

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
ST. PETERSBURG INTELLIGENTSIA CONGRESS
ST. PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
under the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation



GLOBAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

The 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference
June 9–10, 2022



The Conference is held in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation V.V. Putin
“On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov”
No 587, dated from May 23, 2001

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

The annual International Scientific Conference covering the humanitarian problems of modern times has been held in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences since 1993. One of the initiators of holding the conference was Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, an outstanding Russian scientist and a public figure, an internationally acclaimed humanist, an expert in the field of study of culture and records of the Old Russian literature, academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and a foreign member of academies of many countries of the world, doctor honoris causa of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

Since 2001, in recognition of Dmitry Likhachov's outstanding contribution to science and culture and as an acknowledgement of the scientific significance of the Conference, the state status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference has been granted to this scholarly forum by a special decree of Vladimir Putin, then President of the Russian Federation.

Along with the University, the cofounders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences and St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress. Since 2007 the Conference has been held under the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, in 2013 had the support of the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg).

The agenda of the Conference traditionally includes the most universal debatable contemporary issues related to the controversial tendencies in the development of the human society, to the processes of globalization, to the role of the humanitarian culture and education in the modern world, to the vital problems of inter-confessional communication, tolerance, morality, etc.

At present, within the framework of Likhachov International Scientific Conference, contests of creative projects are held for senior high-school students entitled "Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity".

The topic of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference is "Global Conflict and the Contours of a New World Order".

Prominent Russian and foreign scientists participate annually in the Conference, among them are political and public figures, church hierarchs, philosophers, sociologists, lawyers, economists, pedagogues, renowned figures of culture and arts, writers, journalists.

Since 2008 SPbUHSS together with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation have been engaged in the Diplomatic project of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference "The International Dialogue of Cultures".

To summarize the results of each International Likhachov Scientific Conference the Proceedings of the Conference are published which include collections of the participants' reports and speeches, transcripts of workshop discussions and round tables. The Proceedings of conferences are stored in major libraries of Russia and countries of the CIS, in scientific and educational centres of many states of the world. Working materials of the Conference can be found on the "Likhachov Square" special scientific site (www.lihachev.ru).

In 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009–2012, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2022 the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin and D. A. Medvedev, in 2008, 2010–2019 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES
ST. PETERSBURG INTELLIGENTSIA CONGRESS

ST. PETERSBURG UNIVERSITY OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

under the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

GLOBAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

The 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

June 9–10, 2022

The conference, originally called “The Days of Science in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences” is the 28th in number and the 20th in the status of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference

The Conference is held in accordance with the Decree of President of Russia V. V. Putin “On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov” No 587, dated from May 23, 2001

In 2022 the socially important project “The 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference” was realized with the help of the Grant of the President of the Russian Federation for civil society development provided by the President’s Grants Fund in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of January 30, 2019 No 30



**St. Petersburg
2022**

Scientific editor

A. S. Zapesotsky, Chairman of the Organizing Committee of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress

Recommended to be published by the Editorial and Publishing Council
of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Г52 Global Conflict and the Contours of a New World Order : The 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference, June 9–10, 2022. – St. Petersburg : SPbUHSS, 2022. – 192 p., il. – ISBN 978-5-7621-1194-2.

The Proceedings of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference held on June 9–10, 2022 in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences were published in the present collection in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin “On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov”. Representatives of 10 countries took part in the 20th Conference.

The 60 authors of the collection include prominent national scientists, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences: I. O. Abramova, S. Yu. Glazyev, Al. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, A. S. Zapesotsky, G. B. Kleiner, A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, V. L. Makarov, A. D. Nekipelov, R. I. Nigmatulin, M. B. Piotrovsky, V. A. Tishkov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, T. Ya. Khabrieva, V. A. Chereshev and others; the heads of academic institutions and research centers, representatives of universities, well-known state and public figures, heads of mass media: Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation G. A. Hajiyev, First Deputy Director General of the Russian News Agency TASS M. S. Gusman, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on Culture E. G. Drapeko, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs K. F. Zatulin, Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary M. V. Zakharova, Deputy Head of the “United Russia” party faction in the State Duma A. K. Isaev, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs S. I. Kislyak, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council K. I. Kosachev, Member of the State Council, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia M. V. Shmakov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom (2011–2019) A. V. Yakovenko and others.

Foreign authors of the collection include Deputy Minister of Information of Belarus I. I. Buzovsky, Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Russia P. Bülbüloglu, Honorary Associate of the Australian National University A. Kevin, President of the United Chamber of Commerce and Industry “Switzerland – Russia” G. Mettan, Director of the Eurasia, Russia and Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Turkey) T. Turker; professors: Ch. Varga (Hungary), Ch. Goddard (United Kingdom), H. Köchler (Austria), and others.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin highly appreciates the role of the Likhachov Conference: “I expect that this forum, dedicated to international issues, will serve to develop fruitful people-to-people ties and strengthen mutual understanding between countries and peoples.”

ББК 72



**DECREE
OF PRESIDENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
“ON PERPETUATING THE MEMORY
OF DMITRY SERGEYEVICH LIKHACHOV”**

Given D. S. Likhachov's outstanding contribution to the development of the home science and culture I enact:

1. the Government of the Russian Federation should:
 - establish two personal grants in honour of D. S. Likhachov at the rate of 400 roubles each for university students from the year 2001 and to define the procedure of conferring them;
 - work out the project of D. S. Likhachov's gravestone on a competitive basis together with the Government of St. Petersburg;
 - consider the issue of making a film devoted to D. S. Likhachov's life and activities.
2. the Government of St. Petersburg should:
 - name one of the streets in St. Petersburg after D. S. Likhachov;
 - consider the issue of placing a memorial plate on the building of the Institute of Russian Literature of the Russian Academy of Science (Pushkin's House);
 - guarantee the work on setting up D. S. Likhachov's gravestone in prescribed manner.
3. According to the suggestion from the Russian Academy of Science the Likhachov Memorial Prizes of the Russian Academy of Science should be established for Russian and foreign scientists for their outstanding contribution to the research of literature and culture of ancient Russia, and the collected writings of the late Academician should be published.
4. **According to the suggestion from St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress the International Likhachov Scientific Conference should be annually held on the Day of the Slavonic Letters and Culture.**

VLADIMIR PUTIN,
President of the Russian Federation
Moscow, the Kremlin, May 23, 2001

GREETINGS OF VLADIMIR PUTIN TO THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

Dear friends!

I congratulate you on the opening of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Holding your meetings at the St. Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences has already become a good tradition. I would like to point out that Likhachov Scientific Conference are distinguished by a rich agenda, the interested participation of famous scientists and politicians, public figures, representatives of culture and art. This allows us to conduct a productive dialogue on the most important problems of our time, substantive discussion of ways to solve them, taking into account the full range of opinions. And that is why the Likhachov Scientific Conference attract the unfailing attention of experts and the widest possible audience.

I hope that this forum, dedicated to international issues, will serve to develop fruitful humanitarian ties and strengthen mutual understanding between countries and peoples. And, of course, it will be another contribution to the preservation and further study of the richest creative and spiritual heritage of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, whose humanistic ideas are especially relevant and in demand today.

I wish you productive communication and all the best.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

June 9, 2022



Dear Friends!

I'd like to welcome you on the occasion of the 19th International Likhachov Scientific Conference that opens today.

Academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov paid a lot of attention to St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, he was an Doctor honoris causa of this renowned higher educational establishment. And because of that it is symbolic that your meetings take place exactly here, in SPbUHSS, and they are rightly regarded as a significant event in the life of the Northern capital and the whole country.

I'll mention that well-known scholars and politicians, prominent figures in the fields of culture and arts, representatives of mass media traditionally take part in the forum. Their rich in content and sometimes fierce disputes invariably evoke a massive public response, serve to develop Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov's ideas, that have not stopped being urgent today.

I'm sure that the Likhachov Scientific Conference will carry out its lofty mission in future as well, aimed at expansion of humanitarian cooperation, strengthening friendship and mutual understanding by people.

I wish you success, interesting and useful communications.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 23, 2019

**Dear Friends!**

I'd like to welcome you on the occasion of the 17th International Likhachov Scientific Conference that opens today.

Your meetings have become an important, expected event in the public life of St. Petersburg and the whole country. It's encouraging that in all those years organizers and participants of the Conference have been keeping alive the established traditions, paying most serious attention to important, basic issues referring to civilization development and dialogue of cultures. They follow the precepts of the great humanist and educator Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov.

I'm sure that this forum will work creatively and constructively, will be remembered for interesting, productive discussions, informal and really friendly atmosphere.

I wish you every success.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 18, 2017

**Dear Friends!**

Greetings to you all on the occasion of the opening of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference, which has been held in our Northern Capital for many years now.

Your authoritative forum, bringing together the elite of the Russian and global intelligentsia, prominent scientists and cultural figures, has truly become a cornerstone event and grand tradition in the country's public and spiritual life. Importantly, the meeting agenda always tackles the most pressing humanitarian and civilizational problems that are of such critical importance to Russia's present and future.

Today, you have convened to discuss such a fundamental topic as "Modern Global Challenges and National Interests," share your experience, and tally the results of joint projects. I am confident that the proposals and recommendations formulated in the course of the Conference will further

the careful preservation of our national cultural heritage and the advancement of the humanitarian ideas of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov.

I wish everyone productive, mutually-beneficial discussions, much success and all the very best.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 16, 2016

**Dear Friends!**

I am happy to welcome you in St. Petersburg and to congratulate you on the opening of the 12th Likhachov Conference.

Your forum is an important event in the social life of Russia and of a number of foreign countries.

It traditionally brings together representatives of scientific and artistic communities and competent experts. Under globalization, the issues of extending the dialogue of cultures, preventing ethno-confessional conflicts are of paramount importance. There is compelling evidence that the humanistic ideas of academician D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding Russian enlightener and public figure, are still up-to-date.

I am convinced that the suggestions and recommendations drawn up in the course of your meeting will be sought after in practical terms.

I wish you new achievements and all the best.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 17, 2012



Dear Friends!

I would like to welcome participants, hosts and guests of the 11th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Your forum, traditionally gathering the cream of the Russian intellectual community, prominent scientists and public figures from all over the world in St. Petersburg is an outstanding and remarkable event in the international scientific and cultural life. It is crucial that the topics of the Conference precisely reflect the most urgent and acute humanitarian issues, the main of them being promotion of the dialogue of cultures and civilizations in the modern world,

establishment of moral and spiritual foundations of the society.

And certainly, one of the priority tasks for you is preserving the invaluable legacy of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, which is as relevant and significant as before.

I wish you fruitful and constructive discussions, interesting and useful meetings.

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 5, 2011



Dear Friends!

I am sincerely pleased to see you in Saint-Petersburg and open the 10th Anniversary International Likhachov Conference.

This reputable forum is always notable for the substantial membership, comprehensive and effective work, and wide spectrum of issues to be discussed.

I am sure that the today's meeting devoted to the dialogue of cultures and partnership of civilizations should be one more step forward in promoting interconfessional and international communication to bring people closer to each other. And, certainly, again we can see so many 6 Global Development:

Challenges of Predictability and Manageability prominent people together, among which are scientists, public figures, intellectuals, representatives of arts community, everyone who shares notions and opinions of Dmitry S. Likhachov.

I wish you good luck and all the best!

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 11, 2010



I want to extend my welcome to hosts, participants and guests of the 8th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Holding this scientific forum has become a good and important tradition. It helps not only to realise the value of humanistic ideas of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, but also to understand topical issues of the modern world.

That is why the agenda of the Conference involves problems vital for everyone, like personality and society in a multicultural world; economics and law in the context of partnership of civilizations; mass media in the system of forming the worldview; higher education: problems of development in the context of globalization and others.

I am sure that a lively discussion closely reasoned and utterly transparent in its exposition and logic will contribute to the development of the humanities, steadfast and righteous moral norms.

I wish the hosts, participants and guests fruitful cooperation and all the best.

Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 22, 2008



I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding the 6th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

I note with satisfaction that for many years this forum has been carrying out a very noble and important mission of preserving, analyzing and popularizing Likhachov's scientific works.

The International Likhachov Scientific Conference has become a very important forum where people can exchange ideas and discuss the topical issues of the present time. Likhachov's spiritual legacy is an integral part of our science, of the science all over the world. And we are proud to see Likhachov's 100th anniversary, this memorable event, being celebrated on a great scale in Russia and abroad. I wish a successful discussion to all the participants and guests of the conference.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 25, 2006



I should like to welcome the guests, participants, and the organization that is holding this remarkable event, the International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

The most influential and outstanding representatives of intellectual elite – scientists, artists, political figures – participate in this conference to keep up with the tradition. It affords me deep satisfaction to see this forum acquire an international standing. I note with pleasure that its agenda contains the most significant and topical issues of our time. This year you are discussing one of the fundamental problems – impact of education on humanistic process in the society.

The fact that this forum is organized regularly is a great tribute to the memory of D. S. Likhachov, an outstanding scientist, citizen and patriot. His spiritual legacy, scientific works Greetings of Vladimir Putin to the participants of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference 7 dedicated to the problems of intellectual and moral development of younger generations, has great significance. I wish you a fruitful discussion.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 20, 2004



I should first like to welcome the participants of the International Scientific Conference "The World of Culture of Academician D. S. Likhachov." The most prominent scientists and political leaders come together to discuss at this conference the most important issues of the scientific, moral and spiritual legacy of the remarkable Russian scientist D. S. Likhachov. I strongly believe that this tradition will be followed up in the future and the most distinguished successors will develop Likhachov's humanistic ideas and put them into practice while creating the Universal Home for all people of the 21st century.

I should like to express my hope that the Likhachov scientific conferences will be held in all regions of this country as well as in St. Petersburg, and we will feel part of this remarkable tradition.

I wish you a fruitful discussion and a good partnership that will bring many useful results.

President of the Russian Federation

V. PUTIN

May 21, 2001

WELCOME ADDRESSES TO THE PARTICIPANTS AND GUESTS OF THE 20th INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

**To organizers, participants and guests of the 20th International
Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends,

The Likhachov Conference are a reputed academic forum where scientists, politicians, public figures, representatives of culture and arts discuss relevant issues and key trends of development of the modern world, the problems that concern people in our country and abroad.

You have thematic discussions about traditional values and a 'new ethics' of the West, a transition from unipolarity to the model of a multipolar world, the state of the global economy and the objectives of the Russian education ahead of you. These are crucial subjects.

I wish you interesting, fruitful work and all the best.

Chairman of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation

V. V. VOLODIN

Moscow, June 9, 2022

**To participants and guests of the 20th International
Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends,

Welcome and congratulations with the opening of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

An impressive entry list, a thematic diversity of sections and roundtable discussions have made the Likhachov Conference a significant event in the academic life of St. Petersburg and Russia.

To hold this event is not only to pay the tribute to the memory of academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, an outstanding humanities scholar, citizen and patriot of our motherland. The goal of the Conference is comprehensive and deep analysis of global threats and challenges of our time that require constructive answers and decisions.

I am sure, significant discussions in the framework of the Conference will make their contribution in development of models for a stable future, in generation of understanding of Russia's mission and role in the context of geopolitical transformations of the age, and the developed projects and recommendations will be an important milestone on the way of reinforcement of spiritual and moral foundations of the Russian society.

From all my heart I wish participants of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference fruitful work and new scientific discoveries!

Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation

T. A. GOLIKOVA

June 9, 2022

**To participants and organizers of the 20th International
Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends,

I greet the participants and organizers of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. Your meetings have already become milestone events that traditionally bring together outstanding scientists and public figures of today in Saint Petersburg.

Today the name of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov is a symbol of serving timeless values, non-negotiable absolutes for millions of citizens. Humanistic ideas of a great academician are relevant nowadays as well.

It is good that over all these years organizers and participants of the Conference follow the messages of the founder and pay a lot of attention to important problems of the modern world and the multidisciplinary dialogue.

I am sure, the meeting will take place in a constructive and creative manner, and all the participants will be able to be involved in invaluable experience exchange.

I wish you success and fruitful work.

Minister of Labor and Social Protection of the Russian Federation

A. O. KOTYAKOV

**To organizers and participants of the 20th International
Likhachov Scientific Conference**

I bid a most cordial welcome to organizers and participants of the anniversary 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

This event organized at the premises of the Saint-Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences has rightfully gained a reputation as one of important venues for eminent public figures, scientists and cultural luminaries from various countries to join intellectual efforts. It is good that the experience of academician D. S. Likhachov who has made a priceless contribution in the common heritage of Russian and global culture is in high demand and still used in the search of responses for modern challenges and threats arising from the potential for conflict that has accumulated recently.

The matter of establishment of a truly democratic multipolar world that is studied at the Conference this year is particularly relevant today when we witness such a hot and strong resistance to the current changes displayed by the states that do not want to lose their dominant position in the system of international relations – the resistance that contradicts all the legal, moral and ethical norms. It is important that special attention during the upcoming discussions is supposed to be paid to assets and culture as well as the place of Russia in the global processes.

I am confident that the work of the forum will be productive, and its result will give momentum to development of cooperation and mutual understanding between peoples for the purpose of solving global problems.

I wish you all fruitful discussions and all the best.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

S. V. LAVROV

Moscow, June 9, 2022

**To participants, organizers, and guests of the 20th International
Likhachov Scientific Conference**

Dear friends,

Welcome to Saint Petersburg, to the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Over two decades a largescale forum brings together public and political figures from Russia and countries of near and far abroad, people of science, culture and arts on the banks of the Neva River. This momentous event ranks high in the life of the Northern Capital and the international humanities community.

We carefully preserve the heritage of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, a talented scientist, and we are proud that he used to live and to work in our city. This outstanding thinker believed that the Russian culture was able to keep the experience and traditions of various people of the world, to assimilate the best features of the humankind. These thoughts and observations of his acquire special value and significance when compared with the topic of anniversary Conference on “A Global Conflict and the Contours of a New World Order.”

I am sure that your fruitful work will encourage further reinforcement of people-to-people ties and will become a foundation for new educational projects.

I wish you good health, well-being, productive and interesting discussions!

Governor of Saint Petersburg

A. D. BEGLOV

**To participants and guests of the 20th International
Likhachov Scientific Conference**

On behalf of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia that unites millions of progressively thinking workers, I bid a most cordial welcome to all the participants of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference and congratulate them!

Today, when the world stands on the cusp of global turmoils, when irresponsible politickers are willing to propel the peoples of the world into the global disaster striving to keep and multiply the riches of a small privileged part of population, it is evermore crucial to make a cold evaluation of the increasing conflict and to suggest ways to overcome it.

Your academic forum is unique in terms of an entry list which enables rapproachment and dialogue of intellectual elites from various countries and can encourage the search of solutions to eliminate the contradictions accumulated in the world. Nowadays the world is interested in an open, honest and constructive dialogue that reflects various approaches to the prospects of global development more than ever.

The Russian workers just like the working population of the entire world are vitally interested in a stable and fairly arranged society. We may not allow the social victories of the humanities secured in a consistent struggle over the last century to be destroyed.

I sincerely wish the participants of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference fruitful and constructive work, a positive mood and new creative accomplishments!

Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia

M. V. SHMAKOV

June 9, 2022

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL LIKHACHOV SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE Information

The International Scientific Conference at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences first took place in May, 1993. It was timed to the Day of Slavonic Letters and Culture. It was initiated by academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov. Since then the conference has been held every year. After academician Likhachov had passed away this academic forum received the status of International Likhachov Scientific Conference from the government (by the Decree of President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin "On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov" № 587, May 23, 2001).

The co-founders of the Conference are the Russian Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress (founders: J. I. Alferov, D. A. Granin, A. S. Zapesotsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, D. S. Likhachov, A. P. Petrov, M. B. Piotrovski). Since 2007 the conference has enjoyed the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

Traditionally, the most universal debatable challenges of the present time are put on the agenda of the conference: "Dialogue of cultures under globalization," "Education in terms of the new cultural type formation," "Culture and global challenges of the world development," "Humanitarian issues of the contemporary civilization," "Contemporary global challenges and national interests," "Global world: system shifts, challenges and contours of the future," "Global development: challenges of predictability and manageability," "Global conflict and the contours of a new world order" etc.

Every year the greatest figures of the Russian and foreign science, culture and art, public and political leaders take part in the conference. The following members of the Russian Academy of Sciences have taken part in the conference in recent years: L. I. Abalkin, I. O. Abramova, G. A. Arbatov, N. P. Bekhtereva, O. T. Bogomolov, V. N. Bolshakov, Yu. S. Vasilyev, S. Yu. Glazyev, M. K. Gorshkov, R. S. Grinberg, An. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, A. V. Dmitriyev, T. I. Zaslavskaya, M. P. Kirpichnikov, M. I. Kleandrov, G. B. Kleiner, A. A. Kokoshin, A. B. Kudelin, V. A. Lektorsky, A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, I. I. Lukinov, D. S. Lvov, V. L. Makarov, V. A. Martynov, V. V. Mironov, N. N. Moiseyev, V. V. Naumkin, A. D. Nekipelov, R. I. Nigmatulin, Yu. S. Osipov, A. M. Panchenko, N. Ya. Petrakov, V. F. Petrenko, E. I. Pivovarov, M. B. Piotrovski, N. A. Platch, V. M. Polterovich, E. M. Primakov, B. V. Rauschenbach, Yu. A. Ryzhov, N. N. Skatov, A. V. Smirnov, V. S. Styopin, M. L. Titarenko, V. A. Tishkov, J. T. Toshchenko, T. Ya. Khabrieva, V. A. Chereshev, A. O. Chubarian, N. P. Shmelyov, B. G. Yudin, V. L. Yanin and others. Academicians of the Russian Academy of Education who have taken part in the conference are the following: S. A. Amonashvili, V. I. Andreyev, G. M. Andreyeva, A. G. Asmolov, A. P. Beliayeva, M. N. Berulava, I. V. Bestuzhev-Lada, A. A. Bodalev, E. V. Bondarevskaya, G. A. Bordovsky, V. P. Borisenkov, G. N. Volkov, Yu. S. Davydov, A. V. Darinsky, E. D. Dneprov, S. F. Yegorov, V. I. Zagvyazinskiy, I. A. Zimniaya, Yu. P. Zinchenko, V. G. Kineliov, I. S. Kon, A. S. Kondratyev, V. G. Kostomarov, V. V. Krayevsky, O. Ye. Lebedev, A. A. Likhachov, G. V. Mukhamedzianova, V. S. Mukhina, V. A. Miasnikov, N. D. Nikandrov, A. M. Novikov, O. A. Omarov, A. A. Orlov, Yu. V. Senko, A. V. Usova, Yu. U. Fokht-Babushkin, G. A. Yagodin, V. Mitter (Germany) and others. Such public and state figures as A. A. Akayev, F. A. Asadullin, N. S. Bondar, A. E. Busygin, P. Bülbüloğlu, G. A. Hajiye, G. M. Gatilov, Al. A. Gromyko, M. S. Gusman, E. G. Drapeko, K. F. Zatulín, M. V. Zakharova, A. K. Isayev, S. L. Katanandov, K. I. Kosachov, S. V. Lavrov, E. I. Makarov, T. A. Mansurov, V. I. Matviyenko, V. V. Miklushevsky, A. A. Pankin, V. N. Pligin, H. M. Reznik, K. O. Romodanovsky, A. L. Safonov, A. A. Sobchak, E. S. Stroyev, V. Ye. Churov, M. V. Shmakov, A. V. Yakovenko, V. A. Yakovlev have also participated in the conference. Among the figures of culture and art who have taken part in the conference are the following: M. K. Anikushin, N. V. Burov, A. A. Voznesensky, I. O. Gorbachov, D. A. Granin, N. M. Dudinskaya, Z. Ya. Korogodsky, K. Yu. Lavrov, A. P. Petrov, M. M. Plisetskaya, M. L. Rostropovich, E. A. Riazanov, N. S. Safronov, G. V. Sviridov and others.

Since 2007 in the framework of the Conference there has been held Likhachov forum of high-school students of Russia (from 2014 r. — International forum of high-school students), which gathers winners of the annual competition of creative projects entitled "Dmitry Likhachov's Ideas and Modernity" from all over Russia and abroad.

Supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Diplomatic Programme of the conference "International Dialogue of Cultures" has taken place since 2008. Ambassadors of foreign states present their reports and give their opinions on acute challenges of present time.

In 2001, 2004, 2006, 2009–2012, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2022 the hosts and participants were greeted by Presidents of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin and D. A. Medvedev, in 2008, 2010–2019 by Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation.

The collection of articles is published on the results of the Conference every year. The copies of the volumes are present in all major libraries of Russia, the CIS countries, scientific and educational centers of many countries in the world. The Proceedings of the conference are also available on a scientific website "Likhachov Square" (at www.lihachev.ru).

CONTENTS

Decree of President of the Russian Federation “On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov”	3
Greetings of Vladimir Putin to the participants of the International Likhachov Scientific Conference	4
Welcome addresses to the participants and guests of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference	8
About the International Likhachov Scientific Conference (Information)	11

REPORTS

I. O. ABRAMOVA , <i>Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i> AFRICAN VECTOR OF RUSSIA’S FOREIGN POLICY AMID THE BREAKDOWN OF THE OLD WORLD ORDER	17
D. O. BABICH , <i>Journalist and columnist for the RIA Novosti news agency (Moscow)</i> WESTERN MILITARY PROPAGANDA. TECHNIQUES AND PRINCIPLES FROM 1991 TO THE SPECIAL OPERATION IN UKRAINE.	21
G. M. BIRZHENYUK , <i>Deputy Chairman of the Academic Council, Head of the Departments of Social and Cultural Technologies and Conflictology at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Honored Worker of Higher Education of the Russian Federation, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS</i> THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE. EXPERIENCE OF ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION STUDIES	23
N. S. BONDAR , <i>Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (2000–2020), Head of the Judicial Law Center, Chief Researcher of the Constitutional Law Department of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation</i> NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL IN THE GLOBAL CONFLICT OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: NOT ALL “ETERNAL” THINGS ARE INVARIABLE.	26
P. BÜLBÜLOĞLU , <i>Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Azerbaijan to the Russian Federation (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Art History), Professor, Azerbaijan SSR National Artist</i> CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS A DRIVER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HARMONIZATION	30
I. I. BUZOVSKY , <i>Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk), Candidate of Sociological Sciences</i> TECTONIC MOVEMENTS OF THE VALUE DOMAIN (BELARUSIAN FRACTURE)	32
A. N. DANILOV , <i>Head of the Sociology Department of the Belarusian State University (Minsk), corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Dr. Sc. (Sociology), Professor</i> CIVILIZATIONAL RIFT: THE BIRTH OF NEW GODS	36
L. L. FITUNI , <i>Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Head of the Center for Global and Strategic Studies of the Institute, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i> HERMENEUTICS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER	39
G. A. HAJIYEV , <i>Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS</i> A HAUNTING TRAGEDY OR CATHARSIS?	42
S. Yu. GLAZYEV , <i>Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i> ON RUSSIA’S CURRENT POSITION IN GLOBAL HYBRID WARFARE AND CREATION OF THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR OUR VICTORY	44
Ch. GODDARD , <i>Professor of the Department of International Private Law at Moscow State University of Law named after O. E. Kutafin, Master of Science (Construction Law), Bachelor of Architecture (United Kingdom)</i> RUSSIAN EDUCATION AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF EPOCHS (DIALECTICS OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE). WHAT DOES RUSSIA NEED?	47
Al. A. GROMYKO , <i>Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS</i> EUROPEAN CULTURE – A ROAD OF SORROWS	49
A. A. GUSEYNOV , <i>Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS</i> WHAT’S NEW IN THE “NEW ETHICS”?	51

A. K. ISAEV , Deputy Head of the “United Russia” party faction in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Political Sciences, Professor of SPbUHSS	
ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION	56
O. G. KARPOVICH , Vice Rector for Research at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Law), Dr. Sc. (Political Sciences), Professor	
CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER IN THE CONTEXT OF TODAY’S GLOBAL CHANGES	61
A. KEVIN , Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University (Canberra), diplomat (1968–1998), independent expert, recipient of literary prizes	
‘TOWARDS HOBAPYCB’	65
T. Ya. KHABRIEVA , Director of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy President of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Lawyer of the Republic of Tatarstan, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS	
THE “AXIOLOGY” OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TURBULENCE.	70
A. D. KHLUTKOV , Director of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Associate Professor;	
V. A. SHAMAKHOV , Scientific supervisor of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, 1st class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Colonel General of the Customs Service	
RUSSIA ON THE WAY TO EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL (CIVILIZATIONAL) GEOPOLITICS	76
A. V. KOSTINA , Director of the Institute of Fundamental and Applied Research at Moscow University for the Humanities, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor	
VALUES AND MEANINGS OF CULTURE AS A FACTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY	78
H. KÖCHLER , President of the International Progress Organization (Vienna, Austria), Professor Emeritus at the University of Innsbruck, Ph. D.	
THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER: REFLECTIONS IN TIMES OF GLOBAL REALIGNMENT	80
O. Ye. LEBEDEV , corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Pedagogical Studies), Professor (St. Petersburg)	
RUSSIAN EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITION TO A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: WHO DOES THE SCHOOL BRING UP?	84
A. G. LISITSYN-SVETLANOV , Chief Researcher of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor	
RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL WORLD: A NEW STAGE FOR BUILDING THE INTERACTION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS	86
Ye. I. MAKAROV , Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Research Supervisor of the Center for Monitoring and Analysis of Social and Labor Conflicts at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS	
ECONOMICS OF ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL AND LABOR SITUATION AT ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES	
SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE	89
I. A. MAKSIMTSEV , Rector of St. Petersburg State University of Economics, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Honorary Worker of Higher Professional Education of the Russian Federation	
EURASIAN INTEGRATION – THE BASIS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL REGION	91
V. K. MAMONTOV , Chairman of the board of directors of the newspaper “Komsomolskaya Pravda” (Moscow), Director General of the radio station “Govorit Moskva”, director of the Foundation for the Support of Network Initiatives “Smart Internet”	
A WORLD OF INTENTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES	93
A. P. MARKOV , Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Dr. Sc. (Pedagogical Studies), Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS	
GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME AND FUTURE SCENARIOS	96
G. METTAN , President of the United Chamber of Industry and Commerce “Switzerland – Russia and CIS States” (Geneva), Executive Director of the Swiss Press Club	
THE WESTERN NEW TONGUE MAKES ANY DIALOGUE OF CULTURE A DEAF TALK	99
L. M. MOSOLOVA , Professor at the Department of Theory and History of Culture of the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Art History), Honored Worker of Higher Education of the Russian Federation	
RUSSIAN EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITIONING TO A NEW WORLD ORDER	104
V. V. NAUMKIN , Scientific supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor	
CONCERNING CIVILIZATION-STATES	106

A. D. NEKIPELOV , <i>Director of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS</i> RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN THE MIDST OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS	108
R. I. NIGMATULIN , <i>Scientific supervisor at P. P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor</i> SCIENCE, ECONOMIC WARFARE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE	111
S. B. NIKONOVA , <i>Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, Member of the Academic Council of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy)</i> CRISIS OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY VALUE SYSTEMS. TRANSFORMATION OF THE MODERNIST ETHICS: RATIONALITY AND CRITICISM?	113
A. V. SHERSHUKOV , <i>Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Editor-in-Chief of the Central Trade Union newspaper "Solidarnost" (Moscow)</i> LESSONS OF THE NOVOCHERKASSK TRAGEDY FOR MODERN RUSSIA.	115
M. V. SHMAKOV , <i>Member of the State Council of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS</i> GLOBAL CONFLICT AND CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER	117
V. A. TISHKOV , <i>Scientific supervisor of the N. N. Miklukho-Maklai Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, academician-secretary of Department of Historical and Philological Sciences of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation</i> NATION-STATES IN THE HISTORICAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT	119
Zh. T. TOSHCHENKO , <i>Chief Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Sociological Center of the RAS (Moscow), Corresponding member of the RAS, Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the RAS journal "Sociological Studies," Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor</i> IDEOLOGY: OBJECTIVE REALITY OR ARTIFICIAL CONSTRUCT?	123
S. A. TSYPLYAEV , <i>Editor-in-Chief of the national scientific-political journal "Vlast" (Moscow), Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, 3rd class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy</i> RUSSIA'S EASTWARD TURN: EXPECTATIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS	127
T. TÜRKER , <i>Director of the Research Center for Eurasian, Russian and Eastern European Studies, Doctor of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ankara (Turkey), Professor</i> A NEW UNIVERSAL ORDER? CIVILIZATION(S) STRIKE BACK?	130
A. V. USPENSKAYA , <i>Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), Honorary Educator of the Russian Federation, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS</i> CH. DICKENS ON AMERICAN NATIONAL TRADITIONS	133
Cs. VARGA , <i>Professor Emeritus of the Institute of Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Pázmány Péter Catholic University (Budapest), Dr. Sc. (Law)</i> TRADITIONAL VALUES AND WESTERN EFFORTS TO EXPORT "NEW ETHICS" VIA SOFTING LAW BY REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW	135
A. V. YAKOVENKO , <i>Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom (2011–2019)</i> RUSSIA'S SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE AS A CATALYST FOR SHAPING THE NEW WORLD ORDER	139
A. S. ZAPESOTSKY , <i>President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i> WHY THE UNITED STATES IS DESTINED TO BECOME A REGIONAL POWER	142
K. F. ZATULIN , <i>First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries</i> UKRAINIAN ISSUE	146

Plenary Session

GLOBAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER	148
--------------------------------------------------------------------	------------

Participants:

- I. I. BUZOVSKY**, *Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk), Candidate of Sociological Sciences*
E. G. DRAPEKO, *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation*

- S. Yu. GLAZYEV**, Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor
- M. S. GUSMAN**, First Deputy Director General of the Russian News Agency "TASS" (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Political Sciences), Professor, Honored Journalist of the Russian Federation, Honored Worker of Culture of the Russian Federation
- T. Ya. KHABRIEVA**, Director of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy President of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Lawyer of the Republic of Tatarstan, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS
- S. I. KISLYAK**, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)
- G. B. KLEINER**, Deputy Scientific Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the RAS (Moscow), Head of the Department of System Analysis in Economics of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor
- K. I. KOSACHEV**, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow)
- A. S. MAKSIMOV**, Chairman of the Committee on Science and Higher Education of the Government of St. Petersburg, Candidate of Technical Sciences
- G. METTAN**, President of the United Chamber of Industry and Commerce "Switzerland – Russia and CIS States" (Geneva), Executive Director of the Swiss Press Club
- A. D. NEKIPELOV**, Director of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS
- M. B. PIOTROVSKY**, Director of the State Hermitage Museum, member of the Presidium, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Chairman of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS
- M. V. SHMAKOV**, Member of the State Council of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS
- M. V. ZAKHAROVA**, Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
- A. S. ZAPESOTSKY**, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation
- K. F. ZATULIN**, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries

Panel Discussion

"THE GRAND CHESSBOARD" TODAY AND TOMORROW 160

Speakers:

- A. S. ZAPESOTSKY**, President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation (moderator)
- I. O. ABRAMOVA**, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor
- V. A. CHERESHNEV**, Chief Researcher of the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ekaterinburg), member of the Presidium of the Ural Branch of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Medicine), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS
- E. G. DRAPEKO**, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation
- S. Yu. GLAZYEV**, Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor
- AI. A. GROMYKO**, Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS
- A. K. ISAEV**, Deputy Head of the "United Russia" party faction in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Political Sciences, Professor of SPbUHSS
- S. I. KISLYAK**, First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)
- D. A. LIKHANOV**, Writer, Chairman of the Russian Children's Fund (Moscow), Children's Protection Fund, President of the International Association of Children's Funds
- A. G. LISITSYN-SVETLANOV**, Chief Researcher of the Institute of State and Law of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor
- V. L. MAKAROV**, Scientific Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the RAS, Director of the Higher School of Public Administration of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor
- V. K. MAMONTOV**, Chairman of the board of directors of the newspaper "Komsomolskaya Pravda" (Moscow), Director General of the radio station "Govorit Moskva", director of the Foundation for the Support of Network Initiatives "Smart Internet"
- S. G. MUSIENKO**, Director of the Analytical Center "Esom" (Minsk), Member of the Public Advisory Council under the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus

V. V. NAUMKIN, *Scientific supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor*

R. I. NIGMATULIN, *Scientific supervisor at P. P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor*

V. G. PETUKHOV, *Professor of the Department of Theory of Law and Law Enforcement of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Candidate of Law, Judge of the Statutory Court of St. Petersburg (2005–2011), Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honorary Employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lieutenant General of militia in reserve*

V. N. PUNCHENKO, *Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (Minsk)*

M. V. SHMAKOV, *Member of the State Council of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS*

Zh. T. TOSHCHENKO, *Chief Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Sociological Center of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the RAS journal "Sociological Studies", Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor*

M. V. ZAKHAROVA, *Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*

K. F. ZATULIN, *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries*

Round Table

THE TRANSITION FROM UNIPOLARITY TO REAL MULTIPOLARITY:

THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICS. 174

Participants:

I. O. ABRAMOVA, *Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*

D. O. BABICH, *Journalist and columnist for the RIA Novosti news agency (Moscow)*

I. I. BUZOVSKY, *Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk), Candidate of Sociological Sciences*

V. A. CHERESHNEV, *Chief Researcher of the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ekaterinburg), member of the Presidium of the Ural Branch of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Medicine), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*

E. G. DRAPEKO, *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation*

L. L. FITUNI, *Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Head of the Center for Global and Strategic Studies of the Institute, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*

S. Yu. GLAZYEV, *Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*

Al. A. GROMYKO, *Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS*

P. N. GUSEV, *Editor-in-chief of the newspaper "Moskovsky Komsomolets", Chairman of the Commission of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation for the Support of Mass Media, Chairman of the Union of Journalists of Moscow*

A. KEVIN, *Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University (Canberra), diplomat (1968–1998), independent expert, recipient of literary prizes*

Ye. V. KHARITONOVA, *Senior Researcher at the Institute of Africa of the RAS (Moscow), Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor*

S. I. KISLYAK, *First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)*

V. V. NAUMKIN, *Scientific supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor*

V. N. PUNCHENKO, *Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (Minsk)*

V. A. SHAMAKHOV, *Scientific supervisor of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, 1st class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Colonel General of the Customs Service*

S. A. TSYPLYAEV, *Editor-in-Chief of the national scientific-political journal "Vlast" (Moscow), Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, 3rd class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy*

M. V. ZAKHAROVA, *Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY, *President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation*

K. F. ZATULIN, *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries*

INDEX OF NAMES 192

REPORTS

I. O. Abramova¹

AFRICAN VECTOR OF RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AMID THE BREAKDOWN OF THE OLD WORLD ORDER²

The events of February 2022 and the Russian special military operation in Ukraine have significantly altered our country's foreign policy priorities. Today Western states are waging a war of annihilation against us, so Russia must give up on its illusory aspirations to become part of the Western world. The West has never regarded Russia as an equal partner, but imposed a system of interaction where our country was assigned the role of a semi-colony, following the orders of the suzerain and providing it with the necessary material, financial and human resources. In order to achieve this goal, all means of colonial influence were used against the Russian Federation, including shrinkage of the industrial potential and reorientation of the Russian economy toward the export of natural resources; technological, financial and informational dependence on the West; destruction of the national system of education, science and culture; narrowing of the sphere of application of the Russian language; bribery of elites; "brain drain"; imposition of a Western system of values on Russian youth, and much more. They also wanted to weaken, or, rather, disintegrate the Russian army and surround the Russian territory with military bases of NATO countries, which they have successfully accomplished in the 1990s and 2000s. Since Russia possessed a strong nuclear capability, they had to create a system of checks and balances that would make it impossible for our country to react in time to a preventive nuclear strike. A major role in this policy was assigned to the former republics of the Soviet Union, primarily Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. Inside Russia, the bet was made on support of those political forces which, should they come to power, were ready to make a complete compromise with the West.

Despite the undoubted success of these efforts in Ukraine and Georgia, the policy has not generally yielded the desired results. Moreover, despite numerous sanctions, over the past 10 years Russia has significantly strengthened its defense and economic potential, and repeated attempts to change the Kremlin's political course have failed. In this context, it was essential to use fundamentally new lever-

age on our country, including unleashing of a direct armed conflict on our borders. To a certain extent, the events in Ukraine simply "unmasked" and transformed our confrontation from a partially camouflaged to an overt form. The West has openly and collectively opposed us, using every conceivable and inconceivable instrument of pressure – economical, diplomatic, political, informational, military and humanitarian. In the difficult situation which Russia is facing today, we need to finally part with our illusions and intensify work with countries that are willing to continue cooperating with us. These are not only India and China, but also other developing states, former colonies and semi-colonies of the West. Every effort must be made to ensure that these countries continue to perceive Russia as one of the *key pillars and beacon of the developing world*; a state rising up against the modern sophisticated forms of exploitation and robbery by the united West. Today we find ourselves in the same boat with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and have no choice but to defend our independence and sovereignty by taking up arms against the collective West on our own borders.

In 2022, the process of transformation of the modern world has significantly accelerated. Multipolarity as a new emerging world order potentially opens the door to a more equitable system of international relations that takes into account the interests of the widest possible range of the global community members, more effective and rapid development of many states, although it does not preclude competition and confrontation between them.

"Against this background, there is a reassessment of the comparative importance and role of the regions of the world as zones of clashing interests of the participants in the renewed rivalry. In the context of extreme undesirability of ultra-dangerous direct confrontation between the old and new players, the geostrategic, political and military importance of the peripheral zones of rivalry has increased [5]," including the African continent.

Numerous manifestations of the profound crisis in the modern world order signify a need for change. In defining a different configuration of the world order, old and new players will need raw and fuel resources, personnel, knowledge and skills, previously untapped markets and spheres of influence. In this sense, Russia and Africa are becoming increasingly close.

Both Russia and African states have unique natural resources, not yet fully explored and divided, and a huge territory with a population density below the world average. The struggle to include Russia and Africa alike in the sphere of influence of a particular player will grow increasingly more fierce in the coming years. In the emerging new bipolarity, the main adversaries in this struggle will be the United States and China.

Obviously, this global perspective is not acceptable for Russia and Africa, because it puts at risk their economic identity. Even now Africa is expressing concerns about

¹ Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS, member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, professor of the Department of African Studies and Arab Studies of the Peoples' Friendship University of Russia, leading researcher of the St. Petersburg State University, Dr. Sc. (Economics). Author of more than 250 scientific publications, including 11 monographs: "The New Role of Africa in the World Economy of the 21st Century," "Islam, Global Governance and the New World Order" (co-authored), "Arab City at the Turn of the Millennium, Emerging and Failed States in the World Economy and Politics" (co-authored), "African Migration: Experience of Systemic Analysis, African Population in the New Global Economy," and others. Member of the editorial boards of the scientific journals *Asia and Africa Today*, *Scientific Notes of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences*, *Conflictology*, and *Contours of Global Transformation*.

² The report is based on the message shared at the meeting of the Presidium of the RAS on February 9, 2022: *Абрамова И. О. Геостратегическая схватка за Африку и интересы России в преддверии второго Саммита Россия–Африка // Российская академия наук : [сайт]. URL: <http://www.ras.ru/news/shownews.aspx?id=7180d283-2d7d-4342-b018-b69e0123cdda> (date of address: 27.05.2022).*

China's growing influence on the continent, along with the habitual discontent about the former colonialists and the United States, while simultaneously accepting financial injections and economic assistance from either side. For Russia, unambiguously described in Western strategies as an adversary and "aggressor," entangled with economic sanctions, a "turn to East" is also risky in terms of falling under the influence of a much more economically powerful China.

In this regard, the development strategies of Africa and Russia complement each other in many ways. It is quite indicative that, in the context of the new emerging model of global development, both countries understand the need to rely on their own potential and to cooperate not with one key partner, but with a range of players. For instance, in Africa, both at the continental level and at the level of regional conglomerates and individual countries, the concept of "African ownership" has been increasingly adopted since the early 2000s, suggesting the ability to own one's development. Today the concept is becoming Pan-African. In 2013, the key strategic document of the African Union, Agenda 2063, put forth "Africa-centered development" as a starting point in the continent's growth agenda. According to the African economists, this approach does not mean that Africa refuses to participate in international economic relations, but that it shifts the focus of its development to the domestic market and localization of imported goods and services. Integration within the framework of the African Continental Free Trade Area should play a key role in this process [8].

As for Russia, it needs a new strategy for socio-economic development. The key objectives of this strategy include accelerated development of the Russian economy in order to ensure the growth of welfare of its citizens; saturation of the domestic market with necessary goods and services; revival of national industry; real growth of exports of non-energy commodities; ensuring presence of the Russian Federation among the leading countries of the world in research and development – among other steps, through creation of an effective system of higher education; achieving "digital maturity" in key sectors of the economy and social services; reforming the financial system and establishing a new mechanism of international settlements.

In our opinion, African direction of Russia's foreign economic activity can make a significant contribution to solving the aforementioned problems. Moreover, in conditions of increasing tension in relations with Western partners, the growth of China's economic and political power and influence in Asia, and escalation of the situation in the Middle East, the African vector of Russia's foreign policy takes on special significance. Politically, the support of Africans is extremely important for us as they account for more than a quarter of all votes at the UN. Economically, Africa is the most important market for sale of our industrial products and application of Russian technologies, including localization of our country's production capacities on the continent, training of personnel, and transfer of knowledge and skills. Between 2014 and 2019, the African consumer market has doubled in size and continues to grow at a faster rate than the rest of the world (4–5% per year versus 1.5–2%) [7]. Rapidly increasing demand for goods and services opens up new opportunities for sale of Russian industrial products on the African market.

We also need Africa as a supplier of essential strategic raw materials for successful development of modern high-tech industries. These are primarily manganese, chromium, bauxite, uranium, lithium, and rare earth metals.

Russia, which is also focused on import substitution and revival of national industry and agriculture, has 10 times less population than Africa. Meanwhile, to ensure accelerated development of production, access to large foreign markets is required. For a long period of its modern history, Russia was primarily focused on the development of economic ties with the Western world; now it has found itself in a very vulnerable position. Its intended role as a "gas station," a raw materials appendage of the developed countries and simultaneously an importer of Western industrial products, technologies and "values" was being implanted for over 20 years with obvious success, manifesting in degradation of the domestic industry, science and education and, as a consequence, a strong technological and informational dependence on the United States and Europe.

Economic sovereignty of the Russian Federation has been undermined, whereas its political status and international prestige have significantly diminished. Moreover, the disappointing, bordering on profound cataclysmic trends in the economy and society of the leading Western countries preclude favorable attitude of the United States and its allies to the very idea of restoring a powerful, multi-sectoral and self-sufficient economic complex in our country, even in the case of hypothetical substantial concessions from Moscow.

Meanwhile, the contemporary Russia needs a true economic breakthrough, which is impossible without restoration of multi-sectoral industry and development of domestic technology. Expansion of any production, including its high-tech varieties, is rooted in the growing demand for a certain type of product and the possibility of localization of the production process outside the country as close as possible to the consumer.

That is why it is very important for us today to identify the key focus in our relationship with the African continent, to find the niche that will allow us to designate a special role to Russia in the development of Africa, distinguishing it from other partners of African countries and simultaneously matching the strategic objectives of both the Russian Federation and the African Union.

At the plenary session of the Russia-Africa Economic Forum in 2019, Vladimir Putin said that the trade turnover between our countries, which exceeded 20 billion dollars in 2018, is insufficient and should at least double in the coming years [3].

Trade is undoubtedly the most important aspect of foreign economic activity, and the prospects for increasing trade turnover between Russia and African states are quite favorable. Moreover, the structure of our exports to Africa in 2019 in terms of non-resource and non-energy component, which reached 80%, was nearly perfect [4]. In the commodity structure of Russian exports to Africa in 2019, machinery, equipment and vehicles accounted for almost 25%, mineral products – 20%, metals and metal products – 8.5%, chemical products and rubber – 5%, timber and pulp&paper products – 4%. An increase in Russian-African trade can be achieved both through its diversification and geographical expansion (to date, 84% of Russia's total trade is with seven states: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, South

Africa, Tunisia, Nigeria, and Sudan), and as a result of an increase in the supply of African goods to Russia. These are primarily agricultural products and unique types of minerals of strategic importance, which we often buy through European and other intermediaries [2].

“Cooperation with African states in the framework of the African Continental Free Trade Area (ACFTA), one of the flagship projects of Africa’s prospective development until 2063, also seems quite appropriate. However, cooperation in trade and financial investments will be significantly behind the leading actors in the short term” [1].

Still, we believe that in our mid- and long-term relations, working out bilateral opportunities for *technological partnership* could be *crucial* to attracting African countries and contributing to Russia’s successful economic development. This area can become a driver of development of the interacting parties in the conditions of the fourth industrial revolution and stimulates establishment of new strategic alliances.

Export of technology is, first and foremost, the export of products manufactured by companies in knowledge-intensive industries. Such products are manufactured using the latest equipment and technology, with engagement of highly qualified, specially trained personnel, embodying modern scientific achievements, best practices, and high socio-economic efficiency. At the same time, technology export suggests licensing the manufacturing of knowledge-intensive products, localization of manufacturing of a particular product or its individual components, as well as personnel training and cooperation in the scientific domain. It is obvious that this form of interaction is in the interests of both Russia (which thus obtains a large market for its exports and strengthens its influence on the African continent through training) and Africa (which increases the production of new goods with high added value inside the continent and receives highly qualified personnel trained by the Russian party) [1].

In the transforming world, “the demand for Russian technology in Africa can grow significantly, because Russia has high competencies in the areas that are topical for the African continent today. These are the agricultural sector (including seed farming, animal husbandry, fertilizer production, processing and storage of agricultural products); medicine (not only the production of drugs and vaccines, but also development of a network of medical institutions); digital technology, transport and energy infrastructure, space, construction, water supply, and mining” [1].

All of these plans are designed for the long and medium term. However, today we need to develop the tactics for interaction with African partners which would render effective and rapid results.

Most African states have now assumed a “wait-and-see” attitude toward Russia. This is manifested in the results of the vote in the UN General Assembly on the U.S.-Ukrainian resolution condemning Russia’s military operation in Ukraine. Out of 54 African states, 28 voted for the resolution; 17 countries abstained – Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Congo, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zimbabwe, CAR, Equatorial Guinea, South Sudan; 8 states did not vote – Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Morocco, Togo, and Eswatini. Eritrea was the only African country that voted against the resolution.

Almost all African countries have no sympathy for Western partners, but are heavily economically dependent on the United States and the EU. In the current situation, further development of Russian-African relations will directly depend on the success of our special military operation in Ukraine. In this case, the sympathies of most African states will be on the side of the Russian Federation. However, even today, there is a number of special considerations.

1. It is necessary to revise approaches to cooperation with African integration groupings, primarily with the African Union, in order to strengthen Russia’s influence at this platform. It may be advisable to separate interaction with the African Union into an individual agenda, in order to distinguish it from relations with the African continent as a whole.

2. Russian activity in Africa is already bringing tangible fruit. The countries to which Russia provides economic support and military-technical assistance continue to be interested in strengthening our relations. On the contrary, states that do not work so closely with Russia have spoken out boldly against our actions. Thus, augmenting cooperation with them in the near future requires further evaluation. Russia should respond firmly and unequivocally, emphasizing the role of the USSR in the independence of African countries and inadmissibility of accusing Russia of neocolonialism and imperialism.

3. Russia should clearly and unambiguously state its position: abstaining countries should be “rewarded” (in terms of investment and security, including food security, etc.). We should start building a long-term partnership with these states.

4. Special attention should be paid to Eritrea, one of the five countries that voted against the anti-Russian resolution at the UN General Assembly and one of the two countries, along with Russia itself, that supported us at the UN Human Rights Council. In a situation where even Venezuela, an old and loyal ally of our country, has abstained, Eritrea’s position means an invitation to broad cooperation. Taking into account Eritrea’s extremely favorable location (from a military point of view as well), we should focus on building ties with this state, minding the political and image-related risks.

5. In the situation of a tough confrontation between the West and Russia, African countries can occupy the niche of more important partners in the near future: for instance, among the 35 states that abstained in the UN General Assembly vote on the Russian special operation, 16 represent the African continent.

6. At the same time, African countries can compete with us as suppliers of energy resources, especially oil and gas, to the EU. It is time to start working in this direction.

7. Particular attention should be paid to building Russia’s informational influence on the African continent using both official Russian mass media and social media. Despite the fact that in Africa the Western mass media have a lot of authority, there are many comments from regular Africans on social media in support of Russia. Current events are probably perceived as a demonstration of our country’s ability to defend its own interests, which is welcomed by Africans. Some social media comments also mention that Russia has always supported Africa, so now Africa should support Russia. Thus, current events can contribute to strengthening our country’s positive image in Africa.

8. We also need to consider the risk that African youth will become reluctant to study in Russia. Many news stories are devoted to the problems faced by African students in Ukraine; since Russia is often mentioned in these stories, and Africans tend to perceive the territory of the post-Soviet space as a single whole, the resulting fears and concerns can be extrapolated to our country.

9. Joint Russian projects with American and European companies on the continent can be discontinued by the decision of our partners. In this situation, it makes sense to look up to the companies of the third countries which abstained during the vote on the UN resolution on March 2 this year.

10. The main area of our cooperation in the near future should be to ensure food security of African states (including supplies of grain and other agricultural products, fertilizers, etc.). *We need to explain to our African partners that it is the West (and especially the U.S.) that is to be blamed for the threat of famine on the African continent, since it has completely cut off the supply of Russian products there, particularly food.* Cooperation in the biomedical field is also crucial. Even now African countries are concerned about rising food and fertilizer prices, whereas the combat against infections and other diseases is one of the continent's most pressing challenges. In the long term, we need to increase exports of high-tech Russian products to Africa. In response, we expect the African states to refuse to support Western economic sanctions and to increase cooperation with Russia across all areas.

11. Special attention should also be paid to the Pentagon's biological laboratories in Africa, actively promoting this topic. In 2020, the world learned about existence of U.S. biological programs in the following African countries: Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda [9]. Another source listed the following countries in the same year: Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe – 49 biological laboratories were accounted for in these countries [6].

12. There is an urgent need to develop a new financial mechanism for our economic cooperation with African states with minimum connection to dollar and euro, using national and digital currencies, netting mechanisms and concessions.

13. It is extremely important to ensure a continuous and serious evaluation by professional researchers (experts on Africa rather than novices without the appropriate experience and knowledge of the continent) of the economic and political consequences of specific decisions for our country, steps taken by African governments and newly discovered circumstances in relation to their economic opportunities and actions (conjuncture). *To this end, it is necessary to support purpose-oriented analytical and advisory activity of specialized research structures which have proved their high applied performance*, providing them with adequate information, material and technical support.

References

1. Абрамова, И. О. Стратегия России на африканском направлении: что изменилось после саммита Россия–Африка 2019? / И. О. Абрамова, Л. Л. Фитуни. – Текст : непосредственный // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. – 2021. – Т. 65, № 12. – С. 68–78.
2. Документы ТСВТ. – Текст : электронный // Федеральная таможенная служба : [сайт]. – URL: <http://stat.customs.gov.ru/documents> (date of address: 12.05.2022).
3. Завражин, К. Владимир Путин призвал удвоить товарооборот с Африкой / К. Завражин, К. Латухина. – Текст : электронный // Российская газета. – 2019, 24 окт. – URL: <https://rg.ru/2019/10/23/vladimir-putin-prizval-udvoit-tovarooborot-s-afrikoj.html> (date of address: 12.05.2022).
4. Международная сеть. – Текст : электронный // Российский экспортный центр : [сайт]. – URL: https://www.exportcenter.ru/international_markets/world_map/ (date of address: 26.08.2021).
5. Фитуни, Л. Военно-стратегическое значение Африки в постмонополярном мире / Л. Фитуни. – Текст : электронный // Национальная оборона : [сайт]. – URL: <https://2009-2020.oborona.ru/includes/periodics/geopolitics/2017/0227/210520646/detail.shtml> (date of address: 23.05.2022).
6. 25个国家和地区, 200多个生物实验室究竟在干啥? 美国请回答. – Text : electronic // xinmin.cn : [website]. – URL: <http://wap.xinmin.cn/content/31830499.html> (date of address: 23.05.2022).
7. African Economic Outlook 2021. From Debt Resolution to Growth: The Road Ahead for Africa (chapter 1). – Text : electronic // African Development Bank : [website]. – URL: https://www.afdb.org/sites/default/files/2021/03/09/aeo_2021_-_chap1_-_en.pdf (date of address: 23.08.2021).
8. Sherif, K. Africa's key to wealth growth: produce and consume locally / K. Sherif. – Text : electronic // The Africa Report : [website]. – URL: <https://www.theafricareport.com/38264/africas-key-to-wealth-growth-produce-and-consume-locally/> (date of address: 23.05.2022).
9. 重磅揭秘! 美军全球布局生物实验室被曝光! 格鲁吉亚73名志愿者“试毒”身亡. – Text : electronic // CCTV.com : [сайт]. – URL: <http://app.cctv.com/special/cportal/detail/arti/index.html?id=ArtieTEs5tQcd31al7GQhZnZ200516&fromapp=cctvnews&version=807> (date of address: 23.05.2022).

D. O. Babich¹

WESTERN MILITARY PROPAGANDA. TECHNIQUES AND PRINCIPLES FROM 1991 TO THE SPECIAL OPERATION IN UKRAINE

Late 1980s were a period of false hope and unhealthy euphoria. Against the backdrop of agreements between the “Soviet leader” Mikhail Gorbachev (as the Western press referred to the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) and American presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, the end of the Cold War was announced. It seemed a closure of the period of perilous confrontation which began in the second half of the 1940s through the fault of both sides – Stalin’s Soviet Union and the United States, which was in a state of McCarthyism. At that time, the Americans were supported by Britain, France, the resurging West Germany and other allies who feared Soviet expansion, including former enemies Japan and Italy.

The Cold War was a complicated process, one of its negative consequences being the restriction of contacts between the “genetically” quite European successor to the Russian Empire – the Soviet Union – and Western Europe with its overseas “expansion” – the United States. While not so painful today, in the 1960s and 1970s this isolation indeed looked very harmful to the USSR, because the states of America, Western Europe and Japan (“Big Seven”) constituted the group of industrially developed countries.

Nevertheless, the Cold War was a form of maintaining equilibrium in international relations, helping avoid major international armed conflicts in Europe from 1945 to 1990 (beginning of civil wars in the former Yugoslavia). Russian historian Professor Anatoly Utkin suggests this understanding of the period, recognizing its positive consequences. (In the relatively peaceful period from 1945 to 1979 when the Afghan War started, the USSR accumulated knowledge and became softer in the morals, which enabled democratization and creation of a pluralistic press independent of the state in the 1988–1990s).²

At the same time, Professor Utkin points out that the United States and its allies in Western Europe never saw the process of mutual disarmament as a “win-win” game, even during the “honeymoon period” between Russia and the West at the time of late Gorbachev and early Yeltsin. Even from the early warming of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1986, Reagan, Bush senior, and then Bill Clinton saw what was happening as a process that is beneficial primarily for the global West, necessarily entailing gradual weakening of Moscow.³ The West simply decided not to inform Moscow about this yet – according to the rules of the advertising market, unfamiliar to Soviet people, where the author of an advertisement is not responsible for the naivety of the consumer.

Nevertheless, for the residents of the USSR (and, since 1991, for the inhabitants of the former Soviet republics), as

well as for the well-meaning left-liberal public in the West, the advertising created a version of some “end of history” – a “perpetual peace” beneficial to all the inhabitants of the Earth, wherein military conflicts were eliminated due to the gradual transition of the entire world to the universal Western values, which “have conquered the entire world and will not be replaced by anything in the foreseeable future.”⁴

American political scientist Francis Fukuyama’s first article dedicated to the end of history was published in 1989, the “miraculous year” (*Annus mirabilis*, to quote the enthusiastic European commentary) when pro-Soviet regimes in Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria have fallen one after another. All of these coups were bloodless, the only bloody one being the fall of the relatively Soviet-independent regime of Nicolae Ceausescu in Romania at the end of that same year. Fukuyama’s theory seemed to work by and large.

But in August 1990, it cracked. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, which had just emerged from a difficult war with Khomeinist Iran (1980–1988), decided to compensate for the losses incurred due to the fruitless attempt to occupy the oil-producing provinces of Iran. In August 1990, Iraq occupied the oil-rich emirate of Kuwait, one of the main sources of Persian Gulf oil for the world markets. The U.S. unleashed a war with Iraq in January 1991. Its goal was to push Iraqi troops out of Kuwait and – now that was a new thing! – a change of regime in Iraq. As a result, the 1991 war was almost bloodless for the United States (the number of American troops killed by Iraqi weapons was less than the number of anti-Iraqi soldiers who died in car accidents and other mishaps while delivering massive amounts of weapons to battlefields in the Persian Gulf region).

This was a completely new situation for the Western military propaganda. Now there was no need to calm down the people of the United States and other Western countries about the losses of their armies. As for the Iraqi army and civilian casualties, a soothing version was created: first, the extent of those casualties was understated (only after the war they have shown the houses and underground shelters destroyed by American bombs, in which thousands of Iraqis died); second, it was claimed that the war was weakening the “repressive regime” of Iraq, which would otherwise kill many more innocents.

Fukuyama himself tried to portray the wars not only in Iraq (in 1991 and 2003), but also in Syria, Libya and Yemen as “transitional conflicts” to perpetual peace, but now his utopia is finally failing. The irony of his own story is that after the coup of 2014 in Ukraine, Francis Fukuyama began moonlighting in Kiev as a lecturer for several “leadership programs” of the American “Atlantic Council.”⁵ In his speeches back in 2019–2021, Fukuyama promised Ukraine peaceful development and prosperity, especially in the days when he has given a paid lecture course to Zelensky’s team, who had absolutely no public administration experience after winning the 2019 Ukrainian elections.

¹ Journalist and columnist for the RIA Novosti news agency. Author of a number of publications, including: “The Theatricalization of Evil in Nabokov’s Novels,” “The Writer’s Universe Must Be All-Inclusive: On the Novels of Albert Camus,” “Nabokov and New Criticism in the U.S.,” “The Theory of Receptive Aesthetics,” “Success in Journalism – What It Constitutes and What Traps There Are Along the Way,” etc. Member of the Russian Union of Journalists.

² Уткин А. Мировая холодная война. М.: Алгоритм, 2005. С. 15.

³ Ibid. С. 18.

⁴ Фукуяма Ф. Конец истории и последний человек. М., 1991. С. 10.

⁵ Atlantic Council, Analytical Survey, 2021.

The main principles of the new Western military propaganda became apparent during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Before giving them a detailed scrutiny, let me name the necessary “framework elements” that make it effective:

1) the war zone is closed to uncontrolled penetration by any independent journalists, both Western and non-Western. All visits should be accompanied by the US military or international missions loyal to the US – *the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)*, *the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)*, the European Union, etc.;

2) the actively working press center produces information (primarily videos) in a “constant news flow” mode to satisfy the persistent “information hunger” of the world’s media with materials beneficial to Western troops;

3) with regard to possible unpleasant surprises inherent to war (unexpected losses in personnel and equipment, abandonment of territory, image losses due to cruelty to the enemy population), the rules of “damage control” are applied by PR services of large companies.

The methods of damage control are already well known to all employees of PR services of large companies: all “unauthorized persons” are denied access to the “disaster zone,” the most negative versions of what happened are discredited in advance, competitors are blamed (in war – the enemy “violating the laws and customs of the war”). The mantra that “the situation is under control” is constantly repeated, and the civilians “need not worry.”

Very soon after 1991, it became clear that Fukuyama’s conclusions had meant exactly the opposite: fragmentation instead of a united planet, war instead of peace. The Gulf War was followed by wars in the former Yugoslavia (Serbo-Croatian in 1991–1992, Bosnian in 1992–1995, Kosovo in 1999), as well as in the former Soviet Union (Moldovan in 1992, the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 1991–1994, a series of wars in Georgia). After a brief period of detached observation of these conflicts in the early 1990s, the West (primarily the US and the EU) began to actively intervene in almost every war, with the goal of destroying large states and replacing them with a multitude of the new quasi-states that were only formally sovereign, but in fact dependent on the West (steps were taken to destroy Yugoslavia as the largest Eastern European federation, weaken Russia as the largest “fragment” of the USSR, and Iraq and Iran as the largest independent countries in the Middle East). Since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in 2016, an open economic war has been launched against China – with mutual losses of tens of billions of dollars.¹

In the context of Russia’s current confrontation with the NATO bloc and its allies over the Ukrainian issue, it would be useful to highlight the basic principles of the Western military propaganda, as these are the principles that have guided the Zelensky regime and its Western allies in their actions since the beginning of hostilities in Donbass in the spring and summer of 2014 and especially after the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine in February 2022. Here’s how they are delivered by the non-conformist edition Anti-Spiegel.²

1. “We do not want (did not want) war.”

Anti-Spiegel’s comment on this principle: “If you believe the Western media and politicians, all they want is peace. But in the case of the Ukrainian conflict, there is an obvious inconsistency: if the West is so eager for peace, why isn’t it taking the initiative to negotiate and compromise? Instead, Western countries began to destroy channels of communication with Russia, deport Russian diplomats en masse, etc.”³

2. “The other side is fully responsible for the war.”

In the case of the Ukrainian conflict, it is undoubtedly Russia. So, German mass media refer to the events in Ukraine as “Putins Angrieffskrieg” or “Rußlands Angrieffskrieg” (“Putin’s attack war,” “Russia’s attack war”). The phrase “Angrieffskrieg” is deliberately lumped together in one word to clearly identify the culprit.

Here’s how Anti-Spiegel refutes this version: “The Western mass media know very well that it was France and Germany who officially buried the Minsk Peace Accords in October 2021. They just decided not to discuss it too much in the Western press. The Western mass media also know that Russia has marked Ukraine’s accession to NATO as a red line, but this has not changed the behavior of Western countries; the Western media remember that since December 2021 Russia has invited the West to talks on mutual security guarantees, including the Ukrainian issue – and the West has rejected such talks. All of this is not news to the Western media. They just don’t tell their readers about it.”

3. “The leader of a hostile country is demonized.”

The Anti-Spiegel author ironically notes that “there is nothing to add, everyone knows what commentary the ‘quality Western media’ are publishing on Putin. They are below the standards of the worst tabloid press.”

4. “The West protects the common good, not the private interests.”

Rapid entry of American oil companies in Iraq after its occupation by the United States in 2003, major economic interests of France in Libya (the first NATO country to attack it in 2011), purchase of black earth in Ukraine by Western buyers – all these examples by Anti-Spiegel speak for themselves.

5. “The enemy deliberately commits atrocities. When our side commits them, it is unintentional.”

Remember that the war in Iraq began with reports (later proven to be false) of the killing of babies in Kuwait by Iraqi troops, and the events in Bucha, Ukraine, were used to dramatically increase shipment of arms to the Ukrainian regime.⁴

Conclusions. The principles of the Western military propaganda briefly listed here should be carefully studied. With the rigid ultra-liberal ideology that has won in the West, these principles are unlikely to be called into question in the near future – it will take both time and courage to do so.

Russia should clearly point to these techniques rather than speak in general of the “deceitful nature of the Western mass media.”

¹ Owen J. Liberal Peace, Liberal War. American Politics and International Security. Ithaca : Cornell Univ. Press, 1997. P. 113–116.

² Nach Lehrbuch: Deutsche Medien betreiben Kriegspropaganda // Seniora. org : [website]. URL: <https://seniora.org/politik-wirtschaft/nach-lehrbuch-deutsche-medien-betreiben-kriegspropaganda>.

³ Nach Lehrbuch: Deutsche Medien betreiben Kriegspropaganda.

⁴ Ibid.

G. M. Birzhenyuk¹

THE SITUATION IN UKRAINE. EXPERIENCE OF ANALYSIS IN TERMS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION STUDIES

Even a superficial content analysis of publications about the situation in Ukraine in terms of the frequency of the wordings descriptive of what has been happening there since February 24 shows that the word “conflict” significantly prevails over the others – both politically correct and otherwise.

This is not only and not strictly because Roskomnadzor demands that all materials using the word “war” are removed from the media.² This is because a “war” is not only the actions of one country against another, but also a legal case governed by the rules of international law. According to the Hague Convention III of 1907 (Art. 1), “The Contracting Powers recognize that hostilities between themselves must not commence without previous and explicit warning, in the form either of a reasoned declaration of war or of an ultimatum with conditional declaration of war.”³ Besides, “the existence of a state of war must be notified to the neutral Powers without delay.”

Strictly speaking, both before the adoption of this convention and after its introduction into the system of international law, the declaration of war has been something of a ritual, an essentially non-binding element of international relations. So, the Seven Years’ War of 1756–1763, which involved all large and most medium and small states of Europe, as well as the Caribbean, India, the Philippines and even some Indian tribes, was not preceded by a formal declaration of war by any of its parties. Napoleon only issued a proclamation for his army. The Seven Years’ War had such scale that Winston Churchill termed it the First World War.⁴

¹ Deputy Chairman of the Academic Council, Head of the Departments of Social and Cultural Technologies and Conflictology at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Honored Worker of Higher Education of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 100 scientific publications, including: “Global Information Challenges and Information Security,” “Time and Social Institutions as Universals of Culture,” “Socio-Cultural Synchronizers and Regulators” (scientific editor), “Monitoring of Social and Labor Conflicts in Russia: Theory, Methodology, Technology” (co-authored), “Labor Arbitration in Collective Disputes: History and the Present” (co-authored), “Trade Union Movement in Russia: Major Trends (2005–2015)” (co-authored), etc. Recipient of the St. Petersburg Government Award for Outstanding Achievements in Higher Education and Secondary Vocational Education (2016). Full member of the Academy of Tourism. Professor Emeritus of M. Tursunzade Tajik State Institute of Arts. Professor Emeritus of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

² Reports assessed as containing inaccurate data about the actions of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation have been found by the agency in the following sources: Novaya Gazeta, Ekho Moskvy, Dozhd, Mediazona, The New Times, Svobodnaya Pressa, Krym.Realii, Journalist, Lenizdat, and InoSMI. Some of these sources have now either been closed or declared foreign agents. On March 4, 2022, a law was passed that imposes serious criminal penalties for fakes about the Russian Armed Forces. Their propagators are punished with fines from 700 thousand to 1.5 million rubles, penal or compulsory work, or imprisonment in a colony for up to three years. If such actions result in “grave consequences,” the term of imprisonment could constitute 10 to 15 years (Art. 207.3 of the Criminal Code).

³ Convention Relative to the Opening of Hostilities of October 18, 1907 (entered into force on January 26, 1910). URL: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague03.asp; <https://european-court-help.ru/iii-gaagskaja-konvencija-ob-otkrytii-voennyh-dejstvij-dejstvujushhaja-ot-18-oktjabrja-1907-goda/>.

⁴ Bowen H. V. War and British Society 1688–1815. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998.

The last country to declare war in the twentieth century was Mongolia. Ulaanbaatar declared war on Japan on August 10, 1945⁵, a day after the Soviet Union which thus complied with the Yalta Accords.⁶

Since the 18th century, the declaration of war, on the one hand, began to resemble a ritual similar to shaking hands with rivals in chess, wrestling, boxing and other types of martial arts and team competitions; on the other hand, it became a verbal form which often had nothing behind it. Here it’s fitting to recall that Britain and France declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939, but for the next eight months their troops took almost no action that could be regarded as military.

There were no major wars in the world after World War II. But there was the U.S. military operation in Vietnam (1960–1975); the Vietnam invasion of Cambodia on December 25, 1978, and the overthrow of Pol Pot; the entry of Soviet troops (as emphasized in official reports, their “temporary limited contingent”) in Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, for a long 10 years; the armed conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falkland Islands (1982); the bombing of Yugoslavia by NATO troops; the destruction of Iraq, Libya, Syria; the 20-year US campaign in Afghanistan; and finally, the “peace enforcement” in Georgia in 2008 by the Russian troops.

Bottom line: there were no wars, but millions of people – military and civilians – died in the fighting. This is purely legal casuistics. According to UN norms, a state declaring a war is automatically considered an aggressor, with all the ensuing consequences, whereas a state that carries out aggression without declaration of war is not considered as such. In this context, it is clear why Ukraine does not declare war on Russia: in this case, according to the UN Charter, it automatically becomes an aggressor, and neither the “collective” nor the individual West will support an aggressor.

For these reasons, it makes sense to refer to anything connected with military actions, campaigns, operations, and the like, as conflicts.

The collisions described above have a similarity with labor conflicts. In Russia there are hundreds and thousands of them – of varying nature, scale, and consequences – but the Labor Code does not contain the concept of a “conflict.” Law No. 175-FZ of November 23, 1995 “On the Procedure for Resolving Collective Labor Disputes” contains the term “labour dispute,” which means “unresolved disagreements between employees and employers... concerning the establishment and change of employment conditions (including wages), conclusion, amendment and performance of collective contracts and agreements on social and labour re-

⁵ Declaration of the Small Khural and the Government of the Mongolian People’s Republic on the Announcement of War on Japan // Pravda. 1945. August 11.

⁶ People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. M. Molotov received the Japanese Ambassador Naotake Sato on August 8 at 17:00 Moscow time. The former made a statement on behalf of the Soviet government that from August 9, the USSR would consider itself at war with Japan (See: Дубинский А. М. Советско-китайские отношения в период японо-китайской войны, 1937–1945. М., 1980. С. 246).

lations.” However, only the disputes that are registered under a special procedure which takes about 35 days become acknowledged by the law. Trade unions and employers do this only in extreme cases. Eventually, formally there are only a few disputes, but in reality there are many conflicts.

One cannot help recalling a Soviet-era joke: “...When our audience asks whether a war will break out, our answer is no, it won’t, but there will be such a struggle for peace that it will leave no stone unturned.”

If we try to apply the methods of analysis in terms of conflict resolution studies to the situation in Ukraine, the following can be stated.

1. It makes sense to start the analysis with identifying the parties to the conflict. At first glance, the question seems rhetorical, since one country (Russia) is conducting a special military operation against another country (Ukraine). However, on March 16, during a meeting with the government on social and economic support of the regions, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the collective West is trying to destroy a strong and sovereign Russia¹.

Foreign Minister Lavrov formulates his position in the similar way. At the conference “Digital International Relations 2022” at MGIMO, he said that “the situation in the contemporary world is seriously aggravated. This is due to the aggressive line of the collective West, led by the United States, which seeks to restore and permanently enforce its dominance in international affairs”².

In other words, there is reason to believe that the parties to the conflict are not Russia and Ukraine, but Russia and the “collective West.” The question is, what is Ukraine, in this case? History will provide a definitive answer, but for now we can only assume what Ukraine’s role could be – from the object that history has chosen for an epic clash between the two civilizations (like the Balkans, which became “Europe’s powder keg”) to the fuse that ignited the fire of World War I on June 8, 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was murdered in Sarajevo.

2. In terms of forms and spheres of manifestation of conflicts, they are present in a great variety – from acute military conflict on the territory of Ukraine (as well as the LPR and DPR) to equally acute conflicts in economic, financial, scientific, technical, informational and other areas of social practice and international relations.

3. It is rather difficult to determine the exact spatial and temporal limits of the conflict. They are not even limits because it is not finished yet; to avoid poor predictions, we should better focus on its origins and beginning. Most likely, this is 2014, the starting point being the referendum in Crimea and Sevastopol and the incorporation of these territories as constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Another point (or conflict trigger) is the coup d’état in Ukraine that took place in February 2014, and the opposition’s coming to power. Immediately thereafter, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine repealed the law “On the Fundamentals of State Language Policy,” which had been in effect since 2012. According to the law, the Russian language and the languages of national minorities received the status of regional lan-

guages in those areas where they are native to at least 10% of the population. As a result, protests erupted in eastern Ukraine, where the population is predominantly Russian-speaking.

On June 16, 2016, Kiev adopted amendments to the law “On Television and Radio Broadcasting,” which established language quotas for radio. Since November of that year, at least 60% of the broadcasting time had to be allotted to news and entertainment programs in the state language. On music radio stations, songs in Ukrainian language had to constitute at least 35% of daily broadcasting time, and if the radio station’s concept implies broadcasting mainly foreign music, then 60% of vocal compositions in the languages of the European Union had to be mixed with at least 25% of songs in Ukrainian in prime time.

On September 28, 2017, Ukraine adopted a new version of the law “On Education,” which prescribed gradual introduction of a ban on the use of the Russian language, as well as the languages of other national groups in the work of educational institutions. A year and a half later, a law “On ensuring the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the state language” was passed, also aimed at restricting the use of the Russian language and languages of minorities. Starting July 16, 2022, violators of the language laws will be subject to sanctions in the form of hefty fines. Besides, from 2024 there will be various penalties for “public humiliation or insult of the state language.”³

The law on the state language belongs to the category of the most sensitive and resonant regulations, as it affects the interests of many people in multiple areas of their lives, such as mass media, education, the ability to work in public service, go to theaters and movies, watch television programs, listen to the news, serve in the armed forces, etc.

