of reason to itself, which closes out any chance for opposing subjects to further exist. By this kind of logic, a separate individual loses his/her status of an independently thinking subject, they fuse in the impersonal super-individual mind and, therefore, the dialogue becomes impossible to continue. In any case, logic suggests the existence of a transcendental or absolute subject which dictates general and necessary rules and laws of thought to individuals. The dialogue eventually turns into a monologue of the subject towering over all, devoid of any individual differences and characteristics.

Even though in fiction any form of verbal communication between characters is called dialogue, the author of the book does not necessarily think dialectically (in contrast to Mikhail Bakhtin’s interpretation of Dostoyevsky, for instance). Dialogue is not an interaction of ‘talking heads’ but that of ‘heterogeneous subjects’ with various viewpoints and opinions. An array of opinions can be wide, while the truth is one and only. Dialogue is the very means of harmonizing particular points of view on what the truth is. But is there a way to retain individuality of every complying partner of the dialogue provided all of them represent different cultures? Every culture does have its logic distinct from any other.

An attempt to combine the idea of dialogue of cultures expressed by Mikhail Bakhtin with Hegel’s dialectics was made by Vladimir Bibler in his day when he suggested renaming dialectics into dialogics (see [Bibler 1991]). ‘Dialogics is the

logic of dialogue between two or more logics.’ While dialectics ‘suggests the development of *one* given logic which is equal to itself’, dialogics means ‘*communication of a logic and a logic*’ which do not coincide with each other being beyond them, on the border with still another logic, another global culture’ [Bibler 1998: 14-15]. Dialectics is the logic of dialogue, dialogics is the dialogue of different logics. While Bakhtin, according to Bibler, whose ideas the latter used as a starting point, considered dialogue in terms of one logic, namely modern European logic, paying a tribute to monologism, Bibler viewed any logic as existing in the context of self-denial, of the transition to some other logic, either already known or still undiscovered.

Bibler started to treat the dialogue of cultures as drama unfolding before our eyes in the context of the twentieth-century culture. All of us are participants in this drama. Culture is what happens to us now; it is the way we go by, which can only be the dialogue with all those who lived before us. One cannot engage in the dialogue without being a ‘self-determined’ person, an individual capable of self-reflection, who can be the master of his fate, who can visualize himself differently (as others see him). All this results in creating a new world, new existence. Commenting on this approach, Svetlana Neretina and A. Ogurtsov write: ‘Our time, as Bibler emphasizes and defines it, is the time when the mind is redirecting itself from the idea of the world as an object of cognition (the idea of modern times) to the idea of mutual understanding, which can only be effective if the individual is capable of self-reflection, thus completely transforming all his being, his thinking, his logic, his ethics’ [Neretina, Ogurtsov 2000: 258].

In his works, Vladimir Bibler posed the question of the need to transform the classical logic of the mind (‘logic of culture’), limited mainly by the sphere of knowledge and which was clearly expressed in Hegel’s *Science of Logic*, into the logic of communication of different cultures (‘culture of logic’), as they appear in their ‘works’. The world we live in is not the world cognized but the world created; it is created on different foundations not concurrent with one another. Human life is not something created by man once and for ever, but something that is constantly recreated by him in his intercourse with the works of different times and peoples, with their creators and characters. This is the world of culture, which is beyond the scope of a single logic. Thus, the logic of postmodernism is not that of *moderne*. The latter is obsessed with the pathos of generalizations, with reducing everything and everyone to a common denominator, while the former is characterized by the pathos of communication of heterogeneous, various worlds and meanings, which impel individuals to make their own free choice. The drama of modern history lies in a tense confrontation between the logic of cognition and the logic of communication. How can it be resolved? According to Bibler, there is no definitive answer to this question yet, it only provokes the search for such a solution.

Another approach to the problem of a dialogue is hermeneutics, which is generally viewed as the art of understanding in contrast to the logic of explanation. In hermeneutics, the dialogue is deemed as a psychological procedure rather than a logical one, and it allows retaining individual features of the subjects participating in the dialogue. Hermeneutic interpretation of the dialogue suggests understanding of others, ability to listen and construe what their partners say, to pore at the meanings and implications of their words, actions, and thoughts. But hermeneutics was not able to solve the problem of the dialogue in full either, to withdraw the dialogue beyond the ‘hermeneutic circle’, where one thing refers to another and there is no hope to find some mediating and connecting link between them.

Jürgen Habermas’s theory of communicative action is an attempt to interpret hermeneutics as a condition of human communication. The efforts of the German philosopher are aimed

at finding such a technique of public debate that would lead people to reciprocal understanding and consensus on key issues of life. This approach is opposed by the postmodern idea of linguistic communication (here I refer to *The Postmodern Condition* by Jean-François Lyotard). According to it, communication does not suggest striving for consensus; on the contrary, it means undermining any established structure, the destruction of 'grand narratives' or meta-narratives, the expansion of 'instability' and 'paralogisms'. The language itself is the scene of battles, wars and conflicts, a means of separation rather than that of unification of people.

Yet, how should we define dialogue? People have always communicated with each other via verbal or written speech, however, as mentioned above, not every discourse is a dialogue. Dialogue is not just the ability to relate something about ourselves to others, or, conversely, to listen to what they tell about themselves (both are a kind of a monologue), but it is such a form of communication which involves talking about ourselves to others, or rather about the things relevant to us. In our desire to understand and comprehend ourselves, we address not only ourselves but we also turn to those who lived before us and live next to us. The dialogue is born from the need to see ourselves not only the way we are in our imagination but in the minds of others, i.e. out of our desire to understand what others think of us. In short, it arises from the need for self-awareness that is possible thanks to interaction with others; otherwise it is mere egotism, often very biased and therefore erroneous. According to Bibler, 'self-awareness is "perception" of myself (of my "ego", rather than my individual actions and wishes) from the high (or the low) of the existence of other people or things, with the existence being holistic and ontologically significant' [Bibler 1991: 323].

At all times, a man has been reflected in another man. However, in contrast to an ordinary mirror, this 'other man' is endowed with consciousness and speech. A man can see himself in that mirror if only he carefully listens to what others say, trying to grasp what is relevant to him. From this point of view, we cannot call any communication with others a dialogue. When meeting a stranger, we usually ask ourselves the question 'Who is he?' and try to get our own answer. A similar procedure called *explanation* is common in the sciences dealing with inanimate objects: the one asking is a subject and the one asked about is an object. If another person is also endowed with his own consciousness and speech he can be asked the question 'Who are you?' and the answer will follow that needs an attentive listener. This is the hermeneutic procedure of *understanding*, widely used by the humanities and history. The object here is the one who asks and the subject is the one who answers. And still it is not a dialogue in its strict sense of the word. The dialogue begins with the question 'Who am I' addressed to another person and with the speaker's readiness to look at himself from the outside and see himself through the eyes of an onlooker. Bakhtin called this procedure creative hermeneutics that gives birth to a new meaning through the *interpretation* of the text spoken or written by someone else.

Asking others about himself, the man becomes engaged in *human relations* with others, for treating others like human beings is seeing one's own reflection; not in the sense, of course, of mere analogy, copy, or *duplication* of oneself, but in terms of one's *continuation* and *enrichment*. Outside of that relationship a person is just a physical body, but not a social being. Any 'I' exists together with 'I' of others and everybody is 'self' inasmuch as they acknowledge others' 'selves'. Here, a person as a subject does not exist in isolation; they exist in their relations to others. The relationship between partners in terms of a subject and an object is not a human relationship and, therefore, not a dialogue. In contrast to a simple conversation, the dialogue is always a dialogue between two subjects, in which

the subjectivity of one does not deny but accepts the subjectivity of the other.

In this respect, dialogue does not fit into 'subject-object' relations. Any objectification is an exclusion from dialogue and, therefore, from the world of human relationships. Everything that is in the orbit of the logic of objectification (reification, alienation) is not capable of dialogue. Things in the form of natural or man-made structures do not enter dialogue, only people as mediating each other subjects can engage in dialogue. Therefore, it would be right to speak of the dialogue between people of different cultures rather than of the dialogue of cultures (or civilizations).

Any system of relations in the form of impersonal and objectified economic, political or ideological institutions excludes dialogue. Man in these relations is personified as an object of control and manipulation by different government agencies, but not as an independently thinking subject. Even acquiring global character, such a system chooses to resolve its problems not through a dialogue between its agents but through direct subjugating by means of commands and orders from above. Is dialogue then possible in the modern and ultimately rationalized and institutionalized society?

The need for a dialogue is often concluded from the diversity of species constituting the mankind – tribes, peoples, nations and civilizations. Does any multitude need a dialogue? Flora and fauna are also constituted of a multitude of species but there is no evidence of any dialogue in these worlds. What makes human multitude different from animal and plant worlds?

The taxonomic unit of the human race is not a species but an *individual*. Only an individual is endowed with a sense of belonging not only to his species but to the genus as well and, consequently, he develops a need for an interaction with the representatives of another species. So the dialogue is the interaction not between species but between individuals. Species do not join in the dialogue. For a species other species do not exist or else they are viewed as alien and even hostile. Hence, the so-called friendship between nations is not a precise notion. There is no friendship between nations, there is friendship between people constituting these nations but only in the case of getting individual identity which brings them beyond their ethnic groups, which enables them to customize the values of a higher rank.

That is why a simple classification of cultures by different species does not contain a conclusive data about the possibility of dialogue between them. For instance, Oswald Spengler, who devised a classification of world cultures which he likened to living organisms, expelled this possibility and only stated the existing similarities and differences between them. Anthropological science dealing with preliterate (ethnic or national) cultures deprived of individual authorship and which are products of collective work, does not provide anything definite on the dialogue between them.

The dialogue arises not because there are different cultures, but because there is a special type of it which gives birth to a perception of *all-human kinship*. This type of consciousness did not exist at earlier stages of culture when the individual did not differentiate himself from his species completely affiliating himself with it. It took time for people to become aware that they all are brethren in mind or in something else. It was not until a man perceived himself as a separate individual that he realized his belonging to an entire human genus and therefore to people of different cognate groups, denominations, cultures and even races. The perception of human kinship gave birth to the need of dialogue both within one's own group and with representatives of other groups.

Civilization, whose basic principle is free individuality, turns the dialogue into a major form of interpersonal communication. In this respect, it would be appropriate to speak of

*the civilization of dialogue* rather than the dialogue of civilizations. Such a civilization, in my opinion, deserves the name of *universal civilization*, which is capable of uniting people globally. Everyone regardless of their background and residence acquires the right to engage in a dialogue with anyone whom they consider a necessary addition to their own life. And the wider the spectrum of the life, the wider the range of the dialogue interlocutors.

Thus, universal civilization does not suggest abolition of different cultures; it offers an open access to any of them by those willing to interact. It makes borders between people (not between cultures) flexible and makes it possible for them to migrate from one cultural space to another, the way we move from one place to another. The civilization, therefore, is universal not in terms of one global culture, but in terms of connecting people by the right of each individual to choose freely their cultural identity being open and tolerant to diverse cultures. The relation of dialogue is that of equality between cultures thanks to which any culture has a chance to become 'my culture', and the border between what I consider my culture and any other is solely determined by my own free choice.

But may this be a utopian supposition? It has become habitual to call any positive and promising idea utopia. Few doubt that we are witnessing economic and information globalization nowadays. Not everyone welcomes it, but all agree that the process is actually taking place. So why should we consider utopian the model of globalization which has not only economic but also cultural grounds, which views globalization as the state which provides all people of the planet with equal rights to reap the fruits of any national culture? Isn't it obvious that today the development is advancing in that very direction?

Many modern Russian and foreign researchers agree on the fact that in the process of globalization culture is gradually running beyond national boundaries ceasing to be purely national in form. Let me refer to two opinions of that kind. One of them was expressed by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, according to whom we live in the world where notions of closed national regions have become preposterous. In such a world, 'not a single country or a group of countries can tape themselves off from one another' [Beck 2001: 25]. Such a society has to reconsider once again 'self-evidence of the Western model', to pose the question of how peoples and cultures can perceive themselves in it. Indeed, globalization 'means processes through which national sovereign states get involved in the net of transnational actors and comply with their powerful opportunities, value system and identity' [Beck 2001: 26]. It questions the principal idea of the age of *moderne* that after the downfall of empires, societies can only exist within their national borders. Globalization breaks these bonds and builds new types of relations between national states and transnational actors and processes. In the context of ongoing changes, the isolation policy cannot be considered modern. Such a policy of separating from the world for the sake of wrongly understood patriotism and nationalism is beyond the logic of global development. The Russian philosopher Vladimir Malakhov, a specialist in national relations, comes up with the same opinion. He writes in his book *The State Under Globalization*, 'In the modern society, production, distribution and consumption of culture products go beyond national boundaries. (...) Global demand goes hand in hand with global supply. The company producing one or another culture product, looks to a consumer outside the country which is the seat of its headquarters.' [Malakhov 2007: 206].

Globalization defies not the existing and long-standing national cultures but the possibilities of an evolution of culture in its national form. In the world of global transformations, an individual involved in transnational networks, cannot get stuck within his national culture only. As a consequence, there arise new local communities divided by the boundaries which do

not coincide with the national ones. Instead of uniting people by their nationalities, they unite people by their cultural preferences which overstep the boundaries of one nation. So the fans of pop music and of classical music populate the world; they form cultural communities both globally and locally. Modern means of communication make it possible for people to find their cultural kindred spirits all over the world, and commune with them on the basis of cultural kinship instead of the national one. In other words, globalization creates not national but a global locality which both unites people on a planetary scale and distinguishes them depending on the cultural choice they make.

To give a name to this new type of cultural community, a new term was coined – 'glocalization' – which is a blending of globalization and localization. It was introduced into the academic interlocution by Roland Robertson, an English sociologist specifically to fixate the ongoing interconnected processes in the global world – homogenization and heterogenization. The meaning of this term is directed against those concepts of globalization which follow the logic of a unified global system of transnational links defying all differences and diversity. Global system in these concepts signifies either the capitalist system exemplified by the developed Western countries, and primarily the USA, or the global information networks controlled by supra-national government agencies. Some prominent Western sociologists have raised their voices against the unifying bias of those concepts proposing instead a concept of cultural globalization which defies the possibility of a complete overcoming of cultural diversity in the globalizing world. In terms of culture, in their opinion, globalization does not suppress but preserves and even actualizes localization of culture in accordance with certain principles, not necessarily national.

Glocalization unlike economic and sociological theory of globalization, looks to perceive this process in terms of the theory of culture. For theorists of this approach, the main consequence of cultural globalization is the birth of new localities which do not follow the pattern of traditional localities – local, regional, national, ethnic etc. – which are forms of cultural self-identification of people. People's preferences very often are more important than their national traditions and habits. Companies, advertisement, trading firms addressing mass consumption in the whole world are in the least interested in the national composition of their customers. Those who manage to overcome the limitations of national clientele, win the competition. In the process of cultural globalization, national symbols become the sign of free communication on a transnational scale. Out of the mass of national culture, globalization chooses what has become valuable to people belonging to diverse cultures, what has become somewhat invaluable on a transnational scale. Cultural choice which is not restrained by local and regional barriers becomes a precondition for including an individual into the global cultural communication.

The right of every individual for this choice is, in my opinion, a fundamental condition of culture on a global scale. Only this right is able to provide for the cultural equality of people on a planetary scale. None of the existing national cultures can be an example for other national cultures, nor can it be severed from them. Globalization in the field of culture should not be viewed as a new single culture, obligatory for all, but as the way this culture functions, the one which enables everyone on the planet to use all benefits and achievements of any national culture. In the global world, the demand for culture cannot be reduced to national barriers, it is wholly dictated by personal needs and wishes of the individual.

What in this case should be the cultural policy of a modern state with regard to its own culture? A peculiar form of resolving national problems in culture has become multiculturalism, much advertised in the West and especially in the USA. Its goal is to maintain through the state cultural features and

traditions of smaller ethnic groups. This policy is opposed by those who come up with the idea of equal participation of all members of the society in public life irrespective of their ethnic origins instead of artificial preservation of smaller ethnic groups. The former enables any culture to compete on a par with others. Cultural identity in the modern world, according to this approach, must be based not on mandatory prescriptions regulating the life of an individual in a group but on his free cultural choice. This freedom enables to constantly remodel social reality and change the meanings underlying this reality and its goals. Social constructivism with regard to culture, in the opinion of Seyla Benhabib, an American cultural researcher, means that 'a cultural group of people is not a given entity; it is formed and it changes with time through habits and traditions. Cultures do not represent entities with precisely defined boundaries; they are mental networks which are redefined time and again through words and acts of those who represent these cultures' [Benhabib 2003: XXXV].

But then the movements which strive for keeping traditional – religious or any other – cultural identity and for 'freezing in time and space the boundaries separating nations and cultures' [Benhabib 2003: XXXV] should be confronted with democratic and egalitarian policy which means pursuing not only preservation of culture of minorities by the state, but also broadening of democratic participation of people in the intercultural dialogue and communication. This participation leads to the emergence of new cultural groups and their incorporation into a civil society. 'Unlike a multiculturalist,' says Benhabib, 'a theorist of a democratic profile admits that in mature societies political incorporation of new groups will rather lead to hybridization of cultural heritage on both poles. Modern people can choose, whether they should support their cultural traditions or destroy them. (...) In short, democratic incorporation and preservation of succession of cultures are not necessarily mutually excluding. If you are to choose between them,

I would place democratic participation and equality higher than cultural peculiarities.' [Benhabib 2003: LII–LIII].

We should agree that democracy in culture is, first and foremost, the right of man for a free choice of his own cultural identity which does not interfere with the freedom of choice of other people. Unlike multiculturalism with its artificial conservation of the lifestyles of cultural minorities, cultural democracy gives the individual and the entire nation the right for cultural self-determination. The main thing is that this right should not be dictated by falsely perceived ethnic solidarity and subjugation on part of the state or some group but by the decision of the individual. Nobody can be made to live in a cultural milieu without his or her personal consent. The culture itself will be developing with time in the direction not of national diversities but of individual differences and peculiarities, fed by cultural achievements of all nations.

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### HRH Michael of Kent<sup>1</sup>

#### DIALOGUE OF CULTURES IN CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Before discussing the 'international dialogue of cultures' I would like to start by outlining some observable features of globalisation that have a profound impact on cultural identity, cultural change and the cultural and creative economy. I would then like to explore how cultural relations and the cultural and creative industries can play a positive role in addressing some of the effects of the global changes referred to as 'globalisation'.

Anthony Giddens defined globalisation as 'the intensification of worldwide social relations, which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice-versa' (Giddens, 1990). In this respect, globalisation is not a new phenomenon because explorers, national and international, as well as imperial armies and conquerors have been bring-

ing influences, good and bad, to other parts of their own country and to the rest of their world for centuries. What has changed in the last twenty years, however, is the scale, speed and intensity with which the changes have taken place and the way in which immediate communications technologies have influenced the process.

How has globalisation manifested itself in terms of far-away events impacting on localities close to home? I would like to concentrate on three main, very simple, parameters – economic, social and cultural.

Starting with the most obvious, the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the USA some years ago prompted the almost total global collapse of stock markets. Billions of pounds worth of notional value was lost almost overnight from companies and stocks around the world, and is still to be recovered. More important perhaps, it set in place a new economic world order where losers became winners and winners – mainly those whose own financial systems were intimately and comprehensively dependent on those of others – became losers. The profound depths to which some of the western economies sank in 2009/10 are still to be navigated. At the same time, globalisation – in terms of open markets and free trade between countries – has been shown to underpin global economic growth. [As one of Britain's well-known but controversial artists, Grayson Perry, put it:

'I can't help thinking the recession might be quite a good thing, to flush out the system a bit'.]

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The effects of this crisis – largely exacerbated in terms of their geographical impact by globalisation – are already manifesting themselves in a number of ways:

- a tendency to refocus on national sovereignty in economic affairs;
- less liquidity for corporations and individuals;
- a demand for stronger national identity;
- greater competition for international markets and resources;
- declining levels of trust between competing groups.

Socially, too, the impact of globalisation has been, both literally and in a metaphorical sense, revolutionary. The way societies interconnect and the ability to observe and engage with events happening far away has forced societal and political change around the Middle East and North Africa, and has enabled the voice of democracy to gain ground in a time frame that would have been unheard of a few years ago. The use of Facebook, Twitter and other social networking tools, combined with rapid advances in mobile telephony, have together allowed people to engage socially from all around the world in an immediate, direct and visual context. There is, as various social networking pundits have said, no hiding place. Now you can hold a pocket-sized videoconference with your family via mobile phone when you are travelling and individuals, as well as journalists, can send live reports to news channels. [As one member of the public said recently about her discovery of the ‘white ribbon campaign’:

‘I discovered the White Ribbon campaign on Twitter, but I would have found out about it anyway, since I have a lot of friends on ‘v Kontakte’ (Russia’s biggest social networking site).’]

The cultural impact of these changes is also profound.

Language is still the main means of communicating, but speaking your own language is no longer enough. In Western Europe, for example, as in many regions, English is the accepted lingua franca, but, by itself, English is no longer enough for today’s generation. At least one other language – frequently Chinese – is necessary to gain a place in the international job market [where employers are becoming increasingly selective and international in their recruitment strategies. As David Graddol said in his recent publication on world English, *English Next* (2006):

‘Analysis of international travel movements suggests that three-quarters of all travel is between non-English speaking countries. This suggests a large demand for either foreign language learning or the increasing use of English as a lingua franca.’]

Access to cultural heritage – both historic and contemporary – is immediate and comprehensive. Take a virtual tour of the British Museum in London or the Guggenheim in Bilbao from anywhere in the world; look at the British Council’s online national collection of 8500 British works of art; or watch an opera performed by the New York Metropolitan Opera live in a local cinema. Virtual reality is quickly being at one with actual reality. The line between the two is becoming thinner and the distinction less important. Cultural information, cultural artefacts and cultural events are now accessible wherever and whenever you want them to be. However, in the same way that economic globalisation is driving a perceived need for more economic sovereignty, so cultural globalisation is driving a perceived need for greater cultural identity.

So, with all of these developments what role is there for cultural relations and the cultural and creative industries?

Let me deal first with Cultural Relations.

One of the corollaries of globalisation has been a growing mistrust between different sections of the world’s populations and, therefore, a potential threat of instability and fragmentation. While Cultural Relations cannot by themselves solve all the problems associated with globalisation they do play an

important role in engagement and mutual understanding between cultures. As an illustration, an organisation working in the field of Cultural Relations since 1934, the British Council, has amassed hundreds of individual case studies that demonstrate the benefits that result from involvement in cultural and educational programmes and exchanges. In an attempt to address this question with greater scientific rigour, however, a more systematic piece of research has been recently undertaken with 1500 young people in China, India, Poland and Saudi Arabia. The aim was to establish more objectively whether people’s involvement in cultural relations projects with Germany, France, UK and USA reflected in any way on their levels of trust towards the people of those countries and their governments. After rigorous preliminary setting of benchmarks, the results of the research showed a systematic correlation between those who had been exposed to cultural relations programmes and increased levels of trust both in individuals and governments of the foreign country – a strong vindication of what Joseph Nye called the use of ‘soft power’ as a more subtle form of diplomacy [than the ‘hard power’ or coercion so often associated with traditional foreign policy. He recently said in *Foreign Policy*, April 2011:

‘Leadership in a global information age is less about being the king of the mountain issuing commands that cascade down a hierarchy than being the person in the centre of a circle or network who attracts and persuades others to come and help.’]

Of course, the notion of trust is contentious in itself – involving elements of respect, commitment and consistency in a relationship over time; but the message from the British Council’s research was clear – cultural relations build trust

What was also interesting, if predictable, was that visiting a country is particularly strongly associated with an increase in trust, and that there is a correlation with the number of visits. The convincing case for cultural relations, though, came from the fact that the results of the research showed categorically that there was a positive association between levels of trust perceived towards the countries in scope of the research exercise and a willingness to engage further with the country in question. This trust in individuals and governments and subsequent engagement with them is key to overcoming some of the obstacles associated with the positive process of globalisation.

Now to the Cultural and Creative Economy.

The cultural and creative economy – with which the city of St Petersburg is particularly familiar – offers one of the most powerful tools for combating some of the more malign influences of globalisation. Why? Because, first and foremost, they are a driver for social integration (witness Daniel Barenboim’s West-Eastern Divan Orchestra performances in Palestine and remember Mstislav Rostropovich’s performance of Dvorak’s Cello Concerto with the USSR State Symphony Orchestra in London in 1968). The Guggenheim Museum was not sited in the Basque region of Spain by chance; and the redevelopment of New Holland in St Petersburg is not a random project. [The transformation from its original use as Russia’s first military port in 1721 (and later as a timber drying yard) into a multifunctional area with art galleries, performance and entertainment spaces, commercial areas, accommodation and retail outlets, illustrates the power of culture to drive social as well as economic regeneration. So history repeats itself in that St Petersburg, under Peter the Great, was already then a globalised city drawing on architectural skill and expertise from all over the world. The city was, according to the Italian Francesco Algarotti, in 1739:

‘A great window recently opened in the north through which Russia looks on Europe.’

So, again we see how globalisation has allowed the best available expertise in the global marketplace – the New

Holland project was put out to international tender – to make a positive contribution to an important local socio-cultural-economic development project.] Second, the cultural and creative economy opens up dialogue and access to cultural values across physical boundaries – films, books, and video and sound recordings all offer insights and stimulate discussion. The creative economy's commercial exploitation of ready and cheap access to the internet, for example, with all of the benefits of being able to easily download books (via Kindle and Tablets), music and film has made culture available to anyone with internet access, anywhere at any time. And with such freedom of choice and technology, the quality of the literature – fiction or non-fiction – remains the same but is more accessible around the world. And greater accessibility will, in time, result in greater cross-cultural access and hopefully, greater tolerance of, and respect for, other cultural values.

Third, they are key to economic development and prosperity at a local level. The Cultural and creative industries are estimated to account for more than 8% of the UK's national income – compared to 10% for its world renowned financial services sector – and employ 5% of the total workforce. And throughout the early 2000s, the UK's creative economy grew at an astonishing rate of 8% per annum making it the largest creative sector in the EU and, relative to the UK's GDP, probably the largest in the world. It is interesting to speculate, within the context of globalisation, why the UK has been particularly successful in this area, not to give me a platform to extol the virtues of the UK's creativity (though it is tempting!) but

to reflect on the deep-structure connection between openness of expression, cultural creativity and economic success. Other societies, like the UK, are becoming better educated and more affluent, and new technologies are universally available. So why is the UK leading in this area? It is partly because demand for new cultural product is high, and, of course, the worldwide demand for English language applications gives our creative industries a big advantage. Creativity and innovation spring from a desire to experiment with the 'new' rather than stick with the 'old'. Thus, the creative and cultural industries thrive in the UK to a great extent because tolerance and openness to new ideas and cultures, generate new concepts and, in the right environment, new products and processes. In a borderless, virtual world, given appropriate support and the will to make it work, this can happen anywhere. Globalisation, in this context, should be viewed as a positive process.

In a world where so much is available at a distance, where almost every artefact in every museum can be viewed virtually, why then are the cultural industries thriving as they have never done before? Why is it that 5.8 million people visited the British Museum in London in 2010, 5.1 million visited the Tate Modern and 2.5 million visited the Hermitage? And why is it that visitor figures for these institutions are increasing by as much as 20% per annum? The answer, I suspect, lies at the very centre of this debate – in globalisation; for as much as globalisation projects a sense of economic, social and cultural homogeneity, the more people want to differentiate themselves and their cultures from everyone else's.

**Manuel F. Montes<sup>1</sup>**

## **FINANCIAL COLLAPSES, SOCIAL INEQUALITY AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: TOWARDS THE NECESSITY OF NEW 'CULTURE' OF GLOBALIZATION**

A system-wide breakdown of the financial sectors in the United States and Europe sparked the current global economic crisis. The U.S. and European economies have the greatest command of resources and the most advanced diversity of production and the capabilities of their population. These financial crises threaten to cause widespread unemployment and output losses not only in the economies involved but also on the global economy itself. The negative impacts of the crisis continue to spread. Thus, the economic collapse at the heart of capitalist economies indicates deep-seated contradictions in the nature of globalization and capitalism itself.

The current situation is not the first time that capitalist globalization has entered an existential crisis. The globalized economy we live in now is actually the second incarnation of the capitalist world economy. The first one ended in 1914. Graph 1 depicts the scale of capital flows among the G7 countries from 1870. It shows that the scale of capital flows (as a proportion of economic activity) was only beginning to be approached only in the 1990s. Obstfeld and Taylor<sup>2</sup> (2004), in the absence of a long-period data set, present a stylized pattern of capital mobility (Graph 2)

where the scale of the capital integration reached in 1914 is recovered in the 2000s.

Will the current pattern of monotonically increasing global capital integration continue? Or will the current crisis lead to another period of de-globalization and de-capitalism?

### **1. The Primacy of Finance over the Real Sector**

In its most basic form, the current global crisis is a crisis of the private financial sector in the advanced economies. In last year or so, because news stories are dominated by the public debt troubles in the United States and Europe, many observers have lost sight of the financial sector the actual and continuing origin of the crisis. The most direct evidence of the financial sector is the true locus of the economic crisis is non-existence of genuine economic recovery more than two years after the start of the economic slump. A recovery within a year is the more normal pattern for cyclical recessions in developed countries. In the normal pattern, the return of private investment after inventories have been drawn down initiates economic recovery. In the current situation, investment, and economic growth, has not yet recovered in the normal time frame.

The financial sector in the U.S. and Europe is undergoing a recovery period, which normally requires at least three years to complete (Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). These periodic, widespread financial collapses have punctuated the history of capitalist growth. At the global level, the Great Depression of the 1930s was one such instance. In the last eight centuries, individual economies have experienced financial crises of various degrees of seriousness. The rebuilding of the asset base of financial companies so that they can restart lending is what is involved in "deleveraging" and financial reconstitution.

Policy responses so far to the current crisis are dominated by policies which aim to protect the financial sector. If poorly

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<sup>2</sup> Obstfeld M., Taylor A. M. Globalization and Capital Markets // Working paper / National Bureau of Economic Research. 2002. № 8846.

Graph 1. Long-Term Pattern of Capital Flows Among G7 Countries, 1870–1995



Source: Howell L. USA Today Magazine. 1998. Vol. 27. Iss. 24. Fig. 7.

undertaken, protecting the financial sector could prove detrimental to overall economic recovery. The most recent instance of such a failed strategy was in Japan, after the collapse of its financial asset bubble in 1991. Public sector rescues of failing bank companies in Japan encouraged these banks to delay recognizing their losses. Recognizing loan losses means that the private sector bearing the losses of its lending activity during the boom period. The delays in writing off bad debt resulted in an extended period of deleveraging in Japan and have been associated with a decades-long slow growth in that country.


In the financial sector rescues, taxpayers' resources have been used to rescue large financial companies. While the profits from the risky investments of these financial companies were privately appropriated, the losses from these risks have effectively been socialized. The resources applied have become a social burden for years to come because they have increased fiscal deficits and the level of outstanding public debt. Increases in public debt directed mainly at shoring up the asset positions of the financial sector cannot be associated with increased economic activity and employment.

Both the bank rescues and the depressed economic activity have weakened public sector balances, which has in turn compelled states to undertake austerity programs. The irony is that austerity programs do not address, and could worsen, the problem of depressed economy activity in a situation of weak private investment. Without a recovery of tax revenues as long as economic activity is depressed, the danger of an insolvent public sector becomes a self-inflicted reality.

Private financial markets have become the prime location of economic decision-making. Previously, the Great Depression of the 1930s exposed the dangers (and incongruity) of such an order of priority in the phrase "tail wagging the dog," where finance is the "tail" and production and employment activities in the real sector is the "dog." When the tail of finance "wags" the dog of the real sector, profits from the buying and selling of financial assets takes priority over investment in machinery and new ventures. In contrast to purely financial investments, such investments result in the installation of new capital equipment which could employ people to produce useful things. This kind of investment increases society's production capacity and creates productive work places.

In the decade before the crisis, growth in the financial in the advanced countries sector outstripped growth in all other sectors. Between 1960 and 2006, the financial sector in the

Graph 2. Stylized pattern of capital mobility



Source: Obstfeld M., Taylor A. M. Globalization and Capital Markets // NBER Working Paper, 2002. № 8846.

United States expanded from 14 to 20 per cent of the economy, while manufacturing fell from 27 to 11 per cent. While US GDP grew 27 times during the same period, total debt increased 64 times, debt by financial companies by 409 times, and household debt by 64 times (Lim 2010).

**2. Inequality-Driven Growth**

Despite the dominance of finance, it would be erroneous to attribute the root of the current global crisis to the breakdowns in the system of global finance. If that were the case, the only response required would be a re-regulation of the financial system. While reversing the careless deregulation of the financial system in the last 30 years would have positive impact, it would not represent the solution because the root of the current crisis lies elsewhere. The root of the current crisis is the dependence of the global economic system in increasing economic and social inequality as the main basis for its growth. The near collapse of the global financial sector collapse was brought about processes of increasing economic inequality. Solutions that address only problems in the financial sector and that do not end or reverse unequalizing trends will only set the conditions for subsequent - most likely, more devastating - crises.

In the 1980s, partly as a reaction to period of low growth combined with inflation in the 1970s, the world's leading economies embarked on a process of deregulation, privatization, and tax cutting. The political justification for economic reform programs which eventually turned out to all-encompassing and applied to developing countries too was the idea that reducing the state's role in the economy will logically lead to faster growth and greater wealth for all.

From the 1980s, privatization, deregulation and tax reductions on wealth and income accompanied enormous changes in economic frameworks and world-views in both developing and developed countries. These reforms effectively protected economic actions of the wealthy from regulation and taxation. These reforms were justified by the apparent need - or perhaps a superstition on the need - to rely on private property accumulating activities to spur investment and growth. Some of these were justified as a means to remove economic inefficiencies imposed by government intervention on private sector activities. Beyond the purely technical adjustments, these programs were ideologically driven. The economic transformations ultimately meant that growth became wholly dependent on activities of the upper reaches of the income distribution. Social goals were subordinated to maintaining maximum freedom of

economic action for the wealthy. There was a widely held view that welfare programs reduced the incentive for work. Moreover, the argument was that questions of poverty and inequality would be automatically resolved through better jobs as a consequence of stronger private investment flows.

State investment and provision of social services such health and education lost its priority even in developing countries. The diminished activities of the state were believed to be better for private investment. The overall impact of this reform project, the neoliberal project, was the removal of fetters on the private sector to undertake what it required for profit-making irrespective of its real impact on the economy. The ultimate impact was a sharp redistribution of income away from the working classes to managers, capital owners and rentiers.

Union protections – in both public and private sectors – were weakened, crippling the ability of workers to use democratic processes to gain a fair share of economic growth. In the neoliberal framework, states abdicated responsibility for providing full employment and livelihoods for all. They also abandoned an implicit commitment to making sure that wages kept up with productivity growth. As the incomes, and purchasing power, of workers stagnated, the result was the introduction of a chronic situation of insufficient economic demand, a problem well-known to Marx.

The neoliberal project had a global reach. Developing countries undertook neoliberal reforms as an imperative of export-dependent growth. In the 1980s, structural adjustment programs in Latin America and Africa and in the Philippines came as conditions in the context of the international debt crisis of that period. These programs were designed though the international financial institutions – the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund notably – all of which were public agencies in which advanced economies had dominant voting weight.

In the neoliberal era, developing countries competed against each for investment and for export markets. One of the key tools was wage suppression and the mobilization of women’s work in unstable and low-paid employment. In truth, these policies of wage and income suppression as a tool of attracting foreign investment constituted an unproved theory, a false culture as it were, sustained by powerful interests or faith based views of how the international private sector chose its investment locations. Most countries could not really compete for foreign investment since most foreign investment were concentrated in a few countries where a host of **other** factors, par-

ticularly stable social and political policies, were critical. In the real world, productivity is as important as cheap costs and in many instances pure wage suppression did not succeed in building long-lasting export industries.


Developing countries deregulated their trade and removed restrictions on capital flows in order to increase their exports and obtain capital from abroad. The advanced economies “forgot” the costly historical experiences of the 1930s which lay behind their financial regulations and dismantled these systems in order to compete with other states in attracting capital from other states.

These economic reforms replaced the previous paradigm where states had borne the primary responsibility over the economic advancement and well-being of their citizens with a paradigm based on global economic competition among countries following the policy-driven dependence of developing countries on world trade and the subsequent entry into the global economy of former socialist countries in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Countries competed with each other by deregulating, privatizing, and reducing taxes (which ultimately reduced the capacity of states to fulfill many of their social protection obligations).

Tax revenues in most countries, but most particularly in developing countries, became associated with risking the loss of international competitiveness. Governments had to begin to operate within limited means. The needed resources to maintain government investment and the social provision of services such as education and health eventually became severely constrained. In many places, these had to rely increasingly on private provision, to the disadvantage of the poor. Services that used to be provided available universally became means-tested, or more often than not, eliminated.


In the advanced economies, competition from imported production depressed domestic production and domestic wages. However, the rise of the financial sector provided high short-term returns mainly from capital gains and other short-term profits and high incomes for financial workers, while wages stagnated. In the United States, wages did not keep up with productivity and corporate profits (Graph 3). Between 1990 and 2005, inflation-adjusted production workers’ pay increased by 4.3 per cent while the legally mandated minimum actually fell by 9.3 per cent. All of this, while CEO pay increased by 298 per cent and corporate profits by 141 per cent. In the same period, corporate profits rose to unprecedented levels (Graph 4).

Graph 3. Comparison of Workers’ Pay with Corporate Profits, Inflation-Adjusted, United States 1990–2005



Source: Executive Excess 2006: the 13th Annual CEO Compensation Survey / Institute for Policy Studies and United for a Fair Economy. Washington ; Boston, 2006.

Graph 4. Corporate Profits as a Proportion of GDP



Source: Business Insider. URL: <http://www.businessinsider.com/what-wall-street-protesters-are-so-angry-about-2011-10?op=1> (accessed : 25.02.2012).

What was the overall impact of the framework which sought to take care of the poor and the unemployed by liberating private investment? While removing burdens and restrictions provided a reprieve from the inflation cum stagnation pattern of the 1970s, private investing did not guarantee the widespread creation of good jobs. Instead, consistent with the historical experience, the neoliberal arrangements concentrated profit-making into the speculative bets on prices of assets (corporate stocks, bonds and indebtedness, prices of contracts to deliver food, fuel, metals, and minerals, land and property, and so on) which were one degree or more removed from production activities.

The tail-wagging-the-dog economic dynamics led to a high degree of economic inequality before the Great Depression of the 1930s (Graph 5). The top one per cent of income earners controlled more than 20 per cent of income then. Graph 5 indicates that the income distribution in 2006, right before the financial crash and the subsequent global crisis is comparable to that period. In 1928, the concentration of wealth has caused the economy to be quite dependent on the actions of the wealthy. When the financial markets collapsed, in a series of asset price


collapses beginning in October 1929, the real economies collapsed. In the 1930s, when real sector activities could not be restarted following widespread bankruptcies of financial companies on whom they depended, governments were compelled to accept a greater role in the economy.

Incomes of those working in finance outstripped those in manufacturing. Tax reductions encouraged the reinvestment of earnings in back into the financial sector, instead of in new jobs and new economic activities. However, wages of workers in rich countries did not keep up with their productivity so their purchasing power from their own earnings fell. By the time the financial collapse occurred, income distribution in the United States was as badly skewed as it was before the 1930s Great Depression.

Manufacturing had moved to many developing countries seeking to export these goods to advanced economies. For the most part, competition among countries in exporting required suppressing wage increases and an increased dependence on foreign markets, instead of domestic demand which depends on growing workers' wages, for growth. The problem with export-dependent growth is that the demand has to come from

Graph 5. US Income Distribution, 1913–2006

**Income Share of Highest Income Households  
At Highest Level Since 1928**  
Share of Total Pre-Tax Income Flowing to Top 1 Percent



Source: Piketty Th., Saez E. Based on IRS data.

rich countries. Because income was increasingly concentrated in rich consumers, there was the danger that developing country exports could not be sold in rich countries.

Finance played a key role in sustaining profits and growth in a global economy with structurally deficient demand. In the United States, the explosive growth of sub-prime lending allowed poorer consumers to buy houses and the borrow money against the increase in house values. The availability of finance sustained the demand for developing countries exports. But this could not last because allowing citizens with no possibility of paying off their accumulated debts from their slow growing incomes to continue to borrow destroyed the soundness of the financial sector. The collapse of the financial sector was a matter of time.

In the developing countries, the shrinking capacity and interest of governments in investment was itself undermining global growth prospects. The state sector in most developing countries significantly reduced their investment – most harmfully in rural areas and agriculture. Because of the tax cutting, state resources had declined. Moreover, international development agencies advised that increased trade (and better export performance) would provide countries with the resources to import their food and other agricultural necessities.

Increased vulnerability of livelihoods in the rural areas helped to channel workers to export industries at lower wages. The policy had placed hope that greater corporate involvement in agriculture would reduce the need for state investment in the sector, increase efficiency and hasten technological improvements. The 2008 food crisis does not provide much evidence that the expected benefits from corporate dependence occurred at the scale needed, even though agricultural companies have grown enormously and made enormous profits from their operations. In the end, the overall policy approach undermined domestic food security and provides the basis for future volatility in this sector.

Volatility has stimulated significant new entry of financial companies in commodities markets. For purely financial reasons, often without a direct capability to perform on the underlying contracts, private actors have begun taking large positions in forward contracts in food markets. Financial participation has amplified the swings in prices beyond what would have been involved in closing demand and supply gaps. The larger price swings have imposed immense suffering – reduced access to food during a price upswing and reduced livelihood and farm earnings during the downswings – and political instability in many developing countries.

Poverty is endemic in developing countries with underdeveloped agricultural sectors. One possible way to accelerate agricultural development is through land consolidation by allowing large private sector firms to do so. This will involve dispossession of access to land by small farm holders as a matter of policy. Research has shown that large scale farming is not necessarily more efficient and more innovative than small scale farms. The weight of agricultural research suggests that investment spending and technological innovation by small farmers is critical in improving agricultural productivity and securing rural livelihoods.

### 3. Correcting the Analytical Model (“the Culture”) of Globalization

The global community faces a distinct danger that the continued application of harmful policy responses to the current crisis will spark a renewed global depression. As explained in the previous section, insufficient attention to the underlying systemic disintegration caused by increasing social inequality affirms policies that exacerbate the dangerous trend.

The onset of the crisis in the late summer of 2007 demonstrates that growth based on growing inequality and dispos-

session will prove to be unsustainable yet again. Designing alternative recovery strategies less dependent on unequalizing trends and which instead facilitate widespread access to economic assets is the challenge of the times. Unfortunately, the politics in many countries are obstructing this search. Policy responses to the crisis have involved public resources to rescue financial institutions without requiring them to write-off their claims against consumers, home borrowers, and even whole countries such as Greece and Ireland. The political influence of the financial sector places such responses at a disadvantage. Such write-offs will reduce the asset values of financial institutions and rich individuals and compel these institutions to bear a part of the burden of social costs of their private actions. Historical precedents suggest that forcing a requisite share of costs on financial sector is the only way restart investment and economic growth. Genuine recovery will ultimately redound to the benefit of all parties, including the financial sector itself. Despite the infusion of public funds, financial institutions have not significantly increased financing for investment and new jobs.

Finance is at the “commanding heights of the economy” (a term introduced by V.I. Lenin at the 10<sup>th</sup> party congress in March 1921). How public authorities in capitalist economies tend to, manage, or supervise these commanding heights greatly determines first of all the vulnerability of their economies to instability and crises and secondly the political viability of the system itself.

Keynesian economics, introduced in the 1930s in response to the global crisis proposed that an active and capable sector is necessary to reduce extreme economic instability. John Maynard Keynes himself viewed the application of his economics analysis not just as a matter of a realistic model of how actual capitalist economies behave but as a tool of defense for the capitalist system itself. This “culture” of Keynesianism was embodied in the post-War institutions, both at the national and the global level. At the national level, governments were assigned the responsibility and provided the policy space for employment and maintaining growth. At the international level, national policies which undermined the economies of other countries – so-called beggar-thy-neighbor policies – were proscribed. For example, fixed exchange values for currencies were introduced and could only be changed in coordination with other countries through the International Monetary Fund.

That the capitalist system enjoyed its greatest period of growth in the 1950s and 1960s in a straitjacket of public intervention and regulation has been interpreted as a validation of the applicability of Keynesian analysis to actually existing capitalism. State control of the commanding heights is necessary to harness private sector energies toward investment in real capital assets and increased output and employment.

This “culture” eventually collapsed around the 1980s and replaced with the neoliberal approach to economic management. State failures, and the associated and perennial corruption, fueled the political impetus. An idealized and romantic view of the private sector as uncorrupt, efficient, and growth oriented represented the new core of the culture of globalization.

This neoliberal approach relies on an undifferentiated view and monotonic view of the private sector as being of only one kind of cloth, the better to advocate for a minimal role for the state. For simplicity and for political potency, neoliberal economics has a difficulty recognizing that there is a multiplicity of private **sectors**, even in one national economy. Private companies are rooted in national economies and cultures in historical time and there are a variety of approaches. They are rooted and diverse in terms of their sizes, their sectors and products, and their technical and managerial capabilities.

One key type of private sector for purposes of this discussion is what economists call “the real sector” which produces goods and employs people. The neoliberal approach ultimately installed an economic system in which all the other private sectors serve the needs of the financial sector. Restoring the primacy of the real sector over the financial sector will require extensive economic reform for which significant political capital is required. To undertake the required rebalancing, states must recover the power to regulate the financial sector so that its resources and energies are channeled to investing in actual economic activities, not in mainly trading financial claims within it. It is a measure of how much of cultural shift has occurred (and must be overcome) that in many economies, state participation in the financial sector is thought of as the road to serfdom, corruption and inefficiency. The current financial crisis has exposed private financial companies to be prone to the same corruption, lack of accountability and transparency as has often been presumed to be a characteristic of the private sector.

In the case of international economy itself, there is a need to reconsider the place of export-oriented strategies that relies on the widespread dependence low wages and vulnerable livelihoods induced by fear of countries in losing foreign investors to other more cost-competitive countries. The economic system introduced by the neoliberal approach involves a state of competition among individual countries for private investment – both domestic and foreign. This has forced countries to reduce regulation and dismantle protection of workers and access to land by small farmers. This competition among states stands in complete variance to the neoliberal model which assumed that competition within the private sector is the main guarantee that private investment will be efficiency-seeking and not subject to corruption. To deploy private sector participation effectively, private investors should compete among themselves for the privilege to operate in countries that are well-regulated and have a productive labor force. Competition within the private sector – not among countries – is after all one of the key paths for achieving efficiency even in the standard economic model. The late economist Milton Friedman is often quoted as having said “The social responsibility of business is to increase profits.” But profit making is to society’s benefit only if businesses genuinely compete with each other and do not use their financial influence to reduce competitive pressures from other businesses or compel public authorities to compete for their resources and investment.

An alternative framework, with a stronger role for the state over economy, has profound implications for the human rights, equal protections and for livelihood. It will require a re-legitimation of the state’s role in ensuring equity. This will include greater state capability to intervene and support the development of educational facilities and provide economic skills to everyone. But it will also require state capability to regulate the size and concentration of income and wealth.