Language policy of the state, being an important part of cultural policy, can be seen, in terms of conflict resolution studies, either as a means of strengthening solidarity in the country, or, on the contrary, as a way of infringing the rights of various social and ethnic groups, inciting ethnic hatred and undermining the confidence of a part of the population in the authorities. For instance, in Romania, in localities where at least 20% of the population speaks a minority language (these include Bulgarian, Hungarian, German, Russian, Serbian, Slovak, Turkish, Ukrainian, Croatian, Czech), these languages are assigned certain functions. In Finland, where the number of Swedes is less than 4%, Swedish is legalized by law as a state language along with Finnish.

In Ukraine, the language policy was blatantly nationalistic, so people essentially had to choose whether to learn the language or to emigrate. It’s hard to imagine a stronger conflict trigger.

However, a conflict trigger or a group of them do not constitute a conflict; they only objectively contribute to emergence of the conflict situation. This situation was carefully constructed. Monuments were torn down, everything that reminded of the Soviet period in Ukrainian history was destroyed, organizations and unions loyal to Russia were banned, books by unwanted Russian authors were confiscated, concerts by Russian artists were prohibited, and so on.

4. The question of the object and subject matter of conflict is among the most debatable in the theory of conflict

¹ Комсомольская правда. 2022. 16 марта. URL: <https://www.kp.ru/online/news/4667731>.

² Лавров: Запад действует в ущерб интересам других стран // Российская газета. 2022. 14 апр. URL: <https://rg.ru/2022/04/14/lavrov-zapad-dejstvuet-v-ushcherb-interesam-drugih-stran.html>.

³ See: Как на Украине ограничивали использование русского языка // TACC. 2021. 15 июля. URL: https://tass.ru/info/11907705?utm_source=google.ru&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.ru&utm_referrer=google.ru.

resolution studies. In the most general sense, the subject matter of the conflict is what is being argued about; a contradiction over which the parties enter the opposition; something that the participants in the conflict cannot agree on. An object is the driving forces, prerequisites that form the conflict's context. In some cases, the object represents the ontology of the conflict's causes, while the subject matter represents its excuse.

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict looks very specific in this respect. Ukraine is simultaneously a party to the conflict (in conjunction with the "collective West") and the subject matter of the conflict (since Ukraine is fighting Russia for its territory and sovereignty), but it is also the object of the conflict, since all the conflict prerequisites were created quite deliberately by the Ukrainian leadership.

But in reality, the subject matter of the conflict is much broader: it is a struggle against the old world order (unipolar world) and an attempt to establish a new world order (multipolar world). The question is, will the victory of one side lead to a multipolar world? The fact that the polarization and mutual repulsion of the participants of international relations will intensify is already clear at this point of the conflict. As for multipolarity, this process began almost immediately after the World War II, continues to this day (its visible embodiments are China, India, Brazil, and Southeast Asian countries) and will not stop with the end of the current conflict. According to Henry Kissinger, "Our age is insistently, at times almost desperately, in pursuit of a concept of world order that eludes common understanding."¹

The subject matter of the conflict is often related to the goals of the parties, but in the case in question, this connection cannot be traced yet. One party, Russia, formulates its goal as "demilitarization" and "denazification" of Ukraine. Also, assistance to DPR and LPR was named one of the objectives (V. Putin's televised speech on February 24, 2022, announcing the beginning of the "special operation").

Speaking at a concert at Luzhniki in honor of the accession of Crimea, Vladimir Putin said that the goal of the Russian military operation in Ukraine was "...to save people from genocide."²

A month after the start of the military operation, on March 24, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova said at a briefing that the operation was aimed not only at demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine, but also at eliminating the threats coming from the territory of that country.³

On April 11, in an interview with Rossiya TV channel, Lavrov said: "Our special military operation is designed to put an end to the reckless expansion and reckless campaign for total domination of the United States and the rest of the Western countries under it on the international arena."⁴

Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation S. K. Shoigu presented the purpose of the operation in a similar manner: "The main thing for us is to protect the Russian Federation from the military threat created by the Western coun-

tries that are trying to use the Ukrainian people in the fight against our country."⁵

In April, Rustam Minnekaev, deputy commander of the troops of the Central Military District, declared that as a result of the second stage of the special operation, the Russian army should provide a land corridor to Crimea, as well as establish control over Donbass and the southern regions of Ukraine, which would give the Russian armed forces another outlet to Transnistria, "where facts of oppression of the Russian-speaking population have been observed."⁶ This means that the aforementioned goals of the operation are not limited to denazification and demilitarization. We can only hope that the army's mission will be limited to restoring the rights of the Russian population.

The second party, Ukraine, has so far formulated its goals in a purely instrumental format: to obtain financial and military aid from Western countries, to join (or to approach joining) NATO, to stop the advance of Russian troops, etc.

Thus, this conflict is very specific because the parties see it differently and have entered it with goals that do not quite overlap.

5. On the whole, the variation in the objectives of the operation, coupled with the novelization of real and military threats on the part of Ukraine, create the impression that this part of the operation is in the process of constant adjustment and refinement. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that not all objectives are being openly declared. So, the proclaimed goals of demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine are impossible without achieving full control over its territory (occupation?) and the change of its regime. However, officials are not saying it bluntly. Perhaps we are witnessing the modern variant of the technology of Napoleon Bonaparte who liked to repeat, "First engage in a serious battle and then see what happens."

6. The last thing to note in this brief analysis in terms of conflict resolution studies is that any conflict is a multi-layered phenomenon. It is a tangle of economic, political, psychological and other motives. Some act as basic, others "come into play" as the conflict develops. Therefore, it is important to correctly diagnose the conflict, because without identifying the root cause, it is impossible to predict its development or to propose effective means to resolve it.

It appears that the military confrontation between Russia and Ukraine is a conflict rooted in socio-cultural and mental factors. Mentally, Ukraine is substantially different from Russia, and talking about the similarity and brotherhood of the two nations can change little in this regard. Ukraine itself is very diverse in all aspects – religious, political, economic, etc. The lines of demarcation run quite clearly along the east-west and south-north axes. These regions differ in ethnic composition of the population, dominant religions, and language. But there are also common traits which are to some extent expressed by the nationalist forces. Among these traits are obvious vestiges of the past: infantilism, carelessness, anarchism, disrespect for oneself and one's surroundings, provincialism, avarice, inconsistency, etc. It is a "peculiar perception of the world: with an ornate and optimistic source, rich imagery, and a desire to beautify everything. It's a baroque worldview. It is inherent not only in Ukrainian architects, artists, writers, but also in every Ukrainian."⁷

¹ Киссинджер Г. Мировой порядок. М.: АСТ, 2017. С. 10.

² Путин назвал цель военной операции на Украине // РБК. 2022. 18 марта. URL: <https://www.rbc.ru/politics/18/03/2022/623488529a7947de68c1e85c>.

³ Все цели военной операции на Украине будут достигнуты – МИД России // Regnum. 2022. 24 марта. URL: <https://regnum.ru/news/polit/3543997.html>.

⁴ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CUN3NXmEulU>.

⁵ <https://argumenti.ru/politics/2022/06/776302>.

⁶ <https://news.mail.ru/card/342/#reference2>.

"There are also the paranoid-patriotic mantras... A Ukrainian is a marginalized person, with a neurosis consisting in an inferiority complex, a feeling of being unclaimed, unfulfilled... In the studies (written by Ukrainian authors themselves) there is a common thread of a conclusion: "we were oppressed, are oppressed, and will be oppressed."²

In Russia, such qualities are practically non-existent in the mass consciousness. "Russia is a civilizational extrovert. All of its actions are directed outward. Ukrainians are introverts. Russia is more masculine, Ukraine is more feminine."³

We are faced with a typical mental conflict, which is "enriched" by second-order factors – religious, economic, political, etc. A military conflict between mentalities has an important feature: when opponents come from different cultures and mentalities, the war cannot be won by either side because their cultures do not overlap. There are many examples: The United States, despite all its power, never were able to defeat Vietnam; the Soviet Union (and then the United States) exited Afghanistan without a victory; the same fate expected the U.S. military operation in Iraq, etc. It is quite probable that the current military operation in Ukraine will not end quickly or unambiguously.

There are other reasons for this conclusion. Specifically, if we look at this conflict at a level of personalities – as a conflict between the two state leaders, it is clear that one of them, due to his education and "pre-presidential" experience, sees real threats in this situation, while the other, due to the same factors, sees only the public and expects it to listen and applaud. But the problem is that a performing actor has no content of his own; he is a reflective and emotional system, designed to speak words from a role, and when an actor speaks his own text (and I don't want to offend all actors), it feels like it would be better if he didn't say anything at all.

The same circumstance complicates negotiations. In conflict resolution studies, there is the term of "conflict me-

diability." It means readiness (even minimal) of the parties to reconcile on certain mutually beneficial terms, the ability to understand each other, to find mutually acceptable solutions. This serves as the basis for starting negotiations in a conflict and the key to its eventual resolution. In the case under study, we see the unwillingness of at least one of the parties to engage in a dialogue. The reasons, both mental and political, are rigidity and stiffness of the parties' positions. So far, some progress has been made in solving the problems that arose during the operation (prisoner exchange, humanitarian corridors, delivery of humanitarian goods, etc.). On the main issues, however, it looks like there is a "zero-sum" game. This is a class of games where a participant wins exactly as much as he loses to the rival. In this operation, one side wants everything, while the other side is not ready to compromise on anything (again, the Ukrainian mentality comes into play). In reality, there is an option of capitulation, in which case negotiations can become a formal consolidation of achievements that took place not at the negotiating table, but on the battlefield.

In conclusion, I would like to quote a line of a memorable song from the popular 1970s movie "Sannikov Land": "All is obscure in this turbulent universe..."⁴ The war has long become a thing of the past, but confrontations keep happening here and there all the time. There is no war, but there is no peace either. There is a military operation, which, unlike a war, does not pursue a victory, but a goal. The goal of the operation exists, but it is not completely clear, as it is unclear whether there will be a salute in honor of its achievement. Still, this does not preclude the possibility of analysis in terms of conflict resolution studies of this situation and other ones of the same kind. Conflict resolution studies is a science that, on the one hand, generates questions and, on the other hand, helps answer many of them and enables further analysis of our very difficult, interesting and, sadly, disturbing modernity.

N. S. Bondar⁵

NATIONAL AND SUPRANATIONAL IN THE GLOBAL CONFLICT OF CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES: NOT ALL "ETERNAL" THINGS ARE INVARIABLE

The profound transformation of social legal reality occurring in the modern times is inextricably linked to the revision of the approaches and stereotypes which only recently determined the development of constitutional reality and axiology of interaction between the national and supranational. Sometimes these approaches are even completely reneged, even though they had seemed unalterable and eternal. The modern crisis of constitutionalism must not be understood in narrow legal terms, but as a systemic challenge to the entire legal civilization.

1. We have inconsiderately refused to recognize any ideology as "state" or "obligatory" (part 2 of Article 13 of the Russian Constitution), but could not escape the strug-

gle of ideas or the confrontation of political and legal values that are fundamentally constitutional.⁵ Today this struggle tends to sharply escalate, acquiring qualitatively new manifestations. In fact, we are talking about a new ideolo-

¹ <https://racurs.ua/824-fenomen-ukrainskogo-mentaliteta-ili-ukraincy-i-rossiyane-siamskie-bliznecy.html>.

² Стражний А. Украинский менталитет: иллюзии, мифы, реальность. Киев: Книга, 2008.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Lyrics by L. Derbenev.

⁵ See: Бондарь Н. С., Баринов Э. Э. Аксиология конституционного мировоззрения. Часть I. Конституционное мировоззрение в ценностном измерении обновленной Конституции России // Конституционное и муниципальное право. 2021. № 12. С. 3–12.

⁶ Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (2000–2020). Head of the Judicial Law Center, Chief Researcher of the Constitutional Law Department of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation, Head of the Scientific and Educational Center for Judicial Constitutionalism of the Southern Federal University (Rostov-on-Don), Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 300 scientific publications, including monographs and textbooks on constitutional and municipal law and theory and practice of legal statehood. Member of the editorial boards of eight scientific journals. Awarded the Order of Honor, Medal of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland II degree, Letter of Commendation from the President of the Russian Federation, Letter of Commendation from the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, etc. Recipient of the National Award

gy – a militant one, one that disregards the international legal norms and rules – the ideology of a socio-cultural fracture of the world, “confrontation of civilizations” (S. Huntington), balancing between war and peace (emergence of new forms of wars – economic sanctions, information war, hybrid war, etc.).

What we are dealing with is not only a revision of core values of the modern life, but also a change in the constitutional and legal meaning and understanding of the fundamental categories of legal axiology, designed to reflect the “eternal” and “invariable” in the rapidly changing assessment scale of the personality, society, the state and the surrounding social and legal reality. Moreover, the very phrase “invariable, eternal, fundamental constitutional ideals and values in the modern world” can be perceived as an oxymoron: is it possible to speak of “invariable” constitutional values in a globally changing system of axiological coordinates of the contemporary world order?

Still, this wording may (and should) offer at least comparative characteristics of stability and dynamism, to be embodied in the constitutional norms and institutions of the ideals of state legal development, principles and higher values, as well as the analysis of the dialectical relationship of relevant phenomena in their temporal dimension. This refers not only to the static condition, but also to the evolution of “eternal” constitutional principles; in the Constitution of the Russian Federation they are primarily reflected in the preamble, chapters 1 and 2. This thesis is also confirmed in foreign constitutionalism, both in connection with the practice of constitutional solidification and implementation of certain principles (for example, the principles of “secularism” of the state, etc.¹) and in the establishment of more general provisions which can be considered an “eternal clause” in the text of the Constitution.²

In this regard, it is crucial that constitutional ideals can relate to the characteristics of “eternal” and, hence, invariable phenomena, only insofar as they retain their relevance in a given historical era in the essential social and political context, and also meet the needs of formally legal, moral and ethical impact on real relations and not turn into some relic of the past, remaining significant for the generation of contemporaries. However, this does not mean that the relevant phenomena, defined through these concepts, remain immovable and invariable, without undergoing either internal or externally (primarily politically) stimulated change or development.³

In this regard, the context of implementation, protection, and development of invariable (fundamental) “eternal” constitutional ideals, both at the legislative level and in law enforcement, especially in the practice of constitutional justice, assumes a specific importance – not only formally legal, but to some extent also socio-political and socio-cultural. The point is that constitutional ideals are not only a doctrinal and cognitive category: by being recognized in

the constitution, they also acquire the properties of a category of the effective law.

At the same time, the analysis of any value components in terms of their embodiment and implementation in constitutionalism suggests the need for understanding of the place of values in the system of modern constitutionalism, as well as their role in forming a holistic view of the features of constitutional development of the modern society, including establishment of a relationship between national and supranational factors in the modern constitutionalism. The essential transformations of values at different levels of their implementation should also be taken into account.

2. A peculiar political and legal result of the modern socio-cultural civilizational rift is emergence of a “multilevel” (national and supranational) value-based constitutionalism, with systemic characteristics that raise obvious questions.

At the heart of this “multilevel” quality, especially at its supranational level, lies the problem of forming a *global modern constitutionalism*. To what extent is its affirmation a reality? Are there prerequisites for constitutional globality today? If so, what could become its regulatory basis? At the first glance, the UN Charter would be the first candidate. But to what extent does this correspond to the current reality, given the gap between the real practice of interstate interactions and the regulatory mechanisms and models laid down in the Charter? Besides, it is obvious that earlier forms of international dialogue, focused on the recognized values of modern constitutionalism, have actually lost their relevance.

In this context, the problem of forming a system of “multilevel” constitutionalism is associated with the emergence of a largely artificial supranational constitutional level, where certain basic values are defined and proclaimed to be universal. These values are far removed from the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, on the one hand, and from the norms conventional for the modern constitutionalism and national legal order, on the other. Legitimacy of this order is explained by the ideas of global representation replacing the idea of state sovereignty (J. Habermas) with the far-reaching consequences of implementation of these “ideas,” including formation of the new European constitutionalism.

Just recently, at least two largely contradictory but interrelated trends manifested in the constitutional development of the European continent countries. On the one hand, there were processes of legal globalization, which consisted not only in convergence and transfusion, but also in competition and rivalry of the leading legal systems of today. On the other hand, there were trends for establishing constitutional legal sovereignty, based on the new awareness of countries, including Western European democracies, of the need to protect sovereign rights, take into account and preserve the socio-cultural features of national-state constitutional systems. As for today, the global trend suggests formation of not even supranational, but the so-called *post-national euroconstitutionalism*. The main factor of its “democratic legitimacy” is not the states with their national constitutions, but a certain homogenized political community of Europeans who have overcome national customs regimes and state borders.

Such a situation can lead to *erosion of national approaches to law as a socio-cultural phenomenon designed*

in “Law Literature for his monograph *Judicial Constitutionalism: Doctrine and Practice*” (2018).

¹ See: *Roznai Y. Negotiating the Eternal: The Paradox of Entrenching Secularism in Constitutions* // *Michigan State Law Review*. 2017. No. 2. P. 253–332.

² See: *Suteu S. Eternity clauses in post-conflict and post-authoritarian constitution-making: Promise and limits* // *Global Constitutionalism*. 2017. Vol. 6. No. 1. P. 63–100.

³ *Бондарь Н. С. «Вечные» конституционные идеалы: насколько они неизменны в меняющемся мире* // *Государство и право*. 2020. № 6. С. 20–34.

to be an equal measure of freedom for all. The category of equality in the system of modern values acts as a concentrated expression of the integral combination, “amalgamation” of the moral and legal image of the individual (as a person and as a citizen). The main threats to the modern legal order, in these conditions, are profound deformations of the requirements of equality and disregard of the socio-cultural characteristics of this universal category. Forms and ways of manifestation of these processes are multifaceted; they do not fit into common principles, have an ultimately wide range of expressly national and cultural axiological criteria, institutional and other characteristics.

This topic has become particularly relevant in modern conditions where an individual becomes alienated not only from the state, but, first and foremost, from the moral and ethical principles of legal life. An important task of the theory and practice of modern jurisprudence is to bring the individual back into a legal environment that is not reducible to formal legal regulation only. Harmonization of formally legal, moral and ethical principles in the law and in the status and behavioral characteristics of a legal person is possible and necessary, first and foremost, on the basis of the Constitution.

The constitutional amendments of 2020 in this regard have significantly increased the specific weight and concentration of moral and ethical principles in the constitutional norms, including those that relate to the anthropological characteristics of the subjects of constitutional legal relations. The effective system of ethical and legal principles of the revised Constitution helps evaluate the actions of citizens and public authorities from the perspective of sin, good and evil, justice and injustice, honesty and duty, i.e. ethical legal concepts and standards.

This provides the grounds for singling out *constitutional anthropology* as a relatively independent doctrinal and practical jurisdictional trend. Hence comes the recognition that the deep foundations of the constitutional spirit and model of human relations with society and the state are centered in the legal, moral and ethical characteristics of the individual, rendering him or her the qualities of a legal personality. In a concentrated form, these anthropological characteristics can be represented through the categories of, first, *equality*, second, *justice*, and third, *personal dignity*. It seems reasonable to view these categories as somewhat of an “*ethical legal trinity*” of a legal personality, as they reflect the principal diversity of axiological characteristics of the subjects of social and legal life in terms of their socio-cultural and formally legal, secular and biblical-philosophical, moral, ethical and constitutionally legal values.

Therefore, in determining the regulatory legal potential of constitutional equality, at least three interrelated principles of its normativity must be considered: *first*, the requirement of equality of the individual as a person (the biological normativity given to man by birth, “equality before God”); *second*, equality of the individual as a personality (socio-cultural, moral and ethical normativity of equality requirements before society); *third*, equality of the individual as a citizen (formally legal normativity of equality before the state, law, court). In such a “trinity” rest the deep, even sacral origins of constitutional regulation of the individual’s position in the society and the state – spiritual, moral, socio-cultural, and not just its legal origins, which is reflected in the specific content of individual constitutions.

So, for instance, the Arab countries have no liberal interpretation of the formal legal equality of men and women; equality itself is perceived in terms of the provisions of the state religion as interpreted by the Islamic law. In India, the principle of equality provided for at the constitutional level actually operates in the context of the varna-caste system, the Hindu law of dharma, which presupposes following one’s own path and abandoning a strife for a significant change in one’s social status, as solidified in the social norm. Europe also has some peculiarities: the constitutional treatment of abortion and the right to life in Poland; the reference to constitutional identity in assessing the constitutionality of Hungary’s 2016 constitutional amendments. Furthermore, over fifty countries in the world have established the so-called constitutional sexual equality, the equality of same-sex marriage, which is certainly based on socio-cultural confrontation rather than on political and ideological struggle.

In a concentrated version, this can be assessed as a manifestation of the deep processes of change, deformation of socio-cultural principles in modern constitutionalism: on the one hand, clericalization of law in some regions of the world, especially in Muslim fundamentalist countries, and on the other hand, secularization of law stripping it of moral and ethical principles in Western democracies.

At the same time, the problem of formation of supranational constitutionalism on the basis of a homogeneous European society harbors a serious political paradox. In fact, as noted by the same J. Habermas, Z. Brzezinski and others, the main foundation for such a consolidation of a united European nation is the transnational media, non-governmental organizations (actively involved in spreading new global “values”), mass political movements (feminist activism, “green” movement, BLM, etc.). Meanwhile, it is becoming evident that the values transmitted by these structures are actually formed not within the complex European public space itself through dialogue and search for compromise, but through the creation of the “right” information agenda and the “new” legal values. In this situation, maintaining the national foundation of the legal system appears to be the key to maintaining a sovereign statehood that reflects, first and foremost, the interests of the people living on its territory. That is why the national constitutional courts are increasingly turning to the idea of constitutional identity, and legislators are creating adequate mechanisms at the constitutional and sectoral legislative levels to prevent uncontrolled penetration of the new “universal” values into national legal orders.

Thus, the system of basic views of the possible models of value-based constitutionalism is currently undergoing a major transformation. Globalization of the world order, including the legal order, poses certain threats to nation-states that are founded on law as a cultural phenomenon of a specific nation. In such a scenario, formation of some kind of a “universal” constitutionalism disregarding the national specificities should be perceived as a forced cultural (and legal) assimilation, which is currently still considered within the framework of the international legal order. Hence comes the problem of the relationship between the national and supranational in the value system of constitutionalism in the present conditions.

3. Analysis of the relationship between national and supranational in its current manifestations (as applied to Rus-

sia, and in view of the content of the constitutional reform of 2020 and its impact on intranational and international problems) suggests that it is necessary to understand the essence of new approaches to this relationship, to the interaction between the international and intranational law.

The change in real international relations, state policies aimed at certain international institutions, previously established and transforming (primarily politically) supranational jurisdictions do not exclude the fact that the generally recognized principles and norms of international law ultimately predetermine important characteristics of the real state of affairs in the modern legal order, national legal systems and trends in their development. This fully applies to the Russian Federation. Poly-systemic, multi-dimensional inclusion of international law in the domestic constitutional regulation helped form the fundamental idea of the national and supranational dimension of legal relations, their relationship in the national system of constitutional coordinates, taking into account the connection between the intranational and international law, at the doctrinal level. It also helped implement these approaches in the existing system of legal order – despite all the complexity and unfavorable aspects of the current foreign political situation.

The constitutional reform of 2020¹ contributed to reassessment of the relationship between national and international law and was, in this part, a natural response to the increasing collisions between acts of international law, especially the decisions of the ECHR as a body of supranational jurisdiction, and constitutional provisions. However, it must be acknowledged that this reform was not the only and certainly not the root cause of a major transformation of approaches to solving these issues. Crisis trends of geopolitical development, which have no formal legal equivalent, nevertheless directly affect the legal life in its national and international manifestations, predetermine the need for a serious rethinking of international legal relations in terms of opportunities, conditions, and limits of their influence on jurisdictional and other characteristics of the national legal order. Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe² and the denunciation of corresponding obligations, including those under the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, are of significant, although not decisive, importance in this respect.

Nevertheless, such circumstances, albeit creating their own context for rethinking the problem of the relationship between national and international law, do not refute the national legal understanding of the generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation as a part of its legal system (part 4 of article 15 of the Russian Constitution), in terms of their fundamental political and legal value in the system of intranational legal relations. The relevant constitutional provisions constitute the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation having superior regulatory legal importance (Art. 16 of the Russian Constitution). They are

essential for determining the nature and legal consequences of the penetration of supranational (e.g. European) legal standards of modern constitutionalism into the space of the Russian legal system, ensure their interaction with national constitutional and other legal requirements, and open additional opportunities for the implementation and protection of national constitutional values.

This purpose of the relevant constitutional provisions establishes the unquestionable supreme legal force, the priority of the Russian Constitution in the system of legal order based on the interaction of its national and supranational principles, and, in fact, emphasizes that *in matters related to the place and role of the international law in the modern national legal order, the Constitution also serves as a constituent act*. Meanwhile, with all the diversity and depth of approaches in domestic jurisprudence to the analysis of the relationship between the Russian Constitution and the norms of international law, including the amendment to Article 79, the constituent properties of the Constitution are, sadly, still not fully considered and are understudied in terms of the international legal aspect. Without this, however, it is difficult to establish a convincing (legal constitutional) case for the unconditional priority of the values of the Basic Law over the norms of international law.

The 2020 adoption of the amendments on the priority of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was objectively conditioned by the need to strengthen the constitutional and legal framework for the consistent implementation of the provisions of supranational legal regulation. Among other drivers were the importance of strengthening state sovereignty and the development of constitutional and legal assessments of national identity, the emphasis on reinforcing the role of the Constitution in the hierarchy of legal sources, and the inviolability of its supremacy as a constituent document with supreme legal force.

The provisions concerning the supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation as a condition for the fulfillment of international obligations in the national legal system have been consistently substantiated by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation on the basis of the letter and spirit of the Constitution. This was not only because of the attention to the specific collisions at different levels of legal jurisdictions in the practice of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (primarily the ECHR decisions) and the existing constitutional regulation, but also due to the relationship between the fundamental axiological principles of the Constitution and the international law.

First, the decisions of the Constitutional Court – even at the initial stages of its activity – provided comprehensive justification for the axiological characteristics of the fundamental features of the Constitution, including the value of its constituent properties. This means, in particular, that the Basic Law alone is the constitutional act with respect to the entire legal system of the state. It concerns both internal characteristics of this system (e.g. its federal nature) and external characteristics, related to creation of opportunities and limits of international treaties of the Russian Federation by the Constitution itself, as well as the norms of international law as a part of the national legal system.³

¹ Закон о поправке к Конституции РФ от 14 марта 2020 г. № 1-ФКЗ «О совершенствовании регулирования отдельных вопросов организации и функционирования публичной власти» // КонсультантПлюс : [справ.-правовая система]. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_346019/ (date of address: 14.06.2022).

² Заявление МИД России о запуске процедуры выхода из Совета Европы // Министерство иностранных дел Российской Федерации : [сайт]. URL: https://mid.ru/ru/press_service/spokesman/official_statement/1804379 (date of address: 14.06.2022).

³ See: Постановления Конституционного Суда РФ от 18 июля 2003 г. № 13-П ; от 21 января 2010 г. № 1-П ; от 26 февраля 2010 г. № 4-П ; от 19 июля 2011 г. № 17-П, and others.

Second, the decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation emphasized the need to ensure the constitutionality of international legal provisions when they come into force for the Russian Federation and for their subsequent application (e.g., Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of July 9, 2012, No. 17-P).

Third, the Constitutional Court pointed at the constitutional possibility of executing the decisions of interstate bodies, provided that they conform to universally recognized principles of international law that define universally recognized rights and freedoms and are part of the constitutional status of the individual (Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation of July 14, 2015, No. 21-P).

Fourth, the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation drew attention to the importance of a balanced approach to legal assessments of emerging collisions of national and supranational legal standards, excluding the focus on subordination to different legal systems. The interaction of the European conventional and Russian constitutional legal order is impossible in the conditions of subordination, because only the dialogue between the different legal systems is the basis of their proper balance (Decision of April 19, 2016 No. 12-P). It is also important to take into account the legal position of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation formulated in the Decision of July 14, 2015 No. 21-P: the decisions of supranational jurisdictional bodies in no way cancel the priority of the Russian Constitution for the Russian legal system and shall be implemented only if its supreme legal force is recognized.

Assertion of supremacy of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in regard to the relationship between na-

tional and international law is a consequence and natural outcome of the return to the sovereignty of Russian statehood and the resulting transformation of the legal order in the modern conditions of development of state and society. The constitutional amendments, in this context, do not diminish the role and importance of international law (inter-state regulation), secured by part. 4 of Art. 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Rather, they serve as a development or particularization of the model of implementation of supranational legal standards, which is also consistent with the approach that the choice of the relationship between the national and international systems is sovereign for each state.

Apparently, the constitutional legal amendments of Article 79 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, supplemented by the provision about the constitutional possibility of non-execution of the decision of the interstate body, containing the "collision" interpretation of an international treaty in relation to the Constitution, should be considered in general context and in connection with the provisions of Article 15 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation. These changes should be recognized as an evolutionary reflection of legal reality, oriented toward strengthening the protection of constitutional values and the national legal order. The priority effect of the Constitution, now expressly provided for by its 2020 amendment, is implemented in direct relation with the exercise of the constitutional-judicial jurisdiction (clause "b" of part 5.1 of Article 125 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation). Therefore, it seems appropriate to pose *the question of judicial axiology* as an instrumental means of resolving collisions between national and international law, which is especially relevant in the current context of geopolitical crisis.

P. Bülbüloğlu¹

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AS A DRIVER OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HARMONIZATION

The foreign policy of a modern state has many drivers, including the ones that are reasonably treated as priorities: first, ensuring the sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of the country; second, creation of appropriate information, socio-psychological and cultural prerequisites for effective international cooperation. If the first group of factors is traditional and has always been and remains the focus of every state's attention, the second group has long been supported only by the leading countries, while the rest saw it as something supplemental and not quite obligatory.

In the second half of the twentieth century, it became apparent that any member of the diplomatic ser-

vice must pay great attention not only to the social, political and economic realities of the host country, but also to the values and attitudes that are common among its citizens. Knowledge of history and culture, understanding of the governing spiritual atmosphere in the country and its prevailing way of thinking have become essential prerequisites for making good diplomatic decisions.

The world community consists of the countries of the East and West, South and North; the differences in their cultures, value systems, and moral standards are generally well-known. In my opinion, harmonious development of the global civilization is impossible unless the nations *understand* each other's interests and aspirations and *trust* each other. Only these prerequisites can help the states cooperate effectively in a range of domains and improve well-being of their people and quality of their lives. This path of planetary development can prevent a catastrophic *clash of civilizations*, according to the warning by Samuel Huntington.²

¹ Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Azerbaijan to the Russian Federation, Dr. Sc. (Art History), Professor, Azerbaijan SSR National Artist, Honored Art Worker of the Republic of Dagestan. Composer, singer, actor. Minister of Culture of Azerbaijan (1988–2006). Author of the book "Cultural Policy in Azerbaijan" (co-authored) and other publications. Professor Emeritus of A. Huseinzadeh Azerbaijan State University of Culture and Arts, full member of the Europe-Asia International Humanitarian Academy. Awarded the Honorary Diploma of the President of the Russian Federation, the Orders of Friendship and Honor (Russia), Independence and Honor (Azerbaijan), Honor (Georgia), and received many other foreign awards.

² Хантингтон С. Столкновение цивилизаций. М.: АСТ, 2016.

The dialogue between the national cultures is a necessary prerequisite for sustainable development of the society, and successful intercultural communication is impossible without *mutual understanding*. However, three fundamental factors underlie success and development. First, treating different cultures as equals; second, respecting their identities; third, unconditional recognition of their typical features and peculiarities.

Famous Russian cultural scientist M. M. Bakhtin reasonably believed that culture can reveal itself more deeply and fully in communication with another culture.¹ There is a reciprocal influence that generates self-reflection, an awareness of the value and character of cultures. Meanings unfold when there is a possibility to view them in comparison and mutual interaction. The dialogue between meanings lifts boundaries, enriches all participating cultures, and makes them multifaceted. By opening up to the world, the national culture simultaneously remains holistic and preserves its face.

The diplomatic activity is only possible in the form of dialogue. The essence and purpose of diplomacy is to “build bridges.” This requires an understanding of the other, otherwise there is a danger of misunderstanding and misinterpreting certain realities and statements, which can lead to a breach in adequate perception of the geopolitical situation. Mutual understanding can only be achieved through understanding the culture and its context.

Diplomacy, which, among other things, takes into account the humanitarian and socio-psychological factor, is in great demand today. It underlies the basis of the so-called soft power. The concept was introduced by the American political scientist Joseph Nye in 1990. Initially he interpreted the soft power as the ability to exert spiritual, intellectual, ethical, and aesthetic influence on the subject of international relations to achieve a preferred result.² Subsequently, in 2004, Nye developed his ideas in the book “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.” He concluded that soft power is the ability to obtain the desired political and other results on the basis of creation of multifaceted humanitarian efforts of sympathy, attractiveness, and confidence in a particular country.³

Creation of effective soft power is possible at an appropriate level of material and spiritual culture of the country – effective economy, advanced science, elaborate system of education, and respect for the canons of civil society. These are the necessary prerequisites for the extensive cultural cooperation between civilized countries.

The soft power thus appears as a multilayered generalized concept whose structure is defined by targeted exchanges in literature, art, science, education, cinema, television, sports, cooking, tourism, etc. Taken together, all this constitutes the content of *cultural diplomacy*. In this sense, culture can be considered a systemic factor of soft power; it can play a key role in international relations, directly or indirectly influencing world politics and business relations. In my opinion, cultural diplomacy generates a *positive feedback effect*: the more attention a country pays to cultural cooperation with other countries, maintaining a cultural dia-

logue, the more significant and profound are the harmonious relations between nations and states.

Cultural diplomacy can be effective under certain historical, political, and economic conditions and given an appropriate information policy, which together constitute the necessary social and psychological climate, *trust* between countries, nations, organizations and citizens of cooperating countries. Successful cultural diplomacy is possible only if it takes into account the global trends in the development of specific domains of culture and knowledge of the peculiar features of the country on which it is focused. It is necessary to determine in advance the dominant cultural needs, spiritual and intellectual expectations of different segments of the population and especially the young people.

A good example of successful cultural diplomacy in the international relations is the Republic of Korea. Unprecedented development of this country over the past 30 years is associated with its involvement in the processes of globalization, the spread of information and digital technology, and the exponential growth of social media. A favorable socio-psychological environment has helped South Korean goods and services win over many markets in the world. Korea's experience in combining cultural and economic cooperation is worthy of global scaling. Cultural diplomacy takes on a special significance in the era of globalization because it determines the possibility of constructive dialogue and partnership in the interests of strengthening the international cooperation. This dialogue usually takes place in a variety of ways: through the government, through public organizations, and through individual citizens.

Cultural factors have become an important tool for realizing the economic and foreign policy goals of today's independent Azerbaijan. President Ilham Aliyev pays a lot of attention to this issue, and First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva directly supervises it.

In formulating and implementing the foreign policy, Azerbaijani diplomats try to rely not only on sociological, political, economic and other scientific knowledge, but also on the cultural, religious, value and worldview qualities of the subjects of international life, on the characteristics of spiritual and intellectual climate in different countries.

Azerbaijan's arsenal of cultural diplomacy tools certainly includes numerous events organized to promote national fiction, music, visual arts, films, theater productions, and culinary techniques. Performances by our music and dance groups in other countries and participation in international sports competitions serve the same purpose. This helps form a positive socio-psychological attitude towards Azerbaijan and an interest in the culture and way of life of our people in different countries.

In Azerbaijani families, children are brought up from an early age in a spirit of respect for other peoples and cultures; throughout centuries, it has become inherent to our mentality. Spiritual development of our people in history has undergone three major stages associated with different religions – Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. It is imprinted in the historical memory and subconscious of people and today plays an essential role in building harmonious intercultural communications both within the country and internationally. The modern Constitution of Azerbaijan stipulates the basic norms of national policy, which include a provision on the equality of all citizens regardless of their racial and ethnic origin. We believe that the

¹ Бахтин М. М. Эстетика словесного творчества. М.: Худ. лит., 1979.

² Nye J. Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power. N. Y.: Basic Books, 1990. P. 20–21.

³ Nye J. Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics. N. Y.: Public Affairs, 2004.

cultures of small peoples are a precious asset. The need to preserve these cultures springs not only from their historical and social significance, but also from the requirement to respect human rights, since any national culture is the embodiment of the right of people to their own world, to a traditional worldview developed over centuries. In Azerbaijan we believe that multiculturalism should become the worldview basis of a polycultural world and intercultural dialogue.

High level of cultural development in Azerbaijan produced a significant impact on development of an effective system of public administration and shaping of a well-functioning social reality. Ultimately, this is reflected in the im-

pressive economic, social and humanitarian development performance of the Republic of Azerbaijan.

In recent years, Azerbaijan has become a special point of attraction for the world community through organizing and successfully carrying out large-scale international scientific, cultural, sports and other events, and implementing various humanitarian projects of the UN, UNESCO and ISESCO.

Effectiveness of cultural diplomacy certainly depends on understanding the meaning and significance of worldview, spiritual, socio-psychological, and cultural factors. Hence comes the need to adjust the process of training future diplomats, and pay more attention to cultural, psychological, and ethical issues in the educational process.

I. I. Buzovsky¹

TECTONIC MOVEMENTS OF THE VALUE DOMAIN (Belarusian fracture)

When face to face,
There is no face to see.
**The big things, to be seen,
require distance.**

S. Yesenin. Letter to a woman

Sergei Yesenin's famous lines are acutely relevant to the analysis and evaluation of contemporary social processes. The globalization policy has been generating the challenges and threats in recent years, both in the Republic of Belarus and globally. The situation requires a special kind of thinking and an appropriate "observation altitude," in order to see processes and events as a whole and not as isolated manifestations, transferring the adequacy of perception in the plane of situational thinking, affective activity and emotional pacifism.

Just a few years ago – *perhaps only a sick imagination could have conceived this in the year of the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory* – in a country that had lost every third man in the terrible ordeals of the Great Patriotic War and had the opportunity to bring up generations that had not known battle, to gain independence, there would be mechanisms capable of turning over the minds of a seemingly adequate part of the population even without armed intervention, push them towards self-destruction, and make a flag that is historically questionable at the least and associates with collaborationism in the Belarusian land during a bloody war, into a symbol of imaginary freedom. Only an unhealthy imagination could fathom heirs of the Great Victory covering the Minsk is a Hero City stele with this flag – with their own hands, without coercion, moreover – with fanatical enthusiasm. As if it were a great experiment,

we have observed practical implementation of theoretical technologies for manipulation of public consciousness and behavioral attitudes, carried out in a short period of time but with thorough prior preparation, and can conclude today that it has worked. An unprecedented PR campaign, rallies similar to concerts, with speeches by leaders addressing different target audiences, introduction of symbols such as white ribbons... Nothing like this has ever been implemented in Russia, and certainly not in Belarus. "Peaceful protests" were instantly transforming into street riots; people's actions spoke that they had been willing to abandon welfare, peace, and history of the country under a general motto: "We stand for all that is good and against all that is bad."

Belarus has become one of the testing grounds for practicing and implementing particularly subtle strategies, which we have yet to comprehend in order to understand the entire spectrum of problems and global social processes, to see how underestimated was the work with meanings, values and culture, how great the power of the accumulated destructive tools and resources, and how global the nature of social development issues.

Color revolutions, social upheavals, armed conflicts, world wars, the destruction of countries, empires, and the like are only manifestations of the great civilizational confrontation that we have witnessed and participated in. *The goal of this confrontation lies in the spiritual realm, and now we are observing its tectonic shifts.* Behind common concepts and their substitution, like in murky water, code systems are being built on an unconscious level.

Discord in concepts, terminologies, their substitution leads to discord among the people. Structural categories of our society such as democracy, human rights, freedom of speech, civil society, sustainable development goals, green economy, decentralization, gender equality, quality education and the like have become habitual and are deemed

¹ Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus, expert of EcooM Analytical Center, Candidate of Sociological Sciences. Held executive positions at the National State Television and Radio Company of the Republic of Belarus. He was the second, and then the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Belarusian Republican Youth Union. Worked in the main ideological department of the Presidential Administration of the Republic of Belarus. Former deputy head of the Presidential Administration. Former head of the administration of the Central District of Minsk. Former Deputy Chairman of the Standing Committee on Education, Science, Culture and Social Development of the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly. Member of the National Commission on the Rights of the Child. Awarded the Order of Honor.

to be self-evident in administration decisions at the state level. Still, although we are on the march for restructuring all spheres of life in accordance with these goals, or the so-called points of social growth, there is no consensus or common understanding of all categories of transformation and no single attitude toward them in the society. The postulated social priorities are promoted under the motto: "Do as we do, and you will live as we do," without the right to actual discussion, without the slightest effort to reconcile them with cultural, spiritual, moral, and, of course, economic national interests. As a consequence, individuals and the society as a whole, on the one hand, experience confidence, as these categories reflect the world practice of success, backed up by large-scale informational and PR support, and on the other hand – value dissonance and a state of social entropy.

This approach explains the value contradictions in relation to market processes which were emphasized by sociologists before the 2020 presidential elections in Belarus and the accompanying attempts to take down the government. Thus, the vast majority of people believed that the state should allow citizens to earn their own money, and at the same time said that it was obliged to provide benefits and allowances. On the one hand, there was a commitment to market trends, and on the other hand, a claim of social guarantees.

Discord is a social disease where it is not the body but the consciousness of the society that is affected. *It is necessary to have a clear understanding of the values integrated into our lives, their social acceptance*, an awareness that there is a "goal tree" behind the borrowed values, and knowing whether they are aligned with our basic interests.

As noted by V. S. Stepin, values and goals are always interrelated, but values determine the "goal tree." A goal answers the question: "What?" and a value answers the question: "What for?" [8, c. 41].

The true origins of discord lie in the spiritual and moral realm. In an area that consolidates, relates people, unites them into one nation, as opposed to a process characterized by sociologists as the "atomization of society," in which social ties break down, "I and my surrounding" attitude governs, and personal interests prevail over collective ones.

In the case of a shift of value priorities toward the material needs, including situations of natural and artificial economic hardships, most people lose the ability to see the big picture and to adequately assess the situation, and personify it on the basis of situational stimuli. Destructive processes and discord in public consciousness are caused by deterioration of the economic situation, followed by a systemic increase in social anxiety and putting personal value priorities over the national values.

The personal integrity is achieved through being focused on a particular system of values that exists in the structure of the personality and acts as a center shaping the direction of behavior and development in life. *The value attitude functions on the basis of a selective relation to the material and spiritual aspects of life* [3].

The best way to characterize a personality in this regard is to use the concept of "personal value orientation." Value orientation is "a special subjective, individualized and motivated reflection of social values in the psyche and consciousness of a person or a social group at a particular stage of historical development" [5, c. 366]. Value orientations

act as a permissible limit to the possibilities of behavior. *The concept of value orientation reflects the importance of cultural values, clarity and direction of all kinds of spiritual and practical activities and social behavioral attitudes* [3]. Value orientations form a system of coordinates in social and personal development in terms of what is good and what is bad. Consolidated through various spiritual, moral, and aesthetic means, this system becomes the most important source and mechanism for creating a variety of behavioral patterns and awareness of a sense of social identity – one of the key factors determining social behavior.

At the present stage, we are witnessing if not a complete *destruction of administration mechanisms regulating social behavioral attitudes*, then their hypertrophied change which has occurred due to systemic global challenges.

The loss of the fundamental functions of religion and its fundamental influence on formation of ideals and meanings of life in the society, their replacement by ideologized values during a certain historical period made functioning of the regulatory mechanism possible. At the contemporary stage of development, when religion has lost its system-forming positions in shaping of the value-worldview domain for most people in the society, and political ideologization of this domain was being challenged and even condemned, *there was a disorientation resulting in severe social, political and economic consequences, which determined the need to borrow the allegedly effective international practices.*

Besides, in the modern era, historic time becomes compressed: a single generation has an opportunity to live through several epochs, with the possibility of cultural adaptation, development of value perception and assertion of life meanings.

The transformation of modern post-industrial (information) society, along with significant scientific and technological advances, has caused the need to build new worldview approaches. The consequences of this social transformation call for rethinking of value attitudes, which causes a loss of value orientations and a conflict between social and personally significant forms of organization of life. In the structure of value orientations, external demonstration of adherence to certain spiritual priorities decreases, while the dominant individualistic orientation contributes to the development of stable material aspirations and priorities of collective recognition in the mind. People born in an agrarian society had to work during the industrial period and transform their values during the post-industrial time and the digital age. This inevitably causes stress and intensifies destructive social processes which are characterized by an inability to reconcile the current reality with the values that have been traditionally transmitted and internalized earlier.

Expansion of technogenic civilization challenges culture as an independent system of values and norms that brings order into the society – it destroys the basis of personal identity, transferring the world from the system of local cultures to a "global culture" [4, c. 127].

The challenges of time dictate the need to change throughout life, constantly finding oneself in an unfamiliar world. *The urge to fill the gap in the system of value coordinates resulted, inter alia, in the change of basic values.* Thus, according to the results of monitoring of the sociopolitical and economic situation in the Republic of Belarus, conducted by the Center for Sociological and Political

cal Studies of the Belarusian State University in the period from 2010 to 2018, there was an increase in the importance of such a central value as “family.” Attitude toward the value of “religion” has changed: its importance has increased, indicating the need to return to traditional values in the period of collapse of ideological postulates.

Moreover, according to the current data obtained by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies in 2020–2021 during the cycle of sociological surveys, it was found that the contemporary Belarusian society is characterized by dominance of basic values (family, health, work, etc.), integrity and continuity of historical memory, combination of paternalistic settings with the values of individualism and self-actualization, predominance of territorial identity (self-identification) over ethnic, religious and political identity. The peripheral values are sovereignty and independence of the Belarusian state, securing and implementation of social guarantees for citizens; there is a pronounced social demand for quality communication between the authorities and the population [1].

It would seem that the results of the study are quite optimistic, since people prioritize family, health, and work. However, if we consider value priorities in terms of their alignment with the task of forming a socially responsible, patriotically oriented personality, it makes sense to ask: perhaps instead of raising an egocentric person, even if possessing certain favorable qualities, we should focus on bringing up a person integrated into the society, with a healthy social, spiritual and moral consciousness and civic responsibility?

This approach to the basic values is clearly established by the states with a nationally oriented ideology. The government of the People’s Republic of China, echoing the ancient sages, strategically placed the values of law and order, patriotism, love of one’s work, honesty and friendliness in the concept of socialist core values along with such notions as power, democracy, civilization, harmony, freedom, and equality [7, c. 251]. They also make it clear that the concept of core values in fact represents the moral aspect, both of the individual and of the country and society. Without it, the state cannot prosper and the individual cannot succeed. If a nation has no unifying concept of core values, no shared opinion or norms of behavior, such a nation cannot move forward. It is also emphasized that such cases are not uncommon [7, c. 234].

In development of these ideas, one might say that “the interest of the society and its intellectual elite in the search for a national idea arises in a situation of a crisis of identity. Hyperbolization of the national idea, in this case, acts as a compensatory mechanism that helps avoid the sense of national inferiority and discover a national and cultural identity <...> in conditions of civilizational challenges.” [4, c. 369].

Organizing work with the domain of values is especially relevant in the context of the current global challenges associated with international pressure of opposing systems, attempts of critical analysis of the historical past aiming at destruction of previous values and worldviews, accompanied by one simple explanation: “we cannot live like this anymore, we need to develop like the civilized world does.” Given that after the collapse of the USSR, liberal ideology was freely propagating in the public consciousness as progressive, and the entire post-Soviet space was being im-

pregnated with Western values, a clear *distinction formed between the advocates of neoliberal market reforms and the adherents of traditionalist, paternalistic principles.* These branches of thought differ in terms of ideological, spiritual, moral, social and economic content, suggest different concepts of social structure and perceptions of its value foundations.

The contemporary period of the society is associated with transformation of its political, socio-economic, spiritual, moral and cultural domains. This process is exacerbated in the states that are undergoing a period of developmental transition.

Collapse of the society is caused by decay of the collective consciousness, loss of the ability to reason and generate life meanings and development strategies, and not only by economic factors in their pure form. The Soviet Union collapsed not because of the economic problems, but because of the decay of ideals and development strategies. Underestimation of the role of ideas and preoccupation with a situational, descriptive format of work delays progress towards the established goals at the least, and in the worst case – leads to rapid destructive processes that we have observed and continue to observe in the post-Soviet space.

The conceptual framework of approaches to solving the problems of safe social development is prone to change in the course of history. Even in the same time span, it often lacked universality across different social and economic formations. Nevertheless, there is increasingly more attention to the problem, there are more resources to address it, and country-specific approaches to understanding and implementing safety measures are evolving. Notably, the development of theoretical ideas in this area is noticeably behind the practical needs – which makes it difficult to determine the general patterns of emergence of the main sources of dangerous phenomena, create algorithms for the dynamics of processes, ensure uniform approaches to the assessment of security levels, optimize steps preventing various threats, etc. [2, c. 308].

The genesis of social behavioral and value-based attitudes is ambivalent. The attitudes involve influencing human behavior both biologically and socially. They can be hereditary and acquired, unconscious and conscious, individual or collective. Social behavioral attitudes are formed so that the biological and social component are both determined by the influence of the external environment, the sphere of existence and life of social subjects.

Accordingly, the development of social behavioral attitudes includes a set of objective and subjective factors. Objective factors include the level of socio-economic development and welfare of the society, the level of social expectations of interacting subjects, and the presence of goal-setting in the development of social systems. Subjective factors include beliefs, norms, values, collective perceptions, and various models of identity (sociocultural, religious, civic, etc.).

In the conditions of global informatization and digital transformation of the society, there should be a separate category of factors – communicative foundations of development of social behavioral and value attitudes. The communicative foundations include the media, network technologies of the Internet environment and other tools of mass communication systems. Informational influence from the mass media can have either favorable or unfavorable impact

on the development of personal value attitudes; in the latter case, destruction (partial or complete) of the system of coordinates in the value and worldview domain may occur.

Due to the loss of the former influence of religion and political regimes on values and worldviews, a special role is assigned to information and cultural mechanisms, mass media, and media communications: their super-influence can no longer be disputed. In the administration mechanism, they take on the meaning of a vector which sets the principles of understanding and norms of behavior in the society. The society begins to be shaped through the mass media and media communication.

Today the global media environment pervades all social institutions, the spiritual and moral sphere, and culture – all that integrates an individual into social processes. Judgments, assessments, moral, aesthetic, and ideological state of the society are influenced through the extensive toolkit of the print and electronic media, the blog sphere, messengers, and social media – a veritable factory of modern information resources.

The world is rapidly entering the digital age, information and communication technologies are outpacing social development, and information is becoming a strategic resource.

So, in the beginning of 2022, the number of Internet users on the planet grew to 4.95 billion, i.e. 62.5% of the total population. In January 2022, there were 4.62 billion social media users in the world, which is 58.4% of the total population of the Earth [9].

According to a Google Books study, about 150 million authors have been published in the history of mankind, whose works, including scientific ones, have been read by about 300 million people. Over the past 30–40 years, the number of authors has grown to 3.5–4 billion. These people are able to deliver their thoughts to an unlimited audience of readers and viewers, regardless of where they live. Readers, in turn, can leave comments, write messages in the forums – “talk” to the authors in real time. From a subject-object relationship between the author and reader, the media have moved to a “subject-subject” relationship, which underlies a new perception of text as a source of information.

More than 85% of Belarusians use the Internet. Various media and platforms (Internet television and radio, online versions of newspapers, mobile applications, media websites, social media, messengers, etc.) are available to the modern Belarusian audience [6]. However, traditional mass media (radio, television, and printed press) remain the most important sources of information for people aged 45 and older. The traditional media are primarily looked to for analysis, commentary, and clarification. But as a source of up-to-date information, they have long been replaced by Internet resources.

“The media field of the Republic of Belarus is rich and diverse” [6]. As of January 1, 2022, there were 1,680 print media in the country, of which 428 were state-owned; 261 television and radio broadcast media, of which 180 were state-owned; 7 news agencies (2 state-owned); and 38 online publications with only an Internet format (31 state-owned). Thus, state-owned media make up about a third of all media outlets registered in the country.

“The most popular messengers among Belarusians are Viber – 87%, Telegram – 56%, WhatsApp – 46%, Skype – 22%; social media: VKontakte – 3.8 million users, Insta-

gram – 3.2 million users, Odnoklassniki – 2.8 million users, and Facebook – 750,000 users” [6].

According to a study commissioned by the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus and performed in 2021 by Medialzmeritel, Belarusian citizens mostly use such sources of information as Internet sites and television (58.2% and 45%, respectively). Messengers are used by 10.8% and social media by 23.8%.

The reality of the modern information space is determined by the concept of “post-truth,” which accurately reflects the trend of information influence development. Large-scale fake-based influence focused on shifting the consciousness to emotional experiences, distracting from the real situation and pushing to specific predetermined anti-state goals – this is the strategy of destructive forces in the Internet space and their challenge to the society.

In 2021 alone, 2,358 Internet resources were blocked, more than 500 of them for distributing extremist materials. This is also a performance indicator of six years of previous work of the Ministry of Information of the Republic of Belarus. As of January 1, 2022, access to 5,023 information resources and parts of information resources is restricted. 1,519 resources posted information on the sale of narcotics, 1,195 – inappropriate advertising, 993 – extremist materials, 86 – information that could harm the national interests, 22 – pornography, violence and cruelty promotion, 6 – taboo language, 10 – information on behalf of unregistered organizations, 2 – information on the manufacture of explosives, and 1,187 – gambling. Three of the resources did not meet the requirements of Mininform.

Today we have to admit that the Republic of Belarus is faced with threats generated by ideological risks and challenges to national security. This situation undermines the psychological and spiritual environment in the country, shatters the public consciousness, bringing forth the need to effectively strengthen the traditional values of the Belarusian people, viewed from the perspective of national interests of the Republic of Belarus.

Healthy goal-setting can be mainly achieved through “effective organization of communication of concepts in the domain of consciousness: ideals, life meanings, and values” [2, p. 308]. The state appears as a structure for shaping internal communications of the individual in the mechanisms of cognition of value scales in the society.

The practice of organizing work with the mass media and mass communication implies the need not only and not as much for news content, debunking and denouncing opposing ideologies and destructive manifestations of reality, but mostly for conceptual ideas and consolidating values shaping the historic truth. The historic truth is not one and only; it depends on the culture and civilization with which we associate ourselves, on the ideology we develop and defend based on our political priorities.

In conclusion, I would like to emphasize, yet again: knowledge and thinking that determine the value priorities are the most expensive commodity. Those who determine the ideology, the thought, the intellectual life of the society, determine the future of social development.

References

1. Алейникова, С. М. Ценностный портрет современного белорусского общества / С. М. Алейникова. – Текст : непосредственный // Проблемы национальной стратегии. – 2021. – № 5 (68). – С. 135–147.

2. Бузовский, И. И. Концептуализация проблем системной трансформации постсоветских стран / И. И. Бузовский. – Текст : непосредственный // Глобальный мир: системные сдвиги, вызовы и контуры будущего : XVII Международные Лихачевские научные чтения, 18–20 мая 2017 г. – Санкт-Петербург : СПбГУП, 2017. – С. 307–309.

3. Бузовский, И. И. Культурологические и аксиологические подходы в анализе современных социальных процессов / И. И. Бузовский. – Текст : непосредственный // Проблемы управления (Минск). – 2016. – № 5 (62). – С. 9–14.

4. Запесоцкий, А. С. Становление глобальной культуры и конфликты цивилизаций (По материалам Международных Лихачевских научных чтений) / А. С. Запесоцкий. – Санкт-Петербург : СПбГУП, 2018. – 608 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

5. Крысько, В. Г. Словарь-справочник по социальной психологии / В. Г. Крысько. – Санкт-Петербург : Питер, 2003. – 415 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

6. Медиакultura и медиапотребление в белорусском обществе. – Текст : электронный // Академия управления при Президенте Республики Беларусь : [сайт]. – URL: <https://www.pac.by/press-center/edinyy-den-informirovaniya/2022/edi-noyabr2021.php> (date of address: 12.05.2022).

7. Си Цзиньпин. О государственном управлении / Си Цзиньпин. – Пекин : Изд-во лит-ры на ин. яз., 2014. – 630 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

8. Степин, В. С. Цивилизация и культура / В. С. Степин ; научный редактор А. С. Запесоцкий. – Санкт-Петербург : СПбГУП, 2011. – 408 с. – (Классика гуманитарной мысли ; Вып. 3). – Текст : непосредственный.

9. Digital 2022: Another Year of Bumper Growth. – Text : electronic // We Are Social : [website]. – URL: <https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2022/01/digital-2022-another-year-of-bumper-growth-2/> (date of address: 12.05.2022).

A. N. Danilov¹

CIVILIZATIONAL RIFT: THE BIRTH OF NEW GODS

First, a few words about the civilizational rift. The consequences of the collapse of the USSR appeared to be more tragic than anyone could fathom, and the resulting civilizational rift has not yet been bridged. If anything, it's deepening. The countries formed on the wreckage of the former Union are drifting in different directions at different speeds. As it happens during any period of change, the rift has also entered the souls. More than ten years ago, Savely Yamshchikov gave his assessment: "I believe that the most intimidating result of the 25 years of our so-called post-perestroika era is that during this time we were forced to lose our memory" [10]. Famous literature personality Yuri Kublanovsky said that "in the last years of the Union's existence... the scope of plunder was unparalleled in history since Byzantium, and there it was aliens who plundered, while here – our own kin. But even more frightening is the moral impoverishment" [2]. A dirty flood of blasphemy poured over the heads of our fellow citizens... so much that culture was unable to conduct an "expertise" and sort the wheat from the chaff, to build new priorities. In the global chaos of the civilizational rift, the Soviet Titanic was sinking into history: a new world with new traditions, values, and gods was being born.

A. V. Smirnov argues that "the modern era could be quite accurately called an era of struggle for the global promotion of one civilizational project" [5, c. 352]. He means the Western project. But is it even possible to sustain and develop the global diversity based on a single pillar – that

of the Western European civilization? It is simply impossible to ignore the uniqueness of such civilizations as China, India, and the Islamic world. Many believe that the consumer society built by the European civilization is an inevitable prospect for the entire world, so its values and ideals should be recognized as a model. They believe that compared with other social models, this society has a number of advantages, being the only one with the potential for successful economic and cultural development.

At the same time, the very implementation of the consumer society values outside Europe generates new crises and contradictions due to the frequent discord with the national and cultural peculiarities of other countries. So the question arises: does this path lead to prosperity and well-being on a worldwide scale? Are its problems just growth pains or are they an evidence of some fundamental flaws? This is especially relevant for the societies that have not previously experienced this type of organization of socioeconomic and cultural life and that can still opt for other civilizational paths. Here one should pay attention to the "amazing match that exists between the modern scientific picture of the world and the philosophical ideas which grew on the soil of original culture of Russia and its Silver Age as well as the philosophical and worldview ideas of traditional cultures of the East, and not only those new mentalities which are gradually formed in the depths of Western (technogenic) culture of the late 20th century in connection with comprehension of modern global problems" [6, c. 489]. It is necessary to analyze various perceptions of these tectonic shifts, the likely motives and mechanisms for choosing new paths of development, and those points on the planet (if any) where their implementation has already begun.

"The world is moving toward a new social order whose visible features are already quite prominent in many countries" [3, c. 8]. As a rule, a new civilizational integrity does not emerge as a completed project but grows out of the global dynamic chaos left from the departing civilization. The transition to a new integrity becomes fixed, as systems with growing complexity tend to increase their level of organization. The new level of organization means the new quality. And this new level of organization always affects and alters the previous levels. It may be due to the emer-

¹ Head of the Sociology Department of the Belarusian State University, corresponding member of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Dr. Sc. (Sociology), Professor. Author and co-author of more than 300 scientific works on sociology, methodology and technique of sociological research, theory and history of sociology, including monographs: "Transitional Society: Problems of Systemic Transformation," "Power and Society: Search for New Harmony," "Humanitarization of Science and Education in the Period of Transition" (co-authored), "Sociology of Power: Theory and Practice of Globalism," "The World of Values of Modern Man: Belarus in the European Values Study Project" (co-authored), "A Word about Contemporaries: Essays, Interviews," "The World of Values of Modern Man: Belarus and its Neighbors in International Projects for the Study of Values" (co-authored), "Knowing to Anticipate... Sociological Etudes," "Synthesis of Philosophy, Science and Culture," "Modern Society in a World of Global Change," etc. Chairman of the Belarusian Sociological Society. Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of the Belarusian State University. Sociology. Laureate of the Award by the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus.

gence of new laws of development. The laws also appear over time. If a new level of development is achieved, then new patterns emerge which can constrain and limit the effect of the previous ones.

People's connections and relationships, communications, worldviews, consciousness and culture change in the process of transition. All of these areas are constantly interacting, and development takes place. The spiritual matrix of the old civilization in which we live has already formed. A corresponding type of development was established. It has a great value diversity which builds up over time. It also has traits that distinguish traditionalist civilizations from the current one.

Of course, it may all be wishful thinking. This is often the case when it comes to such fundamental questions as the civilizational rift and emergence of growth points for new civilizations. So why isn't the seemingly most reasonable and justified thing happening in reality? What stands in the way to a multipolar world and the world's acceptance of the Other? It is the very nature of man and his belonging to a particular civilizational whole, which is changeable, selective, and functions in the orbit of a very particular logic and meaning. A human mind cannot overcome the gravity of the once established and adopted cultural code. It is possible to accept dialogue with the Other, the possibility of convergence of meanings, ways of life, and cultures, but for some reason civilizational wholes do not allow others in and do not want to go out of themselves. Every nation or state lives or aspires to live in its civilizational capsule. "There is a fierce struggle over the future because it is intimately connected with conflicting public interests" [8, c. 10]. As it happened, by their thirtieth anniversary the new independent states had entered the new century without role models, their idols had faded, and the new ones turned out to be kings for a day.

However, the West still attracts... Although after three decades, the post-Soviet world is not so delighted with the possibilities of the consumer society that has now been established in a number of European countries and the United States. Its ideals and values are not as inspiring today as they once were. On the contrary, there is increasingly more doubt that this is the only possible way forward. Admittedly, there are fairly good reasons for such assumptions. Individual consumption that is often unrelated to real human needs is becoming more and more widespread, and the processes of globalization, strongly supported by countries where consumer society is already established, contribute to the distribution of the corresponding value systems across all regions of the world. Analysis of dynamics of value orientations in the post-Soviet space shows a rapid shift from the values of survival to the values of development and self-expression.

The question is, what values and life meanings should guide us? There are consumer societies of the Western world living according to their own values, and there are others with traces of traditionalist cultures which have been transformed in the process of modernization, in one way or another. It is true that along with the Western technologies and features of educational systems, their spiritual matrices are being borrowed and adapted to the societies that live by traditional laws and customs.

Some newly sovereign states from the former socialist camp chose to develop according to the Western model. But

today the world is facing the global crises (environmental, anthropological) brought about by the Western civilization. Other crises – economic, financial, cultural – do not always affect the entire world, but remain inevitable and regular. So the question is, should one choose these well-known strategies, if the experience of their implementation shows that they lead to crises? Would this be a good way forward, or should we be looking for completely new ways? For example, should we take a course toward a new multi-civilizational integrity? But in that case, how, on what basis are we going to reconcile different values, or develop a new base of values? What stages should the society go through, what steps should it take to avoid repeating the mistakes of the past?

Here the paramount problem is transformation of basic values; to a large extent, it was the cause of the civilizational rift and forms the content of the new civilizational integrity. In the post-industrial world, with emergence of the consumer society, rationality begins to be understood differently, along with science and economic life of the society. From this position, it would be interesting to look at the value dynamics in the consumer society, and to consider new points of growth for the future. What are the changes that exacerbate an already emerging global crisis? The problem of values is the problem of developing some kind of common content that is meant to contribute to resolution of the global crisis. If it doesn't happen, it means that the values to be guided by should be different.

A. Giddens, in his famous work of 1990, gives an unequivocally positive answer to the question: "Is Modernity a Western Project?" and explains that "the nation-state and systematic capitalist production," which "are rooted in the specific characteristics of the European history and some correspondences in previous periods or in other cultural conditions. If in close association with one another they have since spread around the world, it is because of the power they have created, among other things. No other, more traditional social forms were capable of competing with this power in such a way as to be able to maintain complete autonomy and not be affected by trends in global development" [1, c. 322–323]. And further: "The radical turn from tradition inherent in the reflexivity of the modernity breaks not only with previous epochs, but also with other cultures" [1, c. 324].

More often than not, it is the general chaos that precedes the emergence of a new civilizational integrity. The new growth points are already budding in it. The challenge is to make the emergence of a new multi-civilizational whole the project of a real multipolar world. Therefore, without ignoring the centuries-old experience of the development of Greek-Latin-European culture, we should, according to Smirnov, conduct "a study of the logic of non-Western cultures, which is the primary task of the theoretical development of the project of a multi-civilizational world" [4, c. 357].

New information and communication capabilities have now emerged that have pushed national boundaries, turning the world into a big village where it is impossible to hide from the intrusive electronic eyes. Computer technology began to determine a lot in human life, to form its own, virtual world. The possibilities of artificial intelligence have called into question the future of homo sapiens itself. After the collapse of the socialist system, complete and uncondi-

tional victory of the Western model of development and the establishment of a unipolar world were declared. But something went wrong...

Unfortunately, the all-human concept, which was developed in the Russian thought in the 19th and 20th centuries, is still not perceived as the future of a multi-civilizational world. It is difficult to accept the Other, to detach oneself from one's local culture, which has no alternative and is imposed for embodiment in the global civilization project. Even earlier, V. S. Stepin emphasized: "It is important to comprehend the changes taking place in different spheres of modern culture and to find out whether there are new vital meanings and values which will become the germinal forms of a new cultural and genetic code, providing a new type of civilizational development" [7, c. 737].

Each era has its own dominant influences on the formation of national identity. We have now entered the era of the information society, where so much depends on the global web with its unlimited possibilities. The man-made virtual world began to reproduce and consolidate life meanings and behavioral attitudes that had not been tried in the real cultural space into the socio-cultural code of the new generation. This may cause a serious discrepancy between the state cultural tradition, the historical experience of the people and the attitudes of the new generation. Of course, this is an indirect mechanism. One has to look at what is "passed on by adults: timeless wisdom or outdated prejudices" [9, c. 321]. New risks and challenges require new approaches to tackle them. The transition to a new model of civilizational development is dictated by the obvious global instability to which the modern world is forced to adapt.

The civilizational rift can be overcome through recognition of a multi-civilizational, and therefore multipolar, world. "The main contradiction of the current moment in this regard is the contradiction between the declared project of the multipolar world and the absence of a project of a multi-civilizational world" [4, c. 24]. Access to the points of growth of multi-civilizational integrity can be through countries with traditional cultures that have retained their customs despite modern technological and social modern-

ization. The challenge is to make the emergence of a new multi-civilizational whole the project of a real multipolar world.

Thus, it is reasonable to raise the question: what the thirty years of the post-Soviet wonderings have left in human souls, whether they have been filled with kindness and light, whether historical truth has triumphed and what remains in the people's memory without distortions and withdrawals, whether the moral impoverishment has been overcome... And we will see how much more needs to be done to make our culture shine again and perform the sacred deed of creating a bright future, to sort the wheat from the chaff, to be ready to accept a new world of multiple civilizations, which would create the new gods...

References

1. Гидденс, Э. Последствия современности / Э. Гидденс. – Москва : Праксис, 2011. – Текст : непосредственный.
2. Кублановский, Ю. 90-е принесли настоящую катастрофу / Ю. Кублановский. – Текст : электронный // Свой : приложение к газете «Культура». – 2016, 6 авг. – URL: <https://portal-kultura.ru/svoy/articles/zvanyy-gost/138486-yuriy-kublanovskiy-90-e-prinesli-nastoyashchuyu-katastrofu/> (date of address: 13.05.2022).
3. Новое интегральное общество : общетеоретические аспекты и мировая практика / под редакцией Г. Н. Цаголова. – Москва : ЛЕНАНД, 2016. – Текст : непосредственный.
4. Смирнов, А. В. Всечеловеческое vs. общечеловеческое / А. В. Смирнов. – Москва : Садра : Издат. дом ЯСК, 2019. – 216 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
5. Смирнов, А. В. Логика смысла как философия сознания: приглашение к размышлению / А. В. Смирнов. – [2-е изд.]. – Москва : ЯСК, 2021. – Текст : непосредственный.
6. Степин, В. С. Теоретическое знание: структура, историческая эволюция / В. С. Степин. – Минск : Беларуская навука, 2021. – Текст : непосредственный.
7. Степин, В. С. Человек. Деятельность. Культура / В. С. Степин. – Санкт-Петербург : СПбГУП, 2019. – Текст : непосредственный.
8. Урри, Дж. Как выглядит будущее? / Дж. Урри. – Москва : Дело : РАНХиГС, 2019. – Текст : непосредственный.
9. Харари, Ю. Н. 21 урок для XXI века / Ю. Н. Харари. – Москва : Синдбад, 2019. – Текст : непосредственный.
10. Ямщиков, С. В. [Выступление] / С. В. Ямщиков. – Текст : непосредственный // А. С. Пушкин как мировоззренческое явление национальной традиции : материалы научно-общественной конференции. – Псков : Сельцо Михайловское, 2009. – С. 21–24. (Сер. «Михайловская пушкиниана»; Вып. 49).

L. L. Fituni¹HERMENEUTICS OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER²

Hermeneutics deals with the problems of interpreting texts not only in the usual narrow, “editorial” sense of the word (although in that sense as well), but also in the broadest philosophical sense: texts as products of lingual expression, interpretation of meanings that arise in dealing with significant human problems. In this report, the author intends to share his thoughts on interpretations of the phenomenon of the “New World Order” (NWO), which for a long time has appeared either as an ideal or as a chimera related to reorganization of the established course of life in the world community. In practice, however, history shows that all such reorganizations are invariably accompanied by cataclysms and dire consequences for many countries and peoples.

It makes sense to begin our speculations by trying to agree, at least in general terms, on what is understood as the “new world order.” Let me emphasize that we are not looking into the specific content of international reality at the arrival of the next NWO, but rather aim at highlighting the key distinctive characteristics of the latter as a generic phenomenon and an independent being, outlining the system of political relations within the entire mankind. In other words, we consider it as a recurring pattern of political, economic, and social reality in the universal history.

The very composition of the term indicates at least three key features, which in their unity generate a new quality of being for the entire humankind. The foundation of this tripartite essence is the noun “order,” i.e. *clear and precise organization of any sphere of reality*. The default assumption is that it refers to social relations – political, economic, social, or otherwise. The “world” points not only at the geographical scope of the new world order, but also that it establishes a hierarchy and rules for the interaction between various parts of the universe, including relations between countries, peoples, classes, communities, and other social groups that comprise them. Finally, the most important differentiating component in the term, the adjective “new,” is meant to signify termination of the laws and rules of the “old,” previous order, or at least their substantial modification or selective use.

¹ Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS, Head of the Center for Global and Strategic Studies of the Institute, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Member of the Scientific Council under the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 280 scientific publications, including: “Islam, Global Governance and the New World Order” (co-authored), “Africa and Russia’s National Interests” (co-authored), “Africa: Resource Wars of the 21st Century,” “The Economics of International Terrorism,” “International Capital Flows in a Globalized World, Financial Monitoring” (textbook), “Shadow Circulation and Capital Flight,” “Will We Overcome Hunger? Key Problem of the Developing Countries,” etc. Editor-in-Chief of the Journal of Scientific Notes of the Institute for African Studies and of the Global and Strategic Studies series. Member of the editorial boards of the journals *Asia and Africa Today*, *Journal of Financial Crime*, *Journal of Money Laundering Control*, etc. Deputy Chairman of the Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund’s Expert Council on Global Issues and International Relations. President of the Moscow Independent Documentation Center for Freedom, Democracy and the Rule of Law.

² The report was prepared within the framework of the project “Post-Crisis World Order: Challenges and Technologies, Competition and Cooperation” under the grant of the Russian Ministry of Science and Higher Education for major research projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development (Agreement No. 075-15-2020-783).

In the light of the above, one can infer, in a broad sense, that the entire course of the universal human history in general is a succession of declarations and collapses of undertakings interpreted by contemporaries as a “new world order”: from the ephemeral, as later turned out, monotheistic reforms of Ehnaton in ancient Egypt, to the ephemeral, as now turns out, globalist constructions of the adherents and epigones of the unipolar *New American Century*.

That which contemporaries perceive as the arrival of the *Novus ordo seclorum*, in other words, “a new order for the ages,” is often seen after one or two generations as an unfortunate disturbance, a ridiculous zigzag in the main course of history. However, it is possible that after an even longer period of history, the stigmatized zigzag will be rehabilitated and interpreted as a “bright phenomenon ahead of its time,” misunderstood and undeservedly slandered by contemporaries and their immediate descendants.

Thus, the understanding of NWO is “historical, transient, temporary, and this means that the very horizons of understanding are changeable” [2, c. 79]. Each successive generation interprets the *new world order* in its own way.

The process of understanding the new world order concept is fundamentally infinite, as the meanings attributed to it move in an endlessly expanding circle. The recurring comeback from the whole to the part and from the part to the whole alters and deepens the understanding of the part’s meaning, subjecting the whole to constant development. As H.-G. Gadamer shrewdly summarized, “formulation of the question is guided by ‘pre-understanding’”. We are talking about an established social system that has the meaning of a historically formed, scientifically unprovable norm. It is not only the subject of experiential scientific rationalization, but also its framework, in which the methodological work is “inserted.” In this case, the research solves the problem mostly by considering the hindrances in the existing social functional relationships, or also by explaining through the critique of ideology that challenges the existing dominant relations.” [1, c. 617].

The idea of a “*new world order for the ages*” has been at the core of the United States’ existence since inception. Anyone can see tangible evidence of this postulate on a dollar bill. It bears the Great Seal of the United States with the motto “*Novus ordo seclorum*.” However, appearance of the term in its modern political sense is associated with the name of the 28th President of the United States (1913–1921) Woodrow Wilson. On January 8, 1918, he presented his famous Fourteen Points, which later formed the basis of the Treaty of Versailles. Essentially, they represented a common scheme of NWO, although the term was not used there. On February 18, 1918, Wilson gave a special address to the U.S. Congress on the New *International Order* [6] and on September 9, 1919, at the University of Minnesota he first used the phrase “new order of the world” describing a world order where only democratic countries would be admitted. For autocrats, the doors will be closed. Notably, to express this thought, he used an English idiom “*to send to Coventry*,” which means “to subject someone to boycott, ostracism, cancellation”: “*The league of nations sends autocratic governments to Coventry*” [5].

As we can see, the “cancel culture” – in its ethical basis being a product of Protestant social conscience – was already inherent in the constituent texts of American presidents in those years, including their international affairs. Of course, Woodrow Wilson could not have anticipated how literally an autocrat from Germany in 1940 would take his invective of “coventrying” in regard to the democratic Britain.

However, the said German autocrat tried to impose his own interpretation of NWO, which he called in his native language, without any ambiguity, *die neue Ordnung*.

At the 1945 Yalta Conference, Joseph Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill discussed plans for a postwar world order. However, the bipolarity that developed after the war prevented the victors from establishing a unified NWO on the planet. Each of the superpowers interpreted the ideal meanings of NWO in its own way. However, the established bipolarity itself can be considered a specific, higher-level new form of world order, which has existed for almost 45 years.

After the 1989 Malta summit, both Mikhail Gorbachev and George H. W. Bush saw the era following the end of the Cold War as the NWO. However, their interpretations of the phenomenon were not the same. Gorbachev used the actual words “new world order,” while Bush Sr. spoke of the same descriptively as “a world quite different from the one we’ve known” [7]. Gorbachev, fascinated by the ideas of world brotherhood, nevertheless favored the construction of a “pan-European home” in which decisions regarding NWO would be made collegially. But Bush and his successor Clinton viewed NWO through the prism of unambiguous and unquestionable American leadership.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 can be considered the starting point for establishing another NWO. From the last decades of the 20th century to the present day, the dominant world order has changed at least three times: the collapse of the bipolar system, the establishment of unipolarity with undisputed hegemony of the United States, the possible emergence of a multipolar system. As for the arrangement and real prospects of the latter, no clear view or unequivocal opinion exists thus far. The current stage in shaping of the model of international relations is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty and instability.

The successive change of these cycles has made speculations concerning the ongoing tectonic shifts in the world economy and the established world order a constant truism of the last thirty years.

As the unipolar world began to erode in the 2000s, and vague but gradually more visible contours of global polycentricity began to appear in the haze of neo-liberal fundamentalism, the toolkit of prophetic clichés about fateful changes and their irreversibility started to grow. After the 2008–2010 crisis, the NWO cliché started to lose popularity to the substitute phrase “The world will never be the same again,” although for 10 years after the global crisis conceived in the U.S., no radical changes occurred [3, c. 5–6].

In 2020, with the onset of the coronavirus pandemic, it was reiterated that “humankind has now entered a different reality.” By 2022 the states of the world, despite the enormous costs and significant human losses, had nearly recovered from the shock of the first two years of the crisis and began to build *models and rules of existence in the “new normal”* [4, c. 5], that is, internationally, NWO.

Changes on a global scale have already occurred. As we have stressed in previous publications, in the first two months of the pandemic, most governments have effectively carried out operations to restrict many of the previously unquestioned freedoms of citizens: entire sectors of the economy (international air travel, tourism, etc.) have been shut down. Quality of life of large swaths of the population has declined radically, whereas the cycle of life and behavioral order in developed countries (less so in developing countries) have become subject to strict regulation on a voluntary basis. Without resorting to the difficult procedure provided for by national laws, almost all states used instructions from representatives of the executive power (often not the top level) to de facto transfer the leading economies of the world producing more than 80% of the gross world product to mobilization mode [4, c. 5–6]. At the same time, industries not adapted to function in such a mode (tourism, small business, etc.) fell into a coma, if not died. The fragmentation and parcellarization of national societies have reached proportions unprecedented in modern history. Inter-country, inter-ethnic and inter-confessional relations are under tremendous strain, which opens a window of opportunity for the active use of the “divide and conquer” principle by forces interested in it [4, c. 6].

While not aiming at assessment of ultimate effectiveness of these governmental measures, it is important to be aware of how significant they are, even after their expiration (in about two years), for the evolution of state power, sentiments and interactions in the society, and future international relations. Russia in its present state and situation is fully exposed to general world processes.

Scientists and politicians agree that “*the pandemic and the global economic downturn made it impossible to develop globalization in the same vein as in the 1990s and 2010s*” [Ibid]. And here’s why.

The term “globalization” is known to refer to two closely related but essentially different phenomena: a) the ongoing process of global generalization and internationalization of economic life, regardless of the will of people; b) the political and economic project to use this objective process in the interests of the dominant (leading) groups of the world financial and economic oligarchy. The United States was the global leader of the “project” and its nation-state inspirer and driver for many years; it created world alliances in its interests and formed new, complementary centers of economic power that ensured its dominance. States and alternative centers of influence that did not fit into this scheme were to be eliminated or relegated to the role of outcast from the world community, doomed to a miserable existence [Ibid].

As we know, *this pattern of globalization has failed* because it has created competitors for the U.S., such as China and, to a lesser extent, other countries with rising influence, recently classified as “developing,” “collapsed,” or “backward.” Within the oligarchic elites of the West, there was a growing disagreement between the part which gave priority to the global hegemony of the United States, and the part for which the national shell of the dominant oligarchic group was secondary to its group (class) interests [Ibid].

Both parts were nevertheless interested in restarting globalization in the updated situation under the new program code. The first part wanted to replace “globalization 1.0” with an updated version of the U.S. model of

world domination in the paradigm of the unconditional “power of American imperialism” of the mid-20th century – nullifying the results of the rise of China, India, Brazil and the weakening of the EU, Canada and several other players. The second part allowed for some redistribution of the balance of power in global hegemony at the expense of the share of the EU, Russia and a number of other actors, ensured by a more rigid domination of collective supranational structures formed primarily by this same part of the global oligarchy [Ibid].

The pandemic created a window of opportunity for both of these groups. On the one hand, the outbreak of coronavirus infection has greatly increased the state’s governing role, showing the vital importance of returning the industries scattered across the world over the years of the past globalization model to their own sovereign territory and jurisdiction.

On the other hand, failures of governments to stop the pandemic, the inability of virtually all Western democracies to effectively confront the virus at the national level (the difference being that some did “badly” and some “extremely badly”), the inability to defend the highest “European value” they proclaimed – human life – have dealt the nation-state an irreparable blow. The official policy of the authorities of some Western countries – to save the young while leaving the old to die – has seriously undermined the moral and ethical foundations of the institution of the family, already severely eroded in recent decades [3, p. 10]. Extreme disruption of social ties through the introduced mechanism of self-isolation, the concept “everyone saves himself by separating from society” created the preconditions for rejecting “ineffective state intervention” and convinced many people in the latter’s poor performance. “This has formed the necessary environment for bringing *communities of competent non-state actors of supra-sovereign level* to the forefront in the post-pandemic future” [Ibid, c. 11].

Sharp aggravation of the crisis of the political system in the United States in the second half of 2020 led to (perhaps temporary) victory of the “ultra-globalists,” who, on the one hand, advocated for rigid consolidation of the West, and on the other hand, stiffened the approaches to Russia and China. Despite all costs, the victors managed to consolidate the “collective West” around the revived propagandist ideological slogan of NWO-1918 “Democracies against authoritarian regimes,” and in military material terms – around the NATO bloc and its sub-products in other regions of the planet (AUKUS and others). By the end of 2021, the change in the dynamics of the existing world order is actually long overdue. The world, having finally overcome the “zigzag of history,” in its typical contradictions returned to the beginning of the twentieth century and froze in anticipation of a new Sarajevo...

As shown above, “new world orders” are usually born as a result of irreversible changes in the global balance of power, the undermining of the planetary positions of the old hegemonies and progressive ascent of new candidates to this role. This is not a linear process. In some cases (as was in the late 1980s and early 1990s) the old hegemonic powers are able to re-establish their position by seizing and absorbing new, previously inaccessible resources. Thus, at the end of the Cold War, the collective West was able to regain its historical dynamism for a time, thanks to the fact that,

on its own terms, it obtained the full potential of the former socialist countries for its disposal. This allowed it to extend its hegemony for nearly 30 more years. However, by the mid-2010s, the easily accessible part of this reserve, whose consumption did not cost much, was practically “digested.” What remained was the “hard-to-develop” segments of the world economy in the former Soviet Union and particularly backward areas of the developing world. In addition, as noted above, the mid-term horizon promised inevitable confrontation with China and possibly with some of the other large and populous ascendant economies.

Redivision of the world, followed by the introduction of another NWO, was just as inevitable. It was decided to play the Ukrainian card by the spring of 2022 as a final solution of the aforementioned problem, and perhaps Russia was seen as a weak link in this global balance of power.

For Russia, deployment of such a scenario signaled the need to actually abandon the orientation to the West, albeit somewhat weakened, but still retained since the Gorbachev era. It was a mistake and a fateful negligence to naively hope that the West would want to take care of the vast area of the former Soviet Union and its large population (today about 400 million people in total) and help this part of the world achieve the same level of prosperity and well-being that its citizens have.

The deindustrialization that has taken place, the parcellization of territory, the unbundling and separation of economic entities, the liquidation of most of the system-forming advanced manufacturing sites and entire industries, along with the collapse of vocational education and training, the declining quality of general education (not to mention moral upbringing) have led to the fact that by the time of confrontation with the West, Russia is forced to solve a host of problems that could otherwise be non-existent or not so grave.

The crisis of the world order that broke out in late winter this year created the need to renew the entire ecosystem of economic and political relations in the internal and external contours of the Russian statehood. There is a clear need to strengthen both contours, to form new or updated approaches and, most importantly, incentives (either positive or negative) to improve relations with foreign states. We need to overcome the situation where Russia is expected to give something to someone all the time, relying at best on assurances of eternal friendship and “strategic partnership.” The partner should have a very clear understanding of its resulting losses in the case of neglect of our country’s interests. At the same time, it is clear that in the overall range of “persuasive arguments,” the power arguments will be the last resort.

Today’s urgent task is to overcome *pain points* at the external and internal contours. At the external contour, such points are those countries which experience the enemy’s undisguised pressure because they want to preserve and further develop relations with Russia, and are unwilling to join the boycotts and sanctions of the hegemonic powers. The most vulnerable point on the internal contour seems to be the lack of understanding by a significant part of the population that Russia’s success in building a new world order and its place in it depend directly on the size and quality of each citizen’s personal contribution to the collective efforts of the entire country. A proper place in the emerging new world order will allow Russia to stop being an exploit-

ed and robbed semi-periphery, required to follow the externally established rules, and to join the ranks of equal system-forming actors of the world order, defining the essence of its development.

References

1. Гадамер, Х.-Г. Истина и метод: Основы философской герменевтики : [перевод с немецкого] / Х.-Г. Гадамер. – Москва : Прогресс, 1988. – 699 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
2. Канке, В. А. Основы философии : [учебник для студентов средних специальных учебных заведений] / В. А. Канке. – Москва : Унив. книга : Логос, 2008. – 288 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
3. Фитуни, Л. Л. Коронавирус и «конец истории» / Л. Л. Фитуни. – Текст : непосредственный // Ученые записки Института Африки РАН. – 2020. – № 2 (51). – С. 5–13.

4. Фитуни, Л. Развивающиеся страны в политической экономике посткоронавирусного мира / Л. Фитуни, И. Абрамова. – Текст : непосредственный // Мировая экономика и международные отношения. – 2020. – Т. 64, № 9. – С. 5–14.

5. Address at the University of Minnesota Armory in Minneapolis. – Text : electronic // The American Presidency Project : [website]. – URL: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-university-minnesota-armory-minneapolis> (date of address: 09.05.2022).

6. Address to Congress on International Order. – Text : electronic // The American Presidency Project : [website]. – URL: <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/311360> (date of address: 09.05.2022).

7. September 11, 1990: Address Before a Joint Session of Congress. – Image (moving ; two-dimensional) : video // Miller Center : [website]. – URL: <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/september-11-1990-address-joint-session-congress> (date of address: 09.05.2022).

G. A. Hajiye¹

A HAUNTING TRAGEDY OR CATHARSIS?

The urgency and unexpectedness of events since February this year, the rupture of international legal and established economic relations that have been built over decades, inevitably give rise to alarmism. The expression of V. D. Zorkin has come to life: “The world is tired of peace.”

What is going on – a dangerous collapse of the established legal world order or a healthy catharsis? In Poetic, treatise on the theory of drama, Aristotle used the metaphor of catharsis, which means physical cleansing of the human body. He compared it to the effect of tragedy on the mind of man.

To understand the meaning of the ongoing events, we must immerse its entire series in a complex context of political, economic, ideological relations and recall the discussions about the possible ways of constitutionalizing international law. And we must recall Shakespeare!

In the early 2000s, J. Habermas published a number of papers and gave several interviews on the terrorist attacks in the United States in 2001 and their aftermath – the war in Iraq, Yugoslavia (Kosovo), crisis of the UN and international law. He focuses on the problem of the collapse of the process of constitutionalization of international law by the “hegemonic power,” in development of Kant’s project “Toward Perpetual Peace.”

The discussions originate from Kant’s ideas of perpetual peace (“either perpetual peace among nations or cemetery peace,” according to E. Yu. Solovyov) and his project of the state of civil law, described in his treatise “Toward Perpetual Peace.”

Kant’s project, directed toward the distant future, is summarized in the following fragment: “The problem of

creating a perfect civil order depends on the problem of lawfulness of foreign relations between states; without the solution of the latter, the former cannot be solved.”² By lawful relations between states he meant the requirements that are quite understandable to the ordinary, subjective, “unmystified” mind.

Kant rose to the level of foresight of what happened in the twentieth century when he suggested that we should consider whether the political skill of men, shaped by the “inherent discord of the human race,” could one day become a true “hell with its misery,” so that in the end “both the condition already achieved and all previous progress in culture would again be destroyed by barbaric desolation.” Being quite realistic, he assumed that “halfway” to lawful interstate relations, “the human nature will probably experience the most severe calamities.”³

Kant is a representative of idealism in philosophy. Has he made any miscalculations in his project leading to a “world state”?

Two centuries later, it became possible both to appreciate its strengths and to find its possible weaknesses. In the twentieth century, the seed planted in the purely European soil began to produce sprouts: the Kellogg–Briand Pact; the founding of the League of Nations after World War I, when the United States entered the European arena; the policy of victors, in which the USSR was already involved along with the United States and Great Britain; and the emergence of the United Nations.

In April 1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt wrote that “more than the end of this war, we want an end to all military undertakings.”

But the U.S. still took the path of militarization, abandoning the implementation of Roosevelt’s dreams. U.S. global power ambitions have become a reality.

The UN became a “paper tiger”; there was the Srebrenica tragedy; the Kosovo conflict; the concept of “militant democracy” and later, the concept of the neoconservatives emerged, with their vision of an American policy to create

¹ Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 270 scientific works, including monographs and textbooks: “The Protection of Basic Economic Rights and Freedoms of Entrepreneurs Abroad and in the Russian Federation: the Experience of Comparative Analysis,” “Entrepreneur – Taxpayer – State: Legal Positions of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation,” “Constitutional Principles of Market Economy,” “Constitutional Economics,” “Ontology of Law (Critical Study of Legal Concept of Reality),” “Russian Judicial Power: the Modernity and Prospects” (co-authored), “Law and Economics (Methodology)” and others. Member of editorial boards of 12 scientific journals. Member of the Presidential Council for the Codification and Improvement of Civil Legislation. Awarded a Diploma of Merit of the President of the Russian Federation. Honorary Doctor of SPbUHS.

² Кант И. Сочинения на немецком и русском языках. М., 2001. Т. 4 : Критика способности суждения. Первое введение в «Критику способности суждения». С. 429.

³ Соловьев Э. Ю. Категорический императив нравственности и права. М., 2005. С. 284.

a world order along their own lines. All this has weakened the UN and strengthened the position of right-wing conservatives in the United States.

A seemingly regular American journalist, Robert Kagan, published an essay "Americans come from Mars, Europeans from Venus." This essay, which was originally to be titled "Strength and Weakness," was actually turned into a national security doctrine by the Bush Jr.¹ This was facilitated by Victoria Nuland, wife of Robert Kagan.

Kagan distinguished between Americans, whom he called followers of Hobbes (recall his Leviathan, the symbol of the state), and Europeans, whom he called Kantians (probably for their belief in human rights, the "perpetual peace" project, and the "world state").

In his essay, Kagan mocks the following ideas popular in Europe:

- that the victory over Nazi Germany was achieved thanks to the efforts of the Red Army, which had suffered enormous losses;

- that the social constitution and economic success (of European countries) have a power of appeal and should therefore be the main factors of "soft, non-military power," which will provide Europeans with influence in the world;

- the pacifism cultivated in Germany;

- the idea of building a European military force in Europe independent of NATO.²

It was Kagan who championed realism in international relations and criticized idealism in foreign policy.

Let us return to the evaluation of the Kantian project for the constitutionalization of international relations in Europe.

Obviously, the model of one world-wide republic, a world state community, is a project for the distant future, if feasible in principle.

In Europe, they followed the path of the union of states – the European Union, to which Ukraine was also promised accession. But even the idea of "Europe of different speeds" does not help resolve to accept Ukraine into this Union. Turkey has been "at the entrance" for years; it is not allowed in, even though it is a member of NATO.

Kant's project is being adapted to the specific political interests that are far from altruistic; this can be proved by the following facts: it was necessary to place NATO military bases (and essentially the U.S. bases) on the perimeter of the USSR; Turkey is accepted into NATO, but, given its religious composition and keeping in mind the imperial past of this country, it is unlikely to become a member of the European Union and remains, since 1964, in the status of an associated member.

So the pace of expansion of the Union and the speed of progress toward a new bright future for the humanity, as was the case with the project of building communism in a single country, proved to be overly optimistic, which means – erroneous.

But the most serious difficulties for the future project of perpetual peace are created by the "hegemonic power" which, in the spirit of notorious realism, and in fact in the spirit of egoism, manipulates the Union. In a snap of the fingers, Britain resorted to Brexit; the EU Constitution failed to be adopted.

The most destructive force that Kant failed to anticipate, though, was the doctrine of *unilateralism*, which emerged under President Bush the Younger. In September 2002, he released a new security doctrine in which he announced the right to launch a preventive military strike, the need

for which is determined at the sole discretion of the United States.

And in his State of the Nation speech on January 28, 2003, he said that if the UN Security Council did not agree to military action against Iraq, no matter how justified, then the United States, if necessary, would disregard the prohibition on violence solidified in the UN Charter.³ (He said the following: "...the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others.")

Unilateralism is not just a deeply conspired concept, but a practice that defines the U.S. relations with other countries, based on new digital technical capabilities, international, and in fact U.S.-established financial institutions like the World Bank, legal institutions promoted in other countries (like the institution of punitive compensation to protect the interests of American rights holders, which has been implemented throughout the "developing world" with the help of American diplomacy). Besides, there is the practice of stigmatizing countries as pariahs, empires of evil.

The doctrine of unilateralism consists of several components, including the military and normative. The first underlies a strategy for the use of military force, dismissing Kant's dreams as empty idealism. The second component is essentially a tactic of cynical use of the popular idea of human rights. Why propose any other normative goals when it is already clear that human rights must be respected in every country *at all costs*, without regard to the cultural identity?

Liberal fundamentalism has been parasitizing on Kant's ideas about the most sacred thing on earth, essentially denigrating and radically rejecting other moral attitudes.

In the end, paradoxically, the dialogue of cultures is using the language of guns.

What is happening in the world right now is the conflict of cultures that William Shakespeare foresaw. The play *The Merchant of Venice*, written at the very end of the 16th century, nearly 500 years ago, describes the tragedy of law, epitomized by the drama of the moneylender Shylock. The drama of his situation is that he had confidence in the law of Venice, and this almost sacred faith in the law is undermined by the trial which is described in detail by Shakespeare. The ancient Irish litigator Senchus Mor says: "There are three epochs during which all things lose their sense: a time of natural disaster, a time of general warfare, and a time when established treaties are reneged."

The plot is based on the opposition of two people and two different cultures. The Western culture is embodied by the rich merchant Antonio, and the Eastern culture by the moneylender Shylock, an alien living in the Venetian ghetto (a migrant in the language of today), but still a man with a sense of dignity. His dignity is trampled by Antonio, who spits in his face in public only because he is of different blood. The arrogance of the European is the main reason for the conflict between two people, two cultures. Shylock is guided by revenge when he utters the famous phrase: "The villainy you teach me, I will execute."

The author has done his best to make the reader hate the moneylender Shylock, but the reader living 500 years later may surmise that the real reason for the drama is arrogance. Shakespeare seems to have described all the vices and virtues of men, as if intending to prove that nothing changes in the world – there will always be Shylocks and Antonios.

The haunting contradiction of cultures born of the haunting arrogance is what the ever-relevant Shakespeare warned mankind about.

¹ Хабермас Ю. Расколотый Запад. М., 2008. С. 77–102.

² Ibid.

³ Хабермас Ю. Оп. cit. С. 171–175.

S. Yu. Glazyev¹

ON RUSSIA'S CURRENT POSITION IN GLOBAL HYBRID WARFARE AND CREATION OF THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR OUR VICTORY²

The special military operation (SMO) uncovered a plan prepared in advance by the U.S. power and financial elite to seize power in Russia. It includes the following steps.

1. To exhaust the Russian armed forces in a clash with the well-trained Pentagon-controlled AFU fighters, “stitched” by the Nazi vertical of officers appointed by the U.S. and British special services. To turn the population of Ukraine into zombies infected with Russophobia. To turn the sympathies of the international community against Russia by charging our leadership with war crimes and genocide. On this basis, confiscate foreign currency assets of Russia and impose total sanctions against it, causing as much damage as possible. This stage is actually completed.

2. To terrorize the Russian population by shelling border settlements and military infrastructure facilities, sabotage of transport, and hacking attacks. To strike the public consciousness with a stream of fake negative news and anti-government propaganda via social networks. Through their agents of influence in the financial and economic structures of power, to impose an economic policy that blocks mobilization of resources, including inflated interest rates, continued export of capital, encouragement of currency and financial speculations, manipulation of the ruble exchange rate, and inflated prices. Thus, to repeatedly exacerbate the effect of sanctions and provoke a collapse in production and a decline in living standards. This stage is in full swing.

3. Against the background of falling living standards and losses during the SMO, to provoke protest sentiments and destructive socio-political actions with the aim of overthrowing the legitimate authorities. To use the entire arsenal of methods for organizing “color revolutions” financed by the comprador oligarchy against the promise of unfreezing the assets seized in the U.S. and European jurisdictions. At the same time, to prepare the organizational and ideological basis for separatist actions in the regions. This stage is now under active development.

At this stage, the following tasks are also envisaged:

- consolidation of the U.S. control over the European Union and NATO countries;
- use of Polish, Romanian and Baltic armed forces, as well as mercenaries from Western, Near and Middle Eastern states in combat operations against Russia;
- destruction of the male population and the actual enslavement of the women and children of Ukraine for the subsequent development of this territory in the interests of the power and financial elite of the United States, Britain and Israel.

The implementation of this plan, in fact, is aimed at the destruction of the Russian world. Following this, the U.S. “deep state” plans to destroy Iran and block China.

However, due to the objective laws of global economic development, this plan is doomed to failure. The U.S. will not be able to win the global hybrid war they have unleashed to maintain their global hegemony. They are inevitably losing it to China, which is rapidly gaining strength due to anti-Russian sanctions.

In an effort to inflict maximum damage on Russia, Washington, London and Brussels have played their main trump cards: a monopoly on the issue of world currencies, the image of a model legal democratic state, and the belief in the “sacred” right of private property. In doing so, they forced all countries independent of them to search for new global monetary instruments, risk insurance mechanisms, restoration of international law and creation of their own economic security systems.

The anti-Russian sanctions have undermined, rather than strengthened, the global dominance of the U.S. and the EU, to which the rest of the world has become distrustful and wary. They dramatically accelerated the transition to a new world economic order and shifted the center of the world economy to Southeast Asia. Russia needs to withstand the confrontation with the United States and NATO, bringing the SMO to its logical conclusion, so as not to be torn between them and China, which is confidently becoming the leader of the world economy.

However, the weaker is the U.S. position in the world, the more aggressive is the behavior of its ruling elite. Having chosen Russia as their main target, they will go all the way in an effort to prove to the whole world their role as a global hegemon. In order to stand up to an enemy that is an order of magnitude greater than we are in terms of financial, economic and technological power, it is necessary to mobilize all the resources available in the country. Meanwhile, we are still losing them: the brain and capital flight continues (\$65 billion in the first quarter of 2022), export of most natural resources; half of the production facilities are idle.

Instead of proposing measures to mobilize free resources, economic agencies echo the IMF in making gloomy forecasts of falling GDP this year, reducing investment and personal income by 6–10%. However, if a scientifically sound economic policy is put in place, the available resource potential allows for an increase in these indicators by 5–15%.

¹ Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission, Academician of the RAS, Head of the Department of Theory and Methodology of State and Municipal Management at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Author of more than 300 scientific publications, including books: “The Theory of Long-Term Techno-Economic Development,” “Strategy of Advanced Development of Russia in the Global Crisis,” “Lessons of Yet Another Russian Revolution: Liberal Utopia Collapse and the Chance for an ‘Economic Miracle’,” “The Ukrainian Disaster. From American Aggression to World War?,” “The Future Economy,” “The Last World War. The U.S. Starts and Loses,” “The Battle for Leadership in the 21st Century. Russia – U.S. – China. Seven Options for a Foreseeable Future,” “The Leap to the Future: Russia in New Technological and World Economic Patterns,” “Beyond the Horizon of the End of History,” and others. Deputy of the State Duma of the first, third and fourth convocations. Awarded the Order of Friendship, the Medal “In Memory of the 850th Anniversary of Moscow,” the Medal of the Security Council of the Russian Federation for Merits in Ensuring National Security, the Jubilee Medal of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, a Commendation from the President of the Russian Federation.

² The report is based on a text published by the author in the Telegram channel “Glazyev for Thinking People” on April 30, 2022, and a paper: *Глазьев С. Ю. Необходим незамедлительный переход к системе стратегического планирования // Завтра. 2022. 7 марта. URL: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/neobhodim_nezamedlitel_nij_perehod_k_sisteme_strategicheskogo_planirovaniya.*

An example of this policy can be Primakov–Gerashchenko's government from September 1998 to May 1999, which managed to stabilize an even worse macroeconomic situation within a month and achieve the growth of industrial production up to 2% per month. Instead of increasing the key rate when inflation was higher than today, V. Gerashchenko left it at the same level, times lower than inflation. Simultaneously, the currency position of commercial banks had been fixed and currency control had been tightened. This protected the currency market from speculators, and thanks to the positive trade balance the ruble rate quickly stabilized. Tariffs for the services of natural monopolies were frozen, antitrust policy was strengthened, and export duties on raw materials were reinstated, which brought down the inflationary wave and ensured significant budget revenues. The opportunities for import substitution were realized thanks to the flow of cheap credit through targeted refinancing mechanisms introduced by Gerashchenko for commercial banks to lend to manufacturing enterprises. Rapid growth in the production of domestic goods saturated the market and suppressed inflation. The economy has entered the mode of expanded reproduction on its own technological base.

Since 2012, financial and banking market regulators have been pursuing the opposite policy in the ideological vein of the "Washington Consensus." The damage from this policy accumulated in Russia since 2014 is estimated at 30 trillion rubles of underproduced products and 15 trillion rubles of unmade investments.

In order to reduce the dependence of the country's monetary system on sanctions, the export of gold should be banned and a tax should be introduced on the purchase of foreign currency, as well as a tax on the export of capital not lower than the amount of the income tax.

It is advisable to immediately introduce a special instrument of refinancing authorized commercial banks that lend investment in import-substituting production at no more than 2% per annum for up to three years. A similar instrument should be used for lending import-substituting production of machinery and equipment (machine tools, agricultural machinery, road-building equipment, etc.).

Of the non-financial sanctions, the most painful measure would be to stop servicing American and European-made aircraft. There is no other option but to boost the production of Tu-204 (214), IL-96 and IL-114 with automatic buy-out of these aircraft by state-owned banks and leasing them to air carriers. The Bank of Russia needs to urgently activate a special instrument of refinancing at a rate not exceeding 1% for authorized commercial banks against the pledge of domestic aircraft purchased by them.

Despite the existing balance of the food market, in order to maintain it in the long term, an embargo on the export of grain, oil, sugar should be introduced; stocks of food essentials should be increased, including for the purpose of commodity interventions (if necessary – to switch to direct administrative methods of their distribution to the population). We should also curb the rise in price and export of mineral fertilizers by introducing an export duty. The same should be done with regard to the export of products of the chemical and metallurgical complex, which are in demand on the domestic market.

A super-urgent task is transition to domestic software in all spheres, starting with the public sector, defense and energy.

The response to the introduction of restrictions on exports of high-tech equipment to Russia can only be widespread import substitution and rapid development of high-tech cooperation with China. Both measures require massive lending through the deployment of special instruments by the Bank of Russia for refinancing commercial banks and development institutions, issuing targeted loans for the implementation of investment projects on the terms similar to those of China (from 0.5% to 2% per annum for up to 10 years or more).

In general, effective management of the functioning and development of the economy in this special period requires a rapid transition to a system of strategic planning, based on the tried and tested mechanisms of public-private partnership with the introduction of procedures of responsibility for achieving targets and backed by a purpose-oriented monetary policy of financing the implementation of the tasks of strategic planning.

Based on the successful current international experience, it is proposed to introduce a special instrument of the Bank of Russia for refinancing authorized commercial banks and development institutions that lend investment projects formalized as SPIC (special investment contracts), IPPA (investment protection and promotion agreement), or in other formats of multilateral investment agreements established by the government. The participants in these agreements should include government-authorized commercial banks and development institutions, which, in scope of the stipulated investment loans, could receive refinancing from the Central Bank at a rate not exceeding 1% per annum for the term of the agreements. In this case, the final borrower could take a loan for the implementation of an investment project at 2–3% per annum. This would be consistent with both international competitive conditions and the objectively low risk of the project, formalized as an investment contract with the authorities and commercial banks (development institutions) authorized by the Government.

In general, the scale of threats and resulting prospective tasks based on the goals of ensuring rapid economic growth at rates above the world average, requires urgent implementation of measures to sovereignize Russia's economic space and to maintain the necessary level of economic security.

Strategic development management and economic sovereignty

1. Development of a strategic plan to mobilize available resources in order to provide the armed forces and the population with the necessary goods, and a legal and regulatory framework for its implementation. Implementation of this plan should be conducted on the basis of public-private partnership and financed by the Bank of Russia through special instruments for refinancing of authorized commercial banks, which should bring targeted loans to enterprises under contracts for the manufacture of products in execution of this plan.

2. Formation of a centralized management structure headed by the President, similar to the State Defense Committee of the USSR, whose decisions should have the force of law, binding to all authorities, including the Government and the Central Bank, system-forming banks and corporations, and administrations of the constituent entities of the Federation. State banks and enterprises, as well as large private corporations, should be put in a rigid framework for the implementation of the decisions of this body to carry

out state orders at centrally established prices. Exports and imports of strategically important goods must be controlled by the government in order to provide the armed forces with all the necessary resources. To this end, a procedure for the formation of state reserves should be introduced through the mandatory sale of part of the foreign exchange earnings to the government at a fixed rate.

3. Subordination of macroeconomic policy, including monetary and credit policy, to the goals of modernization and growth of production of high-tech military and dual-use products. For this purpose, credit lines with a rate of no more than 2% per annum should be organized for enterprises manufacturing products under state orders and working under government programs.

4. Creation of reserves of strategic raw materials necessary for the production of military products and ensuring the socio-economic security of the country with their acquisition into the state reserve of the Bank of Russia along with gold and foreign currency valuables.

Foreign economic security

5. Renationalization of the Moscow Exchange and its subordination to the Bank of Russia. Re-establishment of the ruble's exchange rate control. Protection of the monetary and financial system from speculative attacks on the basis of standard market cooling measures, licensing of capital and limiting non-trade operations, fixing the currency position of commercial banks. Introduction of a tax on the sale of currency and securities purchased less than a year ago. Cardinal increase in the efficiency of currency control. De-offshorization of the economy and stopping the illegal export of capital according to the recommendations provided earlier.

6. Rejection of the services of rating agencies, auditing, consulting and legal companies of unfriendly countries in the development of methods of monetary authorities, work of government agencies, banks and corporations.

7. Expansion of Eurasian economic integration, both in terms of the set of functions of economic regulation (to supplement them with currency, monetary, educational and information policies) and in terms of the number of EAEU countries.

8. Transition to national currencies in mutual trade and investment not only in the EAEU and CIS, but also within the BRICS and SCO. Withdrawal of joint development institutions from the dollar area. Creation of a payment system and interbank information exchange system independent on unfriendly countries.

In the conditions of an economic war waged against Russia, it is important to implement the task set by the President of the Russian Federation to transfer exports of our goods to the Russian ruble, which will lead to the formation of a fundamentally different, steadily surplus foreign trade system. Due to the proposed approach, the foreign trade surplus only in 2022 is estimated at 25 trillion rubles. In the context of the rejection of trade in currencies of unfriendly countries, it is necessary to accelerate the “decou-

pling” of reproduction of the Russian economy from Western pricing of domestic exchange commodities by setting their firm domestic prices and freezing tariffs on electricity and transportation for the current year. This policy will lead to import substitution and development of our own industry, growth of citizens' incomes, and sovereignization of the EAEU common economic space.

Export duties should also be introduced in the segment of trade in raw materials with unfriendly countries, which will help withdraw up to 25 trillion rubles of natural rent to the federal budget and eliminate opportunistic dependence on price fluctuations in global markets.

The new architecture of international monetary and financial relations

In the current situation, Russia should act as a world leader – initiator of the transition to a new world monetary and financial system, based on an international agreement that provides transparent rules of emission and circulation of digital international settlement currency, secured by a basket of national currencies of the countries who are party to this agreement and stocks of exchange goods produced in them (“commodity bundle”). A mathematical model of the construction of such a currency showed its high stability. In parallel, it is necessary to develop a mechanism for pricing in this currency, which requires creation of its own exchange space, whose concept is now being elaborated by EEC specialists.

Leaders of the new world economic order (China, India, ASEAN countries) can take part in formation of a new, fair and transparent world monetary and financial system, along with the victims of American aggression, such as Russia, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, and Afghanistan.

There is an urgent need to complete the protracted process of creating a state ideology that corresponds to traditional moral values, with modern guidelines for behavior. It could be based on the concept of social-conservative synthesis, combining the values of social justice and Christian (Muslim, Buddhist) morality. This ideology should not only be declared but also practically confirmed in the mechanisms of regulation of socio-economic reproduction: progressive taxation of income and property, universal social guarantees, career opportunities, nationalization of illegally privatized or enemy-controlled infrastructure and strategically important monopolistic enterprises, including hydroelectric power plants transferred to the control of the US Treasury.

The ideology of socio-conservative synthesis, as well as the measures proposed above are fully consistent with the principles of functioning of the new, integral world economic order. It is based on a combination of centralized strategic planning and market competition mechanisms, encouragement of private initiative and state control over money circulation; harmonization of activities of all social groups based on the criterion of improving public welfare. The activities of the state-owned media should be subject to this ideology.

Ch. Goddard¹

RUSSIAN EDUCATION AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF EPOCHS (DIALECTICS OF THE PAST AND THE FUTURE). WHAT DOES RUSSIA NEED?

Introduction

The Chinese curse “may you live in interesting times” springs to mind. Our world is very different today due to a pandemic and a special military operation. Our students will inherit the current changed reality, one which – it must be admitted – is not as comfortable as it used to be.

We see western propaganda, led by the UK’s Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary. Russophobia is encouraged, together with widespread economic sanctions and belligerent actions with arms supplies to those who do not support our way of life. As a result, the world in future will treat our young people differently.

Russians, as we all know, do not surrender. We might say – “let them do their worst, we will survive.” And of course, we will. But we cannot be passive. Instead, we must take, an active life position.² We cannot let those outside our borders dictate how we should live, forcing us to exist according to their terms. The famous programme «Их нравы» shows us what those terms and standards can be. Colour revolutions and gender freedoms are not part of our culture. So, what can be done?

The European Space

This has significantly changed since the post war 1947 Dunkirk Treaty between the UK and France. The European collective expanded with the Brussels Treaty, the Modified Brussels Treaty, then again with the North Atlantic Treaty (with its 12 original signatories), and yet further with the subsequent 18 further State accessions to NATO membership.

The 1948 Vandenberg Resolution of the US Congress is the heart of American commitment to military intervention for mutual defence of European territories, which enabled the establishment of NATO. This Resolution also lies at the heart of the exertion of influence, opinion making and subtle control over these territories and peoples.

In the words of F. A. Lukyanov:

*“February 2022 marked the end of a large-scale historical experiment aimed to test the hypothesis that Russia may be included in the international order created by the leading Western powers without its participation but providing certain room for its development in accordance with the rules established by the leaders of this order. The result is negative.”*³

¹ Professor of the Department of International Private Law at Moscow State University of Law named after O. E. Kutafin, Master of Science (Construction Law), Bachelor of Architecture. Author of a variety of scientific works, including: “The Culture of the Application of the Law in Great Britain,” “An Englishman in Moscow and MSAL,” “Experts and Expert Evidence in International Arbitration: Use, Duties and Obligations, and the Basis of Their Appointment” etc. Member of the Architects Registration Board, Royal Institute of British Architects, Association of Project Managers, Association of Planning Supervisors, Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. Chief Editor of the “Kutafin University Law Review.”

² Colloquially this was referred to as having an “активная жизненная позиция,” or “АЖП”

³ Lukyanov F. A. Old Thinking for Our Country and the World // Russia in Global Affairs. 2022. № 20 (1). P. 5–10. DOI: 10.31278/1810-6374-2022-20-1-5-10.

As to the effects of this – an interesting person to listen to is Nikita Mikhalkov.⁴ For the foreigner, he offers many rich insights into Russian thinking and culture. His famous programme “Besogon,” has the ikon of the famous 4th century saint, implying driving out demons, and eliminating false thinking. The famous biblical words “They have eyes but do not see – ears, but do not hear”⁵ can be easily applied to those abroad who look to Russia and Russians.

The interesting website “Have Fun with Russian” has a useful bilingual piece by him in which he states (about Russians):

“...we understand that we will never be liked. We are different. Our faith is different. Our ideas about good and evil are different. Not because we are better, but we are different... we must be powerful, independent, armed, know our place and understand for sure that we will not give it to anyone. And that should be the basis for us. It seems to me that the basis of our existence should be only the national interests of our country and our peoples.”

It is to be regretted that the creation of post war European space ignored the wide gulf between their thinking, aspirations, and culture – and those of the peoples of the Soviet Union – simply imposing their own order. One might call it a permanently expanding collective colonialism. This is the backdrop to the current situation

Effects on Russia

Some ideologies are seductive, admired for qualities outside one’s own experiences. Liberals will be easily seduced. The Bologna education system experiment is one such example which Russia has been tempted to explore. This exploration recalibrated and redefined Russian higher education and its diplomas to a model for western integration. The result is not good. For example, we have seen an absolute dilution of the 5-year qualification of Specialist, and a simultaneous retrograde shift in the provision of school education.

The general role of education, in the words of Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation N. P. Patrushev is to:

*“develop logical thinking, give knowledge and the ability to make independent decisions.”*⁶

It is impossible to disagree with him that children today are taught to put crosses in boxes. Those of us who are parents who supervise homework, see an increasing tendency towards box-ticking, and a move away from tasks which develop the person and their intellect.

Mr. Patrushev also draws our attention to the fact that education cannot be digitalised – because it needs the development of personal intellectual and spiritual qualities. These are not delivered through online zoom sessions but only by close interpersonal interactions between student and teacher.

⁴ Famous Soviet and Russian filmmaker.

⁵ Mark 8:17.

⁶ See: Глава Совбеза призвал вернуть советский опыт образования. Что не так с нынешней системой? // Накануне.ру. 2022. 31 мая. URL: <https://www.nakanune.ru/articles/118751/>.

One of my strongest impressions living here is the film culture of the Soviet era, notably Lenfilm and Mosfilm. Hollywood compares unfavourably. With a few notable exceptions, our films are richer in the depiction of human interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal strengths are a bed-rock of our society, and we must capitalise on them.

Educational Funding

O. N. Smolin¹ reveals some uncomfortable news in the article referred to above. Have we really slipped down the UNESCO and World Bank league table of education funding as a percentage of GDP from 98th to 120th out of 193? In Soviet times, education spending was 7% of GDP. Current data is hard to come by, but in the recent words of the OECD:

*“The Russian Federation was among the ten OECD countries that spent the lowest proportion of GDP on primary to tertiary educational institutions. In 2018, the Russian Federation spent 3.4% of GDP on educational institutions, which is 1.5 percentage points lower than the OECD average.”*²

In my view, the amount of money available to education is a matter for the Security Council, and I think we should all support the Secretary who is highlighting the dangers of a population poorly equipped intellectually to undertake all necessary tasks required of them. Moves to reverse this, and improve the population bring another Soviet achievement to mind,

Electrification

The re-emergence of central strategic economic planning³ brings a return to Soviet thinking that the economy and its sectors can be positively controlled for societal benefit. This idea was often ridiculed in the West, notably the so called “Five Year Plans,” born as it was of communist ideology, something unacceptable.

Yet the idea of central planning was exactly mirrored in their economic recovery plans, such as the 1948 American Marshall Plan (aka the European Recovery Plan). At its end, there was a significant increase in European agricultural and industrial production, and as a significant improvement in the balance of trade and related “dollar gap.” Proof that central planning can work. The Plan was oiled by \$15 billion USD of financial (and no doubt ideological) contribution (simultaneously with the Vandenberg Resolution noted above enabling the commitment to American military intervention in Europe). There is no such thing as a free lunch, and with this Plan there was undoubtedly significant ideological penetration with values from abroad into places where hitherto they did not exist. And which expanded increasingly eastwards.

Any study of central planning must start with Lenin’s “Electrification of the Soviet Union” programme. Delegates here will be familiar with GOELRO,⁴ the first Soviet plan for national economic recovery and development. There is a well-known statement from these times that “Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the country.”

¹ First Deputy Chairman of the Education Committee of the State Duma.

² Russian Federation // OECD ilibrary : [website]. URL: <https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/7659c2a2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/7659c2a2-en> (last accessed: 3 May 2022).

³ Федеральный закон от 28 июня 2014 г. № 172-ФЗ «О стратегическом планировании в Российской Федерации» // КонсультантПлюс : [сайт]. URL: http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_164841/.

⁴ GOELRO – State Commission for the Electrification of Russia.

Re-Electrification

We surely do not want unnecessary confrontation, but we can no longer be seduced by illusions of democracy and liberalism. Nor should we accept living in a space (both physical and intellectually) with boundaries (both geopolitical and cultural) that become increasingly threatened year on year.

From these threads above, I derive my opinion that we need a “Re-Electrification” of society, using education reforms to create the essential tool needed for the “active life position” to reestablish a balance between our way of life and that of the West. In particular, I would like to see a return to the Soviet education system, with a refocusing onto dialectical training to challenge and repel that which exists outside our borders that is unacceptable to us. Those whom I meet who came through this Soviet system are cultured, intelligent, questioning and capable. But what do I mean by dialectical training?

Dialectical training

Dialectics is substantially more than mere debate. At its heart is a discourse between two parties who hold different viewpoints about a topic, where both wish to discern the truth through reasoned logical argument. It requires openness of mind mutual respect, and inquisitiveness. Unlike debate – beloved in the west as a symbol of democracy – it excludes subjective matters, such as emotions or rhetoric. There is a mutual wish to discern the truth – not simply force acceptance of one party’s position upon the other. Currently, the imposition of unilateral (and illegal) sanctions⁵ shows a clear wish to impose a view, not engage in a dialectical discourse.

In my own sphere, the use of dialectical methods is found in international moot court law competitions. These involve a case, with legal issues to be researched and argued in writing and orally. Students do this for both Claimant and Respondent on the same facts – and must defend, with deep legal reasoning, their points of view. These are done in the student’s free time, and payment for the teacher – if at all – ignores the amount of time invested to support students. Nonetheless, Russian teams regularly do very well. My own university and faculty under our Director Y. A. Alimova has recorded two first places in the international Jessup Russian rounds in the last five years, and twice a placement in the top 16 (out of 540) in the international Willem Vis competition. Both are English language moots. The faculty also has other significant placements and wins in Russian moots. These competitions are fiercely competitive and intellectually rigorous.

Languages

Should be studying foreign languages as part of education in Russia? We must be equipped to take our battles abroad in the language of our opposing teams. It should be noted that our Foreign Minister speaks English fluently, and our President speaks fluent German. In the sphere of high political global interactions, our leaders and those who support them clearly understand the thinking behind the well-known quotation:

⁵ Many of the sanctions measures involve new laws that make certain things illegal, that were once legal – such as ownership of property and other assets. The new laws are then used to justify theft of State and individual property. The jurisprudence of retrospective laws and their illegality is well known. We hear that legal actions by Russia against these sanctions are already in progress (see for example: Медведев заявил, что Россия подаст в суды из-за санкций // Коммерсантъ. 2022. 6 апр. URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5294610>).

*"If you talk to a man in a language he understands, that goes to his head. If you talk to him in his own language, that goes to his heart."*¹

For young lawyers, the new reality is pregnant with opportunity. We must be able to challenge illegal actions taken against us, abroad and in the language of the oppressors. In particular, the field of State Investment Arbitration is an important one, made more so by actions being taken by hostile States against investors which may be the Russian state, or a Russian entity. There is an international moot competition on this topic, the Frankfurt State Investment

Competition² that will help prepare students to a dialectic ability in this field.

Conclusions

We must reelectrify our society with rich interpersonal Soviet era type education, with an emphasis of developing effective dialectics. Some fields, such as law need this as a core skill. Other fields need it to support and develop citizens to a level of intellectual ability to meet the tasks demanded of them – including defending our way of life whenever called upon to do so.

Al. A. Gromyko³

EUROPEAN CULTURE – A ROAD OF SORROWS

An adult European 30–40 years ago and now are people from different realities. However, not much has changed in the history books over this time, considering the history of Europe until the second half of the twentieth century. School textbooks in the countries "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" are essentially the products of the same framework cultural matrix, perhaps the most diverse and controversial in the world. Culture is one facet of "long history" – the history of structures that change extremely slowly. Human behavior and perception of the world have never kept up with the pace of technological development. This is especially true about identity of every nation and individual, including the cultural environment in which we are embedded from childhood and which pervades us. This environment is vastly differentiated in terms of culture: high and low, elitist and popular, refined and consumerist, local and global.

Culture reflects the course of history and shapes it in many ways. In the 1980s, Europe was still a postwar phenomenon, a part of the world not only divided by the bipolar epoch, but also shaped by the Great Victory of 1945. However, Europe was already deeply involved economically and technologically in the transition from industri-

al to post-industrial society, from modern to postmodern era, and in culture as well. In 1980, Alvin Toffler's "The Third Wave," a futurology classic about the post-industrial world, was published.⁴ Yet the real watershed was between the 1980s and 1990s, when after the end of the Cold War and passing of the Soviet Union, the world began to turn global in terms of trade, market relations, finance, politics, and, last but not least, culture.

The words of E. Husserl pronounced in 1935 apply to all of the Greater Europe: "No matter how hostile the European nations may be to one another, they still have an inner kinship of spirit that pervades them all and transcends national differences."⁵ The Europeans – heirs to Greek-Roman and Christian civilizations – were raised, both before and after 1945, on the classical examples and works of the Renaissance and Enlightenment, the literature, poetry, painting and architecture of the New Age – the "golden era" for Russia of the 19th century. Perhaps the century before last was the peak of European culture, at least in its "high" form. Then European humanism was nearly trampled and destroyed by two world wars. The bipolar world has largely, but not completely politicized European culture.

The end of the Cold War between the 1980s and 1990s smoothed out some of the contradictions within the Old World – inter alia, due to the de-ideologization of culture. One of the symbols of the new era was the return of writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the new Russia in 1994 – 20 years after he was banished from the Soviet Union. Solzhenitsyn pondered on the renewed union of the three Slavic republics – Russia, Belarus, Ukraine – and Kazakhstan.⁶ Another iconic figure banished from the USSR for anti-Soviet views was philosopher Alexander Zinoviev. From 1978 to 1999, he lived in Munich. In many ways following Solzhenitsyn's, the trajectory of his views evolved from Westernism to Slavophilism.

After dismantling of the Iron Curtain, new cultural rifts, even if at a different level, could not be avoided over time. In confirmation of the diagnosis of its perpetual internal contradictions, Europe became the ground for the new di-

¹ President Nelson Mandela.

² I have taught this subject at Masters level to both Russian and international students. The field is complex – the standard textbook runs to over 1200 pages. I am thinking of taking a group of students through this competition in 2022–2023, a competition that we have never yet entered so far. But it is a field that our young students will benefit from being capable within.

³ Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS. Author of more than 250 scientific publications, including monographs: "Political Reformism in Britain. 1970–1990s," "Modernization of the British Party System," "Images of Russia and Britain: Reality and Prejudice," "Building Good Neighbor Relationship. Russia in the Space of Europe" (co-authored), "Better Ten Years of Negotiations Than One Day of War. Memories of Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko" (author and compiler), "Europe in the 21st Century: New Challenges and Risks" (editor and co-author), "Concerning Topical Issues. Europe and the Modern World" etc. Editor-in-Chief of "Contemporary Europe" journal, Editor-in-Chief of "Social Sciences and Modernity" journal. President of the Association of European Studies of Russia. Chairman of A.A. Gromyko Association for Foreign Policy Studies. Member of the bureau of the Department of Global Problems and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Member of the Scientific Council under the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russian International Affairs Council. Head of the Department of History and Theory of International Relations at N.I. Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod. Honorary Doctor of Paisii Hilendarski University of Plovdiv, Varna Free University "Chernorizets Hrabar" (Bulgaria), and Voronezh State University. Recipient of the Prize of the Foundation for the Promotion of National Science (2004, 2006).

⁴ Toffler A. The Third Wave. N. Y. : William Morrow, 1980.

⁵ Гуссерль Э. Кризис европейского человечества и философия // Культурология. XX век : антология. М., 1995. С. 302.

⁶ Солженицын А. И. Как нам обустроить Россию? // Комсомольская правда. 1990. 18 сент. № 213–214. С. 1. URL: http://www.solzhenitsyn.ru/proizvedeniya/publizistika/stati_i_rechi/v_izgnanii/kak_nam_obustroit_rossiyu.pdf?ysclid=137jbz6mj7.

viding lines, and Western Europeans have engaged in new social and cultural engineering. The European Economic Community and later the European Union represented the narrative of the new Europe, with the boundaries equated with the borders of an integration project centered in Brussels. The civilizational boundaries of the Old World have historically been fluid – they have narrowed and widened, but generally absorbed more and more land over time.

But before the 1990s, there had never been an attempt to mark the borders of Europe with the external contour of a postmodern regional integration association, instead of the civilizational, historical, political, social and cultural space of the former European metropolitan cities. In other words – first to confine the European space to the EU territory, and then to expand “Europe” based on the constructed and formally legalized EU rules. In the meantime, Russia resumed the long-standing historiosophic dispute in which Russia and the West were confronted.

The unique period of the 1980s in the Old World history was followed by a period of illusions and then disappointments, including those of epic proportions such as the Great Recession or the pandemic. Many of the pillars of the modern European culture began to transpire in the 1980s. It is not by chance that in 1981, Jean Baudrillard published his famous work “Simulacra and Simulations,”¹ especially memorable for one of its signature theses: “We live in a world where there is more and more information, and less and less meaning.”

In recent decades, in the Western part of the Old World there have been attempts to give new meanings to European culture. One of these was the concept of “new Middle Ages,” developed and popularized by Umberto Eco, inter alia, in “The Middle Ages Have Already Begun” (1993).² In this work he argued with Roberto Vacca’s earlier anti-utopia, “The Near-Medieval Future”³ (1971), in which the author predicted a retreat of the modern technological age into a bleak past.⁴ Eco himself was more optimistic and saw the modernity as a “continuous period of transition,” where, as in the Middle Ages, the goal was not to conserve the past, but to bring the conflict between the old and the new under control and create a mechanism for adaptation. These reflections by Eco are consonant with ideas found in the works of other scholars dedicated to various aspects of risk. So, in 1986, Ulrich Beck’s textbook “Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity” was published. The phenomenon of risk was studied by Anthony Giddens in his works on late modernity.⁵

The last decades are experienced by the Europeans as the medieval theme of fear, even with the expectation of the end of the world – at least the world as we know it. Such feelings were whimsically intertwined with periods of euphoria. But the new spiritual upswing always ended with the return of pessimistic sentiments. In the 1980s, Europe feared World War III between the USSR and the

United States because of the deployment of nuclear missiles on both sides of the Iron Curtain. In 1986, a man-made disaster struck at Chernobyl. The euphoria in the end of the Cold War has been replaced by a cold shower of conflicts in the former Soviet Union, the Yugoslav wars and the struggle to preserve the territorial integrity of Russia itself. The illusions of perestroika were overshadowed by the dramas and tragedies of millions of people who found themselves “on the wrong side” of the border after the USSR collapsed.

At the turn of the millennium, expectations of a “happy end of history” were replaced by gloomy predictions of a “clash of civilizations.” The approaching magic number “2000” in the calendar was associated by some with the Last Judgement, by others with the “computer apocalypse.” The new millennium had just begun when the problem of international terrorism rose from the Russian to a new level after 9/11. The project of the so-called global caliphate of ISIS was aimed at the destruction of European culture and its physical extermination. In 2008–2009, Europe was shaken by the Great Recession, and in 2020 by the COVID-19 pandemic.

Hyper-liberalism phenomena began to multiply, such as the demand in a number of European countries to remove symbols of faith from public places and human clothing. Thus, from the point of view of conservative social thought and common sense, Europe was depriving itself of its cultural roots and cultural immunity, becoming vulnerable to the expansion of other cultures, including the fundamentalist part of Islamic culture. The value system of a modern European citizen increasingly represented a deformed, unbalanced set of ideas, where liberalism in its classical form gave way to neoliberalism, to the detriment of conservative and collectivist traditions of public thought and consciousness.⁶

Since the 1990s, European culture and identity have been challenged by unprecedented migration. After the collapse of the USSR, several dozens of millions of former Soviet citizens found themselves in the new states, where they became a national minority. More than 20 million Russians were particularly affected. At the same time, paradoxically, the new Russia, whose borders moved eastward, became ethnically more European than the Soviet Union, since the proportion of Russians whose worldview was based on European culture drastically increased in the country (up to 80%).

The critique of Enlightenment ideas, of which Nietzsche’s superman and the mass consumer society were a byproduct in the twentieth century, is echoed in many contemporary literary works, such as Patrick Suskind’s “Perfume” (1985).⁷ William Golding’s novel “Lord of the Flies,” which later became a cult, appeared in 1954, but the writer received the Nobel Prize for his work in the fateful eighties (1983).⁸ Its point is not to praise the man – the book is not about Prometheus or Icarus – but to describe the man’s fall.

The category of empire was another vector of reflection on Europe’s modern identity. The new literature dedicated

¹ Baudrillard J. Simulacres et simulation. P. : Galilée, 1981 ; *Бодрийяр Ж. Симулякры и симуляции*. М. : Издат. дом «Постум», 2015.

² Эко У. Средние века уже начались // *Иностранная литература*. 1994. № 4. С. 258–267.

³ Vacca R. Il medioevo prossimo venturo. Milano : Mondadori Saggi, 1971.

⁴ Long before the European intellectuals of recent decades, Nikolai Berdyaev wrote about the “new Middle Ages” in his work “New Middle Ages” (1924). Berdyaev compared his time to the period of late Antiquity.

⁵ Giddens A. The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990 ; *Idem. Modernity and Self-Identity. Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991.

⁶ Громыко Ал. А. Метаморфозы политического неолиберализма // *Современная Европа*. 2020. № 2. С. 6–19.

⁷ Suskind P. Das Parfum. Die Geschichte eines Mörders. Zürich : Diogenes, 1985 ; *Зюскинд П. Парфюмер. История одного убийства*. М. : Азбука, 2016.

⁸ Golding W. The Lord of the Flies. L. : Faber and Faber, 1954 ; *Голдинг У. Повелитель мух // Вокруг света*. 1969. № 7–11.

to the European Union as an empire has appeared, encompassing such cultural elements as identity and values.¹ Notably, based on historical experience, empires have sought to continually expand both inward and outward. When they lost the ability to do so, or when expansion led to overstretching, the process of (self) destruction began. Similarly, the phenomenon of “enlargement fatigue” in the European Union has marked the limits of the EU as an empire, even if recognized as one with the noble, “neo-medieval” character. In fact, the history of the past twenty years has shown that expansionism of the EU has followed a hard path, with “soft power” increasingly receding into the background of its foreign policy toolbox, giving way to outright coercion and militarization. But such is the fate of imperial thinking, no matter how well-intentioned slogans might be used to cover it up.

Contemporary European culture appears as the intertwining and layering of old and new, premodern, modern and postmodern. The attitude of “Bread and circus!” has migrated from the depth of history to the contemporary Europe, and turned into hypertrophied mass consumption. Back in the 1920s, thinkers of the Frankfurt School (T. Adorno, M. Horkheimer, H. Marcuse and others) were discussing the pitfalls of massification and standardization of culture. The great folk culture, which gave birth to the tradition of laughter, amusement, and carnival hundreds of years ago in Europe, has nearly degenerated in the era of postmodernity. After the collapse of the socialist camp, the culture industry flooded the post-Soviet space.

Christian humanism gave way to the “universal” humanism as European society’s religious feelings faded; the values underwent unification in the spirit of “end of history” that was somewhat akin to the end-of-the-world expectations inherent in religious thinking. Just as people used to go to church en masse, they sat down en masse in front of

the television pop art, another powerful instrument of moral and aesthetic degradation. The postmodernist wave of mass culture in the form of pop culture marked a setback in the cultural development. There was a movement backward from science to religion and then to magic.

At the same time, technology continued to advance, leaving increasingly less time to be conscious of the reality. As a result, the theme of the man-machine confrontation regained popularity. In cinema, its vivid embodiments were blockbusters about ruthless Terminator robots. COVID-19 also brought about a new kind of Luddism – a “rebellion of people against machines”: in 2020, modern Luddites in Europe were destroying mobile 5G network towers in fear of a pandemic. It also signified the shift in European mass consciousness from consumer culture to post-materialism, manifesting in the ideology of European environmentalists and “greens.”

* * *

In recent decades, Europe and European culture have been deeply immersed in the reality of postmodernism and its new offshoots – post-post-modernism, trans- and post-humanism. The humanistic foundations of New and Contemporary European civilization, rooted in Antiquity and Christianity, are now juxtaposed with modern mass culture and “digital” society, with all their bright and dark sides.

Whether the European cultural space will continue to experience fragmentation, politization, and, to a large extent, degradation, is an open question. Can classical culture continue to serve as its “cementing mortar”? Is it possible to harmonize national traditions with a “digital” world full of conflicts? It seems that the colossal cultural heritage of Europe still has the margin of safety to resist the bad taste, simplification, clip mentality, and deconstruction of high and folk culture.

A. A. Guseynov²

WHAT’S NEW IN THE “NEW ETHICS”?³

The word (definition) of *new* in ethics, as in other areas of life, is applied to changes of various scale, including epochal shifts in the way of human existence. New was the ethics of Jesus Christ, of the New Testament which united people of different tribes in the face of one God. New was the democratic ethics of the New Age, which equated diffe-

rent social strata as citizens of the same republic. New was the communist ethics, which was supposed to unite all people into one brotherhood. Is there anything like that in the phenomenon that is termed “new ethics” today?

I

The “new ethics” as a term in its current meaning is a very recent development. To the best of my knowledge, its history has not yet been thoroughly traced. In the United States, the “new ethic” refers to the moralistic turn of the public consciousness that seeks to expel colonialism, racism, sexism, and other forms of imperialism from humanitarian knowledge and generally accepted values⁴. Certain domes-

¹ See, for example: Zielonka J. *Europe as Empire: the Nature of the Enlarged European Union*. Oxford : Oxford Univ. Press, 2006 ; Тэвдой-Булмули А. И. Европейский союз как имперский конструкт. К вопросу о применимости понятия // Международные процессы. 2019. № 2. С. 91–100.

² Director of the Institute of Philosophy of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of more than 500 scientific publications, including books: “Ethics and Culture,” “Philosophy – Thought and Action,” “Antique Ethics, The Golden Rule of Morality,” “Great Prophets and Thinkers. Moral Teachings from Moses to Our Days,” “Culturalism by Dmitry Likhachov” (co-authored), etc. Editor-in-Chief of the journals “Ethical Thought,” “Social Sciences,” member of the editorial boards of the journals *Bulletin of the RAN*, *Philosophical Journal*, “Issues of Philosophy,” and “Philosophical Sciences.” Vice-President of the Russian Philosophical Society. Recipient of the State Prize of the Russian Federation in Science and Technology. Honorary Doctor of SPbUHS.

³ The report is based on the paper: Гусейнов А. А. Что нового в новой этике // Ведомости прикладной этики. 2021. Вып. 58. С. 91–106.

⁴ According to the Russian-American researcher V. I. Rossman, “Instead of classical problems, the humanities have focused on ‘micro-narratives’, problems of minorities, and the ‘new ethics.’ There was a certain ‘moralistic’ turn in the humanities that was closely linked to a critique of imperialism, colonialism, sexism, racism, and other social ills. Largely legitimate, this critique has nevertheless been unbalanced and has led to the degeneration of the humanities into grievances studies, a caricatured version of science of grievances and victims of history. At any rate, the victimhood agenda has become the most prominent in the public debate” [9].

tic authors believe that the term was coined in Russia, is limited to the Russian-speaking space, and expresses a Russian view of the radical moral processes taking place in the West [7]. This term received an additional impetus and became a meme after film and theatre director K. Bogomolov's paper "The Abduction of Europe 2.0" [2].¹ In any case, the "new ethics" does not refer to the changes in our domestic moral ideas and social habits, although they have been quite significant in recent decades (e.g. with regard to labor, consumerism, sexual relations, etc.), but to the bold processes in the moral (ethical) practices of Western countries, unusual from the traditional point of view.

The term "new ethics" is used with different value connotations: for some it denotes a certain vector of social processes in the Western world; for some it is a step forward on the uplifting journey of liberalism; for some it is a dangerous boundary, a red line of sorts, which denotes the collapse, the crash of thousands of years of moral foundations of the modern civilization and, above all, is a mortal threat to us, our people, country, and way of life. The latter point of view, specifically that of radical critique, is the most interesting and insightful for understanding whether the discussion concerns the new ethics in the aforementioned epochal sense, i.e. a different understanding of the ethical foundations of our social existence.

In fact, we are talking about a change in the morals that is expressly manifested in broad social movements for postcolonial clearing of the humanities, against discrimination of women (Me Too), against racism (Black Lives Matter, BLM), and for an open gender identity. These processes have been going on in the Western countries, especially in the United States and Great Britain, for a relatively long time (two or three decades). They have affected a wide range of problems of public consciousness, and have become a significant and, most importantly, morally prevailing social and political force. In Russia they have become widespread in the last two or three years and affect certain aspects of human relations (harassment, political correctness, gender identity); they are largely perceived as someone else's problems and the public response is mostly negative. Let me emphasize: those who call this a new ethic and reject it precisely as such, as being completely unacceptable (personally, historically, in terms of religious and national aspects), are outraged not by the movements themselves, but by their claims for exclusivity. The problem with the "new ethics" is that it claims to be the new moral truth.

A woman who, 20 years post-factum, recalls her boss wanting to have lunch with her or lustfully touching her knees under the table, is not just reminiscing and sorting out her soul; she is seeking sympathy, support, compassion and justice; her opinion in this case should not be questioned, just as the possibly sincere opinion of the alleged abuser that he had no bad intentions or even has no memories of the episode, should not be taken into account: she and he in this context do not appear as personalities, but as mouthpieces of unequal (masculine) relations between the sexes.

¹ "The modern West appears as a criminal that has been chemically castrated and lobotomized. Hence the stiff fake smile of benevolence and unconditional acceptance on the face of the Western man. This is not the smile of Culture. This is the smile of degeneration... The modern Western world is shaping up into a New Ethical Reich with its own ideology, the 'new ethics'." [1].

A homosexual couple is not content with being left alone; they demand social recognition, and not only legal rights, but also moral validation to be treated in the same way as a different-sex union. People who experiment with their gender identity expect the same morally compassionate attitude from the society.

The BLM movement's proponent is not content with condemnation of racism in the United States; he or she wants every white person to feel and publicly admit to being a racist; so that oppressors (even if they were "good" masters) were not honored as morally worthy heroes; so that statues and other memorials are not dedicated to the so-called prominent slave-owning men. The logic behind the movement itself is that racism as a morally unacceptable (or rather: totally unacceptable) phenomenon cannot have any historical, psychological, economic, or other justifying reasons, and that only the members of discriminated races ("people of color") have the right to judge it and voice out their right.

The Russian (Russian-speaking) public space and media have just started a focused discussion of the "new ethics." Still, the generally accepted (or at least prevailing) expressly negative attitude toward it is quite established. The society has already formulated the most important objections to it, reflective of the qualitative features of this social phenomenon and at the same time designed to become a mental boundary separating it from the system of the so-called traditional Russian values. In my opinion, they boil down to the following questions: "Why can't I tell a person who is behaving badly that he is behaving badly?"; "Why, if I think a person is behaving badly, it is not enough for him that I do not judge him, but he wants me to think he is behaving well?"; "Why should I feel guilty about something I personally have no part in and that was not my intention at all?"

These three *whys* are by no means far-fetched; they are actually structuring the public consciousness of the majority of Russians and occur in their everyday communicative experience. These questions do not simply dwell on the external changes in morals brought about by the aforementioned Western movements, but uncover their underlying value base, the very ethical construct of relations between people in the society. We are actually witnessing a new turn in ethics.

II

"Why can't I tell a person who is behaving badly that he is behaving badly?" This question, which I borrowed from the public texts of a famous journalist, writer, and public figure, is remarkable for its fundamental obviousness. It seems to be imprinted in the image of morality that dominates everyday consciousness as the knowledge of what one ought to do. In fact, why can't I say about something that exists that it actually exists, that two times two equals four, etc.? The answer is quite simple: you can if you really know.

But do you know what is good and bad in terms of behavior, especially moral behavior? When you say of someone that he has done wrong, the question arises what it is that you are condemning: the act itself, its content, or the fact of an act, the act of a particular person. When it comes to the content of an act (word, action, look, life, etc.), whatever it is, it is amenable for objective (scientific) evaluation (description, measurement, weighing, etc.). But when

it comes to the fact of the act, or the individual who committed the act, then how can you or anyone else evaluate it, because it was he who committed it, it was his act, and he, by committing it, by the very fact assumed all responsibility for it, all its consequences, including, by the way, your (our) moralizing evaluation?

The act can be bad, it is not a rare occurrence. But can a man be bad? If yes, than who can tell? And why exactly am I, someone else, third, tenth, and so on, or even all together, entitled to do it – to competently judge it? Is there any knowledge that makes it possible to separate the good people from the bad people, and if so, who has it and what school teaches it?

Mikhail Bakhtin teaches that in the philosophy of an act as an attitude of a living individual to the world (culture), we should distinguish between the subject-based content of an act (or action itself in the narrow sense), which is an element of the world, and the fact of act, reflective of the living individual who stands behind it [3]. But this distinction is not intended for maintaining the academic accuracy and separating one aspect from another without lumping them together. In fact, it is impossible to separate these sides (aspects) of the act. An act *cannot be separated from the one who commits it*: an act, good or bad, whatever it may be, is committed under a name, is someone's act; an act in itself, without the individual who performed it, does not exist and cannot be described in its factuality. At the same time, the individual also cannot be separated from the act: the individual without the act, without doing something, whatever it may be, is not a living individual, he simply does not exist, is an empty space, zero; to be is to act. As M. M. Bakhtin summarized this fundamental property of human existence, an individual has no alibi in being. Distinguishing between these two sides (two aspects) of the act, namely its subjective origin and its empirical (objective) manifestation, the fact of the act and its subject-based content, is necessary in order to understand the act as a whole, to make its ends meet and understand its internal structure.

It is possible to connect these diverse sides of an act (which, precisely because of this diversity, create the balance in its structure), only if one moves from the fact of the act to its content, and not vice versa. The fact of the act is given to us in its uniqueness, as this one act (a look, a thought, a deed, a joke, a journey, a book, a suffering, a life – whatever it is), whose uniqueness we cannot express except that it is produced by a concrete living individual, who is all merged, included, embodied, remained in the act, and of which we can say nothing beyond the act itself, without naming it, by naming the one who it belonged to, just as we exhibit a shirt in a museum with a caption that it was worn by this famous person, or keep a night cap of a distant ancestor in the house as an extraordinary treasure.

In aesthetic terms, we cannot say anything about the author of an act or acts, except for what is given (fixed, embodied, imprinted) in the acts themselves, which we can describe, prove, analyze, etc. It follows that we can evaluate the acts every time on the basis of their concrete content and the criteria that correspond to them, each time well-defined and verifiable, and determine more or less accurately whether this or that act is bad or good. For this we have our own, more or less accurate but always specific criteria, which are determined by the nature (matter, substance) of

the act itself. But about the living, concrete individual who the act belongs to, we cannot say anything beyond (apart from) the act, because there is no gap between him and the fact of the act. The only way to stay grounded on the facts and be objective is to judge (evaluate) the acts, but not the person who has committed them, recognizing that the latter has a profoundly mysterious, primordial and inescapable capacity to act (the imperative), a capacity which philosophy struggles to determine, giving it various names (freedom, freedom of will, arbitrariness, autonomy of the spirit, moral autonomy, etc.). It is important for us to emphasize that it is understood, both in everyday speech and in theoretical experience, as moral force: notwithstanding the debate between various philosophical doctrines, they all agree on the point that morality (moral force) is the initial beginning of man, a human semantic nerve or sorts, responsible for his active existence.

This idea, according to which good and bad can apply to acts but not the people committing them, will become clearer and more familiar if, instead of “good” and “bad,” we use the concepts of “virtue” and “vice” that are adequate for evaluating human behavior. The alpha and omega of moral judgment is to judge vicious deeds but not vicious people; villainy but not villains. Ethics has been based on this postulate ever since the theory discovered ethics itself as a space of human freedom, and social consciousness, in the form of the Sermon on the Mount, solidified it as a normative practice.

When we characterize an act as vicious, we proceed from the fact that it was a free act of an individual (person) who might have as well not committed it. Otherwise, we could not consider it (the act) vicious. This is why, although we associate the individual with this vicious act because it is his act, we do not identify the person with it, thereby preserving for the individual the very possibility of acting freely.

Therefore, the elementary requirements of logic prohibit extending moral evaluation beyond the actual limits of human acts to the very individuals who commit (perform) them, for then the latter would be deprived of the very possibility of committing them. After all, moral evaluation is a view of the reality through the prism of vice and virtue, the very possibility of choosing between them. This choice, of course, is not ethically neutral; vice and virtue are not equal in the face of the moral subject; it represents only the first step that the individual takes as a moral subject, the first ramification in his or her life journey.

Basically, the choice between vice and virtue is the first choice on the path of virtue, in the pursuit of virtue. Either a man possesses the freedom to choose between vice and virtue, and then he himself cannot initially (substantially, by nature, by design) be either virtuous or vicious, he can only want (desire, strive, have the opportunity) to be virtuous, not vicious. Or he himself (initially) is vicious or virtuous, and then he has no choice between vice and virtue.

The first and most general definition of virtue and vice as moral concepts is that the first is what we aspire to and the second is what we avoid. Therefore, if virtuous acts can still be viewed with some (most likely negligible) probability as an expression of the virtuous essence of those who commit them, then in the case of vicious acts, there are no grounds for such a transfer of the quality of the act to the qualities of its author.

Apart from the logical considerations, there is a sociological reason that prevents the transfer of moral evaluations from acts to their authors. In morality, individuals follow only those requirements which they themselves consider moral, that is, they act on their own behalf. This means the autonomy of morality in its sociological expression. Or, to express the same thought in another form, there are no special persons in the society who have a justified and universally recognized right to speak on behalf of morality, to determine what is virtue and what is vice, and to rank people according to the moral criteria.

Socrates said that there are teachers of mathematics, music, and gymnastics, but no teachers of virtue. They do not exist because virtue cannot be internalized from the outside. Each (without exception!) activity has generally recognized experts, professionals, teachers of sorts, who are in some way authorized by the society in this capacity. Morality has no such persons. It appears to be the only domain that lacks them. Ethical (moral) standards exist, but there is no authority behind them; no authorized representative.

Every person is believed to be their authority and representative. Moral accountability is a way of being of the acting individuals themselves: whatever they do, they do what they must, as no one else can act instead of them; and no one, acting on their own behalf, can do anything else but what they must. Just like the living individual cannot transfer to another the ability and capacity to be alive, he cannot delegate another the moral accountability for everything he does. And it is indeed the accountability for everything, as there are no acts that are specifically moral; but all acts, their very being as acts, constitute a subject of moral accountability; here it is not even necessary to specify that we mean acts committed in sound mind, since the very fact of moral accountability is the first and indisputable criterion of the same.

Concerning BLM movement that was born in the United States out of anger over the death of a 46-year-old African-American George Floyd from the hand of a police officer in Minneapolis, our mass media commented that there was a contrast between the grandeur of the honors (gold casket, the abundance of officials, the elaborately solemn funeral ceremony) accorded to the deceased as if he were a national hero, and the dubiousness of the cases that marked his biography (five prison terms, the last one five years to 2019 for armed robbery; on the day of his fateful death he was stopped because he was suspected of having paid in a store with a counterfeit bill of money).

The commentators have compared and measured the value of George Floyd's life and personal dignity, which were trampled upon by the grossly disproportionate actions of the police, as subsequently proven in court, against the value of the acts he committed, as if the former depended on the latter. Meanwhile, the excessive, even caricatured, celebration of this very man in the bleakness and even insignificance of his biography emphasizes with particular force the unconditional value of the life and dignity of each individual, and the BLM movement that reinforces this truth raises it to the level of a paramount political force.

The question is more complicated when it comes to the so-called eminent persons whose deeds are considered progressive by historical standards, but who were ethically toxic as individuals, both in fact and in conviction, e.g. were slave owners, such as one of the forefathers of the United

States Constitution and the first popularly elected president, George Washington. It is logical to assume that human morality, since it has no sources other than freedom, is not influenced by the epoch, or at least cannot be seen otherwise, cannot but be conceived of as the absolute law of reasonable life.

If on the basis of vicious acts one cannot infer a negative assessment of the moral dignity of the one who committed them, and George Floyd's criminal acts did not prevent his honoring as a person, then likewise, public merits cannot be the basis for the moral elevation of the one to whom they belong, and George Washington's public achievements cannot cancel out his personal disgrace as a slaveholder. By asserting this truth in the framework of an openly stated political position, BLM supporters are undoubtedly raising public morality to a new level. They proceed from the belief that moral offenses have no statute of limitations. This also applies to the history of a society whose foundations were based on moral crimes, for it bears their inevitable and profound traces: in particular, the tradition of erecting monuments to statesmen in spite of such crimes.

The same is true for the history of individuals, as evidenced by sensational and highly publicized cases of harassment that occurred long ago (sometimes 20–30 years earlier) and in such random forms (such as flirting without consequences) that the accused have forgotten about them. Moral trauma leaves an indelible mark on the victim's soul, just as a person's body bears the mark left by a knife or bullet. And one shouldn't be under the illusion that this only applies to certain sensitive or courageous people who dare speak about it. The point is that it is not a mental trauma, but a moral one: it touches the very nerve of life.

III

“Why, if I think a person is behaving badly, it is not enough for him that I do not judge him, but he wants me to think he is behaving well?” The answer to this seemingly natural perplexity has to do with what we understand by tolerance and how we see its role in the human society. Tolerance literally means patience – it is one word, but from an ethical perspective it has at least two significantly different meanings.

In the first approximation, in the most common and everyday use of this term, patience is understood as a special, i.e. a softer, condescending, less aggressive form of moral judgment toward a person who has committed an unworthy act. As such, it is a moral psychological quality of the individual, a property of temperament or character. It expresses an attitude toward the individual but not toward the bad act he committed; is open to forgiveness, aims to distinguish the individual from this act to a certain extent, believing that the individual is better than this act (that the latter was untypical of him, will not happen again, etc.). In this sense, patience is a form of a relationship between individuals within the same culture, the same system of values; it is not considered a positive moral quality in itself, but only insofar as it supports, strengthens the latter. There are contexts in life in which patience is perceived as a disadvantage. In such cases, the moral language contrasts it with exactingness, righteous anger, and uncompromising attitude.

In the second sense, patience is a fundamental moral virtue that was formed and historically consolidated in the

modern times as a result of the devastating religious wars of the 16th century that accompanied the formation of modern European nations and nation-states. In literature and media it is most often referred to by the borrowed Latin word “tolerance.” Tolerance arises as a recognition of the futility of military resolution of religious disputes and the human passions and interests behind them. Its first form was religious tolerance: it became the ethical and legal basis for uniting people in a single political and legal national space regardless of their religious affiliations. The *Edict of Nantes* of 1598 is considered the first legal document that sanctioned multi-faith practices, recognizing equality between Catholics and members of the Reformed religion in the rights to education, medical treatment, and public services.

Tolerance refers to such patient (non-aggressive, restrained, peaceful) relations between individuals that are practiced by them in full awareness of the fact that they hold different mutually unacceptable value positions: religious beliefs, life beliefs, and political positions. It is no longer a question of a respectful attitude toward the individual in spite of the fact that the latter commits an act that is unacceptable from the point of view of the other, but rather of a special respectful attitude, which is directed toward the individual precisely because he does something that is wrong in the opinion of the other. In the first case, we are dealing with patience as a natural inclination, and in the second – with tolerance as a quality of social relations, which is solidified as an artificial habit.

Tolerance is characterized by the fact that it excludes corrective action (criticism, discrimination, harassment) in relation to views and actions that are perceived and evaluated purely negatively by the acting subject. In short, it represents a moral form of a relationship between individuals who hold different worldviews.

Tolerance is an appropriate way of public behavior in a situation of religious, ethnic, racial, or cultural diversity of the social organism. Its historical fate has not been easy, but nevertheless the general trend has been toward an increasing expansion and deepening of the field of tolerance, extending it to gender, race, ethnic cultural and other aspects of social relations. This process continues, becoming relevant and particularly acute in connection with the intensification of intercultural contacts, expansion of migration flows, legitimization of non-traditional practices and other contemporary challenges.

Tolerance is an intrinsically contradictory practice that requires a special construction of different aspects of human consciousness, in particular the volitional (ethical-normative) and epistemological aspects. The pathos of truth in a man reaches its climax when it is related to one’s worldview choices, beliefs, and convictions. At the same time, the very idea of the absoluteness of truth obliges one to consider any of its concrete incarnations as relative. Thus, tolerance becomes an expression of the diversity of individual human paths to absolute truth and, at the same time, an ethical sanction for them. We must be tolerant because we are imperfect and capable of making mistakes. Tolerance is active recognition of each person’s right to exist responsibly and to pursue his or her own path to truth.

Tolerance is associated with yet another inner tension. It concerns the differences within its ethical normative aspect between its functioning as a political legal reality and as a moral principle.