The argument can be made that a human rights approach as the starting place in economic policy-making places the primacy in the right order – people first and profits second. For the majority of people on Earth, basic economic rights, such as the right to food and livelihoods, must be the starting point in shaping the nature of the economic system. This means that access to capabilities necessary for human dignity cannot be relegated to a market outcome.

Ensuring that all its citizens can find a meaningful and dignified role in the economy means that the state must have the legal tools to regulate all asset markets (not just protect the wealth accumulating activities of its citizens), to govern the growth of the economy to ensure that it is creating jobs for and building the corresponding skills and capabilities for everyone. The role of the state must thus drastically change from the prevailing conception of its role since the 1980s.

#### 4. Conceptualizing Elements of a Sustainable “Culture” of Globalization

What might be the key elements of an alternative culture of globalization?

The current dominant culture of globalization – neoliberalism – has not failed for upper reaches of human society. The problem with it is that at the minimum it is inconvenient or inconsistent with generally held belief about human values and at a maximum it imposes enormous human costs which are advantageous to a small minority. Wallerstein (2008) predicts the demise of neoliberalism. This neoliberal “culture” supplanted a previous “culture” – which we might associate with Keynesianism – as a result of a combination of the failings of that system and the political success of private parties chafing under the strictures imposed by state regulation on their wealth accumulation desires.

Conceptualizing the elements of a different globalization “culture” must thus address the failings of both neoliberalism and Keynesianism. There is limited space for a full elaboration of these issues here and will only point to the main set of failings and possible responses. The neoliberal framework did not succeed in supplanting the state as the executive committee of bourgeoisie by an unregulated financial sector. As pointed above, its driving force of unequalizing growth is proving to be macroeconomically, if not politically unsustainable. The “super-indebtedness” of leading economies, including the US which now provides the world’s payments currency and the political swing back to protectionism and some welfare state suggests reflects significant losses for neoliberalism (Wallerstein, 2008). However, the political changes required to re-regulate finance, to reform the global payments system and to reinstall greater social content to economic growth will be profound and conflict-ridden. In the developing countries themselves, the socio-political readjustment associated with a change in economic strategy will also spark political and social conflict (Pronk 2010) because these kinds of changes will require profound redistribution of political power.

A broader understanding of Keynesianism’s failings during its heyday is a work in progress. That Keynesian policies might have overreached and overregulated can be conceded. However, the failings originally pointed out by neoliberal thinking have proven false as an overall critique – the state is indispensable, not an option, for an orderly capitalist economy. The main part of Keynesian thinking confined itself to macroeconomic policy, accepting the neoliberal emphasis on limited state economic intervention and avoiding the conflicts state-led policies might imply for the engine of growth in a capitalist economy. Relying solely on private investment as engine of growth means that investment must be spurred by guaranteeing private profits either through wage suppression or tax policy. Both of these played a key role in the US economic evolution.

Maintaining demand only as a macroeconomic issue left the issue of ensuring that supply matches demand – in terms of products, sectors, labor skills, and so on – unaddressed. U.S. industrial policy also augmented short-term private profitability but government did not provide any long-term direction to investment which is what is required to match supply with demand and hardened the dependence of investment on low wages and low taxes.

In ignoring the social and economic development dimensions of state policy, Keynesian macroeconomic policy ultimately turned out to be unsupportive of private investment and vulnerable to the neoliberal deregulatory and tax cutting solutions. Keynesian policy can only be sustained if it addresses industrial and social development, which is as much a challenge for developed countries as it is for developing countries. Defending the welfare state as a rearward action, instead of deliberately spurring social development, as globalization

broadened and external competitive pressures increased only made the neoliberal solution inevitable. The experience of the European Union economic area, now mired in debt trap exemplifies how welfare states are untenable when accompanied by policies that bolstered the primacy of private finance in investment and economic development.

The global community faces at least a decade or more of instability with respect to economic paradigm. Default global rules, mostly predicated on the pre-eminence of finance and a minimal state, will increasingly come into conflict with the increased economic interventions of national states provoked by social demands. Many industrial policy interventions will run afoul of multilateral trade disciplines, for example. Thus, finding at least some minimal common paradigm on which to redesign global governance, finding a productive "culture of globalization," is an urgent task. Otherwise, globalization will once again experience a thorough retreat as it did after 1914.

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## INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AS MEANS OF OVERCOMING FEAR

*Dialogue* is not only a tool to build peaceful coexistence and interaction of cultures which are hostile to each other but also means of overcoming *myths* and negative *emotions*, which sometimes give birth to conflicts between them rather than the rational reasons.

*Fear* occupies the leading place among the emotions which cause distrust, hostility, conflicts and hatred. Nevertheless, the Bureau Chief of Time magazine, Matt Rees living in Jerusalem is most probably right. In his work 'Geopolitics of emotions' he focuses his attention on three emotions from a number of those that determine human behaviour: fear, hope and humiliation because they are 'closely connected with confidence'. And confidence in its turn 'influences decisively the way the people and the nation react to the challenges they come across and the way they treat each other'. Fear influences equally the behaviour of states and ethnic groups. Fear of the extermination has recently stimulated each of the two superpowers – the USSR and the USA – to reach such degree of nuclear armament that the enemy could not deliver a fatal blow with impunity. The doctrine of mutual assured destruction was born. Ironically, it was the bases for the dialogue. Although, of course, not all talks represent the dialogue, but these were not only talks, but the dialogue of the two opposing value systems, unthought-of without overcoming of the existential fear.

Nuclear weapons in fact serve as a fear-overcoming instrument. For Israel, for instance, the non-recognized possession of this weapon is caused not only by the rational motives (the ability to hold back the potential enemy surpassing in numbers and in usual arms), it is deeply irrational as the psychological survival complex itself, which is quite clear, taking into account the Jewish historical background. However, fear often generates hatred which prevents one from establishing good

relations with neighbours and constructive dialogue. Ideological indoctrination together with fear aggravates all the negative elements of the group mentality and behaviour which prevent one not only from the mutual understanding with others, but also with one's own people.

Matt Rees as mentioned above, on having studied the mentality of the Holocaust victims in Israel, writes about the strong deficiency of Israeli government's attention to them in the recent past. He explains it with the mercantile and ideological reasons. Speaking about the 'early Zionism' period, he cites the words of David Ben-Gurion who said one month after the 'Kristallnacht':<sup>2</sup> 'If I had known that it is possible to save all Jewish children of Germany by transferring them to England and only half of them by transferring to *Eretz Yisrael* (the Land of Israel), I would have chosen the latter.' [!]. Within the long-time fear, Israel's violation of the basic rights of Palestinians on the occupied territories looks like an emotional revenge for the humiliation they had gone through.

The irrational fear is also the basis of the Israeli concept of the 'existential threat' which helps today justify the possibility of the preventative attack on Iran. To tell the truth, the more realistic politicians do not share the calls to war which do resemble hysteria.

It was the fear that finally led to the creation of an atomic bomb by the North-Korean regime which hardly plans to start a nuclear war with the South but hopes to ensure its own survival.

But what is fear in this context? French scholar Dominique Moisi considers 'fear to be an emotional response to the real or exaggerated assumption about imminent danger. The fear leads to the defensive reflex which shows identity and fragility of the human, culture or civilization at the given moment... Fear is the force of survival in the naturally dangerous world.'

Fear rules many of the Western societies in their attitude towards China. In connection with its explosive growth, the analysts are worried with the question: what will happen if 'the collectivist societies' (we should not forget about fast-developing Vietnam) are so economically successful that they outdo the West? But this is not the only reason. In one of his columns American journalist David Brooks wrote from China: 'The rise of China is not only an economical phenomenon. But it is also a cultural phenomenon. The ideal of the harmonious collectivist [society] can turn out to be as attractive as an American

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<sup>2</sup> The first coordinated Nazi mass-attack of physical abuse against Jews in Germany on 9–10 November, 1938.

dream.’ And here the dialogue is also the only means to overcome fear through the outworking of confidence between the states, nations and ethnic groups.

And now a bit of theory. I will remind you of the so-called theory of a symbolic choice. No wonder that in its boundaries the central idea of understanding ethnicity is the complex ‘myth-symbol’. According to Edelman, myth is ‘a belief shared by a large group of people, which gives a specific weight to events and actions’ (under this interpretation it does not matter whether the event which is called a myth was the real or the invented one). Symbol is understood as an ‘emotionally charged reference to the myth’. Stuart Kaufman, one of the authors working in the genre of this theory, writes that a complex ‘myth-symbol’ represents ‘a network of myths and symbols connected with them’. In other words, people make a political choice not out of convenience, but following their emotions and responding to the symbols which are offered them.

According to Donald L. Horowitz direct incentive to the ethnic violence are emotions as for example the *fear* of the group disappearance threat. And Crawford Young focuses his attention on the important role of stereotypes (myths) and symbols in ‘the identity maintenance and group mobilization promotion’. Thus, the paradigm of the ethnic conflicts birth offered by Young and Horowitz looks like that: a fear of the group being destroyed (of the identity being destroyed) leads to the appearance of hostility and then to the group violence. According to Young, the atmosphere of hostility and threats raises group solidarity and makes people consider the events in the ethnic terms.

Everything mentioned above can be illustrated with the problem of the Muslim diaspora in Europe. If for the USA and Canada immigration has been for a long time a part of their life, the Western European states on the contrary started encouraging mass migration only since mid-1950s when they were in need of workforce for the fast growing economies. Considerable part of migratory flows going to the West and North and in the first place to Europe come from the Islamic states. The people who came to the continent profess a different faith which is more religious and are different in the sense of culture.

This predetermined the arrival of serious problems, connected with fear, and it was the religious factor that has played an important role in that, according to many Europeans. In Denmark when the right-wing Danish People’s Party (DPP) came to power, they adopted the most radical measures against migration in Europe. The Minister of Integration Rikke Hvilshøj reacting on the predominant sentiments in 2005 said: ‘The problem is that you cannot integrate Muslims in big numbers in the country where the cultural base is Christian.’

Can we not feel the fear in the statement of Christopher Caldwell, a famous American journalist and author of the fundamental work about Muslim immigrants in the West: ‘European tolerance towards other cultures was sincere, especially among the élites, but even they could not expect that such tolerance would mean the appearance, the rooting and the wide expansion of a foreign religion on the European soil.’ Thus, the author concludes, Europe has planted the seeds of threat by itself – the seeds of internal and international [!] inter-religious disorder. It is true that the European countries have had a long history of confrontation with the Islamic world, aggravated with the colonialism. The source of the relation to Islam as to the potential threat was already expressed in the end of 19th century by famous French writer Ernest Renan: ‘Islam was liberal, when it was weak, and aggressive, when it was strong.’ It was this historic background that made the spreading of the anti-Islamic sentiments over Europe so easy, while nowadays there are other reasons for that.

Today, the Muslim community in Europe numbers about 20 million people, including more than 5 million in France (mostly Arabs), about 4 million in Germany (mostly Turks),

2 million in the UK (mostly Pakistanis and Bengalis), provided that in London only there lives more than 1 million Muslims, or its eighth part. Population increase among Muslims is much higher than among non-Muslims, and according to different forecasts, by the third quarter of the century Muslims will predominate in Europe. Of course, no one knows what they will be like by that time and what the relations between the West and Islamic world will be (though according to Samuel Huntington ‘centuries-old military confrontations between the West and Islam can hardly lessen’).

Trying to limit immigration and non-indigenous population increase, some European countries resort to quite strict measures. Denmark has passed the law unprecedented in Europe, which forbids the citizens to take into the country the spouses younger than 24 years old if they are not EU countries’ citizens (the same procedure for older ages is very complicated). It is connected with the statistics which shows that migrants from Asia and Africa who live in Europe prefer to look for marriageable partners in the countries of their origin. At the same time, a conclusion can be drawn based on the statistic data, that the young people are the most common partners for the arranged marriages among the immigrants. During many years about 25,000 Turkish citizens, two thirds of them women, apply to the German consulate for visas on the basis of their marriages to the citizens of these countries.

In other words, from the mid-1980s about half a million of ‘imported spouses’ have moved into the country, and the Turkish minority in Germany increases thanks to these marriages and to the children born in them. In Great Britain 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi get married to the ‘imported spouses’, that was the leading factor of the 50% growth of the Pakistani community in Manchester, Birmingham and Bradford in 1990s. Europeans see the problem not in the fact that these marriages increase the number of immigrants uncontrolledly, but in the fact that firstly they are an alert of the collective choice of immigrants against assimilation/integration, and secondly, they increase the percent of citizens who do not speak the language of the country that accepted them and who are not integrated in the society at all, this leads to ghettoization. Though, this choice is not surprising. According to the data of the German University of the Youth, 53% of Turkish ladies aged from 16 to 29 who live in Germany under no circumstances are ready to marry a German. The other side is not ready for the mixed marriages either: according to the polls overwhelming majority of the Germans does not want to have a ‘Turkish relative’.

But if in Denmark 90% of citizens with Turkish and Pakistani background in the first, second and third generations of immigrants find spouses in the countries of their origin, it seems to be explained not only with the cultural differences which prevent them from marriages with the Dutch women. But also with their low status in the society and the discrimination they suffer from, all these factors impede the successful integration. The fact that proves the anti-integration sentiments of the Turks in Germany is that only 5% of them want to be buried in Germany, though 68% are positive about the idea of Muslim cemeteries in Germany. However the fact that this number is so small can be explained by the wish of the Turks to be buried in their historical homeland in accordance with Muslim traditions. Hybridized cultural and biological mixing is also prevented by the myths and stereotypes that separate Muslims from the native people of the Western countries. They can be seen most vividly in the attitude to women.

Muslims think that dissoluteness and permissiveness predominate in the Western, especially in European society, and women’s behaviour is immoral. They are very negative about sexual contacts before marriage let alone adultery. Muslims are sure in the superiority of their moral principles, considering that they are characterized by the respect to women and equal rights but taking into account the physiological differences between

sexes. They point out that Islam doctrine protects a woman and suppose that the Western society does not. We want to mention that Russian Orthodox Church also criticizes the European civilization for promiscuity and disregard of the family values.

Some representatives of the Muslim diaspora in Europe think that by their indecent clothes European women provoke sexual aggression of the men. A girl should enter a marriage being a virgin according to the Muslim moral principles. As an insurance some, Muslim parents ask gynaecologists to give 'virginity certificates' to their daughters. There are surgeons whose specialization is to recover virginity (in the Netherlands this operation was even covered by the insurance up to 2004). A British journalist from the *Daily Mail* published an interview with such a surgeon who formed the membrane and implanted a capsule with artificial blood into it on request of the fiancées.

Europeans, from their part, are also sure in the superiority of their concept of relationship between men and women. Even in the UK, where different communities and cultures coexisted almost without conflict for ages, 60% of the native British think that Muslims treat women 'disrespectfully'. The polls in Spain showed a surprising coincidence of the evaluation of each other given by Muslim and non-Muslim respondents: 83% of native Spaniards consider the attitude to women in the other group to be disrespectful and only 12% respectful, among Muslim respondents these figures are 83% and 13%, respectively. Muslims are accused of beating their wives which is permitted by Sharia. But in fact there is no agreement on this question among Muslims themselves.

Modernist religious and social leaders are for combination of adherence to incorruptible Islamic values with the denial of the archaic legislation. Abdulaziz Sachedina, an American professor of religion of an Iranian origin, thinks that Muslims 'should understand the Sharia as the system of values, not as the system of laws'. And Taufiq Ibrahim, a Russian professor of an Arab origin speaking about the interpretation by the medieval Muslim theologian of the 34th ayah of the 4th sura in the Koran, which lets Muslims to beat disobedient wives, interprets the verb *doraba* as leaving, not beating. No doubt that the custom of 'honour killing' is obsolete and has nothing to do with the Islamic faith, it comes from pre-Islamic tribal ethics, when fathers and brothers of the girls or women killed for violation of the conduct codex. Usually the 'honour killings' are done by the Kurds and Pakistani, and they do it in public, without hiding, though they know about the severe punishment they can get. By the way, in the Western countries these crimes are also punished, when migrant workers often consider their daughters and wives, together with themselves, to be dishonoured even when they are dressed too frivolous.

Polygamous marriages are a special case for the relationship between Muslim community and the native majority in Europe. Most EU countries do not recognize the spread of the right to reunion for the members of polygamous marriages and the Muslim institution of polygamy. But there is also another point of view in Europe, which should be respected as a part of the Muslim community culture (though in some countries of the Islamic world plural marriages are prohibited by law). In the UK in February of 2008 the Department of Labour and Pensions recognized the rights of the 'additional spouses' and gave them some bonuses. In reality polygamous marriages exist even in such a secular country as France – mainly among expatriates of Western Africa.

To regulate immigration, European countries use the technology of *immigration choisie*, which for example welcomes only doctors and programmers, because there is an acute want in them and the natives for some reason do not rush to get this qualification. In some European cities the immigrants make up a significant part of this personnel. Nevertheless, the level of life of the overwhelming majority of the Islamic countries expatriates in the EU countries is much worse than that

of the local people. According to the King Baudouin Foundation research of the Moroccan community in Belgium, every second Moroccan expatriate lives below the poverty line, and more than a third of them prefer identify themselves as Muslims rather than Moroccan or Belgian, less than 30% work for wages, 20% are unemployed, the rest is in the small.

As the Russian journalist writes, 'they are often refused work because they have an Arab name or just on the basis of face control. With such an appearance one cannot rent an accommodation in every district of Brussels. The youth of the third and forth generations speak about 'legalized racism'. But they prefer democracy, appreciate the Belgian social system and the respect for human rights in comparison with their historical homeland, where they do not want to return. Ali Allawi, Iraqi ex-minister and Princeton University researcher, writes that in 2005 among Turkish and Moroccan immigrants in Belgium (almost all of them are Muslims) there were almost 40% of unemployed [!], among the natives only 7%. Therefore the number of Muslims in European prisons is disproportionately high: 11% in the UK (while Muslims are only 3% of the population), and shocking figures in France! – 60% to 70% (all in all 11% of Muslims), in the Netherlands these figures are 20% and 5% respectively.

The problem of proneness to conflict in the relationship between the Muslim community and European states that receive it can hardly be solved and in the time of warming, activated by the support of the protest movements during the 'Arab Spring' by the West. Constructive dialogue is complicated with fears and distrust of the communities to each other.

However, it was the time of the "Arab Spring" when the question of respect and dialogue became acute for the Arab world, in some parts of which the power was taken by the Islamite parties as the conservative 'Muslim Brothers' or radical religious Salafis (this term is used to describe a wide range of Islam movements who appeal to the idea of return to the ideals of *as-Salaf as-Saleh* – 'Pious Predecessors'). The hot debates started here between the Islamite and the followers of the temporal power and between different Islamite movements. Tense ideological struggle is on not only for example between Shism and Sunnism, Sufism and Wahhabism, but between clashing movements inside the modern Saudi.

The modern politicized Wahhabism (or Neo-Wahhabism) is also called 'Sahvism'. This term comes from the expression *as-Sahva al-Islami* ('Islamic revival'), which was widely used in 1970s in contrast to, on one hand, traditional, official Wahabist religious establishment of Saudi Arabia, and on the other hand, to more warlike Jihad movement of Salafism, which is also called Neo-Salafism. The example of this movement is the ideas and the work of Juhayman al-Otaybi and his followers who took over the Grand Mosque in Makah in 1979. But there are also Salafits who strongly reject the idea of Jihad as an act of violence based on the idea of takhfira (the anathematization of those Muslims who profess Islam 'incorrectly', and because of this must be exterminated).

To give an example of this discourse, we can cite one of the Jihadist critics, Saudi author Khalid al-Duhayl. He claims that the idea of Jihad in Wahhabism firstly, can only be applied within the boundaries of the centralized state territory built by its founders on the Arabian Peninsula, and secondly, taking into account their adherence to the Hanbali madhhab Wahhabits cannot accept Jihad without the approval of the head of the religious community in the form of his written request.

Wahhabism even in its non-political form is criticized not only outside Arabia, but also inside it. In a letter to a Western newspaper one ex-follower of the radical Wahhabits, Mansur al-Nukaydan wrote: 'Starting from 16-years-old I was a Wahhabit extremist. With my like-minded fellows we set fire to the shops which sold Western films and even burnt down a charity foundation which helped widows in our village, because we

were sure its aim was women's liberation.' The cruelty of these actions is obvious, but the position that backs them is based on culture and norms of behaviour rather than politics.

Serious conflicts even between purely 'every-day', non-politicized fundamentalism (be it Saudi Wahhabism or 'the Taliban' ideology) and accepted in the overwhelming majority of the modern world societies (including Muslim societies) norms and values are too big. Wahhabism critics usually proceed from the postulate of the irreconcilability of this movement in Islam. Thereupon we should note that Islamic tolerance is marked not only by the authors who are the followers of this religion but also those who can hardly be biased. Thus Léon Poliakov, a French writer, famous for his fundamental works about Jew-baiting in different historic epochs, writes: '...Islam is first of all a religion of tolerance. Nothing can be more false than to view it in accordance with rather a widely spread belief as demolishing any resistance with fire and sword.'

Comparing Muslim and Christian civilizations, the author goes on: '...Jesus' humble instructions led to the birth of a warlike civilization, the most irreconcilable among all known in the history of humanity, while the warlike teaching of Muhammad gave birth to a more open and tolerant society.' We can add that in both cases (and that is right for other world religions) we mean not the religious ideology itself but a social religion, behaviour of people who do some cruel things supposedly in the name of the religion triumph. In this sense radical-Jihadists resemble medieval inquisitors to some extent (without taking into account their global ambitions). Their ideas and actions are in acute contradiction with the ideology of the absolute majority of Muslims in the world and with the classical Islam legacy, including Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, as an American researcher Delong-Bas shows. More and more modern Muslim thinkers call to modernize the religious dogmas.

The constructive attempts of internal modernization the Muslim thinkers call for are supported by one side of the Muslim *Ummah*, alert another and are totally rejected by the third. The curses of many conservators poured down the head of one of the leaders of the Muslim community in Europe, a grandson of the founder of the movement 'the Muslim Brotherhood' and University professor Tariq Ramadan when during the debates with Nicolas Sarkozy, the Minister of the Interior at that time, he proposed to impose a moratorium on *hudud* – severe corporal punishment prescribed by the Sharia to Muslims for some crimes condemned by the God. In other words, these punishments should not be abolished, but not used.

T. Ibrahim, like Ramadan coming from understanding of incompatibility of *hudud* with the universal human values in their modern interpretation (and as him being criticized by the conservative part of Muslim religious establishment), also does not infringes upon Sharia, but tries to prove that in the sources of Muslim teaching there is no straightforward instruction to use these shockingly fierce punishments. Both scholars, like

many of their followers, undoubtedly believe that this adaptation modernization strengthens the positions of Islam making its values more acceptable to highly modernized Muslims who live in the Western (and Russian) society.

As French specialist in Islamic studies Olivier Roy thinks, this appeal of Ramadan fits the principles of *laïcité* (French secularism) accepted in France more, than if he was against these religious regulations. Because the society and the state are in charge of terrestrial, not the heavenly business, that is why they should not sentence to corporal punishment for these crimes and moreover should not carry it into effect. "The Hell can wait". Another reformer sheikh Mohammad al-Ghazzālī in his work attacked what he calls *al-Fiqh al-Badavi* – Bedouin law. He considers the set of cruel assertions and fatwās discriminating women, non-Muslims and part of the Muslims at the name of Islam and *as-Salaf as-Saleh* to be in fact the distortion of Islam.

But susceptibility to modernization in the Muslim world today which has become one of the most important and influential parts of the world society, does not mean the acceptance of all the values and norms, elaborated by other civilizations, even if they are authorized by the international law. The influence of the Islamic norms, for example, made the Muslim states to accept critically some elements of such document as the Declaration of Human Rights, where the Article 18 says: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes *freedom to change his religion* [emphasis mine – *V.N.*] or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance only with the permission of the person and not by force.' By the way, among those who worked over the text of this declaration was famous Lebanese politician of that time (a Christian by religion) Charles Malik. In 1981 the Islamic Council of Europe has accepted its own Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights elaborated by the group of the eminent Muslim intellectuals, including Ahmed Ben Bella, the former president of Algeria. The document was presented to UNESCO, but did not draw a wide response. However, later in August of 1990 during the Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the widely reputed Declaration of Cairo was adopted where the Islamic vision of human rights was stated. Of course, there is no right for Muslims to change a religion, which is unacceptable, but it says: 'It is forbidden to use any form of forcing a person or to make use of his poverty and ignorance to convert him into a different religion or disbelief.' (Article 10).

Everything said above means that the dialogue as the only means of harmonious and peaceful coexistence and mutual enrichment of the cultures in the time of globalization is not possible without reaching confidence, and it requires overcoming negative emotions, and first of all fear that drives people to desperate actions.

S. S. Neretina<sup>1</sup>

## GLOBALIZATION AND DIALOGUE

The ideas that the globalization of culture leads to unification of cultures are very diverse.<sup>2</sup> For some scientists processes of globalization turn into anti-human trends, which unify and ruin cultures, for others it is the creation of the global socio-cultural environment, which is reflected in the world's social institutions responsible for maintenance and development of the world culture, in the appearance of the new strata of the

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<sup>2</sup> See for more details: Ogurtsov A.P. *Philosophy of Science: 20th century. Conceptions and problems*. Part II. St. Petersburg, 2011. Chapter 'Philosophy of Science in the times of global communications'. (Filosofija nauki, XX vek. Kontseptsiy i problemy. Tom II. Glava "Filosofija nauki v epohy globalnih komunikatsij.)

society and the unified way of life. The latter idea leads to the loss of peoples' characteristic reference images and turns into a destructive phenomenon aimed at eradication of the national culture. As a rule, globalization is considered to be Americanization of the world. Its peculiarities are reduction of rational elements of culture to an absurdity, domination of quantity characteristics (commercialization), readiness to use, guaranteed quality at a certain level, packaging into bright symbolic forms and creation of the virtual reality.

Such globalization obviously leads to unification of culture and has risks not only for individuals, but for the society as a whole. The fact is that ethno-cultural diversity has many vital functions in the modern world, and its most basic task, in the opinion of A.P. Ogurtsov, is to overcome social entropy and to prevent socio-cultural uniformity, which seems impossible within globalization. Disapproval of the globalization of culture by many philosophers, sociologists and religious figures is based on the identification of globalization and integration on a world scale. Said above is the commonplace for those who write about globalization. The thing is not to be afraid of the evident, but to analyze modern cultural processes, and then we might avoid apologetics and negation of globalization processes.

The first point to consider is that there was the subject change in the world history. It used to be an individual, now it is the masses introduced by the mass-media. Any event nowadays always exists as a media-event. It is mediated by the mass-media or the Internet. The possibilities of the cross-cultural interaction are displayed in the theory of dialogue.

The idea of the dialogue as a fundamental notion of one's being (for some) or as a fundamental notion of the being-in-the-culture (for others) arose inside the problems as old as the world: relations between the speech and reality, knowledge and faith, science and religion. Discussions of these notions are still on. It seems that today the notion of 'the dialogue of cultures' becomes a commonplace and is fading. V.S. Bibler, the last 'dialogist', stated sadly that the term has turned into the commonplace word and wrote an article 'On Responsibility for the Notion of "Dialogue of Cultures"'. I understand this but at the same time I want to show the points of transformation of the scientific term not into a commonplace word, but into a discourse of heterogeneous society *involved* into communication which does not call for a long and close interaction, but which has changed the conception of unitary author and unique work.

The masses represent the new subject of history and include both the distinctness and indistinctness. They became the matter of philosophical, poetical and artistic research of the 20th century. 20th-century Russian poet Mandelstam said "The world starts anew!" this slogan can be interpreted as the call to a new author's culture or as a diagnosis of the society where the crowd is a hero ('The Egyptian Stamp'). This crowd expressed polyphony rather than the author's single monophony. The dialogue is still there. But its role has changed. Within the author's culture dialogue played a key role and was the dominate of the cultural creative work (V.S. Bibler), within the cult of the crowd the unique author is oppressed by his own heroes, author's attitude is destroyed, ignored or it becomes one of the voices. (M.M. Bakhtin).

The invention of the virtual world is also connected with media and Internet and depends on this new hero. In dramatic art the role of animation becomes more and more important. And it fits the technical progress of our time. We can well speak not with real people, but with animated TV presenters constructed by a cyber-computer or with a number of unfamiliar people as well as with the familiar ones. This entire polyphonic world can fit into one room!

Eugen Rosenstock-Huussy, one of the pleiad of philosophers of the dialogue, saw the basic phenomenon of being in human communication, the world of that generation which out-

lived two World Wars seems to be one-of-the-kind experience of catastrophes, which provoked anarchy, decadence and revolutions. He called them social diseases (including war) which had not been cured up to now. The time of these diseases is speechless one, because old traditions lose their power in the times of catastrophes. But the same time is characterized with the birth of the new languages.

Their understanding is possible through debates, lawmaking and narrating, by means of them the society reinforces spatiotemporal axes which vector and orientate its members. In this situation, speech becomes the basic principle of world's learning and socializing. Speech is dialogic *per se*, for speech comes as an answer to an appeal, where the efforts of minimum two speakers are needed. Thereby dialogue can be defined not as a logical phenomenon as in Plato's *Dialogues*, not as a mathematic convention as in a physicist's lab, but as a victory over natural differences imposing the sequence order of people in the course of time because each discourse between people of different times is the victory over nature. Dialogue is the definition of a man and, in a more general sense, of a society. Culture, thus understood, was naturally used as one of means of politics.

Revolutions and wars (World wars, local wars, anti-colonial wars) are socio-political factor of history's subject change. Scientific-technological progress was equally important (invention of a steam-engine, a car, a plane) and changed the understanding of weight, speed and moving direction. Only these changes made possible the creation of any constructions. Einstein's formula  $E=mc^2$  played an equally important part in the creation of new understanding of culture.

One of the avant-garde leaders in Russia, K. Malevich expressed even clearer than poet Mandelstam the new ideas which had changed the face of culture. For him, weight, speed and moving direction became the basic *philosophic* notions. Malevich wrote that speed and motion of the modernity are such that the forms of the thing 'are not the forms of the expression <...> they are melted in the feeling of motion', the relations between the elements 'reflect the grade of the perceived motion. No wonder, that only one element is left from the running motorbike — a part of the wheel, half of the biker's face — all the rest is gone.'<sup>1</sup> In Europe, W. Benjamin expressed modern tendencies and showed that 'a passionate desire "to bring the things nearer" both in the spatial and human meaning is as characteristic of the modern masses as the tendency to overcome uniqueness of any entity through the acceptance of its replica,'<sup>2</sup> because the speed of transformation uniqueness into a standard is only a bit behind the reaction speed proper. Without taking speed, weight and motion direction into account one can only render dead things.

If in the first decade of the 20th century avant-garde painting expressed the new tendencies, later on it was joined by the cinema and photography. Painting could not possibly become mass-culture: one had to know how to paint. While cinema and photography could be literary made by anyone. They were originally non-professional. Nowadays this amateurish approach is being cultivated and encouraged. In one of the leading modern universities there was an advertisement: 'Shoot your cult film.' It means that this film which has not been shot yet is already understood as a cult one because it will be made by an amateur.

These changes, connected with the speed, weight and motion direction, altered the meaning of the culture and art. It shifted from the thing to the delivery of the energy of changes. This energy 'has woken the soul up' and has done with the old *cognizing reason*, which Malevich compared to 'an old callus

<sup>1</sup> K. Malevich. Form, colour and impression (Forma, tsvet y oshchushcheniya) // Black square. (Cherniy kvadrat) M., 2008. P. 75.

<sup>2</sup> W. Benjamin. The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media [Russ. tr.]. Moscow, 2000. P. 128. (Prouzvedeniya iskusstva v epokhu jego tehniceskoy vosproizvodimosti. Ozarenija.)

of the habit to see everything as natural', when physicists followed by artists 'managed to construct a pattern of the new life of things',<sup>1</sup> because 'the wholeness of things disappeared when their motion was shown, for their flickering parts were often concealed by other running bodies'. It was essential not 'to show the motion of things, but their demolition [or as they would say now — destruction or deconstruction — S.N.], <...> i.e. the way to a non-figurative art'.<sup>2</sup>

Without an art object there is a new task set for the author: to show 'the condition of the objects' and this condition 'is more important than their sense and meaning'. *Intuition* became the basis for thought. It replaced the reason and went 'over null' to the creativity. The function of the reason is doomed to be the reduction to the utility. The painter was forced to leave the subject and things in return for the energy of discord and the mass consisting of the moments of time.

It is obvious, that if the unique qualities of the master and the painting itself were valued before, nowadays the exhibition possibilities of the painting are valued. It may have no aesthetic value. For instance, I personally have three quite good paintings from 'The Bulldozer Exhibition' of 1974, but they are most valuable for me especially because of being 'bulldozer'. In the time of speed discoveries, which turn everything into mass, the inner life of a human being turns out to be overlaid with soap operas without actors, but with talking mannequins, without plots, but with changing situations, actions, exam tests, a cloak of historical and philosophical researches covering the essence of the modern philosophy — that it went 'over null' of the reason. Following Hegel, one can say: it went into alter-reason, into its negation and the negation of its own negation (which demands to return and to reread Hegel attentively). A. Gluksman, one of the 1968 rebels and creators of 'the new French philosophy', thinks that the meaning of this new existential philosophy is in the quick reaction to the everyday experience of the universal ideologies, mass destruction, concentration camps, when not a single fact of human existence, but a society whatever-it-might-be, 'smoking slums of society waste areas', tramps and riff-raff are concerned.

A thinking subject of modern culture and philosophy has not got a name. Stating his position on the Net and speaking openly about his real problems, he has an opportunity to hide himself by creating a nickname, which can give a freedom of speech and thought, and create a distance not only between himself and his reader, but also between himself and himself, which will break traditional capacity of seeing and self-presentation. This is a dialogue too, but a dialogue between unidentified subjects, who cannot be treated from the point of view of classical psychology, anthropomorphism etc. One and the same person who speaks openly under his name in the media and under his 'own' icon on the Internet can represent two different persons (and here we have a grammar question — whether 'I' is singular in this case). An old logic question how universal is possible if it is entirely inside me (inside this very thing) has turned into a schizophrenic question, because in which 'me' this universal exists if 'me' is 'two in one'. 'It-they' exist not as an inner 'I' dialectically opposed to one's self, as 'the other me', but as an alien to one's self. Moreover, 'I' can be out of one's self to such extent that it can forget what the real 'I' is, because 'I', if 'I' forget about myself (got lost in a game, changing masks) become unidentified. The Internet let us cross this critical border, when it is possible to recognize a person who has finished a conversation in a person who has started it.

Using of pseudonyms was common in the Middle Ages. But if we cannot up to now call the real personal name of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, we can describe his style. Nowa-

days it is possible to change styles, we have thousands of stylists at our service ready to turn a beast into a prince, to change your gait and even to make your tongue shorter. The technique in the time of repeatability permits to conceal or to individualize any singer. In the opera 'The Queen of Spades' staged by Y.P. Lyubimov, it was possible to hear the 'voice from the choir', because there was a microphone in front of every singer. The technology helps to conceal this total or disastrous dependence of one on the other creating by the means of technique an imaginary independence of everyone. The sense is always shifted. That is why to avoid this constant shifting there could be only one main principle of survival — self-determination, provided that the person collects all his 'I's.

The modern situation has returned to this very idea of self-determination, which compiled one of the definitions of culture (V.S. Bibler), without realizing it and even repelling old universalistic claims. But Bibler's idea was rooted in the dialogue as immanent ontology with the emphasis on the individual on the way of mutual understanding with the other subjects. The difference is that the modern individual views himself neither on the ways of *mutual understanding*, nor on the way of understanding at all. He is involved into the process of communication not to construct or reconstruct his personal prime notions, but to make himself known. Here we speak about the idea of the new reason of new culture as a new form of being which has such spatial width and hospitality that it can absorb simultaneously all ways of comprehension known and unknown turning the vectors of communication not in one dimension from the Past into the Future, but in different dimensions, which is especially significant in the new time of globalization.

But communication of the reason is thought as their *accidental* staying one by the other (during Internet-contacts people find each other by the hit-and-miss method). This case does not have the aim to embody 'in the works <...> a phenomenon of self-determination', 'self-determination of human's being and mind',<sup>3</sup> though it shows not the vertical ('inside the crater of ideas' of the epochs which follow each other), but the horizontal being of cultures on 'no one's land' of 20th — beginning of 21st centuries. It simply has no time to do it.

In the framework of totalitarian regimes, concentration camps, crematoriums, and the threat of nuclear destruction 'the ultimate questions of being' has transformed the sphere of ideas, where they used to exist, into the sphere of such a reality where all moral, scientific and other principles has been shaken. Everything Bibler said about transduction points of reasons of different epochs, cultures and civilizations, and their profound inner dialogue can be fairly applied to our time. But in my opinion there is also something that he foreseen (because he wrote about responsibility for the notion 'dialogue of cultures') but did not accept.

Indeed the transduction of reasons, images, emotional-psychical tension inside one person, in his different 'egos' is realized on the border and does not have its territory. But this border registers only my being. There is neither mutual understanding, nor mutual determination (see above for the reasons). So much more there is no mutual understanding which means the identity of reasons of different people. We mentioned above the existence of 'the two in one'.

Bakhtin also defines culture as something that reaches the borders of consciousness, and concentrates on them, for 'the cultural sphere has no inner territory <...> [ and the act of culture] drawn away from the borders loses firm ground, becomes empty, arrogant, degenerates and dies out'.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>1</sup> W. Benjamin. The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility, and Other Writings on Media [Russ. tr.], p. 18–21.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., p. 21.

<sup>3</sup> Bibler V.S. Idea of culture in the works of Bakhtin//Odysseus. A person in the history. Research in social history and history of culture. Moscow, 1989. P. 50. (Ideja kulture v rabotah Bahtina. Odissej. Chelovek v Istorii. Issledovanija po sotsialnoj istorii i sotsialnoj culture.)

<sup>4</sup> Bakhtin M.M. Questions of literature and aesthetics. Moscow, 1975. P. 25. (Voprosy literaturny I estetiki.)

But the question is whether we can speak about a culture in this case? Can we call *such* culture a state, when there is a desire for the dialogue, and it realizes, but there is no desire to create what is called masterpiece? 'To be means to communicate in the form of a dialogue. When the dialogue finishes, everything finishes. That is why, generally speaking, the dialogue cannot and must not finish.' Bakhtin does not mean culture here, he means human existence. And something that cannot finish should rather be called polyphonic communication. And polyphony does not only refer to the human wholeness. It can refer to something in general, be connected to different wholes and fragments of the whole. Everything that occurs in this polyphony is the required consequence of human questioning his being. It has the global power and meaning characterizing human consciousness immanently no matter what forms it has. Polyphony includes the call of the emptiness. Jean Cocteau expressed this idea in the following way: 'I reproach myself, because I have so much to say and much more that I cannot say, something that overwhelms and is surrounded with the emptiness arising around...'<sup>1</sup>

The new form of philosophy presupposes discovery of the voice, acquisition of the voice, which of course can be lost on the Internet, but can also be claimed for. The involvement offered by the Web lacks fear, which is born out of the understanding of universality of the truth ('fear is the beginning of cognition'). It gives the new understanding of universality as the proper characteristic of the one. There are as many universalities as the words.

In this sense we witness the creation of the new philosophical form like hidden-open democracy, when not only the voices of our contemporaries are heard, ready to explain and to redo the world, but all the voices heard before (voices of Husserl, Hegel, Malevich, Heidegger, Bibler, Bakhtin), those voices lose their *instructive* function concerning the ways of being but gain the function of *offer*: choose what you like. It is no coincidence that the modern cultural-political state is expressed in the terms of advertising. The mass-crowd can rely on a first person, but these parties more often serve as a signal to an action: to move or talk. It is not the prior lord of the thoughts.

It is like he is met by occasion, he appeared to be in front or he said something I want to react on, even if our aims do not coincide. His task (if he has any) is to create a communicative fear-less space, where we do not necessarily hear each other, but react to some cries, key words. No wonder that key words are required to publish an article now. Such leader has no prop-

erties of a dedicated personality *visa versa* he assumes the way of being that can lead to the loss of 'I'. However, all the ways of being and non-being are conceptualized ('caught'), otherwise communication has no sense.

But the modern concept is not 'catching' of the *sense* of a thing which makes the thing clear and transparent. Diminishing weight, speed and different motion directions are such that the claims of the communicating participants have no time to form, their concepts-works come apart the moment they are born. The modern 'I' does not care about knowledge as a skill to do something or to understand. Information is a synonym of knowledge today. The term which has lost the sense of image shape and has turned into the sum of applicabilities. Such an 'I' defines the measure for imaginaries that acquired the face of the truth rather than names things. Even 'the highbrows' (the term of A. Ya. Gurevich) have lost their interest in how the other people think. Hastening to express oneself, we hardly ever read each other.

That is why the problem of understanding expressed in the desire for philosophical captivation with the being (M. Heidegger) is raised again. If for the antiquity 'to understand' means 'discover the *eidos* of the thing', for the Middle Ages it means 'to discover the faith, which is already given in the Revelation', for the Modernity it means 'to cognize the thing', then today 'to understand' means 'to conceptualize the situations you are interested in personally, to be able to turn them so that they bring advantage to you'. That is why the role of tropes (metaphors, metonymies etc.) is so important. We are leaning against the fragment analysis at the moment and that is a consequence of the invisible effect of the new speed. Concept catches this fragment personally, which makes it important today. The mind is forced to treat this sphere 'between' these invented and volatile concepts. This very mind is metaphysical. Reason is alienated into the computer. Mind and Reason start an artful game (artfulness – is one of the definitions of the *Sophia* the Wisdom) which helps to look in the eyes of any thing, to evaluate it and to present it in the different light.

The lack of a strong theoretical thought today is not a disease, but the global contemporaneity itself which claims for the global dialogue and conceptual bondability of a heterogeneous, polyphonic sound for its expression. There is a national diversity in the speed of concepts, and peculiarities of cultural regions which are disturbed neither by the readiness to use, nor by the guaranteed quality, nor by the package. They are even likely to accentuate cultural diversity.

A. N. Nysanbayev<sup>2</sup>

## THE APPEARING AND THE ESSENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE DOMAIN OF CROSS-CULTURAL DIALOGUE

In the context of globalization and the development of multi-polar interdependent world, it is mutual understanding that is becoming a necessary condition of fruitful dialogue between cultures and civilizations, countries and nations, which are building together a new system of the world ep-

och. With this in mind, it is extremely important to study and reconsider the experience of reciprocal understanding accumulated in the heritage of the first Teacher of the East who had laid grounds and developed the conceptual basis of understanding and also realized the programme of understanding and the philosophy of dialogue in his works turning to the cultural traditions of Antiquity, those of the Muslim East and the Turkic world.

Dialogue implies rapport and mutual acceptance of cultural experience of other people. Dialogue is a factor to change one's inner world, to expand the horizons of cognition and make discoveries.

The key idea that I'd like to stress is that Kazakhstan was bound to be at the crossroads of world civilizations between Europe and Asia, the fact determined by demographic and

<sup>1</sup> Cocteau J. La difficulté d'être. SPb., 2003. P. 201. (Tiazhest' bytyja)

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cultural reasons rather than geographic ones. Hence, in its position, it is a Eurasian country, a constituent of the Eurasian civilization.

At first glance it may seem that it would be natural for Kazakhstan's development to enter the Turkic-Islamic world, because the country is connected with it by common national roots, language and century-long traditions and customs. However, in contrast to our eastern neighbours, the forms of purely Muslim culture are unlikely to dominate in Kazakhstan.

In ancient times, various religions were professed and could peacefully coexist in the Kazakh steppe including Christianity, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, and Tengrism, the major belief of Turkic peoples, that was for them almost as significant as Islam. It should be emphasized that in Eurasian space, two greatest denominations – Islam and Christianity – have coexisted for centuries, religions which were practised by two super-ethnic groups: Turanian and Slavic. At that period it was the dialogue of religions and beliefs that was the form of their interaction.

At present all necessary conditions have been created in Kazakhstan for the dialogue as a means of national and civil consolidation; steady and dynamic economic development has been maintained; democratic institutes and those of civil society are being established; the strategy of industrial innovations is being implemented; stability, security and independence of the young state is being strengthened in the context of globalization. Such are cultural and historical foundations for inter-confessional communication and spiritual concord in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

We can distinguish several types of the dialogue: dialogue as the sum of monologues, where partners are not involved in the essence of what everyone says – it is only a superficial, formal dialogue. There may be a different situation where partners listen to each other, but each still hold their own opinion. And finally, there is one more type of dialogue, the most preferable one in order to achieve the consent where partners not only listen to one another, but both change, revealing something that had been unknown before they entered the dialogue. It is this new content that helps reach a sound, existential agreement of the parties and their interests that means spiritual and moral understanding.

It is possible to describe these types of dialogue in a number of terms: acceptance of otherness as one's own, perceiving otherness as something alien and perceiving otherness as something different. The first type of agreement suggests either ignoring partner's otherness or, instead, adapting to their experience (assimilation). The second type means refusal to accept the other's views and values which implies the interpretation of the 'alien's' tone as negative. Finally, the third variant most closely matches the desired agreement: the sides recognize each other's otherness and interpret it with positive evaluation without losing their own identity. To be different means to be particularly attractive and to possess specific resources of consent.

I am very attracted to the interpretation of philosophy by Italian philosopher Nicola Abbagnano. He treats philosophy as a dialogue of free people, and considers the life of the man in the world ethical.

There is no drastic confrontation between Western and Eastern philosophy either metaphysically or ontologically any longer. Philosophy is a true dialogue of free people. The dialogue that implies freedom leads to closer philosophical understanding.

The philosophy of mutual understanding is a basic and very promising direction in modern Kazakh philosophy. Its origins are primarily found in Kazakhs' traditional wisdom and in the teachings of al-Farabi. Having imbibed these transcendental ethical values through its spiritual experience, modern

Kazakh philosophy combines spiritual potential of the East and West, of Asia and Europe.

The first Teacher of the East, great al-Farabi laid the foundations for the philosophy of mutual understanding, following the principle of tolerance towards other cultures, religions and spiritual practices. He joined a constructive dialogue between the philosophy of antiquity and the Middle Ages, of Islam, Christianity and Judaism and easily entered the modern discourse of Kazakh philosophy of mutual understanding. In his teachings, al-Farabi disclosed unlimited opportunities for integrated communicative dialogue between completely different spiritual and intellectual worlds. The principle of mutual understanding as a way to learn the semantic space of philosophical ancient heritage allowed him to develop the dialogical nature of philosophy and to understand it as a dialogue of free, equal spiritual and intellectual practices. Through the prism of al-Farabi's philosophical heritage, the great communicative meaning of the philosophy of mutual understanding becomes clear.

The phenomenon of mutual understanding is an ontological foundation for the development of open dialogue of national philosophies and contemporary philosophical discourses that reveals the uniqueness of the world through the unique ways of philosophical reflection.

People often ask me what I mean by the philosophy of mutual understanding, and sometimes they are genuinely surprised that such philosophy is possible at all. I believe that the development of philosophy in the context of mutual understanding goes in line with the schools that combine and contain the best that had been produced by European and Eastern traditions, everything that belongs to the depository of the world philosophy, where the East and the West meet in the understanding of the eternal, everlasting meaning of existence.