In the political legal sphere, tolerance is aimed at ensuring the equality of civil and human rights of individuals regardless of their origin, social status, religion, political beliefs and other actual (objectified) personal characteristics, whose observance is guaranteed by the subjective basis for the unity of the political legal social organism. It is always historically specific and limited by its own legal framework, which, acting as protective barriers against intolerant behavior, constitutes its own limitations. Although modern law classifies the protection of personal liberty and dignity as an absolute right, it nevertheless authorizes derogations when it comes to social emergencies and particularly dangerous criminals. Tolerance in law retains the rank of social expediency.

Another thing is its place in morality, where it acts as an unconditional duty. Tolerance as a moral principle ultimately rests solely on the moral autonomy of the individual, because the surrounding world, society, and people may have many arguments in favor of tolerance, but such arguments can never be the sole or even the primary motivating force behind the behavior of individuals. As any moral principle, it assumes this quality to the extent that it acts as a requirement that one makes of oneself; and not just a requirement, but a prohibition against imposing one’s beliefs on others. Tolerance as a common norm that ensures the unity of a culturally diverse community can function only in the limited form of legal coercion that cuts off actions violating this norm and blocks the individuals who do not recognize it. In this sense, it suggests and incorporates an intolerant attitude toward those who are intolerant themselves. And only as a moral principle, according to which my tolerance is expressed by not imposing my life beliefs on others, it is able to unfold into a universal form. As a moral, individually binding principle, tolerance is a form of nonviolence.

To answer the question why it is not enough for supporters of various “ideological” minorities to be “endured” (not judged, not discriminated against), why they also want to be valued, to be considered valid, we can say that they do this in defense of their human dignity. For example, why supporters of LGBT communities are not content with not being prevented from cultivating their sexual gender identity as private individuals, but want to make it known publicly (demonstrate it), walk the streets with their flags, organize festivals, and so on? This is their way to extend their legal status to moral recognition: they assert, firstly, themselves as individuals who have the right to determine their own beliefs and principles of life, and secondly, their beliefs and principles as full-fledged forms of social life, valid on self-evident basis.

IV

“Why should I feel guilty about something I personally have no part in and that was not my intention at all?”

In the most general philosophical sense, the answer to this question is very simple: there are no things in the world in which you have no part. The very way of human existence in the world is a way of participating in it. This idea can be developed in various ways: I cannot help but understand and feel my involvement in what others are doing, including people completely unknown to me, even those who lived centuries before me, whoever they are and whatever atrocities they have committed; in short, whoever and whatever it is about, I cannot help feeling guilty just by the mere consideration that I belong to the same human race. As a ge-

neric being, I am involved with all individuals who belong to my – human – kin.

But even from the perspective of one's singularity and oneness, the individual cannot build a relationship with the world without taking a personal responsibility for it. After all, a man always acts toward a purpose; he cannot do anything without first stating his desire, without deciding what he must do; we are rational beings because we cannot live and act in the world without judging it, without expressing our attitude to the world; even if we are doing this in various forms and with different energies. In fact, each person creates and cannot help but create his or her own holistic image of the world, and cannot but be responsible for it. As a living individual, I am, by virtue of my conscious existence, bound to the species, inevitably centering it on myself and thus being accountable to it.

Within this philosophically sound understanding of responsibility, the claims that black America makes against white America for the slavery of the past on which the United States was nurtured, and for the racial prejudices of today, do not seem far-fetched or nonsensical. And one can understand those white people who have actively joined BLM, publicly kneeling in recognition of their historical guilt, even if they have nothing to do personally with slavery or racism. It should be emphasized, however, that only black America has the right to judge whether or not the white majority of the country (all of it, every single person) is responsible for the racism that still pervades the fabric of the society. By virtue of the same logic, only women (and not men) can bear witness to the debasement of their dignity in historical relations between the sexes.

References

1. Арутюнян, З. О домогательствах, проблемах трансгендеров, институте репутаций и радикальной непримиримости /

З. Арутюнян. – Текст : непосредственный // Новая газета. – 2020, 5 авг.

2. Богомолов, К. Похищение Европы 2.0 / К. Богомолов. – Текст : непосредственный // Новая газета. – 2021, 21 февр.

3. Гусейнов, А. А. Философия поступка как первая философия (Опыт интерпретации нравственной философии М. М. Бахтина) / А. А. Гусейнов. – Текст : непосредственный // Гусейнов А. А. Этика и культура. Статьи, заметки, выступления, интервью / научный редактор А. С. Запесоцкий. – Санкт-Петербург : СПбГУП, 2020. – С. 229–263.

4. Драгунский, Д. Печку письмами топила. О том, как «новая этика» изменила время и пространство / Д. Драгунский. – Текст : электронный // Газета. – 2020, 7 авг. – URL: <https://www.gazeta.ru/comments/column/dragunsky/13184497.shtml> (date of address: 20.05.2022).

5. Конец привычного мира. Путеводитель журнала «Нож» по новой этике, новым отношениям и новой справедливости / составители: Т. Коэн, Е. Иванова, А. Чапаев [и др.]. – Москва : Альпина нон-фикшн, 2021. – 340 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

6. Кронгауз, Е. Так вышло. 29 вопросов новой этики и морали / Е. Кронгауз, А. Бабицкий. – Москва : Альпина Паблишер, 2020. – 288 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

7. Магун, А. Откуда взялась «новая этика» и насколько она левая и тоталитарная? / А. Магун. – URL: <https://meduza.io/feature/2021/02/23/otkuda-vzyalas-novaya-etika-i-naskolko-ona-levaya-i-totalitarnaya> (date of address: 20.05.2022). – Текст : электронный.

8. Романова Т. В. Толерантность и политкорректность: аналитический обзор современного состояния проблемы (лингвистический аспект) / Т. В. Романова. – Текст : непосредственный // Политическая лингвистика. – 2015. – Т. 2, № 52. – С. 39–49.

9. Россман, В. Атланты и кариатиды: Гуманитарные науки в зиндане современного университета : рукопись / В. Россман.

10. Скидельский, Э. В новой этике действительно много тоталитарного / Э. Скидельский ; перевод И. Куна. – URL: <https://meduza.io/feature/2021/02/17/v-novoy-etike-deystvitelno-mnogo-totalitarnog> (date of address: 20.05.2022). – Текст : электронный.

11. Толерантность как культурная, политическая, лингвистическая проблема (анализ материалов СМИ и политического дискурса). – Нижний Новгород : Деком, 2017. – 304 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

A. K. Isaev¹

ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION

Our old and now new Chinese friends are known to have an ancient saying: “God forbid you live in an era of change.” The Slavic mentality is different from the Chinese mentality. “There is delight in battle, and the gloomy abyss on the edge, and in the furious ocean...,” “Blessed is he who has

visited this world in its fatal moments” are quotes from the national classics.

In the twenty-first century, Russians are having enough “bliss” and “delight.” What is happening today can be compared without exaggeration with such turning points in Russian history as the Great Unrest of the early 17th century, the invasion of Napoleon in 1812, the national catastrophe of February 1917, and even the Great Patriotic War.

Today's events really resemble the Great Patriotic War, as the so-called collective West, led by the ruling circles of the United States and Great Britain – an active participant in this duo – is waging war against Russia. The war is being waged on all fronts, including culture, and it is not just the banning of Tchaikovsky and the declaration that Pushkin and Dostoyevsky were imperialists. This is primarily “dehumanization” of Russians, creation of their demonic image. Why are they doing this? It's because a mentally well-to-do person is uncomfortable when his kin are destroyed; so the object of aggression has to be deprived of human characteristics, and then destroyed without worry or fear of redemption. This is exactly what is now being done to Russians practically all over Europe.

¹ Deputy Head of the “United Russia” party faction in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, member of the State Duma Committee on Labor, Social Policy and Veterans' Affairs, Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Candidate of Political Sciences, Professor of SPbUHS. Editor-in-Chief of the “Solidarnost” newspaper (1991–2000), Secretary of the FNPR (1995–2001), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation of III–VIII convocations (1999 – present day). Author of a number of publications on the problems of social, trade union and labor movement, including books: “Social Environment,” “Social Environment in Crisis,” “Economic Democracy – Modern Ideology of Traditional Trade Unions of Russia,” “History of Russian Trade Unions. Stages, Events, People” (co-authored), Major Changes in the Labor Legislation of Russia, and others. One of the authors of the current Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Member of the General Council of the United Russia Party. Honorary Doctor of the Russian Academy of Advocacy and Notaries. Awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland IV degree, the Order of Honor, Friendship, P. A. Stolypin Medal II degree and others. Awarded a Commendation from the President of the Russian Federation, Honorary Diplomas of the Government of the Russian Federation, the State Duma, the Federation Council of the Russian Federation, etc.

However, the war unleashed against Russia is not only about culture, but primarily about trade and economy. Actions taken to the detriment of our economy cannot be called sanctions, not even “infernal.” Generally, in world practice, the purpose of any sanctions is to force a country to do or, on the contrary, not to do something, in accordance with some legal decision. But the sanctions that have been announced and are applied against Russia do not even pursue the goal of ending a special military operation, but are aimed at total destruction of the economy. Both French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire and U.S. President Joe Biden were quite frank about this when they said that Russia should be thrown back into the 19th century.

That is, we are talking about a conscious policy aimed at humiliation, impoverishment, and ultimately the suffering and death of tens of millions of people. A “hot” war has been unleashed against Russia in Ukraine. But we are all well aware that, in fact, NATO is at war with us using the hands of the Ukrainians. NATO officers plan operations, NATO aerospace reconnaissance data and NATO weapons are used in military operations.

It is not by chance that Ukraine was chosen as a combat force directed against us. There are several prerequisites for this. The first is that the school of Zbigniew Brzezinski (and the entire modern establishment of the US Democratic Party are Brzezinski’s disciples) taught: Without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be a superpower and becomes a mediocre regional country.

The second premise is that Ukrainian nationalism is an ideal sparring partner to fight Russia, because it has unique generic features: first, its ideology is anti-Russian from the onset; second, in all periods of its short history, it has entered into alliances with those who at that time were the strongest and most dangerous enemies of Russia.

Why is Ukrainian nationalism directed primarily against Russia? If we agree with our president that Ukrainians and Russians are essentially one nation, then how do we separate one part from the other? Only by opposition; according to Dmitry Dontsov, one of the classics of Ukrainian nationalism, by “etching everything that is Russian out of the Ukrainian people.”

Here the Ukrainian nationalism classics agree with us and our president. Stepan Bandera wrote in 1950 in a paper entitled “The Ukrainian National Revolution, Not Just Resistance to the Regime”: “Our general line of liberation policy is based on the fact that the struggle for the state independence of Ukraine is a struggle against Russia, not only against Bolshevism, but against every invading Russian imperialism that is inherent in the Russian people in history and modern times.”

Bandera can be considered the “Lenin” of Ukrainian nationalism. And here are the words of its “Karl Marx” – Dmitry Dontsov: “It is not the slogan of independence that is relevant in and of itself. Our Ukrainians once dreamed of an independent Ukraine in alliance with Russia. What is relevant, more real, more concrete – more likely to be realized! – is the slogan of breaking away from Russia, of dissolving any connection with it.” For, he believed, the choice was either Ukraine or Russia.

And the fact that Ukrainian nationalists have always allied with Russia’s enemies is confirmed even at the level of symbolism. For example, there is a common belief that the modern yellow and blue national flag of Ukraine symboli-

cally depicts sprouting wheat and cloudless sky. In fact, its author is state traitor Ivan Mazepa, known for betraying Peter the Great by going over to the side of the enemy. At that time Russia’s enemy was Sweden; the flag of that state was a yellow Protestant cross on a blue background. During the Battle of Poltava, so that the Swedes could distinguish between the Ukrainian Cossacks fighting on Mazepa’s side and those who fought on the Russian side, they attached a small yellow and blue rectangle to their flag. And the red-black flag of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army is essentially the banner of the National Socialist German Workers’ Party (the only legitimate party in Nazi Germany).

So, a war is being waged against us using a variety of means, that is, a hybrid war. Its purpose is frankly articulated by our former compatriots who have fled abroad. They often argue with each other, but the two theses are constantly repeated. First: not only Putin, but also the United Russia party and all Russian people are responsible for everything that is going on, so we will have to repent for at least 70 years, just as the German people repented for Nazi crimes. In fact, this is, to put it mildly, a completely unfair comparison. Even if they really believe that the Russian military committed crimes in Bucha and fired rockets at Kramatorsk, is that comparable to Buchenwald and Auschwitz? To Holocaust, the mass genocide of the Slavs, the murder of tens of millions of people?

The second thesis is even more interesting; it can be found both in small essays and in multi-volume works, like Boris Akunin’s. In brief, the wording is something like this: the modern Russian state is a direct heir of the Golden Horde, it inherits Russian imperialism, so no matter how you put it together, it always turns out to be imperialistic. The tsarist Russia was an empire, the Soviet Russia after it, and the Russian Federation became an empire, too.

Consequently, the goal is to destroy this state so that its remnants could somehow adapt on the fringes of Europe and the America-centered world. Thus, we are faced with a quite clear challenge: either perish as a state and civilization, or win. There is simply no other option left to us by those who actually committed aggression against us.

And what does it mean to win when it comes to our confrontation with the mightiest country in the world – the United States of America and with the most powerful military political bloc, superior to Russia – NATO?

I don’t think taking hold of Washington is among our immediate plans. From my point of view, for us to win is to endure for the next few years. If Russia persists and strengthens during this period despite economic sanctions and military pressure, it will mean a failure for the United States and the entire America-centered world.

And what are the root causes of the war being waged against Russia? In my opinion, this war was largely predetermined by the contradiction between the economic and political order of the world as it emerged after World War II. The United Nations is the direct heir to the anti-Hitler coalition; within the UN, there is a Security Council whose primary mission is to maintain international peace. Five countries are permanent members of the UN Security Council, and each has the veto power. This is called the multipolar political system.

Meanwhile, in the economic world, things have turned out differently. In 1944, when the future victors were already considering how to arrange the world in the future,

Stalin demanded some of the territories, most of which we had lost by now (only the Kuril Islands and Kaliningrad remained). But Uncle Sam bought it with money – the Bretton Woods Agreement, under which the U.S. dollar became the world's reserve currency and the main means of payment – that is, in fact, was turned into an analogue of gold. This agreement had three major economic consequences.

First: all trade transactions between countries are conducted in U.S. dollars. If Honduras decides to buy bananas from neighboring Guatemala, it must first buy dollars and only then can pay for the goods. In terms of world trade, this means that for every box of matches sold, the United States receives a certain amount (say, one cent), simply for the fact that it owns the means of payment.

The second consequence is that currencies around the world are pegged to the dollar; that is, they are issued only in the amount equal to the U.S. currency available with the country. If Russia needs to increase the money stock, we can only print money to the extent of our gold and foreign exchange reserve; otherwise, inflation can increase greatly. In general, it would be more true to say “foreign exchange and gold” instead of “gold and foreign exchange” because in the reserves of all countries, gold does not exceed 20% (and most have much less); the rest is “foreign exchange,” that is, mostly dollars. In order for us to print rubles to meet the economic need of the country, we must first buy U.S. dollars. But you can only buy them by selling some real goods! That is, in exchange for a natural product (oil, gas, ores, etc.) what we get is not even cut paper, as columnists say, but zeros in electronic accounts. You can call a certain country names like the Golden Horde, but natural tribute from around the world is actually collected by the United States.

Finally, a third consequence, that is also very important. Suppose we decided to print rubles without regard to the dollar. What does this lead to? The only possible answer is hyperinflation. Just like water, money will fill the entire volume given to it, limited by the size of the national economy, and this “water” will tear the entire economy apart. Savings will collapse, working capital of enterprises will depreciate, loans will become more expensive, etc.

Is there a country in the world that does not need to peg its national currency to the dollar? Yes. It's the United States of America. Unlike other nations, the U.S. does not need to limit the amount of printed dollars to the amount of dollars it has. Therefore, the U.S. Federal Reserve System, which, as we know, is a private entity,¹ prints as many dollars as it sees fit. For example, according to experts, during the COVID-19 pandemic they stamped out up to \$4 trillion – the so-called “helicopter money,” which was generously handed out to who they wanted. If any other country did that, it would ruin its economy. But the U.S. economy is not a closed vessel, but rather a tub standing on top of other tubs. When it fills up, the “water” simply drains into other containers. Thus, by the end of the last century, the U.S. had mastered the best kind of export – the export of inflation.

The dominance of the dollar in global finance was called into question when a number of European countries established a single currency – the euro, and then Russia and China began negotiations on trade using national currencies. The U.S. does not like it very much, so in order to

¹ FRS includes 12 federal reserve banks and about 3,000 commercial banks. The form of capital ownership is joint stock.

strengthen the monopoly of the dollar and to zero out their huge national debt, they started this war. Ukrainian nationalists think they are fighting for their homeland, but in reality they are dying for another solitary goal – to strengthen the U.S. dollar. Western propagandists say that the United States is fighting for liberalism against Nazism, but in fact their ideology is described by a single word: dollar. Everything else is nothing but tools. Liberalism is good as soft power (defending minority rights, etc.), but Nazism is the weapon used for harder action. We remember that Maidan was unleashed by pro-Western “liberals,” but when force was required, Nazi units were put into action.

Victory over Russia is fundamentally important for the United States because its political history is a series of defeats. In the last 15 years they have not won a single more or less convincing victory. They promised to bring Iran to its knees, overthrow Maduro in Venezuela, Lukashenko in Belarus, and Assad in Syria – nothing worked out. Even from the little North Korea they bounced like a ball off the wall, and fled in disgrace from Afghanistan. If they lose to Russia once again in front of the whole world, it will mean the end of them. Then the dollars, bonds and other debt instruments, which are a huge system built on top of the dollar, will begin to return “home.” The U.S. economy won't be able to take it. A country where half the adult population are bloggers and lawyers, and where the real industries (excluding the defence sector) have moved to other countries, cannot exist as it did before. Therefore, if Russia survives, the collapse of the America-centered world is inevitable. No one is hiding it. Both Russia, represented by Sergey Lavrov, and the United States, through Biden, have declared that they are fighting for a new world order. That is, it is essentially a world war, and we will have to deal with very serious blows.

Here I would like to discuss the role that our political party has to play in this difficult situation. We are now seeing a very high level of national unity: the overwhelming majority of people supports Putin's decisions and the special military operation. But we understand that this is largely an emotional reaction, largely due to the sanctions imposed on Russia. People understand who challenged us and what the challenge is. There is a long struggle ahead. After the special military operation is over, one way or another, the confrontation with our real enemy will not stop. So we will need a lot of political power to bring the society together, just as we needed it to lead the country out of the economic crisis in the early 2000s.

Only the United Russia party can play the role of such a political power. It may be an axiom for you and I, but when we meet with voters, we must be prepared to answer one and the same question, “Why you?” After all, communists also say, “We are patriots, we approve of the return of Crimea and the people's republics of Donbass. In fact, we were the ones who proposed the resolution. We support the president in all his foreign policy endeavors. What makes us different from United Russia is that we are kind. They're mean, they don't want to give you money, but we'll distribute it among everyone. So choose us.”

What can we say to these arguments? First: as of today, the only party that really supports V. Putin is United Russia. V. Putin is United Russia. Fruit are impossible without root. Were it not for a whole series of decisions voted for by the United Russia alone, the president would not be able

to conduct a strong, independent foreign policy today. One such example is the parliamentary vote for the mineral extraction tax, when the law introduced by the president received the necessary number of votes only after the United Russia faction voted for it.

Let me remind you of another important episode. In the early 2000s, Vladimir Putin suggested that the first priority would be paying off debts to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). We understood that this debt entailed not only economic but also political dependence. In the course of my work in trade unions, one of my duties involved studying of the memorandum of the Russian government to the International Monetary Fund, where we committed ourselves to some articles of the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. It is unclear what IMF has to do with our labor law, and yet it has begun to dictate its terms. And then Putin offered to settle accounts with IMF. The opposition parties were categorically against it: why should we? All states have debts, let us better spend on pensions and salaries, etc. But what would happen to our pensions and salaries today if we continued to be in debt to IMF? And only United Russia supported the president at that time.

In those years, the country withstood the first blow to our economy. What has kept us going? The budget rule and the strict budget policy United Russia insisted on. When voters asked if the government would be able to pay pensions and benefits on time and in full, we could honestly look them in the eye and answer, "Yes, the budget law passed for three years provides for that. All obligations will be met because each article was calculated on the basis of real conditions." And indeed, social problems began to be solved little by little – thanks to United Russia. The system of social support established during those years still helps us mitigate many adverse effects on the Russian economy today. Establishment of such a system was made possible by Federal Law No. 122, known as the "law on monetization of benefits," which, yet again, was approved only by United Russia. The other factions did not dare vote for this law, very unpopular at that time.

We are often rebuked for approving significant budgetary expenditures on such items as defense and security. Every time budget discussions begin, my colleagues and I have to listen to the disapproving comments about healthcare and education spending. But it has long been known that the nation that does not want to feed its own army will soon be forced to feed someone else's. If we do not allocate the necessary funds for defense and security, after a while we will not be able to determine for ourselves how much we need to spend on health and education. Nevertheless, only our party has consistently defended these budget items.

Another important point: United Russia is a party that has branches in most localities across the country, so we are accessible to almost every voter. No other party has such an extensive structure. Many opposition parties participate in elections to the State Duma and legislative assemblies of the constituent regions of the Federation at all times, but when it comes to elections at the local level, say, CPRF "closes" 30% of seats at best. United Russia, unlike other parties, is represented everywhere. This is very important because Russian Federation is a huge country with many regions and national entities, so the preferences and interests of our population are very diverse. And only United Rus-

sia can respond to the request of any voter, regardless of class, nationality, or social background. All this means that we have been playing a unifying role for many years, and quite successfully.

Finally, United Russia is an actual party of Russian political culture. We do not reject any period of our history.

Liberal parties say that the seven decades of the Soviet state were a dark, totalitarian time. We object – of course, tragic mistakes and even crimes were committed, but in those same years, the country achieved victory in the Great Patriotic War, the first flights into space, and other success in various fields – in science, culture, etc. We respect veterans and their views, including their memory of the past. They do not contradict the ideology of our party in any way.

Communists, on the contrary, fight for the "purity" of their ideology, arguing that Russia had a terrible regime before the October Revolution, otherwise there would have been no revolution at all. We believe, however, that even in tsarist times Russia had considerable achievements and conquests. It is true that today we can hear, for instance, from Gennady Zyuganov that he largely approves of the activities of Alexander III. But Gennady Andreevich should know that Alexander Ulyanov, brother of his idol Vladimir Lenin, participated in the preparation for the attempted assassination of Alexander III. We can also refer to the text of the Manifesto of the Communist Party, whereas Marxism continues to be the main ideology of CPRF. The Manifesto proclaims that workers have no Homeland. Vladimir Mayakovsky praised this Marxist "truth" and dreamed of "living in a world without Russias, without Latvias, in a single human community." The ideology of cosmopolitanism, and in fact anti-patriotism, was conceived by the classics of Marxism, who, however, never treated all nations equally. They especially did not like the Russians.

In the Soviet period, as we remember, a complete collection of V. I. Lenin's works was published, while the works by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, even the multi-volume ones, were never really "complete." The ideological department of the CPSU Central Committee knew perfectly well that some lines by the classics should better not be published in Russia. Nevertheless, something did make its way into print. In particular, in one of his works, Marx quotes the Polish politician Duchinski: "The very name Rus' was usurped by the Muscovites. Not only are Russians not Slavs, they do not even belong to the Indo-European race. They are aliens who should be kicked back behind the Dnieper." And here is how Marx himself feels about this point of view: "I wish it were true, or at least that this view would become predominant among the Slavs." And here is a quote from Engels' polemic with M. Bakunin: "Europe has only one alternative: either submit to the yoke of the Slavs, or finally destroy the center of this hostile force – Russia." In another letter to Bakunin, Engels writes: "A merciless life-and-death struggle with the Slavs who betray the revolution, a struggle for destruction and ruthless terrorism, is not in the interests of Germany, but in the interests of the revolution."

It would seem that the Russian Communists should have taken it all into account. But, unfortunately, this did not happen. We remember that the Bolshevik Party was probably the only one in the history of our country which openly called for our own defeat during World War I. This view was considered correct until the mid-1930s.

In 1930, there was a debate in the capital about the Master Plan for the reconstruction of Moscow. It consisted in demolishing the Church of St. Basil and removing the monument to Minin and Pozharsky. Eventually, the cathedral and the monument, fortunately, remained in place. But in the course of the debate, a poem was published in the Bolshevik magazine (later *Kommunist*, now *Svobodnoe Slovo*) of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. It deserves to be reproduced:

The Minin and Pozharsky
should be melted! Why do they need above all heads to rise?
The two shopkeepers vainly celebrated,
October caught them selling merchandise.
We didn't break their necks – they were lucky,
Although I know it would have been a fit.
They say, they have saved Russia in their market,
But was there a point in saving it?

All this happened before the Great Patriotic War. Then there was the war, an invocation of the Russian roots, Dmitry Donskoy, Alexander Nevsky, and some adjustment to the Communist ideology. But we must remember that there are two components to the ideology of modern Communists – the Marxist class ideology and the patriotic one that has been introduced in recent years. It is difficult to predict which one will prevail if we encounter economic problems because of the sanctions. All the more so because in the recent past, in 2021, the Communists entered into an alliance with the obvious enemies of the nation – the Navalists, who have been pushing the CIA's tactics of the so-called smart voting in elections. We also remember that it was our fellow Communists (albeit only a few of them) who declared that they did not support the special military operation.

As for the other political parties represented in the Duma – LDPR, Fair Russia, and New People – anyone can see that they cannot claim to be a national leader. Fair Russia leader Sergei Mironov has recently taken a strong patriotic stance (for which he deserves credit), but in 2011–2012, during the first attempt to shatter our country, deputies from this party came to the meetings wearing white ribbons – symbols of protest. And it was Fair Russia that included the current state traitors in the lists for the State Duma: father and son Gudkov, Ilya Ponomarev. We remember that, and we have learned some lessons.

And New People? When the Duma was voting for an appeal to the President of the Russian Federation to recognize the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics, it was the only faction that voted against it. Now they are taking a more patriotic stance, and we welcome that.

All this makes United Russia the only option. Especially considering that this is the only party that has experience in pulling the country out of crisis. The Communist party has another sort of experience – one of immersing itself in a crisis. There was a period when Mikhail Gorbachev was General Secretary of the Central Committee, not of United Russia, but of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and then the party officials signed the notorious devastating Belovezh Accords. Unlike them, we lent a shoulder to the president when it was necessary, and worked with him to overcome the economic problems that had piled up in the 1990s.

Let me remind that the global financial crisis broke out in 2008, triggered by the bursting of the mortgage lend-

ing bubble in the United States. Russia, too, found itself in the crisis zone. People began withdrawing money from their accounts en masse, and then Putin proposed several urgent measures: first, to issue loans to banks so that they could pay all those who wanted their money, and to increase the amount of deposits subject to insurance. The opposition was outraged: "Why do you finance the deep pockets, let's give the money directly to people!" Our answer was, "If the banks close, what and how you will give to people?" We did a great job together with the government and the president at that time. We managed to keep on our track, and overcome the crisis. As of today, there are no other parties in Russia who have the experience of overcoming the national crisis.

Why is this especially important right now? Nowadays Russia has many problems to solve because of the sanctions imposed by the Western countries, mostly related to the economy. An immense job has to be done to ensure that these sanctions have minimum effect on the country's life. Combating unemployment, curbing the growth of prices, supporting businesses, providing medicines – all these tasks will have to be addressed on a daily basis.

But the main thing that is expected of us (we are not the executive branch, after all) is the renewal of ideology. As far as the past is concerned, the ideology of United Russia is clear and unambiguous. We have studied history and formulated all the necessary assessments, so we know exactly what we are up against. But our vision of the future is not as clear. What are we building? Do we want to take America's place in today's world, which is still America-centered? But this is unlikely to be supported by other countries. We have abandoned the socialist model, which was an alternative to American financial capital, but we have not yet constructed a new model that would be a worthy goal for us. We will have to embark on this mission, and I am sure that the United Russia party can tackle this challenge.

Among the most important and urgent issues is the behavior of the Russian elite. The president spoke of national traitors, but are there many of them among farmers, workers, teachers, and doctors? There are practically none. But there are plenty of them among those whom we, as the ruling party, have coddled and showered with awards and honors for years. But we're not the only ones to blame. Betrayal of the elites is a chronic disease of Russia. In the early seventeenth century, the noble boyars ruling the country (the famous rule of seven boyars), who actually lived better than most in Russia, turned out to be the agents of Poland. And who betrayed the emperor in 1917? Front commanders who said, "Leave." And the Soviet Union? The top of the Communist Party. Can this problem stop reoccurring? It can.

And what about other countries? British elites, for instance, have always stood up for the country's national interests, which is why the Conservative Party representing them has always had the support of voters, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill is known as the most fervent patriot whose achievements are still considered unsurpassed.

Units of light cavalry of Great Britain made up of members of the most noble families were sent to Russia during the Crimean War to assault the battery at Balaklava. It was a pointless undertaking, they all died. But in Great Britain they are considered to have accomplished a heroic act because they did as their country told them to. I think we have to learn that from them.

As members of the State Duma, we will have to pursue one of the wills of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy: to return to the Russian language. Language is a way of thinking, people think in words. Cashback, hashtag, and other such words belong to the language of our adversary, and if we think in their language, it makes us less strong in fighting them. Virtually any Anglicism has a normal counterpart in Russian, and it would be wise to insist on using the words of the mother tongue wherever possible. We can do this at least at the legislative level.

In general, there is a lot of work to be done. Today we are often asked the question, "When will all this end and

normal life start again?" The answer is: there will be no more of that life. There will be a new one, a different one; and as for the current turbulence, be patient. We have an example of a country with far fewer natural resources and opportunities compared to what we have. It is right next to the U.S., and the big neighbor has been strangling it with all its might for decades. They have landed their troops in it, made attempts to kill their leader, introduced imaginable and unimaginable sanctions... To no avail! Yes, I am speaking of Cuba. And I suggest that we remember the motto under which the patriots of Cuba live and win: "Homeland or death!"

O. G. Karpovich¹

CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER IN THE CONTEXT OF TODAY'S GLOBAL CHANGES

In the recent decades, the processes of gradual change in the balance of power between the traditionally leading players in the international arena and their influence on the international political situation and the system of trade and economic relations, and emergence of new actors in these processes, are the factors that are ever more urgently calling for including the transformation of the world economic order, and the world monetary system in particular, in the practical agenda.

Shaped in 1944 at the end of World War II at Bretton Woods, the foreign exchange system cemented the dollar's role as the world's main reserve currency. The dollar standard was adopted, the American currency becoming the basic unit of payment used in international settlements, the only currency partially convertible into gold, the currency of interventions and reserve assets.

The U.S. government assumed an obligation to maintain a constant price for gold, and to exchange all dollar cash into gold at the request of the Bretton Woods System member countries. International institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were created to support this system. Later, in 1947, came the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, transformed into the World Trade Organization in 1995.

After 30 years, the U.S. was no longer able to maintain a national currency peg to the gold standard. In August 1971, President R. Nixon announced a "temporary ban on the exchange of dollars for gold," thereby effectively initiating the process of terminating the Bretton Woods system, and in 1976, as a result of the Jamaica Conference, the

foreign exchange system was converted under the terms of floating rates, commensurate in the international currency market, while maintaining the dominant role of the dollar.

On January 1, 1999, euro was introduced in non-cash circulation, and on January 1, 2002 – in cash circulation. Today it is the second most important reserve world currency.

Despite the somewhat weakened position today, the United States continues to be the most powerful political, economic and military power in the world, and the dollar remains the world's main reserve and settlement currency. In addition, U.S. liabilities circulating on the international financial market (about 30 trillion dollars) have a significant impact on the countries, funds and private investors who hold them.

At the same time, unexpectedly for the rivals, there is the rapidly growing, particularly political and military, influence of Russia; China that is aggressively winning leading positions in the global industrial and trade-economic competition, and emerging new players such as India, Brazil, Turkey, and several other countries who are becoming stronger and claiming an independent role. In this context, the once unconditional leadership of the United States is gradually fading. The logic of the situation is increasingly calling for changes in the world order in order to adapt to the new reality. These trends are becoming especially pronounced in the system of international economic relations and in the settlement infrastructure and instruments (primarily the U.S. dollar) that serve them.

The situation in the global economy and in the world financial market has been dramatically aggravated by the losses incurred by most of the world economies as a result of the coronavirus pandemic that began in 2019. According to some experts, in 2020 the pandemic resulted in a reduction of trade in goods by 8% and in commercial services by 21% year on year. According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, by the end of 2021, the economies of the world lost about 7 trillion U.S. dollars in total.

The refusal of the U.S. and NATO to actually consider the proposals to take into account the Russian national interests and the principle of indivisibility of security, en-

¹ Vice Rector for Research at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Dr. Sc. (Law), Dr. Sc. (Political Sciences), Professor. Author of more than 450 scientific publications, including monographs: "Economic Crime in Russia. Theory and Practice of Counteraction," "Global Problems and International Relations," etc.; chapters in collective monographs: "Strategic Nuclear Arms in the History of International Relations of the 20th–21st Centuries," "New Technologies in Diplomacy," etc.; papers: "European Union Climate Policy: Time for Responsible Decisions" (co-authored), "U.S.-European Relations after the Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan" (co-authored), and others. Full member of the Academy of "Military Sciences" of the Russian Federation, the Russian Academy of Legal Sciences, and the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences. Chairman of the editorial board of the journal *Bulletin of International Scientists*, member of the editorial boards of a number of scientific journals.

shrined in 1999 by the Istanbul Charter of European Security and the Astana Declaration on the results of the summit of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2010, as well as the sharply negative response of the West to our country's special operation in Ukraine led to an explosive systemic crisis – direct and acute political, economic, informational and indirect military confrontation.

The massive sanctions regime imposed on the Russian Federation today, including disconnection from the SWIFT system, a ban on dollar transactions and freezing of foreign exchange and gold assets, directly violates the principles of international law and the practice of international economic relations. As a result, the strategy of using economic leverage as a “weapon of retaliation” against one of the world's leading powers by the U.S. and NATO objectively undermines the principles of the international monetary and financial system, creates a significant disruption in the system of foreign trade exchanges, credibility of the United States as the guarantor power of the safety of foreign assets for many countries, the legislator of the rules and regulations to maintain international economic stability, as well as the dollar as the basis of the international monetary system.

As a consequence of the sanctions imposed against Russia, narrowing of the supply of important goods (hydrocarbons, some food products (e.g., grain, sunflower oil), metals, mineral fertilizers, etc.) in international markets is inevitable, as is the disruption of the established cooperative chains that largely determine the economic situation and social stability in many countries of the world.

Today one can confidently speak of intensification of the processes diluting the role of dollar. The development of the situation under this scenario and its expansion will inevitably lead to an aggravation in the economic and financial crises in the world. Obviously, the emerging scenario and its imminent consequences can no longer be ignored by the leadership and financial structures of many countries around the world, regardless of their political orientation and trade and economic priorities.

In this context, the ability to maintain solidarity within the ranks of the anti-Russian coalition and the prospect of its expansion will be crucial for Washington. Even now, despite the large economic costs the EU would incur if it refused to buy Russian hydrocarbons, we are learning about the intentions of the Europeans to implement plans for alternative schemes of oil supplies to the countries of the Union. The reasons for this are purely political. Europe, which has abandoned its claims to military, political and economic sovereignty, will be forced at this stage to fully follow the course declared by Washington.

At the same time, the threshold factors for the Europeans may go beyond the level of price to be paid for the policy of Russia's blockade with sanctions. The prospect of inevitable and significant reductions in national economies, deteriorating social standards, and the resulting aggravation of the domestic political situation is bound to have an ever-growing impact on the policies of the countries of the region. If losses of the EU countries-consumers of Russian hydrocarbons will be too severe, it is highly likely that, given the reluctance of the U.S. to provide substantial support to Europe, the disagreements between the EU countries may increase significantly and eventually lead to the desynchronization of rates in relation to the purchase of Russian hy-

drocarbons and possibly in a number of product items critical for Europeans.

It was quite telling that Europeans used various combinations to circumvent the U.S. sanctions against Iran agreed upon with the EU. As the real course of events shows, this situation will be inevitably reproduced one way or another in the current conditions with regard to the embargo on Russia.

The acutely negative initial reaction of the EU governing bodies to Russia's demand to pay for gas under a scheme that provides for Russian gas suppliers to receive funds into their accounts in rubles is gradually changing to a less definite formula, worked out by the EU Commission, making gas purchases from Russia possible “without violating the sanctions regime.” A number of European countries have already agreed at the national level to pay for gas in rubles, while others are currently working on this issue. The inevitable negative consequences of cutting off gas supplies to countries with the most radical position will eventually force their leaders to take a more sensible approach to this problem.

Further actions by the Russian leadership only exacerbate the difficult situation for Western European countries. On March 7, 2022, the Kremlin published a list of countries unfriendly to Russia, including EU states. This was followed by a series of presidential decrees and Russian government documents regulating and toughening nearly all trade and economic relations with unfriendly countries, which the latter perceive as Russian countermeasures. Presidential Decree No. 52 “On application of retaliatory special economic measures in connection with unfriendly actions of some foreign states and international organizations” came into force on May 3.

Against this background, we should expect serious negative consequences for European countries not only in the economic, but also in the social sphere. By taking an extremely unrelenting stance, Russia will drive the Europeans into a corner and force them to seek a way out through compromise and dialogue with our country. This, in turn, will lead to an increase in contradictions between European countries and the United States who pressure their allies to counter any violation in the coalition discipline, while simultaneously promoting their interests in the European markets.

Such a scenario could objectively contribute to the “revival” of attempts of the European states to formulate a kind of “sovereign and independent” pan-European policy, including security matters, with establishment of appropriate regional structures. They have been working in this direction within the EU with varying progress for quite a while. The current French President E. Macron has repeatedly articulated the idea of greater European autonomy, up to the creation of a European army, clearly claiming to be the leader of such processes.

So far, such excessive autonomy has been successfully suppressed by Washington. However, the claims for greater independence have not been completely eradicated in the ranks of Europeans, and the events in Ukraine will obviously play the role of a catalyst for these processes, which can develop quite unexpectedly in the conditions of the new, so far provisional, world order.

Participation of the US President J. Biden in the NATO, EU, and G7 summits in Brussels on March 24–25, 2022,

and his trip to Poland on March 26 for negotiations with the Polish President A. Duda and meetings with American servicemen were aimed at strengthening the anti-Russian coalition and giving the European wing of NATO more determination in opposing Russia. In this regard, the concerted continuation of the sanctions policy against Russia and an increase in assistance aimed at improving AFU defense capabilities were expectable.

Some of the decisions were more prominent, like establishment of a "joint (U.S. and EU) task force for development of an action plan to enhance European energy security," as well as Biden's statement that the U.S. and NATO "will respond to Russia's use of chemical weapons." This statement could be interpreted as creating preconditions for the use of military force in Ukraine. Its impact, however, was substantially tempered by the American president's words that "the nature of the response will depend on the nature of use."

The summit also approved the defense concept of the "EU Strategic Compass" adopted on March 21 this year by the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union for the period until 2030. In particular, the concept stipulates that a stronger EU in terms of defense and security will contribute to global transatlantic security and complement NATO's capabilities, and provides for the creation of a rapid response force consisting of five thousand members.

The very fact that so many events vital for Western countries have been held within three days on short notice raised expectations of unprecedented measures against Russia that would force Kremlin to retreat. However, the "modest" results of the past summits and Biden's European tour will be rather perceived as a reflection of the West's confusion and its attempt to "save face," as well as a demonstration of Washington's capabilities that have already become limited.

The same context applies to the results of consultations held by the leaders of U.S., Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Romania and Poland on April 19, 2022 in videoconference format, attended by President of the European Council Ch. Michel and President of the European Commission U. von der Leyen, and also to the meeting of defense ministers of NATO and its allies (the participants were from over 40 countries) held at American base Ramstein in Germany on April 26, 2022, and initiated by the U.S. They resulted in formulation of the main goal: to prevent the success of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, and an essentially agreed upon action plan for its implementation, including, *inter alia*, providing Kiev with financial aid, sending weapons, including heavy ones, and military supplies to the conflict zone, and stepping up efforts to isolate Russia from the world.

At the same time, the system of "red lines" officially prepared by the Russian leadership and presented to the United States and NATO is, in fact, a claim for a radical reorganization of the hitherto existing global political order, as well as the global security system. Implementation of the declared goals of the operation in Ukraine (if the scenario is successful for Russia) and the demonstrated resistance to massive pressure from the United States and NATO will objectively work to further intensify the processes of shaping a new world order and – as one of its fundamental components – transformation of the world monetary and economic system. In this context, the U.S. administration's policy of

simultaneous active confrontation and containment of Russia and China significantly complicates the implementation of U.S. intentions and, on the contrary, further pushes Beijing to work closely with Russia, creating a basis for increasing mutual support.

In the current situation, efforts to further expand the circle of participants in the anti-Russian alliance are extremely important to the U.S. administration. According to the current developments, most of the "second and third league" states have taken a wait-and-see attitude at this stage. It is quite symptomatic that the UN General Assembly votes on the anti-Russian resolutions "Aggression against Ukraine" of March 2 and "Humanitarian consequences of aggression against Ukraine" of March 24, 2022, did not lead to an expansion of the anti-Russian coalition. The attempts of the U.S. and British leaders to persuade China and India to support the sanctions regimes and the policy of Russia's isolation have not yet rendered any results. Biden's and British Prime Minister B. Johnson's efforts have proved fruitless as well in their attempts to encourage Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to increase their oil production.

As for another problem much discussed in the world, that of the prospects for establishment of a new world monetary and financial system, as in the previous periods, its outlines will largely depend on the specific parameters of the new world order, which is very likely to begin to actively form based on the results of the discussion between Russia and the United States on the conditions of the new international security system and operation on the demilitarization and denationalization of Ukraine, with close involvement of other actors in these processes, first of all China and India. It seems that in the new conditions, establishment of a single monetary system is hardly realistic – the differences in the positions and claims of the leading state actors and their associations will be too great, while the "allergy" of many countries to the policy presently pursued by the United States may be too significant.

It is safe to predict an increasing trend towards regionalization of the global economic space on the basis of simultaneous and parallel development of several currency systems: the dollar system based on the yuan, which can claim to be the second most important one, the euro and (in case of favorable developments) the ruble. Other options, such as the rupee, cannot be completely ruled out. Another possible development path suggests the search for a neutral system acceptable to all, based on the principle e.g. of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) created in 1969 under the International Monetary Fund or based on the functioning of cryptocurrency, another system acceptable to all.

Weakening of the dollar as a result of the impending systemic political and economic crisis against the background of unfavorable processes (a certain loss of credibility as a reliable repository of gold and foreign exchange reserves, growth of public debt to 128% of GDP (data of February 4, 2022), inflation to 8%, etc.) will seriously pressure the American economy. Thus, on March 21 this year, J. Powell said that the Federal Reserve System headed by him is ready to abandon its support of the economy in order to curb inflation. He acknowledged that "reducing inflation without severely damaging the U.S. economy is no easy task." At the same time J. Powell said they were ready to "take aggressive steps and increase the federal funds rate by more than 25 basis points."

In these conditions, the gradual decline in the role of the U.S., even though it may become more obvious and intense, will nevertheless be quite long, uneven, fraught with new aggravations of the international political situation and volatility of global and regional economic and monetary-economic processes. Drivers of weakening of the dollar will be for a long time largely constrained and offset by its continuing significance as the most common global currency of trade and economic transactions and international settlements for a large number of states-allies of the U.S., active efforts to maintain its importance by the Americans themselves in their immediate zone of political and economic influence, as well as the inertia of established stereotypes for many countries in the world. The process of the dollar's weakening, even if it accelerates significantly, is unlikely to be dramatic.

Obviously, one of the alternative systems will be based on the yuan. Beijing expects to turn the yuan into one of the most popular units of settlement and make it the world's reserve currency and a real alternative to the dollar. China has launched and is actively promoting abandonment of the U.S. dollar for quite some time now. As Russia's trade turnover with China grows, our countries are increasing the volume of settlements between each other in their national currencies. So, in 2021, about 25% of mutual settlements in foreign trade between China and Russia were made in rubles and yuan.

According to a statement (March 14, 2022) made by the Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission S. Glazyev, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China will develop a draft of the independent international currency system, which is expected to be based on a new international currency and calculated as an index of a basket of national currencies of member countries and prices of exchange-traded goods. It is expected that the draft will be presented for discussion in the nearest future.

It is also quite indicative that Russia and India who are discussing settlement of foreign trade transactions in their national currencies, are ready to consider the yuan as the base currency. A number of countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are also gradually abandoning the U.S. currency in mutual trade in favor of national currencies. Japan and Indonesia, as well as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines, have already signed agreements for transition to such transactions in cross-border trade. At the same time, China still has a long way to go, e.g. to overcome the obstacles posed by the fact that the yuan remains only partially convertible today.

The ruble, which many experts consider significantly undervalued, will also be able to function as a regional currency. The developing practice of trade between Russia and a number of countries in national currencies will also contribute to this. However, this process will be seriously constrained by the ruble's current status of an unstable speculative currency. At the initial stage, efforts to introduce it as a regional currency will be supported mainly by political factors, primarily in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

In the broader space, the emphasis will be made on the transition to ruble in settlements for goods for which Russia is a traditionally leading supplier. Expanding the zone

of the ruble to serve trade and economic exchanges in national currencies in a bilateral format with the BRICS states (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), *Shanghai Cooperation Organization* (SCO), the EAEU and possibly a number of ASEAN countries will also become an important vector of Russia's foreign economic activity. Establishment of the ruble as a regional reserve currency and consolidation of its position will be facilitated by a consistent policy of transitioning and expanding the zone of foreign trade transactions, both by nomenclature of goods and by the list of counterpart countries. Along with the implementation of this line, there will be an increasingly pressing need for measures to stabilize the ruble, or possibly a monetary reform.

In the process of forming a new world order, which will take into account the results of the operation in Ukraine, Russia may have a good chance of gaining more political and, consequently, economic weight in the world, as well as strengthening its position in the dialogue on global security issues. However, the period when political dividends and technical military arguments will be able to provide stability and strengthen the role of Russia and its national currency in the global affairs is not likely to last very long.

The decision of the Russian President to switch payments for gas supplies to unfriendly countries to rubles and his instruction to the Cabinet, the Central Bank of Russia and Gazprom to implement measures to change the currency of payment by March 31, 2022, was an important, albeit forced, step. This decision will have serious financial, economic and, obviously, political consequences. The Russian president, who announced in his speech the introduction of this initial retaliatory measure against unfriendly countries, mentioned that trading gas for rubles was only the first step. It is already clear that, despite the first reaction of the U.S. and the EU, this step, in fact, puts Russia's opponents in a stalemate.

Implementing this line will not be easy and will take some time. However, some of the countries have already declared their willingness to switch to the new standards. As for the other states, including those that manifest the most aggressive and hostile behavior against Russia, their actions in this matter will ultimately be determined not only by political, but also by social economic factors.

Russia's ability to back up its political and technical military arguments with positive results in consolidating its economic status will be critical in terms of reinforcing its position as one of the world's leading superpowers. In this context, the need to accelerate the processes of economic and technological development of the country becomes the main challenge for the Russian leadership.

The success of this course will determine not only our country's role in the world, its interaction with major opponents and fellow countries, such as China and India, but also our country's position in global international and regional associations. In the meantime, when planning the political and economic course for the medium and especially long term, in an effort to eliminate the dangers posed by our traditional opponent, the United States, it is important to constantly keep in mind the possible negative consequences for Russia of being confined to the echelon of the other global economic leader, China.

A. Kevin¹**‘TOWARDS HOBAPYCB’**

During most of the Gorbachev years, from 1985 to 1990, I headed the Australian Foreign Ministry’s Policy Planning Branch in Canberra. One of my jobs was to try to make best-information analyses and predictions of global politics. (Like most others working in the field, I did not predict the break-up of the Soviet Union).

Let me modestly try my hand, one month ahead of the 9–10 June 2022 20th Likhachov Scientific Conference, to set the present Ukraine conflict in context and to predict its most likely political outcome.

The future of Ukraine is being decided on the battlefield because Kiev has not (indeed, has not since 2014) been a serious agreement-capable negotiating partner for Moscow. This became tragically clear after Kiev’s rejection of the 29 March, *ad referendum* to governments, peace agreement reached in Istanbul. Kiev backed away from the Istanbul peace framework under covert pressure from the United States and UK, who were and remain keen for Ukraine to continue the conflict, and probably also from the extreme nationalists around Zelensky.

I say ‘tragically’ because so many soldiers and civilians have continued to die needlessly in the Ukraine and Donbass People’s Republics fighting since 29 March, and so much of Ukraine’s national public wealth continues to be squandered and destroyed in this lethal quarrel between brothers. Meanwhile, Kiev’s stated conditions for peace become increasingly far-fetched and impossible.

This conflict, now over three months old, has already had world-changing consequences. A massive decoupling of the world economy is taking place. But that is not the subject of this paper – I am sure others are writing on it. I am interested to explore here the most relevant past, present and future for Ukraine.

The two protagonists – Russia and ally Belarus. versus a *de facto* coalition of Ukraine, US and NATO – have different war aims and different rules of engagement. We are seeing a uniquely murderous interaction between the real military conflict in Ukraine, and a surrounding cynical information war run by the West.

Russia could decisively destroy the Kiev regime tomorrow, if it chose to unleash on the capital city its full non-nuclear military superiority (it won’t). Kiev and its allies already lost the war in its first few weeks but are so convinced by their own false propaganda that they refuse to see this fact. Nor does the West seem to care much whether they are winning or not, so long as they can keep the war going for as long as possible, in the hope of some collateral political gain from the huge misery the war is bringing to the people of Ukraine. And for Biden and his party, there are huge arms sales profits to be made – ironically, for weapons that Russia is safely blowing up in targeted missile attacks as they pass through Ukraine on their way to the battlefield.

Putin’s hand was forced on 24 February by Kiev’s continued shelling of Donbass cities, after the 21 February Russian recognition of Donbass sovereignty and the announced

Russia-Donbass mutual security treaties. Russia fired the first shot on 24 February, but the United States had loaded and primed the gun.

Going back to 2014, after the Maidan coup, when an anxious Donbass appealed to Russia for security on the Crimea model from invasion and genocide, Moscow for years tried for peaceful solutions to enable Donetsk and Lugansk provinces (oblasts) to stay within a new federal Ukraine with guaranteed constitutional protections for Russian language and cultural rights.

The word ‘Novorossiya’ was briefly revived in 2014 as a proposed confederation of these two oblasts. The term is the historic ‘New Russia’, a geographical term for this area in which Russian settlers were encouraged to live after it was conquered from the Ottoman Empire 300 years ago.

As Kiev’s shelling continued and as the Minsk peace talks bogged down in 2014, some people in Donbass began to talk of building an expanded Novorossiyan political confederation: perhaps extending all the way westwards to the Transnistria border, and taking in the eight oblasts of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporozhia, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkov and Dnipropetrovsk (including the important cities of Krivoy Rog and Dnipro). The project evoked controversy and was politically frozen in May 2015. There is an interesting background essay on this in Wikipedia, ‘Novorossiya (confederation)’.

Wars end in one of two ways; either by total capitulation of the defeated side as by the Confederacy in the US Civil War or by Nazi Germany in Berlin in 1945, or in negotiated peace settlements as in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 or the Treaty of Versailles in 1919.

Looking at the way the conflict in and around Ukraine seems to be heading now, the indications point to the latter outcome. I don’t think Russia is strong enough to achieve full Kiev regime capitulation across Ukraine – or that Russia even wants to.

Historical and geographical overview

Looking at the strategic map of NATO Europe and Russia, there have been important changes in recent years. Finland and Sweden are close to joining NATO. NATO now represents most of Europe: hardly any European countries remain non-aligned. Russia and its ally Belarus will soon face on their borders a long front of hostile NATO countries from the Arctic to the Black Sea.

From Russia’s strategic perspective, she is pretty much back to where she was when Napoleon’s united Europe attacked Russia in 1812, or when Hitler’s united Europe attacked Russia in 1941; but with less strategic depth now than she had in 1812 or 1941.

But there are global strategic changes too that advantage Russia. Europe no longer leads the world. Now, the US leads a Western bloc of adversaries of Russia; about 15% by population of the UN membership. China is a world power and Russia’s firm ally. Russia is the world’s leading nuclear weapons power. Much of the world outside Europe is non-aligned and refusing to join any NATO-Russia fight.

For at least the past 300 years, Ukraine sat at the centre of this European strategic geography. Since 1991 it has

¹ Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University (Canberra), diplomat (1968–1998), independent expert. Author of six books, including: ‘Return to Moscow,’ ‘Russia – Australia Relations: History and Modernity,’ etc.; papers ‘Australia’s Secret Preemptive War Against Iraq,’ ‘Cambodia and Southeast Asia,’ etc. Recipient of literary prizes.

become increasingly aligned to US and NATO; dangerous-ly so since 2014. It is now receiving huge military and intelligence help and political support from US and NATO.

Ukraine has become the flashpoint in a major deterioration in Russia-West relations that goes back at least to early 2014, the months of Maidan and post-Maidan, and I would argue back even further to 1991, the year Russia and Ukraine came into existence as the first and second-ranking successor nations to the Soviet Union.

Ukraine, like Russia, had a violent and conflicted 20th century history. By 1890, the Russian Empire's strategic imperative of deep borderlands had been achieved. Finland, the Baltic states, Belarus and Ukraine and even eastern Poland, Crimea, and the Caucasus, were all by now securely incorporated within the Russian Empire. Towards the end of World War One, German armies briefly occupied Ukraine and southern Russia. Ukraine was torn between local communists loyal to Moscow, and local nationalists who tried to set up an independent Ukrainian state. The communists prevailed. Ukraine suffered hugely in the 1930s under Stalin's policy-forced famines. When Hitler's European armies invaded in 1941, a revived Ukrainian nationalist movement led by Stepan Bandera welcomed them. Many other Ukrainians, identifying with Russia, had fled eastwards with the retreating Red Army. The Battle of Stalingrad turned the tide. Ukraine was devastated by the Nazi invasion and the Red Army rollback.

After the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet leadership gave priority to rebuilding Ukraine's ruined cities and industrial strength. Ukraine and Belarus were treated by Moscow with great respect and kindness. The troubled history of Ukrainian wartime collaboration with Nazis was buried. Ukraine again became a powerhouse of Soviet industry and agriculture as it had been in the 1920s and 1930s. Ukrainian Communists enjoyed great power in the postwar Soviet Union. Khrushchev – himself part-Ukrainian by birth – in 1954 transferred Crimea which had for 300 years been an integral part of Russia, to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. He naively believed that these two neighbouring Soviet socialist republics would always be close brothers.

After the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine, a large and resource-rich sovereign state of nearly 50 million people, sadly never found a strong patriotic post-communist leadership. It staggered on for 23 years to 2014 under weak mostly corrupt governments in thrall to immensely rich post-Soviet oligarchs. The economy languished, while Russia after 2000 under Putin's leadership quickly recovered its national morale and strength.

But in Ukraine, under pressure of unemployment, corruption, and chronic economic depression, long-buried fascist movements began to revive. As the best young Ukrainians emigrated to Russia or the West, some who were left turned in desperation to their fathers' and grandfathers' fond memories of fascism. A fiercely committed new ideology developed – of hatred for non-native cultures and especially for anything Russian. Never more than 5% of the Ukrainian population, these young men and women learned how to exercise political leverage through a combination of extreme violence and guile. Rich oligarchs used them as private armies, but the Ukronazis – for this is what they are – had the last laugh. They penetrated the essential organs of society – the military, the police, the public administration at all levels, using the old Communist political

commissar model. They killed those who seriously resisted them. Intimidation ruled.

Some Western media initially tried to report these dangerous trends accurately. But those voices have fallen silent now. Ukronazi power in Ukraine is just not mentioned at all. The Ukronazi movement has been whitewashed by the West, and is thus all the more dangerous now.

Meanwhile, Russians continued until very recently to think sentimentally of Ukrainians as their 'little brothers.' After centuries as neighbours in one empire, there had been extensive cultural and economic integration, reciprocal tourism, and intermarriage. Kiev, Kharkov and Odessa were proud Russian-speaking ethnically multicultural cities, and very much part of the Russian cultural and artistic world. Ukrainian urban elites spoke Russian and thought in Russian.

The Donbass region in the east was almost entirely Russian-speaking. Ukrainian was a rural dialect there. The Ukrainian language and national culture were strongest in Western Ukraine. Until 2014, all Ukraine's languages and ethnicities enjoyed equal protection under the law.

Some Ukrainians, influenced by extreme nationalist ideologies, did not reciprocate Russians' affectionate feeling of close affinity. But many Russians and Ukrainians felt very close. Their destinies had been intertwined for centuries. This shared close history doesn't sit easily with principles of national sovereignty and sovereign equality of all states, on which the United Nations international order rests. There is a tension between this universal doctrine, and the historical reality that large states inevitably influence their smaller neighbours. Putin and Lavrov have spent much time trying to explain these complexities. It is commonsense realism that large and small neighbouring states ought to treat one another with courtesy and mutual respect. The challenge for diplomacy is to manage such potential conflicts and thus keep the peace among nations large and small, within a framework of rules set by the UN Charter.

The avoidable rise of Ukronazism 1991–2022

US and NATO diplomacy in eastern Europe, and in particular Ukraine since 1991, deliberately failed this challenge. The US through its expansion of NATO to Russia's borders since 1996 knowingly encouraged virulent anti-Russian nationalism in the smaller countries to the West and south of Russia. It did this as part of a continuing undeclared policy of trying to weaken and subvert Russia – even after the fall of Communism. The more that Russia's self-esteem and strength was rebuilt under Putin since about 2007, the more aggressive and overt the reality of anti-Russian policy in the West became. The mask of friendship towards Russia was shed. The current conflict has exposed US enmity towards Russia in all its raw intensity.

United States policy towards Ukraine was on its face ambivalent in the first 23 years since 1991. The US claimed to support democracy in Ukraine. But there was always a darker, undeclared strand of US policy in Ukraine: of encouragement for Ukraine's extreme nationalist parties, successors to the World War Two Nazi parties, with their visceral hatred of all things Russian. The US wanted to foster and to use these parties to recreate Ukraine as a weapon against Russia: to create a Frankenstein monster, an 'anti-Russia.'

The February 2014 Maidan Square coup was a violent overthrow of the non-aligned Yanukovich government. Since this US-supported coup, the US has taken an overt role in Ukrainian politics in support of the anti-Russian extremist ideologies which had by now entered the Ukrainian political mainstream. The small Ukrainian democracy movement was sidelined.

Extreme nationalists moved into key positions of control throughout the Ukrainian political parties, civic administration and military forces. They formed their own elite military battalions, like the Azov and Aidar Battalions. These new political army units were equipped and trained by US and NATO instructors to be the most expert and fanatical Ukrainian Army battalions.

The significance of the years 2014–2022

It should be clear to any fairminded person that the present war in Ukraine actually began not in February 2022 but eight years previously in 2014, after the Maidan Square coup brought to power a strongly nationalist and anti-Russian government that immediately began to enforce new discriminatory anti-Russian laws. The frightened majority-Russian population in Crimea begged Russia to correct Khrushchev's foolish 1954 decision, by accepting Crimea back into Russia. The Russian Parliament agreed.

Donbass tried to do the same, as it was already experiencing severe ethnic discrimination and language suppression. Donetsk and Lugansk are rich industrial densely populated provinces, centred around the large Russian-speaking cities of the same name, and the major port city of Mariupol in the south. They demanded equal language rights and appealed for Russian help. But Putin was trying still for a federal political solution within Ukraine.

However in May 2014, the Ukrainian president Poroshenko ordered a brutal full military assault on Donbass. Two-thirds of the rebel provinces' territories, including the port city of Mariupol, were captured by Kiev. The two main rebel cities were mercilessly shelled. France and Germany and the UN in late 2014 brokered a fragile ceasefire, but the war dragged on, with Kiev never honouring the ceasefire. Civilian deaths in rebel Donbass over the eight years have been estimated at up to 14,000. Hundreds of thousands of families were made homeless refugees. The Western media rarely if ever reported these inconvenient truths. For Russians they have been a constant source of pain, anxiety and anger.

Things came to a climax in February this year. For months the Biden administration had started to send to Kiev powerful city-destroying weapons – something the Obama and Trump administrations had both previously refused to do. Russian intelligence learned that Kiev extreme nationalists were now planning finally to invade Donbass by force and to expel surviving Russian speakers to neighbouring Russia. In other words, ethnic cleansing.

Kiev had concentrated its best and most fanatical anti-Russian forces – 60,000 strong – in heavily fortified Western Donbass. As a deterrent, Moscow had massed over 100,000 Russian troops on Ukraine's borders.

On 17 February, the two rebel cities seceded from Ukraine and begged Russia for protection. On 21 February Russia finally recognised their independence and signed mutual defence treaties with them. Many observers hoped

this would ease the military tension but they were wrong. Ukrainian shelling of the Donbass cities intensified.

Finally on 24 February Putin announced a special military operation to *demilitarise and denazify Ukraine*. He announced *limited rules of engagement*: Russian forces would not attack Ukrainian civilians, or even Ukrainian soldiers in barracks. He refused to call it a war, because for him it was the wrong word for a quarrel between brothers.

Did the Kiev extreme nationalists and the US deliberately provoke Russia into starting this war? Did they deliberately put Russia in a position where it had *no choice but to go to war*? I think serious historians will accept this verdict.

The war's first phase, and the importance of Bucha

It is important to stress – because Western mainstream media still do not report this – that in the first weeks of the war, Russian air power and missiles destroyed the Ukrainian armed forces as an integrated mobile modern force: by destroying the Ukrainian airforce and airfields and by crippling Ukrainian army mobility and military secure communications.

I think Russia may have initially expected a quick and easy victory. They thought the people would welcome them. Their intelligence under-estimated the strength and persuasive power of extreme Ukrainian nationalism, backed by public fear of lethal regime punishment of dissenting civilians, and by US and NATO full-on diplomatic support for the Kiev regime.

Eight years of Ukronazi power had bitten deeply into Ukrainian people's minds. Hence Putin's purge of 150 Russian intelligence professionals: it seems they got it wrong, telling their government what they thought it wanted to hear. Ironically, US and NATO intelligence services may be making the same professional error now, overstating to their governments the resilience and staying power of the Kiev regime; either this, or their governments are not heeding them.

When Russian forces encountered stiff Ukrainian armed resistance in Kiev and Kharkov – using residential city areas as human shields – the Russian tanks and armoured vehicle columns, unable under their Rules of Engagement to shell residential areas withdrew: initially to the surrounding countryside, and a month later in late March almost back to the Russian border.

They left behind many vulnerable people who had welcomed or accepted their arrival. The murderous vengeance of the returning Ukrainian nationalists in places like Bucha was terrible indeed [1]. REF ONE Russia looked on appalled as Ukrainian extremist nationalists killed hundreds of their own Ukrainian compatriots as props, to stage false-flag alleged Russian atrocity scenarios, which Western media and politicians like Ursula von der Leyen and Josef Borrell lapped up without question and continue to their shame to do so.

I think that after Bucha, Russians finally saw the utter evil they were confronting in trying to deal respectfully with the Ukronazi-dominated Zelensky administration. They saw clearly at last that Ukronazis regard Russians, and Ukrainians who are friendly or civil towards them, as cockroaches – *untermenschen* – to be lied to, abused, and even killed without humanity or compunction. This has profoundly affected Russian military and diplomatic strategy from April onwards.

During the first month of the war, Ukrainian artillery shelled Russian-occupied areas from positions in Ukrainian residential city blocks in Kiev and Kharkov, where Russian artillery could not safely return fire without risking civilian lives and homes. Most of Kiev is still intact. The Kiev regime represent this as a victory. It was not.

In that first month of the war, Russian forces took heavy casualties. As noted, Russia could at any time have used air and missile power to flatten Kiev and Kharkov but chose not to do this, out of consideration for their Ukrainian brother nation. This fact is key to understanding this strange war.

Russia has continued its precision-targeted missile destruction of military targets from the air all over Ukraine. It has taken out Ukrainian fuel depots, weapons stores and arms factories, airfields, foreign fighter training bases, and electric railway traction stations throughout Ukraine and as far away from the Donbass front line as Odessa and Lvov. The option is open to strike key diesel railway junctions, even diesel train and truck convoys, as necessary to halt the flow of western weapons, missiles and fuel to the West Donbass cauldron.

The Donbass cauldron

In early April, Russia's strategy changed to a concentrated military focus against the strong Ukrainian extreme nationalist army in West Donbass: that same highly motivated army which had been preparing in February to overrun the rebel Donbass cities. In this West Donbass region, the war bloodily grinds on. Russian military superiority on the ground and control of the air space above means that the Ukrainian troop concentrations in the cauldron are effectively immobilised and taking disproportionate casualties. Russian commanders advance slowly, to husband their men's lives.

But the end result is not in any doubt. According to military experts like Scott Ritter, Alexander Mercouris, Andrey Martynov, or Jacques Baud, the brave but heavily outgunned and immobilised Ukrainian soldiers in the Western Donbass cauldron are all doomed to surrender or die in combat. I take no joy in this prediction because Kiev still insists on no surrender. So any surrenders are risky local affairs – most soldiers will stoically fight to the death as long as ordered to. The Donbass cauldron garrison has not yet found, and may never find, its General von Paulus.

We do not know when this will end. But it can only end in one of these ways. There will be no relief columns to the rescue, because these were Ukraine's best soldiers.

Mariupol

A word on Mariupol. A proud Donbass city, it unwillingly fell to Kiev Azov Battalion forces in 2014, and they garrisoned it harshly ever since. Mariupol was surrounded by Russian and Donbass forces early in the present war. There followed weeks of bitter and destructive fighting as the Azovs retreated towards their last stand in the Azovstal steelworks. As they retreated, their artillery fire reduced much of the city to rubble and their snipers vengefully killed thousands of civilians in the streets for sport. They destroyed Mariupol's beloved Drama Theatre in a planned false flag explosion from within, intended to kill 300 hostages, which they tried clumsily to blame on an alleged Russian missile strike [2]. REFERENCE TWO. The Azov's gross cruelty towards the people of Mariupol, as in Bucha,

has steeled the determination of Russian-speaking people in the Donbass region and beyond never to trust Kiev again.

The information war

A few quick words on this. Very little of what I have said so far in this paper is known to Western audiences, who are sheltered in a false propaganda narrative that Kiev is 'holding its own' militarily in a noble war against a brutal aggressive Russia which launched an unprovoked attack on Ukraine 10 weeks ago and has been committing great war crimes against Ukraine ever since. Nobody challenges this false narrative in the West, except for a few isolated contrarian websites and authors like me.

There is mainstream Western media agreement to stop referring to Ukrainian Nazis or their cruelties against Ukrainian citizens and Russian prisoners of war. There is silence on the facts that President Zelensky was elected originally as a peace candidate, but that he is controlled now by ruthless Ukrainian Nazis who would shoot him if he tried to make peace with Russia. And silence on the facts that most of the civilian war deaths so far have been caused by Ukrainian shellings from human shield areas, by sniper killings, and by punitive murders of alleged pro-Russian collaborators as in Bucha. False flag atrocity stories, prepared and carried out by Kiev extremists, have been rapidly reported around the world using all the resources of Western media. Civilian deaths in places like Bucha, Mariupol and Kramatorsk have been totally misrepresented in the West and Western media have knowingly collaborated in these lies. The purpose has been to paint Russia as a brutal aggressor and to fuel anti-Russian hatred in western circles. It all makes the task of peacemakers harder, which is part of the reason why the information war is being pursued so enthusiastically in the West. As in Orwell's '1984,' it is intended to keep up public support for the war. It is succeeding in this.

I believe the Russian forces continue to observe the Geneva Conventions of humanitarian warfare. The Ukrainian side clearly does not, and this is having a huge effect on the possibilities for peace and settlement of disputes.

The now unashamed United States admission of helping Kiev with real-time military targeting intelligence – which helped the Ukrainian side to sink the cruiser *Moskva* – would have left in the Russian military command a cold rage and determination to seize the maximum military and political advantage from here on in this war.

When the Donbass cauldron falls or surrenders, Russian forces will resume their slow but sure advances westwards: through Nikolayev oblast towards Odessa and the Transnistrian border, and through northern Zaporozhnoye oblast into Dnipropetrovsk oblast. I think Kharkov will finally fall to Russian encirclement.

At some point, Kiev's political nerve will crack and it will sue for peace. In the end, no quantities of delivered US and NATO weapons will compensate for the loss of trained fighting men through death, injury or surrender. In what is left of the fighting Ukrainian Army, officers' fear of being shot in the back by Ukronazi commanders if they surrender will I hope finally give way to a determination to end their men's pointless suffering. Whenever the fighting ends, the end could come quickly and dramatically.

The geography of a postwar outcome is becoming clearer. There is just too much Ukronazi power now solidly en-

trenched in Kiev and Lvov for Russia to gain the upper hand in these cities. They would be hotbeds of sabotage and terrorism. On the other hand, Odessa once liberated will in all probability, after a tentative period of testing the water, joyfully welcome the new order, as has happened in cities like Mariupol, Kherson and Melitopol. Whatever Ukronazis may be left in Odessa, and their power to intimidate local populations, will melt away.

I see emerging in the closing weeks or months of this conflict a partition solution. There will be two new demilitarised states in place of the present Ukraine, one in the north-west and the other in the south-east. Both will be neutral and non-aligned between Russia and the West, on the Austrian or Swiss model. Neither will join NATO or be militarily protected by NATO.

Russian military power on the ground will determine the final boundary between these two new states. I predict the new south-eastern state will include the eight southern and eastern oblasts of Odessa, Nikolaev, Kherson, Zaporozhzhia, Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkov, and Dnipropetrovsk including its important industrial cities of Krivoy Rog and Dnipro.

This new, politically friendly to Russia, multicultural and tolerant state will be mostly Russian-speaking but with full language rights for other language communities. It will be richer, because of its access to the industrial wealth of Krivoy Rog and Donbass, the rich wheatlands of the black earth steppes, and its control of access to bulk global exports through many ports. Postwar reconstruction will be swift, aided by Russia and by its own people's liberated native energies and resources.

The residual Ukrainian state with its capital Kiev will be larger but poorer because it will be landlocked and weaker in natural resources. Its people will initially be psychologically more depressed because of losing the war, as Germany was depressed for several years after 1945. The west will aid the new state to rebuild its infrastructure and economy. Western propaganda will work to keep morale as high as possible by praising the heroism of the defenders. Hollywood will make movies with Ukrainian soldiers as heroes. There will still be Ukronazis around, they will not go to trial, but their political agendas will have to moderate, and

their capacity to harm Russia and Russians even in their own state will be sharply curtailed. Many might give up in disgust and emigrate to the US or to Canada.

Could such a peace be negotiated diplomatically and enshrined in elegant signed treaties between the parties, internationally guaranteed by major European powers or by the UN Security Council? This would obviously be the best solution but I doubt it will be achievable for many years. There is too much entrenched hostility towards the Russian state now in Kiev, Washington, London and Brussels, and too many vested interests (e.g., Western armaments industries) wishing to maintain a political climate of bitter conflict.

I think the more likely outcome is a frozen conflict, as in the India-Pakistan conflict in Kashmir or the Georgia-Abkhazia conflict.

Anti-Russian revanchism will linger on in the Kiev state, encouraged by the West. But Russian power will nurture the new state and protect it from harm, as Russia has nurtured and protected the state and people of Belarus.

The question arises what the new state might choose to call itself? I would modestly propose a new name. The name 'Novorossiya' carries too much historical and colonial baggage now and means too many different things to so many different people.

I vote for Новарусь.

Like Belarus, it has its roots in the old sacred word for Russia, Rus' (русь). Thus it would nicely encapsulate the message that these three friendly nations – Russia, Belarus and Novarus – are all part of the great Русь family. It would be a hopeful and forward-looking new name for a new nation that had left the cruelty and anti-Russian racism of the Kiev regime decisively behind it. It would symbolize a new start.

References

1. *Kevin T. Lies, truth and forensics in Ukraine – The case of Bucha.* – Text : electronic // The Scrum : [website]. – URL: <https://thescrum.substack.com/p/lies-truth-and-forensics-in-ukraine?s=r> (date of address: 08.05.2022).
2. *Kevin T. Real war, propaganda war – the case of Mariupol.* – Text : electronic // The Scrum : [website]. – URL: <https://thescrum.substack.com/p/real-war-propaganda-war?s=r> (date of address: 08.05.2022).

T. Ya. Khabrieva¹

THE “AXIOLOGY” OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNATIONAL TURBULENCE

Challenges of the time and the role of law in overcoming them

D. S. Likhachov starts his great book “Man in the Literature of Ancient Rus” with a statement: “A human being is always the central object of literary creation.”² Anthropocentrism of the outstanding scholar and humanist can be safely applied to all phenomena of the world civilization, and law, among its other achievements.

Now that we are witnessing a profound transformation of civilization – the unprecedented globalization of the modern world, computerization of information flows, technologization and digitalization of human existence itself – the question is, Has this existence become more harmonious and secure? Against the backdrop of man-made and natural disasters, pandemics, and rising international tensions, the answer does not seem very optimistic. And once again, we are looking up to the tried and tested means of harmonizing social relations – the law.

The modern man, whether he is aware of it or not, lives in a multidimensional legal space, consisting of international, regional, national, and local levels. Each level of the legal corpus is dynamic and seeks to provide answers to the challenges of our time.

International law: from fragmentation to crisis

The processes of diversification and expansion of international law have led to its fragmentation, which has manifested itself in the growth of specialized norms (such as the *lex specialis* norms of case law) and regulatory systems (such as “autonomous” EU law) that are not clearly interrelated between each other and are not related to the basic

principles of international law. This phenomenon is rightly seen as a threat to the integrity of international law.

From the 1990s to the present day, there have been more disturbing symptoms signaling a decline in the universality of international law. Initially, attempts were made to secure the supremacy of international law over state policy. These attempts have failed. At the same time, there is a clearer trend to transform international law into a unipolar normative system governed from a single center (or, more precisely, from a leading state). The use of military force for so-called humanitarian purposes, especially bypassing the UN Security Council, has become a symbol of rejection of the fundamental ideas of international law by a group of the world’s leading states. Downplaying state sovereignty and near-total disregard for the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs are clear signs that international law has been replaced by a surrogate: global (or world) law. Apparently, international law has not only entered a period of serious crisis, but has also approached the collapse of its model formed on the basis of the UN Charter.

What can be the response of states unwilling to put up with the imposed “global quasi-order”? The main task today is to revive the categorical imperative of the conciliatory nature of international law, which has at all times been the law of consent. We must ensure that international relations are based only on equal rights and respect for the sovereignty of states. It is becoming increasingly clear that a multipolar system is not only desirable but also necessary for the revival of international law based on the UN Charter, and for overcoming its current crisis state.

The existing theory of international law, based primarily on the UN Charter and relevant international treaties, stipulates that the states should incorporate international norms into national law in various ways.³

Therefore, in many countries there is an ongoing debate about the relationship between international and domestic law, including the supremacy of national constitutions in the law of nations. Many constitutions assert, in one form or another, their supremacy over an international treaty or, more generally, over international law in general.

The constitutional practice of most developed Western states is based on the supremacy of the constitution over international law. Certain intricacies in the constitutional regulation of this issue may occur in states that belong to the common law system. Such provisions found in them are more often formulated in the decisions of the highest courts. For example, U.S. Supreme Court decisions make clear that the Constitution takes precedence over federally negotiated treaties and that the rule of the Constitution take precedence over the international treaty provisions.⁴

In France, an international treaty or agreement containing provisions contrary to the Constitution can only be concluded if the Constitution is revised accordingly. At the

¹ Director of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation, Deputy President of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Professor at the Department of Constitutional Law at MGIMO (University), Dr. Sc. (Law), Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Lawyer of the Republic of Tatarstan. Author of more than 400 scientific publications, including monographs: “Constitutional Reform in the Modern World,” “Venice Commission as a Subject of Legal Interpretation,” “Interpretation of the Constitution of the Russian Federation: Theory and Practice,” “National and Cultural Autonomy in the Russian Federation,” “The Theory of the Modern Constitution” (co-authored), “Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring in the Constitutional Dimension: Political and Legal Studies” (co-authored), “ASEAN as a Driver of Regional Integration in Asia” (co-authored), “Law and Social Development: a New Humanistic Hierarchy of Values” (co-authored), etc. Editor-in-Chief of the “Journal of Russian Law,” “Journal of Foreign Law and Comparative Law,” member of the editorial boards of the “State and Law” and “Constitutional and Municipal Law” journals. Representative of the Russian Federation in the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe (European Commission for Democracy through Law). Full member of the International Academy of Comparative Law. Member of the Presidential Council for Countering Corruption; the Presidential Commissions on Civil Service and Administrative Talent Pool and on State Awards; the Russian Government Commission on Legislative Activity; the Government Commission on Administrative Reform; the Expert Council of the Presidential Administration for Ensuring Constitutional Rights of Citizens; the Scientific Council under the Russian Security Council, etc. Deputy Chairman of the International Union of Lawyers, member of the Presidium of the Association of Lawyers of Russia. Awarded the Order of Merit for the Fatherland IV and III degrees, Order of Honor, Order of Friendship, etc. Honorary Doctor of SPbUHS.

² Лихачев Д. С. Человек в литературе Древней Руси. СПб.: Азбука: Азбука-Аттикус, 2015. С. 5.

³ Лазарев В. В. Философские основы имплементационной деятельности // Журнал российского права. 2020. № 9. С. 5–18.

⁴ See in more detail: Конституция Российской Федерации: от образа будущего к реальности (к 20-летию Основного закона России) / под ред. Т. Я. Хабриевой. М.: Юриспруденция, 2013. С. 528–529.

same time, the French Council of State, in a Decision of 30 October 1998, assumed a very clear stance that “the supremacy of the rules of international law enshrined in Article 55 of the French Constitution does not apply in the domestic legal order to the rules of constitutional law.”¹ In the Federal Republic of Germany, international treaties have the status of federal law and must comply with the Constitution. If they contradict it, they remain valid under international law, but cannot be applied in the domestic sphere without an amendment to the Basic Law.

Constitutions in other regions of the world also contain numerous examples of legislative consolidation of supremacy of the Basic Law, sometimes in its original form. For instance, the Constitution of Mexico provides that the laws of the National Congress issued on its basis, along with all treaties aligned to it, constitute the supreme law of the federation. The Mexican Supreme Court additionally concluded that international treaties take precedence over federal and state laws, but are inferior to the Constitution. A similar formula is enshrined in the 2014 Tunisian Constitution: “International agreements approved and ratified by the Parliament take precedence over laws, but not over the Constitution.”²

This raises another question concerning the relationship between the national legal system and an international treaty in which the State ceases to participate, and its status. At a first glance, it's all easy: no treaty no problem, that is, a treaty that has ceased to be valid in the territory of Russia will no longer be regarded as part of its legal system, and it will not be subject to the provisions of Part 4 of Article 15 of the country's Constitution. Federal law provides that termination of an international treaty by the Russian Federation releases it from any obligation to perform the treaty in the future and does not affect the rights, obligations or legal position of the Russian Federation that arose as a result of performing the treaty prior to its termination. However, the nature and content of the treaty, as well as the associated circumstances, may affect the process of termination of international obligations.

Today's reality demonstrates relevance of the issue of termination of a number of international treaties on the territory of a state to international and constitutional law. And there is a fresh instance: forced withdrawal of Russia from the Council of Europe, announced on March 15, 2022, did not prevent from completing the procedure of termination of membership in this international organization on January 1, 2023. In this case, Russia could denounce the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) as of September 15, 2022. However, the resolution of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of March 16, 2022 of the same date terminated Russia's membership in the international organization, which led to the automatic termination of all international treaties open only to member states.

An unjustified exception was made for the ECHR, though, whose validity and, consequently, jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was extend-

ed for Russia by another six months – until September 16, 2022. Russia (through the draft Federal Law “On termination of international treaties of the Council of Europe and invalidation of certain provisions of legislative acts of the Russian Federation”) decided to terminate the ECHR, as well as other twenty treaties, from March 16, 2022. Thus, ECtHR judgments on appeals raised after March 16 this year will not be reviewed in Russia.

The withdrawal from the Council of Europe and the denunciation of 21 documents (the Charter, the General Agreement on Privileges and Immunities of the Council, its protocols, the ECHR and its ten protocols, as well as three conventions) entail not only the adoption of the relevant law, but also the abrogation of nine federal laws (ratification), amendments to nine codes, two federal laws and four presidential decrees.

Thus, only after all the procedures for changing Russian legislation in connection with Russia's withdrawal from the Council of Europe have been duly carried out, it will be possible to say that the relevant treaties are not an integral part of the Russian legal system.

There is an opinion that, in addition to resolving the legal and technical issues of termination of the Council of Europe treaties, it is necessary to generally deal with the legacy of its values, “echoes” of which will linger in the Russian legal system. Apparently, we should not “eradicate” from the legal system of the state the entire catalog of values enshrined not only in the Council of Europe conventions, but also in other international treaties and acts, which remain valid for Russia. So, we should preserve the value achievements with a broader horizon of effect (the UN, CIS, SCO, BRICS, etc.) as imperatives of common international law, without reference to specific mechanisms of their previous implementation, and as generally recognized principles and norms of international law, taking into account and building on the Constitution of the country in the first place.³

The Law of Integration Associations: Political and Economic Imperatives

Common international law is in crisis and in search for answers to today's challenges, but not all levels of the international legal corpus are in the same state. International integration law, sometimes referred to as supranational law, is becoming an object of close attention not only of legal science, but also of states. The carrier and “legislator” of this supranational law are regional international organizations, in some cases distinguished by their integrative nature, i.e. as having supranational powers. Unlike universal international organizations, in which most states of the world participate, and which have a rather complex and inefficient decision-making mechanism, regional international organizations generally have a more compact arrangement and

¹ See: *Маклаков В. В.* Конституционный контроль и защита прав и свобод человека в современной Франции. М.: ИНИОН РАН, 2015.

² The Tunisian constitution was reviewed by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe. See: CDL-AD (2013)032 Opinion on the Final Draft Constitution of the Republic of Tunisia. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 96th Plenary Session (Venice, 11–12 October 2013). Characteristically, the Commission made no comment regarding the provision on the supremacy of the Constitution in the legal system of the country.

³ See in more detail: *Хабриева Т. Я.* Конституционная реформа в России: в поисках национальной идентичности // *Вестник Российской академии наук.* 2020. Т. 90, № 5. С. 403–414; *Eadem.* Конституционная реформа в России в координатах универсального и национального // *Журнал зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения.* 2021. Т. 17, № 1. С. 6–12; *Хабриева Т. Я., Клишас А. А.* Тематический комментарий к Закону Российской Федерации о поправке к Конституции Российской Федерации от 14 марта 2020 г. № 1-ФКЗ «О совершенствовании регулирования отдельных вопросов организации и функционирования публичной власти». М.: Норма, 2020; *Морозов А. Н., Каширкина А. А.* Конституционные преобразования в Российской Федерации и взаимодействие международного и внутригосударственного права: преемственность и новизна // *Журнал российского права.* 2022. Т. 26, № 1. С. 120–141.

more modern and flexible institutional mechanisms helping them quickly achieve their goals. However, there is an emerging trend which has yet to be appreciated: formation of some regional international enclaves of a closed type, which include the European Union and (as increasingly evident recently) the Council of Europe.

Russia acts as an advocate of equitable and fair international legal regionalism, which is manifested in the strategies of its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), CIS, SCO, and BRICS. International integration associations (EAEU, the Union State of Russia and Belarus) are important tools for ensuring international and regional economic stability, overcoming global economic crises and minimizing their consequences. They produce a tangible impact on the economic growth of member states, provided that the interstate integration association itself functions effectively. It's because, as a rule, within the framework of an interstate association there is a special international legal and economic space established through international treaties, which should remain a space of security and stability in times of global crises thanks to the arsenal of closer cooperation on the basis of mutual support, laid down in international legal acts.¹

In our opinion, progressive development of integration requires states to gradually build up integration interaction, that is, to deepen and expand areas of cooperation by including new parameters and formats in the matrix of legal regulation.² Of course, such parameters and formats of integration interaction between states within an international association or international organization are impossible without an international legal component and, ultimately, without the agreement of states on new areas and forms of cooperation within an interstate integration association.

At the regional level, there is a very active build-up of a corpus of the so-called integration law, which competes and sometimes conflicts with the norms of international law. So, in some of its judgments, the Court of Justice of the European Union has explicitly upheld the priority of "community law" over international law.³ However, this concept cannot be supported unequivocally, because this approach opens the way for the abuse of law (even if integration law) to the detriment of the interests of third states and other international organizations. The EAEU, for example, takes the opposite position, consolidating the commitment of member states and the Union to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, as well as other generally recognized principles and norms of international law, in the preamble of its founding treaty.

At the same time, against the background of deformation of the international legal order and intensification of international and political confrontation, it is essential to pre-

serve the international legal basis for favorable development of global and regional integration.⁴ At the same time, it cannot be denied that the current integration agenda reflects aggravation of regionalization, which has replaced globalization in all common world processes.

In general, the phenomenon of regionalization fits into the logic of dialectical processes. It replaces globalization when the latter ceases to follow the ascending line of civilizational development. In this case, regionalization is objectively a certain "alienation" from the achievements of human civilization in the global sense. Besides, the phenomenon of regionalization is a "salvation trajectory" for strained international relations, as it helps avoid confrontation between global players in rigid formats. In one way or another, regionalism can act as a political alternative and an economic platform for the growth of new international cooperation with states that have long been in the shadow of global politics and economics. This fully applies to the phenomenon of regional integration within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), as well as international cooperation organizations such as the SCO and BRICS, which are not strictly integration associations, but have some of their characteristics.

Maintaining the function of interstate integration associations at the regional level, as well as development of international legal regulation of integration relations in conditions of deformation of the global legal order means that the states have to solve the problem of modernizing legislation and constitutional norms. It is noteworthy that over the past two or three years, all EAEU states have significantly updated both their constitutions and their current legislation.

It can be concluded that the political and economic imperatives encourage many states to look for points of reference in integrative regional associations and in the integration law. It is no coincidence that integration dynamics manifests not only in Europe, but also in the Central and South America, Africa and Southeast Asia.

The Constitution as a haven of social stability

In the conditions of a large-scale global conflict developing in different areas, and the uncertainty of contours of the new world order, the Basic Law of the state – the Constitution – remains the key element of the internal stability of a society. Perhaps legally it is the most reliable pillar. It sets the key vectors of the society's development and lays a solid foundation for the regulators of social relations.

Russia has also adopted the strategic benchmarks of the new paradigm of sovereign value-oriented constitutional development. Until recently, the practice of constitutional amendments has been less radical than in many other countries that have undertaken full-scale constitutional reforms.⁵ Constitutional transformations in the Russian Federation took place through spot changes in the Basic Law and unlocking its potential through the legal interpretation activities of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, as well as lawmaking.⁶

⁴ See about it: Тихомиров Ю. А. Способы преодоления критических ситуаций как деформирующего фактора развития государств и мирового сообщества // Журнал зарубежного законодательства и сравнительного правоведения. 2022. Т. 18, № 1. С. 13–15.

⁵ See in more detail: Конституция 1993 года: была ли альтернатива: материалы круглого стола (Москва, 16 января 2019 г.) / под ред. Т. Я. Хабриевой. М., 2020.

⁶ Хабриева Т. Я. Конституционная реформа в России: в поисках национальной идентичности // Вестник Российской академии наук. 2020. Т. 90, № 5. С. 403–414.

¹ See in more detail: Нарышкин С. Е., Хабриева Т. Я. К новому парламентскому измерению евразийской интеграции // Журнал российского права. 2012. № 8. С. 5–15; Хабриева Т. Я. О правовых контурах и координатах евразийской интеграции // Проблемы современной экономики. 2013. № 3 (47). С. 21–23; Тиунов О. И. Об особенностях развития интеграционных процессов на постсоветском пространстве // Журнал российского права. 2012. № 8 (188). С. 92–98; Курбанов Р. А. Евразийское право. Теоретические основы. М.: ЮНИТИ: ЮНИТИ-ДАНА, 2015; Он же. Евразийская интеграция в контексте мировой глобализации: современные тренды и тенденции развития // Вестник экономической безопасности. 2020. № 1. С. 133–141.

² Каширкина А. А. Евразийский экономический союз: расширение границ и правовая реальность // Журнал российского права. 2016. № 11. С. 160–171.

³ See, e.g.: *Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L.* Case 6/64. Judgment of the Court of 15 July 1964.

The President's Address to the Federal Assembly on January 15, 2020, in fact, announced a strategy of further constitutional and legal development of the state, based on the values of man-made civilization and collectivism, as well as the priority of socio-cultural character of the Russian society.

The broad discussion that unfolded during the preparation of amendments to the Constitution of the Russian Federation demonstrated the public demand for the Basic Law to reflect the "constitutional authenticity" and a number of other values and moral guidelines.

The President's initiative, which was implemented in the Law of the Russian Federation on Amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation "On Improving the Regulation of Individual Issues of Organization and Functioning of Public Power,"¹ gave a start to something that was, albeit not a constitutional reform,² but still a transformation approaching the former in its significance, scope and depth.³ Their implementation had the following consequences.

1. Expansion of value catalog of the Basic Law, so that it represents a more detailed reflection of historical origins, spiritual traditions and own ideals of the Russian society.

2. Modernization of the system of social rights of citizens and legal guarantees.

3. Adjustment of the form of public authority, giving it new outlines in connection with a tangible correction of the content corresponding to this form.

4. Special tuning of the state mechanism and implementation of public authority, as well as technological processes of formation and implementation of public policy, establishment of new parameters for the functioning of the system of public administration.

5. A change in the configuration of dichotomy of the national legal system, the extent of its openness and protection from negative external influence. It occurred through the incorporation of a new (but already tested through the activities of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation) formula of commensurate universal and national legal values, principles and norms, into the Constitution and constitutional legislation.

As a result of discussions at various levels, including public debate and debates in the chambers of the Federal Assembly, the updated Constitution of 1993 reflected or emphasized socially significant benchmarks which considerably expanded and deepened the value content of the Constitution. Among them are the following.

1. Socio-cultural and spiritual values are the basis of national (state) identity and self-identification of the Russian people: a multinational union of equal peoples united by a thousand years of history; continuity in the development of the Russian state; historically established state in-

tegrity; Russian as the language of the state-forming ethnos; all-Russian cultural identity; culture as unique common heritage while maintaining the cultural identity of peoples, ethnocultural and linguistic diversity; preservation of the memory of ancestors who gave us the ideals and faith in God; historical truth and its protection; patriotism, citizenship, honoring the memory of the defenders of the Fatherland, the importance of heroism of people in defense of the Fatherland; traditional Russian family values – marriage as the union of a man and a woman; ensuring the priority of proper family upbringing; respect and care for parents and elders, the solidarity of generations.

2. Values of social (including socio-economic) development: sustainable economic growth; advanced scientific and technological development; socially oriented public policy; "value-based" attitude to labor and respect for the worker; social partnership; public and individual health and shaping the culture of responsible attitude of citizens to their health.

3. Environmental value benchmarks: preservation of natural and biological diversity of the country, ensuring environmental safety, environmental education. Regulation of these provisions aims, inter alia, at establishing an optimal balance between individual freedom and the public interest.

4. Socio-political values: civil peace and harmony in the country; economic, political and social solidarity; development of civil society and support of its institutions, including non-profit organizations; international peace and security; peaceful coexistence of states and peoples. These values were not previously consolidated at the level of constitutional regulation in the Russian Federation, with the exception of some provisions of the foreign policy section of the Constitution of the RSFSR of 1978 (where there is a reference to the Constitution of the USSR).

5. State legal values: the principle of legal succession (legal continuity) in relation to the Union of SSR, securing the Russian constitutional identity in the domestic and international space; the principle of unity of public authority. Since the system of separation of powers that includes "checks and balances" is one of the signs of a state governed by the rule of law and is a value of a political, state-legal nature, certain changes in this system are also worth mentioning.⁴

In addition, emphasis has been placed on such values previously enshrined in the Basic Law as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, entrepreneurship and private initiative.

Not explicitly mentioned as a value, but present in the text of the Constitution (which can be determined through a systematic interpretation of its norms) is a strong, independent state, corresponding to the Russian mental tradition. The most important part of any Constitution is consolidation of the norms of state sovereignty at the highest legal level. The new wording of the articles on succession (legal continuity), strengthening international peace and security, and participation in international treaties should be seen in a general context that reinforces and deepens understanding of the concept of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation and the foreign policy of the state.⁵

⁴ *Хабриева Т. Я., Черногор Н. Н.* Будущее права: наследие академика В. С. Степина и юридическая наука. М. ИНФРА-М, 2020. С. 62–64.

⁵ See in more detail: Комментарий к Конституции Российской Федерации (постатейный) с учетом изменений, одобренных в ходе общероссийского голосования 1 июля 2020 года / под ред. Т. Я. Хабриевой. М. : ИНФРА-М, 2021.

¹ See more about this in detail: *Хабриева Т. Я., Книшас А. А.* Op. cit.

² On the features and characteristics of constitutional reform, as well as other varieties of constitutional change, see: *Хабриева Т. Я.* Конституционная реформа в современном мире. М. : Наука, 2016 ; *Хабриева Т. Я., Чиркин В. Е.* «Цветные революции» и «арабская весна» в конституционном измерении: политолого-юридическое исследование. М. : НОРМА : ИНФРА-М, 2018 ; *Khabrieva T.* La réforme constitutionnelle dans le monde contemporain. P. : Société de législation comparée, 2019.

³ For a chronicle of the constitutional transformations, see: Конституционная модернизация – 2020 и Институт законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской Федерации // Институт законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской Федерации : [сайт]. URL: https://izak.ru/img_content/content/books/konstitucionnaya-modernizaciya-2020-2.pdf (date of address: 16.06.2022).

It is quite acceptable to assume the same approach to assessment of constitutional regulation of issues related to strengthening the protection of the Constitution itself, maintaining its authority and priority in the legal system of the country, and to non-interference in the internal affairs of the Russian state. The Russian Federation, as a sovereign state with full powers to determine the configuration of its own legal system, has previously consolidated in part 1 of Article 15 and will continue to exercise the supremacy of the Constitution over those norms of international law that do not align with it. First of all, it is about interpretations of the provisions of international treaties made by interstate bodies in contradiction of the Constitution of the Russian Federation.

In search for new strategies for legal development, both globally and nationally, most states are guided by the world-view agenda that reflects the defense of national sovereignty and cultural identity. For Russia, it is extremely relevant. Now that value markers have finally been placed in the Basic Law, we can move forward – to fine-tune the legal system of the Russian Federation in unison with the constitutionalized spiritual, moral and political-legal reference points. This will allow the Russian Constitution to take its rightful place in the global constitutional space and ensure the successful overcoming of shortcomings and deformations of the international legal order.

Value benchmarks of modern societies and their consolidation in constitutions

The constitutional reform of 2020 in Russia has heightened the interest in the axiological (value) component of the Basic Law. As we know, the text of the Constitution was amended to incorporate the historical heritage of the country, the cultural identity of all its peoples and ethnic communities, the protection of the institution of marriage and the family, social guarantees, etc. According to some liberal critics, the emphasis on collective identity in the updated Constitution allegedly aimed to “slow down the emergence of modern society in Russia.”¹ In fact, strengthening of value elements in modern constitutionalism is a worldwide trend.

In the new or updated constitutions of non-European countries, the emerging trends manifest in overcoming of an exclusively liberal model of values that was considered to be universal. States increasingly assert not only political but also “value” sovereignty. It seems that the departure from the classical principles of Western liberalism in favor of protecting one’s own sovereignty and the values of one’s own development will accelerate, since the “universal,” “all-human” ideals proclaimed by the West have proven to be little more than declarations in the current international environment. Even the values associated with inalienable human rights (freedom, property, security) were denied in practice and easily violated.

The history of world constitutionalism is inextricably linked to the axiological assessment of the constitution as the basic law in the state. In the words of one of the founders of the sociological school, E. Durkheim, one of the tasks of any constitution is “translation of ideas about the values

of a society into the language of law.” Moreover, according to Durkheim’s concept, the very vitality of a society is determined by whether it has ideals and higher values.²

Even the first world’s constitutional acts of the 17th–18th centuries in England, the United States, and France contained a reference to the basic principles and values of revolutionary liberalism: the rule of law, parliamentarism, separation of powers, natural and inalienable human rights. They were freedom, equality, property, and resistance to oppression.

The liberal individualistic constitutions of the eighth and nineteenth centuries were replaced en masse in the twentieth century by constitutions that enshrined the value concept of a “social” and “legal” state. Socialist constitutions based on values that deny or transform Western liberal ideology have also emerged.

At present, gradual change of the vector of world civilization’s development toward a multipolar world (which is apparently encountering enormous obstacles) creates preconditions for the emergence of new constitutional value benchmarks. These benchmarks are mostly grounded in the historical diversity of cultures and national legal systems. This phenomenon is particularly typical of countries with ancient and distinctive cultural traditions, such as China, India, Russia, for the Arab-Muslim region (especially after the revolutions of the Arab Spring), and for some communities in Africa.

It is quite natural that the first two decades of the twenty-first century opened a new stage in the massive transformation of constitutions in these countries and regions of the world, which began to use new strategies of their development and concepts of their own socio-cultural identity. One can say that the socio-cultural, value-forming role of the Constitution as the basic law of the state is now more in demand than ever.

The evolution of global constitutionalism in favor of stronger defense of one’s own values and national identity is particularly evident in the examples of the constitutions of Latin America, Africa and some Asian states. Even some Eastern European countries (e.g., Hungary) supplement their constitutions with provisions that are largely at odds with the Western liberal mainstream (e.g., marriage as the union of man and a woman, role of Christianity in preserving the nation, support for a unique language and culture, core values of the nation such as fidelity, faith, and love).

Whereas the first Latin American constitutions (Venezuela 1811, Argentina 1819, Mexico 1824, Bolivia 1826) followed French or North American models, the current constitutions are more authentic, taking into account local realities and enshrining various socio-economic values that had no parallel in earlier constitutions of the world.

After becoming independent, most African states have modeled their constitutions after former metropolises. However, in the most recent African constitutions there are increasingly more provisions that reflect the national specificity, national identity, and cultural uniqueness of these peoples. The role of traditional law adds originality to their legal systems.

A special group of African constitutions includes the constitutions of the states of predominantly North and Central Africa, sometimes referred to as “Islamic” constitutions.

¹ Бланкенагель А. Конституции, коллективная идентичность и конституционная идентичность: куда мы должны двигаться? (на англ. яз.) // Сравнительное конституционное обозрение. 2022. № 1 (146). С. 73.

² Дюркгейм Э. Социология. Ее предмет, метод, предназначение. 4 изд., испр. М.: Юрайт, 2019.

Many of the newest constitutions in the region emerged as a result of the revolutionary events that became known as the Arab Spring¹. These include the Constitution of Morocco (2011), the Constitution of the Republic of South Sudan (2011), the Constitution of Egypt (2014), and the Constitution of Tunisia (2014). In addition to traditional Islamic values, they enshrine the foundations of the social and state system which reflect the specifics of the cultural and historical development of these countries. So, the Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt devotes several pages of its preamble to the historical features of the country and its contribution to world civilization.

It can be argued that in the African constitutions of the 21st century there is a significant expansion of the limits and objects of constitutional regulation, the intention to supplement the Basic Law with all important manifestations of social life and a wide range of moral and ethical values, which previously were not the subject of legal (especially constitutional) regulation. Special sections appearing in African constitutions reflect the basic goals and principles of state policy and “values of the state and the nation.”²

It seems that modern Latin American and African constitutions deserve a thorough study by the constitutional scholars when it comes to the regulation of national identity and national constitutional values; they are often superior in this respect to the constitutions of Western countries and other regions of the world. They contain references to the value foundations and principles of building the society and the state, the main goals and objectives of public policy. Such goal-setting is fully consistent with one of the main features of any constitution – to be a political and ideological program document. Not all of the world’s constitutions meet this challenge.

Value benchmarks are characteristic of the constitutions of all CIS states. In addition to references to the common values enshrined in the preambles, these constitutions establish the right to preserve national and ethnic identity (Article 56 of the Armenian Constitution) and ties with the Diaspora (Article 19), the responsibility of the state to preserve the national historical, cultural and natural heritage (Article 15 of the Constitution of Turkmenistan). The updated constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic contains a separate chapter dedicated to “Spiritual and Cultural Foundations of the Society” (Section One, Chapter III). Characteristically, none of these states assumes an obligation to “carry the light of their values” to the outside world.

We see a somewhat different picture in the European Union. EU experience shows that even generally accepted value benchmarks may not always lead in the right direction. It is well-known that the fundamental values of this associa-

tion are enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.³ They include the ideals of the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. Over time, these values have developed numerous protection mechanisms that are increasingly invading the constitutional development of individual member states. At the same time, the traditional mechanism for countering the “serious and persistent violation of fundamental values,” the famous Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, is complemented by more and more new mechanisms of oversight and enforcement. The apogee of this ideological pressure is the Rule of Law Conditionality Mechanism, envisioned in 2020.⁴ It threatens to deprive Hungary of the EU Recovery Fund, which was created to deal with the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic, as well as other budgetary funds needed to implement the Union measures. This calls into question the very feasibility of Hungary’s membership in the EU. As penalties set by the Court of Justice of the European Union for violating the values of the rule of law, Poland already owes the EU more than 100 million euros, and this debt is increasing by 1 million euros every day.

There are also concerns about the provisions of the Treaty on European Union, according to which the Union carries out international cooperation not in order to come to mutual agreement with other civilizations and peoples, but in order to protect and “promote” its own values, which is directly enshrined in Article 21 of the EU Treaty. This is nothing other than a “dictate of values,” which entails concrete practical consequences. In 2020, the European Union issued Council Regulations⁵ under which anyone in the world could be deprived of possessions, property, income and freedom of movement in Europe for actions qualified by the Union as “serious violations and abuses of human rights” (which is a very biased concept). And all of this is done outside of geographical reference, that is, as an extra-territorial effect of the association’s regulations on individuals, without the need to decide whether to hold them internationally or domestically responsible.

Thus, the “dictate of values” has no place in the reboot of the modern world order and formation of the polycentric architecture of the world order, which is becoming inevitable. The negative experience of the European Union is a reminder that no amount of radicalism, dictate and extremism, even for the common good, contributes to the preservation of peace and well-being of people.

* * *

To summarize, in recent decades, the entire system of law regulating the sphere of social relations at different levels has undergone a serious transformation. Lawmakers try to

¹ See more about this in detail: *Хабриева Т. Я., Чиркин В. Е.* *Op. cit.*

² It should also be noted that many terms denoting historical national institutions and establishments have been incorporated into the latest African constitutions in the national languages, without translation into European languages. For this reason, when the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation was preparing a multi-volume edition of the Constitutions of the World, it was necessary to give either a word-for-word translation of these terms or a commentary to them. See: Конституции государств Америки : в 3 т. / под ред. Т. Я. Хабриевой. М. : Ин-т законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской Федерации, 2006 ; Конституции государств Азии : в 3 т. / под ред. Т. Я. Хабриевой. М. : Норма : Ин-т законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской Федерации, 2010 ; Конституции государств Африки и Океании : сб. / отв. ред. Т. Я. Хабриева. М. : Ин-т законодательства и сравнительного правоведения при Правительстве Российской Федерации, 2018–2022.

³ Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union // EUR-Lex : [website]. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT> (date of address: 16.06.2022).

⁴ Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget // EUR-Lex : [website]. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?toc=OJ%3AL%3A2020%3A4331%3ATOC&uri=uriserv%3AOJ.L1.2020.433.01.0001.01.ENG> (date of address: 16.06.2022).

⁵ Consolidated text: Council Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 of 7 December 2020 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses // EUR-Lex : [website]. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/1998> (date of address: 16.06.2022) ; Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2021/478 of 22 March 2021 implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1998 concerning restrictive measures against serious human rights violations and abuses // EUR-Lex : [website]. URL: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A2021R0478> (date of address: 16.06.2022).

keep up with the rapid changes in the conditions of human existence. Each era created its own contexts, dictating its values to the law. The law preserves prior contexts which combine to form the memory of law, which is, akin to lan-

guage, a code complementing the history. In our search for points of reference for modern law, let us not forget D. S. Likhachov's advice: all achievements of civilization must serve the human good.

**A. D. Khlutkov¹,
V. A. Shamakhov²**

RUSSIA ON THE WAY TO EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL (CIVILIZATIONAL) GEOPOLITICS

The global trend towards emergence of a multipolar world order unfolds right before our eyes. What is happening will take years to acquire its real contours, but even today the signs of multipolarity are becoming more and more visible. Just recall S. Huntington's concept of local civilizations, thanks to which the classical (power, military) geopolitics gradually began to become global (civilizational).

Now not only states, but also local civilizations, international unions and organizations (for example, the United Nations, the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Organization of Turkic States) are seen as actors in global geopolitics.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, there was a trend toward establishing of a unipolar world headed by the United States, but as years go by, world politics and international relations experts are ever more confidently speaking of the coming multipolar world order.

One example of this is the speech by I. S. Ivanov³ at the 20th Annual Conference of the Baltic Forum "USA, EU and Russia – a new reality" (2015). Here are his words on the *decline of the Greater Europe*: "It has become fashionable

to claim that Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok is being replaced by Greater Eurasia from Shanghai to Minsk. Although the contours of Greater Eurasia remain shaky and unclear in many respects, one cannot fail to see the objective and long-term nature of the processes of establishing a new transnational economic and political structure. Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia are emerging as new centers of global gravity, and the relationship between them is becoming the main axis of future world politics...

Our task is to determine the rules of the game between the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasia, which would minimize the risks of uncontrolled confrontation, create opportunities for dialogue and cooperation in solving common problems and restoring manageability of the international system."⁴

Four years later, V. A. Chizhov – Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the European Union, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, who took part in the 17th Rhodes Forum "Dialogue of Civilizations" (conference "Global (dis)order: Towards dialogue-based world-views") – delivered a report entitled "Global (dis)order and European (in)security," in which he said that the European Union was founded "not on values, but on interests, as an instrument to prevent a new war in Europe... Now the EU has, in a sense, returned to its original purpose and has again turned into an instrument to align the interests of its member states. In less than three weeks, the new European Commission will begin its work. Its head Ursula von der Leyen defined it as "geopolitical." Let's see how geopolitics performed by the newly elected European Commissioners will help overcome the crisis phenomena I listed above and to preserve the global position of Europe in the broad sense, both in economy and politics, in a changing multipolar world...

But I would like to point out the obvious. The only way for the European Union not to turn into a run-down "backyard" of the world economy and politics as early as this century is the unification of Europe or even Eurasia from Lisbon to Vladivostok... As for a more general "recipe" for the unification of Eurasia – in our opinion, it fits into a simple phrase: integration of integrations. I mean conjunction of the economic potentials of the two largest integration projects that coexist on our continent – the EAEU and the EU.

Notably, this recipe was first documented at the Russia-EU summit in Moscow in 2005, in the Roadmap for Common Space of External Security: "Russia and the European Union recognize that the processes of regional cooperation and integration in which they participate and which are based on the sovereign decisions of states, play an impor-

¹ Director of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Associate Professor. Author of more than 60 scientific publications and textbooks, including monographs: "The Policy of Economic Security of Russia in the Context of globalization," "National Financial Policy in Ensuring the Economic Security of the State," "Urban Development: Theoretical and Methodological Aspects" (co-authored), and others; textbooks: "Fundamentals of Economic Security of Business" (co-authored), "Fundamentals of Crisis-Free Public Administration in the Age of Globalization" (co-authored), and others. Awarded the Order of Honor, the Medals of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland I and II degrees, the Medal for Distinguished Military Service of I degree, the Medal "In Memory of the 300th Anniversary of St. Petersburg," Medals for Distinguished Military Service I, II and III degree.

² Scientific supervisor of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Candidate of Historical Sciences, Professor, 1st class State Councillor of the Russian Federation. Colonel General of the Customs Service. Author of more than 100 scientific publications, including monographs: "The Military Security of Russia and its Information Policy in the Age of Civilization Conflicts" (co-authored), "Power Mechanisms for Ensuring the Military Security of the Russian Federation in the Age of Conflicting Civilizations" (co-authored), "Professionalism in Public Civil Service: Technologies of Achievement," etc. Member of the Scientific-Expert Council under the Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Expert Council of the State Duma Committee on Physical Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth Affairs, Expert and Advisory Council under Leningrad Oblast Legislative Assembly, and the Public Chamber of St. Petersburg. Recipient of the Commendation from the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, awarded the Order of Friendship, Order of Saint Vladimir, Order of Holy Prince Daniel of Moscow III degree, Order of the Lion of Finland, etc. Recipient of the St. Petersburg Government Prize.

³ Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia (1998–2004), President of the Russian Council on International Affairs.

⁴ Иванов И. С. Закат Большой Европы: [выступление на XX ежегодной конференции Балтийского форума «США, ЕС и Россия – новая реальность». Рига, 12 сентября 2015 г.]. URL: <https://globalaffairs.ru/global-processes/Zakat-Bolshoi-Evropy-17680> (date of address: 10.04.2022).

tant role in strengthening security and stability. They agree to actively promote these processes in a mutually beneficial way through result-oriented close cooperation and dialogue between Russia and the European Union, thus effectively contributing to creating a Greater Europe without dividing lines based on common values.

In my opinion, it is hardly arguable that “Greater Eurasia” with its linkage of the investment and technological potential of the EU and the resource base of Russia and its EAEU partners will be able to compete with the rapidly developing Asia-Pacific Region (APR).¹

Meanwhile, the power policy that the European Union is pursuing today does not aim at overcoming the crisis phenomena in Western politics, taking into account the formation of a multipolar world and other global changes. On the contrary, since the start of the special military operation in Ukraine, EU policy has become even more odious.

Moreover, it should be remembered that the strategic objective of Russia’s relations with the EU was clearly formulated in the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation (approved on October 30, 2016), which mentions three regions of the Eurasian continent – Euro-Atlantic, Eurasian and Asia-Pacific: “Creating a common economic and humanitarian space from Atlantic to Pacific on the basis of harmonization and coupling of European and Eurasian integration processes.”²

It is obvious that the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation will undergo certain changes and will be adopted in a new version after completion of the special military operation and rethinking of global geopolitical shifts in the world.

In the course of discussions on Greater Eurasia, the Greater Eurasian Partnership and Russia’s place in it, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking in the Federation Council of the Russian Federation on December 1, 2021, defined the current status of our state as follows: “Russia is a great Eurasian, Euro-Pacific power.”³

This reminds of the proud words addressed by Chancellor A. M. Gorchakov to the European governments after the

Crimean War: “Russia isn’t getting angry – it’s getting focused” (“La Russie ne boude pas – elle se recueille”). Thus continues the tradition of Russia’s open and clear policy. However, this policy updates with time: today it is in line with V. Putin’s statement about the need to keep the West in tension (“a certain tension has arisen there”⁴).

This Russian position clearly expresses one of the key trends of our time: mutual isolation of states and their resistance to attempts to exert external influence on their behavior after the end of the “thirty-year transition” that followed the Cold War.⁵ The need to keep the West in tension is a natural response to the hybrid (including cognitive) warfare waged against Russia, which has defined the global political and military agenda in recent years.

Today, Russia is perceived by Europeans as an empire, as Hélène Carrère d’Encausse, a well-known French historian and political scientist, permanent secretary of the French Academy, wrote in her book “Eurasian Empire.” Based on a detailed review of the political intricacies of life in post-Soviet Russia, she asks: Since the idea of Eurasianism has once again become popular in Russia under the influence of nationalists who are nostalgic for the empire and see this idea as a means to realize the imperial dream, should we conclude that “the importance the Russian government attaches to Islam and Asia today is the last manifestation of an imperial mentality that survived the Empire’s demise? Or is it, simply, the pragmatism of a state that is learning to live without an empire and trying to replace it after its collapse with a zone of special influence based on a kind of a ‘Monroe Doctrine a-la Russe’? Will Russia, inspired by the American example, eventually be transformed into a republic-empire?”⁶

The answer can hardly be unambiguous. Still, Eurasia, as the center of geopolitical and other interests of many countries, is seen differently by the states – of the Eurasian continent itself, be they great powers or limitrophe states, and of those who observe from the shores of other continents. Russian geo-civilization, in turn, should be seen as one of the poles of a polycentric world order.

¹ See: Кефели И. Ф., Шамахов В. А. Геополитические и геоэкономические аспекты взаимодействия ЕАЭС и ЕС в формате Большого евразийского партнерства // Евразийская интеграция: экономика, право, политика. 2019. № 4. С. 17–25. URL: <https://www.ejournal.ru/jour/article/view/247/230> (date of address: 16.06.2022).

² Указ Президента РФ от 30 ноября 2016 г. № 640 «Об утверждении Концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации» // Гарант : [информ.-правовой портал]. URL: <https://base.garant.ru/71552062> (date of address: 21.06.2022).

³ Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s speech on “Russia’s foreign policy priorities” at the “government hour” and answers to questions in the RF Federal Council of the Federal Assembly. Moscow, December 1, 2021. URL: https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonKJE02Bw/content/id/4977054 (date of address: 10.04.2022).

⁴ Speech by President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin at an expanded meeting of the board of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow, November 18, 2021. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/deliberations/67123> (date of address: 19.11.2021).

⁵ Эпоха пандемии: год второй. Возвращение будущего : ежегод. докл. Междунар. дискус. клуба «Валдай» / О. Н. Барабанов [и др.]. 2021. Октябрь. С. 21. URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/39314> (date of address: 16.06.2022).

⁶ Карпер д’Анкокс Э. Евразийская империя. История Российской империи с 1552 года до наших дней. М. : РОССПЭН, 2010. С. 330.

A. V. Kostina¹

VALUES AND MEANINGS OF CULTURE AS A FACTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY

When the famous social philosopher V. M. Mezhuev characterized the 20th century as the century of culture [3] (by the way, this statement is also true for the 21st century), he mostly meant culture's ability to act as the main core, marker and driving force of the society in all its manifestations – starting from economy and technical development and ending with politics. The idea behind this statement is as follows: despite the importance of technological breakthroughs in convergent technologies and the digital transformation, advances in artificial intelligence and bioengineering, and economic takeoffs, the main driver of national development is primarily culture.

There are a number of reasons to that. *The first reason is that culture is a system that determines the normativity of any community* – not in its legal sense, but in its behavioral sense, where human activity correlates with a system of prescriptions that require compliance. And in this sense culture, as a functional system, is not less rigid than the legal system. Culture sets certain boundaries of human behavioral activity: everything within the boundaries has a positive content, and everything outside the boundaries is negative and subject to social disapproval.

The fear of disapproval of one's community compels one to adhere to the limits of what is permissible and to avoid committing dishonor – “not to do that which we disapprove in others,” according to Thales [2, c. 74]. In doing so, culture provides legitimacy to the goals one sets for oneself, their moral sanctioning, as well as the evaluation of all one's actions measured by the sense of personal responsibility. Strategizing one's life according to the moral code of one's nation, leading to public recognition and appreciation of that life by others, is one of the most important values contained within the boundaries of those cultures that have a connection to their traditional foundations. This concept of a moral code is inherent to virtually all peoples of Russia.

In the context of this understanding, culture can be seen as a system of regulation that influences human activity through a set of norms and traditions. Their acceptance means being aware of oneself as a member of that culture. Their rejection corresponds to a rejection of the very content of that culture, and in fact means a denial of the right worldview among the representatives of this nation and their misinterpretation of basic concepts; due to this disagreement, they are perceived as strangers and aliens, and therefore as enemies.

Such an interpretation of culture as a normative environment expands its meaning from the domain of the beautiful (which is usually the first association with culture) to the sphere of social regulation, which forms the totality of norms and meanings that distinguishes one nation from another, one civilizational system from another.

The second reason, which enables us to consider culture not only as the main source of modern development, but also as a factor of national security, *is the value content of culture*. Today culture serves as the ideological core of military conflicts. Thus, the main goal of modern wars – conscientious, information, network-centric, cyber-wars – is the destruction of all ideological and value pillars, all symbols that give meaning to the existence of any nation. Victory in such wars correlates with the defense and protection of one's metaphysical values, one's image of the world and vision of the future.

To justify this, it is sufficient to recall the events of the Arab Spring, when traditional values were discredited by the opposing liberal values which were actively promoted by various nongovernmental organizations through a system of charity events and humanitarian projects. The ideals of liberalism and democracy, electoral and market rights, and individual freedom do not correspond in any way to those that prevail in traditional Eastern societies with their clan system. Personal freedom, which means primarily individual autonomy in the West, in the East implies a deep embeddedness in community affairs and coherence with its interests, the ability to bring prosperity to the community through the freedom to use its protection and support.

Equally different is the understanding of the value of justice, which turns out to be even more culturally and historically mediated. What is taken for granted is fundamentally different in the West and the East, being correlated with the entire way of life and corresponding to “certain conceptions of the essence of a human and his inalienable rights” [7, c. 650]. Unlike the West, the East considers fair all that is aimed at strengthening the community. In this context, the slogan of the Arab revolutions “Bread, Freedom, Social Justice,” to a certain extent prompted by American campaign strategists, reads differently, because the concepts of freedom and justice are integral for the value foundations underlying the systems of Western and Eastern ways of perception of the world. Replacing the connotations of these basic values without replacing the concepts themselves is an effective mechanism for destroying the value systems of traditionalist states.

This gives reason to consider culture in terms of its value content as one of the leading, strategically important factors of national security of any state in the modern world.

Today, when the special military operation is being carried out, Russia's values are criticized, and Russian masterpieces that have long been part of the golden treasury of the world culture – works by F. M. Dostoyevsky, L. N. Tolstoy, P. I. Tchaikovsky and others – are hastily withdrawn and discredited. In the situation when Russia confronts geopolitical expansion of NATO and the European Union, it is clear that this confrontation has a strong value component.

¹ Director of the Institute of Fundamental and Applied Research at Moscow University for the Humanities, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor. Author of 366 scientific publications, including monographs and textbooks: “Culture as a Factor of National Security of Modern Russia: Significance and Role Model” (co-authored), “Russia: The Way to the Future. Technologies of New Society Formation,” “Culture: Between the Slavery of Conjunction, the Slavery of Custom and the Slavery of Status” (co-authored), “The Ratio of Traditionalism and Creativity as the Basis of Socio-Cultural Dynamics,” “National Culture – Ethnic Culture – Mass Culture: ‘Balance of Interests’ in Modern Society,” “Theoretical Problems of Modern Culturology: Ideas, Concepts, Research Methods,” and others. Editor-in-Chief of the journal Scientific Council, member of the editorial boards of the journals Knowledge. Culture. Skill, Culture and Civilization, Context and Reflexivity: Philosophy about the World and Man, and Politbook. Awarded a Certificate of Merit from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation.

Comparison of such fundamental documents as the National Security Strategies of Russia and the United States confirms this thesis. The U.S. Strategy adopted in 2015 under President B. Obama defines the need to “shape the contours of a new world economic order that will continue to reflect our interests and values” [4]. American values include equality, democracy, freedom of speech and religion, the American way of life, the rule of law, human rights, and the protection of communities such as “ethnic and religious minorities, people with disabilities, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people, displaced persons, and migrant workers” [Ibid]. The 2017 Strategy, adopted under D. Trump, postulates that protecting the American way of life serves as one of the four pillars (along with developing American prosperity, preserving peace through strength, and advancing American influence) [5] whose preservation constitutes a national priority.

Importantly, Strategy 2017 also presents values as the essence of the American way of life, as something that “contributes to the strength, stability, and prosperity of sovereign nations” [Ibid], as something that needs to be protected. Its emphasis is that American values are seen as universal, “overarching,” *requiring distribution and implementation*. And these cultural codes, including freedom and democracy understood in a liberal way, human rights without limits, property and welfare, determine the context of information wars in their hard and soft forms and constitute the content of network communication, mass culture products, and new communication patterns. These codes become the ideological basis of the information war the West is actively waging against Russia. The Interim National Security Strategic Guidance published in 2021 outlines the vectors of America’s development that build on the provisions of previous strategic planning documents [1].

Russian values are “life, dignity, human rights and freedoms, patriotism, citizenship, service to Homeland and responsibility for its fate, high moral ideals, strong family, creative labor, priority of the spiritual over the material, humanism, mercy, justice, collectivism, mutual assistance and mutual respect, historic memory and continuity of generations, the unity of the peoples of Russia” [6]. These values are traditional, i.e. historically shaped, permeating the history of Russia since day one but still relevant to date. They are inherent to all peoples of our country and act as an integrating power forming the national identity of Russia.

It is important that the values in the Russian National Security Strategy 2021 are defined as those enshrined in the Constitution of the Russian Federation and “forming the basis of Russian society, national security, further development of Russia as a social state under the rule of law, in which respect and protection of human and civil rights and freedoms, improvement of the well-being of people, protection of the dignity of Russian citizens are of utmost importance” [Ibid].

The purpose of conscientious warfare is to influence the mind of the enemy in order to change his basic orientations and destroy his system of values. In this regard, one of the main goals of the state is to bring up new generations of

citizens in a spirit of respect for the culture of their people and to form their ability to understand the causes and consequences of events, to independently assess any information distributed through communication channels, and to subject it to critical reflection. This is necessary in the situation when traditional Russian values are subjected to communicational and psychological influence with a purpose of replacing them with fundamentally different ones. Russian values are the ones intensely influenced and constantly attacked by the United States and its allies who seek to deliberately “Westernize” Russian culture. It is actually defined as one of the goals of the U.S. Strategy: “To effectively lead in a world undergoing significant political changes, the United States must remain true to our values at home and advance universal values abroad” [4].

Consequently, loss of values, assumption of distortion of history, devaluation of spiritual significance of great personalities and heroes, weakening of the state-forming ethnos, discrediting of the Russian language – all this carries the threat of losing not just culture, but the sovereignty of Russia. On the contrary, preservation of these spiritual foundations makes it possible to strengthen its sovereignty and move toward new advances in human and social development.

The basis of Russia’s identity is its moral values and meanings shared by the Russian people, their spiritual content and the path of great service, which has always opposed the pragmatism and utilitarianism of the West. It is the great culture that is the source of our spiritual strength and inspiration in the defense of Russia and its further development.

References

1. Белый дом представил промежуточную стратегию США по национальной безопасности. – Текст : электронный // ТАСС : [сайт]. – 2021, 3 марта. – URL: https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/10829651?utm_source=google.ru&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.ru&utm_referrer=google.ru (date of address: 07.06.2022).
2. Диоген Лаэртский. О жизни, учениях и изречениях знаменитых философов / Диоген Лаэртский ; перевод М. Л. Гаспарова. – [2-е изд., испр.]. – Москва : Мысль, 1986. – 570 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
3. Межуев, В. М. Идея культуры : очерки по философии культуры / В. М. Межуев. – Москва : Унив. кн. : Прогресс-Традиция, 2012. – 403 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
4. Полный текст Стратегии национальной безопасности США. – Текст : электронный // ОКО ПЛАНЕТЫ : [информационно-аналитический портал]. – URL: <https://oko-planet.ru/politik/politiklist/271399-polnyy-tekst-strategii-nacionalnoy-bezopasnosti-ssha.html> (date of address: 07.06.2022).
5. Президент Дональд Трамп провозглашает стратегию национальной безопасности, направленную на продвижение американских интересов. – Текст : электронный // Правд-информ : [сайт]. – URL: <http://trueinform.ru/modules.php?name=Laid&sid=20585> (date of address: 07.06.2022).
6. Российская Федерация. Законы. О Стратегии национальной безопасности Российской Федерации : Указ Президента РФ от 2 июля 2021 года № 400. – Текст : электронный // Гарант : [справочно-правовая система]. – URL: <https://base.garant.ru/401425792/> (date of address: 07.06.2022).
7. Философский энциклопедический словарь / главный редактор Л. Ф. Ильичев [и др.]. – Москва : Сов. энциклопедия, 1983. – 839 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

H. Köchler¹

THE STRUGGLE FOR WORLD ORDER: REFLECTIONS IN TIMES OF GLOBAL REALIGNMENT

I

As long as sovereign states have existed, international order has been shaped by the *will* to preserve the status quo, and the *revolt* against it. The dominant actors of the moment – those that prevailed in the struggle for power, whether in a hot or cold war, or in some other form of rivalry – will always do whatever is needed, in their assessment,² to preserve and perpetuate their privileged position, at the expense of all others.

Unlike as suggested by the beneficiaries of the post-Cold War status quo, we are not now witnessing the advent of a new era of lawlessness or, in reverse, the end of a so-called rules-based international order. The “law of force” has determined the course of events ever since the beginning of history. This did not change with the adoption of international agreements or the creation of organizations aimed at the prevention of war. In spite of solemn proclamations to the contrary, neither the *Treaty of Westphalia* after the Thirty Years’ War (1648) nor the *Holy Alliance* after the Napoleonic wars (1815), the *League of Nations* after the First World War or the *United Nations* after the Second World War did put an end to the use of force between states. More often than not did the conclusion of a war herald not an era of peace (not to speak at all of the Kantian vision of “perpetual peace,” *ewiger Friede*), but a renewed struggle for power – either among the group of victors or by a single hegemon, aiming for imperial rule. Those who are – or see themselves as – the winners try to perpetuate their dominant position. This was true for the “Concert of Powers” after the Vienna Congress as it (still) is true for today’s P5, the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, who Hans Morgenthau once referred to as “the Holy Alliance of our time.”³ The military interventions in the European periphery, justified in the name of “humanity,” by the “Powers” of the 19th century are mirrored by the “humanitarian interventions” of Western powers after the end of the Cold War.⁴

Notwithstanding the ban on the use of force between states in the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928 and in the Charter of the United Nations, powerful states have continued to wage war also in our era, without due attention to issues of legality. In all the years since the end of the Second World War, the UN system of “collective security” has remained utterly ineffective. Devastating wars, in fact unilateral military interventions – in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, and more recently in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, or Libya – have been testimony to the primacy of *national* interests over *international* law all along, in spite of the United Nations’ solemn commitment “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.”⁵

In that regard, nothing has changed in 2022. Those who now deplore the end of a “rules-based order” are disingenuous. It has never existed. Notwithstanding the grand proclamations in the wake of Europe’s, or the world’s, major catastrophes – in 1815, 1918, and 1945, – every new beginning was fraught with contradictions and inconsistencies. Whether it was the promise by the signatories of the Holy Alliance Treaty to uphold “the precepts of Justice, Christian Charity, and Peace”⁶ or the solemn intention of the founders of the United Nations “to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security”⁷: instead of heralding a new era of peace, the moral triumphalism of the victorious states only resulted in further unrestrained struggles for power and for regional or global supremacy.

In particular, the promise of the founders of the United Nations, assembled in San Francisco, to create a new world order of peace – based on a strict ban on the use of force in relations between states that was to be enforced through an elaborate system of collective security as laid out in Chapter VII of the UN Charter – was flawed from the outset. The system they created was designed in such a way as to *exempt* its enforcers, the victorious powers of 1945, from that ban. One just needs to read the fine print of the Charter. Article 27, Paragraph 3 provides, in somewhat oblique language, that the permanent members of the Security Council can veto any coercive measure against themselves, even if they are party to a dispute, including in cases when they use force or threaten other states with the use of force.⁸ This strange kind of “procedural immunity” effectively also applies to states that are allied with a permanent member. Thus, what was actually created was a system of *anarchy* among the great powers. Ever since its foundation, the United Nations has been helpless against the abuses of their privilege. Whether one is prepared to admit it or not: a system of anarchy among the great is a system of anarchy among all. The

¹ President of the International Progress Organization (Vienna, Austria), Professor Emeritus at the University of Innsbruck, former Chairman of the Institute of Philosophy, Ph. D. Author of 40 scientific publications, including: “Phenomenological Realism: Selected Essays,” “Democracy and International Legal State. Proposals for an Alternative World Order,” “The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Contemporary Political Power,” “Global Justice or Global Revenge? International Criminal Law at a Crossroads,” “Muslim-Christian Ties in Europe. Past, Present, Future,” “Security Council as Performer of Justice?,” “World Order: Vision and Reality,” and others. Awarded the Medal of Honor of the Austrian Higher Education Society, the Medal of Honor of the International Peace Bureau (Geneva, Switzerland), the Great Medal of David the Invincible of the Armenian Academy of Philosophy, etc. Honorary doctor of the Mindanao State University (Philippines) and the Armenian State Pedagogical University. Professor Emeritus of Pamukkale University (Turkey). Member of the Advisory Board of the Academy for Cultural Diplomacy (Berlin, Germany).

² Since the end of the Cold War in particular, the phrase “all necessary means [measures]” – used in resolutions of the Security Council – has become common parlance in self-serving justifications of excessive uses of force.

³ *Morgenthau H. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. [6th ed.]. N. Y.: Knopf, 1985.

⁴ *Köchler H. The Concept of Humanitarian Intervention in the Context of Modern Power Politics: Is the Revival of the Doctrine of “Just War” Compatible with the International Rule of Law? // Studies in International Relations*. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 2001. Vol. XXVI.

⁵ United Nations Charter // United Nations: [caïr]. URL: <https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter>.

⁶ The Holy Alliance Treaty – TREATY between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, signed at Paris, 26th September 1815, Para. 2 (“Government and Political Relations”).

⁷ United Nations Charter.

⁸ For details, see: *Köchler H. The Voting Procedure in the United Nations Security Council: Examining a Normative Contradiction and its Consequences on International Relations // Studies in International Relations*. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1991. Vol. XVII.

long list of unilateral uses of force by permanent member states, since the early years of the organization, is testimony to this predicament of the international rule of law under UN auspices. Whenever a permanent member, or one of its allies, is involved in a dispute, the Security Council is paralyzed.

What, since 1945, prevented a new global conflagration was not the United Nations system of collective security, but the – albeit fragile – *balance of power* among the two major actors of the Cold War period, the Soviet Union and the United States. Global security was based on mutual *deterrence*. This changed with the events of 1989. After the end of the bipolar balance of power, the self-proclaimed winner of the power struggle of the Cold War, together with its allies, was able to use war to advance its geopolitical agenda, and to do so with total impunity – whether in Yugoslavia, Iraq or Afghanistan, just to mention some of the most consequential uses of military force in this period. In a triumphant speech in March 1991, President George H. W. Bush, declaring victory in the Gulf War, misleadingly spoke of “the very real prospect of a new world order.” He claimed that “the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate,” would now be able “to fulfill the historic vision of its founders,” and, borrowing from a speech of Winston Churchill after World War II, he suggested that this would be a world where the “principles of justice and fair play” will prevail.¹

Nothing could have been further from the truth. In the hegemonic setting of the 1990s, the earlier mentioned structural flaw in the UN Charter became even more consequential, and detrimental to global order. Suddenly, the United States was able to set the global agenda not only without any procedural challenges within the UN system of collective security (due to its privilege under Article 27²), but also without having to face any competitor in terms of power politics. This elevated international anarchy to an entirely new dimension. To emphasize it yet again: The element of anarchy was built into the Charter of the United Nations. According to that very statute, the prohibition of aggressive war is necessarily *ineffective* when it comes to restraining the assertion of power by the most powerful. This means lawlessness by virtue of the law (namely, the letter of the Charter). Thus, the United Nations Organization is condemned to the role of a mere bystander if a conflict involves a permanent member of the Security Council. There should be no illusion of the “laws” of international realpolitik (or, more precisely, power politics): Impunity, under the Charter, of certain members in cases of their own transgressions is not an innocent procedural mishap (in certain specific situations), but a statutory fact. Double standards are part and parcel of the functioning of the world organization in its most important responsibility, the maintenance of international peace and security. The organization would never have been established if this had not been the case. Commenting on the veto, former US Secretary of State Cordell Hull did not mince words: “our

government would not remain there [in the UN] a day without retaining the veto power.”³

II

However, the primacy of power over law, evidenced in statute and practice of the UN (as shaped by some of its leading members), may ultimately be self-defeating. It thus seems to be a lesson of history never learned: Every assertion of power, particularly by a state claiming hegemony, provokes a counter-assertion. The quest for perpetual dominance, inherent in the logic of hegemonial rule, brings never-ending challenges to any guardian of the status quo in his strategy to prevent a competitor from reaching strategic parity. The “blow-back effect,” as it was aptly described by Chalmers Johnson in his seminal work, “The Costs and Consequences of American Empire,”⁴ may lead to conflict and armed confrontation in all corners of the world.

The global struggle for power has entered a new phase. At the beginning of the 21st century, it is the challenge to *pax Americana* that determines the transformation of global order in the direction of a new multipolar constellation that will be different from the one that had existed among the P5 (the five permanent members of the Security Council) for a short period after 1945. As we explained in regard to the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter, the United Nations was conceived of as a tool of the P5 to rule the world.

After several decades of bipolarity (after the 1950s) and a relatively short “unipolar moment” (after 1990), a new and complex dynamic of power relations is unfolding of which the late Zbigniew Brzezinski spoke as the “global realignment.”⁵ The great power consensus embodied in the UN Charter does not anymore reflect the reality of today. The predominance not only of the West, but also of the traditional industrialized world, is coming to an end. Due to the absence of checks and balances in the UN system of collective security, US-dominated unipolarity has profoundly destabilized global order and created a power vacuum in strategically vital regions. New alliances are being shaped by countries that were left out of the power equation in the Cold War period, and even more so under the conditions of unipolarity.⁶ While centers of economic gravity are shifting from the Western world towards the East, new, alternative trade and financial networks are being set up that better represent global realities and build new bridges between North and South. The process is accelerated by the Western powers’, in particular the United States’, insistence on setting the rules and excluding those who do not abide by the unilateral standards set by those states. The illegal policy of unilateral sanctions, imposed – and in many instances also enforced extraterritorially – by the United States and the European Union, is evidence of an exclusivism that is at variance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. This policy has not only seriously undermined the free trade system of the WTO [World Trade Organization],

¹ Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the End of the Gulf War, March 6, 1991. Cf. also, Köchler H. Democracy and the New World Order // Studies in International Relations. Vienna : International Progress Organization, 1993. Vol. XIX.

² Brzezinski Z. Toward a Global Realignment // The American Interest. 2016. Vol. 11, № 6 (July/Aug.).

³ Hull C. The Memoirs of Cordell Hull. N. Y. : Macmillan Co., 1948. Vol. 2. P. 1664.

⁴ Johnson Ch. The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. N. Y. : Metropolitan Books, 2000.

⁵ Brzezinski Z. Op. cit. P. 1–3.

⁶ For details see: Köchler H. World Order in an Age of Transition // The Saint Petersburg Lectures: Civilization and World Order : Studies in International Relations. Vienna : International Progress Organization, 2019. Vol. XXXIV. P. 61–73.

but also has poisoned the climate of international co-operation and profoundly destabilized the system of global security.¹ The unilateralist strategy is essentially revisionist. It is part of a larger struggle for power in the beginning 21st century, namely for the preservation of the dominant position of the West under an emerging new order that will be different from the fragile multipolar balance of power after World War II.

In its structure, it resembles the competitions for power in earlier periods of transition. However, what has changed in the constant struggle for power are its implications for the survival of mankind. Any “repositioning” – or realignment – within the global balance of power, involving the major global players, now occurs under the sword of Damocles of nuclear annihilation. It is to be hoped that this risk will at least caution rational rulers who understand the logic of “mutual deterrence.” The argument in favor of deterrence is based on the rationale of “mutually assured destruction,” another term from the inventory of the Cold War era. However, an appeal to the rationality – and responsibility – of leaders of the great powers in the Security Council may not be enough. In spite of the grand strategy of non-proliferation embodied in the NPT,² nuclear weapons capability has already spread beyond the traditional “nuclear club.” The unstable global situation and the regime change interventionism of the post-Cold War years seem to have led an increasing number of countries to view nuclear arms as insurance policy for national survival. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, leaving open whether in a case where a state’s survival is at stake – “in an extreme circumstance of self-defence”³ – the use of nuclear arms might be in conformity with international law, hasn’t made things any easier. Legal ambiguities notwithstanding, in the logic of mutually assured destruction, an insurance policy for survival may quickly turn into a guarantee of collective suicide.

Also, the nuclear capability of an increasing number of states will severely distort power relations and may make global realignment much more unpredictable and chaotic, fraught with the risk of global conflagration. When in the possession of nuclear arms plus high capacity missile systems, a small, otherwise weak and uninfluential, country may totally upset an existing balance of power, and even dictate the actions of great powers. The disparity between the parameters of power – economic, political, and conventional-military versus non-conventional – defies even the most elaborate geopolitical calculations. In view of this state of affairs, a legal prohibition of nuclear arms such as the one recently adopted⁴ can only be of *declaratory* nature – as an act of what we in German call *Gesinnungsethik* (“ethics of conscience”). Instead of adoption of a treaty that is unenforceable from the outset, what is needed is an act of *Verantwortungsethik* (“ethics of responsibility”) by the leaders of nuclear states committing their countries to a *policy of no first use*.⁵ It is appropriate to recall here the

consensus of just a few months ago among the five permanent members of the Security Council on a somewhat implicit no first use-declaration. In their joint declaration, the leaders of the five countries stated, *inter alia*, “that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” and “that nuclear weapons – for as long as they continue to exist – should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.”⁶

III

The state of international affairs as we have described it leaves the world with the question as to how to “organize” the greed for power – and the mutual mistrust among states that accompanies it – in such a way that it does not ultimately defeat itself, i.e. that, in the nuclear era, it will not lead to the self-destruction of mankind. What is needed is a new *honesty of realpolitik*. The history of power politics has been a sequence of grand delusions and dishonest proclamations by those who were out to rule the world or, more “modestly,” to change the balance of power in their favour – whether it was Alexander the Great in his conquest of Asia two and a half millennia ago, the “Concert of Powers,” assembled at the Vienna Congress, the 19th century British Empire, or, in our “post-modern” age, the United States of America, undertaking – after having proclaimed “victory” in the Cold War – to reshape the world in its image.⁷ They evoke “civilization,” “peace,” or – in modern parlance – “human rights,” “democracy,” “justice,” or “rule of law.” However, what they mean – in the overwhelming majority of cases – are the *national interests* of the conqueror or competitor for power. Because they are so typical of the disingenuous, self-aggrandizing imperial narrative, we quote here from the words of British Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin, in his Empire Day message of 1924:

“When we speak of Empire, it is in no spirit of flag-wagging. [...] I think deep down in all our hearts we look to the Empire as the means by which we may hope to see that increase of our race which we believe to be of such inestimable benefit to the world at large; the spread abroad of people to whom freedom and justice are as the breath of their nostrils, of people distinguished, as we would fain hope and believe, above all things, by an abiding sense of duty.”⁸

The false idealism of, and delusions nurtured by, proclamations of a *novus ordo saeculorum* have always stood in contrast to the sobriety of the reasoning and calculations of *realpolitik*. Today, when President Bush’s “New World Order,” proclaimed in 1991, has dramatically failed and the unilateral system which the United States aimed to establish on the basis of that proclamation is increasingly challenged,⁹ new uncertainties emerge in an ever more complex *multipolar* framework. On the “grand chessboard”¹⁰ the entire globe has become for the power game among more

¹ For details cf., Köchler H. Sanctions and International Law // International Organisations Research Journal. 2019. Vol. 14, № 3. Economic Sanctions, Global Governance and the Future of World Order. P. 27–47.

² https://www.un.org/ru/documents/decl_conv/conventions/npt.shtml.

³ <https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/reviews-pdf/2020-10/188.pdf>.

⁴ <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N17/209/75/PDF/N1720975.pdf?OpenElement>.

⁵ For details see, *inter alia*, Tannenwald N. It’s Time for a U. S. No-First-Use Nuclear Policy // Texas National Security Review. 2019. Vol. 2, iss. 3 (May). P. 130–137.

⁶ Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapon States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races. January 03, 2022 // The White House : [website]. URL: [whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races](https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/01/03/p5-statement-on-preventing-nuclear-war-and-avoiding-arms-races) (date of address: 02.06.2022).

⁷ Kissinger H. Diplomacy. N. Y. : Simon & Schuster, 1994. P. 19.

⁸ Baldwin S. On England and other Addresses. N. Y. : Frederick A. Stokes, 1926. P. 71.

⁹ Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy. Munich, 2007, Febr. 10. URL: en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034 (date of address: 30.04.2022).

¹⁰ Brzezinski Z. The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostategic Imperatives. N. Y. : Basic Books, 1997.

than the two or three traditional players,¹ new groupings emerge, and the “board” is constantly being reconfigured, which makes predictions almost impossible. Apart from the traditional “major players” and their regional or worldwide groupings such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union (EU) or the G7, intergovernmental organizations such as the African Union, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), to mention only a few, have begun to challenge the Western-dominated global architecture.

Not surprisingly, this has initiated a flurry of “alliance diplomacy” according to the ancient imperial maxim, *divide et impera!* [divide and rule]. It’s essentially about “containing” the new emerging powers and/or their alliances in order to preserve the power and privilege of the self-appointed guardians of global order. Among those “reactive,” still somewhat informal, alliances figure the “Quad” (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue [QSD] between the United States, Japan, Australia and India) and “AUKUS,” a trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The overlapping membership of these structures (global-regional) has enormous disruptive potential, bringing new risks of inter- and intra-regional rivalries (e.g. between India and China, Japan and China). These may in turn be opportunistically exploited by a global power struggling to defend its dominant position against any new rival. Stemming the influence of its main antagonist in Asia – or staving off the emergence of a new geopolitical constellation – was indeed the overriding motive, on the part of the United States, for entering into the above-mentioned ad hoc alliances.

Under the circumstances, there is no global arbiter, no intergovernmental organization that would be capable of moderating the repositioning of power in the gradually unfolding multipolar framework. Herein also lies the existential challenge for the United Nations: *how* to survive the transition from the multipolar order of 1945 to the multipolar order of the 21st century? The organization will simply become irrelevant if it continues to embody the power balance of an earlier era. In view of the statutory veto of the “powers of 1945” over any amendment to the Charter,² the problems appear almost insurmountable. After the post-World War II period of de-colonization, the four decades of the Cold War, and upon the end of a destabilizing hegemonial interlude, the grand task for the international community will be how to manage the *real* post-colonial constellation of the 21st century – with the former colonial countries finally emancipating themselves from the persistent tutelage, – and how to integrate the Global South into the balance of power. This will, among other measures, require an enlargement of the Security Council in regard to permanent membership.

Finally: It is a delusion to believe in world order in a static sense – because this would create the impression as if there existed permanent, immutable rules, enforceable on everyone, and providing a stability frozen in time. In the

real world, history is a sequence of ever-changing, dynamic constellations of power among those that achieve the status of “major player” at a given point in time. Their efforts, though ultimately vain, to preserve the *status quo* – and to stave off contenders “by all necessary means” – has always been a driving factor of international conflict.³ Whatever provisions (norms, principles) and mechanisms the international community may agree on, the parameters of human nature will not change.

Against the background of an obviously permanent struggle for world order, “perpetual peace” – Immanuel Kant’s vision of *ewiger Friede*⁴ – will remain a noble vision. It may nonetheless have the role of moral conscience, or of a corrective of the excesses of realpolitik that in our nuclear age can threaten the survival of mankind. A *world state* – which alone could do away with inter-state conflict and the “tragedy” of power politics, as John Mearsheimer aptly described it⁵ – would be a totalitarian colossus whose organizational imperatives can never be compatible with the aspirations of mankind for freedom (individual as well as collective), for civilizational diversity, and self-determination.

Also, in today’s system of sovereign nation-states, there can not yet be international law in the strict sense of the term “law.” Unlike the norms of morality, the norms of law are, as Hans Kelsen convincingly argued,⁶ defined by *unified* mechanisms of enforcement in the case of their violation. These are absent in the present system. The wording of the United Nations Charter leaves no doubt about one fact: namely, that *power trumps law* when it comes to the sovereign status of the organization’s permanent members, the enforcers of the “law” under the provisions for collective security according to Chapter VII of the Charter.⁷

In the absence of unified mechanisms of enforcement of the norms of international behavior, states may have to rely on the rules and maxims of old-fashioned realpolitik. In view of the consequences of nuclear war, any global realignment in the emerging new multipolar framework will need to be rooted in a *rational calculus* of each nation’s interest to survive, on the basis of *mutuality*. (This also is the essence of the United Nations’ principle of “sovereign equality” of states.⁸) As long as it is not effectively restrained by law, the struggle for world order will only then not end in collective suicide if a robust balance of power deters each actor from striking first. In the *real* world – and until mankind will have “reinvented” itself – peace, as disillusioning as it may be, is not “guaranteed” by law, but maintained by the fear of destruction.

³ For details see, Köchler H. *Power and World Order // Current Concerns* (Special Edition). Zurich, 2022 (Febr.). P. 1–4.

⁴ Kant I. *Zum Ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf*. Königsberg, 1795. (Philosophische Bibliothek. Vol. 443 / ed. Heiner F. Klemme. Hamburg : Felix Meiner, 1992.)

⁵ Mearsheimer J. J. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. N. Y. : W. W. Norton & Company, 2014.

⁶ See the chapter on the law as coercive normative order in: Kelsen H. *Reine Rechtslehre* [1934] / ed. M. Jestaedt. Tübingen ; Vienna : Mohr Siebeck : Verlag Österreich, 2017. P. 94.

⁷ For details see, Köchler H. *The Dual Face of Sovereignty: Contradictions of Coercion in International Law // The Global Community : Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence*. 2019. N. Y. : Oxford Univ. Press, 2020. Pt. 6 : Recent Lines of Internationalist Thought. P. 875–885.

⁸ United Nations Charter.

¹ United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China – in the two decades since the 1970s.

² According to Article 108 of the Charter, an amendment requires the consent of the permanent members of the Security Council.

O. Ye. Lebedev¹

RUSSIAN EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITION TO A MULTIPOLAR WORLD: WHO DOES THE SCHOOL BRING UP?

The challenges of education development in a changing society stem from the fact that graduates of educational institutions will have to live in a society that does not yet exist. The search for a solution to this problem involves attempts to identify key competencies, soft skills, and other universal ways of doing things that may be in demand at different historical and technological stages. It is more difficult to identify value benchmarks for students to reflect the changes taking place in a society. It is especially difficult to determine value benchmarks for the system of upbringing in the general school, as during its education span, the world can change significantly.

A discussion of the prospects, challenges, and possible consequences of the transition from unipolarity to real multipolarity is essential to identifying the situation of value choices within which the school is to determine its strategic goals. The choice of goals requires the inter-related questions to be answered: Who should the school bring up in the context of the transforming world order? If a school has a certain autonomy in the social macrosystem, who can it bring up? Who is the modern Russian school most likely to bring up?

The answer to the first question depends on the concepts of a multipolar world, which, judging by what is said in the mass media, may fundamentally differ. It has been suggested that there are three blocs of states: the first is led by the United States, the second by China, and the third bloc consists of states that have not joined the first two. Russia could become the leader of this bloc. This scheme reminds of the Soviet view of the world, in which there was a capitalist system, a socialist system, and a movement of non-aligned countries. The concept of three blocs gives Russia the role of Yugoslavia.

Other assumptions have also been made about the centers defining the new world order. The influence of such centers can be explained either by the factor of "equal threats," which will inevitably have to be reckoned with, or by the factor of opportunities in solving global problems.

In such a multipolar world, Russia can be perceived either as a powerful military state, capable of "repeating," if necessary, or as a country with exceptional resources – not only natural, but also technological and intellectual.

Understanding the nature of a multipolar world is crucial to answering the question: What qualities should schools foster? In one case, the emphasis is made on the fact that young people will have to live in a society that is divided into "friends" and "enemies," in which there are unfriendly states and it is difficult to take advantage of the international division of labor. In the other case, preference is given to preparing for life in a society based on the idea of cooperation, recognition of common values, and the possibility of mutual enrichment of cultures.

Views on the prospective changes in the world order reflect the real processes taking place in the society only to a certain extent. Nevertheless, they can set value benchmarks for the development of the education system. When discussing possible vectors in the development of Russian education in the mid-term, it is important to highlight extra-systemic processes that have become irreversible. These phenomena come from the outside of the education system but strongly affect it (in this case we mean the system of upbringing in secondary schools).

At least four such phenomena can be distinguished.

The first is the growth of people's anxiety in a situation of uncertainty, lack of confidence in their future and in the state's ability to guarantee the implementation of long-term programs of obvious importance to various social groups. The consequence is orientation on short-term plans, quick results, and instrumental values, in youth, among others. Thus, in the Soviet Union, after the abandonment of the idea of building communism, individual programs to build "communism for myself" began to prevail.

The second is the increasingly persistent attempts to explain the country's economic and other difficulties by the hostile environment, by the state policy in the previous historical period, and by the machinations of the "fifth column." The consequence is an increase in mutual suspicion, a lack of confidence in one's abilities to change the situation, and an orientation toward the position of a "stowaway" – avoidance of public activity. Additionally, in seeking to solve urgent problems, the state appeals not to the personal needs of citizens, but to their civic duty; for instance, it urges to increase the birth rate in order to solve the demographic problem.

The third is inevitable shortage of specialists of varying skill levels, engaged not only in mental but also in physical labor, in the situation when international contacts are limited (even if the transition from confrontation to peaceful co-existence and resumption of cooperation occurs). The consequence is the contradiction between the desire to make a "vertical" career and the need to focus on continuous professional development within a "horizontal" career.

The fourth is the impossibility of an iron curtain, even with a significant reduction in international contacts. Any "curtain" will prove transparent; therefore, the situation in the society will be evaluated not according to the predetermined criteria, but according to the personal values.

All of this will inevitably affect the analysis of the education system's potential and the understanding of which of its capabilities will be in demand at the social and personal level. Even with limited external contacts, it is no longer possible to avoid international comparisons. Such comparisons were not uncommon for the Soviet Union, too, when certain features of the Soviet educational system were seen as its advantages.

When assessing Russia's role in a multipolar world, it is necessary to keep in mind the achievements of the domestic education system, along with its capacity to influence the transformation processes in the society. Its undoubted achievements include solving the problem of access to gen-

¹ Corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Pedagogical Studies), Professor. Author of more than 280 scientific publications, including: "Digital Debut of Educational Relations," "Management of Educational Systems: A Research Project," "Didactics as a Theory of Transformation Processes in the Educational system," "Upbringing Goals as a System Forming Factor," "The End of Compulsory Education System?," and others. Member of editorial board of *Issues of Education* journal.

eral education, creating a large-scale system of preschool institutions, extra-curriculum education for children, adult education, postgraduate education, quality primary education, quality education in Physics and Mathematics. The Soviet Union had substantial experience in assisting the developing countries in advancing education. In defining Russia's role in a multipolar world, it makes sense to consider our capabilities in solving global problems of education and in advancement of modernization processes in this field.

Assessing the impact of the education system on the transformations taking place in the Russian society involves answering the question of the education system's degree of autonomy. The education system is capable of shaping common values of students, influencing the level of their social and cognitive activity, development of personal qualities, and readiness for personal and professional self-identification.

In the meantime, specific goals of education may vary. The content of the goals is determined by the values to which the system is oriented. Social values and school values are not always the same. The school may recognize the value of individual autonomy and the ability to make responsible and informed decisions in situations of choice, but in daily practice the school may strictly regulate student behavior.

Autonomy of the education system stems from the contradictory social request for educational results and means of its fulfilment. In the case of schools, it is a contradiction between the requirement of universal accessibility and, at the same time, sufficient quality of education. In practice, this contradiction manifests itself in the phenomenon of academic performance. It is clear that in the context of compulsory secondary education, there is a requirement for academic performance, which is a prerequisite for solving the problem of social equality of students. But the goal of universal academic performance can be set in different ways.

In the Soviet school, the goal was to make different students in different circumstances and with different levels of readiness for learning achieve the same educational results within the same time – not only for the entire period at school, but also for the period of study of a particular topic. The consequence was the use of various coercive teaching methods that hinder the development of cognitive independence of students. Another consequence was falsification of indicators and reduction of students' own responsibility for the quality and results of their studies. Overt falsification of the "performance rate" reduced moral authority of the school and hindered fulfilment of its upbringing potential.

The demand for high performance indicators was dictated by ideological considerations: it was necessary to demonstrate the benefits of socialism. Besides, the school served as a "social shelter" that ensured participation of all adults in life of the society.

Both Soviet and post-Soviet schools made attempts to solve the problem of the quality of education through new educational technologies and possible individualization; but until the focus on the uniformity of programs and results is maintained, the potential of the general education system is only partially fulfilled.

The autonomy of the education system stems not only from a known discrepancy in social and pedagogical goals, but also from the fact that this system is difficult to man-

age. As far back as a century ago, Henri Fayol discovered the importance of such a management mechanism as the scalar chain. As the education system becomes more complex and the composition of participants of the educational process changes (including the increased level of education of teachers and parents), the scalar chain becomes less and less reliable. The educational goals articulated in regulatory documents and the goals (real, not planned) set by teachers can substantially differ. Students' goals do not always mirror those of teachers. The focus of the educational process depends on the ratio between its regulation and opportunities for self-identification of participants. Such opportunities can be an important factor if joint activities of the participants in the educational process are perceived by them as a value.

The possible misalignment between the declared pedagogical goals and actual results is associated with another feature of the educational process – the relationship between teaching and upbringing. The specifics of the goals of teaching and upbringing is well known: while the former can be defined as "destination station," the latter most often show the "direction of travel." The problem relates to the nature of the connections between these goals.

In educational practice, teaching and upbringing are often seen as parallel processes, which is reflected in the concepts of "upbringing work," "upbringing activities," "upbringing moment," "upbringing work plan." Implementation of upbringing goals, in this case, acts as a supplement to the results of teaching. Meanwhile, the educational process can be seen as fostering of experience in solving problems that are significant for children, which suggests mastering of mandatory norms, development of certain personal qualities, and choice of value benchmarks. In this case, the leading role is played by the goals of upbringing. The nature of the relationship between teaching and upbringing is a factor that determines the degree of compliance of the educational results (subject-related, meta-disciplinary, personal) with pedagogical goals.