Al-Farabi and his philosophical experience is unique because he managed to uncover the meaning and value of the idea of mutual understanding between Greek and Islamic philosophy. It does not seem possible to prove their influence on each other, nor is it necessary. But what matters is the fact that there is consolidated intellectual space of mutual understanding whose origins go back to philosophy which is globally acknowledged. Guided by this experience, today we are developing in Kazakhstan full-fledged dialogical philosophy of mutual understanding necessary in the era of ever-growing globalization.

At present, the formation of consolidated space for a dialogue between cultures and civilizations, where the desired and the necessary consent can be acquired, becomes a priority of social and cultural arrangement in the world full of contradictions and conflicts. Dialogue as a form of mutual understanding, cooperation and coexistence is a real alternative to violence, domination, supremacy and monopoly.

Objective historical tendency to build a new multi-polar human community faces persistent resistance of the forces that are reluctant to see the decentralized and harmonized world and impose their position and political will on other countries and peoples. In fact, it is historically outdated practice of supporting the alleged consent, pseudo-freedom and quasi-democracy by eliminating true, inner harmony and democratic liberties. Dialogue of cultures and civilizations can be a powerful barrier against such policy, and can demonstrate the opportunities and ways to structure the world differently and to achieve genuine understanding and agreement.

We have come to the conclusion that agreement is of urgency on a global scale. We should achieve it through and thanks to differences in individual and ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, its impetus should not come from the outside, but it is a consequence of internal impulses, a sound dialogue and intercultural communication. One can argue that the modern community is still far from such an agreement, since in the unipolar world,

only one superpower reigns and dominates for the time being. However, reality proves to be different. Significant counterbalance is being formed in the form of the European Union uniting 25 states, as well as other integrative unions – the common economic space of Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus. Besides, speaking of the culture of agreement, we design the future rather than maintain the status quo. Such is the mission of the theory: to draw a vector into the future, so that it could determine the present.

When speaking of integration and harmony, we mean inter-ethnic and cross-cultural interaction in the first place. Being a poly-ethnic and multicultural state, Kazakhstan views this situation as the most important asset, which broadens the range of possibilities for the country's development. Over 130 ethnic groups and 46 confessions live in peace and harmony here, without any discord and collision. In many respects, it is a great merit of the Kazakh ethnic group, which has traditionally demonstrated high tolerance consciousness.

Agreement can be reached not by concealing and regulating conflicts and difficulties but by resolving them. The prospect of cultural harmony and coexistence of ethnic groups in Kazakhstan, the development of tolerance is primarily connected with the interaction of the two ethnic groups – Kazakh and Russian – dominant in the country. They both have a solid base for a profound intercultural dialogue and mutual understanding. This includes long-standing traditions of strong Eurasian brotherhood, the spirit of reciprocity and collectivism, centuries-old communications in the field of economy, culture and politics. Kazakhs and Russians have steady mental ties, too; these are the universals that determine the type and national character of both ethnic groups: the inclination to collectivism, similar attitudes towards women, and definite interpretation of power.

It is of great importance for us to study the issue of Kazakhstan's participation in the dialogue of cultures and civilizations, it seeking and finding the national idea, aimed at consolidation of poly-ethnic society with the dominating Kazakh ethnic group at its centre. Dialogue of religions and cultures is necessary in order to solve peacefully domestic and external problems of modern Kazakhstan. To achieve these goals we must study international and national practice of organizing and conducting a constructive dialogue of cultures and civilizations. The instructive practice of Kazakhstan in conferencing three Congresses of leaders of the world and traditional religions in 2003, 2006 and 2009 would be of use. Active preparations for the fourth Congress to be held in 2012 are under way at the moment.

However, past centuries and especially the twentieth century which ended not erelong have vividly demonstrated or rather brought up a stringent necessity not only to learn to understand and imbibe certain branches of knowledge but, which is more, to come to mutual understanding between people, their worldviews and cultures. Former assumptions based on subject-object and intra-object relations which originated in Western and Eastern traditions are gradually replaced by a new vision and the growing tendency to develop cross-cultural dialogue between people.

In the context of globalization, dialogue becomes a problem rather than a topic, and the problem is so complex and vital that it penetrates all spheres of modern life in our interdependent world full of conflicts. Well-grounded concern over the future is voiced today in terms of urgent necessity of the dialogue between ethnic groups, nations, states; people and government; modernity and traditions of social development; philosophy and science; science and religion; the dialogue between traditional and alternative religious beliefs; inter-denomination and intra-denomination dialogue; the dialogue of the teacher and the student, the educator and the educatee, etc. These are but a few sides and aspects of the vital problem of dialogue, mutual

understanding and agreement. They have always existed but it is only in the age of globalization of the 21st century that they have become as topical as have never been before. The reason for it is that the problem arising in a particular sphere of life or in a separate region is inevitably echoed in other spheres and regions, so local difficulties and contradictions trigger global ones.

From the generalized cultural and philosophical point of view, the problem of making a new world order takes the form of the essential constructive dialogue and civilized relations between the West and the East. It is common knowledge that the West and the East are two opposite types of the world outlook, two different attitudes, two different existences in the world, two contending typological forms of culture: functional and speculative, intellectual and poetic, rationalized and expressive, actively progressist and moderately conservative, pragmatic and ecological.

So, keeping in mind the development of a consistent, equal and constructive dialogue between the East and the West, their balanced, considered and harmonized interaction, their mutual enrichment, one can say that new integrated philosophy of mutual understanding is the true philosophy of the future aimed at solving the problems and tasks posed by the past for the sake of the present and future, for the sake of the worthy life of the humankind in the new millennium.

It would be no exaggeration to state that the targeted philosophy of mutual understanding has already existed archetypically in the form of traditional Kazakh philosophy, which can be considered its prototype and even model, and nowadays in the form of free philosophy of Kazakhstan. Anyway, neither Kazakh nor Kazakhstani philosophy is predominantly or absolutely of the Western or Eastern cultural and historical nature. It is a Eurasian philosophy and therefore, it can combine advantages of the West and East, of Europe and Asia. As for its worldview, ideological potential and content, national philosophy has absorbed the pathos of mutual respect of cultures intertwined in it, the spirit of togetherness, eager openness to influences and achievements of other cultures. Hence, there is every reason to be proud of the national philosophical culture of understanding, but the fact also entails a responsibility to preserve and fully actualize its humanistic potential on the part of all those who care and create culture.

In promoting the dialogue and integration of the East and the West, in advancing the dialogue of cultures, nations, ideologies, all spheres of culture take active part: politics, science, religion, etc. This adds to the fact that the range of problems and issues is so wide. It is impossible to speak of mutual understanding, if some fundamentally important aspect is omitted.

As for the stages of this mutually enriching cultural integration, they can be described in the following way. The original community (unity) of the human race is replaced by the differentiation of cultures, ethnic groups, types of contacts with the world; later the modern world searches for ways of mutual understanding and mutual consent of different interests. This leads to a dialogue, and through it to real knowledge and understanding of other cultures comes. This process involves mutual exchange of values necessary for life and the development of cultural interaction, and spiritually common humankind, truly equal human brotherhood is formed on this basis.

Of course, in order to achieve this noble goal, it is necessary that the dialogue itself should pass successive stages or phases, leading to understanding and agreement. The first indispensable step-phase or its condition is mutual trust of parties entering a dialogue. Through the trust and skilful combination of mutual interests and openness, the partners get to know each other and, as a consequence, inspire mutual respect and interest, because every culture possesses values that are sure to arouse interest and respect, and hence, the dialogue naturally

grows into a close and mutually beneficial cooperation directed to achieve certain common goals.

It should be emphasized that when speaking about the space of intercultural dialogue, about the need to achieve mutual understanding, harmony and unity, we mean realistic dialogue, that is, the one in which parties can hear, or at least try to hear each other. We view understanding not only as a theoretical, mental acquisition of the material from another culture, but as its heartfelt recognition. Agreement for us is not a formal and imposed contract which prescribes 'tolerance' to each other, but sincere understanding and acceptance of common goals and objectives. Most importantly, we understand unity neither as a unification or dissolution of one culture in another, nor as their mutual absorption, 'annihilation', nor as artificial preservation of the existing cultural diversity. Unity, if viewed from a dialectical and sense-bearing position rather than from a formal one, is nothing but mutually creative relationship enriching all communicating parties (such is for example, the true unity of man and God, man and man, culture and other culture, etc.). In other words, we understand unity as an inner harmonious cohesion of diversity, diversity in unity, and, therefore, as the development of diversity. Indeed, development is only possible through mutual creative enrichment, interaction of diverse parts of the whole; otherwise diversity is not going to develop and may break apart.

As demonstrated by the sad events of recent years, isolationist claims, requirements of closed and static monoculture lead to extreme and, indeed, agonizing form of some 'originality by all possible means, at whatever cost', i.e. to radicalism, extremism, terrorism, bigotry on the global scale. But such culture is deprived of the reviving force of true humanity, openness, tolerance, trust, amicable learning and shared work. For culture, in the strict sense of the word, is practical and objective manifestation and embodiment of spirituality – the moral nature of man. A reverse and unfortunately not uncommon case in today's world is when culture becomes an end in itself, bare spiritless mastery, the pursuit of external forms, or the desire of their conservation. These are cases of culture devoid of spirituality. And the latter turns into so-called anti-culture.

Such understanding of the issue of philosophy of the dialogue between the East and the West in the context of globalization brings hope and confidence which makes it possible to say that, first, the peculiarity of Kazakhstani (Eurasian in spirit) philosophy allows it to enter the vast cultural and civilizational space of the world and engage in the dialogue of confessions, cultures and civilizations. Second, such involvement in the new cultural and historical dimension can encourage the culture of

the Kazakhs to broaden their limits by accepting the dialogue with other cultures. This process will facilitate better understanding of our own culture and ability to meet competition. That means being able to reach new heights of world achievements. Third, the new model of globalization involves such a creative open cross-confessional and cross-cultural dialogue, which, on the one hand, allows joining the global information network and, on the other, preserving our national identity, national dignity, individuality and uniqueness of the national vision of the world.

The beginning of the 21st century made it clear that contemporary communication should be understood as a dialogue paradigm of the modern world community. Anthropological context of communication in the age of globalization becomes more important, because today it is necessary not only to develop the history of humankind, but also the human history. This is possible through the dialogue in which different personalities, different cultures and different national visions of the world are recognized. It is only after the purpose of understanding is achieved through our interaction that communication becomes authentic.

The whole tolerance issue is built around the phenomenon of understanding and agreement, which can be achieved through a profound personal dialogue. Personality in philosophy is always present and manifests itself as a tolerant personality always ready for communication through the dialogue. I believe that only personality-oriented philosophy is capable of fulfilling universal consensus which is possible through preserving, permitting and encouraging differences. Agreement involves preservation and facilitation of diversity, and therefore is based not on suppression and violence, but on inner understanding, spiritual attraction, rapprochement of national characters and mentality. Viewed in this way, agreement is introduced in the context of mutual understanding. It opens way to discovering the experience of learning the truth that is beyond the area controlled by a scientific method. Mutual understanding cannot be reduced to rational explanatory procedures, it presupposes emotions, expression, intuition, wisdom of life. Personality-oriented philosophy awakens creativity, free thinking, and since philosophy has personal meaning and personal character it brings personality co-existence into the world as well as co-existence and diversity of cultures.

One can say with confidence that freedom, tolerance, dialogue and mutual understanding are dominant values of the contemporary globalizing world. Their assertion both in theory and in practice is a guarantee that the humanity will save life on the Earth and enhance spiritual forces of kindness and mercy.

**Alfredo Pérez Bravo<sup>1</sup>**

## MULTICULTURALISM

First allow me to express my gratitude to the Rector of the University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Doctor Alexander Zapesotsky, for his kind invitation to participate in the 12th International "Likhachov" Scientific Conference. It is a privilege to join you in what becomes already one of the most im-

portant academy events in Russia, under the theme: "Dialogue of Cultures in the Globalization".

The organizers of the conferences have proposed to me the topic "Multiculturalism as a problem for National Politics and for International Relations". Having reflected on the subject, I would said that the multiculturalism is not a problem as such, but definitely in our days it is a source of a great deal of disagreements, misunderstandings and even conflicts, but also a new way of life that can contribute to development and prosperity of those Nations who learn and know how to confront and manage multiculturalism. In other words we are in front of a big national and international challenge.

If we accept that the multiculturalism is the coexistence of two or more different cultures in the territory of one nation, then we will be referring to a rather recent phenomenon in the

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history of humanity, which will undoubtedly be the most characteristic feature of the national profiles during the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Nevertheless, the multiculturalism is part of the genesis of the modern states, like Mexico, Italy, Greece, etc. The formation of the current national group of actors of the international system, which in some cases has taken centuries, registered without doubt the original existence of various groups within what is now their legal boundaries. However, today we witness a new form of multiculturalism, when we see that the national boundaries have been crossed by men and women of different cultures, and stay in the new land to make their life there. In both cases we speak of multiculturalism, but in the first one a process of cultural assimilation already took place.

The important fact that I would like to highlight is how every day we will witness the transformation of the Nations -and the whole world- in a more obvious multicultural entities. If we look in detail to the current state of the social composition of different countries in the world, we find that most of them, if not all, experience in different degrees the phenomenon of multiculturalism. The globalization, the large migration flows (the relative easiness in the mobility of human beings across the world -legally or illegally-), the new technology (Internet, transportation, communications, etc.), the transculturation of societies through the media, the new global economic processes, the consumption of products from other countries, etc., have created a huge space for the consolidation of the multiculturalism.

A common dictionary definition tells us that: *"multiculturalism is the preservation of different cultures or cultural identities within a unified society, as a state or nation."* In a philosophical view, *"Multiculturalism is a system of beliefs and behaviors that recognizes and respects the presence of all diverse groups in an organization or society, acknowledges and values their socio-cultural differences, and encourages and enables their continued contribution within an inclusive cultural context which empowers all within the organization or society"* (Caleb Rosado, Ph.D. 1997). According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, *"multiculturalism is the body of thought in political philosophy about the proper way to respond to cultural and religious diversity. Mere toleration of group differences is said to fall short of treating members of minority groups as equal citizens. ... While multiculturalism has been used as an umbrella term to characterize the moral and political claims of a wide range of disadvantaged groups, including African Americans, women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled, most theorists of multiculturalism tend to focus their arguments on immigrants who are ethnic and religious minorities (e.g. Latinos in the U.S., Muslims in Western Europe), minority nations (e.g. Catalans, Basque, Welsh, Québécois), and indigenous peoples (e.g. Native peoples in North America, Maori in New Zealand)."*

It is clear that when we refer to multiculturalism we are talking about several concepts that are included in one term, and for that reason this broad term can create dissimilar reactions in different people, in different governments, and in the international community. For some societies, multiculturalism can be a problem of coexistence, for others -in the other extreme- a pride of national identity. This concept is also a political tool; this year we have presidential elections in some of our countries, and we have to agree that the reference to "multiculturalism", becomes a powerful weapon of any political discourse, whether in favor or against what is different to us, as a group, or even as a society; most of the time we do not see proposals of solutions, some politicians do not build on the benefits of diversity, they only point out the cultural differences and their fears to those differences.

I will keep the idea that multiculturalism is the presence of two or more different cultures coexisting in one Nation. It is an irreversible phenomenon, and we have to understand it and

learn how to take the best of this new national/global reality. But how can we address such an important subject in a limited space of time? We should study national case by national case in order to approach a more accurate analysis, and therefore reach specific conclusions, but for time reasons let me propose a brief categorization by social profiles: the first group of societies is related to the historical formation of the nation-state; the second, a Nation with the social acceptance of the central features of the cultural identity of the groups that coexist in its same legal territory, and the third one is related to the short time that a diverse culture has been introduced in the physical and social space of a modern nation, generating a more difficult multicultural process (it is the case of the world current migrations and its consequences).

I belong to a very ancient civilization, made up of from many different cultures, and where the multicultural process has been there for millennia. Also as Ambassador of Mexico I have had the opportunity to work in countries where multiculturalism plays a central role in the daily lives of its citizens, to mention a few: Malaysia, Panama, Russian Federation, and United States (as head of the political section in the Embassy of Mexico, I spend two years in Washington, DC).

Let me refer first to the case of Mexico (first mentioned group), a country with civilizations dating back beyond 3000 years. During its long history, from the "Olmecas" (the mother culture) up to the "Mexicas" (Aztecs) who dominated Mesoamerica at the time of the arrival of Europeans (Spanish -fifteenth century-); during the three centuries of Spanish colony up to the independence movement (1810), as well as in the modern Mexico, my country has always been a multicultural Nation. Today, with its 115 million people, more than 10 million Mexicans belong to 52 different ethnical groups (indigenous), each one have its own languages and traditions, as an indicative of the broad and complex multiethnic and multilingual composition. The main component that characterizes multiculturalism in Mexico is the mosaic of its rich diversity of its original indigenous groups. In Mexico, multiculturalism is part of its national soul.

In the second group the clearest example for me is Malaysia, a wonderful country where three main cultures: the Malays, the Chinese, and the Indians, coexist together in the same national territory, with a low degree of assimilation but with a high degree of social achievements. It is a really complex and successful multicultural equation; everyone has fully assumed its social responsibility inside the national boundaries. The Malays control the government (therefore the army); the Chinese controls 80% of the commercial activity, and the Indians in the service sector, mainly in the law and medical fields. When you live in Malaysia (I had the privilege to spend 6 years in Kuala Lumpur) you understand that the main elements in the new multiculturalism are respect and a clear notion of a common destiny.

United States is a very interesting case, and somehow belongs to the third group. The great American Nation is indeed a multinational society and, therefore, a multicultural one. It is a country made of migrations. It is in my opinion the best example of the most positive cultural assimilation. Due to its extraordinary economic success during the XX century, the US became the land of the hope, became again the land of foreign migrations. The American giant in many regards has been a world leading economy thanks to the contribution of millions of foreigners. As Mexican, I have to point out the huge amount of Mexicans living in United States (for several generations), and their amazing support to the development of the North American economy. But at the same time I have to underline that millions of my countrymen although keeping features of the Mexican culture (food, traditions, religion, music, etc.), through the years have been assimilated into the new "American" culture, transforming the multiculturalism to a new social

culture. Regardless this unique social assimilation, the upsurge of new immigrants into United States has created social tensions, and a huge concern to its National Security, leading in this way to the negative perspective of multiculturalism.

Finally, I would like to state that the formation of any specific culture responds to a historical process, in which for various reasons (geographical location, economic development, as well as unpredictable events such as wars, annexations or nationalist emancipation), generates societies which are more open to the assimilation of cultural diversity, than others. At this point, and considering the growing phenomenon of multiculturalism is everywhere, we should perhaps focus more in its positive aspects. We need to develop a new system of national education where the cultural assimilation should play a

prominent roll. This is a big task, and not an easy one, because we should be very careful to create the most respectful socio-political response to demographic multi-ethnicity.

In order to understand and face this great challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we, as individuals, governments, and the international community should be more focus in the new reality of the world. We should be working in build a better future, base in the new reality and in the new social composition of each Nation. We should learn to become more international oriented, culturally sensitive. Searching in any foreigner or different culture its best capacities and talents and stop the fears toward the different. We may keep the best of ourselves, our national seal, but be always ready to accept the most positive contribution of others.

V. V. Popov<sup>1</sup>

## THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN CIVILIZATION

It is a real challenge, even with a detailed thorough and profound analysis, to give characteristics of the major trends in the development of the geopolitical situation at the present stage when the humankind is at the cusp of the 21st century's second decade, and due to the acceleration of socio-economic and political processes, their increased diversity, complexity and interdependency in the age of globalization. New mass media technologies are introducing dramatic changes into the contemporary context; and even political scientists, with their generalizations and analyses of the current events, cannot always keep pace with them. The character of cataclysms that have been taking place in the recent years is so fast changing, that those who witness them are unable to perceive their core meanings and make necessary conclusions. We are bound to face again and again the unexpected turns that are hard to foresee or forecast.

Nevertheless, against the background of a profoundly complex and dynamic global picture, we can clearly observe the signs of a severe crisis that the Western (European, to be more exact) civilization is experiencing (North America makes another story due to the on-growing population).

Today we can speak of two global historic processes drawing to an end. First, the five-century-old Eurocentric world (a relatively small group of major powers, together with Russia and, since the 19th century, the US that have been holding the mechanisms to determine the global development) is declining. At the same time, new geopolitical parameters and domains are being developed, when civilizations, other than the Western – Chinese, Indian, Islamic, Latin American – are entering the foreground.

Second, the industrial civilization is approaching its two-century-long deadline, and the post-industrial civilization, also called integral, is rising. A system update of the global strategy is of vital necessity. Its targets are to form a new mode of production and consumption (which would provide for a balance between nature and society), to bridge the gap between the rich and the poor, to establish a truly multi-polar world order based on a dialogue and partnership between states and civilizations.

Today there are visible signs of the decline of the Western, aka European, civilization. Oswald Spengler's scientific pre-

vision in *The Decline of the West* (1912) is evident at present, a hundred years after it was made. An explicit confirmation of this can be found in *Time* magazine, which in its issue of August 11th, 2011 published a voluminous research 'The End of Europe'. In his study *The 21st Century* A.I. Utkin, a well-known Russian scientist, wrote: 'Only a generation ago was Europe prepared to face any threat with determination and resistance. But the present generation, as well as the forthcoming one, lacks energy, courage and stability to preserve their culture, structure and lifestyle.' (Utkin 2010, *The 21st Century*, Moscow, p. 245).

Having gone through the two exhaustive world wars, the blood of numerous conflicts and cruel destruction of natural resources, the European civilization, after the peak of its prosperity, is going through the crisis of dying out; so far, though on the surface, the European lifestyle and its level of developments remain to look attractive and well-to-do.

Mikhail Veller, our well-known publicist and writer, gives a very eloquent and convincing characteristic of this state. 'It is Europe that gave the world everything it has now. Science, technology, culture, progress, might, freedom, comfort are all from Europe. But today's Europe, rotten and decayed, has no capacity to preserve itself. Bury it! Do not imitate it! But do imitate the greatness of Europe in its dramatic changes – its grandeur, its talent to work and its severe morality.'

Damocles' sword of demography is hanging over the aging Europe, with its indigenous population reducing faster and faster. In future, Europe is a terminal case due to the demographic paradigm. The tendency demonstrates the further reduction of population, and Europe will be growing decrepit. The aging of population is heightened by the steady reduction of fertility. Eighteen out of twenty nations with the lowest birth rate are European. If the tendency persists, by 2050 the number of Europeans of the working age (15 to 65 years old) will fall to 365,000,000, while people older than 65 will increase in number and make up 172,000,000, one third of the total population. These are 'the statistics of a vanishing race', as experts call it. Any attempts to slow down this process result in proposals to raise the retirement age to 75. There are also other palliative measures discussed: tax increase, deficit financing etc. But these measures cannot radically help recover from the crisis.

The European economy will keep its diffuse with the growing number of retired people; it will have to open up to the growing migration to make up for its reduced workforce. To preserve and support its level of life and to prevent a drop in living standards, Europe will have to constantly increase the amounts of foreign workforce inflow. In the nearest fifty years, the proportion of working and retired people will change from

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5:1 to 2:1. By 2050, Europe will need 169,000,000 immigrants to preserve its current population and economy level, which means a 60-fold increase. They are most likely to be Arab immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. They are bringing their political views and religion with them. Experience proves that the projects for integration and assimilation of immigrants, for their perceiving of western values, mentality and behavioural patterns, for the American melting pot model to be transferred to Europe, have all failed. The EU has been unable to work out efficient policies for the foreign workforce adaptation. Ethnically homogenous Europeans are not able to incorporate immigrants who have a different mentality and world-view. The leaders of the major western European countries openly admitted this, saying that multiculturalism proved a total failure. This is especially so with the dynamically growing Muslim community: the increase in number of Arab immigrants (today one fifth of Vienna's populations are Muslims) will reinforce the Muslim world, including its radical organizations. And this fact will inevitably result in interethnic and international conflicts, in the increase of social and psychological opposition within society.

Turkey's full membership in the EU is a definitive example. France and Germany, major EU countries *per se*, are against the membership, which makes bilateral relations complicated. December 2011 was another proof of a civilizational split, not just of a political controversy: Turkey recalled its ambassador to France making the move in protest after the French parliament had passed a law making it a criminal offence denying the Armenian genocide in the Ottoman Empire.

Many Europeans see the membership of the country with an 80-million population, Muslim for the most part, as a danger, because it will result in a diffusion and further loss of the European identity. Besides, this trend will intensify in the context of the increasing de-Christianization of Europe, which basically means demolition of Europe's cultural foundations.

It is the fact that the influence of religion in the Old World has fallen, of Christianity mainly, which has always been an integrating element to sustain and preserve the European lifestyle. For example, according to the rating provided by the Centre for the Study of Global Christianity, located on Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary's main campus in South Hamilton, Massachusetts, 'all major religions in Western Europe are degrading, except for Islam; in addition to that, half of the adherents who consider themselves Christians, do not attend liturgies.'

According to the results of polls and field work (published on the Al-Jazeera site on December 20th, 2011), in the last twenty years the number of Europeans who identify themselves as Christians decreased from 66 to 43 per cent. At the same time the number of those who do not identify themselves as followers of any particular religion increased from 31 per cent in 1981 to 51 per cent in 2009.

Thus, we can say that the two trends are crossing: de-Christianization and a kind of the civilizational split, which projects through strained relations with the Muslim minority resulting from the inability of the European communities to integrate a rapidly increasing Muslim population.

The split happened at the cusp of the development of industrial civilization. The morality of the West rests on the principle set forward by Francis Bacon: 'Science has to put Nature at the service of Man'. This conception is somewhat dangerous because technologies evolve faster than mentality, the material part grows faster than the spiritual one. Eventually, it leads to degradation of moral foundations of a society and its further decay. With such erosion of values the man himself and his identity are degrading. The recent terrorist attack in Norway in Summer 2011 was a tragic example of this. Motivated by his personal rejection of a cultural discord, a European nationalist

injured more than 100 and killed 77 fellow countrymen during the attack.

Global informational revolution has put culture and morality in jeopardy. A unified pseudo-culture and moral degradation are being imposed on the new generation. The crisis of moral values has reached its climax, which projects through divorce and same-sex marriage rate increase, and drug and alcohol addiction, prostitution, paedophilia etc., such dreadful vices of the present age. The threat of losing cultural heritage, ethnic and civilizational diversity is growing.

Today the world is witnessing a total system crisis of the globally dominating form of power. Here are the words of Alexander King, President Emeritus of the Club of Rome: 'The life we are living is obsessed with an urge towards mindless consumption, destruction and conflicts; we are groping for the keys to survival. It was morality that was the line marking man's departure from the animal world. There is a real danger now that the dominance of politics and the practice of consumption will reduce man to the ground floor of his human image and that the next step is catastrophe.'

Europeans themselves acknowledge the gravity of the situation. 'Revolt and greediness of bankers have resulted in the communal disintegration of Britain... The ties between generations have been torn apart; understanding and trust have gone to pieces. People are being eroded by selfishness and fear; moral values are violated. England is going through the process of self-destruction.' Such were the words in 2011 Christmas Day sermon of Archbishop of Canterbury Rowan William, Head of the Church of England, that has more than 77 million adherents.

According to French President Nicolas Sarkozy, Europe is experiencing the most difficult phase in its post-war history at the brink of 2011–12.

Having been brought about by the incessant greed of banks and corporations which make one spend more than one's income, financial and economic problems have become another aspect of the system crisis in the Western civilization. These processes are boosted up by the increasing shortage of energy and mineral resources, primarily located in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Global economic crisis highlights the evils of the society: it has lost its control over the rapidly growing financial flows of virtual capital, separated from the stir of real economy. The gap between the richest and poorest is much too wide (74:1). (Mathematicians and physicists believe that ratio to be critical for the globe). With its natural major feature – profit-maximization – capitalism strengthens such traits of human character as aggression, greed and desire for dominance, expansion and acquisition.

That is currently obvious in the Mediterranean zone, where the debt crisis is undergoing a chain reaction, and the crisis is starting to creep northward. The statements and actions of the 'politically correct' Western countries are becoming more aggressive. During the invasion of Iraq, for example, most European countries exercised restraint and distanced themselves from the US campaign. In 2011, however, France and England initiated and led NATO operations in Libya. They thought that after a brief and inexpensive campaign, without casualties and with no resistance from the local population, they would capture the strategically important positions they needed close to rich reserves of cheap high-quality oil and gas. Now, however, it is clear that they were mistaken; and the situation there remains extremely complicated and unpredictable. The leaders of some Western states may in the future face serious investigations into their actions, which damaged their countries' national interests.

A crisis of government and leadership is now emerging in the court trials that have begun in Ireland, France, Ukraine, etc. (Some British political scientists are not ruling out new charges against the former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, who

deliberately lied about Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for attacking Iraq).

With the end of the Western civilization's dominance as foreseen by the eminent English historian Arnold Toynbee, a new giant is emerging on the world stage – the Asiatic civilization, with its huge, predominantly youthful population, with its powerful raw materials and human potential and natural resources, and with its focus not on the material pragmatism that has eroded Christian values but on consensus and a preference for the 'benevolent' authoritarianism against the Western model of democracy.

In Russia, a country that spans two continents and has always took pride in its spirituality and its fusion of different cultures, more and more people start to understand that the future of the world lies primarily with the Asian civilizations. In an article published on October 4, 2011 in *Izvestiya*, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin pointed out that 'Russia can function as an effective link between Europe and the dynamic

Asia-Pacific region. The establishment of the Eurasian Union can also help Europe, which is united by common values of freedom, democracy and market laws. An economically logical and balanced partnership system between the Eurasian Union and the EU could create real conditions for changing the geopolitical and geo-economic landscape of the entire continent and would have an unmistakable positive global impact.'

There is no doubt that the Russian Federation is a particular civilizational type, whatever name is attached to it – Eurasian, Orthodox or anything else. That is why Russia can do a lot to prevent a clash of civilizations, so convincingly predicted by American professor Samuel Huntington. Nowadays, when the civilizational gap, especially between the Western and the Islamic worlds, is getting wider, it is the making of a true dialogue of cultures that gets into the foreground.

Russia has a special part in this process because, as famous Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev noted, it is an 'East-West' and can act as a peacemaker for different civilizations.

**Alexander Rahr<sup>1</sup>**

## RUSSIA IS EUROPEAN – NOT WESTERN

The West is reluctant to realize that an average Russian citizen feels safe in Putin's state. Let's take a look back in history in order to remember the times when things in Russia were better. Most Russians have accepted state capitalism (as an economic model to support the country's economic development). The fact that the government questioned the dealings of the oligarchs, showed them their limits and regained control over natural resources was approved of by the population. The West failed to understand that Putin re-established a sentiment of dignity among many Russians. Russia regained respect and was no longer pitied and treated as a beggar. As a blogger wrote, the difference between Russians and West Europeans lies in the fact that in the West the top priority is given to well-being, while on the Russian side the top priority is pride in their fatherland.

'Russia is what it is', Dmitry Medvedev said during his lecture in Davos. In this way, he was lecturing the West without permitting it a chance to be lectured himself. The West replied, 'If Russia considers itself as part of Europe it must comply with European rules.' The new image of Europe is not based on geographical criteria as we might know it from the last centuries, but on universal legal values, such as democracy, social-market-economy, rule-of-law, pluralism, minority rights, freedom of speech etc. It took centuries for Europeans to acquire these values. Today, they form the *Acquis communautaire* and have a greater importance to European people than territorial possessions.

Russia feels discriminated since the West has overwhelmed the European continent with its ideological values. After the fall of Communism, Russia had to reinvent its identity. Russia's search for identity led it to its Byzantine heritage.

From a Russian point of view, Western Europe is guided by values having their roots in Roman legal culture, while Russia as a descendant of the Byzantine Empire, which disappeared in 1453, has different, (but also) European roots. In the West, life is greatly determined by the rule of law, while in Russia,

the focus is on justice and fairness (taken subjectively). When a case could not be resolved with the help of laws, a verdict was pronounced by a just, fair tsar instead of by court.

Today, a "Western Democrat" cannot imagine the "non-democratic" Russia as being an ally of the West. Western-style political sciences simply are sciences of democracy. This is due to the West's victory of the Cold War. In former times, when giving political recommendations, researchers in the East had to examine life in Russia. In those days, the whole world was watching Russia which, in fact, controlled half of Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West lost its interest in the East; first of all the widespread fear and second the need to "grapple" with this country had disappeared. In the '90s the West still showed some interest in what was going on in Eastern Europe, but as transformations slowed down the West seemed to become tired of Russia.

When it comes to Russia, modern sciences of democracy primarily examine it from their own Western perspective. Many players of the European value system follow this principle, and so do representatives of civil society – non-governmental organizations (NGO). Speaking of them, we do not think of Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Bread for the World or Red Cross, which are doing their best to turn the world into a better, more human planet. However, the influence of some American and German funds and think-tanks on international issues cannot be underestimated.

The NGO-zation of Western foreign policy brings about one problem. Since the Cold War, foreign policy in Europe has focused on some particular values, and spreading these values strengthens peace and wealth outside Europe. Over the last years, Western values have been promoted in a pseudo-bellucose manner. At the Munich security conference, the American senator John McCain stated that the spreading of values in foreign policy concepts is not a missionary activity, but simply constitutes an essential part of security policy. The European commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood policy Stefan Füle argues that EU partnership-programme-policies aim at reaching "ordinary people" in partner countries and not government officials.

Young people in Eastern Europe and Arab countries are no longer content with virtual freedom in the internet; they claim personal freedoms in their real lives. According to the West, human rights belong to everyone, they are universal. Those violating or ignoring human principles are going to be penalized and severely punished. This is also the reason why

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non-governmental organizations have been founded. They have the purpose to “transfer the advantages” of a liberal system to other communities. In democratic countries, NGO activists are sort of fundamentalists “clad in the armour of ancient crusaders” (as Putin said). Unlike crusaders fighting with a sword they use modern weapons of a free information society, namely Facebook and Twitter. In the 20th century, the Soviet Union tried to spread the Communist revolution in other continents. Socialist revolutions triumphed in North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Nicaragua, and Angola. In the 21st century, it is the West exporting revolutions; it is the West encouraging democratic revolutions in the world. During the Cold War, an international peace movement was directed against the USA that had been considered an imperialist state. The Soviet Union at that time evoked warm feelings in left-wingers. All of a sudden, twenty years later America evolves as an advocate of democracy and German ‘Greens’ demand to balance military operations against dictators. However, an autocratic Russia is stigmatized for being a country infringing human rights.

Russia’s reputation has been seriously hurt by international mass media. The West doesn’t have a positive attitude towards Russia. The few positive stories get lost in the flow of information and can hardly find their readers, because they are of no interest and contradict what the Western audience believes and wants to believe about Russia. In Germany, people expect media to cover events both objectively and morally. Since political and social life in Russia usually does not fit into Western standards, exasperated journalists often use a moral cudgel. As foreign policy is part of the entertainment industry, we constantly feel a need for new intensity. Covering Russia in Western press always means using extremely exaggerated stereotypes: on the one hand, there is an evil state that deprives its citizens of freedom; on the other hand, there is the Siberian landscape and pathetic old women in wooden huts.

Although Russia no longer arouses such great interest among Germans, the aim of the European Union and Western civil society is clear and remains the same for the years to follow: to instil democratic values and to transfer the liberal Western model to Russia. Europeans are convinced that spreading democracy among close neighbours helps to guarantee their own security. It is commonly believed that democracies do not fight one another. Unlike China, Russia is part of the European continent, and, therefore, the West puts forward greater claims in terms of democracy against Moscow than against Beijing. This transfer of values, however, should not turn into a policy of double standards, since political cynicism, which predominates Western thinking, only recognizes these values as long as they do not clash with the West’s own interests.

The Soviet Union carried out the policy of double standards *par excellence*. Duplicity of Soviet diplomats literally became a byword.

What was allowed for one person, wasn’t allowed for the other; and it was decisive which side had the right of interpretation and real force. Today, the West treats Russia arrogantly, because its own system of values is better and it can guarantee its citizens a more comfortable and fulfilling life. The West despises Russia, because the latter has one foot stuck in socialism, and the other – in barbaric capitalism which is unacceptable, either.

The West has forgotten how thorny its own path to democracy was, and how incredibly difficult it was for Russia to go through a triple transformation from an Empire, over a planned economy and a totalitarian system to a democracy and a market economy. If the European Union had suffered such an economic catastrophe on its own, as Russia experienced it in the ’90s, its democratic system would also have failed.

For only 20 years the Russian people lives without Communism. Democracy must take root there. Twenty years after Germany’s defeat in World War II, a real civil society had not yet been formed in the Federal Republic of Germany. The

*Spiegel* case revealed the government’s intrusion on freedom of the press. The country’s political landscape was dominated by one single political party and, the government tried to introduce emergency laws against student protesters; several incidents occurred between the police and the protesters; until 1963 the power was held in the hands of only one chancellor in Bonn; and Bavaria was continuously controlled by the Christian Social Union (CSU).

However, the most striking example of double standards in politics is the Kosovo conflict. Moscow condemned the recognition of Kosovo’s independence by the West as a violation of international law, namely, to attach greater weight and importance to the primacy of the state’s territorial integrity than to the people’s right to self-determination. Why did Kosovo get the right to independence, while Abkhazia and South Ossetia when striving for independence from Georgia didn’t?

It goes without saying that Russia also refers to double standards, especially towards its weaker neighbours. On the one hand, the Kremlin punished Khodorkovsky for his criminal activities during the period of privatization in the ’90s; on the other hand, it left other oligarchs unpunished and they were able to remain unaffected regardless of similar offences. Russia proclaims values and principles which are frequently of a mere declarative character. It is only natural that Russia acts following its own particular interests.

Another issue dividing Russia and the West is the different interpretation of European history. The historian Richard Pipes argued that Russia authoritarian mentality goes back to the long period of the Tatar-Mongol invasion, in which immunity to Western democracy could develop. Debates lasted for three days and demonstrated once again that the 20<sup>th</sup> century is to a high degree perceived from an “emotional” point of view: history was to evoke a feeling of pride and this pride was to become an important factor in building a new Russian identity in the 21st century.

However, history can clearly be used as a weapon, too. A number of former Soviet republics never missed the chance to present themselves as the tragic victims and, begging for sympathy and acceptance, to be guaranteed protection by the West. Russians realized that some European states wanted to take all the credit for the victory over fascist Germany during World War II for themselves. It is well known that the victory put the USSR in the position of the second superpower and guaranteed it a permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Russia still identifies itself with its Soviet heritage. Most Russian people believe that the USSR defeated Hitler without any help of its allies. According to the social scientist Lev Gudkov, this victory ‘perpetuated’ the power of the Soviets. During *perestroika* much of the military pathos faded away and Russia’s expectations to integrate into the West started to grow. After the hardships of the ’90s, in public conscience, the longing for the bygone empire became vivid again. Indeed, every rationally thinking Russian must have been very well aware that Russia’s contribution to the 20th-century achievements was limited by the victory in World War II and Yuri Gagarin’s space flight.

Why then, does Russia not ask to be forgiven for the 45-year-long occupation of Eastern Europe and why does it refuse to admit its defeat in the Cold War, the same way as Germany did after World War II regarding the Nazi crimes? Russian leaders are rather reluctant to admit their mistakes for imposing Communism on the members of the Warsaw Pact, because this might result in compensation claims and could eventually lead to the equalization of national-socialism and communism, which could downsize Russia’s victory in World War II. Meanwhile, Vladimir Lenin and the October Revolution have been forgotten and Russia considers itself a victim of a shameful Communist experiment in the history of humankind.

On the other hand, Russia has not got rid of Stalinism, which cannot but only cause concern. Even today, half of the Russian

population thinks of Stalin positively. His merits in Russian history are endlessly discussed, while nobody, except human rights organizations, mentions the victims of the Soviet GULAG. The fact that Stalinist repressions aimed at eradicating the old intelligentsia, nobility, wealthy peasants and then the military elite, scientists and even prisoners of war, has been erased from the memory. The reason seems obvious: Wasn't it Stalin who, within thirty years, managed to turn the backward agrarian country with a plough into a superpower with nuclear weapons?

It seems that Russian people are enchanted not by Stalin's personality but by the mythical omnipotence of this tyrant. Only few Russians are ready for repentance and national reconciliation. Still, a majority of Russians reject the idea of actively reconsidering their country's past as post-war Germany did.

The German historian Kristian Meier could agree with this approach. World history shows that forgetfulness instead of active memory has often been the best remedy. This has been the case in Spain after Franco's dictatorship. Coming to term with the past would lead to the desire of revenge which in turn causes revenge again. Meier suggests that reaching a cease-fire, should at the same time bring about oblivion and forgiveness. After 1945 Germany chose redemption and non-forgetfulness of Hitler's crimes, though this decision did was not made easily. It would probably be too insolent to demand of Russia reconsidering its past, because it is not that long ago that it freed itself from totalitarianism. Still, the human rights group "Memorial" appeals to the Kremlin to dedicate a monument to the millions of Stalin's victims as soon as possible. This act could be appreciated abroad. However, Dmitri Medvedev expressed his concern that ninety per cent of young Russians cannot name a single person who openly revolted against the repressions during Soviet times.

According to the journalist Andrei Zolotov, the Russian society is still in the state of the 'cold civil war'. It is hard to find a consensus while at the same time dealing with the heritage of the past. Hundreds of thousands of descendants of Stalin's victims are confronted by the same great number of people whose ancestors were Stalin's adherents and executioners. Neither Putin nor Medvedev is at ease handling the past. Both belong to the so called 'red aristocracy': Putin's grandfather worked in Stalin's administration, while Medvedev's grandfather participated in the violent collectivization of peasants.

The "Future Workshop" is a permanent working group of the Russian-German discussion forum 'Petersburg Dialogue'. For a few years now, members of this group have been meeting in interesting places – whether in one of the German federal "Länder" or some remote Russian province. These events as many other public civil society forums in Germany promote mutual understanding between people. They facilitate contacts between active young professionals of both countries and provide room for heated debates about Europe's future. Those taking responsibility for the future get to know each other better so in this way, in about 20–30 years, they will be able avoid conflicts in their communication.

I hope that by that time the last stereotypes will be wheeled to the dump of history. Unforgettable conferences, held in short summer nights in Novosibirsk, near romantic waterfalls in the Altai mountains, or near to the border between Russia and the European Union in Pskov, on the Baltic coast in Kaliningrad, at a Christmas market in Dresden or in the triangle between Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic or on a boat trip to Hamburg— these events enable young people to adopt different perspectives on how to build a common home – Europe. Furthermore, guests from the Ukraine, Baltic countries and Poland do also participate in these events.

The dominating topic of these debates is the "disarmament of history". Russia is considered to be a country with an unforeseeable past. Its history used to be rewritten by the whim of its current ruler, which resembles planting bombs which can go off

in the future. German colleagues invited a few active and young Russians for a conference in Obersalzberg in Bavaria where Adolf Hitler was planning the invasion of the Soviet Union. The participants visited the Third Reich Museum. During their long walks in the forest, they had discussion about if Russia was able to reconsider its past in a similar way. For example, one of Stalin's dachas on the outskirts of Moscow could be turned into a museum dedicated to Stalinist terror.

Young Russians warned their European colleagues not to impose any policy of "destalinization" forcefully on Russia – the country has to free itself from the 'serf's mentality'. Germany answered as follows: without breaking off from Stalinism, Russia cannot become part of a future Europe. However, it has become possible to be able to openly discuss sensitive topics of Russian history. This gives Russia the possibility to join a united Europe, similar to the chosen by West Germany in 1945 and Eastern Europe in 1989 which later became part of a united Europe, too.

Today, Russia finds itself in a very difficult stage of its development. Liberals in the West and in Russia consider the church to be an institution of the 18th or 19th century and that it should not interfere in processes taking place in society. This probably holds true for the Western culture but not for Russia. Following 80 years of Communism, Russia looks for its roots somewhere in pre-revolutionary Russia, taking into account Russian traditions including Christianity. Religiousness was lost in a Communist Russia, and returning to this tradition is of utmost importance. Without a religious revival in Russia including Orthodoxy, Russia would not be able to find its own way. The church as an institute is of more importance in Russia than in Western cultures. Imagining the present-day Russia is not possible without the church - despite all the difficulties the Orthodoxy is facing on the way of its revival.

The contemporary world is changing rapidly in front of our eyes. Many people think that religion has become obsolete, that the world enters a post-Christian age where the church remains an obstacle to the evolution of mankind. In this situation, Russia represents an absolutely different point of view reminding us how important it is to remember the 'the joint of time' of all mankind.

The world is developing in such a rapid and dynamic way that it is not possible for the church to answer unambiguously to the great amount of trends and questions. Problems arise and disappear very quickly. At the same time, there are questions which indeed determine our future. Answering them requires careful thought. The church should not engage in everyday politics, it should not be one of the political players, but I think that this will not happen in Russia. We can rather witness the kind of opposite when seeing politicians showing up in churches, and in this way, searching for support of their voters. Incidentally, Western politicians take advantage of this trick too, because it is well judged when politicians declare that they are religious and receive the sacrament. But the important thing is that religious beliefs should not become a "political stunt" in front of the TV cameras.

Russian society was somewhat crippled under Stalin. Under Brezhnev, cynicism reigned among society. Who else than the church will teach moral values in an immoral 21st century? Today, many people in the West smile ironically when Putin comes to greet Our Lady's belt and many people come to pray before it. Let them smile. We witness the revival of traditions from the Byzantine Empire which for a thousand years had been the guardian of the Orthodoxy. Where else can you witness anything similar? Despite all the changes within the church, Orthodoxy has always been based on the principle of respect for the traditions. The Orthodox Church should not lose its connection to former times as the Protestant church did. The main challenge of our time lies in the orientation towards the future letting us forget everything that was in the past.

H. M. Reznik<sup>1</sup>

## RUSSIA IN GLOBAL COMPETITION: ENSURING THE SUPREMACY OF LAW

Human capital is becoming in present-day world the main resource, and first and foremost, educated, creative professionals who are ready to arrange their own business, to win and to develop in fair competition. Commenting on the results of the survey 'Where are university graduates willing to work?' Minister for Economic Development E. Nabiullina emphasized, 'In our country the generation of people is growing whom we will have to compete for with other countries. They are more mobile, more international, so to speak. We will have to explain to prospective employers why it is in Russia that they should place their production works and develop centres for profit and competence.'

In the meantime, the business and investment attractiveness indices of Russia have dropped to a very low level according to annual ratings of some trustworthy international economic and financial agencies. Moreover, the situation has aggravated over the last years and it was stressed in the reports on the business climate and prospects for the country's innovations submitted by Russia's Public Chamber and the organization 'Opora Rossiyi'.

The research of the Foreign Investment Advisory Council (FIAC) identified five problems that obstruct an increasing flow of investment into Russia. These are administrative barriers (84% of those asked responded), corruption (78%), inadequate and inconsistent legislation (71%) and arbitrary interpretation and enforcement of laws (67%). At the same time, only 39 per cent of the surveyed investors were anxious about being unprotected from aggressively and unethically run businesses. Those investing in Russia appear to fear its government twice as much as their competitors, whereas under regular market conditions it is normally more reasonable to be wary of competition but not the state.

The data are fully in line with recent (May 2011) results obtained by Levada Centre in a survey of young middle class representatives (25-39-year-olds with high income per capita living in Moscow, St. Petersburg or one of twelve cities with population exceeding one million). Young citizens (who constituted 13 per cent of the population in 2009) were asked if they were willing to leave Russia and what their reasons to immigrate were. 59 per cent responded that they were thinking of 'going abroad for some time', 28 per cent – of leaving 'for good'. Most respondents were sole entrepreneurs and employees of private companies; the strongest motive to leave was 'lack of property' and 'state pressure on business'.

Developing favourable conditions for private businesses and attracting foreign investments is a large-scale system task. Ultimately, its solution will be to overcome the prejudices of mass consciousness against private property that was imposed on Russian people for over seventy years as well as the image of businesspeople as men of low moral who snatched generous piece of 'people's wealth', the image developed in the course of the reforms of the '90s.

Traditionally, our jurisprudence views law as a secondary phenomenon subordinate to economy. Modern economic theory has considerably redefined that point of view and admits that law as a system influencing formal and informal institutions is a key mechanism, which not only speeds up or balks the development of economy, but also determines parameters of the economic model which can be reformed either by changing the existing legal system or at the cost of economic and social crisis. The vector leading to the development of effective economy rather than narrow interests of certain social groups should determine the essence of law in a civilized society which every concerned Russian citizen envisions.

In the sphere of Russian legislature there is an urgent and pressing matter to attend. The issue is that the relations in the field of the entrepreneurship and private property appear absolutely unprotected; instead, they are often categorized as criminal. This factitious criminalization of business is attained in two ways: (1) by adopting criminal law acts that contradict common law principles and international law norms and those of other branches of law (except criminal ones); (2) by the interpretations that distort the essence of the legal norms.

The key economic cause of factitious criminalization of entrepreneurship is the appropriation of property of those business owners who have been brought to justice and, thus, the removal of competitors. As a result, true socially justified objectives, such as the criminal law regulation of economic relations, are replaced with random substitutes: protection of property by criminal law in business is substituted with repressive measures taken, sometimes arbitrarily, against entrepreneurs; criminal law and criminal court are becoming mechanisms that govern in economy and are used for property redistribution. However, redistribution of property by the state by means of criminal repression (or by the threat of using it) is counter-constitutional and does not lead to an effective economy and a state governed by rule of law.

The present system of law and law enforcement in the country functioning *de facto* but not vested *de jure* jeopardizes property rights and lawful interests of businesses, which means that under such conditions doing business may result in being involved in the risk group of those who fear groundless prosecution, deprivation of their property and of personal freedom. According to the data, one of ten entrepreneurs in Russia has been brought to justice and not convicted and judging by how our law enforcement bodies work, many entrepreneurs have experienced corruption blackmail in the form of threats to file criminal charges against them. One should take into consideration that such aggressive law enforcement forces entrepreneurs to resort to corruption to protect their property and business, which provokes an increase in criminal impact on business and criminal repressions.

A group of authors that included a unique team of theoreticians and practising specialists, lawyers and economists, specialists in civil and criminal law conducted complex monographic research on how the principle of the rule of law is realized in economy [1]. They came to a conclusion that the transformation of the existing system of law cannot be made through perfecting the text of laws only, it requires that criminal policy objectives and its nature should be changed.

These cardinal changes should include the following:

- refusal from the established practice of criminal law governing economy;
- ensuring independence of the court;
- supreme courts exercising rebuttal of cases when legal norms are wrongly interpreted and specified through the procedure of constitutional monitoring;

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— refusal from excessive use of repression practices in criminal law and law enforcement;

— administering consistently the principle of economy of criminal repression according to which criminal liability should be enforced only in cases of those offences which cannot be protected from by other branches of law;

— administering consistently the systemic principle of law, according to which criminal law cannot contradict the norms of other (positive) branches of law, and its application should not be based on their violation or neglect;

— legal adoption and practical realization of special additional substantive and processual guarantees (compared to the existing ones with regard to other subjects of law), ensuing from the peculiarities of entrepreneurship, and protecting businessmen from unlawful criminal persecution.

It is of particular importance among these measures to ensure independent character of judicial power, cure the maladies of our juridical system, whose fairness evaporates not only when politically motivated cases are tried, but when necessary interpret systematically the laws which are to be enforced.

I am afraid that with the current corps of judges, without relegating economic crimes to the jurisdiction of the juries, it will be very difficult to purge the existing situation. There is a promising cue in that President Medvedev mentioned the need to broaden the competence of courts of juries. In this issue, the support from businesses would be vital, because businessmen still insist that they do not need the court of non-professionals. It is a serious fallacy.

Not long ago I was writing a preface to the selected speeches of Sergei Andreyevsky, an outstanding pre-revolutionary solicitor. I reread them again and found some defence speeches in cases of economic offences. The defence was carried out both in the juries courts and in professional ones. The difference was in the following: the jury's verdicts were mostly acquittals, while professional courts were always in favour of convictions. Why was it so? Because the guilt in the court of jury is not the guilt before the formal norm of law. The jury would pronounce the businessman not guilty, because he would take measures to rescue a bank, and in this he would break the laws, instructions and orders. On the other hand, professional judges would dumbly follow the letter of the Criminal Code. In one of his speeches (the case of a bankrupt bank in Ekaterinoslav), Andreyevsky threw this phrase in the face of the crown court, 'I am afraid that your hearts are despaired in your attitude to the defendant. I can imagine your voices: You can say whatever you want, but you will not escape nemesis!' Then he continued, 'I implore you at least for some time to depart from this

mood! You know the Roman saying: "Not all that is allowed is honest".' This phrase has a much more interesting reverse side: 'Not all which is prohibited is dishonest'. But even this argumentative force of the solicitor, beating hollow the accusation of self-service and fraud which was presented to the defendant who formally had overstepped the bounds of norms and regulations, failed to bring the judges in favour of the 'life truth instead of truth of the code'.

Is the situation with our legislation any better, are there no bad laws in it? Take, for example the article from the Criminal Code on 'Illegal business', which categorizes entrepreneurship as a criminal act even if it only formally violates the permissive procedure without signs of fraud, violence, coercion, bribery or tampering with the documents. Or the article on 'Illegal obtaining of the credit' which just copies civil legislation regarding deals, and which entails criminal liability for a public but not a private delict. Yet one more article, 'Legalizing (laundering) money or other property, acquired by a person as a result of a criminal act'. Our professional courts, according to this article, pronounce sentences which are invariably the establishment of double criminal liability of one and the same person for the same acts. I can add, if somebody does not know this: the existing norm in the Criminal Code, envisaging pardoning from criminal liability with a grounded risk, is dead, and professional courts do not use it.

The next stage should be spreading jury courts gradually into arbitration courts. The use of arbitration courts as a tool to redistribute property has become a key element of raiding. The institute of arbitration judges failed to stop it, first, because they pronounced their mutual verdicts with professional judges and, second, because of the general system of reviewing the acts of first instance courts which rules out the principle of an ultimate verdict of the jury on the case. In civil law, there is the freedom of agreement, and the system of its (law) sources includes good business practices, i.e. the existing and widely used codes of business conduct, not envisaged by the legislation, irrespective of whether they are documented or not. Civil cases can be tried more competently and, consequently, more fairly with the backing of the statutes of the good business practices by the representatives of the business community, chosen by the parties in the dispute and sitting on the jury's deck in the capacity of experts.

The supremacy of law is protected primarily by court. The jury, consecrating the verdicts by the authority of society, strengthens the authority of juridical system, thus instilling legal culture in people at large.

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## MIGRATION POLICY OF MODERN RUSSIA: CONFLICTS AND SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE

As Russia is becoming part of the global economy, its own demographic and economic challenges make processes of migration exchange between our country, countries of the CIS and other countries of the world more intensive.

Considering these processes from different viewpoints we can note both positive and negative influences of external migration on Russia's socio-economic and cultural development. In this article we will try to look into peculiarities of inner conflicts which are caused by migration exchanges typical of Russian society and economy.

### 1. 'All flags will find their way to us...'

All-European peculiarities of demographic development are inherent in Russian society. Due to the industrial revolution of the 30s and the USSR Communist government's combating individual farms (the so-called collectivization) of the previous century a considerable part of the population moved from rural areas to cities. This process also continued after the Second World War. Mostly urban settlements,

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involvement of women in public production, growth of the overall level of education, consequences of the civil and the Second World War – these were the factors which formed the main body of demographic problems for Russia today (ageing population, decrease in birth-rate, demographic holes).

The economically and socially tense early '90s of the previous century speeded up the aggravation of demographic problems. The abrupt decline in the standard of living for the majority of the population, the economic crisis, the general instability of the state made a considerable share of the population leave the Russian Federation.<sup>1</sup> Disintegration of the USSR into a number of independent states reduced the opportunities of making up for the low birth-rate in Russian regions at the expense of high birth-rate in Central Asian republics. From 1992 to 2007 the natural decline in the population was 12.3 million people.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, Russia faced a most serious socio-economic challenge: the absolute decline in population (it is estimated<sup>3</sup> that as a result of natural decline in the population Russia can have about 132 million people) will take place by the year of 2025.

The drift of the population away from the country and the natural decline were to a certain degree made up for by migration. From 1989 to 2008 5.7 million people entered the country for permanent residence.<sup>4</sup> The special nature of this period was that neither Russian society nor economy was particularly sensitive to this kind of migration. Firstly, the majority of migrants were the repatriation of Russian people (67% of the overall number of migrants) from republics of the former Soviet Union and other indigenous peoples of the Russian Federation (about 12% of the overall number of migrants). So, this category of migrants had no difficulty adapting socially and culturally. Secondly, they naturally replaced the leaving people and did not load excessively the social infrastructure.

It was not before 2006 that the composition of migrants who expressed the wish to choose Russia as the country of permanent residence began to change with citizens of other nationalities prevailing.<sup>5</sup>

Thus, we can conclude that, unlike industrially developed countries of the West, the first migration wave in the Russian Federation took a 'soft' course and did not require any in the least measure serious programmes aimed at cultural and economic adaptation of repatriates. Many of those who came back from the countries of the CIS had old ties of relationship, which also made it easier for the state to control and manage this process. The country's economy was on the rise at that time. This factor to a great extent helped to take the 'edge' off the situation.

While the return of Russian and other indigenous peoples of Russia to their homeland can be estimated as a positive phenomenon, the migration processes which were taking place at the same time and which involved employing foreign nationals had different aspects.

On the one hand, engaging cheap workforce especially in the sectors of economy which are not particularly popular

among native-born population allowed to speed up economic development. On the other hand, it sows the seeds of strife.

According to the data from the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of Russia 21.3 million people arrived in the Russian Federation in 2009 and 22.8 million people in 2010. However it is almost impossible to definitely state how many foreigners of this number came to engage in labour activities. This is due to the fact that all those moving are divided into groups according to the purpose of their travel. There are different purposes: 'Business', 'Maintenance staff', 'Private', 'Permanent residence', 'Tourism', 'Transit'.

So, the purpose of travel of the foreigners who are engaged in labour activities in Russia is supposed to be 'Business' or 'Maintenance staff', but it is not all as easy as it looks.

The first difficulty emerges when considering the group who claim that the purpose of their visit is 'Business'. This group includes both migrants who have come to work in the Russian Federation and those who come on business trips and will leave Russia after a short period of time. It is hard to elicit it only basing on the statistics. When considering concrete figures we can see that, for example, in 2009 1.1 million people arrived in the Russian Federation from countries of the CIS, and almost 2.8 million people – from countries outside the former Soviet Union. With that, the CIS: from Tajikistan – 280 thousand people, from Uzbekistan – 350 thousand people, from the Ukraine – 300 thousand people, from Kirgizia – 80 thousand people. Non-CIS countries: Germany – 200 thousand people, China – 250 thousand people, Italy, Spain, France – about 100 thousand people each, the USA and Great Britain – about 200 thousand people each. In 2010 the situation is similar.

With that, if we look into the need for foreign workers as declared by employers in 2009 we can state the following thing: employers planned to engage foreign workers from Uzbekistan – 590 thousand people, Tajikistan – 350 thousand people, the Ukraine – 280 thousand people, Kirgizia – 142 thousand people, China – 348 thousand people, Turkey – 212 thousand people, Spain and Italy – about 1.5 thousand people, Germany, England, the USA – about 6.5 thousand people. Employers had a similar need in 2010 and in 2011.

In this context we can conclude that statistics indices on workers arriving with the purpose 'Business' reflect the number of foreign workers from the CIS countries who work in Russia; the annual number is 1.1 million people. As for countries outside the former Soviet Union, figures differ. And it cannot be said that those who come from non-CIS countries in statistics are foreign workers; they are more likely to be foreigners who come on short-term business trips.

It often happens so that foreign workers, as well as citizens of Russia who go abroad to work there, do not want to busy themselves with documents, so they claim a tourist visa but they spend all the possible period of stay working; most often the period is 90 days (3 months) – they spend it working, then they leave the country and enter Russia again. So, there can be migrant workers in this numerous group. Besides, some foreigners arrive on their relatives' invitations but the purpose of their visit is employment. So they can be part of the group with the purpose 'Private'.

As for the fixed quotas and issued work permits in 2008 3.3 million people were drawn in, in 2009 3.9 million people got involved in work, 1.9 million people in 2010 and 1.7 million people in 2011.

We can also take into account the number of issued work permits to reveal the number of foreign workers who are involved in labour activity. But this is not a complete picture. Because there are foreigners who work for individuals. They also must be taken into consideration. Their

<sup>1</sup> According to the data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service, from 1989 to 2006 over 1.1 million people left the country.

<sup>2</sup> While in 1993 the population size was 148.6 million people, by 2008 this rate declined to 142 million people.

<sup>3</sup> See: Report on the Development of Human Potential in the Russian Federation 2008. Russia Facing Demographic Challenges. Leading authors: A. G. Vishnevsky, S. N. Boblyov. Moscow, PROON, 2009.

<sup>4</sup> According to the data from the Federal Migration Service while the special state programme aimed at compatriots' coming back was in effect, from 2007 to 2011 about 62 thousand people moved for permanent residence to the Russian Federation. See: *Rossiyskaja Gazeta* (The Russian Newspaper) newspaper, the 16th of February, 2012, No. 33.

<sup>5</sup> According to official data in 2006 it for the first time fell almost to 50%, while the share of Russian people fell to 43% (see: Report on the Development of Human Potential in the Russian Federation 2008. Russia Facing Demographic Challenges, p. 26).

number can be counted with the help of patents which are given to foreigners who are employed by individuals. In 2010 129.7 thousand patents were granted, 810 thousand patents in 2011.

Also the highly skilled specialists who earn over 2 million roubles a year are left out of account. They get work permits without regard of quotas.

Besides, citizens of the Republic of Belarus who obtain employment in the Russian Federation on the same basis as citizens of Russia are made no reckoning of. And from 2012 a similar scheme is introduced for citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan. So no record will be kept of these foreigners either.

Also many foreign citizens use the Republic of Belarus as a transit country (possibly this is due to a cheaper flight) and then arrive in the Russian Federation by railway. There are no borders between Russia and Belarus, so no record is maintained of these foreigners either.

Basing on the above-stated facts we can conclude that in 2008-2011 according to statistics and data obtained from the Federal Migration Service and the Federal Security Service of Russia the Russian Federation is annually entered by from 5 to 6 million legal foreign workers to engage in labour activities.

It is estimated that the number of illegal migrants is about the same. As a result about 12 million foreign workers arrive in the Russian Federation annually.

## 2. Who is after Turkey's shores?

Migration processes which are taking place in our country all the more reflect Russia's involvement in the world economy. We can positively say that we have to struggle for our citizens. This struggle does not only embrace economic aspects (the welfare of certain categories of citizens) but also the social sphere (healthcare, education, the housing and utilities system, transport, culture, law and order).

Citizens of Russia annually leave the Russian Federation to engage in labour activities. Some stay abroad forever, some Russian people have temporary or seasonal jobs abroad. According to some data from the Federal Migration Service, 67.5 thousand Russian citizens left the country in 2011 to work abroad. With that, almost 90% of those who moved out of the country were males. And the age composition of the citizens who are moving out is roughly proportional in three basic age groups (18–29 years old, 30–39 years old, 40–49 years old) and is about 18 thousand people in each group.

If we consider the countries where Russian citizens go to in order to engage in labour activities we can notice an interesting trend.

Of 67.5 thousand people who left the country in 2011, almost 30 thousand left for the countries which give the free flag or allow concessional taxation for foreign capital. Among these countries are: Antigua and Barbuda – 2.2 thousand people, Liberia – 5.8 thousand people, Malta – 5.5 thousand people, Marshall Islands – 4.2 thousand people, Panama – 3, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines – 2 thousand people.

As a rule, these are countries which actively use the work of our sailors on ships bearing the flags of the countries mentioned above.

Also there are classical countries where Russian citizens go to in order to engage in labour activities: the USA – 6.5 thousand people, Germany – 2.7 thousand people, Cyprus – 8 thousand people, Greece – 1.3 thousand people, Spain – about 1 thousand people.

Mostly, the occupational composition of the Russian citizens who obtain employment abroad includes qualified workers, which can be seen in Table 1 below.

Table 1

**Occupational composition of Russian citizens obtaining employment abroad**

occupations	number of people
professionals in engineering, technology (engineers, technicians, mechanics, laboratory assistants, architects, town planners, planners of transport junctions)	13068
gas welders, oxygen-cutting operators, electric welders, electric and gas welders, welders (metal)	1260
sailors, skippers, assistant skippers, boat-swains	13523
engine-drivers of all spheres (including tractor drivers), motor operators and their assistants (sum pp. 40-42)	4051
sales clerks, waiters, bar-keepers, barmen	1671
electricians, electrical technicians	966

The statistics on the leaving citizens cannot be considered representative for it includes all those leaving the Russian Federation. Besides, it includes both citizens of the RF and citizens of other countries who crossed the borders of Russia before. It is also impossible to determine the purpose of these people's departures in this bulk.

Besides, these data are not always reliable and not all people inform that they are leaving for a foreign country to work. These materials contain information only about those who declared their wish to go abroad to work.

It has always been difficult to specify where citizens go to engage in labour activities. Citizens are often unwilling to convey this information.

Nevertheless, we can state the fact that due to the conditions of work and opportunities to realize themselves Russian citizens are more and more attracted to industrially developed countries of the West. The latter, encountering demographic problems as well as Russia try to actively engage young specialists in labour activities. For instance, Germany has introduced rather favourable migration regulations for those who would like to get higher education in German and then continue their professional career on the territory of that country. Norway, Finland and even East European countries – Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia – actively engage Russian specialists.

Thus, when forming migration policy it is necessary to take into account the current conflict between the task of retaining the resident population and the necessity to engage foreigners from developing countries in the Russian Federation. The first task presupposes the state's constant work with employers to create prospective workplaces of high quality (adequate remuneration of labour, highly skilled and productive labour while physical labour is to be replaced with intellectual labour, safe working conditions and a high level of social security). The second task, as a rule, is determined by engaging foreign workers in unskilled work with a low level of salary.

In the Russian Federation there are quite a lot of ineffective workplaces where people's salaries cannot ensure a minimum level of satisfying their essential needs. The data in table 2 show that in 2010 over 14.7 percent of citizens working in Russia got wages which were lower than the subsistence rate of working population. To a certain degree it can make people think about a possible leaving the country for permanent residence for countries with a higher standard of living.

Table 2

**The number and share of working people whose salaries are lower than the amount of subsistence rate of able-bodied population (in the Russian Federation generally)**

	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007	2009	2010
Number, thousands of people	38367.7	25892.6	19149.6	23800.0	13103.7	12229.4	12988.9
Share, %	43.6	28.7	21.2	26.4	14.6	13.7	14.7

Keeping economically ineffective workplaces without withdrawing them from circulation the state can considerably predetermine the situation of the native-born population leaving for more developed countries. In this case it is inevitable that serious ethnic and social conflicts can develop.

The uncontrolled foreign labour migration is dangerous not only because Russian citizens face competition at the labour market and due to lower cost of foreign labour force (first of all from countries of the CIS and from South-Eastern Asia) they can be driven out of the labour market, which makes them the working poor. Hereafter the state should find additional resources to finance various programmes supporting poor population. For instance, only expenses of the consolidated budget allocated for allowances in the range of subsidies for deficiency payments of households concerning the fees for housing and public utility services are over 52.9 billion roubles a year.

Unemployed families' sliding down to poverty and destitution leads to desocialization, increase in crime, drug addiction and alcoholism. After all, it makes a most negative impact on internal demographic processes.

It is also important to estimate the long-term effect of migration policy which involves receiving migrants for permanent residence and for the ensuing admission of them to the citizenship of the Russian Federation. As a rule, experts offer alternatives intended for low-skilled workers. However, it is not taken into account that such specialists are initially 'disadvantageous' for the state. This negative economic effect is due to the fact that such categories of migrants are badly-paid and they are ready for informal employment relationship. But when retiring the specialists whose salary is at a rate of a minimum wage or a little over it in case of having a certain length of employment will have a replacement rate of the wages lost at the level of no more than 3.8% of the minimum wage. This is just 0.38% of the minimum subsistence level of retirees (SLR).<sup>1</sup>

Thus, the state at the expense of the taxes of total coverage (i.e. in fact at the expense of other workers-residents) should bring the ratio of the old-age pension to the level of 100% of the minimum subsistence level of retirees. These are only future expenses of the State Pension Fund which even now has considerable deficit. Besides, such level of income will automatically include all the 'alien' poor retired people in entitlement programmes. This is an additional load on budgets of receiving regions.

Another issue which needs considering with certain attention given to resources of the Russian Federation when forming migration strategy is the load that migrants put on Russian healthcare system. It is no secret that today the population of the country is not satisfied with the quality and the range of medical services. It is an important element of creating comfortable conditions for the life of resident population. Besides, the state of medicine has a direct impact on demographic processes. Decline in the quality of medical services will influence negatively life expectancy. However, today Russian medical system is seriously loaded by migrants who arrive in our country. Here are a few rough estimates: the overall expenses of medical system on emergency medical services are

<sup>1</sup> To reach the level of the pension for a typical retiree the employment length of a migrant should be no shorter than 237 years!

8.17 billion roubles a year per 1,070,544 migrants who are registered within the quota in the Russian Federation. With a view to the fact that the number of illegal migrants is estimated to be up to 12 million people a year these expenses rise to a very considerable figure of 98.04 billion roubles. It must be taken into account that these are first of all expenses which subjects of the Russian Federation bear for non-working population (retirees, children, disabled people and other categories of citizens).

Certainly, this state of affairs to a considerable degree increases the workload on the existing system and can give rise to dissatisfaction of the population as in fact they pay for the medical service of 'alien' population.

Another theme is the influence of the processes of migration on resident population in terms of epidemiologic situation. Following the instructions from the Decree of the Government of the Russian Federation of 02.04.2003 No. 188 'On the list of infectious diseases posing a hazard for surrounding people and which can be reason for denial or revocation of temporary residence permit given to foreign citizens and people without citizenship, or a permanent residence permit, or labour permit in the Russian Federation' in 2011, according to the data from Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare, 1,070,877 foreign citizens and people without citizenship were examined for infectious diseases.

There were identified 6,114 people with infectious diseases which pose a hazard for surrounding people and which are reason for making a decision of undesirability of their stay in the Russian Federation, of them 2,653 people were ill with tuberculosis.

In 2011 the Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare made 1327 decisions of undesirability of stay in the Russian Federation for foreign citizens and people without citizenship from the CIS and non-CIS countries (altogether from 38 countries). Of them, citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan – 572, the Republic of Tajikistan – 220, the Ukraine – 112, the Kyrgyz Republic – 92, Azerbaijan – 63, the Republic of Moldova – 48, Armenia – 50.

Among other things, in view of their being ill with tuberculosis 238 citizens of the Republic of Uzbekistan, 212 citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan, 45 citizens of the Ukraine, 59 citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, 44 citizens of Azerbaijan, 32 citizens of the Republic of Moldova, 21 citizens of Armenia were declared to be undesirable visitors in the Russian Federation.

According to the data from the Federal Medical and Biological Agency of Russia in 2011 2,730 foreign citizens and people without citizenship were examined for infectious diseases, 3 cases of tuberculosis were exposed (2 citizens of Uzbekistan and 1 citizen of India). In 2011 the Federal Medical and Biological Agency of Russia made 5 decisions of undesirability of staying in the Russian Federation for foreign citizens and people without citizenship from the CIS and non-CIS countries, of them 4 citizens of Uzbekistan and 1 citizen of India.

In 2010 the epidemiologic situation in the world was complicated by registering a big outbreak of poliomyelitis caused by wild type poliovirus of the 1 type in the Republic of Tajikistan. Cases of poliomyelitis were also registered in the Republics of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan.

In view of the active migration of foreign citizens, first of all from the Republic of Tajikistan, a case of bringing the wild-type virus of poliomyelitis to the territory of the Russian Federation was registered in 2010 despite the undertaken preventive measures.

In recent years the analysis of frequency of cases of measles was evidence of the fact that the number of cases of measles in our country was steadily going down. The intensive incidence rate since 2007 has been less than 1 case per 1 million people. In 2010 measles was not registered in 78 of 83 subjects of the Russian Federation. The situation with measles took a turn for the worse in 2011, which was due to the rise of the incidence of measles in countries of the European region, and to bringing the infection to the territory of Russia. Cases of measles are mostly registered among adult population (those who were not vaccinated and were not ill before).

The rise in the number of cases of measles brought to the country is due to more intense internal and external migration flow in the country. While the share of cases of measles imported to the country in 2003–2004 was no higher than 1%, in 2011 it was 21.3%.

The incidence of measles in 2011 as compared to 2010 rose by 5 times and was 0.44 per 100 thousand people (2010 – 0.09). In the previous year 631 cases of measles in 30 subjects of the Russian Federation were registered. Over 64% of cases take place on the territory of North-Caucasian and Southern Federal Districts where the incidence of measles was registered in all subjects excluding Krasnodar Territory.

Of 6.58 billion people of the Earth about a half (3.30 billion) are at risk of being infected with malaria, among them 1.23 billion people are at high risk in underdeveloped countries of Africa, South-Eastern Asia and Latin America. Malaria affects from 300 to 500 million people and kills over 1 million children a year.

According to the data from the Global Malaria Programme of the World Health Organization at present 82 countries are high endemic and are at the stage of making efforts to eliminate malaria, 12 countries are in pre-elimination period, 16 countries have eliminated malaria on their territories and 27 countries obtained a status of 'malaria-free' ones, which is confirmed by the WHO certificate.

Russia falls within the group of countries directing efforts at preventing new cases of local transmission of malaria. For the first time in 14 years of registering 'subsequent to imported' and 'locally acquired' malaria cases in the Russian Federation in 2009 there were reported only cases of imported malaria, mostly its tropical form from hot countries. In 2011 there was a decrease in the number of new-onset malaria cases by 18.8% compared to 2010 when the case rate was 0.06 per 100 thousand people.

The main factors which further the spread of malaria throughout the world are intensive migrations of the population (air flights in particular), global climate changes (the rise in air temperatures and in the amount of precipitation), resistance of anopheles mosquitoes to insecticides and of malaria plasmodia to medicines.

From the 7th of July to the 15th of September in 2010 in the Russian Federation there were reported 448 laboratory-confirmed cases of West Nile encephalitis (WNE), 6 of them were fatal.

The largest number of people suffered from WNE in Volgograd, Rostov and Voronezh Oblasts. In Krasnodar Territory, the Kalmyk Republic, Astrakhan and Chelyabinsk Oblast' of the country there are reported single (no more than 10) cases.

Elderly people were predominant in the composition of those who fell ill. The cases of WNE were connected with mosquito bites, most often in recreation grounds and in summer cottages situated near waters.

The peak of WNE sick rate (by the dates of incidences of the disease) fell on the second and the third decades of August.

According to the results of advanced molecular-genetic analyses of the material drawn from ill people and infection carriers (the analyses were carried out using the facilities of leading research institutes of the Federal Service for Oversight of Consumer Protection and Welfare) it was stated that the virus which caused epidemic in the current year had been circulating on the territory of Rostov Oblast since 2004, and on the territory of Volgograd Oblast since 2007. The rise in incidence of the disease was provoked by cyclic changes in the biology of the causative agent with due regard for the anomalously hot weather in the summer of 2010.

In this regard it is necessary that the state should take as a whole the range of problems turning up when migration processes become more intensive. But any strategy should be based on the main condition: any migration policy should not breed problems for the native-born population and should not encourage them to search for a new place of residence, for example, in countries of West Europe, which are concerned about solving their demographic problems no less than we are.

### 3. Is all that quiet in Baghdad?

Considering the impact of migration processes we should mention the fact that Russia cannot look on the current state of affairs. Though our country remains attractive for citizens from the CIS states the latter still consider alternatives of working in other countries. Among the countries which can offer more favourable terms of employment are not only countries of the West, but, for instance, Kazakhstan.

What does research suggest? In the Republic of Belarus being left by a great number of people there was developed a programme to ensure security of those citizens leaving. The people were encouraged to think that it was necessary to declare their departure from the country for their own security. In the course of realising the programme it became possible to see where the people were going to work. These data show that in 2008 6.2 thousand people left the Republic for the reason of signed labour contracts, and 4.5 thousand people left the country in 2009. The majority of the citizens of the Republic of Belarus went to the Russian Federation – from 3 to 4 thousand people a year, some went to the USA – about 1.5 thousand people, and about 0.5–0 thousand people went to the Czech Republic, Poland, Lithuania, the United Arab Emirates and Germany.

As for the Republics of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan these countries are attracted by the spatial juxtaposition and cultural affinity of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation ranking second. Also for the republics of Central Asia – donor countries rich countries of the Near East – are attractive. But it is not always affordable for these categories of migrants. Foreign workers from these countries could also move to West Europe, but for the time being this niche is occupied by people coming from the Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland who can meet the requirements of employers from European countries and who are culturally close, unlike foreign workers from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan. For the time being workers from Central Asia are not able to meet competition in European countries. But no one can be sure that soon this group of migrants will not change the direction of their migration.

### 4. What is to be done?

The high rate of migration flows objectively puts numerous questions on the agenda.

The first question is how favourable for migrants is Russia? Why should we think about it? Well, at least because in Russia the share of people over 60 increased to 17% in 2006

(in 1960 – 9%). And this ratio is increasing.<sup>1</sup> And to be able to maintain retiring citizens we should now think of who will pay fees to State Pension Fund. Even with the best scenario in terms of demography we cannot do without migrants. It is estimated by experts that to provide economic growth it is necessary to engage up to 300 thousand migrants annually. First of all they mean those who could later become full-fledged citizens of the Russian Federation.

And this is the first dilemma: the rise in immigration flows undoubtedly exacerbates national and cultural clashes but at the same time it allows solving economic problems.<sup>2</sup>

We mentioned above that the first migration flow was connected with the big Homeland. A new wave of migrants will be totally different. According to the data from the Federal Security Service of Russia 24.2% of citizens coming from Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Tajikistan were born after 1986.<sup>3</sup> I.e. this is a growing group of people whose Russian language is poor, who did not study Russian culture and history at school. Moreover, this group also has a new understanding of religious values.

In this context there appear a number of serious problems which put on the agenda the development of an effective state programme promoting adaptation of those willing to be admitted to Russian citizenship.

This programme must include several important sets: of cultural adaptation, of professional training and certification of qualifications, of social maintenance.

The first set is supposed to ensure the migrants' learning of the Russian language, immersing in the Russian culture and history, being informed about the Russian legal framework. Certainly, such a programme should also deal with encouraging foreign students to get quality education in Russian educational establishments, in the first turn establishments of technical sciences (training them to be workers and engineers).

The second set should ensure career guidance for foreign citizens, possibilities to obtain necessary and economically sought-for qualifications in Russian vocational schools. It is also supposed to help migrants who have some professional knowledge to confirm their qualifications in the system of state certification. The latter is of no less importance because it is necessary both for employers and for employees to be absolutely sure that the labour relations they start will be stable and profitable for both sides.

The third set is linked with the system of state social guarantees which our country is ready to offer to people who want to become its citizens. In this context it is necessary to revise the legislation to a certain extent. It would allow introducing a system of compulsory health insurance, social insurance in case of their temporary disability (perhaps with applying a limit of responsibility concerning the terms and the amount), industrial accident insurance and programmes of pension insurance for citizens who have temporary and permanent residence permits.

When forming a policy aimed at engaging migrants, it is necessary to highlight another point which is of utmost importance in our view: the Russian Federation should see the problem of the so-called 'second' transition when the decline in the overall birth-rate is first of all due to the problem of rise in the share of urban population. In this context engaging migrants to make up for the natural decline in population should be mainly aimed at engaging migrants who want to choose the Russian Federation as a place of their permanent residence in rural areas. Regions of Siberia and the Far East are particularly favourable from this point of view.

Economically, this project is advantageous for a number of reasons. Firstly, in rural areas there are still some abandoned (derelict) housing facilities left. Secondly, agriculture can give employment to low-skilled people. Thirdly, part-time farming and offering derelict lands to start an agricultural business make it cheaper for the state to create new workplaces for this category of citizens. Fourthly, forming rural communities does not put excessive cultural and ethnic pressure on urban agglomerations and does not exert excessive pressure on labour market. Fifthly, the development of rural areas in Siberia can cut the transport costs of delivery of food to big Siberian cities. Sixthly, retirement in rural areas is much cheaper than in cities. It is due to the fact that the cost of life necessities (electric power, heating, communications, transport, etc) is higher in cities<sup>4</sup>. And finally, new citizens' settlements in the areas mentioned above will later allow us to speed up the development of new industrial projects in the Far East and maintain transport infrastructure.

Without going into detail of ways of realising the tasks mentioned above I would like to conclude by referring to a vital fact: solving antagonism and conflicts of migration processes can be ensured only by way of taking into comprehensive consideration all economic, social, cultural and national factors.

<sup>1</sup> In the USA, the share of this age group in the population is 17%, 22% in the European Union, 27% in Japan. It is predicted that by 2025 the share of people over 69 will reach 23% in the Russian Federation, i.e. it will exceed the current European rate. At the same time the share of elderly people over 80 will be increasing.

<sup>2</sup> 'There are limits for migration capacity of any country; these limits are due to the limited opportunities of social adaptation in countries receiving immigrants who are bearers of different cultural traditions, stereotypes, etc. While such immigrants are few in number it does not take them a long time to assimilate in the local cultural environment, they blend with it and no serious problems of cross-cultural interaction emerge. When the absolute and the algebraic number of immigrants is considerable and, most importantly, increases fast they form in the receiving countries more or less compacted socio-cultural enclaves, assimilation processes become slower and there arises cross-cultural tension aggravated by the objectively existing economic and social inequality of 'local' and 'alien' population... What has been said can fully be referred to Russia: as well as other countries which have experienced a demographic transition it needs migrants, it feels the migratory pressure from without and cannot but feel the objective limits of its migration capacity. As everywhere they are due to the situation in the labour market and, in particular, with the throughput capacity of adaptation and assimilation mechanisms and the speed of adaptation, social and cultural integration of migrants'. See: The Population of Russia 2002. The Tenth Annual Report on Demography. Edited by A.G. Vishnevsky. Moscow, KDU, 2004, pp. 209–210.

<sup>3</sup> See *Kommersant* (Businessman) newspaper, No. 18, 02.02.1012.

<sup>4</sup> According to the data from the Russian Federal State Statistics Service in the cost of ultimate consumption of households in 2009 the cost of services in rural areas was 17%, and in urban areas 27.6%. With that in absolute figures the cost of food and non-food goods for households situated in rural areas was lower than for households situated in urban areas: 2,880.2 roubles and, respectively 3,419.5 roubles, 2,054.7 and 3,733.9 roubles.

Marc Scheuer<sup>1</sup>

## DIALOGUE OF CULTURES UNDER GLOBALIZATION

The theme of this 12<sup>th</sup> annual conference resonates particularly well with the mission of the Alliance of Civilizations, which I would summarily describe as follows: to improve understanding and cooperation among nations and people, to reduce polarization, and to build more inclusive societies, at local and global levels, in which the resources of cultural and religious diversity are harnessed for development and peace.

There are probably as many definitions of Globalization as there are participants in our Conference. Yet, most of us would agree, I guess, in recognizing the following features as important to our understanding of that phenomenon: high levels of interconnectedness and interdependence, endless scientific and technical innovation, massive migration as a major source of ever-increasing diversity, an accelerating tempo. We live in a world without borders, exposed to global risks (from economic and financial crises to global warming), and struggling with the notion of a common agenda with collective responsibilities for world citizens, sharing a common humanity. We increasingly realize that, as precious as they are, our local identities must be supplemented with a variety of other connections, in order for us to understand the world we live in and to contribute to its advancement.

Some see this globalizing stage of human history as announcing or positing ‘the end of the prehistory of mankind’, a very long period made of ‘identity-based tensions, blinding ethnocentricity, and a selfishness which is held to be sacred, whether based on country, community, culture, ideology, or something else’<sup>2</sup>. Or, with more of an every-day vocabulary, they insist that our collective well-being as humans now depends on our capacity to revisit the ways we operate in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ and to significantly enrich the complexity of our affiliations<sup>3</sup>, in order to understand and address challenges and opportunities, which have become global. This is pretty much what intercultural dialogue under Globalization is about, in reality.

I intend to make a few comments and observations in that respect, drawing on the latest Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, held in Doha in December 2011. Bringing together 2500 participants from all walks of life, the Forum devoted a lot of attention to the link between a properly harnessed cultural diversity and development, including in particular the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. By and large, it was found that this is a neglected link – some even spoke of a ‘missing link’ – which still attracts far too little policy attention.

Corporate leaders recalled that diverse companies and teams are much more innovative than more homogenous groups. Political leaders underscored the benefits of the huge lending and borrowing at work in terms of technical know-how and cultural practices. The importance of diasporas was underlined, in strengthening links between societies, but also in helping nation building back home, or in solving conflicts in the region of origin (though evidence seems to me still scarce in this respect).

At the same time, it was abundantly acknowledged that building successfully on such diversity requires a lot of atten-

tion: one needs to prepare the minds, to bring about visions of shared societies, to defeat stereotyping and intolerance, and to secure enough common values across cultures to achieve overall social cohesion and harmony. One needs also to seriously address the hard issues of justice, access and participation, which are beyond many of the tensions and conflicts of our world; probably much more so than issues of culture and religion.

By way of example, participants looked at the current state of mutual perceptions by ‘Muslims’ and ‘Westerners’, 10 years after 9/11, as tensions in so-called ‘West-Muslim’ relations had played a decisive role in the creation of the Alliance of Civilizations. Gallup and Pew surveys showed that, while there is some improvement in perceptions of Muslims in Western societies, negative views about Westerners have increased in predominantly Muslim societies, and a lack of respect for Muslims is a too frequent complaint everywhere. Some suggested that a mentality of victimhood may be at play here and they stressed the danger for Muslims in the West to define themselves – or let be defined – through the prism of Islamophobia. Other – Muslim – participants hinted to the need for some Muslim-majority societies ‘to put their house in order’. Yet, all panelists across the board agreed that a populist narrative runs through many Western societies, resulting in shocking discrimination and unacceptable treatment. Often, a negative cultural layer is added to unaddressed or poorly addressed social, economic or political difficulties, making living together in diversity much more elusive. Though this has in the meantime become an increasingly difficult and sometime distressing issue, as in the case of Syria, the political transformation in MENA countries was seen as a great opportunity for rebuilding relations between the West and the Islamic World, provided Europe and the US do not patronize the ‘Arab Spring’, do not export ‘models’ and respect electoral results.

This is only one example. Many others could be quoted. And yet, as underlined by the High Representative for the Alliance of Civilizations, President Jorge Sampaio, ‘diverse societies do not have to be divided. Cultural and religious diversity does not produce conflicts, unless they are hardened by discrimination, or unless prejudice and stereotyping perpetuate marginalization.’

One of the main objectives of intercultural dialogue is to fill the concerning trust and tolerance deficit, which is showing in so many situations.

This often takes responsible leadership. Leaders can make a difference. With the courage of fostering dialogue and securing human rights, which is not only right but smart, they can break vicious circles as claimed in the cases of Indonesia or Colombia. The creation of a Global Movement of Moderates by the Malaysian authorities may be seen as another example of such leadership.

Faith and the dialogue among faiths are also part of the solution in a world, in which 4 Billion people are reported to strongly connect to a religion. Initiatives by religious leaders and faith based movements to support humanitarian efforts, development and conflict resolution deserve recognition. The same goes for moves designed to encourage diverse national societies to define a common good for all, irrespective of religious affiliations. Securing freedom of religion for all and promoting non discriminatory treatment of all citizens are important aspects of an intercultural and inter-religious dialogue that delivers change on the ground. That dialogue does not seek or propose any syncretism. Rather, it builds on the common moral values that underpin the various religions, starting with the famous ‘golden rule’.

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<sup>2</sup> Amin Maalouf, *Le dérèglement du monde*. 2009. English by George Miller: Bloomsbury.

<sup>3</sup> Paul R. Ehrlich, Robert E. Ormstein, *Humanity on a Tightrope*, 2010.

Education, of course, is central in creating the trust that we need. Education is not about forcing on everyone a particular world perspective. It is about creating talents and skills that will allow citizens to value diversity. In a globalized world, sustainable development posits constructive interactions with a great diversity of others. This must be facilitated through education systems that promote openness to other cultures and religions, universal human rights and a deep sense of equal dignity in a shared humanity, as well as an understanding of what it takes to be a citizen. The role of history teaching in reconciliation efforts was underlined. Tourism and exchanges of young people must also be promoted, notably through lifting or reducing visa requirements.

The Forum took note with great interest of a range of projects presented by the Pitirin Sorokin – Nikolai Kondratieff International Institute, supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, which purport to mobilize human knowledge and research, across cultures, in order to best address the challenges of our globalized world in the 21st century. The idea is to lay down the “scientific foundations for a long term strategy for global sustainable develop-

ment, based on a partnership of civilizations”. The important upcoming UN Conference on Sustainable Development RIO + 20 (June 2012) would serve as a platform to present that vision. In addition, a long term program entitled “Revolution in Education as a Bridge to a Sustainable Future of Civilizations” is under development. It is expected to be presented at the Fifth Global Forum of the Alliance of Civilizations, to be held in Vienna in February 2013.

Time and space do not allow for more elaboration. I would only mention here the broad agreement on a need for a better communication on Migration issues and in particular on the positive contribution of migrants, both to the receiving and departing countries. In the same vein, a lot of attention was paid to the challenges of cross-cultural reporting by journalists and how media can do a better job in addressing stereotyping.

The next step for the Alliance of Civilizations, and indeed for all who share the ambition expressed by this Likhachov Conference, is to reach out beyond the circle of the ‘converted’, to reach out to the Millions, in order for the necessary dialogue of cultures to reach the required scale. Let us reflect on how this can be best achieved.

## Eberhard Schneider<sup>1</sup>

### MULTICULTURALISM IN GERMANY

Germany needs multiculturalism because the fifth part of its population has a migratory background. These are people who have been migrating to Germany since 1950 or their descendants.

11 million people, or 13% of the country’s population have their own experience of migration. German citizens with a migratory background make up the following hierarchy by the countries of their origin: Turkey with 1.5% of migrants is on the top of the list, it is followed by Poland (508 000 people), the Russian Federation (445 000 people) and Italy (433 000 people). By largest cultural regions the list is as follows: Europe is on the first place as the region of origin – 54%, the whole Europe, not only European Union. The second place is occupied by Australia and Oceania – 11%. The significant part is made up by countries of the Near and Middle East, and also by countries of South and South-East Asia. In the majority of large German cities there live representatives of more than 150 ethnic groups.

The experience of multiculturalism is becoming more intense within the more lengthy coexistence. In 2008 more than three fourths of people with their own migration experience had lived for minimum 9 years in Germany, two fifth – for more than 20 years. The closest experience of multiculturalism is obtained within bicultural marriages. While only a bit more than half of the population were married without a migratory background, for the population with a migratory background the result was 60%.

People with a migratory background not only get married more often, but also have a higher birth rate – 36%, while among the native population only 22 families out of 100 have children.

Nowadays, Chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel’s statement is often quoted that the doctrine of multiculturalism in Germany has failed. She meant an attempt simply to live together in a multicultural society. No society belonging to different cultures can emerge from plain next-door

living of members of different cultures or from a summary of cultures, because in reality separate cultures including the domineering German culture are not taken into account in this way.

It is rather an integration meaning ‘participation’ and not ‘assimilation’ that is required, which could be the task for the native culture. Multiculturalism has two sides: the majority culture representatives must be ready to let the minority cultures representatives to participate, and not just to be physically present in the society. Mayor of Berlin Klaus Woowereit insists that in a multicultural society the accent should be placed on something that unites, not on something that divides, otherwise ‘one day Germany will be composed of only minorities that fight’. ‘The climate of openness and respect’ is essential so that everyone could fulfil him/herself limitlessly within a multicultural society.

The German Federal Government worked out 64 criteria to measure integration. They include legal status, education in early childhood and language assistance, education and integration into the work force market, social integration and income, public integration, living conditions and health, intercultural opening of services, offices and economics, and also crime, violence and hostility towards foreigners.

The second report on integration indicators had the following results.

A good two thirds of migrants living in Germany from 5 to 10 years, in 2010 had rights for long-term residence, but only 2% got the right for citizenship.

Only 12% of children with a migratory background aged less than 3 years went to nursery and day-care facilities, those without a migratory background – 28%, i.e. twice as many. In the age group from 3 to 6 years the figures came nearer: in the families of migrants – 86%, natives – 95%. In the sphere of education the lag of the young migrants is unfortunately noted, they not only leave school without graduating it twice as often, but gain high performance in school education less frequently as well.

Labour activity and unemployment depend mainly on the current state of affairs. Meanwhile the unemployment rate was coming down both in the whole country and among the foreign population. But the truth is unemployment was twice higher

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among the foreigners that among the Germans in 2010. (All foreign population was taken into account in this factor.) The good news is that the number of entrepreneurs among the migrants is as high as among the Germans.

The integration process is complicated significantly by the low incomes. The population with a migratory background has twice as high poverty risk factor compared to the native population: 26% and 12%, respectively. The number of foreigners who got the minimum state financial allowance in 2010 was twice as high as the total population's. (All foreign population was taken into account in this factor.)

Political interest and involvement into the parties, whistle-blowing or municipal politics is only twice less popular among the population with a migratory background in comparison with the native population. Unfortunately, up to now the migrants who have lived in Germany for a long time but have not got a citizenship so far did not succeed in obtaining the right to participate in the municipal elections. This could have heightened their interest in the political life of the country.

An important sign of the life quality is the provision with a sufficient, high quality and reasonable price home accommodation. Immigrants on average have smaller living space than the population as a whole. Population with a migratory background pay on average 30 cents more for one square meter of the rented space compared to the native population. It is not accounted for by the higher level of the rented accommodation in the cities which are frequent residence places of the people with a migratory background.

These differences are also applied to the health control: children of the migrants aged from 2 to 7 take all the preventa-

tive examinations for the early age 10% less than the children of German population.

Foreign workers employment for government service (10%) is almost twice less than that of the population without a migratory background (18%).

Crime, violence and discrimination make the integration process more complicated. Unfortunately, the foreign population crime rate with 5.3% was twice as high as the rate of all the population of the republic. (All foreign population was taken into account in this factor.) Anti-Semitic, hostile towards foreigners and racist acts of violence reached the lowest rate in 2010 in the last decade. At the same time the statistics of these crimes is still unacceptable.