The educational system is characterized by a diversity of possibilities, which can have different meanings for fulfilment of social goals. In different social and educational situations, the system's different capabilities may be in demand. Besides, the demands of the social macrosystem and the demands of the education system itself may or may not coincide. Fulfilment of requests to the educational system involves the use of certain resources, which the system itself may lack. Its "own" resources include the experience in solving educational problems – past and present, traditional and innovative, national and international.

The polarity of the education system's capabilities means that it is capable of bringing up people with different value orientations and personal qualities. Who the education system actually brings up is determined by the kind of experience of solving educational problems that it focuses on.

In today's situation, the problem of evaluating and fulfilling the upbringing potential of the school has come to the forefront. The problem of attitude to the system of upbringing in the Soviet school is also considered in this regard. It is widely believed that this system was well thought out, effective, and capable of leading the young generation toward its intended social goal. But if we think of this system as a kind of a Titanic, ready to navigate social storms,

what kind of a killer iceberg did this mighty vessel encounter? The collapse is evidenced by the fact that in a situation of crisis, the builders of communism brought up by that school abandoned it for other "construction sites." At the same time, it must be acknowledged that the Soviet school did pay a lot of attention to upbringing and that one can actually list its achievements in the theory and practice of upbringing. The strength of the school's upbringing system was its focus on the common social values; its weakness was that these values were reduced to a particular ideology and a particular political regime. The consequence of this value orientation was intransigence toward dissent, rejection of pluralism of opinions, a negative attitude toward manifestations of individuality, and the opposition of social and personal goals.

The Soviet school rejected the values of pre-revolutionary society. At the "sharp turns" of Soviet history, values of the preceding historical period were denied. In the 1990s, the object of denial was the Soviet experience; in the first decades of the 21st century, it was the experience of the 1990s. At the same time, attempts were made to return to the experience of the "before-previous" stage: in the 1990s – to gymnasium education, now – to the experience of the Soviet school. Upbringing based on the denial of past

values and their replacement with new attitudes eventually leads to the pragmatization of personal positions.

Using the resources of past experience to identify promising areas for the development of the education system can have a good effect, provided that the irreversible processes taking place in this system are well known. If it is geared exclusively to the current demands dictated by the context, the school is likely to produce conformists who are ready, as they used to say in Soviet times, to "fluctuate with the line of the party." If the system is focused on "eternal" values, then the school can bring up people who are ready to develop and improve not only themselves, but also the society.

With regard to the system of education of students in secondary schools, we mean: moral values; the possibility of personal self-identification, which implies responsibility for the consequences of choices; the value of the educational process as an experience of cooperation of individuals.

In a recent publication which deals with a special military operation and its consequences, it was suggested that only future generations will be able to assess the events that took place. These generations are brought up in school. The result of their upbringing will be the criteria that will be used to evaluate the past, present and future of Russia, and its role in the transition to the new world order.

A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov¹

RUSSIA IN THE GLOBAL WORLD: A NEW STAGE FOR BUILDING THE INTERACTION OF LEGAL SYSTEMS

The first quarter of the new millennium can rightfully claim to be the prologue to a new stage of human history. The preceding twentieth century was marked by the collapse of traditional centuries-old empires, the emergence and destruction of a bipolar world, and the political and economic revival of ancient civilizations.²

In all changes that occurred in the twentieth century, Russia has played one of the major roles in the status of

a superpower. This applies to both politics and law, whether it is the international law of the United Nations or the formation of the Soviet national legal system, which had a significant impact on the other countries of the Eastern bloc.

The emerging change of epochs raises the question of the place and role of Russia in shaping of the world legal order of the 21st century and definition of mechanisms of possible interaction between Russian law and other national legal systems. This problem is relevant because any plans for positioning of the state in the global world (except for the military plans, and even that to a certain extent) must be implemented within certain legal frameworks.

The global system of international relations that has formed by the end of the last millennium was based on a fairly well-structured hierarchy of sources of the international law. Among these sources, international treaties (universal, regional, and bilateral) played the central role. The established system of international organizations – universal and regional, as well as the application of legal mechanisms of national law governing international private relations – from family and inheritance relations to commercial investment projects – ensured the stability of the international legal order. The collapse of the USSR and the Eastern bloc, the toilsome process of shaping the legal system of the Russian Federation as an independent state and the legal successor of the USSR [4, c. 30–51]; instability of the CIS as a structure in transition – all this led to the need for significant adjustments in the internal legal policy of Russia and its clear positioning in the entire spectrum of chang-

¹ Chief Researcher of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor. Author of more than 150 scientific publications, including: "National Law in The Context of Globalization," "Modern Global Challenges and National Interests," "Culture as a Factor Influencing the Development of International Law," "Legal Culture and Legal Nihilism: Characteristics, Assessments, Problems," "National and International Legal Order In the Context of Geopolitical Situation," "White Spots in Modern International Law," "The Role of Private International Law in the Interaction of National Legal Systems," "Legal Immunities from 'Colored Revolutions'," "Dispute Resolution Procedure in Connection with the Protection and Transfer of Rights to Inventions, Know-How and Trade-marks," "Arbitration in Industrial, Scientific and Technical Cooperation," "Legal Issues of Scientific, Technological and Industrial Cooperation," "Private International Law: Current Problems" (co-authored), "Legal Regulation of Foreign Investments in Russia," "International Civil Procedure: Current Trends," "Human Rights and Modern State Legal Development," "New Challenges and International Law," "The Role of Law in Russia's Economic Modernization (Case Study in the Oil and Gas Sector)," and others. Member of the editorial boards of the journals "State and Law" and "Proceedings of the Institute of State and Law" of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Member of the Bureau of the Department of Social Sciences of the RAS. Awarded the Orders of Friendship, Leopold II (Belgium), and St. Sergius of Radonezh.

² This is most evident in the example of the PRC. China's GDP in 1980 was \$305.3 billion, and in 2021 it will be \$17.46 trillion. In addition, in a relatively short historical period, China has become one of the leading space and nuclear powers.

ing international relations. It should be noted, however, that there is no “Chinese wall” between the domestic and foreign legal policy in the modern world. These two areas are engaged in a certain interaction.

To build a legal policy in a global world, the minimum requirement is that its principles are embraced by the global community. An example of such a necessary step is the speech of the president of Russia in the Bundestag in 2001 and in Munich in 2007, emphasizing the perniciousness and futility of building a unipolar world. Perhaps at that time the West had not developed faith in Russia’s ability to overcome serious problems that persisted inside the country and take its proper place on the new political map of the world, so, in fact, they continued the path of building a unipolar world without regard to what was said.

It is fair to say that the goals set by the West were partially realized: the crisis in Georgia and the coup in Ukraine demonstrated the invalidity of the idea of a union of independent states in the territory of the former Soviet Union. However, the diversity of development paths for the states in a changing world has revealed the limitations of the Western unipolar dominance.

The two crises that have broken out in recent years – the pandemic and Ukraine – regardless of whether we consider them objective (the first as a product of biological evolution and the second as one of the options of historical development) or man-made, put the question of the system of post-crisis world order before the world community with redoubled force.

The Ukrainian crisis is by no means the last page of the prologue to the future history in which the United States and Russia will not be the only/no-alternative protagonists. Besides, it is far from being complete, especially in terms of the legal framework. A far greater challenge lies ahead for the world community in solving the contradictions between the two world economies, the U.S. and China. This forecast is due to the fact that despite China’s consistent policy aimed at the peaceful resolution of existing contradictions, including economic ones, the U.S. contributes to the persisting military and political tensions, associated, in particular, with Taiwan, which is a major issue for China. In this case, the forecasts of events, as well as the legal framework for a possible crisis, are especially vague.

However, history teaches us that all confrontations between states get somehow resolved in the end. Even wars between major powers eventually give the world some kind of legal order for a certain period.

In addressing the history, we should note that the emerging picture does not seem surreal. It is enough to recall the experience of building a system of international relations as a result of World War II. Then, after the collapse of the order formed at the end of World War I, the foundations for a new model were laid in Yalta. Now it is, if not ruined, bulging at the seams. Who will shape the next legal order? What will be new in it and what will remain traditional? And finally, how can Russia retain a place in it similar to its current status as a permanent member of the UN?

The society is changing, and any superpower can face the question of its own status in future world history. Even during the 1943 Teheran Conference, the Prime Minister of the British Empire – the largest state on the planet at the time – in discussing the opening of a second front, said he had felt like this: “On one side of me, cross-legged, sat

a huge Russian bear; and on the other, a huge American bison. And between them sat a poor little English donkey...” [1]. Today we can treat this statement of W. Churchill in different ways, especially in the part concerning his vision of the future relations between the superpowers and the place (and a special one) of Great Britain in world politics. Another thing is of importance. The bright politician of his time, despite the certain international isolation of the Soviet Union that preceded World War II and the enormous losses that the state suffered in the early years of fighting, correctly assessed further role and possibilities of the USSR, still struggling for victory.

Thereafter, the new legal order based on the UN Charter was shaped by states sharing different, often fundamentally diverse values. Nevertheless, they were allied states, which was a factor of success in creating a new system of international relations based on the international treaty as the main source of international law.

Importantly, if in international relations individual states unilaterally take actions demonstrating friendly or, on the contrary, unfriendly politics, these actions are most often opportunistic. They do not oblige this state to stay on the same course. In contrast, an international treaty, more than any other source of international law, clearly illustrates the entire process of harmonizing the will of states, and reflects the goals and possibilities of their foreign policy. Thereafter, the parties to the treaty are obliged to follow its spirit and letter [3]. In today’s context, it is important to identify the constituent parts/elements of the mechanism for elaborating international treaties and the role of each of them in shaping the emerging legal order. Besides, it is necessary to understand which states should participate in this process so that the agreed legal order is no less stable than the one created following World War II. It seems that shaping the new legal order will not depend solely on the will of the allies and classical diplomacy, as was the case in the past. The decisive factor will be the balance of economic and military power of the main players in the international arena, as well as the reliability of political and legal alliances between states in the two new world poles.

The current crisis clearly demonstrates that world politics depends not so much on the will of sovereign states as on the superpowers. As Putin noted at the plenary session of the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in 2017, “there are not so many countries in the world that have sovereignty...” [2]. In fact, only the superpowers have the real sovereignty.

The world does not agree to the unipolar order imposed on it. However, it seems that we are not about to enter the era of the parade of sovereign states, although the current international law postulates sovereign equality of countries as one of its basic principles. A new model of a bipolar world formed by the superpowers seems more realistic.

Now, in the face of the military confrontation, one of the poles has emerged. Political scientists have dubbed it the “collective West.” There are some contradictions within it, but so far it is acting in a very coherent way. The crisis provoked by it can be qualified as a new form of hybrid warfare against Russia, and its anti-Russian front is legally quite structured. Its military and political basis is NATO, acting on the grounds of an international treaty and as an international organization (subject of international law) for many years. The economic basis is the established associa-

tion of the United States and the European Union. Unlike NATO, it does not have a full-fledged treaty arrangement, but U.S. sanctioning decisions and other economic measures against third countries are duplicated by the European Union. The legal practice of recent years is distinguished by the fact that the European Union has adopted the aggressive American legal principle of extraterritoriality of national law, which had not previously been supported in Europe.

So what can the second pole be and what place can Russia occupy in it? To answer this question, one must first assess whether Russia needs the second world pole, taking into account the fact that it is militarily independent and has a self-sufficient resource base. This self-sufficiency may be acceptable for a country and society based on the worship of an idea, such as the idea of an ideal state. However, historical experience shows that this does not last long. Russia needs a large, diversified market to develop. The country, with its current population, demographic problems, and inherent international claims, cannot create a modern market within its national boundaries. The country's development is possible only if it is effectively integrated into the world economy with an international agenda agreed upon with the interested states.

Since Russia's economic potential is great, but not yet sufficient for world leadership, it needs allies to establish itself in the world markets and especially to develop its high-tech sector. This is the purpose of continued cooperation with such economic giants as China and India; besides, new organizational structures are being formed, particularly with the BRICS countries.

In today's political reality, China and India oppose the "collective West" by not agreeing to join sweeping sanctions against Russia, but this, in itself, is not an evidence of an established alliance that fights against Western domination. As for the uneasy relations among the BRICS countries, all of them, including Russia, have a difficult way to go in order to achieve mutual understanding and trust, to develop an independent system of international cooperation, and especially to create a sustainable legal framework for it. This can most likely be accomplished through a "ho-

orizontal model" of economic integration, that is based on the coordinated positions of the process participants, without the obvious dominance of one of the countries.

Thus, in the new global world Russia faces the following legal challenges that need to be addressed to determine its place among the superpowers:

- conclusion of post-war treaties guaranteeing its security from NATO;
- ensuring the interests and rights of states whose independence Russia has recognized by February 24, 2022;
- ensuring the interests and rights of other territories that have exercised the right of self-determination.

Taking into account the fact that economic relations with the countries of the "collective West" are maintained even in the context of the sanctions war, Russia should nevertheless reconsider the contractual system in economic relations both with individual countries and with the European Union as a whole.

The first step in a radical change of the economic world order can be the departure from the system of dollar settlements. The international financial system is currently changing; for Russia it is associated primarily with the role of the dollar as the main reserve currency and beginning of mutual settlements in national currencies.

Russia's main objective is to maintain its position as one of the initiators of the concept of a new legal order and to actively participate in its creation and functioning.

References

1. Английский осел Черчилль. – Текст : электронный // Интересные факты : [сайт]. – URL: <https://interesnyefakty.org/angliyskiy-osel-cherchill/> (date of address: 19.05.2022).
2. Путин: в мире мало стран, обладающих суверенитетом, и Россия своим дорожит. – Текст : электронный // РИА Новости : [сайт]. – 2021, 2 июня. – URL: <https://ria.ru/20170602/1495693004.html> (date of address: 19.05.2022).
3. Тункин, Г. И. Теория международного права / Г. И. Тункин. – Москва : Междунар. отношения, 1970. – 511 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
4. Шебанова, Н. А. Собственность Российской Федерации за рубежом: правовое регулирование и защита : [монография] / Н. А. Шебанова. – Москва : Юрлитинформ, 2013. – 356 с. – Текст : непосредственный.

Ye. I. Makarov¹

ECONOMICS OF ENTERPRISES AND SOCIAL AND LABOR SITUATION AT ENTERPRISES AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE INITIAL PERIOD OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE

The theme of the traditional Likhachov Conference in 2022 could not ignore the radical change in the situation on a global and national scale that occurred after the start of the special military operation of the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine on February 24. Notably, this situation has a significant impact on the social and labor environment in the country.

It is natural that a powerful flow of rapidly changing information makes it difficult for a regular citizen to single out significant information relating to his key interests: maintaining the level of wages, ensuring the stability of the workplace and workload. It is much easier to discuss generalities about geopolitics and the military art. This is what happens when ordinary people and even some experts are confronted with shocking phenomena that lie beyond their everyday interests and knowledge. We have witnessed a dramatic change in the sphere of public interest and information field – reorientation of a sprawling cohort of virologists and epidemiologists into military observers and analysts.

Accessibility and intuitive use of modern means of mass communication generates a torrent of information that descends on the heads of passive consumers. As the pandemic has shown, if the mass reader/viewer/consumer does not have information hygiene skills, he will face hard times. It is extremely difficult to critically study the continuous flow of information and select credible information when the situation is aggravated by harsh propaganda pressure. Virtualization of reality, creation of fictional images and information objects noticeably reduces the ability of an average person to remain in the real world.

Most of us are well aware that because of the multifaceted, dramatic, profound and dynamic nature of the ongoing changes, the consciousness of an individual, even a very well-informed one, is unable to embrace the whole picture of what is happening, critically study it and give a forecast for the short and medium term, not to mention a long-term forecast. Therefore, it is extremely important to discard the emotional component and, having armed oneself with verified data, to put together a complete picture of the current and near-term events out of separate qualitative parts.

Why did I begin my presentation with this premise? Before analyzing data on social and labor conflicts, it is necessary to take into account the peculiarities of communication bearing the features of military propaganda, in order to

protect our minds from manipulative technologies and prevent blurring and changing the meaning of the terms used to describe the conflicts.

Are such concerns and cautions sufficiently justified? Let's try to understand it together.

First of all, let me remind that in this case I speak as the scientific director of the Center for Monitoring and Analysis of Social and Labor Conflicts of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. The purpose of my presentation is to analyze the social and labor situation in the first part of 2022, divided into two periods: before and after the start of the Russian Armed Forces' SMO in Ukraine.

The first observation is a drastic quantitative and qualitative change in the conflict-related information field, including the sphere of social and labor relations.

It should be explained that our Center collects information about conflicts from approximately two hundred relevant sources, which are carefully selected from many others on the basis of reliability, originality, and relevance of the published information on conflict topics. The information is collected and processed using an automated system on a daily basis. A one-week interval has been selected for detection of trends. Based on the ten years of practice, we know that weekly intervals are best for detecting the trends in the emergence, development or resolution of social and labor conflicts.

Analyzing and summarizing the weekly indicators before and after the 9th week of 2022 (February 28 – March 6 – data from the beginning of SMO), we find clear signs of informational chaos. While in week 5 we received 447 new reports of conflicts related to labor and associated relations, in week 12 we received 984 (an increase of 220%). In other words, we can observe more than a twofold increase in the flow of reports on social conflicts in just one week after the start of SMO. However, further analysis and verification of incoming information reveals a paradoxical picture: the number of useful messages, i.e. those that actually contain information about social and labor conflicts, has more than halved (from 28 in week 9 to 11 in week 12). From this we can conclude that the amount of information that can disorient the consumer who is not always capable of professionally verifying it and filtering the noise, has increased by several times. This phenomenon can certainly cause negative social and psychological consequences and frustration in a significant number of citizens, and this is actually happening now.

From a qualitative point of view, in the described flow of messages there is a large number of texts in which the meaning of the terms used for describing conflicts is distorted. In many cases, the authors of reports and texts seem to be still in search of the vocabulary and adequate terminology needed to describe the occurring events, and this search takes place under time pressure, which impacts the quality of their thinking and presentation of information.

So what is the reliable information from useful information sources that we can attend to?

¹ Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (since 2012), Research Supervisor of the Center for Monitoring and Analysis of Social and Labor Conflicts at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Chairman of the Federation of Trade Unions of St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Region (1991–2000). Deputy (2000–2004) and Assistant (2004–2012) to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the President of the Russian Federation in the Northwestern Federal District. Author of a number of publications on trade union issues, social and labor relations and conflicts, including: "Labor Relations and Trade Unions," "Labor conflicts. History, Theory, Monitoring Methods," "Self-Employment in the Russian Federation. Socio-Economic and Legal Aspects as of 2019–2021" (co-authored), "Self-Employment in Russia. Benefits and Drawbacks Identified during the Experiment of the Introduction of a Professional Income Tax in 2018–2020," and others. Full State Counselor 2nd Class, retired. Professor Emeritus of SPbUHS.

First of all, we can see that the number of social and labor conflicts has decreased since SMO began, and this trend persists. Compared to the beginning of the year (January 2022), when 30 conflicts were identified, which is quite a lot because the first week and a half of January are days off, 20 conflicts were registered in March. That is, there was a decrease in their number by one-third. And if we take into account the parameter of territorial spread, the decrease occurred in the local and regional conflicts. The number of conflicts in the healthcare industry has drastically decreased, understandably due to the continued decline in COVID-19 incidence. If we exclude this important component from the analysis, then we can conclude that in other sectors of the economy, the quantitative picture has not significantly changed (versus same parameters in the previous periods). We still see an increase in conflicts in the manufacturing, transport and construction industries.

At the same time, the causes of conflicts and their legal status have noticeably changed. Among the causes, conflicts arising from complete non-payment of salary ranked first by a wide margin. The number of conflicts arising against the backdrop of the threat of bankruptcy of enterprises has noticeably increased. At the same time, the number of conflicts caused by layoffs and lack of indexation of wages decreased. It is most likely that the decrease in the causes related to job cuts and, consequently, the decrease in the weight of this cause was influenced by the decisions of several foreign companies (with tens of thousands of employees) to suspend operations with temporary retention of jobs and payment of 2/3 of wages. According to the statements of these companies, such decisions were made due to the logistical problems and sanctions pressure, which suggests temporary nature of the introduced measures and the likelihood of a return to normal economic activity of these enterprises. Based on explanations of such decisions, the employees can hope to preserve their income level. Taking into account the fact that regional labor markets cannot momentarily absorb large cohorts of workers of enterprises with foreign participation, who have a fairly high level of wages and a substantial social package, the current situation poses a noticeable threat of increased tension in social and labor relations this autumn, as will be discussed below.

With regard to the legal status, a direct link can be made to the cause of most conflicts – complete non-payment of wages. Due to this link, these confrontations can be classified as legal conflicts, which, in turn, implies special conditions for their development, consisting in the mandatory involvement of the Federal Labor Inspectorate and the Prosecutor's Office in their settlement. The involvement of supervisory authorities, in turn, determines the transience of such conflicts, which are usually resolved within a month.

The obtained data provides much more food for thought, but my presentation has a time limit, so I will proceed to the conclusions.

First, tensions in the social and labor situation and conflicts in enterprises have noticeably decreased since the be-

ginning of SMO in Ukraine and are at their historical minimum for the preceding ten years.

Second, there has been a gradual change in the attitudes of protesters, in which concerns about keeping one's job have come to the fore, especially in the context of possible mass job cuts at enterprises with foreign participation and where imported technology and components have a significant impact on the production process, pushing aside the concerns about increasing wages and their indexation as well as questions of labor protection.

Third, the time for resolving the emerging conflicts has markedly decreased (to 22 days) due to the prevalence of legal conflicts and active intervention of government agencies and supervisory bodies.

Fourth, 54% of all social and labor conflicts that began and ended in the first quarter of 2022 completed to full satisfaction of workers' demands, and in 38% of cases their demands were satisfied partially. In only 8% of cases, workers' claims were not satisfied. This ratio of success in resolving social and labor conflicts with prevailing resolution in favor of workers is unprecedented over the past 10 years and may indicate effective work of supervisory bodies that protect the labor rights of workers, as well as fairly successful actions of the workers themselves and the trade unions that represent their interests.

Fifth, there is currently no reason to expect drastic changes in the dynamics of social and labor conflicts toward growth or decline. Noticeable fluctuations may occur only when the escalating problems of foreign owners no longer allow them to retain their idling employees or they will not be able to find buyers for their assets. In case of such an outcome, it would no longer be possible to continue their work in the current status. Based on the statements of these companies, the end of the current status may occur at different times, probably during September-November 2022. At this time, the traditional seasonal increase in conflicts at Russian enterprises takes place, as can also be expected this year. Therefore, it is advisable for HR services of idling enterprises and regional labor and employment services to initiate professional reorientation of employees and communication about employment to potentially displaced workers, e.g. at enterprises of the defence industry, which by now have switched to a six-day two-shift working week.

I'll finish where I have started. Emergence of a significant flow of information, outwardly related to the description of conflicts, on closer professional examination does not indicate an increase in conflict moods or events. In a "non-virtual reality" stripped of hysterical perception, the number of conflicts is decreasing, and social and labor processes are changing toward ensuring the key interests of workers, which consist in maintaining their only source of income – salary – and purchasing power at the achieved level. As the events of the recent months have shown, this has been the focus of the efforts of trade unions, state institutions, and partly employers, bringing forth the generally positive outcomes described above.

I. A. Maksimtsev¹

EURASIAN INTEGRATION – THE BASIS OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL REGION

Global changes in human worldview and world order determine the vector and speed of historical development of civilization. These changes are due to a multitude of achievements, setbacks, and unforeseen events in the scientific, economic, political, and spiritual domains of the society. The times in which we live are unique: the exponential growth in the quantity and quality of transformations is accompanied by an increase in their mutual connection, as well as the speed of penetration into all civilizational processes. Assessment of the vectors of current global changes suggests the need for a global rethinking of established approaches, concepts, ideas, development strategies at different levels of government – all the way to the individual.

Modernization mechanisms of the existing world order were catalyzed by many phenomena: the global economic crisis, the desire of several states for a unipolar world order, the imbalance in the development of new technologies, the displacement of traditional values by ideas of “new ethics,” the climate change and the pandemic.

Rethinking the domestic and foreign policy is a natural response of the state to the threats posed by the intensification of these global challenges. In such circumstances, it is necessary to strengthen the ties with allies, form communities and coalitions that increase competitive advantages and the ability to jointly overcome the increasing threats. The Eurasian Union has become one of the most promising areas of interstate integration for Russia.

The desire of the Eurasian peoples to unite is based on their spiritual and moral unity and thousands of years of cultural and historic interaction. The idea of Eurasian unity is also important in terms of the concept of a multipolar world, designed to become a new worldview platform of mutual understanding and cooperation for a wide range of different states, peoples, cultures and faiths that reject unipolar globalization.

The ideological basis for Eurasian integration was the historical and philosophical *concept of Eurasianism*, which originated in the 1920s in the enlightened environment of the Russian emigration intelligentsia, and at the present stage has received adequate economic content and enough incentives for implementation by the leading economies in the CIS space.

¹ Rector of St. Petersburg State University of Economics, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Honorary Worker of Higher Professional Education of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 150 scientific and educational publications, including: “State and Prospects of Russia’s Integration in the Baltic Region,” “Development of Trade and Economic Cooperation between Russia and the European Union Countries,” “Russian-European Economic Relations,” “Russian Industry and the Problems of Globalization,” “International Business,” etc. Chairman of the Expert Council for Economics at the Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS Member Nations, Russian-Chinese Intergovernmental Working Sub-Commission for Humanitarian and Scientific Cooperation, Expert Council on Legislative Support for Education of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. Honorary Consul of the Republic of Chile in St. Petersburg. Member of the editorial board of the journal Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Natural Sciences, Editor-in-Chief of the journal “Creative Economy.” Awarded the orders of Honor, Friendship, the Cross of the Order of Merit for the Republic of Poland, the government award “For Outstanding Contribution to Chinese-Russian Relations” (China), the Order of Academic Palms (France) and the Commander of the Order of the Star of Italy, etc. Two times recipient of the St. Petersburg Government Prize.

A Modern Interpretation of the Eurasian Idea – Humanistic Pragmatism

The initial essence of the Eurasian idea was that a special civilization has developed on the vast continent of Eurasia that combines features of the West and the East, but at the same time differs significantly from both Western and Eastern culture.

One of the authors of the concept of Eurasianism, Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetskoy, linguist, philosopher, and culturologist, said that the nature itself indicates to the peoples of Eurasia “the need to unite” and “create their national cultures through working together.”

The concept of Eurasianism has gone through periods of criticism, split, excessive politicization, and a certain populism, and in recent history has been revived in the form of the Neo-Eurasianism movement. However, in the modern context of global development and changes in the geopolitical and geo-economic configuration, it makes sense to ask the question: *What is the Eurasian idea now? A speculative concept*, rather emotional than rational, a *myth* that may be inspiring but difficult to implement, or a *real opportunity* to unite the country potentials – in the broadest sense: economic, geostrategic, social, cultural?

Due to its location, the Eurasian space is often perceived as a bridge, a link between Europe and Asia. There is an urgent need to solve the problem of forming global logistical chains, and in this sense, the connecting role of Eurasia is of great importance. However, we must not forget the intrinsic value and uniqueness of our “*place-development*,” in the words of the Eurasianists. Historian Georgy Vladimirovich Vernadsky provides a very accurate wording in his book “The Outline of Russian History”: “People’s mastery of their historical place-development is only strong when people are *aware* of it.”

It is clear that “*Eurasian identity*,” that is, the awareness of being Eurasian, will come to the citizens of the CIS gradually, as the integration develops. This process is objectively lagging in comparison to the European Union, where the so-called European identity as a kind of supranational affiliation began to take shape since the first attempts at European integration – from the Middle Ages.

In our opinion, a modern interpretation of the Eurasian idea should combine *humanitarian values* (guided by the “know to understand” approach: studying each other’s way of thinking and cultural heritage, which is the “heart” of any nation) and *pragmatically built economic integration* – the development of common industries, major infrastructure projects, and joint innovative developments. All this is already possible in modern conditions, on the basis of the established integration nucleus – the Common Economic Space of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. But humanism in the Eurasian context is highly pragmatic: the interaction between Eurasian peoples and their understanding of common goals and objectives of development will determine the degree of effectiveness of the Eurasian macro-region as a single participant of the global competition.

Eurasian Space as the Place of Diversity

One of the main competitive advantages of the geopolitical and, more importantly, geo-economic space of Eurasia is its *diversity* – of the peoples, historical traditions, cultures, religions, ways of life, historical experience, and business practices. At a first glance, the idea of the advantage of diversity is paradoxical: in assessing the effectiveness of integration, we always speak of the degree of unification, harmonization of conditions, norms and rules, and the degree of homogeneity of space. However, in today's world, the diversity of the Eurasian space is consonant with the growing diversity of the global economy: the benefits of this diversity outweigh certain difficulties in establishing norms and mechanisms of interaction. Such a fundamental principle of the Eurasian doctrine as *polycentrism*, from the point of view of preserving the cultural codes of the nations comprising the Eurasian space, is very important and relevant in the context of globalization, which often means not only unification of approaches to doing business, but also convergence of cultures and languages, erasure of unique national characteristics, and a certain “global simplification.”

In this context, the Eurasian idea has such a great potential precisely because of the synergy that can arise from the development of a unified but diverse Eurasian space, the additional energy that will exceed the sum of the potentials of the uniting countries.

The Impact of Modern Global Challenges on Eurasian Integration Strategy

The world keeps changing. The global economy as a system linking the parts of this world is changing as well. The speed of such changes is constantly increasing, primarily as a result of advances in technology and the increasing speed of information transmission. Perhaps the increase in the speed of changes is the most serious challenge today; we need faster, but equally effective solutions for the implementation of the chosen integration strategy – movement towards the Eurasian Union.

The second challenge is the increasing uncertainty of the global world development. Here are just a few trends: growth in the number of participants of the world economy (countries, companies, international organizations, even individuals who can become prominent figures in the global market due to the development of global networks), increasing amplitude of price fluctuations for almost all goods and assets in a broad sense, and even growth in the amplitude of climate change. In this context, the increasing diversity of actors in the world economy and politics, their decisions and actions play a cruel joke on us: instead of stabilizing the system, the diversity unbalances it.

According to various estimates, the world economic system is currently approaching the bifurcation point or has already achieved it. At this point, the types of solutions change and the spatial and temporal organization of objects can transform. (Remember the works by Ilya Romanovich Prigogine, Belgian and American physicist and chemist of Russian origin, Nobel Prize winner in Chemistry in 1977, author of the concept of “philosophy of instability”). With the world economy at a bifurcation point, it is necessary to modify all strategies of economic life accordingly, including the development models of regional integration associations.

Thus, it is becoming increasingly difficult to predict further development of world politics, economy, and climate, and to determine the megatrends of global development. The 2011 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded for empirical studies of cause-effect relationships in macroeconomics, namely between economic policies and macroeconomic variables such as GDP, inflation, employment and investment, confirming the urgent need for greater certainty in medium- and long-term economic decision-making for all economic actors. In the meantime, many economic laws that have long been considered immutable (such as the rational behavior of economic subjects), begin to be questioned in the crisis period and require rethinking by both theorists and practitioners of economic life. This fully applies to the theory of international economic integration, which builds on the principle of explaining the ongoing processes of creating regional economic blocs, but does not offer a viable model for the future development of integration associations.

Therefore, it is advisable to determine the conditions under which the Eurasian macro-region will become an effective spatial and economic system, capable of withstanding external shocks and possessing its own identity and certain competitive advantages.

1. It is necessary to develop an adequate balance between the “top-down” development of the institutional environment (it will contribute to the clear adherence to a certain “roadmap” of Eurasian integration) and corporate “bottom-up” integration based on the mutual interest of companies of the participating countries and adequate models of cooperation.

2. The key economic mechanism and simultaneously a criterion of effective development of a unified Eurasian economic macro-region should be the degree of cooperation between industrial enterprises of traditional and new industries, scientific and educational centers as the basis of innovation infrastructure, which implies continuous development of mutual interest between participating countries and formation of super-productive regional manufacturing systems.

3. The available global integration experience provides us with certain learnings: for various reasons, many regional associations of states have entered a phase of internal contradictions. Some of these reasons are more objective – economic (financial imbalances, lack of economic controllability in the European Union), some are more subjective – geopolitical (multiculturalism crisis in Europe, contradictions in the Asia-Pacific region in the form of the conflict between China and Japan over islands and resources in the South China Sea). This experience is very important for us: we need to build cooperation mechanisms within the framework of Eurasian integration under the principles of equality of existing participants and openness to new ones; to conduct regular monitoring of the economies of member states; and to develop an adequate mechanism for accepting new countries.

4. Education and science in the Eurasian region are an important connecting factor that supports its common identity and objective competitive advantages. This factor can unite leading scientific schools and talented young people of the macro-region through virtual networks. We can discuss building a model of intelligent network infrastructure of the future – with the Eurasian Association of Universities as its potential basis.

Fulfillment of these conditions, which are largely inter-related, will enable the Eurasian space to evolve into a single effective macro-region. However, the current situation in the world economy is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty. It can be more accurately described as “multiple uncertainties”; that is, a set of global economic development factors that are external to regional integration in the Eurasian space and whose impact is difficult to assess because of the increasing speed and multidirectionality of their impact.

Nevertheless, the constant aggravation of the struggle of national economies for different types of resources (financial, natural including territorial, information including innovation, etc.) changes the geo-economic state of the world and requires the integrating states to constantly monitor the international economic processes and adjust the integration strategy accordingly.

First of all, following the results of the acute phase of the crisis, the integration concept should include opportu-

nities for self-stabilization in the face of an aggressive external environment. This can be implemented, in particular, through the diversification of economic specialization of member countries of the integration grouping, which will lead to diversification of exports and less cyclic fluctuations in their economies. For Eurasian integration, this task is a priority, and it is achievable. In our opinion, as this macro-region expands geographically, it can also self-stabilize, primarily due to the common lingual and intellectual space, allowing for quick strategic decisions and development of a common vision of the future Eurasian Union.

Thus, the current “starting point” for the development of a new macro-region in the Eurasian space is characterized by numerous external uncertainties, but at the same time provides the participating countries with a unique opportunity, in the absence of a clear global economic leader, to form an effective integration system, protected from external economic shocks and open to interaction with the modern global economy.

V. K. Mamontov¹

A WORLD OF INTENTIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES

“The world will never be the same” is a popular phrase. This is how people comment on certain outstanding events that are happening in their lives or around them. And more often than not, it is an emotional assessment rather than an analytical one. The world as a whole is a very strong, cast-iron thing. It changes, of course, but slowly and imperceptibly.

However, there certainly are such events that really and perceptibly change the picture of the world. And those who say, “The world will never be the same,” referring to all that has happened to us since February 24, after the start of Russia’s special operation in Ukraine, have reason to say so. There is some evidence to it. I will try to present this evidence in a journalistic manner, not scientifically, without any deep conclusions, but rather aiming for a certain accuracy and maybe even artistry of my snapshots. These snapshots will be different, from a variety of areas: social life, economy, military history, and history in general. They all serve as a proof that even such an inert structure as the world can indeed be subjected to serious changes, if there is a political, human will to it, along with favorable circumstances and ways, the opportunities for change.

Opportunities can be technological, mental, intellectual. But they must exist. There is a saying attributed to various political figures, which goes like this: “It’s not the intentions but the opportunities that matter.” This approach explains a lot. It doesn’t really matter who wants what, unless

there are opportunities to achieve these goals; and this is directly applicable to the situation around Ukraine right now.

For example, we know that Poland has always been obsessed with the idea that it should be an empire from sea to sea – that land and areas, pieces of ground, rivers and people who live in the Western Ukraine are in fact Poland. And it would have been nice to get it all back, to take over, but for quite a long time Poland had no opportunity to do so. And suddenly, mind you, these opportunities suddenly appeared, or at least the Poles think they did.

Their policies have changed, their political stakes have changed, their allies in general have been cast in iron, and it is even hard to imagine that just recently the Polish leaders and political figures, albeit disliking Russia, still lived without illusions. Regarding opportunities, for example, to get their hands on a piece of Ukraine. Today they are definitely thinking about it, yes they are veiling it, yes they have to negotiate with NATO about it. Nevertheless, the opportunity came up, and certainly the intentions were there for a long time. This is a very important thing.

What opportunities, what intentions did we have when we began this difficult, complicated procedure called a special operation? In fact it is risky – very risky. What are our intentions here and what are our opportunities? Let’s take a closer look at this.

Concerning opportunities. Do they lie in the realm of the military? Well, thank God, since the early 2000s we haven’t wasted any time, at least in military terms. We did a lot to modernize the army, we did not sit by, and our scientists brought all the Soviet and post-Soviet scientific developments to material embodiment. Everything about our missiles, Sarmats, Kinzhals and Burevestniks – all of this has gone into development, it has all reached the level of a product. As they say in the course of the military acceptance, “The product has been accepted by the military, the products can fly, the products hit their targets, the products

¹ Worked in the “Komsomolskaya Pravda” newspaper (1990–1997 – head of the department of republics, editor of the department of literature and art, executive secretary; 1997–2005 – held the post of the managing editor and Editor-in-Chief), Izvestia newspaper (2005–2009 – Editor-in-Chief). Director General of the radio station “Govorit Moskva”, chairman of the board of directors of the newspaper “Komsomolskaya Pravda”, director of the Foundation for the Support of Network Initiatives “Smart Internet”. Author of the books: “Seven Dreams in September: Social Fiction,” “How to Make a Newspaper Appealing for Readers?” Member of the Union of Journalists of Russia, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation (2010–2011). Awarded the Medal for the Construction of the Baikal-Amur Mainline.

accomplish their missions” – and that’s certainly an opportunity. We are ahead of our opponents and rivals in this race. But! If you have such opportunities in the military sphere – so to say, in its applied technical aspect – does that mean that a state that has such opportunities necessarily makes that decision? Like, now I have the military capacity, so I will resolve everything in life by military means. No, of course not. It doesn’t happen like that.

The question is, what new opportunities, in addition to Kinzhals, made us so radically change our intentions to live in peace with everyone, to build Eurasia from Lisbon to the Bering Strait, to be friends with everyone, to use our own resources in moderation and offer them to our neighbors, to build “Nord Streams” and the like? At what point did this intention translate into a special operation and why?

Mainly, I think that these changes have taken place in our heads. At least in the minds of those who make decisions, and in the minds of those who support them, who analyze the reality and not run away trying to hide from it. “Peace is better than war!” – say those who surprisingly failed to notice the tragedy of the Russian Donbass. Of course it’s better. Of course, everything that is happening in Ukraine right now is a tragedy. Certainly this is the hardest ordeal, and certainly behind this story of the military solution to the problem is the story of how opportunities for peaceful solutions, political opportunities, have been missed over years. But we must not forget how the political decision was opposed, how the thesis of a Greater Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok was torpedoed, what a counterbalance to this was built, how the enemies – opponents of such ideas – plotted against it.

So what has actually happened? What happened was this: we couldn’t take it anymore. It has become impossible. It has become clear that if we continue to swallow the attitude toward Russia as a secondary power, we will be multiplied by zero. Remember when we were called a gas station and felt offended, and so on? It was just the beginning of the process. It soon became clear: to feel offended is not enough. If we fail to take seriously what our “partners” are saying today, and these are existential things, concerning the very possibility of Russia’s existence, our posterity will not forgive us: we will have squandered our inheritance instead of preserving it.

I hold an opinion that is not uncommon today: what is called the imperial tradition, the imperial way of existence, is actually (and there is no need to be timid and cunning when choosing words) Russia’s way of existence. Multinational, gigantic, historically established. The threat of losing, for example, access to the Black Sea, can no longer be tolerated. Or to the Baltic Sea. The threat of reducing the flight time of missiles to Moscow to a minimum. Turning Ukraine into a nuclear quasi-power.

At the same time they tell us: you must respect the territorial integrity of another state. When someone needs to bomb Yugoslavia, it’s only welcomed; it’s the world community that has decided that bombing is necessary. Now the world community has decided that there is no need to do away with the Nazis in Ukraine. And we decided that we need to. And we can’t do without it. Once again, a change occurred in the heads when Chechnya was returned instead of the shameful peace with the international militants. When we realized that we had to defend Syria – and ourselves in Syria. When we returned the Crimea to its native

harbor. Such steps are based on an unconditional, consolidated military technical component, which is crucial. But the main change occurred in the understanding of what Russia actually is. Well, there’s no way it’s a gas station.

Now let’s see if we have the ability to withstand massive sanctions. There are few cheerful assurances to it. Yes, there is a political will, there is an understanding of the historical challenge; we are gaining determination and going into open confrontation with a large, serious and very difficult opponent. Because the threat is absolutely clear, it is quite visible. But do we have the strength to fight many opponents at once? And here we cannot escape the question: how irreversible is our decision to be free and independent? For now we are freer than many. We are now more independent, more sovereign than literally anyone else. There is still China, and even so, maybe it is a more dependent country. This is a very important point. In order to be free and independent, we need strength, fortitude, good groundwork in the economy and resources, and so on. And here there is one quandary which I would also like to mention.

It’s about the certainty that we are doing the right thing, moving toward independence, sovereignty, that it’s how we defend our own civilizational path. Are we convinced that this is the one and only way of Russia’s development? While engaging in an intellectual kind of argument, I tried to formulate it figuratively and came up with a question like this: “Do we take Mariupol so that Ikea would come back to us, or do we take Mariupol so that Ikea would never come back to us?” I realize that this is a kind of exaggeration, a mental quandary, but one that is extremely important. It may be paradoxically phrased, but I think the answer to this question is unequivocal: “We want to be independent in a real way.”

It’s not something post-modernistic. This does not mean that we should fence ourselves off from the world, build some kind of a wall, return to the USSR, etc. All this nonsense immediately came to the surface of the public discussion of the situation. But they are not the point. Our confidence should manifest not in the readiness to tighten our belts or endure, although perhaps it is inevitable, we’ll see, as they say. But in fact, this is a story about learning to do a lot of things ourselves, not to hope that someone else will solve our problems, not to trade our blood and flesh, and I mean the blood and flesh of our land, that is, oil and gas, in order to get the “goods” (“We’ll sell the oil and buy the rest”). Fortunately, we did not rely on this thesis in the military domain. Although, as I remember now, we were going to buy Mistral. We have come a long way from trying to buy the Mistral to understanding that we have to “solve problems ourselves, and this serious business cannot be trusted to anyone,” according to the old Soviet love song.

I can’t help but refer to my own experience here. In between the work and writing papers, I restored an old Soviet Moskvich car from 1959. What I have to tell you is that everything in this car has been import-substituted. There is not a single part, not a single screw, not a single bolt that was not made on the territory of the great Soviet Union. Yes, the car’s concept is absolutely in line with the automotive tradition of that period. It resembles some car models of the world. Certainly the technology was studied, certainly it was a post-war machine, and certainly our victory and our penetration into some of the sanctuaries of applied science of that the time contributed to its emergence. Surely some

technology and engineering solutions have been spied. But at the same time, looking at this device, rather complicated for 1959 – mechanical, electrical and otherwise – one can't help but wonder: didn't the country that produced Moskvich have a large margin of safety to pursue an independent, sovereign policy? One hundred percent yes.

Why can't we say yes to ourselves with absolute certainty today? For many reasons. Because we sincerely wanted to integrate into the global economic project. Did it work? Let's be honest: it didn't quite work out. Has the "civilized" world accepted us? No, it pushes us to make stools, cars, missiles, Kinzhals and whatever else ourselves. With God's help, of course, and with the help of our true friends. Make, not buy. After all, in that same Ikea, a lot of products are made in Russia. Then why do we need this brand? Why do we need this foreign word? I don't know. They say that this is how we got and are getting (perhaps the West really helped) the technology, logistics, and marketing moves. Some have peeked at how someone turns the screws, how beautiful they can be, so they've stepped up here. Moreover, there are industries in which we really can't pull it all off by ourselves; no other country, by the way, does. But here, too, the question of freedom and sovereignty looms. Say, the problems that automotive producers have today are not technological at all, not market-related but political, with Renault crying, losing revenue, but going away.

They are losing both profits and markets. They wouldn't want to leave, but they are forced by the harsh Euro-Atlantic solidarity. This is how they see their freedom: not to work in Russia, to leave from wherever they are told to.

All right, it's not just about that after all. And it's not about whether Renault goes or stays. There is a shortage of electronic elements. It appeared long before the special operation. And there are monopolists in the world who are the only ones producing them. We can't let everything that runs on lithium-ion batteries go down. We have now decided to finally build a giant factory and produce these batteries ourselves. Because batteries are extremely important to us – we need them for existential functions! And we don't need the Ikea brand for existentials, it seems to me. We can do without it.

Now the danger is that we switch from one seller of goods to another, with our traditional gas. That's what we'll do, of course, in a sense. The world depends on our gas, our oil, our wheat, as it turns out, and many other things, like our titanium, our nuclear energy, our nuclear technology, etc. Nevertheless, we will have to take more and more steps in order not to lose our training, not to lose the ability to make and grow and produce by ourselves what we buy in other countries for some reason. We have to finish with the story of sending metal all over the world to bring in nails made of it. We have to stop sending our wood somewhere far, far away, and then suddenly getting stools from there. Thank goodness we have localized the stools by now, but the story still seems strange. No, we can't grow bananas. I guess we can't. Well, let's buy bananas. Yes, maybe we don't make some first-rate microchips, some technology, well, let's buy them. But the world doesn't want to sell them to us, you say. Sanctions. Well then, we'll have to change that world.

The whole thing is this: we have proclaimed that we are free, autonomous, and pursue our own, independent politics. We can no longer move in line with the Western civiliza-

tion project, as its contradictions with the interests of the country have been exposed to the core. It seems to us, and it is true, that a civilizational project based on a libertarian idea, with its libertarian ineptitude, seems dangerous for our purposes. Thus, we say no to this world. Perhaps largely because the world says no to us. Did someone appreciate our good intentions? The famous formula that I already mentioned, "from Lisbon to Vladivostok," was it adopted or at least considered? No, they were horrified by it. Why?

The answer is there. The point is that we don't really want to close ourselves off from everyone. Yes, we are being forced (and I believe for good) to become more independent and produce our own nails and beyond. We know how, and apparently we can. We look at our armament and say, "Gosh, wow, look what we can do!" We have this evidence working beautifully in a special operation, although it is not a joyful, not a humane way. But what can be done, such ways still exist.

The world has built a global system – economic, political, and I would say cultural. If you can call it culture. It has built such a global system, where we, firstly, do not fit in any way, and secondly, even if we did, it would not give us advantages. Instead, we would be forced to part with what we hold dear. With our independence and sovereignty, for instance. Then why do we need it? And that's where I see a huge conflict. It doesn't mean we can't create – we have to create our own global system. This task is more difficult than reconstructing an old 1959 Moskvich. No, it's not the one that needs to be restored. We must rebuild our global economy, and life itself is building it, we only need to understand it and defend it, including the situation in Ukraine. What do I mean? What is called Eurasia as opposed to the American world. Eurasia is a very powerful and underrated player. China, India, Russia, the old Europe being written off. Well, only if it writes itself off. This is the only possible outcome. It will grow decrepit and die, along with its European Union and its indulgence in the American uncle as its unconditional spiritual economic, political and otherwise appreciated leader.

Once again, it is Eurasia, the Eurasian globalism that interests us (nothing prevents South America from joining it as well). An expanded version of BRICS would do us good. Here we can cooperate, here we understand how to live and how to respect each other. See how we have come the giant way with the Chinese. We had the Damansky too, and look where we are now. Because we are evolving in the same universe. We are developing in parallel. We need each other. We are not a danger to each other, in the end. And we are gradually coming up with the essential, most interesting solutions. For instance, do we have to worship the decrepit Europe, let's say, for former merits, the Beatles and Mozart? And the Americans? And the dollar?

There are self-proclaimed kings of pop music. Who elected Michael Jackson king of Western pop music? No one. He just sang a lot, put out a lot of records, and then he called himself king. We have our own self-proclaimed king in Russia, Philip Kirkorov. Let him be. There is no danger in that. But the self-appointed global croupiers who shuffle all the cards... I am reminded of a phrase from The Pokrovskie Gate movie, "*Savva, what do you need it for?*" Here we are like that Savva. Why do we need it for? We have our own tasks around us, our own existential challenges. Why do we have to go in that direction, can we accept being

treated like that – by the horns and into the stall? No, we'll never go there. First, because the bear has no horns, thankfully, and the bear doesn't ask anyone's permission, as we know from the proverb.

All right, it's all just fancy words. But we really do not need some of the ideology, ideas and other trends that are imposed on us as a precondition for entering the "civilized" world. Well, for example, they are terribly concerned about overpopulation. Therefore they support any kind of human relationship, including personal relationships, except for a normal large family. What do we need it for? Why does Savva need it? We barely have 150 million people for a huge territory! We need large families badly.

What we are now telling each other about Eurasia is a nightmare of the global world as it is now. This is the end of the world hegemony. That's where we got in, that's what happens when we assault Azovstal. That's why we are taking Mariupol. That is my answer to these questions.

I do not claim to have any complete theoretical statements. However, there is another important point that I can't help but mention. When I ask myself the hard questions, "Can we pull it off? Can we do it? Do we really need all that, or maybe we're fooling ourselves here, and we really just want a privilege?" I think not. I and many others are very concerned about the lost lives and the fact that we are forced to deal in such harsh ways with the tasks that determine our future, the very existence of Russia. It's a pity we haven't learned how to do it peacefully.

I am especially sorry that Slavs fight with Slavs, Russians with Russians. It's a kind of a civil war, in fact. What did the story with Azovstal teach us, among other things? When our valiant army was about to storm the factory, the commander-in-chief said, "Stay out of these catacombs." And now, thanks to this precise decision, I think hundreds or even thousands of lives have been saved. I'm not talking about the ones who are out now. These prisoners are not particularly interesting. Many of them deserve trial and the harshest punishment for their crimes. And those who were there by mistake, by stupidity – well, we must also judge, examine, understand, and then decide their fate. But! They are alive, as are those who were going to storm their catacombs. This is a very important point. We explain to the world what we want, and who, in fact, opposes us. In the West, people listen to more than just their propagandists – sometimes genuine footage gets through there, and when they saw those tattoos on the backs and other body parts of the Azov people, they suddenly wondered, "Are we for fascists or what? We support Ukraine, pump it with weapons, is it for fascists?"

A minor epiphany, of course. But there is little good in war, and it's all so shaky, to be honest. But we must value it and gather it up bit by bit – into one truth of the righteous cause. The certainty that we have chosen the right path means that to reinforce that certainty, we have to walk that path to the end and win.

This is the dialectic.

A. P. Markov¹

GLOBAL CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME AND FUTURE SCENARIOS

Today's world is entering an era of the "torn threads" of human history, a time of an "evolutionary change unparalleled in human history" (A. A. Zinoviev). The civilization in its spiritual, technological and geopolitical aspects is approaching a dangerous boundary whose crossing is fraught with fundamental changes and irreversible deformation of cultural and anthropological matrices, the architectonics and metaphysics of which were laid down by the great prophets and philosophers of the Axial time – the era when the intellectual and "worldview" turn of history was completed and the human was formed in his spiritual openness to the world (C. Jaspers). In the alarming assessments of humanity's prospects one can detect echoes of an almost religious eschatology which manifests as rapid growth of "existential problems and contradictions" and ultimate aggravation of the confrontation between good and evil: "much, too much testifies that our age is an eve" [6, c. 1135].

The inevitability of change in the civilizational paradigm is evidenced by the rapid growth of global geo-

political, cultural, anthropological and ecological crises, which call into question the model of progress adopted at the previous stage of man-made development (V. Stepin).² The transition to a new civilizational strategy is also associated with the coming "dismantling of capitalism" as a result of the destruction of the model of market production and the depletion of the resources of the so-called non-capitalist zones formed in the process of global expansion of capital.

The driver of civilization's transition to the post-capitalist phase is the *fourth industrial revolution*, which replaces the current information revolution (the third after the agrarian and industrial revolution) and forms a fundamentally new technological structure based on the expansion of artificial intelligence, total automation and robotization of production. In socio-cultural terms, the inevitable transition of civilization to a qualitatively different state is "guaranteed" by the widening chasm between "power" and "wisdom" (A. Nazaretyan), the growing "asymmetry of arms" between good and evil (A. Kuraev), which gives evil an undeniable advantage in the struggle for minds and souls. In the metaphorical sense, the drama of our time is symbolized by Hamlet's formula "The time is out of joint..." The uncertainty of future scenarios reinforces the approach of the "*technological singularity*" – a point on the curve of histor-

¹ Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Dr. Sc. (Pedagogical Studies), Honored Scientist of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 170 scientific publications, including: "The Entropy of Freedom as a Global Problem of European Culture," "Cultural Regression' as a Result of Neoliberal Reforms in Post-Soviet Russia," "Information Wars of the Post-Industrial World as a Factor in Geopolitical Competition," "Western Civilization of the Postmodern Age: Symptoms of Decline, an Alternative Project for the Future," and others. Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS.

² According to the primary meaning of the word, crisis (gr. κρίσις) means "judgment," "verdict"; in a softer meaning it signifies a border, watershed, outcome, turning point, change in the vector of development.

ical time marking the beginning of the “explosive” stage of progress, striving into infinity and giving birth to a potentially wide range of development models with unpredictable consequences.¹

In previous centuries, Europe was the source of global dynamism and the driver of global development. Today, the Western European model of culture, man, state structure and society fits into the “strategy of descent”: the deep metaphysical and existential fractures of the systemic civilizational crisis minimize its chances for recovery, and not only in the logic of frankly destructive postmodern scenarios, but also in the classical modern understanding, which has long ago and systematically exhausted its constructive resources. The prospect of the end of European civilization with its neoliberal global project “appears for the first time in all its drama: The West is leaving the “arena of history” (A. Pelipenko). The “spiritual capitulation” is brought closer by rifts at the metaphysical level: Western civilization has entered a stage of “ultimate fatigue” from an overstretch caused by the pressure of the “Promethean technological rush” (A. S. Panarin).

Increasingly pessimistic conclusions are heard about the dead-end nature of the postmodern era, which bases its present and future on total nihilism toward the great achievements of previous times. The concept of the world order based on freedom “from” as the highest good and the model of the market as an institution independent of state control, ensuring the process of “self-growth of collective wealth,” proved theoretically unsound and in fact destructive to the key institutions and structures of the state and society.

The notions of the constructive possibilities of a “natural order” arising in a situation of uncontrolled self-regulation have proven to be artificial and groundless: outside of state control and restraining energy of the Logos, all complex systems inevitably tend “toward the final state of chaos and death” (A. S. Panarin). Ruthless market selection “dehumanizes” the individual, depriving him of his basic spiritual qualities – shame, conscience, mercy, and responsibility. Market totalitarianism, by destroying the motivation for social participation, deprives the society of the energy of solidarity, turning it into a “dispersed environment” existing under the sign of entropy.

The metaphysical and institutional crisis of the Western civilization is taking on a global scale, triggering destructive reactions that put the world in an extreme state of disequilibrium. The bifurcation point, increasing the uncertainty of tomorrow, suggests two mutually exclusive strategies for the future: 1) regressive, reinforcing the disorganization of the global system and expanding the space of chaos; 2) constructive, ensuring the reproduction of basic cultural universals and blocking the growth of entropy. These strategies are in a constant (and not always visible) struggle for dominance, which takes place not only in geopolitics, but also in the existential depths of world culture and the human soul. In the meantime, the humanity has always had and still has the freedom to choose: to follow the path of “descent”

¹ The process of replacement of evolution with information technology revolution is described by the “Snooks-Panov curve” which captures the growing angle between the horizontal axis and the curve of the civilizational dynamics, which is increasingly approaching the vertical. The moment in which the curve transitions to a vertical line is the singularity point, which denies the previous laws and logic of development and marks the transition of the world into an unknown future.

into destructive elements (including the distant past) or to ascend to new spiritual heights. The confrontation of these dominants in the contemporary civilizational dynamics is becoming global. “The dilemma is simple and cruel: either, at the cost of thorough clearing, a breakthrough to the next round of complexity, or a failure into total simplification, conservation, and a global retardation of evolutionary dynamics” [7, c. 18].

The first option, relieving the tension of upward movement, inevitably entails degradation and rolling back to “recessive” cultural and civilizational forms. The metaphysical context for the emergence and growing popularity of downward strategies is the postmodern era, whose institutions expand the space of regression, increasing entropy in culture and society. The scenarios of the future within this trend profess anthropological nihilism – destruction of the customary criteria of identity.

1. The strategy of cultural and anthropological regression of the world fits into the pessimistic scenarios reflecting the descending logic of history. For example, Nassim Taleb’s version of a catastrophic future, which does not exclude final self-destruction of a large part of the humankind (e.g. as a result of a global military conflict) [8]. Or the theory of an *escape from culture into nature*, a return to the generic elements, to the naïve age. It found its logical completion in the concept of *cultural nihilism* with its total criticism of culture as “anti-nature,” progressive domination of the artificial over the spontaneous, natural, living. A provoking version of cultural nihilism was the scenario of a total rejection of culture and a return to a “new unity with nature” by the American anthropologist J. Zerzan, who believed that the emergence of the *primitive man of the future* was inevitable [2].

2. A pronounced vector of “anthropological nihilism” is present in the concept of “*guided evolution*,” conceived and performed by the intellectually and ideologically integrated groups of transnational elites who: a) understand the logic of historical processes and build scenarios for an “optimal future” on this basis; b) have the resources to implement them (A. Fursov). The project of “guided evolution” pursues two strategic goals: first, total power over the world – control over resources, spiritual factors of human evolution (including the structures of production and distribution of knowledge), consciousness and behavior of people; second, a soft “anthropological genocide of the world” – creating the conditions for natural self-destruction of a large part of humanity, which becomes redundant in the coming world of digital economy and artificial intelligence.

3. The “*transhumanist project*” of the future fits into the scenario of “anthropological regression.” The logic of its adherents stems from the understanding of global exhaustion of the “energy of ascent,” inter alia, due to the “incredible rise in complexity at the end of the last and the beginning of this century.” Today the world is rapidly falling into a “process of secondary simplification,” whose forces are “desperately advancing on all fronts” [3]. The main arguments in favor of the transhumanist scenario are related to the obvious intensification of two vectors in the mankind’s degradation: metaphysical and biological.

First, humanitarians are critical of the intellectual resources and opportunities to develop the “humanistic” qualities of the mind, which are limited by the “ineradicable properties of the natural substrate”: destructive energies

found in the psychophysical matrices of mentality are embedded in the strata of the collective unconscious. This is the source of ambivalence of the emotional sphere, with its unconscious craving for acute conflict situations and the need to be regularly “fed” with intense negative experiences. In the postmodern phase, the return to corporeality and “unbridled sensuality” that sets free the instincts of eros and thanatos threatens to plunge the humanity into a “cattle-like state,” depriving it of an optimistic future (A. P. Nazaretyan).

Second, the pessimistic assessment of prospects is due to the biological degradation of the humanity, whose gene pool, primarily under the influence of civilizational factors, is accumulating more and more material that threatens its survival in an increasingly complex anthropocenos. Therefore, the decisive condition for the preservation of civilization, from the point of view of the adherents of transhumanism, is “shedding of the biological shell” and “denaturalization of the intelligence medium” (e.g. by designing “man-machine interfaces”). Artificial production of the man, through depreciating his “genetic belonging” and eliminating inherently destructive “generic” bases of identity, will enable the man “to feel himself a carrier of universal and even cosmic history,” opening the prospects of control of metagalactic processes and “noospherization of the cosmos” [5, c. 324].

The “*optimistic*” group of scenarios is the result of the intellectual activity of the humanitarian elite, which has not lost its sense of duty to the fate of the world and has retained faith in the ontological status of the Logos as the conception that generates reality. In this frame of reference, at least three civilizational futures are possible.

1. The *ascension strategy* is offered by an alternative to the waning Western neoliberalism – the *Eurasian project*, a persuasive and significant option in the context of acute problems of state and social development for a vast geographic and cultural space. The Eurasian world rejects the capitalist path of development in its neoliberal version; it does not accept the unidimensional model of market world order that has spread throughout the world, striking the “blossoming complexity” of peoples, cultures and civilizations with “the ailment of the flat-bourgeois end of history” [1, c. 647]. The spiritual code of Eurasia, which could not be completely destroyed by the informational intervention of the West and the comprador groups within the country, rejects the dictatorship of the power of capital, and categorically rejects the Western model of cultural policy which turned the biological practices into a norm of self-expression, the result of which was the spiritual and moral degradation of man.

The status of the spiritual center of the Eurasian continent rightfully belongs to Russia as a civilization established in the socio-cultural and spiritual sense, which provided the synthesis of European and Asian principles based on the primacy of the law of cooperation over the law of competition in previous stages of history, the triumph of truth, goodness, beauty, justice, and the advantage of altruism over egoism.

2. The updated *communist project* is also considered a promising scenario for tomorrow, whose humanistic basis is the image of man in his constructive, creative, spiritual essence. The main argument in favor of this option is that even the socialist model of communism implemented in the

USSR, being humanistically truncated, developed in the direction of ascent, which ensured its victory over Nazi ideology plunging the world into the abyss of racism. European civilization of the 1930s was on the brink of a precipice of descent (S. Kurginyan).

The structure of bourgeois liberalism and humanism had by then been shaken by mass atheism and scorched by hatred on the battlefields of World War I. Nihilism, which destroyed the Christian matrix of the European world and blocked the religious ascent, opened the way for the Nazi “blond beast” to trample on all moral principles. In the end, the energy of the *communist future* saved the world from a total descent into the abominable elements of a pagan past, ensuring the Soviet Union’s victory over the Nazi plague [3]. “The communist system in Russia has not outlived itself, it was young, just beginning to mature, and it was killed. Artificially destroyed. Being a sociologist, I argue that in terms of social organization it is higher than anything in the West... with the defeat of Russian communism, Russia lost the prospect of becoming a great, leading power. I think that the Soviet period was the pinnacle of Russian history, and Russia will not rise to such a height again” [4, c. 323].

The scenario of a communist future becomes realistic, first of all, in the context of the decline of the capitalist system of production. Second, against the background of the expansion of global problems comes the understanding of the futility of the neoliberal model of the world order, which completes its triumphal path with the collapse of the systemic institutions and theoretical framework, including such categories as humanism, freedom, democracy, and human rights. Third, the communist vector is consistent with the humanistic direction of the New Age European thought. It is no coincidence that humanitarians even qualified communism in its Soviet incarnation “as an adapted model of the European Enlightenment” (A. Panarin).

3. The optimistic options for the global future also include the *Noospheric Breakthrough* – a movement toward the paradigm of universal evolutionism and sustainable development, toward planetary cooperation of ethnic groups, toward a world without wars and violence. The basis of the paradigm is V. I. Vernadsky’s doctrine of the noosphere and P. A. Florensky’s ideas of the pneumatosphere, which reproduces the unconditional values of humanity, bringing it closer to the Ideal. The geopolitical subject of the “noospheric socialist transformations” translating the dynamics of the global rifts and collisions “into a continuum of coevolutionary development of peoples and states” could be “Greater Eurasia” (A. I. Subetto), consolidated by the civilizational power and spiritual experience of Russia – an important link in the modern world order, largely determining “the vector of global development and security” (V. N. Kupin).

The project of a *new social state*, whose historical contours “emerge in the coming post-liberal phase of global historic development,” fits into the concept of universal evolutionism. The social state gets rid of fragments of the “Faustian culture” that gave birth to “technological imperialism,” which is murderous for man and nature, rejecting the “spiritual value motivation underlying such progress,” the “utilitarian and anti-human projects to ‘save the world’” initiated by the “Malthusian social Darwinist elite” ruling the world.

The scenario for such a future is built on the rehabilitation of the basic values of the European Enlightenment, which centered on the human creator. "The Enlightenment picture of the world is an open, exoteric one that trusts in the ethnically neutral universals of Progress." The pedagogy of the Enlightenment was highly humanistic: it optimistically assesses the constructive potential of peoples and cultures to "join the peaks of development" (A. S. Panarin). The metaphysical foundation of the project of a new social state could be a *cosmocentric dominant*, fitting human intentions and goals "into the structure of general cosmic harmony whose meaning by far exceeds our arbitrary selfish claims and expectations" (A. S. Panarin). Its humanistic mission is to rehabilitate the "moral and religious foundations" of a world in which the disadvantaged and the "poor in spirit" are the bearers of higher meaning – the saviors of a "savaged humanity" that has learned the law of the jungle.

The optimistic scenarios described above can be seen as options for the future, presented in the status of the potential, which precedes the real and existing and is "concealed" in its depths (A. Bergson). The limitless creativity of man, who has always found a constructive response to the tragic challenges of time, makes these scenarios probable (C. Jaspers). The implementation of one or other option depends not only on objective circumstances and availability of necessary resources, but also on the moral responsibility of the intellectual elite, capable of reviving and transforming the ideas of the future into the energy of creation, integrating on a synergistic basis the spiritual experience of the past and the constructive potential of the present.

The contemporary philosophical and cultural thought should consider the search for new strategies and scenarios of development alternative to neoliberal ideologies not only as a scientific duty, but also as a spiritual and moral responsibility to the future of the humankind. The image of the future is formed by the element of the Logos and then becomes a "self-fulfilling prophecy" that constructs the reality.

References

1. Дугин, А. С. Основы геополитики. Геополитическое будущее России: мыслить пространством / А. С. Дугин. – Москва : Арктогея-Центр, 1999. – Текст : непосредственный.
2. Зерзан, Дж. Первобытный человек будущего / Дж. Зерзан. – Москва : Гилея, 2007. – Текст : непосредственный.
3. Кургинян, С. О будущем коммунизма / С. Кургинян. – Текст : электронный // Завтра. – 2018, 7 нояб. – URL: https://zavtra.ru/blogs/o_budushe_m_kommunizma?
4. Мой путь в науке : интервью с профессором А. А. Зиновьевым. – Текст : непосредственный // Личность. Культура. Общество. – 2001. – Т. III, вып. 4 (10). – С. 278–334.
5. Назаретян, А. П. Нелинейное будущее. Мегаисторические, синергетические и культурно-психологические предпосылки глобального прогнозирования / А. П. Назаретян. – Москва : Аргамак-Медиа, 2014. – Текст : непосредственный.
6. Панарин, А. С. Православная цивилизация / А. С. Панарин. – Москва : Ин-т рус. цивилизации, 2014. – Текст : непосредственный.
7. Пелипенко, А. Русская матрица: Последний путь / А. Пелипенко. – Текст : непосредственный // Острог. – 2017. – № 14. – С. 5–18.
8. Cirillo, P. The Decline of Violent Conflicts: What Do The Data Really Say? / P. Cirillo, N. Taleb. – URL: <http://nassimtaleb.org/2016/06/nassim-recently-presented-thesis-violence-nobel-symposium>. – Text : electronic.

G. Mettan¹

THE WESTERN NEW TONGUE MAKES ANY DIALOGUE OF CULTURE A DEAF TALK

We know the power of words, we know less about the words of power. Words of power seek to harness the power of words. These words, so innocent and innocent in appearance, it is therefore essential to identify them, and to recognize them for what they are: tools of conquest and domination. Instruments of restraint on bodies and minds, means of shaping consent of citizens to unwanted morals and policies. And makes almost impossible any dialogue of cultures.

Very great authors have decoded and brought to light the springs of the language of tyranny.

During World War II, Victor Klemperer, a Jewish philology professor who married an "Aryan" and miraculously survived Nazism, picked up the day-to-day key words and phrases of Nazi language. He relentlessly watched the rise of Nazism in the 1930s, then its triumph and finally its fall. He masterfully demonstrated how the reinvention of German-language words by Hitler's party and Goebbels greatly facilitated the seizure of power and the maintenance of the

Nazi dictatorship. In his masterful *Lingua Tertii Imperii*, the Language of the Third Empire, he recounts how this willful perversion of language led the Germans to almost absolute submission to the Nazi Party. Isn't it Goebbels who wrote in his diary: "We don't want to convince people of our ideas. We want to reduce the vocabulary so that it can only express our ideas."

George Orwell denounced the language of the Stalinist dictatorship. In his novel 1984, published in 1949, he stages the advent of a totalitarian regime which imposes a new ideology, Angsoc, or English socialism, and a new language, Newspeak, which creates and erases words according to Big Brother's needs. A Police of the Thought, inspired by the practice of the Gestapo and the NKVD, but which today would evoke the religious police of Islamic regimes, the censorship by algorithms of the GAFAM or the mass surveillance of the NSA, ensures the dissemination of ideology and language control. She tracks down the slightest deeds, gestures and suspicious words of citizens by guessing with diabolical precision their intentions.

With a beautiful intuition, Orwell set his novel in 1984. It was well seen because the beginning of the years 1980 coincides with the takeover of the economy by the shareholders of the companies and the representatives of the high finance, and with the dissemination of a new ideo-

¹ President of the United Chamber of Industry and Commerce "Switzerland – Russia and CIS States" (Geneva), Executive Director of the Swiss Press Club. Member of the Grand Council (Parliament) of the Canton of Geneva for the Christian Democratic Party (PDC). Author of several books on socio-political topics and international relations, including: "The West vs Russia: A Thousand Year Long War," "A View from the West: Russophobia from Charlemagne to the Last Olympic Games in Rio," etc.

logy, neoliberalism, which has today become globalitarian, both global and totalitarian, thanks to the generalization of a phraseology that has imposed itself in all areas of social and economic life. And that's also when another business of destructuring words and enslaving language, which is political correctness, began. The transformation of vocabulary, the change in the meaning of words, the creation of a new economically and politically correct language, of which we are both the actors and the victims, are the first signs of this general mystification.

But Orwell was wrong on the culprit. Contrary to what he thought, it was not from the English socialist dictatorship that the will to dominate the minds of the end of the 20th century would come, but from market totalitarianism, from the insatiable appetite for power of neoliberal capitalism, and the tyranny of racial and sexual minorities who aspire to impose their way of thinking on the whole of society.

A double matrix, technocratic and emotional

The new dominant language is the result of these two influences. Its matrix is therefore double. On the father's side (read parent 1), she manifests the omnipotence of technocracy, management and the market economy. On the maternal side (read parent 2), it is a reaction to the emotional and social flattening of which minorities feel they are forced to occupy a subordinate position in this same neoliberal society: feminist, LGBT and anti-racist movements and all the organizations of this that it is agreed civil society, humanitarian and human rights NGOs, activists and intersectional researchers. The Western New Tongue is the bastard product of the most icy technocratic ultra-liberalism and the most incandescent victim-soreness. This dual ancestry is the first characteristic of what, for lack of a better term, I call Softongue. Softongue is a "democratic" creation in the sense that it is not framed by a single party, an omnipotent dictator or an all-powerful police. It is simply fabricated, day by day, by two apparently opposing but in reality accomplices forces dominate the social sphere.

In the language of yesterday, we would have spoken of right and left. But it's not that simple anymore because the conservative/progressive divide blurs this distinction. In fact, there is both a conservative right-wing which fears and fights societal innovations and the language that expresses them, as well as left-wing conservatives who fight to maintain the old structures of social protection and the defense of the public service, as well as the neo-capitalists seek to dismantle. Likewise, there are progressives on both camps. Neoliberal capitalism, in its economist version, is supported by the most conservative, if not the most reactionary, fringes of the political spectrum, from the National Rally to Donald Trump's Republicans to all the populist right-wingers in Europe and Latin America. Moreover, the neoliberal right does not oppose the claims of gender and racial minorities either. When it serves her interests, she knows how to be avant-garde. Societal innovations suit him, as long as they offer economic opportunities. Every new societal niche is a potential business niche, whether it is selling creams for black women or operating a transgender club...

As for the progressive, feminist, LGBT and racist "left," it has placed its societal struggles far ahead of the struggle against the excesses of capitalism. The commitment to the disadvantaged classes now comes far behind the fight in favor of "minorities," especially when these same

classes are critical of societal innovations as we saw during the crisis of the French Yellow Jackets. Admittedly, a sometimes very lively competition, brutal conflicts, spectacular turf struggles occur between the two factions, as was the case between Democrats and Republicans in the United States. But once in power, the two groups pursue the same policies favorable to the ultra-rich and apply the same principles of "governance." Basically, there is convergence, congruence, cooptation between the two groups rather than irreducible opposition. The accents change but the language of domination remains the same. New language of wood, the Softongue is the fruit of this double obedience. It is the product of a duopoly rather than a monopoly, of a two-party system rather than a single party. It may be a marriage of convenience, but it is solid and its hiccups, even as sensational as the savage occupation of the Capitol in January 2021, do not call it into question.

You only have to look at things from a little distance to be convinced. Between Donald Trump's "Make America Great Again" and Joe Biden's "Restoring The American Leadership," is there a real discrepancy? Between defeated billionaire Donald Trump and elected billionaire Joe Biden who raised \$ 1.5 billion from big business to run his campaign, is the gap so big? Do they not both draw from the coffers of the richest to come to power and stay there? The quarrels between the candidates of the two parties are all the more acute as they relate to marginal issues and not to the substance. The same is true in our European democracies.

In France, for example, we liked to highlight the opposition between Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande. But didn't they both rule by claiming the same neoliberalism, the same Atlanticism and the same Europeanism, before a third thief, Emmanuel Macron, sent them back to their studies by replaying the same cards in another order? Depending on their interests and the force fields that cross them, some will focus on the economy and others on societalism. Some will privilege the client-consumer-saver and others will exalt a right to be different for the noisiest minorities. But the two camps will pamper the same individuals in a hurry to cry out in the face of the world their uniqueness and their singularity, and shamelessly share the spoils of power.

Softongue, realm of understatement

The second characteristic of Softongue, which earned it its name, is sweetness. Both its strategy and its practice are based on understatement and periphrasis. It does it like the food industry: it adds sugar everywhere. Unlike Newspeak and the language of dictatorships, Softongue does not seek so much to exalt words as to soften them, to tone them down. The Nazi language electrified words, galvanized them, doped them, heated them white. The word Volk, German people, the adjective *völkisch* were carried to the pinnacle. Or on the contrary, she belittled them, humiliated them, vilified them. The word Jewish was swallowed up below the pork. She made words rise and fall to extremes, to the peaks of the heavens and to the abysses of hell. Stalin's language did the same: it praised the worker, the class struggle, the dictatorship of the proletariat and stigmatized the kulaks and the bourgeoisie. Softongue does the opposite. It sweetens, sanitizes, softens, weakens until erasing all relief, all roughness, all materiality, to take its speakers

into an unreal world, cut off from all roots, from all history, from all emotional and fraternal attachment.

We immediately think of neoliberal managerial language. Euphemism and positivity are in the spotlight. The economically correct language of economists and managers is watered down to better hide the deleterious effects of their theories. We must at all costs avoid calling things by their names and relating the effects to their causes. Above all, it is about being constructive. Look at the word “potential,” used in all sauces. Goodbye hope, expectations, ability, talent, daring, aptitude, gift, promise, favorable circumstances, long live the potential! Likewise, expressions such as social charges, which associate the word social with a charge, with an additional cost, when it is only part of the legitimate salary of employees, will be abused.

We will talk about public debt (to make people forget the private debt, point the finger at the state and divert the public’s attention away from those who benefit from this debt, the bankers and the financiers). Words like flexibility will be revered, which instills the idea that adaptation is an enduring imperative that cannot be discussed. Or on the contrary, we will avoid expressions like price increases (this is only a readjustment) and words like dismissal. Layoffs? You do not believe it! It is a social plan, a cyclical adjustment measure, restructuring and, frankly, a gain in productivity. Along with the curves of supply and demand, students of management and economics are therefore urged to learn the captious jargon of their science if they want to succeed in their exams and in their careers. They will quickly know what it costs to talk about recession rather than negative growth, lower wages rather than competitive devaluation, job cuts rather than a stimulus plan, plant closures rather than relocation, social dismantling rather than reform, labor forces rather than human capital. Ban this word work which stains and reminds too much that the capital of some is the fruit of the sweat of others. This modeling of language by economics obviously goes much further than these little semantic make-ups. Thus, we will not be surprised to learn that modern management has adapted the Nazi principles of the management of men to capitalist enterprise, as evidenced by the brilliant career of Reinhard Höhn, theorist of the Nazi organization of work, who became after-war the director of the largest German management school in Bad Harzburg.

The goal? To transform the worker, the employee, into an agent of his own subjection by making him both a boss (of himself) and an employee (of his owner-shareholders). In a language that speaks true, you would call it slavery. In soft language, this is called a “responsible” job. This is how the large American distributor Walmart calls its cashiers “managers” while the hamburger makers at McDonald become “associates,” in the same way (but not for the benefit of the same dividends) as the co-owners of a bank, or the partners of a large law firm. What good is a salary increase when a good semantic bonus does the trick... This is how managerial language succeeded in successfully applying the theories of the Soviet linguist Nicolas Marr who flourished in the Soviet Union in the 1920s. Marr claimed that each social class had its own language, whatever the original language of its speakers, and that, under the enlightened impetus of the working class and the dictatorship of the proletariat, modern societies would soon merge their particular idioms into the single language of communist so-

ciety. Neocapitalism is therefore succeeding where communism failed.