Not long ago serial murders gained publicity: in the course of recent years 8 Turkish and one Greek small businessmen and one German police officer were assassinated by the members of a national socialist underground organization. It had not been discovered for a long time because the German security services classified these murders as separate economic offences, which unfortunately shows not enough coordinated cooperation of different security services of Germany.

Two years ago Berlin, as the first and up to now the only federal land, passed the Law of participation where integration is defined as the process that concerns all the society. The first paragraph of this law reads that people with a migratory background should be given an opportunity to have equal rights for the participation in all spheres of the social life of the country.

I would like to conclude with the words of the Federal President of Germany Johannes Rau which he said in 2001: integration of foreigners is 'the question of the country's destiny', integration is a very long process.

E. N. Shapinskaya<sup>1</sup>

## THE ETHNIC OTHER IN A MULTICULTURAL SPACE

Ethno-cultural identity is attracting attention of researchers from different socio-humanitarian areas. And in the context of current cultural practices, a lot of features of the Other as an ethno-cultural community representative are not being rejected any more, but incorporated into the 'mainstream' culture. It is required that the ethnic identity problem be reconsidered in line with the current cultural practices and tendencies, as Russia is entering the 21st century global space. On the one hand, the rejection of the Other, with the traces of the traditional enemy image, is not a rare thing today. It is historically developed stereotypes that play an important role in this situation; these stereotypes come from Russian history, with the public mentality quite ruthless to the 'infidels' because of its persistent resistance to 'Westernist' reforms. On the other hand, the Other is being 'embezzled', especially so in mass culture which easily borrows cultural forms recently considered 'exotic', bewildering or ridiculous. Examples to this are abundant in fashion, cooking, music and recreation activities. Indeed, what is ethnicity as a feature of the Other? It is fairly difficult to come up with an unambiguous answer; ethnic studies are heterogeneous in their approaches. Not all ethnic subcultures are perceived as the Other. To illustrate this we may refer to the Rus-

sian Northland subculture, which self-identity is high; but it is not taken for the culture of the Other by Russia's other population groups.

Ethnic studies put an emphasis on heterogeneity, difference, specificity, 'otherness'. The discourse of ethnicity is 'the voice of the Other', which enters into complex relations with the discourse strategies of socio-cultural space. It is the shift of the Other's position in culture of the last decades that has raised the problem of ethnicity as of the Other's Voice with its full right to exist in the pluralistic world of modern culture.

Ethnic identity studies pay a considerable attention to the manifestation of ethnic identity in everyday culture that becomes a complex interaction of different influences, borrowings, incorporations, where the notion of the Other is melting or, at least, losing its clear-cut configurations. As multiculturalism is expanding, this is being more and more detected in Russia with its riot growth of megalopolises, which become more and more multiethnic, at least in their consumption. Entertainment industry, with the world of its own, makes another example of ethnic specificity 'being dissolved' in the common cultural space. Here, ethnic identities come out as simulacra, absorbed by consumers as artefacts.

With numerous examples of the 'Other's' culture being dissolved in the modern (or rather postmodern) cultural space, which suggests pluralism and divergence by its definition, it would be most natural to come to the conclusion that the problem of ethnic identity as 'otherness' is removed in the context of a new cultural space establishment. However, this issue is more complex than that; and we may come across very different strategies and reflections in the survey of different socio-cultural processes and their relevant theoretical patterning.

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Culture studies based on postmodern philosophy conceptualize 'diversities', marginal cultures and minorities in terms of fictionality, fragmentation, collage and eclecticism inspired with imbalance and chaos. Approached from this angle, the marginal communities' problem loses its distinctive character and becomes just a fragment in a common cultural collage. At the same time, both in the everyday life of culture and in theoretical thought, we are witnessing other processes unfold. These processes are connected with the intensifying voice of marginal cultures, which are not satisfied with the chance to commercialize their identity or to incorporate its fragments into a dominant culture. The majority of intellectual reflections and theories, targeted to determine the borders of identity, are produced within these identities themselves; and these theories and reflections start a controversy with an egalitarian beat of globalistic aspiration.

It can be assumed that the transition to the information society has considerably changed the very concept of 'Other', extensively established under the lack of knowledge about this very Other. This is especially significant in case with an ethnic Other, whose picture resolved to very exotic images due to the distance and the lack of knowledge. With the development of informational technologies, the increased tempo of movement in space, and, as the result, the massification of tourism, and the vast amount of media production dealing with the description of different cultures, the Other started to transform, to get closer and also fragmented – to allocate certain aspects of its 'otherness' in the global culture common mosaic. All this has brought about many hybrid forms of culture, which have entered the daily lifestyle of the (post)modern human. And these forms, with their initial meaning lost or symbiosed with other meanings, cannot be conceived in an authentic cultural context.

The existence of the Other in the global information society has yet another significant aspect. It is a change in position and property of the Other, of the Other's view of himself and of another player who becomes an Other as they relocate. The things that seem 'other' to us – the objects of our knowledge, curiosity or desire – are, at the same time, a representation of our own self, which takes the image of the Other. It makes itself look exotic when it seems economically sound, but it preserves its authenticity within its own context.

Self-contained, but not compelled to deliver its ethnicity to the total market to be consumed, the Other remains self-sufficient; and the 'western' components, borrowed for a more efficient cooperation with the western culture, remain the ex-

ternal markers of the adaptation to the current reality. There is yet another issue put forward by this situation. If 'otherness' has become an easily available article of consumption, at the same time retaining its identity within a local context, is it at all possible to talk about 'otherness' in the age when all secrets of 'the Other' are disclosed (if it is possible) by unlimited access to information? In answering this question, it should be taken into consideration that the 'Other' is only possible in its certain relation to 'One's own' – whether the subject-object relations or power relations or acquisition-rejection relations. With opposition deconstructed, the Other and the Same become hierarchy-wise equal categories in the framework of intersubjectivity and infinite differences. There are new 'virtual communities' created with the help from the Internet. They are new cultural spaces, where 'the others' and 'the same' are identified according to their personal wish, but not to some preliminary-set pattern (ethnicity, gender etc.). Within this space there are new differences established. It happens so because it is in the nature of 'the Other' to emerge in a space where the former 'otherness' seems to have been dissolved in information superhighway. There are several representation patterns of 'the Other' that come into existence. On the one hand, 'otherness' is stated as 'self'; on the other hand, it is the blurring of 'otherness' that is taking place in the interactive media space, where it becomes a component in general virtual reality. However, 'dissolution' is just a metaphor, for 'otherness' keeps coming back and attaches new meaning to ethno-cultural myths. The Other establishes itself notwithstanding all the consumer society strategies. This happens because the society's collective 'we' needs this to exist. A traditional exotic 'Other' remains attractive even in a cultural industry wrapping. The multiple images of ethno-cultural Other do not so much represent the reality, but rather make up a configuration, based on the ideas of a human from multimedia and global space. These ideas are based on stereotypes of ethnicity because they are more fit for consumption, but not because they correspond to reality.

In Russia, a fragmentation of the Other's image is also taking place. The society has to reconsider multiple ethnic stereotypes and generate a new attitude to the ethnic Other, both inside and outside the country. The society also has to learn to see itself through the eyes of 'the Other'. Without these steps, clashes and the lack of understanding are inevitable. The examples are numerous of how urgent the issue of the Ethnic Other in the new century's culture is. It only shows a big research potential of the related issues.

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## SOCIAL SCIENCES AND THE HUMANITIES AS FACTOR OF STRENGTHENING THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES BETWEEN THE UKRAINE AND RUSSIA

In modern conditions, social sciences and the humanities appear a most important factor in the enhancement of the dialogue of cultures, which becomes a form of human coexistence in the 21st century and involves an active exchange of partner cultures' content while preserving their identity. It is culture that proves to be most susceptible to the manifestations of globalization and modernization because in a globalized world, its representatives should be protected from levelling and from the threat of extinction. However, a cultural exchange suggests not only sharing masterpieces of material culture, but also scientific ideas, patterns of behaviour, values and norms of everyday life. In this way, the synthesis of cultures makes the social and cultural systems imbibe the experiences of different societies, while maintaining their own foundation and independence.

### 1. Social and humanitarian discourse of the Ukrainian-Russian relations

The dialogue of the Ukrainian and Russian cultures has century-long history. The objective of social sciences and the humanities is to revive the parties' equality in the dialogue by eliminating mutual distrust, stereotypes, and squaring historical accounts. With that in mind, the cooperation between the two countries should be aimed at preservation and creation of common values, further development of the comprehensive relationships between the peoples of the Ukraine and Russia in the context of sharing historically established cultural and information space. Institutes of civil society are intended to reset the atmosphere of a creative dialogue, to promote reciprocal enrichment and to encourage sharing spiritual heritage, unique intellectual potential, which will eventually contribute to comprehensive economic and cultural progress of our countries. It is important to further develop cultural peculiarities; to establish contacts between educational institutions; to encourage learning of the Russian language and Russia in the Ukraine as well as the Ukrainian language and the Ukraine in Russia;

to arrange joint events in honour of prominent people of science and culture; to support scientific and cultural exchange of young people; to study together 'sensitive' periods in the history of our peoples to prevent some political forces from heating up tension in the bilateral relations.

The society where knowledge and information dominate poses new challenges and at the same time opens enormous possibilities for the countries of the post-Soviet space. Social sciences and the humanities being capable of the humanistic study of man and society are to direct efforts of the people and representatives of the élite in these countries to consolidate and integrate them in the world community. This can be achieved through deep understanding of the place of the man in global evolution of the world system, of inevitable scientifically based future, as well as through comprehensive study of the solutions of vital problems of the mankind.

In recent years, the Ukraine and Russia have paid special attention to long-term projects of social and political development. Evidence of this, in particular, is the Concept of humanitarian development of the Ukraine up to 2020 initiated by academicians of the National academy of science of the Ukraine V. Geets, A. Onishchenko, V. Smoly, Yu. Levenets, N. Zhulinsky, M. Popovich, V. Vorona and other leading scientists of the section of social sciences and the humanities. Among key issues aimed at implementing the Concept, attention is drawn to educating conscientious citizens of the country, which involves: (1) participation in the affairs of the state and society, overcoming populist trends in national policy, education of patriotism and belonging to the historical destiny of the country; (2) consolidation of the society on a democratic basis, overcoming disintegration of values and norms, social inequality, ensuring political accountability of public officials; (3) formation of the middle class as the basis of social and economic stability, improvement of social and cultural environment through protection of every member of the society and practising healthy lifestyles, and (4) development of youth policy in order to create preconditions for active and optimistic approach to life on the part of young citizens of the Ukraine, providing opportunities for the youth to employ their professional knowledge and innate abilities; (5) innovative development and formation of knowledge economy, which implies innovation as a strategic priority for the next decades, effective use of intellectual potential as a competitive advantage in the modern market society, education of the individual able to act independently and acquire appropriate technology skills; and (6) systemic development of humanitarian cooperation of the Ukraine in science with the focus on democratic values, market economy, rule of law, strengthening cooperation within the framework of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In science and education, the Concept advocates openness to the whole world by cultural exchange, exchange of knowledge, experience, values, best practices of development of educational and cultural institutions, dissemination of advanced knowledge, protection of human rights.

President of the Ukrainian National Academy of Science Boris Paton stressed the importance of developing Russo-Ukrainian relations. In his opinion, the relations between the two countries should be meaningful, targeted at modern achievements in science. He thinks that science, education and technology are the basis of innovative society with the rule of knowledge. Hence, cooperation between Russia and the Ukraine in the sphere is one of the most significant directions

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of their strategic collaboration. Meanwhile, on June 17, 2009 the Supreme Council of the Ukraine conducted hearings of 'Strategy of innovative development of the Ukraine for 2010–2020 in the context of globalized challenges' which is mainly technocratic in character. Similar technocratic tendency takes place in Russia, too. Accordingly, in order to make most use of this important segment of social development representatives of social and human sciences and courses in both countries should consolidate efforts so as to influence the current situation.

## **2. Objective prerequisites of the development of modern social sciences and the humanities in the post-Soviet space of the Ukraine and Russia**

Today innovations are not only a criterion of the level of economic development, but they also permeate all aspects of social activity and suggest a certain way of life of the society and of an individual. It is impossible to provide a consistent and effective improvement of public institutions without treating innovative development comprehensively. Steady progress of innovative policy means its transformation into independent national projects in Russia and in the Ukraine, which involves the formation of a new élite, as well as of individuals capable of making independent decisions, and favourable daily activities. It is in this process that social sciences and the humanities can appear helpful in their exceptional ability to form the following social orientations.

First, international experience shows that a comprehensive system development of social and humanitarian education can formulate a philosophy of advancing enlightenment, cultivate a taste for the creation of new meanings, can restore interest in the problems of the future lost by the community. The system of social and humanitarian education supported by the state and its institutions can not only create democratic mechanisms and protect human rights, but also has the potential to return to the society a sense of the evolutionary rhythm and continuity of existence.

Second, in the '60s–'70s of the last century, Arnold Toynbee and Daisaku Ikeda highlighted in their well-known dialogue the need to reorient education from technological advances to the development of ethical behaviour of people, to ensuring the integrity of the personality. It is what will allow overcoming greed, corruption, aggression, and ideological biases in the present conditions.

Third, only social and humanitarian disciplines are able to provide the following: social self-consciousness, consequences of choosing one or another political system; comprehensive understanding of the complexities of political life, ability to distinguish and overcome negative tendencies of social development; a developed system of political socialization of a person, engagement of an individual in the complex and controversial world of political relations; creation of human values system (freedom, justice, honour and civic responsibility).

Studies of the Ukrainian and Russian scientists suggest the proximity of the problems that relate to improving the systems of social and humanitarian education in the former Soviet republics. These problems, in particular, include:

1. Improving the grading system at universities. This system should not mean simple reproduction of the information received in class. It should include wider criteria of professional aptitude, such as ability to apply obtained knowledge, professional ethics and morals, strategies of behaviour.

2. Bridging the artificial gap between public and private universities. It is necessary to convince young people to choose a higher school judging by the level of education this school can provide rather than by its name or its faked status. State programs supporting promising private educational institutions would be of help here.

3. Building a unified education system and eliminating industry-sponsored institutions, which train specialists far beyond the scope of the sponsor-branches. In particular, legal education suffers serious distortions due to double subordination. For example, in the Ukraine there is an excess of law graduates trained by the universities reporting to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but their field of knowledge is limited and they are unable to deal with the problems of the administrative reform or to handle administrative law and the issues of the executive power.

4. Bringing students closer to places of their residence. This problem can be solved through incentives, flexible loans and grants to fund the construction of university campuses similar to Western ones. This approach can acquaint young people with the idea of an organized society, a new social order based on large-scale thinking, lifelong learning, flexible and adequate response to social changes, spiritual unity and self-organization. Such campuses in the Ukraine and Russia could promote student exchange in liberal arts, as is the case in the developed Western countries. Informal relationship will promote rapprochement of the younger generation of both countries and will ensure friendly relations of Ukrainians and Russians in the long term.

## **3. Law and Politics Education in the Context of Deepening Bilateral Development**

Taking into account the above mentioned objective prerequisites for the development of modern social sciences and the humanities, let us focus on the possibilities of law and politics education as a factor to further the dialogue between the two countries relying on the experience of teaching these disciplines in the Ukraine today. This question is of particular importance due to the fact that these key disciplines contribute to understanding value systems of the Ukrainian and Russian cultures, offer ample opportunities to overcome stereotypes, to combine national and international features.

In teaching law, the long-felt need of overcoming dehumanization of legal profession has become evident both in the Ukraine and Russia. This need stems from the fact that in early '90s of the last century when taking the path of radical social and political reform, we, on the one hand, did not take into account the burden of unique and diverse processes and problems that fell on the shoulders of people throughout the former Soviet Union. Negative social manifestations primarily include legal nihilism; exaggerated individualism with no due respect for the individual; servility, loss of the sense of responsibility for the lives of future generations; uncontrolled information flow, corruption on an unprecedented scale, dehumanization of social relations and government agencies. On the other hand, making generalization and planting phenomena of a different social reality into a unique national soil, we, at the same time, have lost sight of the true nature of people's lives.

In these conditions, sluices have opened so that various ways of manipulating consciousness of people have become possible. We regret to admit that law as one of intellectual activities has played a significant part in this process. A great number of young people rushed to get legal education with self-centred intentions. Moreover, this steady respect for legal career is based not on its special role, but on the perceived profits of those working in revenue agencies, law enforcement bodies, shady legal firms and companies, etc. All this diminishes moral qualities of those who consciously choose the career of a lawyer.

However, law education has changed greatly. Courses on the philosophy of law, comparative law, history of the state and law have been revised. It is necessary to increase the share of these subjects in the curriculum due to their special role in overcoming narrow functional view of law administering and their ample opportunities for collaboration between law

theoreticians in the Ukraine and Russia. For such cooperation, establishment of national schools of comparative law has already proved fruitful. It is also possible to develop joint courses on the philosophy of law and history of the state and law. This is facilitated by the work of the national academic schools in both countries. The Ukraine and Russia can be rightfully proud of their well-known scientists, such as F. Prokopovich, Ya. Kozelsky, S. Desnitsky, N. Kostomarov, K. Nevolin, I. Pokrovsky, M. Dragomanov, M. Kovalevsky, I. Petrunkevich, P. Yurkevich, B. Kistyakowsky, etc.

The urgent need to harmonize legal education with everyday problems under market conditions involves improvement of practical training in the field. It is evident that today the model of training a 'universal lawyer' should be replaced with a new one aimed at the development of market relations. The process will include case study of administering law; mock trials; simulations of legal procedures (licences, property registration); including in the curricula special courses of legislative methods, settlement of disputes, signing contracts; procedures in higher courts; drafting elaborate legal papers (for example, appeals). It is also essential to reform cardinally the system of in-house training and internships by inviting private companies, legal firms, lawyers' offices and notaries for effective cooperation on a contract basis. In the context of the dialogue of cultures it is of great practical importance to update the regulatory and legal framework of cooperation between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation based on clear vision and understanding of common strategic interests, as well as on the joint creation of the favourable national and international context for the development of our countries in the short and long term perspective. This urgent problem goes along with the need of making a revision of the problems which require a regulatory and legal solution. These are such issues, for example, as ensuring freedom of migration, capital flow, relocation of services and goods; cooperation between education institutions, establishment of youth exchanges, cultural ties.

In the early '90s of the last century, the experience of leading Russian scientists served as a decisive factor in the formation of political science in the Ukraine. Within fifteen years when political knowledge in the Ukraine was promoted, political science established itself as an equal part of social science and the humanities in higher institutions. The evidence to it is the publication of dozens of textbooks and teaching manuals by local authors; the opening of the faculties or departments for training professional political analysts in the leading universities; the formation of the professional community of political analysts working in leading academic institutions and university departments with the Ukrainian Academy of Political Science and the Association of Political Sciences of the Ukraine as its core. This resulted in the development of academic schools, which explore issues of ethnologic political science (on the premises of the Institute of Political and Ethnic Studies named after I.F.Kurasa of the National Academy of Science of the Ukraine); of law policy (on the premises of the Institute of State and Law named after V.M.Koretsky of the National Academy of Science of the Ukraine); of political modernization; political analysis and forecasting; regional studies and local self-government; history of political thought in the Ukraine. In the Ukraine, an extensive network of specialized scientific councils for academic thesis defence has been established. In order to form a common space for the development and improvement of political knowledge, it is very important to pay attention to such relevant issues for both countries, as the mutual recognition of diplomas, the harmonization of specialties and certification in the academic field.

In spite of the obvious progress in the development of political science and education, there are some problems which can be solved only by a comprehensive renewal of this important segment of social science and the humanities.

The priority should be given to overcoming one-sided, extremely negative attitude to politics and to designing an attractive project of collaboration between civilized ethnic groups, regions, political parties, government and opposition. Surveys show that attention should be given to the most significant discrepancies in the Ukrainian society: 1) between advocates and opponents of market reforms; 2) between followers of pro-Western and pro-Russian foreign policy; and 3) between the adherents and opponents of the existing political regime. Taking this into consideration, specific events promoting the dialogue between cultures are of great significance. These may include a joint celebration of the 200th anniversary of Taras Shevchenko in the Ukraine and Russia in 2014. In this context, the agreement has been achieved between Russia and the Ukraine to restore the monument to the Ukrainian poet in Moscow. We hope, wide public of St. Petersburg will not remain indifferent to the event as a considerable part of the great poet's life was connected with the city.

It is important to consider a set of problems related to futurology, political analysis and forecasting; building interdisciplinary teams of Western 'think-tanks' type at top universities and research institutes in order to create professional analytical and forecasting environment. This direction is very important as the experience gained in the years of independence by the Ukraine and Russia demonstrates the impossibility to reform social relations without adequate scientific ground, forecast projects, development of new methods for shaping the future of the country – synergetics, foresight, role plays, brainstorming, etc.

Present situation demands that the state should place order for political knowledge. In the Ukraine it suggests, first, the establishment of a centre which would keep record of research topics (such a centre could function under the State Certification Commission). And secondly, there is a need for officially adopted state order for political scientists. Political science will be able to catch up with more pragmatic social sciences and the humanities only on condition that it can take its rightful place in the occupational classification. As for relations between political analysts of the two countries, they should agree on promising research areas, especially in the context of comparative political research conducted on the material provided by the examples of the Ukraine and Russia.

In conclusion, it must be said that globalization jeopardizes diversity and uniqueness of culture. The mythologizing of reality is an important feature of cultural processes in the globalized world. Moreover, modern myths are used to compensate for lacerated, transitional consciousness of an individual and a society. It is possible to get rid of the myths embedded in the social consciousness by odious politicians and mass media in the modern Ukraine and Russia only by means of direct communication within academic and educational systems. Exchange of knowledge, experience, values is a prerequisite of the dialogue between generations, of cooperation and understanding between peoples. Historically, the address to dialogue always marks the beginning of a new culture of communication. The main thing that distinguishes a dialogue from a monologue is the desire to understand the relationships between different views, ideas, events, and social forces.

Great cultural achievements are borne out of the dialogue, which is possible only on the basis of sticking to what is unique in every culture, along with respect for the traditions and values of others. This is the only way possible for mutual enrichment and entry into the world culture. Today, no nation can exist and develop in isolation from its neighbours, without educational, informational, and humanitarian integration. In order to understand the language of another culture, one must be open to the culture of one's own. From the national to the universal, that is the only way to understand what is best other cultures. In this connection, it is necessary

to restore the atmosphere of creative, intellectual dialogue, to preserve and enhance a favourable legal regime for mutual visits to the Ukraine and Russia. On the basis of the dialogue positive images of each other should be formed. It is essential that practices of building national identity at the expense of humiliation and criticism of neighbouring nations should be

abandoned. While preserving their national identities, Russia and the Ukraine should reach a mutually acceptable and coordinated consensus of understanding the basic parameters of civilizational and cultural identity. The success of the Ukraine and Russia as independent states will largely depend on the positive relations between them.

**N. P. Shmelyov<sup>1</sup>**

## WHAT RUSSIA WANTS FROM THE WEST TODAY

Today, certainly, does not mean just and only this present day. Of course, we also imply what is normally referred to as 'for the foreseeable future'.

The first and the main thing that any viable state needs is, certainly, security, and first of all, security from external threats. Russia's historical experience in its relations with the West was not in this sense just diverse, but, we have to admit, it was truly tragic. For the previous 400 years there was a Polish and Swedish intervention in the 17th century, Napoleon's invasion, the Crimean War of the mid-19th century, the First World War, and, finally, the Second World War – the Great Patriotic War, which was fiercer and more destructive than anything that had ever taken place in the world before. And if we add 'the Cold War' of the second half of the 20th century on top of it all, both sides being no less than equally guilty of it, then it will seem surprising that Russia managed to survive at all under such an enormous pressure.

It is natural that a certain 'genetic' distrust is inherent in a Russian man no matter what turn his country's foreign policy takes. And there is no surprise that attempts to preserve the retaliatory capacity will always be inherent in the Russian state despite any (moreover, purely verbal) assurances of the West that the missile defence system under construction in the West will not be directed against Russia. The possibility to retain at least a selective, preferential (not necessarily total) retaliatory blow is a 'categorical imperative' for Russia. And if there have appeared any signs of a start of a new 'cold war' recently – this is not Russia's fault, which in practice abandons the race for 'the parity', but does not at all renounce the guarantee of its existence even if in a weakened state.

However, the issue of external security for Russia (as well as for many other countries) does not amount just to the eventual probability of 'apocalyptic' scenario. The list of large-scale and small-scale external threats to the country is virtually inexhaustible. The Middle East and the Arab-Israeli conflict which has been going on for over 60 years; the unforeseen by anybody 'Arab tsunami' with its still unclear direction; a possible further aggravation of the heated to the limit situation in the region of Iran – Afghanistan – Pakistan – post-Soviet republics of Central Asia; proliferation of nuclear weapons over the world; the rise of international terrorism and Islamic extremism; the neglected local conflicts (especially in the Caucasus) fraught

with other military adventures like the war in August, 2008; the global drug-trafficking and the cross-border crime; and so on and so forth – all of these, as experience shows, may be and sometimes indeed are subjects to regulation by international treaties, which, one way or another, are universally acceptable, though, as a rule, not completely. And all of this is a natural field for cooperation between the West and Russia.

Certainly, today it is too early to speak about a possibility of forming a 'world government' with adequate authorities. But better concerted actions of the West, Russia and, certainly, other countries involved, could, as a matter of course, ensure the preservation of the world civilization (in its diversity) even under the conditions when the world is about to go, as they say, 'out of control'.

It will be fair enough to say that today in these international changes and distresses Russia plays mostly a defensive but not an aggressive role. At least, the idea of the necessity of division or fragmentation of other countries' territories on various pretexts, including Siberia and the Far East, has not been and is not advanced either in politics, or in the public opinion of Russia; the idea which is often pronounced (though unofficially) in the West.

In the Soviet period Russia remained absolutely isolated, though even then mutual cultural, scientific, engineering, sport and other relations were of certain importance, proving a deep-rooted civilizational unity of sides opposing in many other respects. Eventually, the artificially raised walls have collapsed, democracy, multi-party system, supremacy of law, universal human values and freedoms including the freedom of travel all over the world have become available for a Russian man. It is no use making guesses about the scale and the concrete forms of rapprochement of the West and Russia in the offing: this process cannot be measured in years; it will inevitably take decades, even generations. But every important step on this way has always been and will be of ultimate significance whether it is the actual abolition of capital punishment in our country or democratic transformations in its political system, including forming the basis for any effective democracy – the local self-government (in Europe this process started as early as the 11th–12th centuries), or a finally reconciled Russia's integration into the WTO, or abolition of the restrictions placed by Schengen Convention, which is a pressing issue but is still open to debate, etc.

The most impressive of the new Russia's achievements in the development of its relations with the West was, probably, making the EU–Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1997. This agreement has every prospect of being prolonged for the future despite the opposition of certain, mostly 'younger' members of the EU. The four 'roadmaps' planned under this agreement – on external security, on domestic security, on economic and cultural cooperation – are important not only from the standpoint of today but also as a historical prospect, for Russia in particular. If these goals are ever achieved, the united Europe will assume a completely new image including all aspects – politics, the military situation, the social structure, the human mentality, the integrated economic space

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(i.e. the freedom of cross-border movement of goods, capital, workforce and services) and the integrated scientific and technological, educational and cultural potential. It appears that these 'roadmaps' can practically become a most important civilizational guideline for the current and the future generation. And in due course Europe can become an integrated strong centre of power in most respects equalling other modern world centres of power – the USA and China.

Favourable external conditions for the changes carried out, first of all in the economic and social sphere are of utmost importance for modern Russia which has entered the age (it is precisely the age) of another modernization. Do they make for or put obstacles in the way of the set goals? The answer is far from being definite: they can make for, they can be neutral, but at the same time they can put obstacles. For instance, a most serious question: who currently finances who? Does the West finance Russia, according to popular beliefs, or is it Russia that finances the West? Paradoxical though the answer may seem on the surface, in fact it is rather clear: Russia finances the West. Over the previous 20 years the ratio has been approximately 1:3 in the favour of the West, i.e. for 1 dollar of inflow of funds into the Russian economy from the West the legal and illegal cash outflow from Russia to the economy of the West was 3 and, more likely, 4 dollars. All kinds of the withdrawal of capital from the country are estimated today in the accumulated sum of 1 trillion dollars.

In particular, over the past years the amount of investment of just Russian state foreign exchange reserves into foreign (mostly American) state bonds with a low-record yield of 1.0–2.0% of the annual interest rate has gone beyond a sum of about 550 billion dollars. The saddest thing is that such a chronic drainage (bloodletting) of Russian economy takes place against the background of the country's enormous unsatisfied need for investments in practically every sphere including manufacture, infrastructure and social sphere. The flight of capital deprives the country of at least  $\frac{1}{4}$  of its accumulation fund.

Certainly, accumulation and capital formation is first of all a domestic issue of Russia. Today Russia has quite a lot of potential possibilities of increasing its rate of saving (from the current inadmissibly low rate of about 20% to the necessary 30–35% of the GDP), and a more rational use of the funds in stock which it now channels for quite doubtful purposes. Why with the obvious weakness of Russia's credit system cannot Russian investors borrow money from Russian state reserves not at the annual percentage rate of 8–10%, the rate at which they have to borrow from foreign private banks today, but at a rate of 1.5–2%, i.e. the rate at which Russia lends money to its foreign partners? Moreover, the latest crisis showed that the Russian state anyway had to save its main borrowers abroad by massive and in fact irretrievable investment of state funds. And the debt of Russian companies and banks to foreign private banks almost equals our state reserves stored 'for a song' in foreign securities.

We cannot but see our own possibilities of increasing the investment resources of the country as the unjustified, unique in the world ratio in the distribution of the natural resource royalty for energy and raw material resources in favour of private companies; the absence of effective control over the transfer of currency reserves abroad; the necessary restoration of the obligatory sale of currency earnings for roubles; a wider use of issuing and credit possibilities of the Central Bank of Russia (as a creditor of the last resort); tax and depreciation concessions for investors, especially for the ones who modernize the manufacture; abandonment of the 'flat scale' of taxation of income; an effective system of administrative, budgetary, tax and credit stimulation of small and medium enterprise, etc.

But all these measures in no way decrease the importance of the import of foreign capital for Russia, direct foreign investment in particular. For the time being their role is relatively

small: of the order of 3% of the whole capital formation in the country. Foreign capital primarily flows in either for financial speculations ('hot', short-term money) or for super-profitable industries (long-term money) which, however, do not always have a profound modernization effect: cosmetics, brewing, pharmaceutical, tobacco industries, production of soft drinks, service lines, car manufacturing and others. Foreign investments are most actively placed in fuel and energy industry – to  $\frac{1}{3}$  of their overall amount. But it is significant that only 1% of foreign funds are invested in mechanical engineering.

Inducement of foreign capital, its intertwining with Russian capital, expansion of transnational corporations (there are currently about 20 companies of purely Russian origin) – on the whole it is a favourable process which makes for the economic growth and the growth of well-being for its participants. It is only of vital importance to keep and maintain the balance of mutual interests of the sides. But if for some period of time partners find it necessary to impose certain restrictions on funds attracted from other countries (for instance, in industries of national defence in Russia or for some other, in fact, purely political reasons, as in the West) this must be taken for granted. And this should be a given which in due course can be settled so that both sides could benefit from it by way of mutual concessions and compromises.

As the Russian economy is getting more open, it is becoming more and more seamlessly linked to the world monetary system and more dependent on its stability. In particular, if, say, dollar continues to fall into decline and lose its dominating positions it is vital for Russia that this process take many years and even decades. Most countries, including China, Japan and Russia still have too big dollar balances and  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the world trade is still serviced in dollars. Under such conditions the collapse of dollar will deal a severe blow to the world economy. The collapse of euro and the inevitably ensuing disintegration of 'euro-zone' can become a less severe but also a hard blow of world importance (after all,  $\frac{1}{2}$  of Russia's foreign exchange reserve is stored in euro). And we can wait for a new world monetary system on the basis of, say, an artificial currency of the International Monetary Fund or China's Yuan, or some new 'currency package' to appear till the cows come home.

Modernization for Russia today means in the first place its reindustrialization or a kind of 'Second Industrialization'. The excitement of random, rushed reforms cost the country a complete destruction of no less than  $\frac{1}{2}$  of its industrial and technological potential. With the current tendencies, i.e. with the rapid obsolescence of its basic funds, with the growing deficit of investments and the unclear industrial policy of the government, the remaining  $\frac{1}{2}$  of its industrial potential can be once and for all destroyed in 7–10 years. Besides, over  $\frac{1}{3}$  of Russia's farm lands will be out of use. Moreover, according to some experts' research about  $\frac{1}{3}$  of the country's brain will be lost as a result of decline of its science (both fundamental and especially applied), emigration of scientists while a considerable number of scholars will transfer to other, mostly to commercial fields.

Reindustrialization requires that the country should concentrate efforts on a number of main directions of the long-term economic policy. First, it is the choice of the main strategic priorities of the industry's innovation (including the infrastructure). Tough international competition does not just exist but is continuously growing and becoming more intense at markets of high-tech industrial, information, agricultural and any other production. Finding new vacant market niches for the future is not an easy task to complete. Cooperation and coordination of efforts with the leading world manufacturers of corresponding production could be really helpful for Russia. We could also expect our partners (the EU, in particular) to work out their own, quite a concrete project of support and development of Russia's businesses and even industries which could help Russia break away from the dependence on energy and

raw resources and revive its processing industry. The recent statement on the 'Partnership for Modernization' signed by the EU and Russia is evidence of the fact that such an approach no longer seems exotic to Europe.

Secondly, renovating the still-preserved manufacturing facilities, and moreover constructing new ones will require (as it was in the past) a massive inflow of equipment and advanced technologies to the country from abroad. All of these are available in Europe, the USA, Japan (and now in China). After Russia's joining the World Trade Organization, reaching corresponding bilateral and multilateral agreements, abolishing the outdated restrictions Russian needs can and must become one of the main factors of supporting a steady machine-building, electro-technical and other types of export from highly industrialized countries. There will certainly be no problem with payment: even under the current changes in favour of various energy and other alternatives, stable markets for Russian energy and raw materials production in the West will be preserved. We should not forget about the international credit opportunities either.

Thirdly, today Russia faces a probably most acute and complicated challenge: demonopolization of its economy and creating an effective automatic mechanism (of course, with a certain interaction with administrative leverages) of stimulating its innovation process. With the current exorbitant profitability of natural and artificial Russian monopolies they have no or almost no stimuli to modernize old and, moreover, to construct new, technologically advanced manufacturing facilities. Certainly, this is first of all a domestic political, economic and institutional problem of Russia, what is more – it is an issue of decisiveness and indecisiveness of our government. But cooperation and competition with the West both in the field of import and export and support from both sides of inflow of direct foreign capital (especially to small and medium enterprises) could provide an important additional impetus for the Russian economy to transfer to a true market and new structural proportions in its production potential.

Fourthly, the West can play quite an important role in the revival of science and education in Russia. No modernization of the country and its transfer to 'the economy of knowledge' is and will be possible unless the share of financing science and education from the state budget is increased at least two- or three-fold. Privately owned capital is a special matter: it is unreasonable to seriously expect it to take part in solving Russian problems earlier than in a few decades. Whereas an active academic – both research and education – exchange between the West and Russia can, as the accumulated experience shows, develop not only on 'charity' principles but also on rather commercial, mutually beneficial grounds. This is especially important for Europe on the whole, as it is still lagging behind the USA in many key spheres of another scientific and technological revolution; however, it has every chance of achieving the level of the USA with integrated efforts in the nearest decades.

Integration tendencies on the European (to be more exact, Eurasian) continent are an issue of utmost importance in the relations of Russia with the West. West European integration has not only proved its high viability, its natural and organic character but also, as it appears, at present it is gradually getting rid of delusions and excessive ambitions of 'green years'. In reality both today and in the long-term perspective the main issue to solve is, first of all, not the further expansion of the European Union (everything in the world has its limits), but the necessity to avoid its disintegration caused by purely economic, especially financial and currency reasons. Under these conditions, certainly, nobody in the EU takes seriously the idea of new members like, say, Turkey or the Ukraine, or, all the more, Russia joining the European Union. But such sensible considerations do not stop certain influential circles in the EU from adopting a

jealous and even hostile attitude towards integration tendencies in the post-Soviet region; this is partly due to a similar position adopted by the USA governments, which come and go.

A simple and often articulated (both in Russia and in the West) idea has become rather widespread: an idea that integration in the post-Soviet Eurasian economic space and integration within the formed European Union objectively do not oppose each other; moreover, they can (and must) have a mutual final, though, certainly, remote goal. Indeed, why for some arbitrary reasons disregard the centuries-old mutual links in the post-Soviet area – civilizational, economic, cultural and purely human – the ones which have become second nature of the countries and peoples in question? What is more, the countries in question are the countries which were and are, in fact, an integrated market, where only certain barriers and obstacles, which hinder its development, are to be removed. It is already being done, in particular, within the triple Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. This Union is aimed at forming the common free market zone of these countries with a view to a number of other post-Soviet states joining it. What sensible and practical reasons can be put forward against the reconstruction of the integrated infrastructure of these countries; the energy, transport, education infrastructure which has almost totally been destroyed over the two previous decades, let alone the co-operational links between factories which were formed over the many years of mutual work and the virtually integrated market of workforce? It is obvious that forming the Integrated Eurasian economic space is by no means the revival of the great-power Russian imperialism, but a process as natural and organic as the one taking place within the European Union.

Common sense says that without joint international planning and integration of material and technical, financial and human resources of different countries it is impossible, for instance, to meet Europe's demands for energy in a conflict-free mode. Competition in this field is not at all destructive; on the contrary, it is useful. There is enough space for everyone in the vast market for the foreseeable future: for the long established suppliers of oil and gas, for producers of alternative energy sources including shale and liquefied gas – for Russia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, the Arab Near East, North Africa, Norway, and even for secondary in importance producers of a number of other, mostly small countries. It is also impossible to ensure the stable and conflict-free transportation and transit of energy without concerted actions of all partner countries involved. And, quite naturally, when meeting the challenges the interests of both integrations should not be opposed, but should complement each other.

Is there a national or a regional force (in West or East Europe, in China, or in the USA) which can individually solve such problems as, say, a rapid growth of drug-trafficking through Central Asia, which is dangerous for the whole world, or Islamic radicalism and terrorism? Or the unconceivable in its scale task of saving the Aral Sea, the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya? Or forming the West–East international transportation corridor (a system of corridors)? Or, finally, developing the still underdeveloped vast territories in Central Asia, China, Mongolia, Siberia and in the Russian Far East?

This is evidence of the fact that forming a common economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok (if not from Vancouver to Vladivostok) in the prospect of decades is by no means a chimera, but a realistic goal, certainly, if we eliminate the possibility of a global disaster. But to achieve this goal there is no need for the two integrations developing at present on the Eurasian continent to clash or collide; there is certainly no need for outdated primitive attempts to shake the newly-emerged constructive tendencies from within; but there is a need to deeply understand the realities – both the established ones and the ones which are likely to arise in the future. We

should never turn a blind eye to the fact that there is almost no lack of options left in the world, but there appear more and more alternatives – both continental and regional, both in the West and in the East.

Russia has always been and will be Europe in its history, culture, world outlook, and its way of life in general. With its unique and often tragic past and certainly with its mistakes, but still with the same ideals and hopes as other European countries and nations. Being spiritually a European country, Russia at the same time remains an independent and, in a sense, self-sufficient civilization – it has everything (literally everything) to maintain and improve its special position in the world, provided a sensible and correct strategy be applied.

Certainly, we cannot but see that ‘the eastern vector’, ‘the East Asian accent’ has been playing a bigger role in Russia’s

development over the previous decades – in politics, economics, in demographics and in other spheres. Taking into account the country’s geography, this is not only and not just an alternative, but a historical inevitability to be considered by everybody, whether they like it or not. It is not even a matter of what regime will become established in the country in the future – classical democracy, or ‘democratic caesarism’, or even a certain form of authoritarianism. The matter is that some civilizational ‘symbiosis’ in the life of Russia – a ‘symbiosis’ between the European and East Asian influence, taking into consideration its past, its present and its foreseeable future – is likely to be its most probable prospect. And this is not just a question of human belief or disbelief, this is a question of obvious, objective – global, and maybe even supra-global – inevitability.

A. V. Smirnov<sup>1</sup>

### A LOGIC-AND-MEANING APPROACH TO CULTURE AS A NEW INTERPRETATION OF UNIVERSALISM

Quite often two types of cultural studies are not differentiated. Researchers and philosophers may investigate a culture of their own; and they may a culture to which they do not belong. Those who take up the second type of investigation know how different the two situations are. They also know how risky it is to apply conclusions that result from the research of the first kind in the research of the second one. The aim of my paper is to offer a preliminary classification of methodological approaches in domestic and Western Islamic studies that target the problem of a cultural gap between a researcher and the object of his or her research.

Islamic studies can be divided into two major groups. Firstly, case studies; secondly, attempts to comprehend the object of research in a broader cultural context. I will focus on the latter.

In contemporary Islamic (and, generally, Oriental) studies there are two dominating approaches, not just connected, but both springing from the corresponding lines in philosophy of history and in understanding the paths of development for the human society and human culture. I mean the universalist interpretation, on the one hand, and the civilizational approach, on the other.

The universalist approach has an impressive record: in Europe, it dates back to, at least, the ancient Greek philosophy, and is closely connected with the Platonic and Aristotelian conception of the universality of human nature with its roots in the universality of mind. As for the civilizational approach, it appeared in its developed form in the second half of the 19th century, when Nikolai Danilevsky first published his *Russia and Europe* with the principles of this approach clearly set out. Later, this approach was further elaborated by Spengler, Toynbee and others. I will give a brief synopsis of how those two approaches are displayed in the way experts in Arabic and Islamic studies treat the object of their research.

The universalist approach proceeds from the assumption of an *essential unity of the humankind*, and considers cultures and civilizations to be forms of a singular line of development, ascribing their differences to their *specificity*. Specificity can never compete with essential unity, which is prior to the former. In other words, specificity is secondary to universality, i.e., to what is posited as *common-to-humankind*. This assumption has a strong philosophical background: it is based on the Western civilizational experience, and it has a whole lot of practical applications and usage. But that is not what I would like to focus on right now; I would like to turn my attention to the consequences of this standpoint when researchers in the field of Islamic and Arabic studies prefer this position as the basis to deal with their object of research.

The two basic effects are the following. Firstly, a researcher (Western or Russian) of Arab culture has a priority access to a certain universal science. Why? The universalist approach naturally presupposes existence of a universal science. For example, if we make a research in the field of Arabic language, we need general linguistics; if we study Islamic poetry, we cannot do without general poetics; if we deal with Islamic history, we need the science of history, etc. And it is in the West that those universal sciences were elaborated. A Western researcher naturally has a priority access to this universal (universal in a sense that it applies to its subject matter in any culture) science that is fit to its object posited it as universal.

It means that despite all the criticisms against Eurocentrism, either for political correctness or other reasons, universalism, in its traditional sense, provides an unchallengeable epistemic foundation for Eurocentrism which, when cast out through the door, will be back through the window.

The second effect of the universalist position is the following. An non-Arabic or non-Islamic researcher (Western or Russian) has the only language in his or her disposal, the language of European science. This point is often spoken about as if it were the solution but not the problem in itself. But the immediate consequence is that all researched phenomena (of Arab Islamic culture, in our case) need to be reconstructed in order to fit the framework of categories of the European science.

The examples are numerous. Let me mention one. From the end of the 19th century up to the present moment, in order to characterize Islamic cultural phenomena, Arabic and Islamic studies have been using the famous triad – theology, philosophy, mysticism. Naturally, this triad is borrowed from the Western cultural experience; hence, it appears as self-evident. But

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only a few simple remarks are enough to put this self-evidence to question. What is “philosophy” in Islamic world? Is it just Falsafa? And what about theoretical discussions and findings of the early (pre-Ash‘arite) Mu‘tazila? They cease to be “philosophy” and become “theology”? And how about a mystical component in the treatises of Ibn Sīnā, the most prominent Falsafa representative according to Islamic thinkers? Is it an illusion or a plain aberration, and Ibn Sīnā is purely a rational philosopher without a hint of mysticism, according to Dimitry Gutas’ reasoning? And Ibn ‘Arabī cannot be considered a “philosopher,” but, alternatively, has to be classified as “a theosophist”? The endless failures to adjust the Arab Islamic dress to the Western model exceed the limit, beyond which transition from their quantity to their quality takes place and their subject matter becomes meaningless. But, as before, almost everyone who writes about the Mu‘tazila, qualifies them as theologians; and Ibn ‘Arabī is called a theosophist by every other researcher of Sufism... There must be something more than mere traditionalism in this kind of persistent dedication to lame classifications. It is the consequence that inevitably results from the universalist approach; a consequence that, paradoxically, justifies itself by its very inevitability.

As for the civilizational approach, its starting point is the distinguishing features of individual civilizations. These features make each of civilizations unique and *non-reducible* to any other. The civilizational approach varies from theory to theory, but its fundamental principle remains – it primarily focuses on the *inner integrity* of each civilization. From that point of view, “humankind” or “universal X” (where X stands for “values,” “norms,” “patterns,” etc.) are shallow abstractions, with no connection to reality.

Running to the extremes, the opponents of the civilizational approach call this tightness, but not uniqueness: civilizations, being unique integral entities, a kind of a monad each, remain totally alien, inscrutable and meaningless for each other, since any probing into a hermetic entity is impossible from another hermetic entity (civilization).

These two approaches make an opposition in both philosophy of history and Arabic and Islamic studies.

To demonstrate the universalist approach, let me mention the book *Deciphering the Signs of God* written by the outstanding Annemarie Schimmel. “This is one of Schimmel’s most important books,” William C. Chittick said. How is the book structured? The author proceeds from the religious studies general scheme, proposed by Friedrich Heiler in his *Erscheinungsformen und Wesen der Religion*. She uses the scheme as a universal one, therefore applicable to Islam *a priori*. Schimmel writes: “In order to give a form for a cross-section through different phenomena of Islam, the model used by Friedrich Heiler appeared to me to be most convenient.” Religious experience is interpreted here as a gradual periphery-to-centre migration, as the model of the concentric rings, where initial experience encompasses outer rings off the centre with a gradual progression towards the centre. This progression makes up the core of deciphering the signs of God.

It is an open secret that Schimmel’s books make a very interesting reading. By and large, she uses one and the same approach: the author proceeds from some universalistic scheme to its illustration. It appears, however, that a transcendent universalistic scheme is prior to the subject matter, logically at least. If we proceed from a general universal scheme to a research object, then Islamic culture is only relevant because it is suitable to illustrate the scheme, because it fits it. Research material does not come first; but the scheme is prior to it. This scheme does not result from the research material, but is used as a transcendent one, picked up in the Western tradition and then given a universal validity. This fact inevitably leads to the following: the extraordinary vast material of the masterly written Schimmel’s books makes up a thoroughly variegated pic-

ture with its fragments, taken from different culture’s domains, used as an illustration to the scheme.

In terms of quantity, traditional universalist approach in Arabic studies is more current. It is *comfortable* for a Western researcher. But it *cannot account for the inner affinity* of different segments of culture – the observation put forward by Oswald Spengler, Louis Massignon, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, et al. Alternatively, the less current civilizational approach is trying to encompass this fact, though it has been giving in to the anti-Orientalist ideology in the West lately.

To illustrate the civilizational approach in the domestic Arabic studies, I would like to mention Alexander Ignatenko’s *The Mirror of Islam* (Zerkalo Islama, 2004). The material of the book and the conclusions the author makes are both most interesting. The conclusions make it possible to qualify the book as a typical example of the civilizational approach: it characterizes Western and Arab Islamic culture as structured entities. According to Ignatenko, European culture is of a “discourse-image” type – it proceeds from discourse, speech, theory towards imagination. With its progress from theoretical reasoning to imagination, this culture is prospective in nature – leaning forward, addressing the future, making up its image based on theory, and, then, constructing this image in reality. On the other hand, according to the author, Arab Islamic culture is of “image-discourse” type, because it proceeds from imagination to its theoretical reasoning in discourse; it turns reality into an image, a literary plot, and then goes on to exist in the sphere of imagination, but not in reality. Thus, Arab Islamic culture and Western culture are mirrored opposites. At this point it is interesting to return to the book’s title: it happens to give a reflection of Islam in the Western mirror, for it creates the image of the targeted culture as a mirror reflection of author’s native culture.

That will do for the moment to describe the two well-known approaches practiced in Arabic and Islamic studies today, to interpret a research object in a broader context.

Yet there is a third approach that my colleagues and I are working on. We call it a logic-and-meaning approach. In this brief paper I will not try to elaborate on its exploratory procedure, methods and applications. If desired, the reader can have a detailed scrutiny in our publications.<sup>1</sup> However, I would like to give here a very general outline of its basic idea.

The logic-and-meaning approach defines culture as a sense generating “machine.” This is an attempt to analyze the ways that stand behind sense-deciphering procedures that run in our consciousness. We are seeking for an answer to the following question: “What are the mechanisms that explain encoding and decoding of the meaning of a text?” Naturally, a text is not just a verbal text, but any cultural phenomenon, including art, approached as a result of sense generating procedure. Do such mechanisms (procedures) exist? This is question number one. And if they do exist, what are the ways to catch and describe them? Are they similar or different in diverse cultures?

The essence of the logic-and-meaning approach could be described as following: it understands meaning as an entity-and-continuity; to be more exact, as an entity-and-continuity which discloses itself in fixed forms; and tries to discover mechanisms that stand behind this dynamics. There are two basic procedures that reveal it – opposition-and-unity and

<sup>1</sup> Most of them are in Russian; of those that appeared in English I can mention here *Logic of Sense: Theory and Its Application in the Analysis of Classical Arabic Philosophy and Culture* (Chapter I), published in *Ishraq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook*, № 2 (Moscow 2011) and available at <<http://smirnov.iph.ras.ru/eng/pube/ls/i.htm>>; a paper *Cultural Diversity as Logic-and-Meaning Otherness: The Case of Knowledge and Faith in Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures*. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences; *The Council for Researches in Values and Philosophy*, © 2011, pp. 129–133 <<http://smirnov.iph.ras.ru/eng/pube/kfaith.i.htm>>; *Sūfi Hayra and Islamic Art: Contemplating Ornament through “Fuṣūṣ al-Hikam”* <[http://smirnov.iph.ras.ru/eng/pube/hayra\\_en.htm](http://smirnov.iph.ras.ru/eng/pube/hayra_en.htm)>; and *Care for Life in Medieval Islamic Thought: a Logic-and-Meaning Approach* (in print, volume 12 of publications of Institut International de Philosophie). They give at least some idea of what the logic-and-meaning approach is about.

part-to-whole relations. (Here entity-and-continuity goes together with its disclosure and does not exist separately, even in thought: we do not proceed from entity-and-continuity to its disclosure, even logically, but we approach them as two sides of each other only). Though identical in this formula, those two procedures appear as variable when we try to discover the way they work in different cultures. It seems that in Arab culture these mechanisms are working differently, compared to their Western pattern: the *same* is done *the other way*; hence the formula “*other sameness*” used in the logic-and-meaning approach. This formula problematizes sameness as well as otherness.

The traditional universalist and civilizational approaches both have lingering constraints and limits which can be overcome by the logic-and-meaning approach.

The two traditional approaches may well interpret particular sets of facts in a target culture. But there is a touch-stone – an overall interpretation.

The traditional universalist approach always offers a selective interpretation (which is well observed in Schimmel’s works as well as in the works of other researchers who stick to it). Such a selective interpretation is always possible, and diverse epistemological theories may be chosen to back it (an interval theory of truth; an asymptotic approximation methodology; understanding language as a construct projected onto an object, etc.). The problem with the theories of the kind is that we have to already know an object to use these theories for its estimation – otherwise, how could we determine the interval in which particular truth value is applicable; how could we know that we are approaching the object of study, and not getting away from it, and so on. The cart is always before a horse here. The same is true for the civilizational approach: for example, it remains vague with Ignatenko how to use a detected characteristic, claimed to be fundamental, beyond the material of his book (for instance, how can it explain the distinctive traits of Islamic law, religious doctrine, etc?).

As opposed to this, the logic-and-meaning approach insists on the possibility, and even the need, of an uninterrupted, and not selective, interpretation of culture, proceeding from its inherent logic. This is why the criterion of *wide sections of culture* under interpretation is of ultimate importance in this context.

This should have made it clear that the logic-and-meaning approach is *neither* a civilizational *nor* traditional universalist type of methodology.

The scholars who follow the civilizational approach always pick up some *definite content matter* to characterize a culture or a civilization. As a result, such properties become peculiarities of a culture. When Nikolai Danilevsky wanted to point out the distinctive trait of ancient Greek culture, he specifically meant arts in which Ancient Greeks were the topmost experts ever. For other cultures, their specific individuality is fixed as another top achievement (with a fixed content matter) of human spirit. Spengler referred to it as the morphology of culture. Anyway, whichever topics or examples of the civilizational approach are taken, they are bound to be the properties of culture with fixed contents.

The logic-and-meaning approach follows a different path. It considers not the concrete content but the very *principle* that generates it; it never takes contents as a culture’s key element. This approach cannot be characterized as an essentialist type theory or a theory that reifies cultural differences. A specific sense-generating mode (a key element in culture portraiture within the logic-and-meaning approach) is neither a specific form, nor a specific content—it is not what could be understood as an essence or a thing, as something *ready-made*, accomplished and *finished*. Instead, it is a *way* of sense-making and sense-generation, but not the generated meaning itself. In the logic-and-meaning perspective we never refer to any fixed

or primordial essence of culture, grasped as its unchangeable “mentality” or anything of that kind that paralyzes a culture and deprives it of any movement.

Since the focus of the logic-and-meaning approach is the principle (“mechanism”) of sense generation, but not the concrete meanings as such, this approach is immune to criticism usually targeted at the civilizational approach. The core of such criticisms can be summed up in the following question: changing and developing, does a culture remain itself; or, is it, sticking to its authenticity, predestined to forever remain in the past, fixing itself as the spirit’s top achievement once made (Danilevsky), or alternatively, as some unique integral morphology (Spengler), etc.? The civilizational approach, attached to some concrete content (but not to the way to generate it), is predestined to look into the past, pushing a culture the same way, because it is in the past that the essence of a culture it tries to grasp is located. We may as well say that the civilizational approach is very good at explaining the statics but not the dynamics of a culture.

As opposed to this, the logic-and-meaning approach is good at both. On the one hand, it gives an explicit answer to the question “What is the limit beyond which a culture ceases being itself?” – it is the limit drawn by the sense generation procedure that constitutes this culture. On the other hand, it is never limited by any particular cross section of culture at any definite point of time with a fixed content matter, for any such cross section boils down to the sense generating mechanisms behind it, but never the other way round.

What is the difference between the logic-and-meaning approach and the traditional universalist approach?

From the point of view of the logic-and-meaning approach, cultures are differentiated as diverse types of sense generating procedure, i.e., as different implementations of the same mechanisms of sense making.<sup>1</sup> These different sense-generating types *are present in the mind of every human being* and therefore are universal.

This is the crucial point for interpretation of universality within the framework of the logic-and-meaning approach. Universality is rooted not just in the common nomination of the sense generating procedures (opposition-and-unity, part-and-whole) – for any concrete implementation of these procedures makes us speak of variability, but not commonality. Rather, universality means that those concrete implementations (as such, not only different, but incompatible and irreducible) of the sense-generating mechanisms are present in the mind of any person and are not alien to human consciousness as a universal faculty. But, when we take a concrete culture, one or another specific sense generation type is on the agenda, while other types are marginalized, though not wiped off. At the same time, all of them can be traced in human inner experience as pure types.

That is the very reason why the logic-and-meaning approach does not deny universalism. It only denies its reduction to a specific type (on which point I will dwell on further). By no means does it imply that cultures are some locked, tight phenomena; this approach implies that cultures are the phenomena that develop one or another sense generation type, any of which we can trace in our inner experience.

Thus, different sense generation types make up architectonics of human consciousness, being present in the mind of every person. Cultures differ because their dominating sense generation types differ, but this dominance does not mean that other types disappear. So, our consciousness keeps “the genes” of any culture on default; no culture is *strange* to us. One should distinguish between *strangeness* and *otherness*. The strange,

<sup>1</sup> In their specific realization in Arab culture those mechanisms of sense generation are reflected through Arabic theoretical discourse fundamental terminology: the *zāhir-bāṭin* (outward-inward) pair that denotes a specific mode of opposition, and the *‘aṣl-far’* (root-branch) pair that fixes a certain mode of part-to-whole relations.

once its otherness explained, ceases to be strange, but becomes “*the other sameness*”.

So, the logic-and-meaning approach is *not* an anti-universalist one. It presents a universalism of a different kind which is *broader* than the traditional reading of universalism, because it overcomes its limitation by a certain form of rationality which was declared to be the basic constituent of universalism. Within the logic-and-meaning perspective, the universalist line has a more complicated path, which differs from the traditional universalism when it grasps a certain sense generation type and posits it as “universal.” In the logic-and-meaning perspective, universalism means not universality of a concrete type of rationality, but universality of the sense generation ability as a universal and specifically human ability.

The term “otherness” is being used here as an abstraction of one of two equally important parts of the “*other sameness*” formula. The change of a logic-and-meaning foundation makes it possible to perform “the same” but in a different, “other” way. As for Arab Islamic culture, this point is true for philosophy and religious doctrine (I can refer to my own works here, as well as to the works of I. R. Nasyrov, A. A. Lukashev, Yu. Ye. Fyodorova), and for music (G. B. Shamilli), and for fine arts (M. J. Nazarli), and philology (D. V. Frolov), and poetics (N. Yu. Chalisova). Thus, the “otherness” in the logic-and-meaning perspective is entirely different from the “otherness” in the context of discourse targeted by anti-Orientalist criticism.

Yet another difference between the logic-and-meaning approach, on the one hand, and the traditional universalist and civilizational approaches, on the other: while the latter (though with different backgrounds) both appear to be generalizations, the former is *not a generalization* in any sense whatsoever.

To conduct a logic-and-meaning research means to grasp a relevant sense generation mechanism and then reveal how meaning, which makes up culture’s content, results out of those sense generation procedures.

Thus, all the objections against generalizations, that we often here from scholars engaged in case studies, are removed. Case study research only gains by taking into account the sense generation mechanism within a target culture, for no “generalizing” constraints are thus imposed.

Furthermore, the logic-and-meaning approach is an independent line, which is no target for the criticism of the traditional universalism against the civilizational approach, nor for the anti-Orientalist criticism.

The universalist objections against the civilizational approach do not apply to the logic-and-meaning approach: the clarity of sense-generating mechanisms leaves no room for “tightness” and mutual “impenetrability” of cultures. On the contrary, everything which appears “impenetrable” within the traditional content-oriented civilizational approach, in the logic-and-meaning perspective becomes discoverable in anyone’s inner experience, and, hence, our *own*, clear and intelligible as a sense generating mechanism.

Anti-Orientalist criticism does not apply to the logic-and-meaning approach for two reasons. Firstly, the logic-and-meaning perspective has nothing to do with essentialism or with cultural differences reification theories in principle. Secondly, the “sameness” of cultures is no less important than their “otherness” (inseparability of both elements in “*other sameness*” formula): the logic-and-meaning approach makes it possible to reveal the mutual necessity of those two aspects which presuppose one another, and are not mutually exclusive, as it is usually considered.

After all, ironically, the universalist approach, in its traditional interpretation, turns out to be the civilizational approach in disguise: it takes something specific and characteristic for the Western culture and elevates it to the rank of universality. The civilizational approach, in its turn, appears to be the universalist approach in disguise: the image of a foreign culture is always based on the material of one’s own culture, and it is always one’s own culture projection (in its simplest form, a mirror reflection). Therefore, from the point of view of its content and logics, the civilizational approach keeps within the limits of researcher’s own culture, even when it seems to deal with irredundant differences and incomprehensibility of foreign cultures.

Consequently, the traditional universalist approach and the civilizational approach do not keep their promise: they demonstrate neither a true universality nor a culture’s authentic self.

Both those objectives are attained by the logic-and-meaning approach.

On the one hand, it shows a culture as an integral unity which rules out impenetrability, and which is an independent entity with its own “ego.” This metaphor makes good sense: human integrity is integrity of personality, i.e., of his or her “ego,” which is maintained notwithstanding the phenomenal ego diversity (psychological schism and decomposition of ego means mental disorder). *Integrity* means not a tightly closed impenetrability, but a *systematic continuity*. Human being is such an integrity, and this is true not only for a human being as a genus, but also for any individual; but that does not mean that a given individual is hermetically closed and sealed. On the contrary, he or she is open to both the environment and the future (is prospective). And yet, the human being is an integrity: probably totally changing (if we mean separate elements) from cradle to grave, we keep our integrity in the sense of being ourselves, preserving our ego. Not specific features, but namely the ego; and even if an ego manifests itself through specific features, it is the ego, but not those specific features, that human integrity and continuity depends upon. The same is true for culture: it also possesses its “ego,” and a culture remains itself until its ego is lost. It does not refer to any specific content matter, though the culture’s ego manifests itself through it; however, the culture’s ego is not a specific content matter, but a concrete type of sense generation mechanism that produces that specific content matter, as well as any other. The logic-and-meaning approach and its “*other sameness*” principle make it possible to introduce the *civilizational equality* concept, understood as equality of irreducible cultural egos, which makes it impossible to impose upon them any predetermined pattern, proclaimed as universal.

On the other hand, the logic-and-meaning approach provides an opportunity to see the universal as the *pan-human*, and not as something presumably *common-to-humankind* (which, in fact, appears to be concrete-civilizational). The panhuman does not exclude any specific logic-and-meaning type of culture; contrariwise, it includes it as a possible variant of sense generation procedure. At the same time, no single logic-and-meaning cultural type is prioritized; all of them, developing from the same foundation (sense generation mechanism), are its equal, but different, irredundant and mutually irreducible implementations. It is exactly this approach (and not the traditional universalist one) that shows and defends the absolute value of any logic-and-meaning type of culture.

## HISTORIOGRAPHY OF RUSSIA AND THE USA: THE CURRENT DIALOGUE

There are two stages – *Soviet and post-Soviet* – that the relations between the historiographies of Russia and the US have gone through. The keynote of the Soviet stage was marked by a *contention* of the two historiographies: each of them used to lay claims to monopoly over historical truth, though certain cooperation was not completely rejected. The leading edge of the post-Soviet period belongs to the *dialogue* of historiographies; however contention is still present, the quota of which keeps changing and also depends on domestic political issues in each of the two countries, and on their relations on the international arena.

The domestic American Studies in the Soviet period were based on the class approach, which predetermined a confrontation with American Historical Studies. Let us also bear in mind that the Soviet Historical Studies had a special trend – ‘Critique and struggle against bourgeois historical falsifications’, marked by an extreme influence and fighting spirit. The lion’s share of the Soviet historiographic conferences were targeted against the bourgeois, or, as it used to be often referred to, *anti-Marxist historiography*. There used to be volumes and volumes of Doctoral and Candidate’s dissertations focused on critique of anti-Marxist historiography; besides, the US Historical Studies kept remaining the main target for criticisms.

The dramatic change was propelled in the second half of the 1980s, when Mikhail Gorbachev launched Perestroika. As the result of Gorbachev’s policies targeted at the termination of the Cold War as well as at the development of mutual understanding and cooperation with the USA, the ideological confrontation between the two countries, as well as between their historiographies, was softened. These trends extended during Boris Yeltsin’s presidency (1991–1999); he announced Russia and the USA homogeneous civilizations. The new wave began for Russia’s Social Studies, including Historiography and American Studies. The class approach was turned down in favour of the civilizational approach by a part of Russian researchers involved in American Studies (the major part of Americanists were making attempts to combine both approaches). New methodologies and theoretical developments of the Western social sciences (Political Science, Sociology, Anthropology etc.) were taken in; thus Russian social studies, including American studies, started to be based on a new interdisciplinary background, which was totally different from the Marxist-Leninist one. Consequently, the evaluation of American historical experience gradually changed from hypercritical to more balanced, taking into account its different aspects.

There was a change in approaches towards Western Social studies and History, respectively. In Russia, from the second half of the 1980s up to the present, we have been experiencing a real boom in the sphere of translation and publishing of the Western, American for the first place, political scientists, sociologists, economists, historians, experts on international affairs. American Sovietology got rehabilitated. Even more works on the US history by American authors were then translated into Russian and published here. Now, in dominance were those

who used to be considered conservative (consensual) and liberal; and during the two decades their works, translated into Russian, considerably outnumbered the works of American ‘left-wing’ historians, published in the USSR within the 70 years. I would like to give names of only several most famous liberal and conservative US historians, whose works have been translated into Russian: Bernard Bailyn, Daniel Joseph Boorstin, Max Lerner, Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., Frederick Jackson Turner, Louis Hartz.

But when Russian historiography displayed its readiness to switch to a dialogue mode, American historiography kept sticking to its lecturing tone and to the Cold War deficiencies; and the major of those deficiencies is connected with the situation when its representatives come forward with ‘verdicts’ and ‘reprimands’, act as the representatives of the nation that granted itself a mission to spread progressive science and culture and to establish democracy in the world.

The mould of confrontation is still rigid in the relations between historiographies of the two countries. But to blame only American researches would, obviously, be an exaggeration. Russian mentality also preserves some confrontational characteristics, which retain their influence on historical science. Compared to the 1990s, there was a rise in confrontational attitudes of Russia towards the USA in the 2000s. This situation was represented in the books of American authors translated and published in Russia. In contrast to the 1990s, when it was the works of liberal and conservative authors that dominated overtly, building up a highly positive image of America, the 2000s were marked by a larger quota of the sharp critics of America. These are mainly radical researchers, such as Christian Parenti, Howard Zinn, G. Vidal. But there are also researchers, like a conservative traditionalist Patrick Buchanan, who severely criticize the US domestic and foreign policy. It was typical of Russian publishing houses that issued such books at the expense of domestic patriotic sponsors, to do so under the ‘America against America’ heading. And that has a clear message for the reader: America’s vice and deficiencies are real, if acknowledged by Americans themselves, but not by our domestic propaganda.

All in all, a shift from contention to dialogue remains a topical issue for both historiographies – American and Russian. It would not be out of place to frame differences between the two categories. ‘Contention’ means striving for scientific monopoly, for the discredit and removal of an opponent – a challenger; while ‘dialogue’ means a scientific interchange and discussion with the aim to approach the scientific truth, which suggests taking opponent’s rational argumentation, conclusions and reliable facts. *Contention* is a ‘zero-sum game’, while *dialogue* is the scientific enrichment of each party that comes with opponent’s convincing argumentation and undeniable facts; it is also a general knowledge increase for the benefit of historical studies at large. It must be recognized that the culture of dialogue in Russian historiography is far from having set-up frames; while a lot of historians just lack it.

Setting up a dialogue mode in the relation between the two historiographies does not mean wiping out the differences. They will retain because of the differences in worldviews. *Political correctness* makes an example of the current ideological national feature which affects the US Historical Studies, but which is alien to Russian American Studies. Political correctness is a set of ideological principles that were framed in an American society, in its liberal circles for the first place (but conservatives cannot disregard it either) under the influence of the social and political processes and changes of the

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last third of the 20th century. Many historians submitted their scientific vision to liberal political correctness, which, in fact, tabooed any criticism towards African-American, as well as women's movements.

The most important events of the past, such as the American War of Independence, the American Civil War, the Progressive Era of the beginning of the 20th century, the New Deal of the 1930s, were judged not so much due to their positive innovations in comparison to prior periods, but due to their inability

to provide equal rights for African Americans, women, as well as for other 'oppressed' social groups.

The aforesaid argues good reasons that Russian Americanists have for working out their own research background to grasp the US historical experience. I frame this background for myself as following: to reveal and investigate, as completely as possible, most different pages of American history, with all its 'pluses' and 'minuses', striving to find out their objective ratio, their *accurate measure*.

V. S. Styopin<sup>1</sup>

## SCIENCE AND RELIGION: CONFRONTATION OR A DIALOGUE?

There is no doubt that the interrelations between science and religion are among the acutest issues of the worldview of modern times. Science and religion are deeply different and in a certain sense incompatible spheres of culture. Indeed, they are greatly separated, their functions in the society are often seen as opposing one another. However, on close consideration science and religion appear to be mutually complementary.

Considering the society as an integral system it is possible to single out processes of stability and changeability in it. If we consider science from this standpoint we will find out that its distinctive feature is the focus on engendering new knowledge, this is what makes science a most important social factor of change in culture and in society. As for religion, it is the keeper of tradition, of stable and historically proven values. It is in the religion that the universal moral commandments ('thou shalt not kill', 'thou shalt not steal') and the basic models for consciousness and people's behaviour took shape.

Religion is based on faith which is connected with man's emotional world and relies on certain principles. For a pious man these principles are unshakeable. Science also rests on a certain system of principles which shape the worldview. But in science these principles have a historical character, they are stable only at a certain stage of development. For example, the mechanic worldview which was based on the ideals of classical rationality and which dominated in the 17th–18th centuries required deep reconsidering in the late 18th – early 19th century, when ideas of objects as of mechanical systems proved to be inadequate to the subject of most sciences.

A yet more radical review of ontological and methodological principles of science took place during the scientific revolutions of the 20th century: in biology, due to the progress of genetics and discovery of new levels of life arrangement; in physics (developing the theory of relativity, quantum mechanics); in cosmology, due to forming the concept of non-stationary Universe; in inter-disciplinary research (cybernetics, systems theory).

The principles of science and its ideas are changeable. It was noted yet by Einstein, who wrote: 'We must always be

ready to change these notions – that is to say, the axiomatic basis of physics – in order to do justice to perceived facts in the most perfect way logically.'<sup>2</sup>

In science, the change of fundamental notions is the norm. In religion, on the contrary, the norm is the preservation of fundamental principles. Certainly, it does not mean that nothing changes in world religions. The point in question is the initial basis. Even ideological controversies in religion take place in the context of recognition of the same holy scriptures. (The Bible for Protestants and Catholics, the Koran for Shiites and Sunnites). In science there are no sacred books, and a scientist's approach to the great monuments of history is ultimately different from that of a religious person. In this, too, the difference between the two mutually complementary culture life intensions becomes obvious: the dominating values of innovations for science and values of tradition for religion.

As phenomena of culture, science and religion form different programmes of human activity. Science, by and large, aims at studying objects already involved or to be involved in the sphere of human activity – natural, social and mental ones. But science does not cover the whole diversity of culture. Both commonplace sense and imaginative experience, morals and religion are involved in man's understanding of the world. And while science aims, first of all, at studying objective structures, religion reflects the experience of inter-subjective relations, human links based on fundamental values of culture.

Religious feelings reflect the consciousness of man and his situation (faith, hope, love), which cannot be reduced to the rational component. Religion focuses on the responsibility of man to people and God, emphasizes essential obeying fundamental moral laws, the breaking of which leads to the degradation of man and the collapse of social life.

While the scientific worldview was taking shape, the church was actively opposed to the growing independence of scientific knowledge (Galileo Galilei persecuted by inquisition, Giordano Bruno burned at the stake). But gradually the situation changed. Within the Christian tradition the attempts to harmonize the Christian understanding of the world with the developing scientific knowledge became apparent. Thus appeared the philosophy of neo-Thomism, that has something in common with the ideas of Russian Cosmism, then anthropology of Teilhard de Chardin, V.I. Vernadsky's doctrine of noosphere.

On the other hand, within Christian theology as early as in the Middle Ages there existed a tradition of religious cognition of nature as God's creation. The approach, which emerged in the Latin West at the beginning of the 13th century, treated nature as a book written by God, to understand the structure of God's creation, to reveal its logic, its law. It was this interpretation that led to the formation of the type of rationality which was realized in the new-European science. So, the prerequisite for the change-over to the new understanding of nature,

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<sup>2</sup> A. Einstein. *Collected Scholarly Papers*. (Sobranie nauchnykh trudov). Moscow, 1967. Vol. 4. P. 136.

which found a most distinct expression in the industrial civilization, was the Christian cultural tradition. Certainly, in medieval Christianity there was preserved the contrast of the natural and the artificial, inherent in Antique culture, but at the same time it presupposed a potential possibility to transfer to a new interpretation, as man was interpreted as God's creation made after his image and likeness. It made it possible to treat human activity as a continuation of God's deeds, though an imperfect continuation. During the Renaissance and the Reformation a new interpretation of the link between the natural and the artificial began to take shape. In relation to the divine reason, which created the world, nature is interpreted as an artificial phenomenon, and human activity becomes sort of a reduced semblance of acts of creation. In the Modern Age human activity was based on imitating nature, revealing its intelligent design and harmony – in science, technical innovations, and creative activities. The reasonable change of culture by human activity is seen as consistent with its natural structure. This was the emergence of the new way of understanding the world, the idea of the possibility to ask nature theoretical questions and to get answers to them by actively transforming natural objects. So, modifying considerably, taking new forms all the time in the history of culture there continued to be preserved approaches typical of the Christian tradition, while it joined to the values of science.

In the history of new-European culture, science entered into complex controversial relations with religion when it began not only to shape its own worldview but to claim to have a special worldview status. The scientific worldview is renewed all the time; it often radically changes our ideas of the universe. Through the system of modern education, scientific ideas of the world enter into the commonplace consciousness requiring corrections of the world outlook on the whole.

Under the anthropogenic civilization there appear new fields requiring cooperation of science and religion. For example, there are acute problems of interference in the genetics

of man (cloning, influencing the intrauterine growth aimed at projecting a baby with predetermined features). Research into this field provokes numerous discussions concerning the identification of risk areas, which may cause negative social and humanitarian consequences. Not only scholars of different fields but also religious figures take active part in these discussions. There emerge new situations of the dialogue between science and religion, which cause considerable changes in the former status of autonomy of scientific research.

For a long time the prevalent belief was that the anthropogenic civilization with science being its most important source, was the mainstream of social progress. There is no doubt that this civilization has led to incontrovertible advances in industrial technologies, medicine, the rise in living standards. But at the same time it gave rise to global crises which jeopardized the very existence of the mankind. The modern civilization is unlikely to be able to find a way out of these crises without changing the basic values of anthropogenic culture and the strategies of its development. But should the basic values change, it cannot but affect the interrelations between science and religion. The new trends in these relations can be interpreted as the growing points of new values.

We can note that new concepts emerge within the contemporary Christian theology. In this context, the views of contemporary Protestant theologians H. Rolston and A. Peacocke are quite demonstrative. They uphold an idea according to which God never finished creating the world but is creating it all the time, he is a participator in this process and the total of good and evil done by people also makes its contribution to it. Man bears his share of responsibility for the cosmic evolution and influences it actively.

Such ideas, undoubtedly, introduce new overtones into the issue of interaction of science and religion as two most important hypostases of culture and provide new possibilities for their equitable dialogue.

S. G. Ter-Minasova<sup>1</sup>

## THE SIGNIFICANCE OF NATIONAL LITERATURES IN SHAPING THE NATIONAL IDENTITY

The modern age is known to be characterized by two main features: on the one hand, by unprecedented and unbelievable scientific and technical progress in the sphere of communication and, on the other hand, by speeding up globalization process as an important result of this scientific and technical breakthrough.

Without going into details of this most complicated controversial process, I would like to emphasize only one consequence of globalization that has revealed once again the paradoxical ways of human conscience and behaviour.

The paradox is in the fact that the perspective of global unity of mankind, cooperation and interdependency of all people and all countries living peacefully together in one Global village caused a paradoxical reaction, i.e. this perspective (or

threat?) made all the peoples recall their languages and cultures, their national traditions, tastes and values, which led to the understanding of the importance of national identity preservation.

In other words, *the heightened interest in the problem of national identity is a paradoxical but utterly human reaction to globalization.*

That is why the following questions have become topical in the world: what are national identity and national character, how shall we protect them from the global processes levelling everyone and everything, where are their roots and sources?

We will attempt the task of considering the role of national literatures in shaping and preserving national identity.

According to Wikipedia, but with a small correction, national identity is the characteristic trait of the human psyche to express, in a concentrated form, a person's belonging to a certain (in the Wikipedia – different) nation or ethnic group.

The notion of national identity comes close (in some definitions almost coincides) with the notion of national character, which is defined as a psychological make-up of the nation (S. M. Arutyunyan<sup>2</sup>), a set of specific psychological traits attributed to this or that socio-ethnic community (N. Djandil'din<sup>3</sup>) etc.

<sup>2</sup> S. M. Arutyunyan. Nation and its Mental Make-Up. Krasnodar, 1966. p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> N. Djandil'din. Nature of National Psychology. Alma-Ata, 1971, p. 122.

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Consequently, national identity is closely connected both with the national character and with a much broader notion of national culture, which includes the results of spiritual and material activity of people representing this nation.

The word *national* is the main connecting link, which signifies that the psychical features causing world perception, behaviour and people's activities are one of the crucial factors of the nation's formation.

It is interesting to note that arguments over the existence of national characters and identities have practically terminated, the reason being the evident and indisputable burst of xenophobia and aggression, defined as the conflict of cultures, that was caused by geopolitical cataclysms and has become one of the main obstacles on the ways of globalization.

What is the role of classical national literatures in these world processes, cultural conflicts, ethnical confrontations and wars? This is the question which is in the name of our workshop of our remarkable Conference (because it is held in memory of a remarkable personality): *national literatures within the historical dialogue of cultures*.

The word classical should be emphasized here. If one talks about *historical* dialogue of cultures, it means one should also scrutinize classical national literature, because classical literature is only possible when it withstands the test of time, of a long time at that.

Indeed, a work of art or an author can only be called classical in a particular national culture if it remains appealing, widely read and acknowledged by many generations of people of this nation, despite changes in their way of living, culture, ideology and world outlook, which are inevitable in the course of history.

Consequently, it is classical literature that moulds the nation (its identity, character and culture), especially if we mean historical dialogue of cultures.

The dialogue of cultures in the title of both the workshop and the Conference also requires a commentary. What is the dialogue of cultures? The name speaks for itself. *The dialogue of cultures presupposes mutual understanding and cooperation of the representatives of different cultures*. This is a goal (a dream!) to which humanity, troubled with xenophobia and aggression, aspires, but not just a politically correct version for a culture conflict.

When one speaks about national literatures participating in the dialogue of cultures, one means not only the acknowledgement of national writers by the world community. In multinational states (which the majority of states today are), interaction and mutual influence of literatures of peoples inhabiting one country is also a dialogue of cultures; and the advancement of the representatives of these peoples to the level of common and all-country acceptance also makes them classical writers of the union of these peoples.

How are national identity, national character and national culture moulded? It is no exaggeration to say that the main tool, instrument and means is the national language. It's not the only one, but major one. The national language not only reflects the national culture, but also preserves it and moulds it. In other words (of commonplace metaphors), it is the national culture's mirror, keeper and tool.

Literature totally rests on the language resources. A writer has only one source at hand, the WORD. By means of the written word (not the paints, nor sounds) the master of literature – the literary artist! – creates the whole world, populates it, vests it with light, colour, nature, weather, Life, i.e. he becomes the Creator of the world determined by his national origin, character and identity.

However, the word is used also in other sources of knowledge of national identity.

The most popular source of stereotypic national prejudice is the so-called international jokes, i.e. the jokes based on the same plot: the representatives of different nationalities find themselves in the same situation but react differently according to those traits of their national character to which they are attributed in the country where the joke originated.

Thus, the English are pointedly punctual, laconic, pragmatic, reserved, etc in Russian international jokes. The Germans are disciplined and obsessed with order. The French are light-minded and think only about women, wine and gastronomic delights. The Russians are reckless and straightforward fellows, unpretentious, alcoholics, bullies, open, uncultured, but smart and win over other nations. In Russian international jokes all nations behave in accordance with these stereotypes.

The stereotypes of international jokes are far from the objective assessment and give rise not only to doubts but also to severe attacks so often that the very word obtained a negative meaning.

This is one of the opinions from *Sankt-Peterburgskiy Vedomosti* (a newspaper) published on January 11, 1859: 'There are general characteristics of nations; the French are called frivolous, the English selfish, the Russians patient and so on, but goodness gracious, how many thoughtful Frenchmen, selfless Englishmen and very impatient Russians each of us has met...'

The contrast between the heroes of national literatures and the stereotyped characters of the jokes is striking. Indeed, the light-minded French who think only about wine and women, at the level of classical French literature are represented by the dramatic heroes of Stendhal, Balzac, Hugo, Mirmir, Maupassant, Zola, who solve complicated human problems and have nothing in common with 'frivolous' lovers.

On the contrary, the selfish, stiff and absurdly reserved Englishmen of the jokes have created literature sparkling with humour, irony and sarcasm: the fiction of Swift, Dickens, Thackeray, Shaw, Wilde and even Shakespeare, who created 5 tragedies against 22 comedies. Hardly any culture values humour as high.

Drilled with order (Ordnung!) and self-discipline, the Germans of the international jokes presented the world with the most profound and tender poetry of Goethe, Heine and Rilke.

And finally, Russians – hooligans and alcoholics of the jokes – have enriched world literature with a precious contribution: the works by Pushkin, Lermontov, Tolstoy, Turgenev, Chekhov and Dostoyevsky. The characters of these works, with their philosophic quests and delicate emotional experience, are members of the intelligentsia among other characters of the world classical literature (no wonder, the word *intelligentsia* was borrowed by the European languages from Russian).

So where is the Russian national character? In jokes or in Russian classical literature? Who is the typical Russian – a muzhik with a bucket of vodka or Tolstoy's Pierre Bezukhov?

It is well-known that during World War II, fascist Germany was actively collecting information about Russia and the Russians before invading Russia. And Russian literature was not the least of the sources of information. That is how the German leaders made their judgement of the Russian national character. Russia was regarded as 'a colossus with feet of clay': push and the country will fall apart, for it is inhabited by the meditating 'feeble' members of the intelligentsia – like Bezukhov, Nekhludov, Myshkin, Raskolnikov, Uncle Vanya, Ivanov and other characters of Russian classical literature.

Ivan Solonevich bitterly remarks: "Russian literature gave the main background for all the foreign information about Russia: here you have Oblomov, Manilov, superfluous men, pathetic fellows, idiots and tramps."<sup>1</sup>

Fairly critical of Russian Literature as the source of information, Solonevich labelled it 'a distorting mirror of people's

<sup>1</sup> I. Solonevich. *The Nation and the Monarchy*. Moscow, 1991, p. 166.

soul'. He writes: 'Literature is always a distorted reflection of life. But in the Russian instance, the distortion transgresses into some fourth dimension. Russian literature reflected almost none of the Russian reality... Russian literature revealed Russia's many weaknesses but it did not reflect her strong points, and the weaknesses were mostly far-fetched. And when the sorrowful years of wars and revolutions wiped the film of literary verbiage off people's lives, then from under the artistic sham of Manilovs, Oblomovs, Bezukhovs, Shchigrovsky District's Hamlets and Muscovites in Harold's cloaks (A. Pushkin's phrase), of superfluous people and tramps, there emerged people with wills of iron, quite unstipulated by Russian Literature.'<sup>1</sup>

Without getting engaged in the argument, I only want to try to 'rehabilitate' Russian literature which did deceive the Germans. True, there were no Manilovs and Bezukhovs in the Brest Fortress. But who knows what Bezukhov and Oblomov would have done, had they been in the Brest Fortress. They may also have shown up 'the iron of the Russian national character', which, according to

Solonevich, Russian literature failed to reflect. It did not reflect the iron and thus deceived the fiends with its distorting mirror.

However, Solonevich's idea is quite different: 'Neither the state formation activity, nor our military power, nor our will, persistence and grit, unprecedented in the world history, were observed by our literature.'<sup>2</sup> And if they had been noticed and reflected, there would have been no war, which is what Ivan Solonevich means.

But let us turn back to the sources of information on a national identity. Without rejecting indignantly all fiction, as Solonevich does, we do admit that it is not a distorting, but incomplete mirror. It is incomplete, for 'one cannot cover the uncoverable', as Russian writer A.K. Tolstoy said through his fictional character Koz'ma Prutkov. Incomplete and *subjective*, for each work of classical literature has its author with his subjective, personal view of the world, conditioned not only by national self-consciousness and national culture, but also by his personal life, artistic imagination and quite specific personal gift.

Thus, fiction is undoubtedly a source of information on a national character, which reflects and at the same time shapes it.

Problems related to these functions of national literary works are clearly highlighted when the translation of these works into foreign languages is undertaken. This major aspect ultimately reveals both acknowledgement of and participation in dialogues of cultures and – specifically! – conflicts of cultures.

The obvious example of such a conflict is non-recognition or, to be more precise, underestimation of Alexander Pushkin by the outer non-Russian world.

A Russian will never understand why Tolstoy, Chekhov, Dostoevsky and Turgenev are more famous in the West than Pushkin. Paying tribute to these great masters of Russian and world literature, every Russian knows that its patriarch, the father of the Russian literary language and Russian literature, its sun is Pushkin. There can only be one father and one sun.

Therefore, Pushkin's unpopularity in the outer world and especially in England, which is well-known and attested in detail, is so offensive and blasphemous for the Russians that I have no wish to give distressing evidence of it.

This sweeping incomprehension of Pushkin, which sometimes may be sincere, sometimes deliberate and politically conditioned, is usually accounted for by Russian experts and Western 'advocates' of the great poet with a single reason – *the*

*untranslatability of poetry* in general and Pushkin's poetry in particular.

Vladimir Nabokov was quite categorical in this issue: 'My translation theory is very simple, in fact. The only thing that matters is the ideal accuracy of translation... In my book about Pushkin and in quite a few polemic articles, where I crushed the ignoramuses who had been attacking me, I argued and demonstrated that the rhymed translation of Onegin is impossible [emphasis mine – S.T.], for one would have to distort the meaning in order to get the necessary number of syllables and find a rhyme, very trite as a rule. Thus, a word-for-word translation with explanations for the text and extensive notes is for ever and ever the only possible tool for me.'<sup>3</sup>

Famous French philosopher Jacques Derrida considers translation resistance to be a trait of any good poetic work: 'Can a poem be called a poem if it does not resist translation?'<sup>4</sup>

However, it does not at all mean that we should leave any attempts at translating poetry into other languages. On the contrary, the stronger the resistance, the better the poem and the more reasons for us to try and make it available for foreign readers.

Of course, problems and difficulties of translating Pushkin's works into

foreign languages are one of the major obstacles preventing him from getting recognition not just due to the 'trust in the Russians',<sup>5</sup> but as an internationally acclaimed world master. It is 'one of the obstacles', but not the only or most important, the main being his famous Russianness, his soul, national character, national identity, which seem obscure to the non-Russian world.

Pushkin is the soul of the Russian people, and the Russian soul is known to be a mystery, an inexplicable secret for the foreigners.

What does Pushkin's 'Russianness' consist in? Ivan Ilyin believed that Pushkin is 'a most miraculous, whole and victorious blossom of Russianness...' 'What led him was his love for Russia, passionate and joyful penetration into the Russian element, the Russian past, the Russian soul, Russian folk life.'<sup>6</sup> And then, Semyon Frank carried on: 'He had <...> a sheer Russian ardour of cynicism, a typically Russian form of virtue and spiritual firmness that concealed the purest and most profound sentiments under the mask of affected naughtiness.'<sup>7</sup>

Thus, the main reason for non-recognition and incomprehension of Pushkin as the Russian literary genius of the first magnitude is *the conflict of cultures, mentalities and, ultimately, the conflict of souls*. I can foresee the immediate questions: And Dostoevsky? And Tolstoy? And Chekhov? The answer is that they are more *international* and less *national* than Pushkin. Pushkin is a national writer. I realize that this is a trite phrase and that volumes of scientific surveys of 'folk origins and national spirit' have been published. But Pushkin is national. Any Russian grows up with Pushkin and lives all his/her life with him. Fairytales in childhood, then comes school-reader Pushkin, enriching the vocabulary and suggesting quotations on every occasion ('the *encyclopaedia* of Russian life'), then anything about him: letters, recollections, relatives, friends, contemporaries, dictionaries, literary criticism...

Together with Pushkin, a great number of people entered the Russian history, his entire personal world, those whom he loved – and we joyously love them too, and those who hated him – and we suddenly hate them. Apropos, a belated thought: the notion of the Russian person does not mean an ethnic purity

<sup>3</sup> Talk between Vladimir Nabokov and Pierre Domergue. 'Zvezda', 1996, No. 11, p. 62.

<sup>4</sup> Talks with Jacques Derrida. Jacques Derrida in Moscow. Moscow, 1993, p. 162.

<sup>5</sup> 'As far as I know, no Russian ever questions Pushkin's literary reputation. But can we trust Russians?' C.A. Johnson. Pushkin: A Personal View. Contemporary Review. L., 1965, November, vol. 206 (1198).

<sup>6</sup> Pushkin in Russian Philosophical Critique. M., 1990, p. 382.

<sup>7</sup> Pushkin and Modern Culture. M., 1996, p. 17–18.

<sup>1</sup> I. Solonevich. The Nation and the Monarchy. p. 166.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., pp. 164–165.

of the nation 'in blood'. A Russian is a person whose native language is Russian and, consequently, whose native culture is also Russian, because language and culture are the main means that mould the personality. And Pushkin, with his African forebears, proves that best.

Therefore, the point is not in the fact that Pushkin is untranslatable: he was, is being and will be translated. The point is that the non-Russian world does not understand his soul, the point is in the conflict of cultures.

Representatives of different cultures see the world differently: this different vision is imposed on them by their native culture and their native language as the carrier and keeper of culture. Each foreign word is an intersection, a clash of cultures, because between it and the real-world object or phenomenon it denotes there is a notion conditioned by the collective consciousness of the nation united with one culture. That is why each translation is a dialogue of cultures. An alien culture is the most interesting part in this dialogue because the aim of the translation is the acquaintance with it, and the *alien* is the least translatable.

Let us conclude: Pushkin is untranslatable, but all poets are untranslatable, some more, others less.

Pushkin is obscure to the non-Russian world because of the conflict of cultures. But... Pushkin as part of the culture of his time is getting more and more *obscure to the Russians*.

Pushkin is the great classic of Russian literature. The test of time is still going on, and everything is changing radically: the way of life, the social structure, the language and – in a broader sense – culture.

Commentaries, which Nabokov ardently stands up for, are necessary, and in growing numbers, *not only for Pushkin's foreign language translations, but for the Russian readers as well*.

The study of socio-cultural commentaries on extra-linguistic facts enlightens the conflict of cultures, and it is mostly *not only a conflict of one culture with a foreign one, but that of the classical work's past culture with modern one*.

Accordingly, the most wide-spread commentary of this kind should be an explanation of the outdated details of everyday life very common to Pushkin's contemporaries, but entirely forgotten by their descendants. These details are vital to show the characters' inner and outer worlds, the author's attitude to them, and the contemporary readers' evaluation. In this case, commentaries serve as a bridge over the gap which divides 'our' and 'their' time, or as a pair of glasses which can help a modern reader discern the details of bygone ages.

Let us have a look at the example through these glasses, at the beginning of a story about a Stationmaster (*Stanzionny smotritel*): 'Of low rank at the time, I travelled by post (*na perekladnykh*), hiring (paid *progons* for) two horses at each station.' The modern reader needs an explanation of the system of travelling in Pushkin's time: to travel *na perekladnykh* is only possible on post roads regularly used for carrying mail with stops at the stations where there were stationmasters. They

were shown *podorozhnaya*, the document about the rank of the traveller, which signified the appropriate number of horses. *Progon* is a riding fee provided by the treasury. And finally, two horses were given to the officials of the lowest rank. All these data characterize the storyteller and the attitude of the stationmaster towards him, who had confided his story to a person of a low rank, i.e. the closest to himself.

In Pushkin's variants of *Eugene Onegin* there are such lines: 'Get married! – To whom? – To Lidina – What a family! They have nuts served up and they drink *beer* at the theatre.' The modern reader is puzzled: what negative socio-cultural connotations prevent the marriage to poor Lidina? The meanings of the words *nut* and *beer* have nothing to do with the context and do not explain the cultural riddle. The only thing is clear: the social life (social, because nuts are served to the guests and beer is drunk at the theatre) has changed so much that any connection with modern life is lost, and so are the connotations of these words.

What is to be done then? How can Pushkin's riddle be solved? Why does the Russian reader perceive him so enthusiastically, so personally, so unconditionally in spite of the time difference between cultures and unawareness of cultural realities? Why cannot the non-Russian reader, as a rule, appreciate him and, at best, 'trusts Russians'?

There is only one answer: Pushkin is a deeply traditional, national writer, he is a *genius* and the embodiment of the Russian spirit, of the Russian *soul*. And these two notions, *genius* and *soul*, cannot be described and studied rationally or scientifically, and that is why Pushkin's mystery cannot be solved because neither Russia, nor its people, nor its greatest poet 'cannot be understood with pure intellect alone'. The same can be attributed to all other nations and their national literatures and writers.

To sum up, the role of classical national literatures in a dialogue of cultures, in general, and in a historical dialogue, in particular, cannot be overestimated. Classical national literatures are the essential source of information about the roots of national identity; they are the key to a magic door, or rather to the seven doors behind the seven seals where each nation's secret soul dwells, because all the differences of national identities, characters and cultures are obscure and mysterious to other nations. The reason for it is ethnocentrism i.e. perception of one's own culture as the only right, acceptable and standard one. The only way to save life on the Earth is to give the right for self-identity to all nations, for their own view of the world (world outlook), their own way of life, traditions, customs, to accept this right with the mind if not with the heart, to realize the dangers and threats to humanity and to our planet caused by xenophobia, aggression, conflicts of cultures. We should be grateful to those national literatures that stop the hand and the word threatening people. May the writers remember about their great power over the minds and souls of their readers.

And may they use this power for people's good.

## CULTURAL AND LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY OF CONTEMPORARY NATIONS

We cannot say the direction the world is going, as seen from the point of view of evolution and cultural forms and systems: whether it is a unification or a reproduction and complexification of diversity. But we know that the reality itself has become different: there have appeared new tendencies and channels in cultural proliferation, new technical and informational resources to break a cultural norm or a monoculture without marginalizing its bearers necessarily. And if it is the fact, then, the socio-cultural nature of the modern nations – most overwhelming and powerful social groupings – should be reconsidered. I am referring to communities within frameworks of states, very often referred to as ‘nation-states’, and sometimes ‘multinational states’, which, as I see it, make the situation even vaguer. It is national communities, but not ethnic groups or religious communities, that are the major makes of national capital. It is they, who support, preserve and keep a country’s ethno-cultural diversity safe, both in and out of a country. It is especially so when we talk about so-called fellow countrymen or ‘separated nations’. The key factors to preserve (or destruct and corrupt) ethnic, linguistic, religious and other culture-specific systems within national communities are economic foundations, educational and informational institutions, protective legislation, agencies and public institutions, highly elaborated (professional) culture and many other phenomena created by national communities. Over the last decades the preservation agents list has been enlarged by international tools. But, again, these tools were developed and are financed by national communities.