Managers, partners and shareholders from all countries, unite, agree your words, unify your language and your reign will come! Marx just got the wrong actors. He believed that the revolution would be made by the proletarians while it was being made by the bosses. From economic correctness to political correctness Economically correct has become so pervasive that it goes almost unnoticed, unlike political correctness, which is more visible because it is more dissenting and more in the minority. Yet both use the same strategy of euphemism and shape Softongue with equal effectiveness. In many ways, political correctness is even more obsessed with understatement than economically correct. The concern not to offend minorities by using vocabulary considered discriminatory or demeaning is its hallmark. Its multiple conquests, or its many misdeeds, have been described many times since its appearance on American campuses in the early 1980s. It is thanks to him that we have seen the proliferation of the visually impaired instead of the blind, the hard of hearing instead of the deaf, people with disabilities instead of the disabled, people with reduced mobility instead of the disabled, people with disabilities. color instead of negroes, blacks or blacks, homosexuals instead of pederasts, migrants instead of refugees and illegal immigrants. In the same fashion, the new pedagogy taught us that a pencil is said to be a writing object and that the blackboard should be banned because it can “underlie schemes of actions liable to hinder the learning process” of students. students. For their part, after having imposed the epicene language (which is positive), the feminist and LGBT movements have thrown themselves headlong into inclusive writing and gender-based gibberish.

At first, this desire to do well and to speak well had seemed kind and legitimate: isn’t the duty of a modern language, after all, to constantly adapt to the needs and aspirations of its speakers? But very quickly the phenomenon took off. Recently, with the MeToo waves, and the neofeminist and anti-racist mobilizations coming from the United States, the eradicating euphemism has raged, if we dare say it. The wave turned into a tsunami. The verbal guillotine is running at full speed. Inclusive writing, with its syntactic hideousness (Tou.te.X.s), spreads like leprosy in educational institutions and progressive prose, outraging common sense, ear and etymology. The obsessed with gender and race as well as the activists of NGOs supporting minorities “offended” by binary and racialized language track down and denounce offenders on social networks with incredible harshness and violence, forcing teachers and journalists to resign, researchers to cancel their lectures and authors to censor their plays. The spirit of the purge seems to be taking hold on campuses, in schools and in newspaper offices, with the complicity of editors, professors and cultural directors terrified of the prospect of being targeted. We have brought back the fireworks and symbolic lynchings. Most recently, this passion for understatement has turned into ruthless censorship. Like any revolution, this one tends to get carried away and drift into sectarianism and a new form of Terror. From vocabulary, the euphemism has spread to statues, museums and street names, attacking entire swathes of history and culture. In order to erase the inexpiable stain of slavery, it is now an entire part of European and American history that efforts are made to root out of libraries and public plac-

es. With the culture of cancellation, the cleansing moved out of the realm of words and into the streets.

Softongue is a FrenGLISH or a RusGLISH

As its name suggests, the Softongue is a FrenGLISH or a GermenGLISH or a SpanenGLISH. Its speakers, necessarily open, cosmopolitan, liberal, technophile, sensitive to the “sufferings” of the world, cannot limit themselves to a national idiom. The mother tongue? The language of the native country? French for Francophones? It is no longer enough, it smacks of ethnic reductions too much. Softongue is therefore characterized by permeability, porosity, capillarity, an almost ontological connivance for the language of the dominant technical, economic and ideological power, Anglo-American. A subordinate, slave language, Softongue is the new pidgin of the globalized upper classes, which attests to their submission to the empire and guarantees their membership in the circle of elected officials of globalization.

The French Softongue version has no qualms about allowing itself to be colonized by English, on the contrary. This voluntary submission to the standardized Anglo-American is to culture what the dollar is to the economy and to trade, a recognition of the omnipotence of the masters of the empire, the United States, of which it is advisable to be inspired in every way. Of course, we will not deny that in its time, French transfused a lot into English, nor that the globalization of trade made the use of English necessary. A simple language, practical for both business and technical purposes, English has many virtues. But why would it be necessary that, in addition to being the default language of communication, English creeps into French without any particular need? Out of laziness, out of snobbery, we behave with English as with these exogenous species that we allow to take root in an ecosystem to the detriment of native species.

Because the generalization of English as a vehicular language and its percolation into French (or Spanish, or German...) vocabulary are not trivial. Frantz Fanon has shown that to adopt the language of the colonizer is to place oneself in an attitude of voluntary servitude, it is to adopt the codes and the thinking of the dominant. The Americanization of language accompanies and promotes the Americanization of mores, economics and politics. A taboo subject, which immediately unleashes the vindictiveness of the Atlanticists and worshipers of the United States. The sin of anti-Americanism deserves neither indulgence nor absolution. And yet, it is time to make it a virtue because the trend, far from fading, is on the contrary accelerating. We are a long way from the beginnings of the 20th century, when we were content to import from America production methods, Taylorism and Fordism, or musical productions and silent films. Very soon, Americanization was forced by measures of political coercion. The invasion quickly took an imperial turn, thanks to the two world wars. Formal blackmail was exercised in 1947 when the United States imposed on Europe the distribution of American films in exchange for funds from the Marshall Plan, and at the same time imposed on Europeans the techniques and vocabulary of management, entrepreneurial in Anglo-Saxon fashion.

Anglomania accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s with rock music and in the 1980s with the importation of “New Public Management” concepts into public administrations, quickly followed by uninterrupted waves of lexical innova-

tion. by the computer revolution, new information technologies, and finally the digital revolution. In 2020, with the help of the COVID-19 crisis, the proliferation of Anglosolalia has spread to health language: “clusters” are multiplying at the same rate as the virus while “lockdowns” keep coming. This exponential invasion has led to the gradual relegation of all national languages to English, which the French cultural exception has not been able to stop. French, a diplomatic language until the 1920s, suffered particularly from this, to the point that, at the turn of the 2000s, it practically disappeared from the international scene. At the United Nations, in diplomacy and in international organizations, it no longer plays a nominal role, as we can see every day in the headquarters of New York, Vienna or Geneva. In higher education, management schools, and faculties of science, economics and politics, it is being eradicated, with most classes now being taught in English. Scientific literature has not used French for a long time.

Quebec, Africa, certain islands of speaking well like France Culture are still resisting, by keeping a popular language which a more sought after language, and by taking the trouble to properly translate English words, however technical they may be. But everywhere else the dikes gave way. On some radio stations and in the reference press, one word in ten is in English. And we can no longer imagine opening a bar or creating an “event” without giving it an English surname: access to “rooftops,” “awards” and “football cups” are at this level price. For each object, however, there is a perfectly adapted French word. French Canadians are well aware of this, who systematically uncover unjustified Anglicisms.

Softongue therefore participates in the impoverishment of national languages and cultures, in the reduction of their diversity (it is estimated that nearly half of the 5,000 current languages will have disappeared by the end of the century), in a loss of autonomy and in the narrowing of the horizon of thought. If multilingualism is an asset, monolanguage is a misery, because it kills poetry, aesthetic emotion, creativity. But maybe this is the goal? A very effective propaganda tool Fourth characteristic, Softongue is the privileged communication tool of the technocratic class, to whom it serves as an instrument of propaganda. Its mission is to promote its strategies for conquering and maintaining power. Just as capitalism ignores free lunches, so Softongue knows no neutral words. Each of its words must be effective and have a defined function. It is used either to erase a relationship of subjection or to ratify a relationship of power.

Thanks to its infinite resources, its malleability, its plasticity, softlanguage therefore tends to establish itself as the ideal language of lies and manipulation, the language of the new emerging empire, the LTI of our time. The privileged language of Good Any lie, to be believed, must be considered true. But the True does not impose itself. The true lie is much more convincing if it can be associated with the Good. The True, especially if it is false, and the Good are therefore linked, in democracy as in dictatorship. Propaganda, to be effective, must therefore always be done in the name of Good. Any power that intends to expand or subjugate must therefore begin by convincing that it is acting in the name of Good, whether it is a social class, a government or a company. We can even say that the goal of any Power, whatever it is, is to claim the monopoly of the Good. Good therefore does not go without evil, in both senses of

the term, especially when this Good serves as a cover-up for Evil ...

Claiming to act in the name of Good is therefore a work of Sisyphus, which requires a lot of constancy and application, and requires considerable expenditure because the power which claims it must be considered as blameless as possible. It must not only work downstream, towards the future, to justify its questionable actions but also upstream, in the past, to shine its image and rewrite its history if necessary. Take the example of concentration camps and mass deportations. Most people believe that the concentration camps were created by the Nazis. Or by Stalin for the right-wing liberals. It's wrong. It was the British, during the Boer War in South Africa in 1899, who invented the first concentration camps. The Nazis only adapted the concept when they opened the first camp, in 1933 in Dachau, before developing it into an extermination camp, while Stalinism made it a technique of economic exploitation, the gulag, a vast network, forced labor camps to which all enemies, real or supposed, of the regime were condemned. The same goes for mass deportation and genocide. We learn from the textbooks that the mass deportations were committed by Stalin while the first genocide by ethnic cleansing of a territory was allegedly committed by the Turks against the Armenians. It's just as wrong. The first mass deportations and the first genocidal ethnic cleansing were implemented in the United States in the 1830s to displace and liquidate through hunger, alcohol and disease almost all of the Indian peoples who occupied the country. North American continent... Or we see, by the way, that dictatorships do not have a monopoly of Evil, any more than democracies have a monopoly of Good...

Softongue is therefore the language of Good. By the magic of euphemism, it smooths everything, erases roughness, erases resistance, dissolves disputes. It is secular, multicultural, open, without borders. It also connects, expresses the sacred, allows the communion of souls. "At the same time" as Emmanuel Macron would say. She has her pontiffs, her high priestesses, her devotees and her admirers, her zealots and her fanatics. Freedom, democracy, human rights, tolerance, respect, living together, free market, it expresses the avatars of Good in all their forms, as in the old ancient religions, without distinction of race, religion or class. Already in 1991, the very caustic Philippe Muray had guessed that, under the foam of a conquering irenism, the French in the process of soft language was beginning to lend itself to the worship of disturbing idols. "The Empire of Good is spreading its tentacles everywhere: the hold of good-thinking and false otherness continues to grow, the dictatorship of pretense and the tyranny of benevolence are beginning to grow, poison our lives," he warned. Seven years later, in his preface to a new edition of his book, he noted with derision and annoyance that the "good had gotten even worse." Disappeared in 2006, today he would have been horrified to see to what extent the Good has become totalitarian. It is therefore in the name of Good, Liberty, Justice.

Democracy, Human Rights and the Responsibility to protect that we invade and bombard innocent populations and that we condemn to the stake, heretics who have the misfortune to doubt. The millions of victims of the wars in the Gulf, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen are no longer there to testify, they who have been reduced to the state of "col-

lateral damage" before being condemned to death by starvation, deadly economic sanctions. They can die, they who are under the thumb of odious "autocratic regimes" when we are fortunate to be ruled by democratic governments respectful of the rule of law. The belligerents that we are supporting? They are valiant "freedom fighters" who fight for justice and women's freedom. The belligerents that "them," the wicked Russians and Iranians support? They are blood-thirsty killers who do not hesitate to violate the Geneva Conventions by using chemical weapons. The ruthless economic wars we are waging against recalcitrant peoples, Cubans, Venezuelans, Palestinians? These are just "sanctions," as if punishing unruly schoolchildren. Everything is in order. On the domestic front, we will declare that the war against COVID-19 has been declared for our Good, in the name of Health. And too bad for the freedoms and the bankruptcy of the restaurant owners. Closing factories is also for the good of workers, because it is about improving "competitiveness." And if the dividends of shareholders and the salaries of big bosses are exploding, it is to better "trickle down" their good fortune to the poorest. The Bible had warned us, however, that it drew the attention of men – and women – to the dangerous power of words. Genesis opens with a dizzying intuition: the Word became flesh, she says, suggesting that speech alone can generate reality. Without Word, there is no Creation. Without words, no reality, or in any case, no intelligible reality.

In Genesis, Adam and Eve are cast out of the earthly paradise because they stole the forbidden fruit from the tree of Good and Evil. God knew perfectly well what he was doing by forbidding them to touch the Tree of Ultimate Knowledge. Not because of Evil, which every conscious human being can grasp. But because of Good, which can do much more harm than Evil when misused. The passion for Good is therefore poised to subjugate the entire planet, from the depths of the forests of Siberia to the heart of the jungles of Borneo. Everyone is struck by this furious benevolence, the rich as well as the poor, the learned as well as the ignorant, the majorities as well as the minorities. No people or individual can escape its ax. The rebels, the factions, the refractory, the disobedient, the heretics are immediately stigmatized, vilified, bombarded, brought before the courts of opinion for immediate execution.

Softongue admirably carries the cause of Good, since the time it has been refining its lexicon. Who today in the West would dare to oppose Freedom (of the richest), Rights (of the strongest), Responsibility (of the fittest)? These absolutes are not open to discussion, although they place their servants above the law, beyond the reach of critics, beyond accountability. Good has the advantage of being non-negotiable and non-measurable. Who can dispute the amount of? Although a humanitarian "intervention," a government policy, a factory relocation has achieved? By exalting the Good, Softongue allows above all to evade the notion of the common good and to spare oneself from tedious discussions about what it should be. By helping to place the good above the common good, Softongue has become the language of a new cult that is worse than the old one.

The language of technocratic religion

Softongue is therefore the jargon of the new priestly caste. It disseminates the dogmas of the Brahmins of economics, politics, science and the media. It is not a language of po-

ets and writers, nor a language of workers and peasants. It is the language of CEOs, economists, lawyers, academics, journalists, communicators, scientists and experts specializing in all areas of human activity. It is by no means a language of knowledge, it is a language of know-how. Infused with good feelings, stereotypes, tricks and ready-made expressions, it does not aim for knowledge or culture. Especially not! It is a language of power in the service of power. It has its gurus who handle its concepts with virtuosity, like Klaus Schwab and Mark Zuckerberg; his inspired mystics, such as Elon Musk, a character who looks straight out of a 1940s comic book; his philanthropic monk-soldiers, such as Bill Gates and Georges Soros; its licensed theologians such as Bernard-Henri Lévy, Mathieu Ricard and Alexan-

dre Jollien; its regular choristers, who sing the Good Word by millions of copies in dozens of languages, such as Joël Dicker, J.K. Rowling or Barack Obama; his inspired prophets like Yuval Noah Harari, Jeremy Rifkin or Judith Butler. It can also count on fanaticized grammarians, transhumanists ready to have nanografts implanted in the brain while waiting to be cryogenized for their future resurrection, or followers of gender and decolonial studies obsessed with the construction-deconstruction of their sexual and racial identity.

In such a world, using such a language, any attempt of dialogue would be very difficult because all the members of another culture would be considered as a Barbarian to be convert to the New Faith.

L. M. Mosolova¹

RUSSIAN EDUCATION IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSITIONING TO A NEW WORLD ORDER

This report will discuss the causes of the building-up crisis phenomena in Russian education and the need to overcome them in the context of transitioning to the new world order.

We all understand that our country is going through a very acute, strenuous and difficult phase of its historical journey. Indeed, this is a very dramatic moment in the crisis of the modern global civilization, of which we are a special part. The North Atlantic Alliance continues to issue a powerful stream of destructive phenomena, expressed in various forms of sanctions, terrorism, warmongering, inciting mass fears, economic and political destabilization of the world community.

The Russian army is conducting a difficult special military operation to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine. Every day the mass media chronicles the unfolding military, political and economic conflicts, destructions, and loss of life.

Another powerful stream is related to peacebuilding. In the dramatic human situation and special responsibility of our time, Russian intellectuals and everyone concerned are once again trying to make sense of what has happened and look into the near future. In this particular space of being, a huge and somewhat strange "vessel" of Russian education is sailing.

The discussion concerns chronic zigzags of reformist policies between neoliberalism and eclectic conservatism, which have left specific traces in all areas of sociocultural life, including education. Many researchers say that the practice of endless reforms, revisions, amendments, and the entire process of modernizing education "top down" has

obviously stagnated at the ideological boundaries of the 1990s, the neoliberal stage of our "entry into Europe," and did not adequately reflect the real difficulties and contradictions inherent in the Russian reality. On the other hand, useful traditions of domestic education were underestimated.

I suggest that we look at some of the essential causes that have led to certain negative phenomena in scientific and educational culture of Russia.

Firstly, there have been postmodernist views that exaggerate certain cognitive features of comprehension of socio-cultural reality, spreading in our country starting from 1990s. Adherents of these views have questioned and even denied the idea that an objective integrative science of man, society, and culture could exist; one capable of applying its conclusions to social practice, just as the natural sciences (Physics and Biology) do. Seductively ironic, postmodernism has swept across our intellectual field, drawing along with it even sophisticated adepts of the humanities, sometimes entire departmental teams.

I agree with E. S. Markarian, who argued that the negative role of postmodernism consisted precisely in the fact that, by creating a mere illusion of leading the social science toward new worthy goals, it has ideologically disarmed our generation in the face of the dangers awaiting it. The spread of postmodernist concepts and a strikingly disrespectful attitude to the studies of man, society and culture in the post-Soviet period have led to what E. S. Markarian termed "mental disarmament" of the society.²

For the most part, humanitarians have abandoned even the dialectical method of cognition – one of the greatest achievements of European intellectual culture.

I will name a few specific provisions or stances of postmodernism which determined the trends in degradation of the scientific and educational sphere of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries:

– epistemological constructivism, with its transfer project of eliminating classical humanitarian knowledge, high culture, recognition of the beautiful in nature and human re-

¹ Professor at the Department of Theory and History of Culture of the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Dr. Sc. (Art History), Honored Worker of Higher Education of the Russian Federation, full member of the National Academy of Arts of the Kyrgyz Republic. Author of more than 300 scientific publications, including: "Cultural Studies in the Context of Interdisciplinary Studies," "History of Art of Kyrgyzstan (from Ancient Times to the 20th Century)," "Cultural Studies in the System of Modern Education: Philosophical and Ontological Foundations," "History and Cultural Studies in the Knowledge of Human World," "Archaic Eurasian Culture in Light of Modern Science," "Scientific and Educational Topoi of Cultural Studies in the Cultural Landscape of Saint Petersburg," "Interdisciplinary Methodology in Cultural Studies of M. S. Kagan," and others. Awarded the Order of the Badge of Honor, a Certificate of Merit from the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, and a Certificate of Merit from the Government of St. Petersburg.

² Маркарян Э. С. Избранное. Наука о культуре и императивы эпохи / отв. ред. и сост. А. В. Бондарев. М. : СПб., 2014. С. 433–460.

lationships, or, in other words, the rejection of truth, goodness, and beauty;

- rejection of old narratives resulting in a powerful anti-scientism – a rejection of attempts to understand the nature and essence of the world's phenomena, which was clearly manifested, in particular, in the works of I. Prokhorova;

- extreme individualism, presumption of free will that goes beyond the line of reason, nihilism “wrapped up” in academic scholastics;

- the race for innovation, fear of not being able to keep up, the cult of utility, comfort and pleasure which are now substituting “high culture”;

- the refusal to reckon with the biological preconditions of gender, “wild” gender freedom that characterized the third wave of feminism and degeneration of cultural anthropology;

- the adoption of new identities instead of “non-genuine” ones, cultivation of minorities with their deviations.

This is by far not an exhaustive list of causes that have influenced the process of degradation of scientific and educational culture and other spheres of modern human activity associated with the ideas of postmodernism, transhumanism, metamodernism, etc.

The existence of all new sciences in the context of these ideas rests on the critique of classical culture, and they tend to proliferate. Among them are Culture analytics, Culture critic, Cultural history, Media studies, Narratology, Visual culture, Culture identity, Body studies, Sport studies, Fashion studies etc.

The names of the representatives of this range of sciences are well known: M. Foucault, J. Derrida, G. Deleuze, E. Levinas, E. Said, A. Badiou, S. Žižek, R. Krauss, R. Morris, J. Segal, J. Mirkus, and many others.

The common name for these sciences is Cultural theory. According to the researcher of the cultural theory V. A. Martynov, all these disciplines are essentially homogeneous. They share the same theory, methodology, and ideology. Their common method is deconstruction followed by representation. They all work within the framework of multiculturalism and profess an ideology of postcolonial neoliberalism. This is constructivism in cultural studies. Culture is understood here as production of texts (including fakes).

Despite the rejection of reflexive justifications of its positions and its work on the discursive field, cultural theory is an “academic shop” with the awarding of academic degrees. A group of “cultural sciences” – cultural constructivist theory actually acted and does act as a “regular authoritarian discursive strategy” controlling the work of understanding and defining culture. As V. A. Martynov puts it, the new humanitarian knowledge in the formats of cultural theory, in particular in the form of Popular culture studies, acts as a “security organization” for criticizing classical culture. It is busy deconstructing the meanings of human existence, demolishing the complex implications of classical culture and constructing special texts with an emphasis on sociopolitical aspect corresponding to the practical aspirations of the representatives of neoliberalism in the modern West.

The process of reforming Russian education began in the mid-1990s against the backdrop of the victory of liberalism after the collapse of the Soviet system. The ideologues and practices of liberalism, along with a number of ideas of cultural theory, were incorporated by radical lo-

cal liberals into the system of important philosophical, educational, and technological provisions of the country's educational reform. This system is known as the Bologna Declaration, adopted in Russia in 2003.

The Bologna process was thus an externally stimulated rather than an internally driven sociocultural innovation. Basically, it was forced upon us. The words of MSU Rector V. A. Sadovnichy at the VII Congress of Rectors of Russia, “...this is a two-way process. We can be just as persistent in offering our experience to partners. We must protect the interests of the Russian education system”¹ were not accepted for discussion.

Over time, under pressure from the ideas of the Bologna Declaration, our education became, as Alice said in *Alice in Wonderland*, “weirder and weirder.” It is my deep conviction that the Bologna system has not worked productively. Imitations rather than products of genuine scientific and educational creation have appeared.

In Russian science, educational reforms have not received serious philosophical, cultural, sociological, pedagogical, and general scientific substantiation. The competency-based model of education, with its ideology of competition and success, is increasingly being criticized:

- it exaggerated the systemic potential of competence;
- it is not an educational paradigm (this thesis makes no sense);

- it is implemented as a way of projecting the essential features of the modern society and its needs onto the sphere of educational relations; a bunch of competencies can be a means to construct a social actor with given features, rather than to ensure high quality of general cultural and professional education²;

- the system of multilevel education is criticized: a bachelor is perceived as an inferior specialist, and the two-year education course of a master who comes from another sphere of humanitarian or non-humanitarian knowledge in the field of a certain specialization, is considered profanation.

There is a whole range of critical assessments of the Bologna Declaration implementation in Russia and the CIS countries, which goes beyond the scope of this report. The reform of Russian education according to the Bologna scenario is increasingly perceived as part of an Atlantic project to mentally disarm Russia.

On the threshold of building a new world order, Russia should reconsider the enduring questions: “What to teach?” and “How to teach?” This implies the need to diagnose our time with an insight similar to that which Pitirim Sorokin achieved in his time. What is certainly needed is a purposeful concerted effort by representatives of social, human, natural, and cultural sciences. The need for the new integrative knowledge is huge.

It is necessary to overcome the spontaneous development of modern civilization which has reinforced the destructive forces, and to enable the transition to its controlled development. It is important to find real ways of dialogue

¹ Cited from: Давыдов Ю. С. Болонский процесс и сохранение самобытности российского высшего образования // Диалог культур и цивилизаций в глобальном мире : VII Междунар. Лихачевские науч. чтения, 24–25 мая 2007 г. СПб. : СПбГУП, 2007. С. 336.

² See: Мосолова Л. М., Тхагопсоев Х. Г. Компетентностный подход в образовании: к культурологическим измерениям // Мир культуры и культурология : альманах Науч.-образоват. культурологического о-ва России. СПб. : Центр гуманитар. инициатив, 2016. Вып. V. С. 267–275.

and cooperation between nations in order to create a qualitatively new mode of coexistence between different peoples. For this, it is necessary to develop the appropriate ideological, moral, and scientific prerequisites.

Since the general crisis in our world is of a sociocultural nature, it is necessary to provide adequate realistic knowledge of man and his culture "as a defining phenomenon of human life" (E. S. Markarian).

Back in Soviet times, among Orientalists and some of their colleagues in other branches of the humanities, there were many proponents of the so-called civilizational approach. To a certain extent, it questioned the universality of the Marxist 'five-stage' or 'formation' theory explaining the entire history of human society. This cautious search was not simply a struggle driven by fatigue from the domination of "formationism," although this cause also played a role. Fortunately, there were provisions in the Marxist legacy that could be interpreted in favor of some modification to the five-stage formula, in particular the "Asian mode of production." A number of scholars, who at that time promoted the idea of importance of civilizational features in explaining historical processes, continue their research endeavors today.

However, my report is not about the debates of that time, but about the debates on similar issues that are going on today in the humanities of different specialties with active participation of politicians and even journalists. However, it is no longer for the sake of overthrowing Marxism, which had already suffered serious blows (partly unfairly).

Participants in these debates are driven by urgency of the problem, rooted in the widespread notion of the importance of civilizational features of certain societies and distinctiveness of certain states, which are now commonly referred to as "civilization-states" as opposed to "nation-states" or nation-states that dominate the world community. I discussed this point in one of my papers published in *Polis* magazine, to which I can refer anyone interested in this problem so as not to repeat what has already been written.

A considerable number of analysts involved in the debate speak of the phenomenon of *civilizationalism* (al-

Cultural theory of the West and its subdisciplines will have little further relevance. Russia has a different cultural science that Western researchers do not know. It is the result and synthesis of classical science. Collecting the results of all Russian cultural studies is one of the important prerequisites for determining the prospects for the development of Russia and its scientific and educational domain in the new world order.

V. V. Naumkin¹

CONCERNING CIVILIZATION-STATES

though not everyone agrees on the term). Among them are James Dorsey, a Briton working in Singapore, who acts as a journalist and a researcher. He probably wrote more than anyone else on this subject, which he has been studying for many years. He is one of the critics of this trend in world politics and of the "civilization-states" that practiced it. Given the impact Dorsey's thinking has had on a wide readership, both in the West and in Asia, we should examine in more detail his analytical speculations which are sharply politicized by the author, making them quite detached from academicism and scholarly impartiality.

Citing the example of such major civilization-states as India, China, as well as our country, Dorsey argues, in particular, that "Indian civilizationalism" is capable of creating a new "flashpoint" in the future, and claims that the three leaders have the goal of creating a 21st century world order in which "civilizationalist aspirations are placed above national sovereignty, freedom and minority rights."² Given the scope of the report that does not aspire to be a full-fledged theoretical research which would suggest a comprehensive treatment of the topic, I will not touch upon all its aspects and will focus further on the phenomenon of India.

As for the British author's claims about Russia, their invalidity is quite obvious. The multi-ethnic and multi-confessional Russia secures the rights of the minorities so convincingly that this is recognized by virtually everyone who is familiar with the situation in our country. I will cite only the opinion of Muhammad bin Abdul Karim Al-Issa, Secretary General of one of the largest and most influential international Islamic organizations headquartered in Mecca, the Muslim World League (MWL). During his visit to Russia in the course of a program including Moscow, Tatarstan and Chechnya, MWL leader praised the unique centuries-long Russian experience of building harmony, accord and peace among different ethnic and confessional groups in the country. Countries of the Islamic world and beyond always speak favorably of the federal structure of the country and its national and religious policies.

Dorsey rebukes the leadership of another civilization-state, China, for treating Taiwan as an integral part of the country in scope of "one China" policy. But the vast majority of the world states does not support the minority of Taiwanese politicians who want declare independence of the island. It is becoming evident that only the United States are gradually drifting toward the "two-Chinas" policy, which of

¹ Scientific Supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor. Author of more than 500 scientific publications, including books: "History of the East," "Islam and Muslims: Culture and Politics," "The Middle East in World Politics and Culture," "The Red Wolves of Yemen," "Radical Islam in Central Asia: between Pen and Rifle," "The Arab World, Islam and Russia: Past and Present," "The Socotra Archipelago Islands (expeditions 1974–2010)," "Conflicts and Wars of the 21st Century: Middle East and North Africa" (co-authored), and others. Editor-in-Chief of the journals "Vostok (Oriens)," Bulletin of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and Oriental Analytics. Chairman of the editorial boards of the journals "Oriental Archives" and "Epigraphy of the East," member of the editorial boards of many periodicals. Awarded the Order of Friendship, foreign and public awards, including the Order of Honor of the Council of Muftis of Russia, "For Service to the Fatherland" (Golden Cross), "The Russian Nation," the Order of Friendship of the Republic of Tajikistan, the Golden Order of Merit from the State of Palestine, etc. Awarded V. V. Posuvaliuk Prize of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, S. F. Oldenburg Prize of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

² Dorsey J. Indian civilisationalism: a potential next flashpoint? URL: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/360541828_Indian_civilisationalism_a_potential_next_flashpoint.

course raises serious concerns in this friendly state whose people are as proud of their ancient history as we are. Following Western leaders, Dorsey criticizes the national policies of Chinese authorities, accusing them of violating human rights of Uighurs, Kazakhs, and some other ethnic and religious minorities, the vast majority of whom are Muslim. This critic, however, completely ignores the fact that China, like many other states in the world, faces threats to its national security from religious extremists, international terrorists and separatists. It also ignores the success that China has achieved in the economic development of areas densely populated by Muslim minorities. It is indicative that Western politicians, human rights activists and experts, while hypocritically defending Chinese Muslims and openly demonstrating double standards, do not want to see the brutal persecution to which the Russian population of Donbass has been and is being subjected by the Kiev nationalists.

Let's move on to India. Dorsey severely criticizes the prime minister of this civilization-state, Narendra Modi, for the concept of Akhand Bharat (or Akhand Hindustan, "undivided India"), that is, an India that "would stretch from Afghanistan to Myanmar and include nuclear-armed Pakistan as well as Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives" (he forgot to add Tibet, which would complete the picture). Much has been written about this concept, and in this case I can also refer anyone interested to the abundant material available. Of course, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) of today's India has some nationalist adherents, but they do not determine the country's political course. Dorsey admits that since Modi took over the Indian government in 2014, he has refrained from publicly voicing the Indian nationalist geopolitical ambitions, well known to everyone. At the same time, the British author recalls that the last time Modi spoke in this vein was not so long ago, namely in his 2012 interview as Gujarat Chief Minister, when he said that "India, Pakistan and Bangladesh should be reunited again."

Such unionist aspirations do exist among some Indian politicians, but it should not be forgotten that this is not a project of forced unification of these states or their wider circle, but their reunification on the basis of common history and civilizational proximity, as well as on the basis of voluntary reunification of peoples, which would lead to the creation of a mighty state in South Asia, capable of becoming one of the world's leading powers. According to Dorsey, the concept of "Hindu Rashtra" (now commonly translated as "Indian system of government," Hindu polity), in which the Briton sees the embodiment of Indian nationalism, may be still relevant. Although the concept has clearly somewhat lost its appeal, let us not forget that its proponents have previously stressed that it is not about Hinduism, but about "Indianness." Not everyone is included in the community of South Asian religions, though. In addition to Hinduism, these include Buddhism, Sikhism, Jainism, and, as a proponent of Indian nationalism put it, "Islam with an Eastern value system like Indonesian."

Let me say that such scathing attacks on the Modi government by a prominent Western mainstream author are unlikely to strengthen India's orientation toward closer cooperation with the United States and its closest allies in Europe and Asia, or to help build genuine trust between the parties. Yes, it is true that due to pragmatic geopolitical con-

siderations, including those related to the uneasy relationship with China, New Delhi participates in such formats of this cooperation as QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), which brings together the United States, Japan, Australia and India. It is also true that Narendra Modi ascribes great importance to this quadrilateral security dialogue, as evidenced by his recent speeches. Specifically, on May 24, 2022, during the meeting of the QUAD group leaders, he stated that the interaction between the four nations "contributes to the creation of a free Indo-Pacific region." Nevertheless, there was no unanimity between them: the Indian Prime Minister never agreed to join the anti-Russian sanctions of his QUAD partners. Still, attempts to "pull" India into the Western camp continue. Thus, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz invited Modi to attend the G7 summit in June in the Bavarian Alps.

In elaborating on the nationalism of the Indian authorities and pro-government politicians, Dorsey refers to the views of Ram Madhav, former general secretary of the BJP and member of the executive committee of the conservative nationalist organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which is nearly a century old and has an estimated 6 million followers. Madhav seeks common civilizational values among the different religions of the region which could be called the "Greater Indo-Pacific," similar to the "Greater Middle East" invented in the United States. In a recent interview, Madhav told the Briton: "Eastern civilizations and Eastern religions profess the same value system." As an example of such a religious value system, the politician referred to the "humanistic Islam" practiced by the Nahdlatul Ulama – as Dorsey put it, the largest "Muslim civil society" movement not only in Indonesia but also in the world (it was formed as a result of a separation from another moderate reformist non-governmental Sunni Muslim movement, the Muhammadiyah, founded in 1912 and to this day remaining another powerful religious and social structure in Indonesia). Nahdlatul Ulama, a movement that unites up to 90 million Sunni Muslims by some estimates and no more than 30 million by others, advocates ridding Islam of a series of obsolete, long outdated norms. By the way, some experts believe that Indonesia can be included in the number of civilization-states – if not today, then at least in the near future.

The British expert is also dissatisfied with Delhi's policy towards the nearly 200 million Muslim "minority" (Dorsey estimates the number of Muslims in India at 14% of the total population – 1.4 billion). He recalls the 2019 amendments to India's citizenship law that gave eligibility to Indians living in Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan, but not to Muslims, and the removal of autonomy from Jammu and Kashmir, which was the only state in India where Muslims were the majority. There were many Western experts and analysts from Muslim states that didn't see it as a violation of Muslim rights.

Unfair criticism of the policies of "civilization-states," which include the most influential non-Western countries with a long history of defending their national identity in the face of the hegemonic aspirations of Western powers, exacerbates the contradictions evident in the papers and speeches of mainstream Western authors, including James Dorsey, among others. One might assume that the debate over the problem of civilizationalism in the face of new global challenges and geopolitical uncertainty will maintain the current momentum in the near and medium term.

A. D. Nekipelov¹

RUSSIAN ECONOMY IN THE MIDST OF THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS

The last decade of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century unfolded under the sign of neoliberal globalization. The new stage of scientific and technological progress has led to a dramatic increase in the economic interdependence of the states of the world due to the rapid development of international trade and sharp increase in the transnational mobility of financial resources and labor. During this period, internationalization processes took place in the context when the market economy became a universal form of organization of economic life, and their most important aspect was consistent removal of barriers that limited the direct interaction between economic agents from different countries in all spheres of activity.

The trend toward an increasingly homogeneous market environment on the planet has manifested in many ways and has apparently determined the qualitative specificity of this stage of internationalization of the world economy. The process of abandonment of administrative and economic (primarily tariff) restrictions that stood in the way of international trade progressed rapidly as full-scale financial liberalization took place. In the monetary sphere, the position of the U.S. dollar has remained unshaken, while liberalization manifested itself in the transition of most countries to the regime of freely formed exchange rates of national currencies. Common standards of macroeconomic policy were established on the spot. Its monetary component in most countries boiled down to the task of minimizing the level of inflation, and financial component – to the rigid framework of the state budget deficit. The market economy globalization also manifested itself in the rapid development of transnational production structures with their emerging branched value chains that linked producers from different countries into a single whole. The regional integration processes that have developed in different parts of the world were seen in this context as a form of enlargement of the world economy structure in the course of its globalization.

All these trends were accompanied by a tangible weakening of the economic positions of nation-states and transfer of their functions to the level of inter- and transnational organizations. More and more often, the idea of creating a single world government in the future appeared in the public and political discourse.

Of course, even in this context, it was evident that the key role in the process of globalization was played by the United States and its allies. However, it was perceived that the interests of the leading states, in fact, coincided with the interests of the global community, since their implementation contributes to the rapid spread of modern produc-

tion technologies and progressive forms of organization and management. These perceptions were reinforced by the fact that during globalization, transnational companies whose headquarters were mostly located in economically developed countries, moved their production facilities to the developing countries on a massive scale.

Globalization entailed a significant change in the specialization of different groups of states. Economy of the U.S. and many of its allies has become service economy: for the most part, and in the United States nearly entirely, their gross domestic product became generated by services. Of course, the leading place among these services is occupied by the highly intelligent part of the real economy² – science and technology, information and communication, educational, medical, transportation, and construction services. But such systemic activities as financial services play a prominent role in the economic structure. In the last decades of the 20th century, the development of securities markets and sophisticated transactions with financial assets based on complex mathematical constructs turned financial intermediation into a very profitable activity. Globally, provision of these services became concentrated in a limited number of financial centers, most of which are either located in the leading countries or are controlled by them.

Lifting of restrictions on transnational transactions did not (and could not) happen according to a procedure pre-agreed by all countries. Therefore, the weakening economic positions of nation-states during the period of neoliberal globalization were not an inescapable trend that equally affected everyone. The most successful developing countries (most notably China), taking advantage of the opportunities of globalization, have carefully tailored their decisions to liberalize economic activity in accordance with national strategic objectives. This means that even during the relatively favorable course of globalization, the potential for interstate contradictions persisted (and partly grew).

It seems that the global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009 was a turning point. The global catastrophe resulting from radical liberalization of capital markets had severely hit the countries that had previously relied on financial intermediation. And then it turned out that the national interests of the world leaders did not disappear, they just remained in the shadows until they were threatened. As a result of the crisis, the balance of national and state interests shifted, which was due to the rapid rise of China, the change in the overall balance of power on the world economic arena, the increased interest in Russia's position regarding the need to transition to a multipolar world, as well as the appeal of such organizations as BRICS. All this contributed to the return of geopolitics to the forefront of global affairs. During the pandemic, this trend only intensified.

The world economy has entered a zone of institutional crisis. Former leaders of neoliberal globalization switched to restructuring their own economies, a trend that has clearly manifested itself in the return of industries previously

¹ Director of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor. Author of more than 200 scientific publications, including: "Essays on the Economics of Post-Communism," "The Formation and Functioning of Economic Institutions: from 'Robinsonism' to Market Economy Based on Individual Production," "Central and Eastern Europe in the Second Half of the 20th Century," and others; papers: "Macroeconomic Policy in the Context of Globalization: The Experience of Modern Russia," "On the Nature of Modern Global Processes: Reflections of an Economist," and others. Member of the Scientific Council under the Security Council of the Russian Federation. He was awarded the Order of Honor and the Order of Merit for the Fatherland, IV degree. Honorary Doctor of SPbUHS.

² The real sector of the economy should not be identified with the sphere of material production. This sector includes all activities that are part of technological chains leading ultimately to the satisfaction of people's natural needs.

relocated to developing countries. The standards of rational macroeconomic policy that once seemed immutable became blatantly ignored by the developed states in favor of counteracting the recession due to the pandemic and maintaining social stability within national borders. The arsenal of their actions began to include such “unconventional” measures of limiting the freedom of transnational transactions as the use of sanctions against their geopolitical competitors. All this gives reason to believe that we are witnessing a significant slowdown of globalization at the least¹; more likely, it is replaced by fragmentation, which will be accompanied by a significant institutional restructuring of economic relations in various macro-regions of the world economy.

Russia, for well-known reasons, finds itself at the center of the geopolitical rifts of the modern world. The unprecedented sanctions imposed on it after the start of the special operation in Ukraine are quite in line with the general logic of the “deglobalization process” – replacement of the competitive relations of classical market economic agents (firms and consumers) by relations of confrontation between nation-states and their coalitions. In this “game situation,” in which the largest states are direct or indirect protagonists, Russia must find appropriate responses to the challenges it faces.

Due to the sanctions war, the Russian economy has to deal with three main types of shocks. The existing and potential restrictions on Russian exports are (or may become) a source of “demand-side shocks.” Bans on supply of various types of products to Russian firms, as well as naturally occurring or artificially erected logistical barriers that hinder the delivery of imported goods, give rise to the so-called “supply side” shocks. Finally, the reduction of possibilities or even complete blocking of settlements with currencies of unfriendly states falls into the category of “financial shocks.” The channels of impact and the consequences of these strikes on the economy are different, which has to be taken into account in elaborating economic policies.

Shocks accompanying a decline in external demand make sale of export-oriented products problematic; they can cause production stoppages and growth of unemployment. Shocks that disrupt the production process can lead to such an extremely unpleasant phenomenon as stagflation – a reduction in output and an increase in inflation at the same time. Restrictions on the use of reserve currencies in international settlements complicate foreign economic relations and thus entail a series of grave problems for an economy that is deeply integrated into the global turnover. Finally, measures beyond civilized relations, such as freezing of sovereign reserves, funds of legal entities and individuals under sanctions, immediately reduce the resources of the Russian economy. All of this together poses the threat of chaos in industrial and financial activity, an uncontrolled decline in production, large-scale unemployment, and erosion of the social and political stability of the Russian society.

The nature of the emerging problems clearly indicates that our economy will go through a period of large-scale restructuring due to the need to modernize its connection with the system of world economic relations. Clearly, such restructuring under time pressure is a daunting task.

¹ This view has become widespread and reflected in the emergence of such term as Slobalization (slower globalization).

The analysis shows that in the current context, availability of basic resources (agricultural land, extractable resources) for production activities and meeting the basic consumer needs is not a burden generating a “narcotic dependence” on income associated with their exploitation (the so-called Dutch disease) but an essential condition for a successful response to the challenges faced by Russia. This national patrimony guarantees us the ability to maintain a decent level of consumption for the population at all times and to prevent an unacceptable decline in productive activity. Now the key task is to determine the optimum mechanism for financing urgent structural changes. The problem is that these changes require significant investment and will take a long time to implement.

An attempt at ensuring structural adjustment based solely on market self-regulation through interaction of private firms would inevitably entail unacceptable levels of unemployment in the short and medium term. Small businesses can play a certain role in alleviating this problem, so efforts to create the most favorable conditions for their activities are perfectly justified. However, this role is inevitably limited. Without active participation of the state, the process of structural readjustment will be invariably long and painful. The state has the toolkit of active industrial policy that helps prepare general design of the necessary structural changes and achieve its implementation. The state can ensure a sufficiently rapid transfer of some of the revenues from the resource sectors of the economy to sectors in need of investment, experiencing a current shortage of demand.

In a sense, this problem is similar to that of the Soviet state during the years of industrialization. Several approaches to its solution are theoretically possible.

The first one consists in direct withdrawal of funds from donor industries through the tough tax pressure. The disadvantages of this modern version of “*Prodrazverstka*” (a policy and campaign of confiscation of grain and other agricultural products from peasants at nominal fixed prices according to specified quotas by the Bolshevik government during the Russian Civil War) are obvious: it suppresses all stimuli for effective work of the resource sector and arouses socio-political tensions.

The second approach is related to inflationary financing of structural adjustment. The risks associated with it are even higher because the Russian economy is already facing a very acute problem of inflation in the mid-term due to the supply-side shock that has hit it.

Finally, the third approach is to maximize the financial capacity of the state itself. This capacity consist of accumulated funds from the national welfare fund, state-owned factor incomes (profits from state assets, rents for state-owned natural resources), and borrowed funds. Apparently, use of the borrowing instrument will entail that the country will live with a growing public debt for quite a long time. Since today this debt is at a low level, and the attracted loans should be used to create effective production whose income will be the source of this debt’s repayment in the future, this development is not especially dangerous.

The structural shock faced by the Russian economy entails special demands to the monetary policy. The first measures taken by the monetary authorities have proven to be effective. The rapid (as early as February 28, 2022) and drastic increase in the key interest rate to 20% made it possible to bring down the agitation on the foreign exchange

market¹, return depositors to banks, and largely suppress the burst of “momentary inflation.”² Another success is the Central Bank’s quick response to the stabilization of commodity and financial asset markets: its key interest rate was lowered first to 17% (from April 11, 2022) and then to 14% (from May 5, 2022). However, the intention to return to four percent annual inflation in 2023 is questionable. Not the very possibility of achieving such a result, but appropriateness of setting such a goal in the present conditions is doubtful.

The supply-side shock and the resulting significant structural changes in the Russian economy are long-term, clearly not within the horizon of 1.5–2 years. A premature attempt to suppress inflation in these conditions is fraught with serious problems in the production sphere – deterioration of the financial situation of enterprises and long-term stagnation of the economy. Therefore, for the foreseeable period, we should not aim to return to the four percent level of annual inflation as soon as possible, but to ensure the most favorable conditions for structural readjustment of the economy.

In terms of investment appeal for economic agents, which is vital in resolving this problem, the level of inflation is of lesser importance than its predictability for economic agents and the real interest rate. At the same time, a low (or even negative) rate alone does not mean favorable conditions for investment: entrepreneurs have to reckon with the fact that in case of a significant reduction in inflation the situation may quickly and drastically change. This consideration is all the more important since in the normal conditions, there is a clear relationship between the level of inflation and its variability.

The standard approach to solving this problem is to steadily reduce inflation while implementing the steps to convince the economic agents that anti-inflationary policies will be firmly in place, despite the current costs on the production side. Supposedly, this is the most reliable way of shaping a favorable investment climate, and it seems that the Central Bank of Russia is pursuing it, albeit not in the toughest version.

Meanwhile, the complex configuration of shocks faced by the Russian economy may result in a situation when the current costs are too high. Therefore, we should seriously consider another option, successfully tried by a number of other countries where the annual rate of inflation exceeded 30–40%. This option suggests introduction of a system of indexation for all fixed-term contracts, with automatic adjustment of obligations of economic agents to the price index that is regularly stabilized by the authorized state body. Certainly, implementation of this idea requires a lot of ef-

fort and time: in this case, companies have to move to inflation-adapted system of accounting, and the state has to make changes in tax law. Besides, the indexation cannot be perfect, because it will not occur continuously, but at intervals.³ But against the background of the long-term structural shock that has hit our economy, these costs may be acceptable given the benefits that a radical reduction in the impact of uncertainty in price dynamics would have on the decisions of economic actors.

Another challenge faced by the monetary authorities is that the unfriendly states have taken restrictive measures against Russian banks and economic agents, making it difficult for them to use reserve currencies in international settlements. But such a possibility has not been completely ruled out. The resulting situation is quite extraordinary. On the one hand, there is still a “bottleneck” enabling payments in reserve currencies by non-sanctioned firms through non-sanctioned Russian banks for certain types of imported goods. On the other hand, one cannot ignore the fact that unfriendly states can narrow down or even shut off payments in reserve currencies at any time.

Russia’s response was absolutely adequate. Decisions were made to allow Russian firms to repay foreign debts in rubles if necessary; payments for gas supplied to foreign markets were transferred to rubles. Restrictions on the capital items of the balance of payments, in particular the decision for exporters to sell 80% of export earnings in the foreign exchange market, are also important, albeit forced.

The declining attractiveness of the dollar and euro for Russian economic agents led to an unprecedentedly rapid decline in their exchange rates against the ruble. Moreover, escalation of anti-Russian sanctions in the financial sphere could theoretically lead to complete elimination of the circulation of currencies of unfriendly states in the Russian foreign exchange market. In this case, mutual trade can be carried out either using the ruble (as well as currencies such as the Chinese yuan and Indian rupees), or through the introduction of clearing systems of settlement, or through barter transactions.

In general, the situation with the foreign exchange clearly resembles a game. In an attempt to undermine the Russian economy, Western countries have to consider the danger of a drastic reduction or even termination of supplies of vital goods from Russia, as well as the very real prospect of damaging the reserve status of their currencies. The Russian side avoids complete rejection of the use of currencies of unfriendly states and does not put forward a requirement to switch to rubles exclusively in settlements with them, because it does not want further reduction in mutual trade.⁴

¹ The ruble-dollar exchange rate on February 23, 2022 was 80.42, on March 11 – 120.38, on April 13 – 79.63 rubles/dollar. See: https://www.cbr.ru/currency_base/dynamics.

² The rate of monthly inflation (as a percentage of the previous month) in the first quarter of 2022 increased rapidly: January – 0.99, February – 1.17, March – 7.61%; year-on-year: January – 12.5%, February – 15.0%, March – 141.1%, April – 44.0% (see: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/ind_potreb_cen_03.html). In April, inflation began to decline rapidly. Its average daily level in the first half of the month was already half as much as in March – 0.1 vs. 0.237% (see: https://rosstat.gov.ru/storage/mediabank/60_13-04-2022.htm).

³ The possibilities and limitations of adapting to inflation by indexing nominal contracts have long been known (see, for example: *Begg D., Fisher S., Dornbusch R.* Economics. 3rd ed. McGraw Hill Book Company, 1991. P. 520–521), but with the establishment of the Washington Consensus ideology, they have been effectively abandoned.

⁴ At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the danger of enforcing new decisions for “freezing” the amounts in reserve currencies available with Russian firms and banks. What is concerning in this regard is the significant level of current-account asset recorded in the first quarter of 2022, \$58.2 billion; for the entire 2021, the figure was \$122 billion (see: <https://www.cbr.ru/statistics>).

R. I. Nigmatulin¹SCIENCE, ECONOMIC WARFARE, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE²

Scientists, especially those of the Russian Academy of Sciences – the state academy – must maintain contact with and have an impact on all levels of the society, parties, and, last but not least, the government. Therefore, for the time being, scientists must stop discussing the eternal Russian question “*Who is to be blamed?*” They should withhold their anger and communicate only in scientific language, drawing on the example of the great academician Ivan Pavlov. During the revolutionary chaos of 1918, he spoke of the problems of the *Russian scientific mind*. And in the 1930s he found a way to make unrelenting but scientifically worded points about the state of the country to its leaders in his letters. He managed to retain his influence on the authorities and stop the persecution of dozens of victims of repressions: scientists, representatives of the Orthodox Church, and their relatives.

A total of about 450 million people participated in World War II on the side of the Soviet Union with a population of about 200 million people and its allies: the United States, Canada (200 million) and Britain (50 million). Fewer people – about 350 million – fought and worked against them: Germany (50 million) along with the occupied continental Europe (300 million). But now, in an intensifying economic war, our country with a population of only 150 million people is confronted by Europe, the U.S., Canada and Japan, where 950 million people live and work; that is, the ally outnumbers us by more than 6 times. And these are the countries and peoples whose technological advances we have been using for several decades.

In this context of an imminent threat to the stability of our country and the world order, the role of domestic science, including academic and university science, must be put forward. The answer to the question “What can be done?” must be backed up with a scientific component.

The scientists need to focus on solving major problems during 2022 and beyond. Moreover, it is necessary to decide *what* and *how* to discuss, and it is very important to *find ways to discuss* the solutions proposed by scientists in the society and power structures.

First estimates of consequences of the economic war

In 2021, Russia's exports amounted to about 493 billion dollars, 90% of its structure belonging to raw or semi-raw

materials. Most of the export proceeds will *persist* for now, especially since the prices for our raw materials have risen. European leaders understand that without our hydrocarbons and other raw materials their countries will suffer an economic downturn and incomes of their population will decrease, which will lead to problems at the elections. Therefore, our export proceeds, together with the remaining gold and foreign exchange reserves, will help support the ruble exchange rate.

Incidentally, the recent events have confirmed that *extractable raw materials are a more reliable resource* than excessive and inflating foreign exchange reserves, which, as it turned out, can be arrested [2].

It is necessary to study the possibility and consequences of limiting our exports of raw materials and semi-finished products, depending on the removal of restrictions on the imported components that we need. At the same time, we should not exaggerate the scale of the difficulties experienced by the U.S. and Europe because of the sanctions war.

In the United States, even after gasoline prices have more than doubled, it costs only \$6 per gallon, or about \$1.5 per liter, which corresponds to 45 rubles per liter by *purchasing power parity*.³ It is cheaper than ours. They can cope with the inflation, which has already reached 7%.

In Europe, the sanctions war with Russia will create more problems. Higher prices for gas, petroleum products and other raw materials will lead to a more serious drop in GDP and more substantial inflation.

The main problem of the export/import constituent in our economy is that because of the sanctions, it is impossible to buy the imported *components* necessary for our production with dollars and euros. The threat of *unemployment* arises. Without the necessary components which are used in most industries we will not be able to produce consumer goods that contribute to GDP.

Not only our entire industry and air transport, but also agriculture depends on imports of parts and components from Europe, the United States, and China. Without components, we won't have the machines, that we haven't been making on our own for quite a while. And for agriculture, imported seeds, pedigree material, mixed fodder additives, veterinary drugs, etc. are of vital importance.

Inefficiency of the economic bloc

The central and very serious problem that prevents us from overcoming the aggravated economic challenges is the grievous long-term inefficiency of the government's socio-economic bloc, heads of corporations and large enterprises, which comprise almost *no specialists*, i.e. engineers. For 30 years managers, lawyers, and financiers, instead of helping the specialists, have acted ineffectively and even destructively.

We have *the lowest return on investment* in fixed capital (more than 1.5 times less than in Europe and the United States); we have lost *technological* independence. We must

¹ Scientific supervisor at P. P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the RAS, member of the Presidium of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor. Author of more than 200 scientific publications, including monographs: “Fundamentals of Mechanics of Heterogeneous Media,” “Dynamics of Multiphase Media,” “Continuum Mechanics,” “How to Equip the Economy and Power of Russia: Analysis from the Engineer and Mathematician,” “The Crisis and Modernization of Russia – 13 Theorems,” “4E of our Life – Ecology, Energy, Economics, Ethnicity,” etc. Has 21 certificates of authorship for inventions. Member of the Russian National Committee for Theoretical and Applied Mechanics. Member of editorial boards of leading international journals in mechanics and thermophysics. Recipient of the Lenin Komsomol Prize, the USSR State Prize, and the Russian Government's prizes in science and technology. Awarded Gold Medal of VDNH USSR, Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan For Achievements in Science, the Order of Honor, the Order of Merit for the Fatherland IV degree, etc.

² The report is based on the paper: Нигматулин Р. И. Академический взгляд на техно-экономическую блокаду // Независимая газета : [сайт]. 2022. 26 апр. URL: https://www.ng.ru/nauka/2022-04-26/9_8427_blockade.html (date of address: 08.06.2022).

³ According to the economic theory, the comparison of domestic prices and GDP in different countries should be based on the purchasing power parity, not on the exchange rate of the Central Bank.

carefully look out for *specialists*, identify those who have creative experience, and urgently promote them to leadership positions, otherwise we have no prospect of developing productive forces.

We need to significantly improve the training and retraining of *engineers* and skilled workers, not only in universities and colleges, but also in factories and plants. We need to raise the salaries of university and college *professors*. We need to respect the culture of academic freedom, professorial and institutional autonomy. We need to make the prestige and salary of a scientist and a teacher higher than the prestige and salary of an official. The society has to learn to appreciate and respect science and education.

However, the responsible Ministry is now *unable* to implement the program for restoring and raising higher education and science. It does not have qualified and experienced specialists.

Let me remind the names of prominent scientists and statesmen who led the departments responsible for education and science. The Ministry of Education and the Higher Attestation Commission of the USSR were headed by correspondent members of the Academy of Sciences V. P. Yelyutin, G. A. Yagodin, academicians I. F. Obraztsov, Ye. I. Shemyakin. Academicians V. A. Kirillin, G. I. Marchuk, and N. P. Laverov chaired the State Committee on Science and Technology. Compare them with those who hold similar positions now. It feels bitter, sad and even funny.

Economy and productive forces

Apart from assessing the options for replacing imported components produced in unfriendly countries, the government should cooperate with scientific institutions to assess the condition and development of Russia's *raw material base*,¹ which is virtually our only economic trump card, at least for the next decade.

We need to develop the methods of indicative strategic *planning* for key enterprises of the production sector, providing for effective *benefits* (land, tax, customs, administrative) to stimulate fulfillment of target indicators.

We need to urgently develop measures to limit "terrorizing" of businesses by supervisory agencies (law enforcement, environmental, firefighters, etc.) and to declare amnesty for technical specialists who are imprisoned or under investigation for "economic" articles.

It is time to work on the transition to the financing of the state budget by emission of the Central Bank of Russia to provide the economy with the necessary liquidity. We should explore the possibility of settlements in gold, both cash and non-cash option.

Along with mobilization of state structures, we should do our best to develop *small* and *medium-sized* businesses. In the West, they account for 60% of GDP, but in our country only for 20%. In our economy, patronage and pressure from government agencies have become *excessive* again. We should expand the practice of reducing *tax*, such as VAT, for small and medium-sized businesses, as well as for businesses engaged in design, engineering, programming, science, teaching technical subjects, and hi-tech industries. For such businesses, we should offer *targeted credits* at a rate of no more than 5% per annum.

¹ RAS has materials on this topic prepared under the leadership of Academician N. S. Bortnikov and correspondent member of the RAS V. L. Yakovlev.

The government has already begun the work toward these goals, as has been prompted by scientists for quite a while [1; 2]. However, much more vigorous and urgent measures are needed. They are listed below.

1. First and foremost, we need to achieve an urgent reduction in *domestic prices* for fuel, electricity and raw materials. In shaping the domestic prices, analyzing their socio-economic significance, and their comparison with prices and GDP in other countries, we should completely abandon dollar orientation at the rate of the Central Bank ($\$_{CB}$), adopted due to sheer ignorance in government circles. It is time to understand that according to the economic science, when comparing domestic prices in different countries, one should be guided by the exchange rate of the dollar based on the *purchasing power parity* ($\$_{PPP}$).

The $\$_{PPP}$ rate established according to the prices of the most common consumer goods and services in different countries, is currently equal to 25–30 rubles. It is quite stable and principally different from the $\$_{CB}$ bank rate, which jumped from 75 to 105 rubles after the announcement of sanctions, and was later established by the Central Bank at about 70 rubles with restrictions on buying dollars.

In almost all countries with predominant commodity export which they earn dollars from, the bank rate dollar is several times more expensive than the PPP rate dollar: this protects the national currency, prevents flight of capital from the country and helps make production less dependent on imports.

The bank rate at which currencies are exchanged determines *only* the ratio between exports (26% of GDP) and imports (20% of GDP). To compare the socio-economic significance of the rest (74%) of our GDP and the GDP of other countries, people's incomes and prices of various goods and services produced domestically, in particular the "public" goods (food, utilities, transportation, fuel, electricity), we should focus on the rate according to *PPP*, taking into account the share of imported components in the price of goods.²

The price of "public" goods on the domestic market should consist of the *domestic cost* in rubles, state allocations (which should be reduced by raw materials and semi-finished products manufactured inside our country) and a moderate profit.

Reduction of the price of oil, petroleum products, gas and electricity by reducing state allocations and profits will be to our advantage as an investment in the development of productive forces, in particular in road and air transport. The state budget losses should be compensated by an increase in state allocations from the export of oil and petroleum products, because its volume exceeds their domestic consumption by more than three times. This also applies to the export of timber, mineral fertilizers, chemicals, metals, and other raw and semi-finished goods.

2. We have to ensure that the main "production" ministries and large state corporations have their own *backbone design and research institutes*. Their content should be multiplied, and the status of their employees should

² Ruble prices in Russia, when converted into dollars through dividing them by its high bank rate, which is also mostly increasing, look very low compared to prices in the U.S. and Europe. This "allows" the proponents of the government to claim that our price level is quite low and that the population is generally well off, despite the low wages and pensions of most of the working people. If we follow this "logic," any devaluation of the ruble leads to a fall in Russian prices in dollars, which makes no sense for the Russian population in terms of social and economic well-being.

become more prestigious than that of “managers.” Without research and design institutes, it is impossible to overcome the voluntarism of “managers” and their inability to create.

3. Urgently abolish federal *procurement procedures* (see Federal Law No. 223-FZ of July 18, 2011 “On the procurement of goods, works and services by specific types of legal entities”). Procurement should be the responsibility of the CEO and shareholders of the company.

4. Cancel or at least significantly reduce *taxation of low-wage workers* with a nontaxable minimum wage of 1,000 \$_{ppp} per month (about 30,000 rubles). Compensate the loss of the state budget by raising taxes on high incomes, for example, above 16,000 \$_{ppp} per month (about 500 thousand rubles), and expensive property.

5. Particular focus should be made on providing *jobs for young people*. There is an urgent need to increase the scholarships for undergraduate and especially postgraduate students, so that they engage in studies and research instead of going out to protests. Students and graduates of universities should be offered contracts with companies, to make them interested in working in Russia and not in foreign firms.

6. All financial injections into the population, in particular those mentioned above and those leading to an increase in consumer demand, must be *balanced* by an increase in the bulk of consumer goods, including their imports from China, the CIS countries, Turkey, Iran and other states not hostile to us. Otherwise, all injections will be absorbed by inflation.

What the Academy of Sciences must do

The following activities should be considered and discussed.

1. The Academy must *self-reform*. The main task is to involve the active part of the doctoral staff, institute directors, and RAS professors in real work, at least in the departments, including *election* of new RAS members. The credibility of the Academy of Sciences and its members has declined consider-

ably. We need to strengthen the Academy’s reliance on the scientific community.

2. After the reorganization, *it is necessary to raise the question of returning the institutes under control of the RAS*, at least in terms of appointment of directors, approval of state assignments, distribution of basic funding, and evaluation of activities of the institutes. That *could* be achieved. It is time to realize that the officials of the Ministry of Education and Science are incapable of performing these functions.

3. Then we should raise the question of recreating the *Russian Academy of Medical Sciences* and the *Russian Academy of Agricultural Sciences* with their own institutes, in relation to which they should perform the same functions as the RAS. The unity of the three academies should be ensured within the framework of the Association of Russian Academies of Sciences.

4. It is necessary to restore *academic journals*, the Russian system of *dissertation defense* and the *Higher Attestation Commission*, in which scientists, not bureaucrats, play a decisive role.

5. The socio-economic goals proclaimed for 10 years are being postponed, and they will not be achieved unless scientists develop a scientific and theoretical basis for overcoming the state economic, technological, social, and humanitarian problems.

The most important task for the leadership of the Russian Academy of Sciences is *organization of such developments* and their *incorporation* into the public consciousness and minds of the authorities.

References

1. Нигматулин, Р. И. Кризис и модернизация России – тринадцать теорем / Р. И. Нигматулин, Б. И. Нигматулин. – Москва : Новости, 2010. – 48 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
2. От стагнации к устойчивому социально-экономическому развитию России / руководители рабочей группы Р. И. Нигматулин, Б. И. Нигматулин. – Текст : электронный // ПРОАтом : [сайт]. – URL: <http://www.proatom.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=9740> (date of address: 08.06.2022).

S. B. Nikonova¹

CRISIS OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNITY VALUE SYSTEMS. TRANSFORMATION OF THE MODERNIST ETHICS: RATIONALITY AND CRITICISM?

Although social mythology has insisted from the ancient times that there is some eternal struggle between good and evil in the world, it could rather be said that such a struggle is in fact a myth. Those who take the side of evil are in fact very few in human history, and even they must draw on an already existing moral construct to make such a choice. It would be more accurate to say that everyone is fighting for the good, but they understand it in substantially different ways. In order to determine which of the confronting

positions is more “good” than another, an external criterion would be required; transcendence into a meta-position that could be called divine. For centuries people have appealed to this position with absolute certainty, relying on their belief in the good and declaring the opposite position to be evil. Even if there were doubts, they were rather that we could learn this meta-position than that it existed.

The rationalist criticism of the Enlightenment put an end to this hope. Kant’s call to “use one’s own reason” and not to rely on “guardians” who know what the extrinsic absolute moral law is, and his emphasis on the internal basis of morality, which draws its principles exclusively from the conscious freedom of the subject, made the metaphysical criteria for evaluating moral action ephemeral. This has helped acknowledge the plurality of moral positions and the right of the Other to his opinion, has led the culture to the

¹ Professor at the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies, Member of the Academic Council of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Editor-in-Chief of “Terra Aestheticae” journal of the Russian Aesthetic Society. Author of more than 100 scientific publications, including monograph “Aesthetic Rationality and New Mythological Thinking,” collective monographs “Environmental Aesthetics: Problems and Limits,” “Conceptualization of Homo Aestheticus. History and Reflection,” the textbook “Comparative Cultural Studies. Theoretical Introduction,” etc.

possibility of a dialogical state, the principle of intersubjectivity, rational and emotional communication, strengthened the values of humanism and pluralism, opened the way to the recognition of differences of opinion, and moved ethical disputes into a horizontal dimension. Although Enlightenment ethics was eventually criticized for its total rationalism that overlooked emotion and feeling, it did open the way for emotion and feeling to freedom from its former metaphysical slavery.

By the mid-twentieth century, the humankind seemed to realize that it no longer had the right to build rigid systems of distribution of good and evil, to ignore the individual inclinations of individuals, to be inattentive to the multitude of different voices announcing their presence in the world. Rationality was subjected to severe criticism and accused of condoning construction of a rigid system of moral definitions in search of a single criterion of evaluation. In the preface to Deleuze and Guattari's famous work "Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia," which he described as, first, an ethical and, second, a radically anti-fascist work, M. Foucault stated that just as once "Christian moralists sought traces of flesh lurking in the recesses of the soul," the authors of this book "explore the smallest traces of fascism in our bodies."¹

Fascism is understood here in a very broad sense. One can compare this reading to that of S. Bauman in his book "The Relevance of the Holocaust."² Fascism is not aggression, not rallying in the face of the opposite forces, but construction of a complete system that behaves rationally, coherently, under a common leadership, according to a single principle. It is the construction of an intelligent system with a single set of rules, finding the law for it, systematizing, shaping, uprooting the deadwood to arrange a beautiful garden, destroying pests to arrange a coherent and harmonious world, cutting off the superfluous to create a magnificent statue...

Everything that leads to harmony is simultaneously contaminated with this overly rational thought of holistic meaning. The authors of Anti-Oedipus see this danger and try their best to avoid it in their own presentation, making it almost unreadable, disintegrating, torn, as if the "body without organs" of this text is desperately struggling with the rational structure of the text as a coherent organism: "There's an apparent conflict brewing between the machines with desires and the body without organs."³

Critique of the rational, final for the development of the rationalist project of modernist thought, became its internal self-deconstruction. It was willing to admit that the excesses of systematization were a heavy burden and the fault of the rationalist project that had once defeated the conventionality and total rigidity of the traditionalist society. And now it was ready to take humankind to a new, unexplored path, to a new level, where reason would willingly give way to the renewed feeling, bypassing all limitations, now understood and overcome. This was seen as almost a new chance to attain the realm of God, a new, post-secular kingdom of human freedom.⁴

The only disconcerting element of the beautiful post-modernist era was probably the fact that in the economy,

it coincided with an increasing strengthening of the very principle that this new thought was trying to oppose in every way: the principle of capitalist production and consumption that increasingly enslaved human desire and feeling, which in fact was the main subject of the "anti-fascist" criticism by Deleuze and Guattari and other, even more pessimistic postmodernists like J. Baudrillard, who saw absolutely no way out of this manipulative and simulative social dead end. In politics of that time, there was a division of the world into two camps: communist and capitalist. And up to a certain time, it seemed that the existence of the communist camp was a kind of an excess, a false path, a mistake, a misreading of those leftist values that formed the basis of the economic critique of the consumer society, an aberration not meant to exist. They shouldn't have forgotten that the communist project was the very flesh and blood of the modernism and its rational critical reflections, the other side of what became the foundation of consumer society itself, with only minor shifts of emphasis. Nevertheless, they had forgotten.

The fact that Fascism was also only a shift of emphasis in the rationalist principles of the Enlightenment was also ignored. How could the same ideas that lead to humanism and equality end up in the totalitarian dictatorship? It seemed to be a mistake. But the project collapsed. First fascist, then communist. And perhaps in the end it was already clear that the root of the troubles had not even been touched in their destruction, which ultimately led to the complete transformation of all former ideas and values and their mutation into an exact opposite.

Of the three ways of rationalizing the social order generated by critical thought of the modernism, two have shown their propensity to move from the principle of rationality to totalitarian dictatorship. In further transformation, accompanied by the abandonment of the principle of dictatorship, they also abandoned rationality, essentially returning to the old metaphysical beliefs. Thus, fascism, having abandoned its claims to totality, was transformed into traditionalism, trust in archaic values and foundations, while communism, as a real state ideology, came to accord with religious faith. At the same time, the remaining liberal project, with all its pluralistic and anti-systemic sentiments, suddenly transformed, appealing to the prevalence of feeling over rational scheme (the outcome much coveted by anti-fascist and postmodernists), into a new system of confrontation between good and evil, where everything that is not liberal is on the side of "evil," thus transforming this project from recognition of the right of the Other into a rigid dictate.

This dictate is somewhat paradoxical. Recognition of the right of the Other, whatever it may be, and the plurality of voices is the result of the development of only one system of thought: the critical rationality of modernism, which opposed the metaphysics and the traditional way of life. Thus, this recognition as an ideology was imposed from the outside on everyone else. Now the Other, having acquired the imposed right, is forced to "undo" the authority that imposed it in order to assert this right in full. As a result, in essence, we end up with the inevitable dictate of the Other.

The liberal position of recognition turns against its own foundations and must ultimately, in order to ensure its realization, be destroyed and transform into a total assertion of

¹ Делёз Ж., Гваттари Ф. Анти-Эдип: капитализм и шизофрения. Екатеринбург : У-Фактория, 2007. С. 8.

² Бауман З. Актуальность холокоста. М. : Европа, 2010.

³ Делёз Ж., Гваттари Ф. Указ. соч. С. 24.

⁴ See, e.g.: Ваттимо Дж. После христианства. М. : Три квадрата, 2007. С. 65.

extra-liberal, extra-rationalist, extra-critical values (which are, in relation to it, the Others). This is a very precarious position, in which criticism of any irrational fundamentalist beliefs in itself leads to new irrational fundamentalist beliefs, only on a new level. And this is exactly what we get instead of the promised “reign of liberty,” the flourishing of humanism and universal diversity. In essence, the liberal project in the modern world has arrived at the same end as its more totalitarian brethren somewhat earlier: a dictatorship, harsh censorship, a struggle against “vermin” and everything that opposes it (because it stands for evil), a rigid distinction between black and white, a new, quite archaic, system of thought under cover of what remains of the old humanist slogans.

The question is, what went wrong, in all these cases? And in response to this question, there is suspicion. From the Enlightenment onward, the origin of the modernist transformations was rational criticism, a critique of all customs and foundations. It was also the basis of scientific research, breaking through the boundaries of the old worldviews, and of art, which was striving for free expression of human individuality. Nevertheless, all ideological systems that were eventually constructed have used the practical principle of rationality, exclusively to construct new, more reasonable (at a first glance) sets of rules, a new substantive ethical basis for the future society. But it all boiled down to what Deleuze and Guattari suspected with horror in the new world, analyzing with equal suspicion both Marx with his utopia of universal equality and Freud with his domination of the unconscious over conscious (and Foucault amazingly managed to reduce it all to fascism).

In the pursuit of practical results, that which lay at the heart of the whole worldview revolution and which was emphasized by I. Kant was, apparently, successfully and forever forgotten afterwards in the attempts to construct a new beautiful world driven by a free outburst of subjectivity. They have actually forgotten the *critique*. Rationality has always been inherent in man. But critical rationality is the achievement of modernism, through which it secured total domination over all other worldview systems, and also sig-

nificantly humanized people’s perception of the world. Nevertheless, without criticism as it was understood by Kant, which limits the reason’s claim for absolute knowledge, without the constant questioning, weighing, rational discussion in public space between all possible voices of one kind or another, rationality would be nothing but the basis for the most successful construction of a new and ever more perfect system of total control. Yet criticism is so alien to feeling, disposition, emotional response of a traumatized, damaged man, yearning for assertion of his right and receiving it from the new humanistic morality, that it is constantly left out, as if it were some violation of true humanism, a relic of collaborationism with fascists, an inability to take an honest stand. But if we ignore this critical constituent of the modernist project, we will also have to move away from all the humanistic values it asserted.

Back in 2008, when it seemed that the chance of entering the “kingdom of freedom” through strengthening and development of the ideals conceived in the last couple of centuries had not yet been lost, famous Slovenian philosopher S. Žižek in his work “Violence” warned against asserting too explicit and direct action against evil (which itself turns out to be only a disguise of violence exerted by the system), wrote that in today’s world, perhaps the only thing that can save us is theoretical analysis. He recalls the problem posed by J.-P. Sartre in “Existentialism Is a Humanism.” The young man who came to Sartre with a question did not know what to do: to join the Resistance and fight fascism, and thereby abandon and condemn his own mother to death, or to stay with his mother, but betray his homeland’s freedom and the movement against fascism? Žižek says, recalling the famous anecdote about Lenin: “An unseemly third solution to the dilemma would be to advise the young man to tell his mother that he has joined the Resistance, and to tell his friends in the Resistance that he will take care of his mother; while he himself should retreat to a secluded place and pursue sciences...”¹ In 2008, it seemed possible at least as a joke. In today’s world, it seems no longer possible. But it may be more acutely necessary than ever...

A. V. Shershukov²

LESSONS OF THE NOVOCHERKASSK TRAGEDY FOR MODERN RUSSIA

For those engaged in economic, political, and social research, the Likhachov Scientific Conference in 2022 is an opportunity to discuss today’s problems in the context of historical events. As it happens, June this year is a month of commemorative historical dates. Many “knots” in politics and economics still exist, they are still not untied and are only getting tighter.

This year’s Likhachov Conference takes place a few days after the commemoration of the working-class move-

ment in Russia. 60 years ago, on 1–2 June 1962, unrest at the electric locomotive plant in Novocherkassk ended with the shooting of a demonstration. But this was the climax, or rather, part of the climax of the political, economic and social drama. The reason for the conflict were blatant miscalculations in production planning, the system of tariffs and price policy in the Soviet Union in the last years of the Khrushchev era. If, on the one hand, workers’ wage rates are lowered and, on the other hand, meat prices are raised, these erroneous decisions combine to become the basis of a conflict. And if someone further ignites the smoldering conflict, as did the plant manager saying, “If you don’t have money for meat, eat pies with liver,” then the protest erupts in the form of a veritable “Russian rebellion” described by Pushkin. And if, instead of negotiations, the government resorts to the “services” of the army, it ends in tragedy which

¹ Жижек С. О насилии. М.: Европа, 2010. С. 10.

² Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Editor-in-Chief of the Central Trade Union newspaper “Solidarnost.” Chairman of the All-Russian Political Party Union of Labor (2012–2020). Author of the books: “Russia: Trade Unions and Workers’ Organizations” (1991, 1993), “Congress of Russian Communities and Alexander Lebed” (1996), “Trade Union Ideology” (2012), and “Brief History of Russian Trade Unions” (2020).

will be remembered even 60 years later. 22 killed in the square, about 70 wounded. And more than a hundred people who were prosecuted.

What historical lessons should be learned in connection with Novocherkassk? Economic decisions must always be considered not only from the point of view of production and finance. Social results, consequences for the workers and – more broadly – for the entire population cannot be sidelined. These are not “collateral” considerations but the primary criteria for evaluating allegedly unbiased technocratic decisions. Another lesson is the detrimental consequences of neglecting such a tool as feedback. Presence of effective feedback helps prevent negative effects of certain measures or to level them out altogether. When formalism in management or fear of upsetting the superiors become determining factors in decision-making, the risk of error is the highest. But even at this stage, the worst can still be prevented. The third lesson of Novocherkassk is that the lack of readiness for a meaningful dialogue entails a bloody tragedy. Representatives of the Soviet leadership who came to Novocherkassk in 1962, instead of talking to representatives of the protesters, preferred to call in the troops...

Are the events of 60 years ago only a historical flashback, irrelevant to the present day? Not really.

The drama in Novocherkassk shows that even in a state that positions itself as a “country of workers and peasants,” labor relations can contain the germ of an acute conflict which is resolved, as in this case, not through negotiations or other peaceful means, but with the guns.

Now we need to ask ourselves a tough question. Can we say that today, in the contemporary Russia, the events in Novocherkassk have zero chance to repeat? It seems that the guarantees of not repeating them cannot be provided by strengthening of administrative or police control. In the Soviet Union, which many people perceive today in an exclusively favorable light, there were significant restrictions on freedom of speech, the political police, and the death penalty. But the workers still went out on their protest rally. As a result, in addition to those who were shot directly at the plant, several participants of the Novocherkassk events were subsequently sentenced to death. Seven people were executed by shooting and 103 were sentenced to imprisonment for a term from 2 to 15 years.

Today, in a situation of radical reformatting of economic relations inside Russia and especially with the outside world, there is much talk about the need to build new supply chains, quick reorientation from the West to the East, and introduction of technologies that are key to the production of modern equipment. The government invests a lot in import substitution. In essence, we are talking about a “new industrialization.” But these technological and financial issues are inseparable from social issues. During industrialization in the USSR in the 1930s, when millions of villagers moved to the cities, the state made huge investments in the social services. The resettled needed to be provided with housing, food, and medical care, and also with a certain prospect of an increase in their material income and cultural level. The problem with today’s reformatting of the economy is that the “new industrialization” will be (if at all) carried out in a situation of uncertainty and even some turbulence in the workers’ incomes. Mid-term forecasts from some expert communities, including those related to the state, suggest a possible drop in the workers’ disposable income. At the same time, opening of

new enterprises and creation of new jobs also implies an increase in wage funds. Thus, today’s situation is apparently extraordinary and even the forecasts should be regarded with caution, taking into account the patriotic or cosmopolitan stance of the expert, which, of course, has nothing to do with scientific assessments. Nevertheless, even now there is a need for a substantial preliminary analysis of the proposed economic measures and their social consequences, along with a preliminarily environmental check. The declaration of CPSU General Secretary Yuri Andropov, who once said, “we do not know the society in which we live,” can today be read as follows: “knowledge of the society undergoing an economic change must be translated into concrete measures for social development of this society.”