What are contemporary nations? There is still a lot of methodological vagueness and invalid discussions in Russian Social Science about this question. I won’t touch upon the problem of defining a nation ethnically – an ever-inert problem, which is getting new incitement. I will only say that the conception, which I put forward almost twenty years ago, to use this category in a binary (civil and political) sense, but not in a mutually exclusive one, is gaining more supporters in Russia today. But this recognition is laboured in style and on the verge of intellectual schizophrenia at times. Here in Russia we sort of have all the elements of ‘national being’ and national discourse: from economy and a healthy/unhealthy nation to national projects and national sport teams; but the nation itself is as if not there, and its name does not come easily to the speech of many people. One of the reasons for such complexities in recognition is rooted in the wrong understanding of civil nations, the understanding in the Jacobin or American Found-

ing Fathers sort of way. Their conception is like this: a nation should comprise free and equal citizens, who share a language, and perform solidarity and loyalty to the state that they start. But the Jacobin ideal had never been a success, even in France itself, while America’s national idea has gone through curious changes, with little relation to racial and ethnic realities, and even less relation to interracial collisions. Based on the cultural complexity concept, let us have a closer look at these theoretical and practical difficulties. Let us also notice that the question ‘What’s a nation?’ is a difficult one in other countries as well.

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The ‘first nations’ concept came to life in Canada in 1970-1980s, when I was doing my research there. Its first mentioning with reference to indigenous population was made only at the Vancouver Olympics, when ‘the first nations chiefs’ took part in the opening and closing ceremonies, up to their right to participate in lighting the Olympic flame. Thirty years ago, the then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau and many intellectuals of Canada were apprehensive about the renaming of the National Indian Brotherhood of Canada into The Assembly of First Nations (AFN). At the end of 1970s the national leader, French-speaking Trudeau was having hard times persuading his fellow countrymen, including Quebec separatists, that all of them were the same nation. After the three decades of intellectual and political effort of Canada’s élite at the closing ceremony of the Vancouver Olympics the Chair of the Organizing Committee in his speech said that ‘these games have been a further strengthening of the Canadian national unity’. And, connected with this, my question is: ‘Is there a chance to hear such words at the closing ceremony of the Sochi Olympics?’ or by that time the Russian ultra-national dream to pronounce all people in this country Russian and to give the Russians the status of ‘a state forming nation’?

Yet another example of the contemporary discourse on a nation. This one is brought by sports either. At the beginning of the World Football Cup in the Republic of South Africa, among other non-football news in mass media, there was an information about a mass demonstration in Barcelona against the decision of the Supreme Court in Madrid to declare the naming of the Catalan people in the Constitution of Catalonia as a nation unconstitutional. This very right was recognized as the one shared by the whole of Spanish community, which includes not only Catalans, but Castilians, Basques, Galicians and other culturally specific communities. It was for two years that nationalists in Catalonia were waiting for the Court’s decision, which turned to be against their will. Madrid only recognizes language diversity (unlike France with French being the only official language for all citizens), but rejects ethnic split of the Spanish nation into some other nations (like in France).

With its absence of so-called ‘ethnic groups’, Spain is significantly different from Russia; and the Catalans consider themselves not an ethnic community, but a self-governed nation-region. The Catalans are all the people of Catalonia, not only those of the Catalan origin and who speak Catalan. The World Cup final in South Africa brought an end to this acute conflict: the whole Spain was celebrating the victory of its national team that included a lot of players from Barcelona, and even one player from the Basque Country. Thus, disputes around who-should-be-called-a-nation question are current in many countries, but the most current one is the situation when a state, represented by its central government, rejects to recognize ethnic and regional groups as nations. China, for instance, does not recognize as nations all 55 nationalities including the Han Chinese and national ethnic minorities, although Chinese

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citizens taken together make up a nation (Zhonghua minzu). However, this fact does not prevent Ugurian, Quebec, Scottish and other ethnic activists and politicians from using these words to relate to their nations. Thus, the case of rejection or even of a court prohibition is not a universally accepted practice; and it is completely out of question in Russia for its characteristic ethnic meaning of the word 'nation' in this country. That is why our way to reconsider the domestic concept of a nation has never had an idea to 'cancel nations', but, on the contrary, it implies a binary and mutually non-exclusive use of the term 'nation', which is so important for politics, culture and self-consciousness.

However, let us now turn to France, which seems to be the country of a successful and a long-term nation based on civil grounds. Firstly, from the Jacobin persecutions of the minorities and regional languages, the French, as a more or less mutual, though loose, identity came to be only a hundred years after the French Revolution.

The French nation was and continues to be, for the first place, as a doctrine, as a rule of law and as a conventional agreement. France is considered not have any ethnic groups, and all the people of France make up one nation – the French, who, due to the vast historical and cultural diversity of places and territories, give rise to their own identities. This was the very point that Georges Marchais, the leader of the French Communist Party, was trying to get across to L.I. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the USSR, in the complaint he made against the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences for the ethno-demographic reference book issued at the beginning of the 1980s. The French nation aside, the reference book called the Corsican, Bretons and Alsations independent ethnic groups, and also referred to 'transitional groups' presented by immigrants of different countries and generations. French communists were against such fragmentation of their own nation and expressed a sort of a protest. It was the quarrel between Brezhnev and Marchais that saved our institute from the Old Square reprisals. A novice in ethnography then, I thought that S.I. Bruk, the author of the reference book, was right; though now I think that the right one was George Marchais. In other words, according to Bruk, Bonaparte, born in Corsica, was not French, and Sarkozy, the present leader of France, makes even less of a Frenchman! If we follow Bruk and present-day supporters of an exceptionally ethnic understanding of a nation, we will end up separating a whole cohort of national leaders away from their nations: Gordon Brown, a Scot; Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales, both (American) Indians; Barak Obama, an Afro-American (according to Bruk and Bromley, the US black people make up a separate racial ethnic group, which is not part of the American nation proper).

But then what are the French as a nation? It is a historical, cultural and socio-political community within a state, characterized with cultural complexity, which used to decline at political centralization and general civil collisions, and gained back the timely achievements of the past and the diversity in the times democratization, decolonization and mass migrations. The timely achievement of the past do not necessarily mean civilian and ethnic (Corsican or Breton), though these too. The Older France is still divided according to the cultural-and-territorial principle, according to a location or a region of birth ('terroir' for ethnicity). This diversity or cultural heterogeneity of the French used to drive Charles de Gaulle crazy. On the peak of his emotions he said: 'What sort of nation is that which has 450 kinds of cheese!'

And after three decades the situation in France has become even more complex! The present-day 65-million nation of France is made up not only by 'the French proper', i.e. citizens of a long-standing French origin, but also by 13 million of different origin: with 5 million of European origin (Italian, Span-

ish, Portuguese, Polish, Russian etc.), another 5 million of Arab-Berber origin, or expatriates, to be more exact, 0.5 million of Turks, 0.5 million of North African Jews, more than 700 000 of French from the colonies of France. The complexification of religious structure of the French population and the multi-directional character of this complexification are well known: only 10 out of 70 per cent of French Catholics go to church, there are also 22 per cent of agnostics and atheists. And it's all happening against the background of the increasing number of active Muslim believers (the only way to believe in this religion). The latter make up to 5-10 per cent of the country's population.

I am not discussing perspectives for the French nation; I am only making a notice of the very complexification phenomenon of ethnic and religious structure in this seemingly classic civil nation. I am also paying attention to the fact that multiculturalism has never been a reality in the country. In fact there used to be the doctrine of monoculture, making it possible not to recognize the so-called ethnias. In actual fact, based on different specific points (from wine and cheese to historic and proto-state references) regional and local cultural identities made up a contraposition to ethnic groups. The French monoculture can be traced only in the language, but even French itself sometimes seems to be the last bastion under the pressure of foreign immigration. This bastion of Frenchness is defended by a special constitutional law of 1992 on the protection of the language heritage and by the whole number of other state decrees. The present-day France, together with the rest of the world, has, undoubtedly, entered a Post-Jacobin epoch of understanding a nation and what is called nation-building.

It is quite difficult to take the USA as an example for Russian audience. Almost every time you do so you get remarks from the audience on supposedly 'embedded' worthless American recipes for Russia sent by liberal Westerners. However, let us mention that in the USA the Jacobin nation type as a sort of an integrated alloy was just a word. Initially, this concept was implemented through the melting pot doctrine, and later – through the special mission of American nation to be the model and protector of democracy and equal rights. As a matter of fact, America has never been monocultural and, not to say, homogeneous in civil matters. It has always had a lot of ethnic and racial groups and a lot of different languages, to say nothing of the bygone and partly surviving discrimination of the indigenous people, African American and immigrants. I had a chance to observe this, beginning from 1975, taking a trip from the Iroquois reservations in the Great Lakes area to Alaska and Hawaii. And then once, when, after 40 trips to the USA, I saw the 'Welcome to the USA!' billboard at JFK International Airport which was not just in English, but also in Spanish, I only took it as a public recognition of Latin American historical presence among the US population (more than 20 million people to the South of Rio Grande). But then, what's the essence of the growing complexity for the American nation, if the melting pot is a failure, and a multi-ingredient dish is a failure either (the salad bowl concept is getting criticism today from opponents to multiculturalism)?

The answer to this question is – the USA has implemented the *unity in diversity* formula well, though not as a sociological reality, but as a form of self-consciousness that resulted from dedicated indoctrination of the country's citizens. This formula, to some extent, provides for the nation's dynamic development, though it also contains certain risks. American cultural complexification is not decreasing, but increasing (the last acquisition of the sort is more than 10 000 Meskhetian Turks, who have migrated to the USA from Krasnodar region of Russia). And that is happening together with the on-growing American nationalism in its expansionist (messianic, to be more exact) form and also together with the reinforcement of religious fundamentalism among American Christians. The complexification

of the American nation projects through the steady adhesion to immigration and through the growing number of foreign residents (the opposite tendency is relevant for the majority of developed countries). It is quite possible that with the degree of ethnic, religious and linguistic mosaic structure that the Americans have reached any political discussions and scientific treatises on core culture (which supposedly makes up the basis for the nation) have lost their value. It was two or three decades ago that any talks on WASP (White Anglo-Saxon Protestant) and on 100-percent Americans ceased. Nowadays, there is no mentioning of a referent culture for this nation. The present-day Americans is the nation of minorities, of cultural hybridism, or, as Hillary Clinton put it at the last presidential campaign, 'We are the nation of nations'. By the way, we offered this very formula, quite realistic and reconciling, to be established in Russia at the beginning of the 1990s, notwithstanding significant differences in history, culture and mentality that exist between the Russians and Americans.

Let us turn to yet another European example, which is more relevant to Russia's experience: Great Britain or the UK. Let me give a brief overview of the country's ethnic and religious structure and of national development dynamics. Out of the country's 62.3 million residents the English make up 83.6 percent (approximately the same number of the Russians in Russia), Scots – 8.6 per cent, Welsh – 4.9 per cent, Northern Irish – 2.9 per cent, and the overall quota of the British population makes up 92 per cent. The rest of the population are of the Afro (2 per cent), Indian (2 per cent), Pakistani (1.3 per cent) and mixed origin. There is no statistics whatsoever on the population from Russia and the former USSR, though the number of the Russian and Russian-speaking residents is growing quicker compared to other groups of residents (according to some data, the number of students at colleges and universities is about 100 000). Christians of different creeds make up 72 per cent of adherents and Muslims make up 3 per cent. The question is: where is the ethnos and where is the nation? And what do we call that nation, or is there no nation in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?

The nation is called *British*, and the drift from Englishness to Britishness resulted from social debates and from the activities of the Royal Commission on National Identity in the 1980s. The complexity of the present-day Britain as a nation has several dimensions: enormous ethnic and religious variety of urban residents and the rise of the so-called regional languages – a noteworthy event: about 30 per cent of Scotland's population speak Scottish, about 60 000 speak Scots Gaelic, about 20 per cent of Wales's residents speak Welsh, about 10 per cent of Ulster speak Irish, and approximately 3000 speak Cornish. And this is what England is like, with its English nation that supposedly shares one language! Once, when I was delivering a speech at 'Izvestiya' editorial office, L. Radzikhovsky, a political essayist, remarked, 'In England they speak English, therefore the nation is called English. In Russia they speak Russian, therefore the nation should be called Russian.' It would seem as simple as that. However, this scenario does not work in Britain, nor does it work in Russia. For the situation in Russia is the same. The only formula, which is possible here, is that *Russia is the nation of nations*.

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The situation with *linguistic diversity* throughout present-day states is quite similar, since language is tightly linked to ethnicity, especially in the context of domestic scientific and socio-political approach. One example is enough here: Russian theorists and practitioners still believe that a human being should have a native tongue and a single native tongue at that. The note for those who perform a population census – 'a mother tongue and nationality do not necessarily match' – does not help much. The complexity of language, as understood tradi-

tionally, as a phenomenon of culture is the existence of many languages with many variants. Linguistic Atlases or even 'red books' of languages that are dying out have become an everyday reality in the Humanities. All the more so because *the physical presence of language is more evident through oral speech and text, than the presence of ethnicity, almost exclusively, through self-consciousness. Language, being the major means of communication, contains interests of most different human coalitions and institutions, for it provides for their solidarity and functioning.*

The traditional approach to linguistic situation can be reduced to the following: there are no new languages born in the modern world, and, under the influence of globalization, the extinction of languages is boosted up. Some experts believe that by the end of the 21st century there remain only 400-500 languages compared to four or five thousand in the 20th century. Vast speculation and notorious political statements are being made in connection with 'the extinction of languages' and 'red books'. The UNESCO and the Council of Europe have issued declarations and charters on preservation and protection of linguistic diversity. The most widely known international document of the kind is the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (ECRML) adopted under the auspices of the Council of Europe in 1992 as a convention. The Russian Federation has joined the Charter but has not ratified it yet.

It looks as though the world is getting closer and closer to a single language under the influence of globalization. Such dominating languages like English are getting more and more widespread in the global linguistic domain. There are certain reasons for this concern. However, the world's linguistic situation and linguistic situations in different countries are more complex. This complexity is displayed through the following. First, *the blurring and mixing of linguistic areas* to the extent that the making of linguistic atlases is impossible (unlike it was in the 19th century, or unlike the 20th-century situation with ethnicity and religion). Secondly, *a widespread growth of the contemporary human's linguistic database and the spreading of multilingualism in many countries*. Finally, there is a tendency to revitalize languages, i.e. languages come back after the decades of death and/or oblivion. The examples are Breton in France, Gaelic and Cornish in Great Britain and Hawaiian in the USA.

The domestic experience for the first places gives us grounds to disagree with 'the extinction of languages': none of the languages of Russia died out in the 20th century, except for the Sirenevsky dialect of the Eskimo language (it happened when Sireniki, a settlement in Chukotka, was removed). Despite apocalyptic forecasts of some scientist and politicians, there will remain linguistic diversity with the complexification of linguistic situations within present-day nations and with the extension of individual linguistic database. State linguistic policy will, in its turn, develop to recognize and support multilingualism, official multilingualism as well, at the level of state and its regions; and the scope of linguistic services will also be getting more complex. City-hall and other red-tape people will be speaking the same language with the taxpayer, but not vice versa. Multilingualism as a personal attitude and as a policy together with official mono- or multilingualism will be taking their stand as a norm for linguistic communication within national communities. By the way, this may improve the situation for the Russian-speaking residents of Ukraine, Moldova, Latvia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Estonia.

These reflections bring about some questions for science and politics. First, how long is the outdated understanding of 'a mother tongue' going to linger; and what does this 'almighty' category mean anyway? Is it 'the basic language to know and communicate on' (according to Ozhegov), or is it 'the first language learnt in childhood' (thus called 'mother tongue'), or, alternatively, is it something different, like the language of one's

nationality regardless one's knowing or using it? Collecting data on 'a mother tongue', together with other information, is stipulated by the 2001 Federal Law on Population Census. But the 2002 and 2010 Census data throw no light on what this is and how to do this.

We welcome the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, since it is targeted at protecting languages themselves, but not the groups of their native speakers, defined as independent nations or nationalities according to a language they speak. The Charter has no 'mother tongue' notion, also, it does not restrict a language to an ethnicity. For example, if you are a Buryat, your native language is necessarily the Buryat language, and if you are a Tatar, it is the Tatar language, but no other language instead! The reality is quite different from the ideal model: dozens, if not hundreds of millions of people shift from language to language, or learn and use several languages equally. Such situation is most current in the European countries, and Russia makes no exception as well because of mixed marriages, areas with diverse population and high level of education. *It would be absolutely useful if some kind of consensus on a mother tongue were achieved at the level of the European and UNO structures.*

*Secondly.* How much responsibility do a state and its residents have for the linguistic invariability within their state and for linguistic space for education, culture and information? In general, who is in charge of this issue and who is monitoring it, at the international level as well? It is obvious that native speakers and all those who use a language preserve and protect their linguistic systems of communication, but there are some new points in this situation. Public activists, linguists and ethnographers, certain international structures with the mission to preserve intangible cultural diversity want to retain the linguistic situation the way it used to be a hundred or two hundred years ago to keep the linguistic diversity, as the diversity of species in the wild nature. Thus, *The Red Book of Endangered Languages*, just like *The Red Book of Endangered Species*, has appeared for a reason. There are those who stick to the linguistic nationalism policy; they believe that a sovereign state has the right to make its residents study the language that has the status of a national or official language. At the same time, they make no compromise about official bi- or multilingualism. It leads to indirect violence and open discrimination, at the same time such discrimination is widespread in some states of the former USSR.

*Thirdly,* there is the problem of levelling a linguistic diversity in the context of globalization, which includes modern economies and informational systems and human behaviour. There is also the problem of linguistic romanticism and linguistic nationalism, when the question of language becomes a limitation of the human rights and civil rights, and an instrument of political pressure and manipulations, an element of geopolitical rivalry, including pressure against certain countries and communities. *Objective linguistic situation and private human strategies, to some extent, have become a hostage to romantic and politicized approaches to a language and a would-be linguistic policy.* At the end of the 20th century the post-Soviet states, as well as international organizations including UNESCO and OSCE, were overusing linguistic utopias and politicized recommendations.

Nowadays, there are private foundations with special programmes for endangered languages in European countries (Great Britain, Germany). There are projects and scientific research programmes done by Russian scientists. However, to what extent is this concern, or even political mission, up to the individual situation of a country, of its regions and, more importantly, of the interests and strategies of its people? *If we recognize cultural freedom, then we should also recognize the right for a language shift (or assimilation), but not only for keeping a language that is spoken by a part of population (of*

*ethnic, regional or migrant nature).* In such a situation the top world languages, like Russian, English, Spanish and French, will always have an advantage, even with formal equal rights for all languages. The explanation for this is simple: when you know and use these languages, you get more opportunities for prosperity, compared to those who speak minority languages. Therefore, *the principle of linguistic parity at the intergovernmental level (we have a certain number of schools, and you should have the same!) is not always fair and realistic if we take into account the people's very needs and interests.*

This issue has its 'double standards' that are not necessarily set by politicians. For instance, a shift of an immigrant from Russia of Chuvash or Chechen origin to the English or German languages in the country of emigration (the USA, the UK, Germany or Austria) is considered an acceptable part of integration, while the same shift to the Russian language by non-Russian residents maybe be interpreted by linguistic nationalists and foreign observers as linguistic genocide or as the policy of forced assimilation.

The issue of preserving linguistic diversity is of special importance, together with its political meaning, for Europe, with all Baltic States and Eastern European States, as well as for Russia and the CIS countries. The majority of Western European population know two or more languages, but the problem of linguistic policy in the region is not solved yet, as evidenced by the process of ratification and implementation of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages that has been taking years now. Russia has been working on its own viewpoint on the matter.

After signing the Charter in May 2001, Russia has been considering the opportunity to join this treaty by its ratification. Russia is not the only state where the ratification is being postponed. For instance, France and Iceland joined the Charter in 1999 but hasn't ratified it by now. Russia, like many other European states and even more so, has some specificities that prevent it from the ratification of the Charter. These specificities are: a highly diversified linguistic picture; uneven social and cultural development of Russian territories; a reluctance connected with the transfer of the 'language' issue into political domain in the regions with conflict potential. And, finally, this is about considerable expense that will follow the ratification. What makes the Charter itself so valuable for Russia?

The Charter targets the lawmaking and politicians at solving the problems of non-dominating languages as they are, but not at supporting ethnic communities. Such approach is somewhat new to Russia – the successor of the former USSR – a country with a lot of things done concerning the development of languages. The idea that ethnic ('national' in the Soviet words) communities should be subject to state and legal regulation is still predominant here. And a language is a mandatory attribute of such communities ('no people without their language!'). The premise here is: if a state, by its law and other institutions, is supporting any ethnic communities, their original culture and language are being automatically preserved. The reasoning for this seems to be obvious: how can a language and traditions be preserved if not through the support of the people who practise them? Such understanding of the national policy as the direct support of ethnic communities was quite legitimate in a certain period. The first half of the 20th century was the time of tremendous hardships and ordeals for the Russian state. Paternalistic approach of the Soviet national policy, with specific human communities as its subject (those communities were formed on the basis of the 'blood and soil' principle), was quite successful at that time. However, it was quite difficult to use this principle in the late Soviet period. By that time social life had gone through significant changes. Modernization and migration from rural to urban areas on the vast Soviet Union territories brought about the situation when human needs and interests exceeded the limits of 'their own'

ethnic culture, 'traditional' lifestyle and 'their own' ethnic language. Ethnographic, sociological and linguistic research of the period, as well as the 1970, 1979 and 1989 Census showed that ethnic communities ('nations', 'nationalities', 'peoples') were not homogeneous and culturally solid, as science and politics used to treat them. Significant proportion of the population did not recognize 'their own' language as their native tongue and they were using 'an alien' language in their everyday life – which was Russian, most of the time. It was also discovered that a part of the population had a tendency to 'move' from one ethnic identity to another (in terms of that epoch – 'to change one's nationality'). In the context of dominating conventional doctrines and the political teaching 'on nations', such facts were taken as side effects to objective development ('the rise and convergence') of major 'nations' and natural assimilation of minor ethnic communities. In case major 'nations' were partly losing 'their own' language and 'their own' culture, some adjustment to make up for such losses had to be done by governmental politics. In such a context a language was identified as an attribute of an ethnic community; and this resulted in the linguistic problem becoming marginal in the public policy.

*At the present stage a language or languages are not merely a communication tool of certain population groups, but also a cultural value – independent and, to a certain extent, autonomous from its speakers; and this value, just like any other value, may be lost, though, at the same time, we do not mean any physical extinction or 'disappearance of a nation'. A shift to another language does not mean the loss of identity, i.e. awareness of belonging to a certain nation. Self-consciousness can be braced by a religion, connections to a country and its culture and other components of identity.*

*The autonomy of cultural values and risks to lose them with no complications in social life have become ever more acute in the context of globalization. At the same time, many states are aware that cultural losses, such as the loss of a minor language, damage the heritage of the present and future generations and bring about intolerance and discrimination. Russia hasn't worked out an appropriate strategy to take such modern challenges yet. Its lawmaking and enforcement practices, as well as its steps in linguistic policy, are still based on the concept of 'language of an ethnic group', 'language of a nationality', 'language of a nation'; and it gives rise to debates on equality and discrimination of some groups in relation to other. At the same time, it is the vulnerability of some languages compared to others that should be considered.*

If ratified by Russia, the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages can encourage the reconsideration of domestic linguistic policy. Then, it's not only the present legal norms that should be reconsidered (these can take and adapt requirements to preserve and support minority languages); but it is the public and political views on the core of the language problem that should be revised. It will be beneficial for political and scientific thought, and, in the long run, it will improve public management practices in the fields of culture and language.

However, Russia has a more complicated linguistic situation than other European countries. It is obvious that the list of minority languages will only include two or three dozen out of more than a hundred languages. But even to include so few languages will need a lot of effort and substantial financial support for the sparseness of languages. *With the advance of linguistic policy in Russia the list of languages may grow.* Therefore, to implement the Charter in Russia will take decades, but this fact should not be taken as if some support is being given to some nations while some other nations are being discriminated. *In the context of the expanding linguistic pluralism, launched by immigration, and of the interest that new generation demonstrate to their cultural heritage, new approaches to linguistic policy will improve social management and will promote raising integrity and unity in the citizens of Russia.*

As for the present-day situation in the key domain of language learning, the teaching conditions of the so-called native languages of Russia meet European standards for the most part. However, the governmental efforts should be more consistent in this direction as well. The same can be said about the situation with mass media and the practices to support cultural events held in different languages in Russia. Therefore, the most effective policy of a modern state today is to provide a language status for one, two or several languages that is/are announced state language(s), and state language(s) will get a governmental financial support they need to function and develop. *The mission of the state of Russia is, in full compliance with the state standards, to provide for the Russian language learning throughout its territories and for all citizens. At the same time, the state, its regional and local governments together with public organizations and private business should meet linguistic needs of citizens, especially in education, public justice, social services and information.*

**Felix Unger<sup>1</sup>**

## **DEVELOPING A UNITED EUROPE IN THE FUTURE BY ACADEMIES: CONSIDERATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS**

The European Academy of Sciences and Arts sees its mission contributing to Europe in the light of the European tradition as well as to contribute to the future of Europe in its unity, promoting knowledge cooperation and tolerance.

This mission is very prestigious and needs a constant repositioning of ideas and visions. Europe is today a very inhomogeneous entity to be understood out from the history. Europe is evolving definitely. The basis of our common Europe is partially based on the Roman Empire. A clamp between East Rome and West Rome was the Via Egnatia. Christianity played a major role, later split in a West Church and an

East Church. Orthodox and Cyril made missionary attempts to the East parts of Europe as Benedict to the West. From the East have been always attacks by Mongols. They came deep to Europe, the Russians acted more or less as the shield to Europe.

After Charlemagne, in the second Millennium, Europe was represented by different empires. At the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century there has been the Russian, the Austrian-Hungarian, the German, the British, the Spanish and the French Empire. A key role in the whole framework played the Pope, as Roman Church in the Western part additionally.

The 20<sup>th</sup> Century brought a massive change, a complete turnover, to whole Europe. This Century was indeed a cruel Century starting with the genocide to the Armenians followed by the Holocaust in a cruel Second World War with an unacceptable slaughtering of 70 Million people on all sides. There

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was not only the genocide on the Jews, there has been senseless slaughtering of the own Germans, of foreign people in the East, followed by Stalin effectively.

The main reason for such a bloody war has been the fall of the imperial Europe. It was a real "Götterdämmerung", resulting in different fascistic dictatorships in Russia, Germany, Italy and Spain which finally endangered all people in Europe. On the ruins of World War II the new Europe shaped.

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century there was a silent revolution with a unique chance to develop a new Europe in living together. This revolution was unimaginable at the time. The main prerequisite to our peaceful future in Europe is to overcome the remaining or regaining nationalism definitely.

It is demanded to think in an extended way of understanding others, developing co-operations so that we have a new woven interdisciplinary network which gives Europe a new credibility. Goethe has formulated it as the "Gobelin of Life". We need therefore open eyes, open hearts, proper intentions and visions.

The European Academy of Sciences and Arts has the specific emphasis to work interdisciplinary, trans-nationally and building bridges for Europe. This metaphor is explained: when we build a bridge over a valley, it means that we are starting to have a tool to overcome a hindrance. When we take a bridge spiritually it means that we are starting to live together with other Europeans and try to reach their hearts. The main purpose is that we have to use the bridge in our brain and heart, meeting our neighbours as friends in the middle of the bridge. When they are not coming we are crossing the bridge and we start to make friends in new territories.

I already visited most of the Academies of Sciences and Arts in Europe. What I experienced are complete discrepancies in perceiving sciences. In the Western part of Europe, sciences are narrowed to logic, deterministic, mathematical attempts while the Eastern part opens to the humanities, philosophy, and metaphysics which play an indispensable part of the building of sciences. We are dedicated to an enlarged image of sciences. Twenty years ago humanities were excluded in the West. We have been trailblazers and see with great satisfaction how humanities, arts and religions are integrated in understanding sciences (1).

Therefore our Academy is devoted to enlarging the image of sciences in understanding their function. We see the sciences coming from our relation to the nature where we find the natural and technical sciences. We see our relation inter-societal, there are the language sciences, historical sciences, social sciences, law, trade, commerce, medicine and psychology located and then we have to consider as third, our relation to the spiritual topics as philosophy, the arts and the religions. And all those are standing together balanced in a harmonised triangle. Is one part oversized, immediately a degeneration of the other parts takes place resulting in a small focus of our brilliant world. A narrowed picture of the sciences results in a scotomic view of the world. This causes many misunderstandings between people, between the public and the scientific community and leads to an overestimation of the own position.

Our credo is: Academies have to serve man - to serve him in his existence. Having this task in mind in imaging the world, in- and outreach of our positions, then we can start dreaming on our enlargement into the macro- and micro-cosmics and the most exciting vision of our existence.

When we reach out in the macro-cosmos we find today an enormous sky within a cosmos with endless many stars, planets, galaxies - an endless entity. It is fascinating observing how galaxies can penetrate themselves, one goes through the other. There are black holes, and then there are extremely small particles (Higgs particles) which gather the material side. The same experience from reaching out to the cosmic magnitude stimulates to dream into the micro-cosmos.

When we are starting from our body falling into depth, through our molecules, through the atomic structures and going further deeper and deeper then we fall through all and finally we meet us at the same end where the macro-cosmos ended. The macro-cosmos ends in its coincidence. This is only in an enlarged image of sciences, including all what we know and feel. This can be experienced further when you are closing your eyes, opening your heart and start to dream. You will recall the picture of how the galaxies are moving through other galaxies. You experience the same experience in life. It is the same mechanism for our human-being where we are exposed to a constant display with our environment penetrating us in all situations of life starting from breathing, up to love and death.

This enlarged imaging of sciences is very important for a cosmic image where we started in our life. All what we are honestly doing is a small contribution to our human existence, to mankind. There are different ways where academic help is necessary in understanding our world and to find the basis for better and safer life hopefully.

As I said, I see in my journeys a big gap between East and West in perceiving sciences. The scientific image on the Western side is very narrow, materialistically defined. The Eastern side is larger and open to metaphysics too. It is important to think inter-disciplinary, getting the different messages from all other scientific areas, creating new ones. As example I will demonstrate an interdisciplinary attempt coming from organ-transplantation: A patient with a transplanted organ must have an anti-rejection therapy.

With this you are starting also to diminish the natural immunology - the innate immunity. And now it is an upcoming issue how to stimulate our innate immunity. We all have an inborn immunity and we need new scientific skills to preserve and to stimulate it for better. But when we are taking immunity by definition there is a philosophical immunity too. An immunity is boosted by different expressions, by different views, by different meanings. This ends in a theological immunity finally. Recently my grandson has been baptized. The priest asked him "Do you resist the devil?". This is stimulating immunity resisting negative, dangerous ideas, the devil in our life. How difficult it is to resist the devil, we experience during our life. So we have to preserve our innate immunity and fight the bad. Despite people are still fighting; there are still wars, an enormous mass-production of weapons. This is an endless story. There are different alliances as realities in the Orient today. With this example we are taught resisting the bad on the differences of our immunity.

Sometimes I am wondering, can education and sciences ensure a mutual and peaceful living together. The religions are preaching endless peace in our world since Moses. Nevertheless the results are lousy. The crisis in finances, problems with food, energy and water will be the next issues for new wars and reasons for killing other people.

The noblest task of academicians is to understand the doing in reflection of the ethical values. When we are starting to speak on values, then we have to reconsider immediately to the highest value, this is the life per se. We observe how life is threatened and misused. It seems that life does not have always the same value as money. This starts with abortion, with upcoming euthanasia where the life of old people does not count anymore and has a new utilitaristic value. Our health insurances are saying that they face the most expenses at the beginning and at the end of life. At the beginning we are quite successful with abortion. At present time in Middle Europe more abortions are done than babies are born. On the other side in the end the expenses are high as well. That is clear. When you extend this to the old people over 75 years in critically ill situations without relatives and no money, the way to euthanasia is short, life has then no value - therefore being utilitaristic.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we as Academies have a lot to do to bring new visions to our life in an inter-disciplinary, transnational way, to overcome also national burdens and to build between all our folks in Europe human bridges in a solid network.

When we have bridges we have to use them and we have to go over the bridge meeting our neighbours, discussing with them to make them our friends. This is a way of tolerance, "the second mile" where we are discussing in going together more as is needed (2). We need more education to know our own standpoint. When you have an ensured standpoint then you can discuss with your neighbour in a mutual respect in dignity.

Ladies and Gentlemen, we are now living in a wonderful world. 50 years ago I could not dream standing here in St. Petersburg giving you my reflections on the task of Academies. As I just told, it is indispensable to create a broad enlarged image of the sciences and to understand that our task is to serve only man in his existence. The most difficult and easiest prerequisite at the same time is serving man with an open heart and mind.

#### Literature

(1) Manifesto on the Freedom of Sciences, Arts and Religions; European Academy of Sciences and Arts; Salzburg, 2006.

(2) Charter of Tolerance; European Academy of Sciences and Arts; Salzburg, 2002

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### HIGHER EDUCATION AS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION OF COOPERATION AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN NATIONS

Today, almost every person participating in the Bologna educational process is willingly or unwillingly involved in the global culture and has both the opportunity and the commitment to live in a different cultural milieu some time. Therefore, with every coming year, the dialogue of cultures plays a more important part in the global world, representing interests, aspirations, and trends; maintaining and promoting social and cultural diversity.

If we assume that the dialogue of cultures is one of the basic 'commandments' of the individual's behaviour, then provided that the individual is educated and trained properly, probability of national or ethnic conflicts will decrease significantly. In this sense, it is higher education that could perform this special mission. There are examples to that. Such universities as Universidad de Autónoma de Madrid and Universidad de Deusto (Basque Country) in Spain are working most successfully in this direction. Such subjects as dialogue of cultures and conflict management are taught at all departments of these universities. Spain has traditionally been a multinational country, and today it has become home for a huge number of immigrants including those from Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, China, and former Soviet republics. To integrate the multitude of young people in public infrastructure, Spain has developed special educational programmes, and the universities face the task of not only educating young people but also developing the spirit of tolerance and internationalism in them.

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If we turn to our national history, we will see that the making of Russian science including the establishment of the Academy of Sciences and Moscow State University was primarily due to internationalization of education and so to say international academic mobility, which played a crucial role in the development of Russian culture in the 18th century and its integration into European cultural space. It is well known that one of the principal founders of Moscow University, Mikhail Lomonosov, was educated at a German university, and the founder of the famous Russian school of mathematics is Swiss mathematician Leonhard Euler, who came to Russia after his famous countryman Daniel Bernoulli and who worked at the Russian Academy of Sciences for over twenty years. It is appropriate to recall here famous Spanish engineer Agustin de Betancourt, who can be rightly regarded as the founder of higher technical education in Russia. He was the first to introduce new educational standards in the history of technical education in our country: four semesters of higher mathematics, and three semesters of general physics.

To some extent, all these scientists were founders of the global culture.

Today, global culture with its fusion of the unique and the general, the national and the universal, the homogenous and the heterogeneous, is characterized by such an indicator as 'glocalization'.<sup>3</sup> In the theory of global culture, the formation of transnational cultural space is viewed as a process that has a long history (in relation to Western culture which shaped itself primarily during the Renaissance). For the last five centuries, the dynamics of this process has been determined by the logic of by-stage universalization of the format of culture hand in hand with the formation of various modes of local and domestic contemplation.

Education has always been an integral part of culture based on its translation in human generations. In the modern world, education is one of the most important social indicators of a country's development. According to the United Nations standards, the index of national development along with gross domestic product and life expectancy includes literacy ratio in the country and the duration of education. Education lays the foundation of the development strategy of each country as well as humanity as a whole.

In the context of a global culture, education acquires new functions. First, under the domination of the global market, education is becoming an economic factor. Second, migration of people and cultures is gaining pace, which leads to the

<sup>3</sup> Robertson R. Globalization: Social and Global Culture. L., 1992. P. 130.

destruction of cultural patterns and traditional values. Education in this case becomes a factor of social cohesion, contributing to overcoming critical situations in the society. Thus the subject area of *philosophy of education* is defined: what is education in itself (as an actual process) and what is the idea of education (as the meaning of the actual process).<sup>1</sup>

Education is one of the most important mechanisms of the development of an individual *per se* as well as the society as a whole; this mechanism is aimed at the formation and disclosure of the physical, intellectual and spiritual potential of both the individual and the society.

The Declaration of the World Conference 'Higher Education in the 21st Century: Approaches and Practical Measures' emphasizes the fact that if we want to improve the quality of higher education, it has to have international dimension: the exchange of knowledge, interactive networks, teacher and student mobility, international research projects – with due regard to national cultural values and conditions.

The period of studies at a higher school is different in principle from other periods of human life. It is the time when young people build up their intellectual potential, establish public and personal ties, formulate personal values, set goals and priorities. Higher education is characterized by a few key factors which predetermine future friendly interaction of cultures, nations and states. These factors are as follows:

- joining the received knowledge of the achievements of different cultures and nations into a single system;
- establishing a system of personal international ties during the period of study;
- increased international mobility of young people in the period of study;
- gradually establishing a single content base of higher education in the developed countries;
- young people's readiness to absorb a huge amount of knowledge;
- young people's readiness for the perception and comparison of cultures.

The work of all participants on the international project develops their competences including the ability to work in a multicultural environment; the ability to make decisions while doing joint research; the ability to interact socially; the ability to cooperate and settle conflicts; tolerance and respect for other opinions; social mobility; the ability to adapt creatively and many others.

Let us highlight some features of contemporary higher education in Russia which promote the principle of the 'dialogue of cultures'.

1. There is a significant scientific, educational and methodological potential gained in the previous years resting on both national and numerous international achievements.

2. With effect from year 2000, there is a noticeable growth in expenditure on education which leaves behind other economic indices. Some important national educational projects have been implemented.

3. Russia's openness to international community has brought its higher school into the international educational space. The number of students who get their education in part abroad has significantly increased.

4. More and more Russian higher educational institutions are inviting foreign visiting scholars to conduct classes.

In the framework of the issue we are discussing, one should pay attention to the Bologna process. The range of its activities is aimed at developing the possibilities to learn different cultures. When speaking of the Bologna process, people very often focus on one or two factors, while in fact it is quite an extensive system oriented at the international mobility of labour resources during the period of education and following it.

Europe tends increasingly to view itself as a single entity. Vectors of the European integration are directed towards building a single space: geographic, without internal borders and customs, with a single visa policy; political, with a common constitution; economic, with common criteria and common norms. In line with this, Europe builds common economic, financial, political, social and cultural spaces.

In 1984, the European Commission came up with the initiative of making a system of tools to enhance the mobility of human capital on the European labour market. A network of national information centres was set up with the purpose of harmonizing academic standards and mobility in all countries of the European Union as well as aligning countries of Central and Eastern Europe, in Cyprus and Malta. They provide individuals and universities with competent information on the possibilities and requirements regarding mutual recognition of degrees and certain academic courses.

In 1988, a European system of recognition of academic transcripts and credits was established; it ensures the compatibility of the academic material and possibility of the recognition of academic qualifications and competences. The compatibility of academic curricula enables students to choose programmes at any university which correspond to their qualifications. These programmes if completed successfully will be recognized on a par with the ones pursued at a home university. Every year universities prepare information brochures with complete outlines of their courses as well as their syllabi, courses content, requirements, grading system, methods of teaching, structure of departments and units which provide training. These brochures published in native and foreign languages are sent to all partner universities.

The diploma supplement is prepared by universities in compliance with the model worked out by a joint group of the European Commission, the Council of Europe and UNESCO. The template of the supplement is available in eleven languages; it gives a full description of the academic subject, its level, context and contents of the qualifications delivered. The supplement consists of eight parts: information identifying the holder of the qualification; information identifying the qualification; information on the level of the qualification; information on the contents and results gained; information on the function of the qualification; additional information; information on the national higher education system(s).

After signing the Bologna declaration, new tools and initiatives emerged including 'The Creation of Joint (Double) Diplomas', 'Tuning Education Structures', 'Building a Culture of Quality', 'Trends in the Development of European Educational Institutions'.

Priority trends in this way include:

- determining general and special competences of first and second level graduates;
- harmonizing academic curricula in terms of their structure, syllabi and actual teaching methods;
- defining special competences of the graduates of both levels regarding the seven areas of study: business administration and management, pedagogy, geology, history, mathematics, physics and chemistry;
- developing methods of analysis of general elements and special fields of learning.

This project is intended to formulate all-European consensus as to what university graduates are expected to be able to do on completing their course of study.

We should mention some extremely important skills and competences (from the point of view of 'cooperation' which is of a particular interest to us).

All in all, there are 85 skills and competences subdivided into three categories: instrumental, interpersonal and systemic.

<sup>1</sup> Rybakov N. S. *Philosophy of Education // Global Studies: Encyclopaedia / Ed. I. I. Mazura, A. N. Chumakova. Moscow, 2003. P. 1100.*

Instrumental categories include cognitive abilities, the ability to comprehend and use ideas and considerations; methodological abilities, the ability to comprehend and control the environment, to manage time, to build strategies of learning, of making decisions and resolving issues; technical skills, the abilities to use machinery, computer and IT skills; language skills, communicative competences. A specified set includes:

- 1) ability to analyze and synthesize;
- 2) ability to organize and plan;
- 3) basic general knowledge;
- 4) basic knowledge of the profession;
- 5) communication skills in a native language;
- 6) basic computer skills;
- 7) information management skills (ability to retrieve and analyze information from various sources);
- 8) ability to solve problems;
- 9) ability to make decisions.

Interpersonal competences are associated with the ability to express feelings and attitudes, critical thinking and the ability to self-criticism, social skills, the ability to work in teams, to assume social and ethical responsibility. A set of interpersonal skills includes:

- 1) ability to criticism and self-criticism;
- 2) ability to work in a team;
- 3) ability to work in an interdisciplinary team;
- 4) ability to interact with experts in other subject areas;
- 5) ability to accept the diversity and cross-cultural differences;
- 6) ability to work in an international context;
- 7) commitment to ethical values.

Systemic competences include a combination of understanding, attitudes and knowledge enabling students to perceive the way the parts of the whole relate to one another, to assess the place of each component in the system, to plan changes in order to improve the system and to design new ones. Systemic competences involve acquisition of instrumental and basic ones as their foundation. They include:

- 1) ability to apply knowledge in practice;
- 2) research abilities;

- 3) ability to learn;
- 4) abilities to adapt to new situations;
- 5) ability to generate new ideas (creativity);
- 6) leadership abilities;
- 7) understanding of cultures and traditions of other countries;
- 8) ability to work independently;
- 9) ability to design and manage projects;
- 10) ability for initiative and entrepreneurship;
- 11) responsibility for quality;
- 12) will to succeed.

Students in many Russian scientific schools have significant progress in the acquisition of the first group of specific skills, competencies and abilities. National practice of it has proved to be positive.

Let us refer to the second group, which is set separately. The competencies of the second group are aimed exclusively at the development of international cooperation, and at the same time they are very detailed. Items five and six focus on the international aspect of cooperation. The term ‘competition’ is never used in regard to competences and one third of them are linked with cooperation and team work.

The content of the Bologna system represents a set of mechanisms, a model of a single space of higher education including regional (Europe, Southeast Asia, etc.) and national higher education systems. The purpose of the Bologna system is to promote the dialogue between cultures. In this, we see the future of higher education methodology, which will prevent conflicts between states, since they contradict the competencies inherent to educated humanity.

The *globalization* of culture poses several problems to the system of education. Firstly, global commercialization of culture makes higher educational institutions adapt to the needs of businesses and borrow market practices in their work. Secondly, new social and information technologies require changes in methods of training. Only by searching for humanistic solutions of these and similar problems will higher education contribute to building a world of cultural diversity.

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## STATEMENT ON THE NATIONAL UNITY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY

Historically, the idea of nationality evolved in two main directions: cultural and political. In the cultural tradition (with its roots in Johan Herder’s works in the XVIII century.) the nation is a cultural entity formed by common history and based on common cultural characteristics such as patterns of culture, language and national character. In Polish sociology the cultural tradition in the studies on nationalities was strongly represented by Florian Znaniecki (1882–1958) and his school. The political implication of the cultural concept of nationality is a tendency to exclusivist policies vis-à-vis ethnic minorities and immigrants. The former have been subject to the policy of assimilation, frequently with the use of state coercion. The latter were subjected to the process of selection aimed at absorbing only those who had the strongest chance of assimilating to the mainstream.

The alternative, political, concept of the nation has been advocated by the French philosopher Ernest Renan (1823–1892) and by the German sociologist Max Weber (1864–1920). For both of them, the national identity is fully expressed by

the identification with the state. Nation as the “everyday plebiscite” (Ronan) exists because its members want to constitute a self-governing political community and the national consciousness is best reflected in the loyalty to the nation-state, existing or dreamed for (Weber).

The political concept of the nation has been the fundamental idea of democracy. France, after the Revolution of 1789, adopted the constitutional idea according to which all citizens of the Republic are members of the French nation. The same concept constitutes the foundation of the American nation, particularly after the civil war of 1861-65 (the abolishment of slavery and extension of citizens rights to Afro-Americans) and the adoption of civil rights legislation of 1964 (the abolishment of all legal restrictions of citizenship based on race). In a deep sense, democracy is incompatible with any concept that distinguishes between citizens on the base of their cultural identity. All citizens of the nation-state are members of the national community if and when they consider the state of which they are citizens as their fatherland.

The very concept of “fatherland” has two distinctly different meanings, expressed in German by two terms: *Heimat* and *Vaterland*. The first refers to the country of one’s birth, his or her “private fatherland” (in the terminology of the Polish

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sociologist Stanisław Ossowski, 1997-1963). As such, it has no direct political implication. Politically relevant is the second concept of fatherland (“ideological fatherland” in Ossowski’s terminology). In this sense, the fatherland is identified with a state – existing or the one, which the nation wishes to regain.

In multi-ethnic states of today the political concept of nationality is crucial for democracy. In the Preamble to the Constitution of the Polish Republic of 1997 we have referred to “the Polish nation – all the citizens of the Republic”. From my own experience as a member of the Constitutional Commission, I remember how strongly this idea was opposed by those who identified the Polish nation with Polish ethnicity rather than with the concept of citizenship.

Contemporary Russia is an important example of the modern and democratic concept of a nation, which – according to the leading political personalities of the Russian Federation – is composed of all citizens of the Federation, regardless of their ethnic (linguistic, cultural) differentiation. The adoption of the political concept of national identity is crucial for the state policy based on true equality of all citizens and on their identification with the state. Patriotism in this political tradition is best expressed in the citizen’s relation to the state.

Such concept of nationality calls for discussion of two questions. The first is the national status of those national minorities, which do not feel identification with the state they live in. The second is the question of multi-culturalism as a state policy.

In the contemporary world, there are states in which live national groups, which for historical reasons do not feel identification with the state. The most common reasons for such situation are two.

First, the transfer of territories from one state to the other left some national groups within the borders of a state different from the one with which they identify themselves. This is particularly true in East-Central Europe where state frontiers had been changed during and after two world wars of the twentieth century. As such changes had been introduced without consultation with the local populations, substantial parts of those minorities remained alienated from the state, the citizens of which they became. It would be preposterous to consider them members of the dominant nation, if they themselves do not feel this way. The most we can realistically call for is the situation in which the state guarantees such minorities their constitutional rights and the members of the minorities behave loyally toward the state. In the long run, closer relations between democratic states and the integration of some of them within broader entities (such as the European Union) should make this problem easier to solve.

The second reason for the emergence of nationally alienated minorities is the process of awakening of some national groups, which in the past did not feel such strong identity. The Basques and the Catalonians in Spain, or the Quebecois in Canada are good examples. Under the Franco dictatorship, the national aspirations of Basques and Catalonians were suppressed by the repressive policy of the state. In democratic Spain, Basques and Catalonians have been granted far-reaching autonomy – the reform, which in Catalonia produced a peaceful solution, and in the Basque country seriously reduced support for terrorist activities. Democratic Canada presents its French-speaking citizens with the option of voting out of the federation, is such will be the will of the majority. The general conclusion is clear. The democratic state should be ready to grant autonomy or the

right to orderly secession to all national communities, which do not want to remain within the common state. The bottom line, however, is that the decision to secede cannot be imposed by the radical (sometimes using terrorist methods) minority, but must reflect the free will of the people.

Multi-culturalism is a relatively new and controversial concept. It reflects the democratic intention to treat all citizens (and also other permanent residents) equally as far as respecting of their cultural traditions and patterns of behavior are concerned. Massive immigration from Arab countries and from Turkey after the Second World War resulted in the formation of large (several millions each) immigrant communities in several highly developed European states. Originally, it was hoped that the immigrants would either assimilate or depart. In reality, they did neither. Today, the third generation of immigrants lives in Western Europe. It demonstrates its cultural separateness, to large extent based on Islamic religious and cultural tradition.

Democracy requires that all citizens be treated equally and that their different traditions are respected by the state as long as they do not violate the law of the land. Recently, however, the trend to reject multiculturalism became stronger in some democratic states. The growth of nationalism in France and the Netherlands – two states with very strong liberal tradition – is an alarming signal. In the United States, the massive immigration from Latin America (partly illegal) has resulted in the rejection of the idea of multi-culturalism by some prominent intellectuals, for instance by Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008). His concept of the “new world order” is based on separateness of cultures, each protecting its specific characteristics.

Is this a realistic prospect? The conservation of culturally closed communities would require the adoption of one of two policies, neither of which is realistic and neither is compatible with the principles of democracy. One policy would require the closing of the gates from future immigrants and the policy of “sending home” those who had already settled in a new country. The second policy would require forced assimilation of the immigrants. Neither is compatible with the democratic rules and neither is realistic. Attack on multi-culturalism will (most likely) continue, because they became a valuable argument for the nationalistic Right, but they will fail.

The only alternative is the open dialogue of cultures, based on mutual respect and good will. The nation-state may require loyalty of its citizens but must not force them to abandon their cultural identity.

The most complicated problems arise when some elements of cultural tradition lead to behavior incompatible with the rule of law. Family law is the most volatile sphere in this respect. Islamic tradition gives fathers the right to decide on the marriage of their daughters and to marry them at the very young age, in both cases violating the legal rules of democratic European states. So-called “honor killings” are not only tolerated but even cherished by the fundamentalist Islamic tradition but must be treated as criminal by the democratic state. Multi-culturalism is not, and cannot be treated as, an excuse for illegal behavior. The acceptance of cultural diversity and the respect for cultural identities of the minorities have their limits. The law of the state sets these limits. The acceptance of these principles is the best alternative to ethnocentrism and “the clash of civilizations” within the borders of contemporary state. It is not an easy solution, but I do not see any other that would be both realistic and democratic.

## MORE DIALOGUE AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN DIFFERENT CULTURES IS REQUIRED IN THE CONTEXT OF ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION

We live in the era of economic globalization that is more and more turning into reality in the 21st century, when the world develops towards more intensive integration. But practically there appear two vectors of development. On the one hand, economic globalization offered a unique chance for the humanity to develop, on the other hand, it has led to confrontations and conflicts, and serious challenges arose.

In the context of economic globalization that brings out both opportunities and confrontations, various cultures that exist in the world face unprecedented challenges, and the question where the world civilization moves to attracts attention and arises interest of nations all over the world.

1. In the context of economic globalization, will various cultures all over the world establish a new common culture, or will they preserve their own specific culture and develop dialogue and communication?

Nowadays there is a wide-spread opinion that economic globalization has led to homogenization of various cultures, and a new 'world culture' is originating instead of the existing ones. But to my mind, this opinion overestimates the impact of economic globalization on cultures. We acknowledge the deep effect of economic globalization on the basic architecture of a civilized society, especially in economics and politics. But unlike economics and politics that are evidently changeable, the distinct feature of culture as a factor of civilized society is relative stability. Despite economic globalization boosting such significant things as production of machine tools and techniques, science and engineering, management of enterprises etc., it cannot indicate the establishment of 'common world culture'. What is really worth noting is the fact that in the context of economic globalization various cultures differ more and more in their specific features. We should consider philosophy, religion, literature and arts, ethics and values as core elements of culture that originate and evolve under certain circumstances and historical conditions, they serve as major genes of culture, provide the basis of culture and distinguish one culture from another. The major genes and specific features of cultures have been formed for centuries and they cannot be changed. Undoubtedly, economic globalization stimulates generation of a common cultural element, but the differences between cultures cannot be totally eliminated.

2. Economic globalization does not mean Westernization. All attempts to transform a certain culture into a universal model or to impose this model on the whole world are ridiculous. In the context of economic globalization 'Americanized' Western culture and its values are spreading all over the world, compelling to accept a Western concept of culture and impose Western values. The process of economic globalization shows that the attempts to reorganize the world in accordance with Western values, to substitute other cultures by the Western, will sooner or later fail. In the era of economic globalization culture has become strategic resources and wealth of humankind. The point at issue is that some Western countries will govern others exploiting cultures as controlled common property resources. The USA made a lot of efforts to export their values to the de-

veloping countries, using culture as soft power. That's why the developing countries are facing grave and complex challenges to resist hegemony not only in economic, political and military spheres, but in cultural one as well. Virtually, a universal standard for culture does not exist in the world. Preserving national cultural features is crucial for the developing countries.

3. Various cultures existent in the world cannot be split into leading and backward ones. They only differ in their specific features. At present the following opinion is evolving: those who possess advanced technologies and knowledge dominate in development of cultures all over the world, thus gaining a vantage ground in the future progress of society. Such an opinion is only true from a technological point of view. But as far as cultures and civilizations are concerned, it becomes obvious that it is a multicoloured world because of cultural and civilizational diversity. Various cultures make the world multicoloured. Diversity is the basic mark of human society. Various civilizations are identified by a variety of cultures, which assume different historical development, social institutions and mode of evolution in every country. And every country should respect such differences. Despite competition between cultures, they should borrow advantages from each other and eliminate their drawbacks. Respect, enhancement and flourish should be accredited not only to cultures of economically developed countries, but to developing ones as well. All cultures made their contribution into the development of human civilization. They all should have equal rights and occupy an equal place.

4. Co-existence of various cultures is determined by historical necessity. Cultural diversity should be encouraged. National culture is the core of national mentalities and a major gene in its authentic meaning, the gene that distinguishes one people from another. One can say that every people of the world has its own cultural specific features and its own impulse of development. In this respect, despite a dynamic growth of the Internet — popular, fast, conventional and open, it cannot substitute specific national culture, though as a tool of communication between cultures the Internet plays an important role.

5. We need dialogue rather than conflict between cultures. Nowadays the West supports a popular idea that it is the very difference between cultures that leads to clashes and conflicts between them. Observing the way cultures develop, one can draw a conclusion that there are no insurmountable walls between cultures that could prevent communication and dialogue. In the process of economic globalization, overestimation of differences between cultures and the role of their conflict does not correspond to the course of history. One cannot deny that cultures differ, they confront each other and have controversies, but it is not the main tendency for cultures to develop. On the contrary, the main tendency for cultures is to co-exist and cooperate. The best model of relations between cultures is dialogue and exchange. We should consider this issue in the global context. All cultures of the world should take their part in solving global issues. Various cultures have common interests. We should be motivated by the principle of unity in diversity in human culture. We should also acknowledge that existence and development of various cultures reflect a common value of humanity in different aspects and spheres. The aforesaid cultures have their own distinctive features. We should honestly respect diversity, and should not treat other cultures as rivals or potential enemies oppressing other cultures. Manifesting tolerance towards other cultures means receiving tolerance in response. Acknowledgement of cultural differences is a typical sign of civilization. To search for common features preserving differences is the best way for various cultures to co-exist.

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6. China is an ancient civilized country, it has two basic concepts of culture. First, it is to inherit and cultivate remarkable traditions of national culture. Second, adapting and adopting effective elements of foreign countries of the world, to establish and cultivate an advanced culture with specific Chinese features.

7. In the 21st century the process of globalization is accelerating, various economies and civilizations enrich each other. The time is coming when the system of international relations faces changes and is directed towards multipolarity. The world financial crisis that has been in progress in recent years, made a great impact on the framework of international politics and economics. In this respect, the reform of international financial system penetrates deeply into the mind of the world community. In the course of pervasive globalization, under complex and rapidly changing international circumstances, China and Russia should cooperate actively and combine efforts to face challenges. China and Russia have come to a strategic consensus to evaluate international framework development. On the one hand, both countries consider that multipolarity of the world has become irreversible, but on the other hand, we still can witness attempts of unilateral actions, and pursuit of a policy of force. New challenges and threats appear.

Many official mutual declarations, agreements and treaties signed by the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation frequently repeat the views of the two countries on cultures and civilizations. The principal views are as follows:

Firstly, cultures and civilizations are becoming diverse. Secondly, cultural and civilizational diversity is the driving force of human progress. Thirdly, all countries should treat different civilizations and cultures in accordance with the principle of equal rights and mutual respect. Fourthly, they should enhance inter-civilizational, intercultural and inter-confessional dialogue. Fifthly, they should provide harmonious development and mutual benefit of different countries and civilizations. All this proves that China and Russia have paid attention to a crucial role of soft power in international affairs. Following these views and being under pressure of the Western ideology and integrity, China and Russia have formulated their common views on human rights. Firstly, they shall acknowledge a universal character of the principle of respect for human rights. Secondly, every state has the right to stimulate and protect them in accordance with its own specific features. Thirdly, to oppose politization of this principle and application of double standards, to speak out against exploiting the human rights issue in order to interfere in home affairs of other countries. Fourthly, to promote international community approaches to the issues of human rights being based on the objective and non-discriminatory principle.

On the whole, economic globalization is a trend of historical development, when various countries and nations cooperate more and more closely. In this context, conflicts, changes and dialogues between different countries and cultures are in progress. Dialogues between cultures are becoming more topical and real.

**A. V. Yakovenko<sup>1</sup>**

## CULTURE, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY OF RUSSIA

The present-day complex transformation of the world was triggered by the end of the Cold War, but the basis for it had been laid by the processes that were under way in the 60-ies starting both in the East and West. Ours is the time of big questions. If we don't ask ourselves these questions we shall not be able to comprehend what is happening in the World and international relations. Culture constitutes the very foundation of national life, a hidden mainspring of the historic process. I consider the culturological method used in "The Decline of the West" by Oswald Spengler to be quite convincing. The experience of President Bush's Administration even made Zbigniew Brzezinski appeal to his conclusions and raise the need for the international community to develop a shared vision of our era.

History incarnates the cultural type and the mindset of a nation. There is a Russian proverb attesting to this: *Sow a character and you'll reap a destiny*. Accordingly, to understand Russia's internal state, its international standing and foreign policy one has to start with considering its culture.

First and foremost, I am deeply convinced that Russia has as great a future as its "God-given past" as Alexander Pushkin put it in his letter to Pyotr Chaadayev. Probably, our history couldn't have been different, as nothing happens by accident.

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History chooses its heroes and ways to implement the design embedded in the genes of national character.

The French Revolution which continued the cause of Colbert's reforms released the energy that had been building up in the French society from the second half of Louis XIV's reign. A similar charge was being accumulated in Russian society, which had been by and large "dormant" for a good part of the 17<sup>th</sup> century.

As Alexander Herzen put it, Russia responded to the challenge of Peter the Great's modernization by the genius of Pushkin and by the whole Russian culture of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, especially its literature. As to foreign affairs, Russia repaid its debt to Europe by its decisive role in defeating Napoleon. This allowed all European nations to develop independently and naturally.

We have a lot to be proud of about our national character, as it was recently reminded by President Medvedev. Of our broad view of things, for example. Some would call it a holistic-didactic, deductive method, an aptitude for a global, comprehensive analysis of problems. It could be that this breadth of our national character equally accounts for negative and positive things in our history. Among other things it explains the cultural depth, when many things are not obvious "on the surface". To this I would attribute the inner freedom that many people possessed during the Soviet times. But for this freedom, there would be no modern Russia today.

The phenomenon of the Great Russian literature has very much to do with our role in history. There is an opinion that only English and Russian literatures can be deemed truly universal, although this sounds unfair to Miguel Cervantes, Marcel Proust, and many others.

It is hard to underestimate the significance of cultural phenomena as all-encompassing, prompted by inspiration factors determining the state of society. The Russian literature of the

19<sup>th</sup> century is just like that. Gogol alone is enough to explain many things. Turning to the West and the USA in particular, it is hard to overlook the prophetic works that foresaw the final outcome of the processes catching their meaning at the initial stage. Among these, there are *The Quiet American* by Graham Greene, *Dr. Strangelove* by Stanley Kubrick and *The Catcher in the rye* by Jerome Salinger.

Let me dwell on Somerset Maugham's story *The outstation* which convincingly illustrates the costs of egalitarianism as an element of social engineering. It leads to a conclusion that the British Empire was saved by its thoughtful attitude to traditional society in colonies in the spirit of enlightened aristocratism: all people are different and are entitled to be so.

It is not by chance that Oswald Spengler sees the roots of the Western civilization's problem in its cultural decline. According to him, the Baroque period and European music of the 18<sup>th</sup> century draw the line under the culture, when art still found its inspiration in Christianity. This art of the 18<sup>th</sup> century was what Ivan Turgenev was longing for.

Georgiy Adamovich, a leading literary critic of the Russians abroad wrote in his *Loneliness and freedom* that "What the West is unwillingly and gloomily leaving the hold of, Russia must one day return transfigured, having become wiser, and having learnt many things which the West had never known."

Russian literature picked up the baton from Europe and here lays its global historical significance. Let me cite Nicolay Berdyaev who wrote: "Dostoyevsky is the greatest value by which the Russian nation justifies its being in this world, what it can appeal to at the Judgment Day".

In his speech on Pushkin Fyodor Dostoyevsky came to the idea of the "universal responsiveness of Russia", its "pan-human vocation". Largely relying on Pushkin's *Little tragedies*, this mini-Shakespeare, he saw the hope for re-unification of the European civilization, not at all juxtaposing Russia to Europe. On the contrary, Russia was to help "resolve European contradictions once and for all".

How else can one explain the exceptional responsiveness of the Russian literature not only to the state of its own society, but also to the state of the European society as a whole? Its foretelling not only Russia's revolutionary catastrophe, but also Europe's calamity, the First World War which drew the line under the carefree *Belle époque* and the first stage of globalization. Thus, Russia along with all other countries entered a "twilight" period of the European history. The inter-war period – due to the untenability of the entire European politics and the inability of the European thought to face up to the challenges of the times – may well be regarded as an initial stage of the Cold War with security guarantees and "cordons sanitaires" discriminating on the grounds of class.

This intuitive ability to foresee Europe's fate influenced the development of the Russian political and philosophical thought after the catastrophe of 1917. I think that without this intellectual contribution it would be hard to understand what is happening today when a logical historical cycle triggered by the First World War is winding up. Its essence is aptly conveyed by the verses of the *Poem without a hero* by Anna Akhmatova: "As if I crossed myself // Before going down to a gloomy crypt". These lines were written in August 1941, but Europe began "going down to a crypt" with the start of World War I.

Also, noteworthy are theories and ideas of such outstanding minds of various ideological persuasions, including conservative ones, like Vassily Rozanov, Konstantin Leontyev and Pitirim Sorokin. The predictions of the latter keep proving to be right today, though they were voiced out back in the 60-ies.

Vasily Rozanov in his *Apocalypse of our time* (1918) wrote: "The deep foundation of the things happening now is that in the European (all of it, including the Russian) humanity there have developed colossal voids of the previous Christianity and everything falls through into them: thrones, classes, so-

cial estates, labour and wealth". Konstantin Leontyev believed that after the French Revolution European society had entered the stage of "secondary simplification" which would inevitably end up in a catastrophe. This idea in many ways is consonant to the aristocratic critique of democracy by Alexis de Tocqueville. At least, it is hard to dismiss it, if one analyzes the current state of European society and European democracy, together with the political class that allowed the present crisis to happen.

Pitirim Sorokin, being the founder of the modern sociology, believed that the human mission on Earth is not limited to consumerism. According to him, Europe and the West as a whole were approaching disintegration of the "sensual" socio-cultural set-up. It is for this reason that he predicted the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union – as it embarked on the same path of development as the West. These ideas might be viewed differently, but the precision of the forecast contained therein may be pointing to that they really explain some things in the present. All the more so that no other coherent explanations have been offered so far.

To think in terms of a special, non-European way of Russia would amount to renouncing our own history, which was a complex process of mutual influence between Russia and the West. It is generally recognized that the creative work of Pushkin was not only idiosyncratic and folk-spirited but also influenced to a great extent by the European culture.

Apparently, the Russian cultural matrix is compatible with values of the European civilization, if the latter is viewed as rooted in Christianity. At all times, when exceptional circumstances so required, in the era of reforms and severe trials, Russian society put forward persons of every state in life, who put into practice the values of development, renewal and individual responsibility. And they took charge for the destiny of the country. So it was in the times of Peter the Great, Catherine II, during the wars against Napoleon and Hitler, and in the First World War when the Chiefs of General Staff did everything to prevent any check on the mobilization already announced and start hostilities in East Prussia, thus frustrating the Schlieffen Plan. The same thing was happening during the Khrushchev Thaw with its scientific and technological breakthroughs, advance towards freedom of creation and social life.

I think that no one would venture to say that there was no reliance on our cultural tradition in all Russia's achievements throughout the history and that something else underlay the country's renaissance. What would have we been like had we not been able to read Russian classics? We turned out to be able to withstand Napoleon's invasion and Hitler's aggression to the extent that we were different from West Europeans in the cultural sense. May I cite Fyodor Tyutchev who was not only a poet and philosopher but also a diplomat. In his unfinished treatise "Russia and the West" he wrote: "The Russian people is truly Christian thanks to this faculty for self-denial and self-sacrifice, which sort of comprise the foundation of its moral nature".

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There are values and values. It is impossible to view the modern civilization out of the value context of the traditional society, in theory meant to be destroyed by the former. We are convinced that a common denominator for values is needed for the modern world. This is why we speak out at the UN, including the Human Rights Council, in favour of deepening the understanding of such traditional values as dignity, freedom, and responsibility shared by all the mankind. This is more and more often talked about now here in Britain as well.

Let us try to comprehend that neither the Reformation nor the Revolution, neither the Enlightenment nor materialism or socialism saved Europe from its catastrophes, first of all the tragedies of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, which Russia was doomed to share with the West. What happened to liberal capitalism

can be called a literal application of physical laws: the famous "Protestant ethics" got worn out and the whole construction it undergirded collapsed.

It was long ago when Fyodor Tyutchev wrote that "the Reformation threw out the baby with the bathwater", referring to the Christian teaching itself. This paved the way for the Revolution which "every time it starts to create inevitably falls into a utopia". From this we can conclude that Russia through its revolutionary experience has had a communion with the Protestant heritage of Western Europe.

The rise of religion everywhere around the globe testifies to the importance of culture in the discourse on international relations. One of the reasons, as many authors point out, is the emancipation of the Church and other religious institutions from the control of authorities, which allows them to develop their own "political theology". This fully reflects the Russian reality as well as explains the strengthening of the role of the Russian Orthodox Church and other major confessions in the social life of the country.

Madeleine Albright, a former US Secretary of State, focused on this issue in one of her books, revolving around the idea that the West needs to "turn to as profound questions" as other cultures and civilizations do, referring to such "transcendental issues" like "history, identity and faith". Given that "every creed shows the way to contrition and common understanding". It is pretty clear to us, but it would be great if others understood this too – that with no contrition there can be no salvation. As there will be no economic growth without catharsis and correction.

The ideological standoff of the Cold War can be viewed as a means of maintaining the domination of the European civilization in global affairs in conformity with the requirements of that specific period of history. Moreover, as Sorokin understood it, there had always been a common mindset denominator between the two camps which were armed with different products of European political thought.

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Only traditional high culture makes modernization possible; there is no other way about it. Moreover, it will only strengthen this foundation, as our history of the last three centuries clearly shows. But modernization ways may differ. For one, westernization wouldn't work for Russia. We borrow the part of common heritage of the European civilization that has been sifted by time itself with our participation or historical experience. Moreover, today the West is going through a transformation period, accentuating precisely the sustainability of the European model of development. The previous modernizations drew us closer to Europe but Europe itself was changing.

Since I mentioned Salinger, I'll have to speak about the influence of Zen Buddhism on his creative work. Is it not for this reason that it is so poignant and filled with premonitions close to prophecies? In any case, it is all about the West borrowing positive elements from the Oriental culture. This also attests to that the modern world, tired of ideologies and their struggle, needs convergence, synthesis and fusion. On the other hand, that is impossible without renouncing narrow ideologized categories and transition to another, long lost level of generalization and comprehension of reality.

Elements of convergence, which occurred quite regularly during the 20<sup>th</sup> century, are indicative of the innermost unity of the European civilization. Those are reforms of F.D. Roosevelt, the whole inter-war period and the allied relationship of the WWII, the Détente and finally, the contemporary period when Russia has unconditionally accepted the fundamental values of market economy and representative democracy.

I understand that many will treat the statement of Fedor Tyutchev, that "Russia with the mere fact of her existence denies the future of the West" as a declaration of nationalism and

Slavophilia. But such a perception would be unfair towards the person whose philosophic depth was respected by Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy. Tyutchev and Slavophiles were united by the fight against censorship. Returning to his notion you will see, that he meant the split of Europe and the existence of Eastern Europe as a "legitimate sister of the Christian West".

The state of the modern Russian society could be a subject of long discussions. I would just like to draw your attention to the following statement of Masha Lipman from Carnegie Moscow Center in the *Moscow Times*: "In fact, nowadays Russians enjoy unlimited individual freedoms. People are dealing with their own private affairs enthusiastically, without paying special attention to politics". Let us not forget that we could start breathing freely in all respects only at the beginning of the new century. I will not refer to France, to which it took two defeats in wars with the whole Europe and Prussia to set up a more or less democratic form of governance. Europe had to go through two world wars to create a truly representative democracy. I strongly believe that people in Russia need some time to mind their business much enough. The same is true for countries as well; in this respect, Russia has quite a good record. If our partners had set themselves such a task, the current global crisis, which makes everybody suffer, would not have happened.

As President Medvedev said at the celebrations in Saint Petersburg on 3 March, modernization and progress always have the goal of widening the scope of freedom within the society and in international relations. The crisis of democracy is another thing that we have in common with the Euro-Atlantic countries. Why not try together to bring it back to life, including by direct participation of citizens in government, as it is happening now in France and Russia where the American practice of "primaries" is being introduced?

It is indispensable for us to jointly interpret the whole XX century experience in the totality of its tragedies and cause-effect relations, starting from the catastrophe of the First World War. It is difficult not to agree with those who believe that it is the collapse of the old Western civilization and the crisis of the Western society that made possible the emergence of political leaders like Hitler and Stalin. This joint interpretation would atone for all our common and separate sacrifices, including the human cost of the Industrial revolution, but especially what we all went through in the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This would be a core element in crystallization of the common spiritual heritage of Europe.

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And if the European civilization needs a retrofitting, thank God, now in far less catastrophic but still unprecedented conditions, intellectual and political openness will be indispensable. The absence of such openness on the part of our partners is at the root of all misunderstandings and problems of Euro-Atlantic politics of the last twenty years.

In fact, why not be guided by the neoclassical synthesis of ideas of 1960s? This period was not only fruitful from the intellectual or ideological point of view. I believe that to be a potential watershed in the development of Europe and the world, USA and the USSR. The settlement of the Cuban missile crisis brought clarity to the reality of strategic stability. All the subsequent development, along the line of militarization of economy, foreign policy and international relations was inertial and unfruitful. It won't be an exaggeration to say that those years were wasted, though this experience was not in vain. Without the Cuban missile crisis there would be no "peace speech" by John Kennedy in 1963. Regrettably, the political orthodoxy prevailed both in Washington and Moscow and John Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev were no more on stage. Precisely there can be detected the roots of the Soviet stagnation and the current crisis of liberal capitalism.

When we speak about Gorchakov's self-concentration of Russia, we mean complete subordination of foreign policy to the tasks of complex national modernization. That was the case during the times of Great Reforms of Alexander II. And that is the Russian diplomacy's fundamental role as set out by President Medvedev. That is why a multivector positioning by Russia is important, as it is both pragmatic and corresponding to the trends of modern global development, and dictated by our panhuman world-views and our culture. That is why Russia's participation in the G8, G20 and BRICS is natural and necessary.

In modern times, a nation's full or even partial isolation or self-isolation is absolutely out of the question. This doesn't happen anymore and it is no part of our foreign policy philosophy, which proclaims an open approach to the world and international co-operation, willingness to engage in pragmatic and fair interaction with all nations without exception.

Today, when Europe, in connection with the situation in Libya, is enthusiastically engaged in something that is increasingly not typical of it, starting from 1918, or as the British say, "not its cup of tea", there's only regret to be felt. The pragmatism of such approach might turn to be illusory. By supporting the myth of its war potential, Europe is forced to sacrifice a much more important and, in the current period of history, essential thing – its moral high ground, its soft power capabilities. Leslie Gelb meant for everyone to take heed of his warning that in modern times "economy – not military might – is the focal point of geopolitics".

One of the problems in our relations with the West is that the starting point of the strategic thinking of our partners is 1945, i.e. limited by narrow historical frame of the Cold War, which, I am sure, became a space and time warp in history artificially constraining the intellectual horizon of the modern international discourse. Only together, by overcoming instincts and intellectual inertia of the past we can restore the capacity of the European civilization to conduct its "Grand Strategy" in the world.

The truly Greater Europe will have a greater capability to contribute to resolving global issues and settlement of regional conflicts, particularly between Arabs and Israel, where the mediating "Quartet" already represents such Greater Europe consisting of the USA, the EU and Russia.

That is why the key question, which is at the same time the main cultural issue of our foreign policy, is about settlement between the different parts of historical Europe and first of all between the West and Russia. I am confident, that the settlement of this centuries-old quarrel for the common European legacy will define the future of the European civilization in the globalizing world.

It is important to be aware of not only your own problems, but the problems of your partners in order to see common problems, which could make for a positive unifying agenda for the European and Global politics. No less important is that in the conditions of fast changing world it is meaningless to try to preserve the status quo. The real question is how to transform

the system of global governance in order to make it relevant to new realities including multipolarity.

The restoration of political unity of the European civilization should help strengthen its competitiveness and ensure its eventual survival in the modern world. That the West is finding itself at a loss is quite understandable. Nothing threatens the western way of life except its own limitations, revealed by the global crisis. It should be clear that systems of values and patterns of development have become nowadays subject to competition. This is what Francis Fukuyama states in his article in a recent issue of the *Foreign Affairs* magazine, pointing out that new developing markets are advancing not only in economy but also in the intellectual sphere.

Erik Reinert should be right, saying that there is a need of a new policy of developmentalism. As Russian President Dmitry Medvedev underlined, the state is not an aim, but an instrument of development.

The notion of Russia joining the West is totally wrong and contradicts the modern context, as if Russia joins a collective farm (*kolkhoz*), leaving its own history and culture behind the door. Sober consideration of the situation in the West makes it evident that it is a matter of uniting, moving towards each other. An appropriate instrument for this is the idea of modernization partnerships, which are meant to take us to some common state and station at the level of economic interests, as well as institutions and norms of all sorts. Let me remind you that during the meeting between President of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom David Cameron in September in Moscow both leaders signed the Declaration on a Knowledge-Based Partnership for Modernization.

Therefore we put forward such initiatives as a European Security Treaty and a joint European missile defense system (BMD), aimed at relaxing the situation in the European affairs, removing obstacles, mostly of the past, for joint actions in the interests of our common future. These ideas along with the Hague Peace Conferences a century ago give evidence of the positive agenda of our foreign policy, as well as of the culture behind it.

Our culture has saved us more than once and has shaped us the way we are today. Definitely, modernization will lead to a sort of homogenization of the Russian Soul, narrow the gap between Oblomov and Shtolz. But that does not mean that we should abandon our own identity.

The key aspect will be investment in people and physical infrastructure. The UK PricewaterhouseCoopers presumes in its forecast of January that in this case Russia could be the 6<sup>th</sup> major world economy by 2050. One shouldn't succumb to delusion, but at the same time it has to be acknowledged that Russia has always possessed such a potential and proved it in the best years of the Soviet Union and in the period prior to the beginning of the First World War.

I am sure that Europe and the world need Russia exactly like this – being on the rise.

A. S. Zapesotsky<sup>1</sup>

## WHY IS RUSSIA LOSING IN THE GLOBAL COMPETITION OF NATIONAL CULTURES?

Nowadays, twenty years after the dramatic change of the socio-economic formation in Russia, it is clear that Russia's growth rates are catastrophically low compared with the West. And they are even lower when compared to other BRIC countries.

In their interpretation of economy as the 'basis' for a socio-economic formation and of culture as its 'superstructure', the national power framework together with pseudoscientific centres in their service are still guided by the outdated Soviet understanding of Marxism, while it is common knowledge that economy is a subsystem of culture. Skipping of this principle plus adhering to ultraliberal ideology lead to disastrous results. The most distinctive example is the failure of yet another campaign to 'modernize' the country, undertaken by the Russian authorities.

It is well known that experts understand modernization as a transition from a traditional type of civilization to the technological one. The qualitative differences between the two types were brilliantly formulated by V.S. Styopin [1].

The main problem of Russian modernization seems to be the ignorance of its bureaucracy responsible for its implementation. Unfortunately, it is quite a regular practice for Russian state officials to understand modernization as the funding of certain science-intensive sectors, as the using of methods approved by the world community in promoting scientific life (industrial parks, clusters etc.), as the training of young people to operate new equipment. And in this case, benefit is the only way to motivate scientists and engineers. And this is made quite explicit by high-rank officials at the meetings devoted to the implementation of the Skolkovo project. Such an attitude contains disregard of the system of values, needs and motivation that are normal for every contemporary individual. Yet another significant point is that the organizers of modernization have often fairly vague ideas about where adequately qualified people come from and what relations between these people should be set.

In fact, the bureaucrats' attitude is generally reduced to a vulgar entrepreneurial approach: 'There is a challenge, so let's issue required commands, pay for the resources, implement a project and, in the end, derive benefit from it.' In principle, such approach actually denies the knowledge that contemporary science has about the state management of social and economic development. Meanwhile, it is the state of Russian science, culture and education that predetermine its modernization and economic development. Fund allocation and administering alone are not enough.

It is well known that scientific and technological progress and implementation of innovations are inseparable not only from the involvement of talented scientists and inventors and

the arrangement of their work conditions, but from a whole layer of a country's population involved in science, research and experimental activities as well. 'Mathematical models for predicting long-term demographic, economic, energy and ecological development of the world and individual countries', a paper presented by A.A. Akayev, V.A. Sadovnichy, I.Ye. Anufriyev to the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, offers a detailed description of the correlation between the R&D works and scenarios for the development of Russian economy.

Among other things, the authors write: 'The overall rate of scientists, engineers and technical employees, involved in the R&D in Russia today, is about 445,000 against 1.08 million in 1991. For the sake of comparison: the Chinese rate is 1 million; and the US rate of 1.3 million is the highest. Though by the number of people involved in the R&D, Russia still belongs to the group of highly developed countries, it is considerably backward due to the amount of financing, which results in continuing technological degradation. Indeed, the 2009 R&D rate dropped as low as 1 % of Russia's GDP, compared to 2.7 % in the USA, 2.5% in Germany and 3.4% in Japan. More than a twofold drop in the number of employees involved in R&D projects has seriously affected the competitive abilities of Russia's economy' [2].

But, if Russia needs from 0.5 to 1 million of highly qualified employees to sustain its competitive abilities in the global engineering and technical domain, the question arises: Where are we going to get them from? Yet another, equally important question: How will Russia manage to supply those employees with an acceptable socio-cultural environment? The case is about doctors, law enforcement agents, teachers, plumbers etc.? 'Sharashkas' (prison R&D centres in Stalin's time) for geniuses have become a history now. In this respect, no single 'Skolkovo'-like project, even if implemented successfully, does not solve problems that Russia is facing. Modernization is impossible without sufficient general educational and cultural level of the country's overall population. For that very reason, the Soviet Russia began industrialization with the expansion of education, enormous investment into arts and into general culture of the population; and Stalin's educational reform preceded a breakthrough in space exploration and building of atomic submarines.

Culture sets forward ideals, examples to follow, symbols, behaviour samples, concepts of good and evil, of a good and a bad deed. Culture is the origin for standards of socialization and basic social features (language, values, worldview, life activity regulations). Measure for the typical, promoted or rejected may vary in different layers of society, different social groups. But culture sets forward standards and ideals, and encourages people to self-improvement.

A timely question of today is if modernization is possible when mores and spirit are in crisis, when the country is degrading, when the astounding majority of the country's population is depressed for the most part. Here are just a few symptoms of the disaster: homicide rate per year per 100,000 inhabitants in Russia is four times as high as in the USA that is going through a tough period at the moment, and 10 times as high as in the European countries; with its suicide rate three times higher than in the US, Russia is the number two area in Europe; corruption index for Russia keeps getting higher and higher, which means that Russia, together with Kenya, Cameroon and Zimbabwe, is one of the world's most corrupted countries that make up 20% all in all; Russia, with its number of deaths from alcohol poisoning, is dominating Europe's top rungs, while with its life expectancy at birth it is dominating the bottom rungs among the developed countries and European countries

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with developed and emerging economies; with its abortion incidence per 1,000 women, Russia is number one spot in Eastern Europe and the CIS, etc. [3]. And these points do not only characterize the quality of life of lower classes; they also characterize a social and cultural environment for a scientist who works in Russia.

Here is another problem: What kind of generation is entering the stage; will it cope with modernization? Official statistics data are the following: children's interest in reading has dropped dramatically over the past 15 years – the share of those who read on a regular basis has gone down from 50% to 18%; there are tens of thousands of officially registered cases of juvenile alcoholism; more than 80% of young people and almost 40% of school children drink alcohol; the share of juvenile smoking has gone three times higher over the past 15 years; children and young people make up more than 80% among 3 million of drug addicts; the average age of those who first try drugs dropped from 17 to 14.

About 30% of children are born into unregistered marriages. Over the last 15-year period the number of orphans increased by more than 75%. In 1995 there were 450,000 orphans among 21 million of school students, while in 2008 there were more than 900,000 orphans among 13.3 million school students. The level of violence against children, including domestic violence, is critically high. In 2007 the total score for crimes of violence against children was 70,380. Every year 2,000 children are killed or seriously injured, 50,000 children run away from home, 25,000 are reported missing. More than 20% of child pornography distributed around the world is being produced in Russia. About 40% of school-age children do not attend school at all. Juvenile delinquency is growing 15 times faster than the overall crime rate in the country. There are more than 40,000 juvenile criminals in Russia's juvenile correctional facilities, which is almost 3 times as many as in the USSR at the beginning of the 1930s.

The crisis of the Russian family is quite evident. It would be sufficient to say that 5,000 women are beaten to death by their husbands annually. Violence against women, elderly parents and children is being reported in every fourth family. With its divorce rate per 1,000 inhabitants Russia is number one spot among the countries with the developed and transitional economies. Is this the environment where the new Kurchatovs, Korolyovs and Alfyorovs will originate from? It is a rhetorical question if an average Russian family is able to encourage their child's inborn potential and creative talents, to get him or her ready to live in the innovation society.

Education hardly presents a better situation. Due to its conservative nature, the decay of education is slow yet steady. The country has plunged into deep ignorance. As it was mentioned at the Conference before, the latest polls show that more than 93% of Russia's inhabitants cannot recall any contemporary scientist; more than 30% believe that the Sun goes round the Earth.

There is a dramatic shortage of childcare facilities throughout the country. The quality of secondary school is deteriorating. Our estimates show that the 2008 knowledge assessment score of 4.2 should be reduced to factual 3.8, and to 2.8 in 2011. High school students have also been showing poorer results in doing teacher supervised simple scientific research projects, and in independent work with information. In 2011, among school students with an average grade of 4.2, there were only 30% prepared for independent studies. Psychological testing of high school students demonstrates a steady drop of teamwork abilities, the rise of violence and individualism.

Almost all post-Soviet colleges and universities rejected tutorial work outside education process, which had an enormously negative impact on educational quality. Presidents of the country's best universities are seriously concerned by the decrease of students' motivation to study, of their wish to main-

tain discipline and work hard at their studies. Corruption in universities causes a serious public concern. Employers are getting less and less happy with the quality of graduates' training and with their abilities to perform productively.

Analysts note that higher school is degenerating in its essence, under the influence of the latest reforms with their targets, goals, substance, methods and pace unaccepted by the society. Higher education is losing its fundamental nature, previously targeted at a coherent systematic worldview and consideration of fundamental generalizing theories. At present, fundamental conceptions are driven out of higher education. Furthermore, professional training has no connection to finding moral guidelines. Such a situation prompts students to work out their own indicators to assess activities of their own as well as activities of other people. As a result, morally unstable and socially irresponsible graduates enter adult life. Such employees offer no hope in terms of Russia's modernization and its breakthrough into the future of innovation.

In the Soviet times, cultural institutions (cinemas, libraries, museums, theatres, clubs etc.) made a substantial contribution to the development of general cultural level of the population. Our research shows that their influence has been considerably reduced of late [4]. The overwhelming majority of the population has no experience of such an influence at all.

For the last twenty years, the activities of the Russian mass media – of the top federal television channels, for the most part – have been in conflict with modernization goals. From the beginning of the 20th century, an access to culture is more and more associated with an access to information flows. The latter get usually concentrated by small groups of people, involved in clandestine control and manipulation, developing and expanding culture in their own interests, rather distant from the public benefit. As it was mentioned at the 2010 Likhachov Conference, a growing amount of information flows circulating within the society, and their efficiency that grows, are not the only characteristics of the current situation. They serve as a basis for the 'information society' – a state-monopoly association, which embraces not only material life, but also people's consciousness. Production of life purposes, meanings of actions, that are taking place in human consciousness, becomes an independent branch of economy and runs through all traditional spheres of production [5].

Many analysts believe that by the end of the 20th century, democratic ways of organizing society are getting more and more deformed, and they are also giving way to hidden forms of control of dominating élites over the economic and socio-cultural processes. And it is information flows that become the instruments of such control.

Unlike other social institutions, mass media is practising an ever-growing influence on people's consciousness and the overall state of culture; and by now, there has been no precedent for such a large-scale influence. In some cases this influence prevails over the entire bulk of other factors. Since the 1990s the federal television channels have been a key, system-forming factor for not only the information domain, but for the whole moral and ethical space of the country. Television is taking on everything that used to be the responsibility of parents, teachers, professors, figures of art and culture and outstanding writers – human worldview and value system formation, knowledge acquisition, attitude to life and to its certain phenomena, network of interests, motivation cues for different activities, speech habits, domestic behavioural patterns etc. [6]

'A steady domestication of leisure activities, with their structural unification' became one of the post-Soviet key features of changing the lifestyle of Russians [7]. Thus, about 60% of Russians prefer watching television at home in their free time [8]. Watching television tops the list of pastime activities among Russia's population by both parameters – the number of people and the amount of time people spend in front of a TV

screen. A daily TV audience average (in terms of coverage – a number of people who switch their television sets on) is between 75% and 80% of the country's population [9].

Television is playing a major architect in constructing a new national culture that disregards the past. This 'culture' originates not from the centuries-long fundamental values of the Russian society, but from glamour subcultural background of the newly rich Russians. Figuratively speaking, a new culture is being erected by television aside the old one, but not on its construction base. It is being erected on the cultural debris that have already been proved to be inconsistent and rejected by the humankind.

As it was noted at the 2011 Conference, an original culture, which is under construction in Russia, has no precedents abroad. Its closest counterpart is the Ancient Rome in the period of its decline and degradation, taken as a model by the Moscow 'élite' in the beginning of the 1990s. This culture offers no room for such values as labour, honesty, patriotism, friendship, love, professional duty, respect for history and for the elders etc. It also substitutes traditional culture with the mass culture, the so-called pop-culture. As a result, the country's great national culture, as its main developmental track, has been lost [10].

There are serious grounds to believe that the general cultural decline is accompanied by the intellectual deterioration of the country's population. It is well-known that as a human grows up, his or her intellect, being a natural feature, becomes the product of general cultural development as well. This basically means that a successful performance in high-tech activities depends, to a substantial degree, on the literature that a person had read in his or her younger days, on movies he/she watched, whether he/she would have regular continuous intellectual practices.

Deformations in reproduction and development of culture in Russia have resulted in 'a consumer society' (a metaphor used by Western intellectuals to define just one of the tendencies in the development of a contemporary society) – a full-scale characteristic of the current situation in this country. There has emerged a society here that is good at consuming things, but is getting from bad to worse in producing them.

It is becoming clear today that the Russian reforms of the 1990s were based on vicious ideas and principles, which lead to the loss of our country's competitive ability in the globalizing world. The reformers declared the principle for public policy: 'Economy first, then comes culture.' The statement was made that cultural issues should get no attention until the capitalist economy growth made it possible to invest into a cultural development. It's a known fact that in Russia the transition to a capitalist system of economic management was accompanied by the collapse of the economic life. Then the disastrous decline was followed by some recovery. However, there is still a controversy about the issue if Russia will ever get to its GDP of the late 1980s. Official statistics states this has already happened. But a lot of authoritative experts express their doubts about the calculation methods, saying that product's final price includes speculative price increase. In other words, the uplift in prices is claimed to be the GDP growth.

At any rate, 20 years after the reforms started, cultural development remains to be the state apparatus' neglected child. Nowadays, reformers come up with the conception of 'self-support for culture', which is making Russia's cultural development a hostage to its defective economic system.

Meanwhile, both the 1990s policy of 'inopportune' cultural development, as well as the currently implemented market-oriented policy, contains gross theoretical mistakes. And these are called economic determinism.

The economic determinism of the first years in the post-Soviet Russia seems to have had two grounds. First, it was personal interests of the reformers, who wanted to get rich by

means of amoral methods (while culture prescribes moral restrictions and prohibitions). Second, it was economically ill-educated people at power who had misunderstood Marxist teachings in the Soviet times, especially the following statements: 'social being of men determines their consciousness' and 'economy is the basis and culture is a superstructure'. Actually, Marx is known to have realized that in many ways consciousness determines being, and that culture, in some cases, is exerting a decisive influence on transformation of economic relations within a society. Furthermore, economy is believed today to be only a part of culture, its subsystem with a great number of relations, yet unexplored. For that reason, the front-line Russian economic thought has been latterly rethinking the ideas of the great thinkers of the past – on the role of non-economic factors in economic development [11–14].

A desire to supply market with complete control over cultural development originates in the obvious interests of officials: 'You just do your business with culture if anyone can be found willing to pay for it; and we will keep ourselves busy with absorbing state budgets.' However, false theoretical postulates about the supposedly invisible hand of the almighty market show up. Meanwhile, integration of market mechanisms into activities of different social institutions is restricted by various limits. And this is the axiom of the contemporary social-humanitarian knowledge. Once the limits are overstepped, it leads to degeneration of the institutions themselves. And that is what's happening today.

In world practices, different countries have used different methods to approach modernization-related issues. But for support, they have always used achievements of national cultures. During the transition from social to capitalist system of management, Eastern Europe made an unequivocal choice – they took up the EU cultural setup. The cultural setup that the EU needed was technologically ensured by the implementation of the EU legal and socio-economic standards, by the state apparatus, which was set up and operated in compliance with these standards, by social institutions, public life institutions (institutions of civil society) etc. However, the acceptance of all-European values was the cornerstone of their getting admitted into the EU.

It should be noted that the 'common values' declared by the EU were substantially in agreement with national cultural traditions of the EU candidate countries, and consequently, they could provide for a steady national consensus towards the reforms. It is an entirely different question whether the reforms in Eastern Europe should be considered modernization, and how useful they were for diverse socio-demographic population groups. However, the reforms were completed, and according to certain figures of quality of living rating these countries have started approaching the EU top states.

To Russia, this path was unacceptable, because it implied the loss of national sovereignty and passing the control over key economic parameters to Western corporations. The experience of Japan, China and South Korea is of much more interest in this respect. These countries haven't been absorbed by the West, nor did they imitate the western life style. Each of them advanced to modernization through evolution, guided by fundamental cultural values.

In this respect, South Korean experience is the most representative one. Contrary to contemporary western theorists' assertions about an invariable connection between progress in economy and development of democracy, Korean experience demonstrates a different situation: progress in economy can only be worked out together with sustainable development of culture. Korean achievements were made in the context of military dictatorship, and they resulted from a reasonable cultural policy. Though, it did take time to work this policy out. In 1948–1960 the country was taking to the Western patterns. There was progress made in material strengthening of institu-

tions of art and culture, in personnel training of cultural workers, in establishing professional associations of intelligentsia. However, it was the time of the massive flow of low-quality Western mass culture from; and the national culture faced the decline.

In 1960 a conclusion was made that an excessive worship of an alien culture is detrimental to the nation, and that Western values may be introduced to Korea only through its own national and cultural filters. They made the economic problem-solving methods subordinate to the Korean historical heritage and national ethics. And this meant the fundamental economic modernization that was relying on traditional Korean values. This line was implemented by means of dictatorship. In 1966 they adopted a number of significant normative acts, restraining the negative impact of alien cultural values in cinematography, advertisement etc. At the same time, the state enacted a number of measures targeted at the revival of folk arts and crafts. A lot of attention was given to the objects of material culture and cultural development of provinces.

Further economic growth and increase of material well-being of South Korean citizens were developing in compliance with traditional Confucian ethics. The phenomenal prosperity of the Republic of Korea is based on the responsibility cult, the family cult, respectful attitude to predecessors, filial respect, obedience to the state and to the boss etc. plus the application of Western achievements in technology and export-oriented economy. Progress of economic proficiency was getting hand in hand with the growth of national consciousness of the Korean citizens. The maturity of the society was growing. In 1988 the country had democratic elections. The moral renewal and progress in culture opened the gates to freedom of speech and freedom of creation, and to the rise of creative intelligentsia [see 15 for the details].

Such experience convincingly demonstrates that the spiritual potential is a country's strongest point, and that a country's development depends primarily on the moral health of its nation. That is why Russia should understand a course on modernization as a system of measures targeted at strengthening science, culture, education and at the overcoming of a socio-cultural crisis. Only thus can Russia expect to succeed in the global competition.

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