These measures cannot be limited to supporting the poor. Unfortunately, the government’s social policy in recent years, including the pandemic period, has been focused on assistance to the people with low income, most of whom are families with children. Over the past twenty years in Russia, there was a slight decline in the share of such an amazing category of the population as the “working poor,” which included huge swaths of the working population. But at the end of 2021, 50% of workers were paid less than 38 thousand rubles per month, although even those earning such amounts cannot be considered middle class. However, elements of progressive taxation of personal income have begun to be introduced only recently and very limitedly with regard to the most well-to-do strata of the society. And if for many years we were told that because of the progressive taxation, the capital would “escape” abroad, today this argument does not work. There is nowhere to escape, thank god. The issues of social justice (the level and ratio of income, taxation, workers’ and trade unions’ rights) are as important today, at the time of economic transformation, as issues of technological reorganization.

Equally important is the problem of feedback. As of today, the response of the authorities to the possible negative reaction of the population and workers is instrumentally implemented on the basis of the regional control centers. However, for the authorities, these structures are intra-administrative, controlling themselves to a certain extent. The answer to the old casuistic question, “Who cuts the barber’s hair?”, is essentially given in a form that helps with reporting, but is not quite effective in solving the problem itself. It seems that a better method of receiving feedback to the decisions is through building an institutional backbone based on employee representative organizations – the trade unions. Such feedback can be organizationally obtained through the system of social partnership built in Russia on the basis of a system of tripartite consultations, regular negotiations, and tripartite commissions at the federal and regional levels. But in order to do so, the authorities must answer the question if they need a meaningful and positive monitoring of their decisions or only formal approval of their actions? It was the second option that led to the tragedy in Novocherkassk 60 years ago. Its ineffectiveness for both workers and the state is quite obvious today.

Unfortunately, construction of an institutional framework for the social partnership system has encountered some opposition over the last year. State bodies often suggest to liquidate the trade union structure (such as the trade union of lawyers) or consistently, from the regional to the federal level, raise claims against the national trade union

center with the specific goal of seizing union property. Such claims are in fact unfounded, since all the necessary documents were signed by the government and there are effective legislative norms that are being interpreted arbitrarily today. The social policy of the country and the policy of the state in relation to the structures that affect social and labor relations are supposed to be carried out using a single approach. Stories in the vein of Saltykov-Shchedrin ("we will give you a medal for your work and immediately arrest you for this work") cannot be considered normal in a socially oriented state.

But even the introduction of mechanisms of preliminary expertise and follow-up control is not an absolute guarantee for the preservation of social peace and development. Conflicts are inevitable in complex systems like the modern economic and social system of Russia. According to Captain Gleb Zheglov, protagonist of the movie "The Meeting Place Cannot Be Changed," "legal order in the country is not about the number of thieves but about the ability of the authorities to neutralize them." Another thing is that this approach suggests a different level of requirements to the quality of work of the law enforcement bodies, including a definitive break with the practice of the 1990s, when investigators and prosecutors often acted as a tool in property "squabbles" and redistribution of property. Such a break does not seem to have happened yet.

In cases of social or labor conflicts, however, there is always the need of their prompt containment and resolution. Mediation methods do play a major role; by the way, they are being professionally studied and implemented by the Department of Conflict Resolution at Saint Petersburg University of Humanities and Social Sciences. But even so, the role of a continuous meaningful dialogue should not be underestimated; the parties to a social partnership must engage in it during a conflict that has already begun. The responsibility of the parties in this case is to quickly find a way to "unstitch" the conflict without resorting to mutual accusations.

Novocherkassk is not just history. Today sociological surveys speak of low protest potential of the Russian population, including hired workers. But it would be a big mistake to think that the relatively calm situation cannot change. The "safeguard" against social explosions should not be complacency or hope for mutual responsibility of government, business, and workers; but only a constant, meaningful, informal social dialogue based on effective social partnership institutions. And it should not be seen as a "steam release valve" (a rather derogatory image for all sides of the negotiation). It's about preventing problems and actually resolving them, not imitating the resolution. This is the main lesson of Novocherkassk for the contemporary Russia.

M. V. Shmakov¹

GLOBAL CONFLICT AND CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

The 20th anniversary International Likhachov Scientific Conference is taking place at a difficult time for Russia.

Frankly, in Russia there seem to be no easy times. One might recall the writings of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov himself, in which he ponders on the fate of our country: "Russia has always felt itself to be looking for a path into the future, or rushing into the future along this path,"² he wrote.

¹ Member of the State Council of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia. Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Saint Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Author of a number of publications on social and labor relations, social policy, theory and practice of the labor and trade union movement, including the books: "Trade Unions of Russia on the Threshold of the 21st Century," "No Victory Without a Fight!," "For Dignified Labor," "Trade Union News Through the Prism of Humor" (co-authored); training manuals for trade unionists and activists "Conflicts in Labor Collectives" (co-authored), "Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia in a Changing Society," "Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia in Questions and Answers;" chapter "Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia" in the book "15 Years of the All-Russian Trade Union: A Look into the Future." Head of the editorial board of the book "History of Trade Unions of Russia." Head of the author's team of Commentary to the Labor Code of the Russian Federation. Coordinator of the Russian Trilateral Commission on Regulating Social and Labor Relations between All-Russian Trade Union Associations, All-Russian Employer Associations, and the Government of the Russian Federation. Chairman of the Board of Trustees, Professor Emeritus of the Academy of Labor and Social Relations. Member of the Board of the Free Economic Society of Russia. Awarded the Order of Friendship, Order of Honor, Order of Merit for the Fatherland II, III, IV degrees, Medal "In Memory of the 850th Anniversary of Moscow," Certificate of Merit of the Government of the Russian Federation, etc. Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS.

² Лихачев Д. С. Мысли о России // Беседа. Традиции, история, культура : [сайт]. URL: <http://www.tradicii.info/ru/lihachev-ru/124-mysli-o-rossii-lihachev.html>.

Today, yet again, we are looking for the right path. Yet again, the Russian economy is under severe pressure from sanctions imposed by the Western world. However, the decisions of American and European politicians are detrimental not only to Russia, but also to their own businesses and citizens. This is evidenced by the rising prices of fuel, energy, goods, and services in these countries. So, according to the nonprofit American Automobile Association, the average cost of a gallon of Regular grade gasoline (equivalent to AI-92 gasoline in Russia) in the United States rose to \$4.45, an increase of 147% year on year.³ According to Eurostat, the price of energy in the Eurozone in April 2022 increased by 38% YoY.

The labor movement and some Western businesses realize that this could lead to a prolonged economic recession. For instance, the largest German trade unions (IG Metall, IGBCE, IG Bau) were against the embargo on energy supplies from Russia because it could bring industrial production to a halt in Europe and end up in the loss of jobs, which would affect the global economy as a whole.

The disruption of logistics supply chains and the departure of Western companies have also affected the socio-economic situation in Russia. However, the actions of Western countries to weaken the Russian economy have not led to the results expected by the West. Despite the sharp rise in prices in March, provoked by the unstable ruble exchange rate, retail speculations and the population's attempts to

³ Цены на бензин в США установили новый рекорд, поднявшись выше \$4,5 за галлон // ТАСС : [сайт]. URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/14649177?utm_source=google.ru&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=google.ru&utm_referrer=google.ru.

stockpile, the inflation has slowed in April and May, while the ruble exchange rate and the cost of goods and services stabilized.

The situation in the labor market can be called relatively stable. The registered unemployment rate has not increased since January 2022 and remains flat at 0.9%. There are no reports of mass layoffs of employees.

Today, however, additional measures are needed to curb the growth in the number of workers on idle time and those working part-time. Over the two months – from March to May – the number of part-time workers increased by 53,000, and those on idle time by 98,000.

The government is currently implementing a series of well-founded steps to strengthen the domestic economy. Measures to stop capital outflows have been reinforced, and a ban has been placed on the use of Russian natural resources by foreign companies. The key rate was reduced (after spiking to 20% in March 2022, it was lowered to 14% in May). Enterprises are being nationalized to preserve production and jobs. So, the assets of Renault group have been transferred to state ownership; the plan is to produce Moskvich cars at the plants of this company.

At the same time, there is still a risk that the economic situation will deteriorate. Russian employees of foreign firms who have suspended their work in our country may face massive layoffs. There may be not enough vacancies in the relevant professions, which means that mass retraining and creation of new jobs will be required.

Real incomes of the population are declining. Measures are taken to support the poorest segments of the population (families with children, pensioners), but there are virtually no measures to increase the salaries of workers.

The Central Bank of Russia adamantly focuses on “targeting” inflation instead of supporting the Russian economy. There is still a policy of reserving funds instead of investing in the economy. The key rate, although gradually decreasing, remains too high, making loans unaffordable for business. Combat against inflation manifesting in the form of limiting the money supply depleted the economy. Tough requirements set by the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank for lending to Russian businesses hinder their development.

Instead of helping to create new manufactures and jobs, our government was placing funds abroad, thus supporting foreign, not Russian, business. We failed to ensure real import substitution: what could be produced in Russia was purchased abroad. Foreign trade policy focused more on the benefits of foreign entrepreneurs working in Russia than on the support of domestic producers. In fear of inflation, we tightened our belts and almost strangled our economy.

Our country has a great potential. Our territory and natural resources, industry and agriculture, social infrastructure and human capital give us a good chance to implement a “new industrial breakthrough.” This requires a change in the management of the economy as a whole.

To solve the problems of state planning and coordination of enterprises of all forms of ownership, it is necessary to recreate the Gosplan (State Planning Committee) and Gossnab (State Supply Committee) on a new digital basis. They should act as aggregators.

Preserving and creating jobs should be a key focus of state economic policy. Today, the first thing to do is to take steps to preserve the existing jobs. Nationalization is one

of such steps. Nationalization should be applied to enterprises in a state of bankruptcy, strategically important and socially important enterprises whose owners do not ensure their normal operation, as well as to the fixed capital of organizations that have announced their withdrawal from Russia.

Opponents of nationalization speak about preserving business and private property. But business is, first and foremost, the workers, whose main source of income is usually salary. What would such workers do if they lost their only source of income?

Besides, the vast majority of bankrupt businesses end up being liquidated. This means that not only the company will disappear, but jobs will be gone and workers will become unemployed. At the same time, the main creditor of bankrupts is often the state, which completely “strips” its debtors through the banks and tax services. This vicious practice must be stopped. The state’s priority should be to keep citizens employed, not to collect overdue taxes.

Procedures of bankruptcy and nationalization must involve the employees, namely their representatives, that is, the trade unions. All important decisions concerning the future of an organization should be made with participation of employee representatives.

The state must support creation of new manufactures that produce necessary goods and create new jobs. Affordable credit resources must be made available to producers.

The main goal of tax policy should be to support investment in production. This requires easing the tax burden on the manufacturing sector.

In the context of new industrial development, in addition to creating new jobs, the state priority should be to increase the real incomes of citizens.

At present, the state’s efforts are aimed at supporting the poorest segments of the population, primarily families with children. Other categories of citizens receive next to no support and continue to fall into poverty. To a large extent, they are the working population. It is necessary to implement measures to increase the real wages of workers.

According to the current methodology, the increase in the minimum wage and the minimum cost of living depends on the growth of the median wage and income. However, the prices of goods and services, especially basic necessities, are rising faster. Under current conditions, this methodology does not work. It is necessary to return to the quarterly calculation of the minimum cost of living on the basis of the consumer goods basket and to revise the minimum wage at least once a quarter in accordance with the growth rate of the minimum cost of living.¹

It is necessary to make an unscheduled indexation of wages in organizations of all forms of ownership, including the public sector, which employs many “working poor.” Such indexing has already been done by a number of large companies. In the future, wages should be indexed regularly (at least once a year) above the rate of inflation.

The problems of raising the salaries of certain categories of public sector workers must be resolved. Real wages should increase for every worker in healthcare, education, culture, sports and social services without intensifying their work.

¹ Апрельские тезисы. О чем говорили на Генсовете ФНПР // Солидарность. 2022. 27 апр. URL: <https://www.solidarnost.org/articles/aprelskie-tezisy.html>.

Minimum wage guarantees should be established more actively in the regions. According to our data, as of January 1 this year, only 21 constituent entities of the Russian Federation had a minimum wage that exceeded the federal minimum wage. Its amount should not be established on the basis of minimum cost of living, which allows only to survive, but on the basis of minimum consumer budget, which covers the basic material, cultural, spiritual and other needs of workers.

It is necessary to significantly increase the amount of unemployment allowance, which should be established depending on the employment (insurance) record of a citizen. This should be done by introducing an insurance-based method of its payment. We expect that this function will be performed by a new unified state non-budgetary fund, formed on the basis of the Social Insurance Fund and the Pension Fund of Russia.

Emergence of wage arrears should be strictly prevented. Institutions must be established to guarantee that workers are still paid their wages in the event of an employer's insolvency.

It is necessary to continue the work on improvement of the progressive scale of tax on personal incomes. Since 2021, at the suggestion of the President of Russia, a 15% rate of personal income tax on income over 5 million rubles per year was introduced. Now it is necessary to establish a new threshold for incomes over 10–15 million rubles a year and reduce the rate to 0% for those whose income does not exceed the minimum wage.

Creation of new jobs will require changes in the system of vocational training of workers, since these jobs will require workers with certain qualifications. A long-term program of continuing education for citizens needs to be developed. Citizens should be trained free of charge in professions and specialties that are in demand in the labor market;

workers should be offered vocational or supplemental vocational training at least once every 2–3 years.

A system of long-term forecasting of the demand in workers must be developed. Currently there is a shortage of personnel in some economic activities and a surplus in others. "New industrialization" is impossible without a skilled labor force. Not the self-employed persons and small businesses, but Russian skilled workers with fully realized social and labor rights will help implement import substitution and ensure the growth of our economy.

In the meantime, it is important to maintain the achieved level of social and labor rights and guarantees for workers.

Instead of "diluting" the labor law, as proposed today under the pretext of improving conditions for doing business, we should focus on a balanced increase in the effectiveness of legal regulation in the field of labor with the participation of social partners.

To resolve socio-economic problems and prevent social tensions in the society, we need to establish reliable feedback between citizens and the authorities. The mechanism of such feedback in the labor sphere has long been known – it is the social partnership.

The primary tasks in the sphere of social partnership, in our opinion, are as follows: establishment of social and labor guarantees for workers in new forms of employment, including the right to join trade unions; extension of industry agreements to all employers of the industry; participation of trade unions in the management of organizations.

Real alignment between the interests of workers and employers in an effective social partnership at all levels – from enterprise to nation – will facilitate the development of all sectors of the economy, where people will be engaged in activities that bring not only decent income, but also respect and opportunities for self-realization and self-fulfillment.

V. A. Tishkov¹

NATION-STATES IN THE HISTORICAL AND GLOBAL CONTEXT²

The term *nation-state* is merely a synonym for any sovereign state with a designated and controlled territory and an established fact of being permanently populated. This notion came into use in the middle of the 17th century, after emergence of the Westphalian system of international relations, which defined the principles of sovereign states, some

of which are still in force today. C. Young writes: "There was nothing natural or predetermined by historical destiny in the emergence of the nation-state. This is a relatively new phenomenon in European history – nation-states began to form during the French Revolution, and the intellectual currents of the Enlightenment played a major role in their emergence. As modern civil society developed, the very concept of nation (nationality) began to merge with the concept of citizenship and belonging to the state... Nations, like states, are a contingency, and not a universal necessity. However, the common belief is that they were destined for each other; that either without the other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy."³

Nation-states and their role in history

Discussions of what is a national (or non-national) state, whether Russia is a nation-state, and what the composition of the population must be to be considered a nation-state,

¹ Scientific supervisor of the N.N. Miklukho-Maklai Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the RAS, member of the Presidium of the RAS, academician-secretary of Department of Historical and Philological Sciences of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Honored Worker of Science of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 500 scientific publications, including monographs and textbooks: "Requiem for Ethnicity. Studies in Socio-Cultural Anthropology," "Political Anthropology," "Society in Armed Conflict," "Russian People: History and Meaning of National Consciousness," "Ethnicity, Nationalism and Conflict in the USSR and After," "The Russian National Idea," "State National Policy of the Russian Federation" (co-authored); encyclopedias "The Peoples of Russia" (Editor-in-Chief) and "The Peoples and Religions of the World" (Editor-in-Chief), etc. Member of the editorial boards of the journals *Bulletin of the RAS*, *Ethnographic Review*, etc. Recipient of state prizes of the Russian Federation, the Demidov Prize. Awarded the Orders of Honor, Friendship, Alexander Nevsky, the Medal for Labor Achievements.

² The report is based on the book: Тишков В. А. Национальная идея России. М. : АСТ, 2021.

³ Янг К. Диалектика культурного плюрализма: концепция и реальность // Этничность и власть в полиэтнических государствах : [сб. ст.] / под ред. В. А. Тишкова. М. : Наука, 1994. С. 92–93.

are generally based on the definition that nation-states are ethnically designated state and administrative entities, such as those comprising the Soviet Union. This approach also covers the claims of European countries to be nation-states because of long-established nations in their territory and their allegedly ethnically homogeneous composition.

These are all misconceptions, since the formation of European nations, despite the differences, especially between the so-called French (Jacobin) and German models of the nation, between Western and Eastern Europe, was identical in two respects. First, in all cases, these were upper-level projects initiated and implemented by the ruling elites, but with the support of real culturally diverse communities, with varying degrees of awareness of their commonality at the mass, grassroots level. With the French nation, prescribed by the revolutionary elite and then by the Bonapartist regime, everything seems clear: it was a construct based on the cultural component and linguistic version of the central region of the country, Ile-de-France. But even in the case of the German nation, with its appeal to a certain eternal "spirit of the nation" or its natural roots, the Bismarckian method of "fire and sword" played a leading role. The situation was similar in other European versions. C. Nagengast writes: "Many of the 'nationalities' of Eastern and Central Europe, based on allegedly common language, real or mythical ancestry, and history, were literally created by elites; and some members of those elites were not even able to speak the languages of the nationalities thus invented."¹

Intellectual clubs and academic institutions practiced creative "imagination of nations," developed a version of a unified literary language to replace dialects, wrote folklore epos and "national history." E. Kiss speaks of the role of such adherents of nation-building who "have achieved very different political results, which is particularly evident in the cases of small groups that have not had political independence throughout their history. So, in 1809 a certain philologist invented the name "Slovenes" and became the creator of the Slovenian national identity... At the same time, members of other dialect groups, such as Sorbs [Lusatians], never managed to develop a common collective identity, and their political and cultural presence in the modern Europe is therefore not felt in any way."²

The second common point in nation-building, whether European or otherwise, is that no homogenization of the population in terms of cultural characteristics was achieved throughout the entire history of the nation-state, including the stage of modernist globalization. The phenomena of "ethnic revival," "root searching," "minority uprising," and the like emerged in response to the homogenizing influence of global capitalism and mass culture. Publications on the politics of identity often begin with the author mentioning how erroneous and trivial a certain concept of the nation-state has proven to be.

Thus, European nations were not and are not culturally homogeneous collective bodies, some sacred entity sanctified by history and culture. The classic Euro-Atlantic idea of a nation contained such a goal, but it did not materialize. What was actually achieved was spreading the *idea of*

a single nation (French, Germans, Italians, etc.) among the population, forming the feelings of belonging and loyalty (national consciousness/identity), disciplining the population in terms of duty to the nation and teaching them the rights and duties common to all members of the nation. The coveted cultural homogeneity of national communities has essentially backpedaled in recent decades due to mass migration of the population, which has increased the cultural complexity and super-diversity of old, seemingly long-established nations. But have nation-states and nations ceased to exist because of the loss of ethnic purity that was never really there?

Historiosophic publications aside, all this debate has nothing to do with the rigorous science of nation and nationalism, much less with understanding the nature of modern states, in which nations are culturally complex in terms of ethnos, race, and religion. Just look at who makes up the French, German, and British nations today, not to mention the American and Canadian nations, and the answer can be given on the basis of visual analysis alone. So the current search for an answer to the long-standing question "What is a nation?" in order to establish the ontological essence as a culturally homogeneous collective body is futile. *All states, regardless of their population content and form of government, where, politically and socially, there is an idea of a countrywide commonality, loyalty and solidarity of the population, and patriotism as a sense of affinity to the homeland, have reasons to consider themselves nations.* Another thing is that in some cases this term, borrowed from Europe, can be substituted by a similar concept. It can be related to religion (for example, in Muslim countries with their concept of *ummah*) or to the ideology of the so-called national question (for example, in China there is the concept of *Zhonghua minzu* meaning "nation of nationalities"). Finally, in the USSR, the *Soviet people* were a civic-political nation, but only the term itself was reserved for ethnic communities, while the entire union state was declared a "new type of historical community of people."

The return of nations and the nation-state is but a metaphor in response to neoliberalism and postmodernism, with their rejection of this rather strictly organized form of human social coalitions in favor of individual freedom, world government and private interest. In fact, these essential and meaningful coalitions in the form of sovereign co-citizenships have never left the historical scene over the last three centuries. Nation-building, based on the idea of the nation and civic nationalism (with a certain touch of ethnic nationalism) was and is the basis of successful and secure existence of any country, while theories postulating the demise of nation-states are promoted by those who already have such statehood in abundance and even in excess. In the meantime, dozens of countries around the world are experiencing dramas because their population has no idea of a nation, and the state itself does not possess the necessary attributes of a nation-state (above all, sovereignty). We can conclude that *a nation-state remains the norm in the world of modern states, and the subject remains extremely relevant for social scientists and politicians.*

The largest nations of the world and their composition

Let us return to the path of practice-oriented analysis in application to our theme of nation and nation-building. Since

¹ *Нагенгаст К.* Права человека и защита меньшинств: этничность, гражданство, национализм и государство // Этничность и власть в полиэтнических государствах. С. 81.

² *Кисс Э.* Национализм реальный и идеальный. Этническая политика и политические процессы // Ibid. С. 148–149.

the Russian Federation is a large state with a complex ethnic and religious composition of the population, we are interested in the experience of understanding and managing this kind of societies in other countries of the world. Cultural complexity (multinationality) is not unique for our country; among several dozen large countries (Russia ranks 10th in population size) there are none where the population has a homogeneous ethnic, racial and religious composition. Moreover, a fair half of top ten countries are home to a much larger number of ethnic groups than Russia; they may be referred to as “peoples,” “nations,” “nationalities,” “minorities,” “tribes,” or sometimes have no categorical designation other than “ethnicities” or “others.” Most often this is due to their official non-recognition by the state. Nevertheless, in science and international practice there are methods for determining ethnic composition of the state’s population. A particularly strong tradition of such global counting exists in domestic ethnology and statistics.

In the 1960s, the Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences published a multi-volume series titled *The Peoples of the World*, which was the most authoritative source on the subject for a long time and was unofficially translated into English in the United States “for internal use.” S. I. Bruk published an ethnic demographic guide on the population of all countries of the world, containing information on ethnic religious and racial composition of each country, albeit under the umbrella of a concept of ubiquitous existence of ethnicities rather than any other forms of culturally distinctive communities. An encyclopedia I edited, titled *The Peoples and Religions of the World*, was published in 1998; it contains 1,250 articles on peoples and 450 articles on religions. A kind of a register of ethnic nomenclature of the world is maintained in the international organization *Ethnologue*; the U.S. CIA also has its lists of ethnic groups of the world. Below is the data on the structure and composition of the population of the largest countries of the world (table).

Table

State structure and ethnic composition of large countries (2021)

No.	Country	Population (people)	Structure	Number of ethnic groups
1	China	1,400,970,200	Unitary with a system of autonomies: 24 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 30 autonomous districts, 117 autonomous counties, 1,085 national parishes	Fifty-six nationalities are officially recognized: Han – 91.6%, other 55 (Zhuang, Hui Dungan, Manchus, Uyghurs, Xibo, Miao, Naxi, Lahu, Tibetans, Mongolians, Dong, Jingpo, Bai, Koreans, Hani, Li, Kazakhs, Tai, etc.) – 7.1%
2	India	1,357,580,350	Federation, parliamentary republic, 29 states, 7 union territories	Several hundred nations, nationalities and tribes. The largest: Hindustani, Telugu, Marathi, Bengali, Tamil, Gujarati, Kanarese, Punjabi, etc.
3	U.S.	329,210,630	Federation, presidential republic, 50 states, Indian reservation system	Ethnic racial groups: whites 72.4%, blacks 12.6%, Asians 4.8%, Indians 0.9%, island aborigines 0.2%, others 6.2%, racially mixed 2.9%. Hispanics of different ethnic origins 16.3%. Whites are predominantly from European countries
4	Indonesia	265,015,300	Unitary, parliamentary republic	About 300 ethnic groups: Javanese 40.1%, Sundanese 15.5%, Malays 3.7%, Batak 3.6%, Madurese 3%, Betawi 2.9%, Minangkabau 2.7%, Bugis 2.7%, Chinese 1.2%, Papuans and others 15%
5	Pakistan	212,742,631	Mixed-type federation with ethno-territorial autonomies	About 100 ethnic groups: Punjabi 44.7%, Pushtu 15.4%, Sindhi 14.1%, Siraiki 8.4%, Urdu 7.6%, Baluchi 3.6%, others 6.3%
6	Brazil	211,014,564	Federative, presidential republic, 26 states	Ethnicity is not counted; whites 47.7%, mulatto 43.1%, blacks 7.6%, Asians 1.1%, Indians 0.4%
7	Nigeria	188,500,000	Federation, 36 states, taking into account the ethno-religious composition	More than 250 nations and tribes. The largest: Hausa 22%, Yoruba 21%, Igbo (Ibo) and Ijo 18%, Fulani 10%, Ibibio 5%, Kanuri 4%
8	Bangladesh	167,961,222	Unitary, parliamentary republic	Main population: Bengalis 98%, 27 small ethnic groups – 1.1% (according to other sources – 75 groups)
9	Russia	146,877,088	Federation with autonomies (22 republics, autonomous region, 5 autonomous districts)	193 ethnic groups: Russians 79%, Tatars 3.7%, Ukrainians 1.4%, Bashkirs 1.1%, Chuvashes 1%, Chechens 1%, others 10.2%, without identified nationality 3.9%
10	Mexico	126,577,691	Federation without autonomies, 31 states	Métis (Hispanic-Indian) 62%, Indians 28%, others 10% (mostly Europeans). The census does not collect data on ethnicity
–	The world	7,759,546,000	202 countries (193 are UN members), of which 27 are federative	5–6 thousand ethnic groups, about 7,000 languages

How are these countries organized, what ideas and doctrines underlie their policies, and what are the components of the national self-perception (identity) of their culturally complex societies? Ours and other studies show that large countries with great ethno-cultural and regional-historical diversity more often choose a federative type of state administrative structure with varying degrees of authority delegated to “subjects of the federation.” Such countries are India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Brazil, the United States, and Canada. Russia is also among them; for our country, this option

has been tested throughout the history of the Russian state, the experience of the USSR and the new Russia. Among the large states there are unitary states, but with internal autonomies of different levels (China, Indonesia).

In the state administrative structure of large countries, regional cultural characteristics of the population are reflected in different ways. The most common is mixed type, where within a federation or a unitary entity there are autonomous territories (provinces, districts, regions, etc.) that have an ethnic national profile and status equal to or dif-

ferent from the constituent entities of the federation. Such is the structure of China, with its national districts, autonomous regions of Tibet and Xinjiang, autonomous counties and national townships. Other multiethnic countries are organized similarly, with the exception of European countries, where extraterritorial cultural autonomy is favored, and Muslim countries, where the concept of a single *Ummah* does not allow the recognition of minorities (Turkey and Iran).

In some countries the constituent entities of the federation do not have a specific ethnically designated status, yet their boundary lines take into account the ethnic linguistic characteristics of the population, such as in India after reorganization of the states in 1956. However, there are special districts and entire states in India that are de facto autonomies on an ethnic basis (for example, the state of Nagaland with a population consisting of *Naga* tribes), and even areas not controlled by the central government, like Jammu and Kashmir, where the nationalist separatist movement has actually developed into a jihadist insurgency. The latter example makes particular sense from the point of view of assessing historical attempts to implement the "two-nation theory" on a religious ethnic (communalist) basis, as opposed to the secular and cross-ethnic version of nation-building.¹

In order not to exclude Europe from comparative-historical analysis, let us discuss the example of Spain. It is a multi-ethnic country with *Catalans*, *Galicians*, *Basques*, *Occitanians*, *Asturians*, and *Aragonese* in addition to *Castilians*. They speak their own languages, have their own cultural traditions and a strong collective identity, based on the historical memory of the existence of separate state formations. Spain is a constitutional monarchy, but in the twentieth century the idea of the Spanish nation as the foundation of the state was established; Spanish culture and the Castilian (Spanish) language have an outstanding role in the world culture.

Having survived the Francoist regime, under which non-Castilian population, cultures, and languages were forcibly assimilated, Spain opted for a state system based on a federation of 17 autonomies with a high level of self-government. Autonomous communities have their own constitutions (statutes). Culturally strong and economically advanced regions such as Catalonia and the Basque Country have enshrined in their statutes the concepts of the Catalan and Basque nations; a fair half of the population and political class take separatist positions in favor of creating their own states. In that case, the question is whether there is a nation in Spain, and who it comprises?

Naturally, the same question is all the more applicable to the top ten most populated countries. If, according to those who deny the Russian nation, not everyone in Tatarstan accepts it, then many more do not accept the Chinese nation in Tibet and Xinjiang, the Indian nation in Nagaland and Jammu and Kashmir, the Spanish nation in Catalonia and the Basque Country, the French nation in Corsica, the British nation in Ulster and Scotland, and the Canadian nation in Quebec. And so on throughout the list of states which have separatist regions and socio-political forces. *Therefore, the thesis of existence of various kinds of dissi-*

dents within a particular civic nation can in no way serve as an argument for denying the existence of the nation itself. In the same way, one cannot infer presence of a nation in a state from the nature of its government, or, more precisely, from presence or absence of democracy.

It is important to consider how different countries and their rulers at different times, and especially today, "work with the category of a nation" (A. I. Miller's expression). First of all, there is no doubt that all major multiethnic countries have chosen the idea of a civic nation and the ideology of nationalism as affinity with the Motherland, loyalty and service to the Fatherland, that is, patriotism, as a doctrinal basis for ensuring their legitimacy and consent. The idea of a nation as a co-citizenship with common destiny, values, and responsibilities is the basis of virtually all modern states, but for large countries with complex populations and large regional differences, this idea has historically been hard to establish, competing with ethnic nationalism, tribalism, and regional separatism. In some cases, the idea of a common nation on a multi-ethnic basis has been rejected by the ethnic majority, such as the nationalism of the Hindi-speaking majority in India or Han chauvinism in China.

In Russia, the opponents of the Russian nation are not only non-Russian ethnic nationalists, but also, to an equal extent, radical representatives of the so-called Russian nationalism. In Canada, the concept of a Canadian nation competes with the Francophone idea of a Quebec nation, as well as "first nations" represented by the Indians and Inuit, who have an internal autonomous territory and reservation communities.

There are difficult cases when two or three national ideas of equal demographic and cultural potential compete in a country. These are the so-called bicomunal or equal-community states, such as Belgium in Europe or Malaysia in South Asia. But even in these cases, there are recipes for resolving contradictions and developing projects for nation-building.

Another common case of a complication in asserting the concept of a civic nation is when there are regions or enclaves in the territory of one country with predomination of representatives of an ethnic group that constitutes the basis or a significant part of the population of another (usually neighboring) country. The most telling examples are Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, Northern Ireland (Ulster) in the United Kingdom, the Tamils in Sri Lanka adjacent to the Tamil region of India, etc. But even in these explosive situations, national identity and political loyalty to the country of citizenship most often wins, unless there is a history of bloody confrontations between countries and populations, and violent extremists dominate among the ruling politicians.

The fate of nation-states in the modern world

Different countries have different experiences of state-building and expertise in the field of ethnic national, linguistic and confessional policies. In almost all major countries, there are smoldering conflicts of varying degrees of intensity, sometimes escalating into riots or even civil wars that are based on cultural or regional historical differences. India has had to put up with two or three internal armed conflicts throughout its sovereign existence. Nevertheless, the concept of the Indian nation continues to be on the agen-

¹ See in more detail: Шаумян Т. Л. Проблема Джамму и Кашмира // Национализм в мировой истории / отв. ред. В. А. Тишков, В. А. Шнирельман. М.: Наука, 2012. С. 522–573.

da, allowing to maintain the legitimacy and even territorial integrity of the state. In China, there is a difficult situation with the autonomous regions (Tibet and Xinjiang), where ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences constitute a significant obstacle to nation-building on a Han Chinese basis.

These two large countries, comparable to Russia in many respects, have different ethnic national policy strategies due to different state political systems, but their experience of civic nation-building is of interest to Russia. Studies of the modern world order show that *civic (state) nationalism in its various forms continues to play a key role in the system of modern nation-states* – apparently no less than during the formation of the Westphalian system of the first sovereign states of Europe, the collapse of the world colonial system after World War II, and the geopolitical cataclysm caused by the collapse of the USSR.

Nation-states have played a huge role, not only in resolving internal and cross-border armed conflicts of the late twentieth – early twenty-first centuries, but also in such an unexpectedly global problem as the 2019–2021 coronavirus pandemic. It was the authorities of sovereign states, with their ability to provide extensive protective measures, including quarantine restrictions, civil solidarity, and a willingness to submit to the national government, that helped control the spread of the disease¹.

How do modern nations work? In this regard, many components and mechanisms have changed, but some of them remain the same, particularly the development, promotion, and struggle for the very idea of a nation. This act of “birth of a nation” is often associated with certain politicians, founding fathers like Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson in the United States, or charismatic fighters like Mahatma Gandhi in India, Sun Yat-sen in China, Nelson Mandela in South Africa, or influential humanist philosophers like J.-J. Rousseau in France and H. Heine in Germany. “Fathers of the nation” can also be successful military leaders, such as Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, despite the current resurgence of Islamism, or Gamal Nasser in Egypt, despite the failure of his policy of pan-Arabism.

The birth of the nations and rethinking of the idea of the nation also take place in the modern era, especially in connection with geopolitical cataclysms – the collapse of former states and the birth of new ones. This process is successful when there is a candidate for the title of “father of the nation,” such as Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, and Heydar Aliyev in Azerbaijan. There is every reason for V. V. Putin to become one, especially if he could also talk to Mahatma Gandhi, who, unfortunately, passed away before the birth of the current president of the Russian Federation.

Zh. T. Toshchenko²

IDEOLOGY: OBJECTIVE REALITY OR ARTIFICIAL CONSTRUCT?³

One of the concepts compromised during the collapse of the USSR and at the beginning of construction of the new Russia was “ideology.” There were quite a few of those who considered it indecent to utter, not only in scientific polemics, but also in everyday communication. Notably, in the speeches of some pseudo-avant-garde politicians, and consequently in their periodicals, derogatory and insulting judgments were made about the ideology itself and those who used the word or tried to understand its essence and semantic foundations.

In my view, this attitude toward ideology was largely because it was associated with the widespread notion of “socialist (communist) ideology” at the time. And since so-

cialism (communism) was rejected, the word “ideology” was also renounced. This rejection also revealed the second aspect of this attitude toward ideology: the so-called functional illiteracy, which completely ignored the fact that various worldviews continue to exist (and not only in Russia) regardless of anyone’s wishes.

Brief historical overview (Ideology as an indispensable attribute of societal development)

The concept of ideology appeared from the late 18th to the early 19th century as a product of understanding the existing phenomena in the spiritual, cultural and socio-political life of the society. The concept was scientifically introduced by the French Enlightenment philosopher Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836). In his concept, ideology is presented as a set of ideas, designed to systematize the achievements of various, primarily social, sciences. He regarded ideology as a socially useful form of knowledge that should be as accurate as the natural sciences. In “The System of Ideology,” published in 1804, he outlined his idea of ideology as a doctrine of the general regularities of the origin and functioning of ideas in the development of the society.

In further literature, the process of understanding the concept of “ideology” is usually associated with the names of K. Marx and F. Engels, who helped introduce the term “ideology” into wide circulation, both in science and in political life. This conclusion is associated with their work “The German Ideology,” in which they defined ideology as “political thinking created in the interests of certain so-

¹ See: Тишков В. А., Бутовская М. Л., Степанов В. В. Общество и государство в России и мире в период эпидемии коронавируса // Вестник Российской академии наук. 2022. № 4.

² Chief Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Sociological Center of the RAS, Scientific Director of the Sociology Department of the Russian State University for the Humanities, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor. Author of about 700 scientific publications, including: “Precarious Employment: Origins, Criteria, Peculiarities” (co-authored), “Precariat: the Formation of a New Class” (co-authored), “Society of Trauma: Between Evolution and Revolution (Experience of Theoretical and Empirical Analysis),” “Thesaurus of Sociology, Centaur-Problem (Experience of Philosophical and Sociological Analysis),” “Phantoms of Russian Society,” etc. Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the RAS journal “Sociological Studies”, Professor Emeritus of Lomonosov Moscow State University and Russian State University for the Humanities. Honorary Doctor of the Institute of Sociology of the RAS. Recipient of the M. M. Kovalevsky Prize of the RAS. Awarded the Medal for Labor Achievements and P. A. Sorokin Medal.

³ See in more detail: Тошченко Ж. Т. Общество травмы: между эволюцией и революцией (опыт теоретического и эмпирического анализа). М.: Весь мир, 2020.

cial groups,” as one of the forms of transformed consciousness.¹

It must be mentioned, however, that this work was not known to contemporaries: it was first published a century later, in 1932, in the Soviet Union. It is therefore only natural that the explanation of the concept of “ideology” is associated with the “Manifesto of the Communist Party” which explained it as a special concept and substantiated its practical use. The manifesto drew attention to the way ideas are constructed by various political forces and representatives of the ruling bourgeoisie in order to ensure their class and group interests. As a result, the dominant, i.e. bourgeois ideology, is not a projection of interests of the society as a whole, but only of a part of it: the capitalists. They believed that a proletarian ideology, the worldview of the working class, must have arisen as a counterbalance to bourgeois ideology and become an effective force.²

Later, as social thought evolved, the concept of “ideology” was supplemented and refined by many scientists and political figures. While I don’t have an opportunity to analyze this process in detail right now, I will highlight the work by K. Mannheim, “Ideology and Utopia” (1929). In this work he polemicalizes with K. Marx, insisting that, beyond classes, ideology can also represent the way of thinking of people who seek to preserve or permanently reproduce the way of life they approve.³

At the end of the twentieth century, a significant contribution to the understanding of ideology was made by the founders of the Frankfurt School T. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, who developed the concept of a “critique of ideology” (“Dialectic of Enlightenment,” 1947). They made a distinction between the “free ideology” of a subject and ideologies in different areas of social life (such as politics, economics, or religion), emphasizing that the ideologies of different eras are products of historical processes.

The attempt by European Marxists (Antonio Gramsci, Georg Lukacs) to cover the entire diversity of approaches in terms of science and political action is also of interest. Among contemporary interpretations, noteworthy is the assertion of Willard Mullins that ideology consists of four basic characteristics attracts attention: it must dominate cognition; be capable of guiding value judgments; serve as an instruction to action; and be logically coherent.⁴

So what is an ideology?

In the twentieth century, two main points of view gradually emerged in the debate over the essence of ideology.

One of them was reflected in the works of Soviet social scientists and boiled down to the assertion that ideology is a set (and even a system) of theoretical views that are developed by specialists and that reflect the objective needs of social development, designed to express the interests of the workers.⁵

¹ Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Немецкая идеология // Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Соч. 2-е изд. Т. 3. С. 60.

² Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Манифест Коммунистической партии. М.: Госполитиздат, 1959. С. 46–56.

³ Манхейм К. Идеология и утопия // Манхейм К. Диагноз нашего времени. М.: Юрист, 1994.

⁴ Mullins W. A. On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science // American Political Science Review. 1972. Vol. 66 (2). P. 498–510. DOI:10.2307/1957794.

⁵ Биккенин Н. Б. Социалистическая идеология. М.: Политиздат, 1983; Москвичев Л. Н. Теория «деидеологизации»: иллюзии и действительность. М., 1971.

Another view sees ideology not only as a theoretical and political understanding of class interests, but also as an infinite set of ideas through which people perceive their world, their own interests, value orientations, and understanding of the world around them, their country, and their immediate environment. And since perception is varied, diverse, and can reflect different worldviews, there are many ideologies that are in a state of constant interaction, rivalry, and even confrontation.⁶

Analysis of the processes taking place in the world suggests a conclusion that *ideology is a set of views and ideas in which economic, political, social, spiritual and moral relations are perceived and evaluated from the perspective of interests that are important and significant for a given subject in order to implement them*. Ideologies developed by political forces (the state, parties, mass movements) contain goals (programs) of their activity, aimed at consolidation or change (development) of public relations based on the worldview positions, which are reflected in value orientations, attitudes and interests. In all its diverse manifestations, ideology is: a) not just knowledge, but also its evaluation; b) knowledge that is related to what is valuable, important (what should be aspired to) for those who adhere to a particular ideology; c) understanding *how* to achieve the proclaimed goals, which inevitably leads to a struggle of worldviews, their constant comparison and defense in the course of a political and (or) social struggle. In this regard, K. Marx’s conclusion will be relevant: “Ideas become a material force when they take hold of the masses.”⁷ In the meantime, implementation of these ideological and political goals, as history shows, provided a fairly high level of organization and consistent action of the carriers of these attitudes.

In search for an ideology

Ideas are a special, peculiar and specific product of social being. They are born, mature, and often start living a life of their own. Many of them remain just a fleeting spark, while others serve particular social and political forces for a limited time. Among this flow of ideas, only a few are not just a reflection of the political and spiritual meanings of individuals or groups and associations, but are also embodied in the real life of states, nations, and the entire humankind.

Despite these differences in the interpretation of the origin of ideas and their role in the life of mankind, most researchers agree that no country, society or state can exist without an ideology. The most striking manifestation of the existence of many ideologies are political parties that express the aspirations and perceptions of the social base they represent (or claim to represent).

Consequently, in the surrounding world, regardless of the specifics of different societies, ideology is a necessary element of their existence. And if there is no such certainty, then the society fully loses the strategic goal of its own existence and existence of the state. Otherwise there is a spiritual vacuum that only separates the participants in this socio-historical process.

⁶ Волков Ю. Г. Образы идеологии и гуманизма в современной России. М.: Кнорус, 2016; Макаренко В. П. Главные идеологии современности. Ростов н/Д.: Феникс, 2000.

⁷ Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Немецкая идеология // Маркс К., Энгельс Ф. Соч. 2-е изд. Т. 1. С. 416.

An example of this is our Russian reality. Russia's modern official policy regarding ideological issues appeared to be absurd. The contemporary spiritual and moral sphere of the Russian society was traumatized largely due to the fact that the Constitution of the Russian Federation states that there is no state ideology in Russia. In renouncing the *state ideology*, the “creators” of the Russian Constitution have completely ignored the fact that no state that has ever existed or still exists can do without an official ideology, while recognizing simultaneous existence of other world-views and orientations. Newly emerging suggestions that this article of the Russian Constitution should be amended met with fierce resistance from (neo-)liberals, frightening everyone with possible revival of Stalinism, appearance of a new Gulag, and similar horrors. From the same positions, intense de-heroization of national history takes place.

Renunciation of official ideology has resulted in a tremendous trauma to public consciousness, because the previous reference points have been lost, and new ones have not yet been formed. The former unifying ideas that are (or should be) an indispensable attribute of any effective government that wants to maintain statehood have been lost.

I would like to mention an interesting fact – on July 1, 2021, at the centennial of the Communist Party of China, they said that “in no way should we go the way of the USSR

with its openness, ‘glasnost’, historical nihilism, denigration of the history of their country, and revision of the role of the founders of the Chinese state.”¹

The lack of a state ideology has become one of the vices of the emerging Russian statehood. As a result, in 1990s there was a boom of initiatives, from citing the “Orthodoxy, autocracy, nationalism” formula by Uvarov (the Russian government's minister of education of the mid-nineteenth century) to endless search for magic universal slogans. But this search was doomed to failure from the start: all these ideas belonged to individual truth-seekers, scientists, politicians, or simply ambitious personalities.

Contemporary Russian ideologies and its subjects

So who is the creator, carrier and implementer of ideology? What is the criterion of its significance and sustainability in the process of historical development? Under what conditions do ideologies become nation-wide, adopted by major classes, determining the future and destinies of millions of people? The history of the development of revolutions is a clear example of the transformation of ideas into a material force.

If we consider the current situation in Russia, there are many ideologies in the real political and spiritual life, and the main ones are as follows (see table).

Table

What political views do you adhere to?²

Views	Year			Sectors					
	2018	2019	2020	Construction	Transport	Trade, consumer services	Industry	Agriculture	Science
Left-wing (socialist, communist)	22.5	25.2	23.0	27.7	26.3	21.7	20.0	28.0	21.0
Right (liberal)	14.5	14.9	21.6	13.7	18.0	13.0	23.0	13.7	28.0
Patriotic, national	36.8	24.2	25.8	26.0	26.3	20.3	29.7	18.7	29.0
Monarchical	1.2	1.2	1.6	0.7	2.3	0.7	1.7	1.0	2.0
Religious (Christian, Muslim, or other)	5.0	9.1	6.1	8.3	6.3	12.7	4.7	11.7	2.0
Other (write)	1.5	–	12.7	–	–	–	13.7	11.3	13.0
None	18.6	18.9	–	18.3	15.7	22.7	–	–	–
No response	–	6.4	9.3	5.3	5.0	9.0	7.3	15.7	5.0

First, socialist ideology continues to exist in contemporary Russia, despite the crisis of the ideas of socialism and communism. This ideology has not disappeared and, in fact, tends to persist and spread even further.

The socialist idea continues to exist because it embodies the age-old and even millennial dream of a just state, which is what the Soviet Union was in the minds of these groups, notwithstanding all the twists and turns in its development. However, the social base of these ideas has changed (which the leftist parties have not yet fully realized): it is no longer the working class that represents the leading political and

social force – it is fragmented, working in different economic and financial conditions provided by different forms of ownership. In our view, the social base of leftist ideas is the precariat (from the Latin “unstable, precarious, insecure”), which consists of large social groups living in a state of uncertainty about the stability of their present and future situation. These groups are interested in implementing socialist ideas, which they see as a model of the just society. Moreover, these groups do not reject the existence of private forms of property, advocate social (but not egalitarian) equality, and view social justice as a desirable goal.

Second, there is a certain influence of liberal ideology, which is aimed at such outwardly attractive values as the development of democracy and ensuring human rights, but in a rather specific interpretation. It implies a focus on the existence, development and functioning of private property, transformation of the state into a “night watchman,” the absolute, unconditional responsibility of each individual for

¹ Cited from: Карнеев А. Н. Примеряющая мантию сверхдержавы XXI века // Независимая газета. 2021. 1 июля.

² Source: data from all-Russian sociological surveys conducted in 2018–2020 in six sectors of the national economy and culture by sociologists of the Russian State University for the Humanities and the Center for Social Forecasting and Marketing (for details see: Прекариат: становление нового класса : кол. моногр. / под ред. Ж. Т. Тощенко. М. : Центр соц. прогнозирования и маркетинга, 2020 ; Прекариатная занятость: истоки, критерии, особенности / под ред. Ж. Т. Тощенко. М. : Весь мир, 2021).

the choice of his life path, his competitiveness in surviving in the current Russian context. Moreover, it is openly proclaimed, for example by Inozemtsev, that the “new inequality” cannot be considered unjust because it is not based on coercion, but on the activity of creative individuals.¹

It is indicative that the social base of liberalism has shrunk considerably over the years of existence of the new Russia. The people rejected right-wing parties in their quest to take over the legislative and representative branches of the government. In public opinion, both former and current leaders of liberalism, starting with Yegor Gaidar, have been debunked. However, despite the lack of popular support, the economic ideas of liberalism continue to exist at the state level. It was their existence and continued implementation at the official level that led (along with other factors) to the stagnation of Russia’s socio-economic development, growing social inequality, increasing social tensions, and the formation of a society of trauma.

It is telling that the limitedness and even perilousness of the ideas of liberalism became evident to the president of the country as well when, in an interview with the *Financial Times* in June 2019, he made a scathing comment on the role and importance of liberalism in the life of the world and individual countries. Moreover, the President emphasized that the problem is not so much that liberals and their ideas exist, but that “this part of society quite aggressively imposes its point of view on the vast majority.”²

Third, in the 2000s, a conservative patriotic ideology began to take shape, which is currently embodied by a number of rather disparate sociopolitical currents – from adherents of the ideas of traditionalism and the values of previous generations to all kinds of ethnic, nationalist and confessional organizations. Although in one form or another, they all advocate for the preservation of historical and national cultural values, their augmentation, fostering loyalty to the country, support for traditions and customs in the life of modern citizens, these organizations can only conventionally be called a consolidating and moral force, since patriotic garments are worn also by those who fled abroad with a bunch of money stolen in the country, those who live in the criminal world, and those who are ready to join this ideology for the sake of various dividends that it offers. A practical question emerges: can an oligarch be considered a patriot if he keeps all his capital abroad?

Numerous parties and movements play on the field of patriotism – from United Russia to the Liberal Democratic Party and various specific associations advocating a unique development path for Russia. Disparate nature of these powers is exacerbated by the fact that conservative and patriotic ideas are interpreted and implemented differently by different political forces, which often leads to inconsistencies and sometimes clashes.

Fourth, an attempt is being made to introduce religious fundamentalism and even monarchism as an all-Russian, or state, ideology. This attempt is realized through the proposals of ambitious politicians who, in their desire to assert themselves and stay afloat, offer their vision of the worldview of Russians and methods of its formation. For example, in 2013 the notorious Duma deputy Ye. Mizulina proposed the idea of reflecting in the Russian Constitution that Orthodoxy is “the foundation of Russia’s national and cul-

tural identity,” in place of the absent “state ideology.”³ Unfortunately, the updated Constitution contains the word “God,” which in fact contradicts another provision of the Constitution: that Russia is a secular state.

However, it is impossible to go back to the past, which has been repeatedly proven by historical experience. Attempts by the Russian Orthodox Church to enter the desired trajectory of introducing the canons and dogmas of Orthodoxy into the minds of Russians have met with passive, low-key, and at times overt resistance.

Lack of a strategic goal in the state and society in the form of an ideology gives rise to various specific debatable ideas about the “militarization of consciousness”⁴ or transformation of the middle class from a pillar of society into a source of its division and destabilization.⁵ There are also obsessive and confusing attempts to construct and affirm a “conciliar veche morality,” or to prove that the future was predicted by Apostle Paul.⁶

The state of Russian society as a society of trauma generates such substitute worldview forms as quasi-, pseudo-, counter- and paracultures that parasitize on people’s expectations and hopes, which is caused, on the one hand, by their uncertainty about their position in the existing society, and on the other hand, by transformation of culture into a business culture, a means of profit, through indulging the base tastes of a part of the population, among other things. This state contributed to flourishing of the manipulations of various mystical personalities.

On top of that, propaganda of personal qualities of man – honor, dignity, diligence – has disappeared from the political and ideological discourse of the acting political authorities. They have been forgotten or compromised. The official propaganda does not provide examples of people who would epitomize the best qualities of man, who could become a model of behavior for others. Depletion of moral character is yet another sign of ideological impoverishment in a society of trauma.

Thus, the analysis of the opportunities for consolidation of the Russian society shows that it is under threat in the situation of existence of various ideologies, usually reflecting the interests, value orientations and attitudes of different social classes, communities and groups without any attempts of the state to coordinate and harmonize them. The actual situation suggests the need to formulate a strategic goal of Russia’s development, which finds its expression in the state and society ideology, with a clear indication of the means and methods of achieving it. Without such an ideology, Russia cannot fully recover from its traumatized state.

Is there a perspective?

Ideology is essential not only for political organizations and movements, but also for any state; this fact is increasingly recognized around the world. Attempts to view modern societies as de-ideologized have been rejected by the very course of historical development and have become a thing

³ Версия. 2018. № 49.

⁴ Ципко А. С. Милитаризация сознания убивает инстинкт самосохранения и делает смерть сакральной // Независимая газета. 2019. 4 июля.

⁵ Щипков А. Протестная рента. Средний класс, призванный консолидировать общество, его раскалывает и дестабилизирует // Независимая газета. 2019. 8 июля.

⁶ Асопов Н. В. Современная политическая культура России как элемент гражданского и религиозного типов общества // Социально-гуманитарные знания. 2019. № 2. С. 39, 46, 49.

¹ Иноземцев В. Кризис великой идеи // Свободная мысль. 2011. № 1. С. 17–28.

² Cited from: Коммерсантъ. 2019. 1 июля.

of the past. These ideas were developed in the works of Western scholars (R. Aron, D. Bell, S. Lipset, etc.), who argued that developed countries had progressed beyond the social state that required ideology, and had entered a new "non-ideological" era. The "End of ideology" was proclaimed. In fact (and reality has confirmed this), this concept expressed a scientist-technocratic illusion, as if all the problems of the modern society could be resolved exclusively by "technical" means, without participation of the masses, class struggle, etc.

However, the logic of modern historical development has once again demonstrated that no state can do without an official ideology to show its citizens what kind of a society is being built, what goals and ideals it pursues, how personal and public interests will be linked, and by what means this will be achieved. In other words, the de-ideologization century did not come true. As the real historical process shows, ideology returns in spite of everything; moreover, it has evolved into various forms of information warfare.

The policy of the Chinese Communist Party is an example of successful implementation of ideology: the Chinese people are provided with a clear concept of prospective and current (near-term) goals. The future is construction of the "Chinese" kind of socialism, while the goal, which should be attractive to every Chinese person, is implementation of the Chinese dream: to ensure a per capita GDP level of 12 thousand dollars (as officially stated – to reach the level of average wealth of developed countries). Such a combination of public and personal interests has become the unifying force for China, ensuring implementation of the established goals. They will be achieved, which is evidenced by the momentum of China's successful development. While in 1990 Russia's GDP was three times larger than that of China, 25 years later China is six times better at it than Russia.

So what should be the basis of Russia's state ideology?

First of all, *in our opinion, we need a clear and unambiguous definition of the strategic goal of development and the means of achieving it.* This strategy should be reflected in state documents and integrated into the public consciousness, people's understanding of what the country's population seeks and wants to achieve (obtain) in the long term.

Moreover, this goal will inevitably take the form of an ideology, a spiritual and moral compass, so that the majority of the country's population would understand what kind of a society is to be expected in the future.

Secondly, the state ideology is inconceivable without ensuring social consolidation of the society, which cannot be achieved unless the strategic goals of development are constructed not only "top down," but also "bottom up," with direct participation of people, taking into account their value orientations and attitudes. And what does this mean at the present stage of development of the Russian society? Sociological research shows that the *desire for social justice, stable social situation, and sustainable guaranteed future* comes to the forefront. These goals are revealed through sociological surveys in the general population and most social groups. The fact that these needs are not being fulfilled is evidenced by the data from the Levada Center: over the past 20 years (beginning in 2000), the opinion that the country is heading down the wrong path has ranged from 40–50%.¹ How does this correlate with the high level of trust in the country's president, reaching 80% in some years? In our view, this contradiction is understandable: trust in the president is formed personally as to a man who governs the country, whereas the negative assessment is correlated with the basic foundations of the structure of personal life and the opportunities that people can use in their interests, the interests of the family and kin.

Thus, ideology plays a crucial role in strengthening or disorganizing the life of the state, society, social institutions and the entire population. However, the existing timelessness in the spiritual and ideological sphere only increases the traumatic impact on human potential and social capital. The new challenges that have arisen for the society because of the need for a worldview certainty require an urgent solution to the problems of well-being of Russians, humanization of their labor and social activities, creation of opportunities for self-fulfilment and real participation in the construction of a new society.

Hence the conclusion: the ideology of the Russian state must be based on what people want, what the population aspires to. And then the official ideology (if I am allowed to fantasize) can boil down to such goals: *Justice. Dignity. Trust.*

S. A. Tsypliyev²

RUSSIA'S EASTWARD TURN: EXPECTATIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS

A series of geopolitical conflicts between Russia and the West makes it seem that Russia should inevitably turn to the East, i.e. change its political and economic benchmarks and

partners. The "window to Europe" cut by Peter the Great is being tightly sealed in anticipation of a long "winter" in Russian-European relations. There is an urge to widely open the gates to the "warm" Asia-Pacific region, first of all to China. The Russian elite has demonstrated euphoric expectations – China will replace Europe as a buyer of our raw materials, a source of technology and investment.

¹ Независимая газета. 2020. 30 нояб.

² USSR People's Deputy, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Secretary of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and State Security (1989–1992), Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative in St. Petersburg (1992–2000), Presidential Plenipotentiary Representative to the Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS Member Nations (1994–2000), Dean of the Department of Law in the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (2015–2020). Currently Editor-in-Chief of the national scientific-political journal "Vlast," Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, 3rd class State Councillor of the Russian Federation. Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy (1999 – present). Author of a number of socio-po-

litical publications, including: "Elections as a Basis for the Democratization of the Country," "West or East – Where to Turn Russia," "Difference Between Constitution-Based and Life-Based Federalism," "Russia – Ukraine. A Broken Axis of Civilizations," and others. Awarded the Order "Badge of Honor," received a Commendation from the President of the Russian Federation.

The reality is much harsher. China is slowing its development and is not generating a growing demand for raw materials, is very selective in the development of projects, seeks to ensure a cheap raw material base and does not want to create itself a competitor. The Asia-Pacific Region (APR) is emerging as a hub of new opportunities for strengthening economic and geopolitical competitiveness. Without their clear understanding, the pursuit of phantom benefits from the change in global orientation will result in a few lost years at best, and in decades on the sidelines of world development at worst.

What is Russia's strategic national interest? This is not integration for its own sake, not just friendship and trade. Russia's imperative today is reindustrialization. The stake can be placed on agriculture, eco-tourism and sale of clean water, but it would require a complete reboot of the national character. Commodity specialization is a short-term strategy, which should be followed either by a sprint into industrialization, or an exit from the circle of leading world players with no chance of survival after the depletion of natural resources. The idea of a "great leap" into the post-industrial era without an industrial foundation is downright utopic.

The alluring East

The concept that the twenty-first century will be an "Asian century" has become commonplace. China became the main locomotive of development, with an average annual growth rate of 10.5% between 2000 and 2010. Back in the early 2000s, it was logical for Russia, given its place in the global division of labor, to develop ties with countries of the Asia-Pacific region and actively enter local markets. However, Asian countries have not been of great interest to Russia for quite a while. Until 2011, there were no pipelines linking Russian subsoil with Asian consumers.

2009 can be considered the beginning of Russia's eastward turn. When commodity prices fell, the usual sources of funding in the West temporarily dried up, and the resources of the Russian government appeared to be limited, many companies turned to Asia in search for new sources of capital. Among the most significant achievements is the signing of a contract between Rosneft, Transneft and CNPC for the construction of the Skovorodino-Mohe branch of the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) main oil pipeline. Under the terms of the contract, in exchange for a \$25 billion loan from the China Development Bank, Russian companies agreed to supply 15 million tons of oil to China annually for 20 years. Another landmark event was Rusal's IPO at the Hong Kong Stock Exchange in January 2010.

Finally, in the spring of 2014, the "turn" was continued under the influence of the events in Ukraine. 42 agreements were signed in Shanghai, the most important of which was the gas contract between Gazprom and CNPC on the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, valued at \$400 billion back then.

Russian vision of the "Asian course"

Russian vision of the "Asian course" was super-optimistic and consisted in the idea that within 10–15 years, Russia would be able to balance the shares of trade with the EU and the APR in the trade turnover to such an extent that a further split in trade relations with Europe would not cause unacceptable damage to the economy. The flow of

Asian investment will replace Western investment, albeit not completely. China will become Russia's main partner in Asia; Russia's relations with it will follow the same pattern as with Europe: Russian raw materials in exchange for loans, technology, and investment. The steadily growing demand for energy, metals and fertilizers in China will create a powerful incentive for the growth of the Russian economy. A lot of money will come from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Silk Road Fund. Southeast Asia will become a market for domestic mechanical engineering products and infrastructure solutions.

As the past years have shown, this vision was not realistic. Russia needs to rethink the "Asian vector" of its foreign economic strategy.

Today Russian politicians and experts are surprised by the "unfriendly" actions on the Chinese part: closure of the Chinese skies for airplanes with "double registration" (re-registered in Russia without the lessors' consent), intention of Chinese companies to withdraw from the Arctic LNG-2 project, termination of Huawei contracts with Russian operators for the supply of network equipment. This contradicts our picture of the world where there are two centers of power – the United States and Russia, and the rest must decide who to join. We perceive the political and economic contradictions between China and the United States as no-alternative Chinese support for Russia without taking into account the historical and cultural background of the Chinese nation.

At certain points in its history, China produced nearly 50% of the world's GDP and was hundreds of years ahead of other nations that it perceived as barbarians and of no interest to the Middle Kingdom. China perceived itself as the center of civilization, its emperor as the ruler of the whole earth, and the other countries as his tributaries. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that China had established a foreign ministry when "barbarians" from the West started coming to the country. The name of the ministry spoke for itself: "The Ministry for the Administration of the Affairs of All Nations." A country with such a worldview would not be a guided "faithful vassal." China is pragmatic and has its own interests at heart, and it's up to you whether or not to go along with it. Chinese political scientists and experts in international forums directly state that the fate of the world depends on relations between the United States and China. It is naive to expect China to be willing to break ties with its main consumers, the EU and the U.S., for the sake of "solidarity" with Russia.

In the current circumstances, pursuit of the "Asian vector" of Russia's foreign economic strategy is fraught with significant difficulties and will not replace ties with the West in the medium term. The development of ties with Asian states and work with regional investors is belated and occurs in an extremely unfavorable external environment. The specific problems to be considered for successful integration in the Asia-Pacific region include several challenges:

- moving away from an exclusive focus on China;
- reducing the negative impact of sanctions;
- building knowledge about Russia among Asian investors, as well Russia's expert knowledge of APR (including government, business and civil society).

Structural reforms and radical improvement of the investment climate in Russia will be a prerequisite for success.

The dawn of industrialization

It would be useful to recall how industrialization occurred in the Soviet Union. Whence, as if by magic, heavy industry arose in an agricultural country and nearly completely technically prepared it for a long war? The history textbook never told us about American citizen Albert Kahn and his prominent role in Soviet industrialization. Famed as “Ford’s architect,” Albert Kahn was invited to the USSR, prepared an industrial construction program, and in 1930 received a contract to organize the construction of industrial plants to the equivalent amount greater than the current annual federal budget. His firm designed and organized the construction of more than 500 plants. Dozens to hundreds of American and German firms worked on all the sites, performing all kinds of work, from design and construction to equipment supply. It was all paid for with currency from grain shipments. The village bore the burden of industrialization on its shoulders and broke its back.

Today it looks like absolute fiction. On the one hand, there was absolute ideological intransigence, no match for the current one. On the other hand, there were economic interests, the Great Depression, and the pragmatic approach. All of this is no reason to dust our heads with ashes and indulge in a feeling of “national humiliation.” If you think carefully about it, it was the only possible option for obtaining high technology and equipment for accelerated industrialization. Where would we be in 1941 if supporters of “total import substitution” had won?

Industrialization, take two

Today it is both easier and more difficult to launch industrialization in Russia. On the one hand, there are no irreconcilable ideological contradictions with the outside world. On the other hand, strong competitors have risen to occupy the niche of factories of the world – Japan, China, India, and other countries of the Asia-Pacific region.

There is a great temptation to go into isolation under the slogan of “self-reliance,” to close ourselves off from competition. “Buying your own” is a good thing, but it can’t be worked out overnight. Raw materials, components, equipment, and technology will have to be purchased for foreign currency for a long time to come. Where do we get the currency? We should develop industries that produce goods for export in addition to minerals. For example, agriculture, computer technology. Import substitution is the development of export industries, not the closure of the domestic market; this way we will only mothball technological backwardness.

Where can Russian industrial products be in demand, besides the domestic market? Where do we get the technology, the equipment, the investment? Our natural partner is, again, Europe, in its post-industrial part. Just as China is now the industrial factory of the United States, so Russia can compete for the place of the industrial factory of Europe without giving up on the CIS market. Entrepreneurs in the 1990s naturally came up with this solution. The authorities and the business community faced the non-trivial task of combining Russian entrepreneurship, Western technology, and a mostly Central Asian workforce to carefully cultivate a new industry on the rocky domestic soil.

What were Russia’s historical advantages? First of all, its cultural and territorial proximity to Europe. Europe and Russia together are able to create a self-sufficient conglomerate – from raw materials to post-industrial goods, with

a gradual shift of the industrial component to the East. If the “national pride of Great Russians” does not allow us to pursue the same path as Peter the Great, then we are left with the option of a raw materials appendage of China, or whatever you call it. The Chinese are not objectively interested in creating a competitor on the China-Europe line for themselves; Russia, in economic terms, may be of interest to them as a source of cheap raw materials and a territory for transport links. Should we develop economic ties with China and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole? Yes, absolutely. But we should not expect a free of charge “Oriental miracle.”

The window of opportunity is closing

We must clearly understand that our advantages are melting away, we have very little historical time left. China is rapidly mastering the best business practices and modern corporate governance. The country is becoming a global player, so that when we turn to the East, we will be astonished to find the same Westernized approaches that sometimes exasperate our authorities so much. China has also embarked on elimination of its second disadvantage, its remoteness from Europe. If the economies of Europe and China connect via a transport corridor for rapid delivery of goods, Russia will be left with a very modest place in the global division of labor. The reward is a transportation tariff and a lack of economic future, that is, of a historical perspective. The Silk Road will turn into a ring of steel.

Reindustrialization in our country has been actively pursued until it was swept away by the hurricane of oil and gas revenues. The country’s elite and citizens alike believed in the eternal happiness of oil and gas rentiers. In the foreign policy, the “superpower” motifs resounded again. It is already clear that the world does not want to rebuild itself according to our recipes, and foreign policy projects are beginning to press the Russian economy down.

In the spirit of the new direction of thought, let’s harken to the East. Deng Xiaoping willed China to keep a low profile and not demonstrate its claims to leadership. China’s exclusive focus on internal development, the desire to avoid any conflicts that might interfere with it, has produced phenomenal results. Only a foreign policy that creates the best opportunities for the internal development of the country can be considered effective.

In view of the revealed limitations of the Far Eastern track, the turn toward the Asia-Pacific region is increasingly impeded by the need for structural reforms in the all-Russian economic space as a whole. This is also the starting point of a long-term strategy for the new positioning of Russia in the global economy, capable of producing positive results.

Foreign policy initiatives will have to be aimed not only at easing current tensions with the West and lifting sanctions regimes, but also at creating and strengthening international guarantees for a conflict-free transformation of the global economy.

References

- Киссинджер, Г. Мировой порядок / Г. Киссинджер. – Москва : АСТ, 2015. – 512 с. – Текст : непосредственный.
- Масленников, Н. И. Восточный поворот России: проблемы и перспективы / Н. И. Масленников, С. А. Цыплев, И. Ю. Юргенс. – Текст : непосредственный // Евразийская интеграция. Экономика, право, политика. – 2016. – № 1 (19). – С. 38–47.
- Цыплев, С. А. На Запад или на Восток / С. А. Цыплев. – Текст : непосредственный // Ведомости. – 2016, 21 марта. – С. 6–7.

T. Türker¹

A NEW UNIVERSAL ORDER? CIVILIZATION(S) STRIKE BACK

Ernesto Laclau's 1992 article, "*Universalism, Particularism, and the Question of Identity*" is still timely at the age of transition of World order nowadays. While mono-, bi- or multi-polarity debates have been the main issues of international politics for the last two decades, Brexit and especially the strong wind of Trump and beyond himself, Trumpism – which was internationalized, as well – have brought up new questions and new realities despite the triumph of Biden at the presidential elections of 2020 and pledge of the conventional – if we call the post-cold war hegemonic arguments so – in new ways to be called back. Since the promises of Biden on international politics and what the world has seen until today were not in harmony, even in contrast in some areas. Hence, the debates of the Trump era are still fresh, and the question of a world order still needs to be inquired.

The last decade was an era when the main basis of Western societies and international system were challenged by; i. the internal problems motivated by the transformation of technologies, capitalism, society, government and international politics, ii. international rivals at regional scales and iii. a total rivalry from China. It is obvious that those three factors have created a complex picture for the West, which was crystalized in anti-systemic challenges – the terms "right or left populism" cannot explain the complicated situation. Those have been argued to be a spontaneous change or a serious diffraction in the history of the West and the world. However, the pandemic, the election process in the US including the raid to the Senate on 6th January 2021, international political discourses and events have shown up that the world is at an era when *the old could not die, and the new could not be born and we fight with monsters*, as says Gramsci.

Those three layers above deserve to be explained briefly. About the internal problems of the West, at the Likhachov Forum in 2017, I had mentioned Bauman and Bordoní which I assume it is needed to be repeated here: "Bauman and Bordoní's "*liquid modernity*" term referring the current crisis of modernity was at the center of my report since modernity itself could be founded as a *status quo* during and after the long 19th century and 21st century is again a period of obscurity, a quest for a new *status quo* or the with the description by Umberto Eco, "*a trespassing for tomorrow's unsettled contingency, yet.*" Bauman and Bordoní in their book "*State of Crisis*," were arguing that a two-way crisis is actual for modernity, where the first is the impotence of the states and the second is the radical change in social structures. And the results of the crisis of modernity can be categorized as political and social. The most prominent political result, which I want to underline, can be titled as the loss of *identity* or a collective consciousness which was created by the *nation-*

states for their continuity and the whole international system depending on those again. That identity or collective consciousness has two faces: The local one describing the particularity referencing nation, language, religion, history etc. by providing cohesion inside the borders of the country, and the universal one referencing security, justice, democracy, human rights, etc. by providing the continuity of the values system and even international system, as well. Except for the debates on universalism vs. particularism here, I guess it is acceptable that the particularity of nation-states is depending on the universality of values which creates the international system, meaning that huge erosion for universal values is another important fact. Another side of the political result can be summarized as the weakness of the state against the political demands of the masses where legitimate and effective ways for governance are still searched. Here, throughout the demands of the masses, social results can be linked to political ones. It can be argued that the demands of masses have transformed as well. In current social debates it is observed that masses do not know what they want, but they know very well what they do not want, which makes those social wishes less governable throughout modern ways like representation, parliament or parties, even civil society. The other side of social results is the mass hunger for consumption. As authors' conceptualization, a *consumer society* is the new fact for all social and political spheres instead of citizens and that makes the consumption is the current *telos*. The crisis of modernity and the current liquidity which are summarized above are actually indicating the crisis of sovereignty and the crisis of democracy for the modern world. Post version of modernity was generally founded on those evaluations by the claims of postmodernity as supranational organizations and micro nationalisms will be replacing nation-states and nations even, updated versions of democracy will be improved by the means of social media, civil society, etc., number of blue collars will be reduced by white collars and economy will depend on more technology and innovation."

However, the reverse wind of the conventional politics, namely Brexit and Trump first, but the infrastructural dynamics of the conventional society stroke back as a challenge to post-industrial economic relations and conservative values set to the liberal promises of a *fiction* society. In the paradigm of Kojin Karatani (state, capital, society triangle), it can be argued that capital's enlargement against the state and society has created many areas of *problématique* at that period. Just one example, social media monopolies suspending the accounts of an incumbent American President, should be shocking if it is remembered that the monopoly of violence is the most basic explanation of the legitimacy of the state and the authority of censor in that framework belongs to the state, not to a few capital groups. All the debates about populism at that period should be another strong example of the crisis. At the other hand, especially the warning of Madeleine Albright by her 2018 book about *fascism* should be something more than to be mentioned only.

¹ Director of the Research Center for Eurasian, Russian and Eastern European Studies, Doctor of the Department of Political Science at the University of Ankara (Turkey), Professor. Academic interests: history of the Ottoman and Russian empires, modern foreign policy of Russia and Turkey. Author of scientific publications on the history of the Ottoman and Russian empires and contemporary international politics, including: "Problems of the Crisis of Modernity, the Search for Identity and Democracy in the Western World," "History of the Nation: The Influence of the West on the Russian and Turkish Empires," and others.

The second layer, regional rivalries, has been another issue of the crisis. Described as “*Westlessness*” in Munich Security Forum, or described as “*Hobbesian international environment*” at the World Economic Forum; the almanacs for the last decade have written the vacuum and “slight” conflicts in international politics nearly at all the regions of the world. The Middle East, including Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya; Africa, especially the Sahel and East African coast; South American democracy crisis, esp. Venezuela; Eastern Europe, especially Ukraine in 2022, etc. Regional powers with global impacts emerging at that period like Russia, India and Brazil; regional powers like Iran, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Africa, Egypt and Saudi Arabia were the actors challenging the West. Moreover, the split within the West like Brexit, Turkey’s quest for a more autonomous foreign policy, France’s African perspective or Germany’s “*neue Ostpolitik*” were bigger challenges for the Western world. All those “small” crises with millions of people’s death or starving or homelessness that happened during the *Westlessness*, have strengthened it more in the framework of hegemonic decline, and the rivals have ascended more against the descending West.

Although these rivalries frazzled the Western hegemony in international politics, the real challenge, which was a systemic one, has come from China. As mentioned above as the third layer, this challenge has been a total one and seeking global dominance. Debates on a Chinese character Bretton Woods must be a clue for a total challenge since all the Western hegemonic world system is based on Bretton Woods principally. Of course Bretton Woods created some results to fortify the Western hegemony, but still it was a result of a reality, economic dominance of the US. The Nixon shock was a comma in the sentence, but not a full stop. Three factors, (i. China’s fast economic achievements today, ii. the comma mentioned above which made the current economic system invalid and, iii. new actors’ – like India and Russia – positions towards a search for a new system) can bring down the dominance of US dollar. Obviously this is a new world.

While during the two decades of “*belle époque II*” just after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, the motto was a new free world where “*the history has ended*” according to Francis Fukuyama, for the last decade – especially after Brexit – metamorphoses of China into a global power has been witnessed and free world with free trade under liberal values have been the first ones to be dropped by the West in the framework of a *new cold war-ish* environment. Fukuyama this time writing the “*Identity*” and legitimizing his late professor Samuel Huntington’s “*the Clash of Civilizations*” concept. A summary of last few years’ events will contribute to the context at that point. First issue to be remembered should be the general debate between Trump and Biden before the elections. A total contradiction and even a divided society’s reflection was the main impression about the American elections of 2020. Regarding domestic politics, Trump was ‘*conventional*’ conservative (the term ‘conventional’ is used here to distinguish it from the ‘*neo*’ form) and Biden was liberal and even social democratic in the terms of Europe. About economics, Trump was pro-conventional industry while Biden was progressive by supporting the information and service sectors. About international economic relations, Trump was *mercantilist-ish* while Biden was an advocate of free trade. About interna-

tional politics, Trump was to create a controlled vacuum which made the allies needy for the US, Biden was to call America back to the world stage for strengthened alliances with the old allies. Shortly, Biden has been trying to find the golden middle between pre-election himself (promising a “*Great Reset*” from Klaus Schwab of World Economic Forum, a post-industrial dream, progressive society and American new world order which all were motivated by his liberal *weltanschauung* and ultra-idealistic international politics approach) and Trump’s position, promising to *return to American Dream* of post-WWII, an industrial and solid society, a spontaneous world order where “*America is first*” which all were motivated by his conservative views and ultra-realistic international politics premises. It is clear that this is a quite difficult balance...

Biden – or any other, Democrat or Republican – today and in the near future has to deal with dual-society problems of the US which are based on the need for a coexistence of conventional industrial and post-industrial societies, huge economic problems (ie. inflation), divided society, progressive demands and conservative reactions, political stiffness, divided party motivations between generations and even ideologically, challenges for the upcoming elections, etc. However, all those issues may address a more fundamental issue, as mentioned above, an inquiry for a new *telos*, a new *habitus*, a new *modus vivendi*, a new American *status quo*, which can promise a way of being civilized, when “*post-civilization*” term is as valid as the term “*post-truth*.” This inquiry, of course, will be hand-in-hand with the inquiry of solutions on international politics and even a new world order, where Biden was disappointed for not finding the world he left with Obama in 2016.

Concisely, the world of 2020 – which was far beyond the Western hegemony and lacks a stable architecture – was in general view; a total rival – China, an old rival which is in between the US and China – Russia, challenging allies – Germany and France, rising regional powers and their ambitions all over the world. Kissinger plan of the Trump era – articulating Russia and adding India to the alliance of Pacific countries with the core Anglo-American bloc which is formed of the US, Canada, UK, New Zealand and Australia, to contain China – was realistic and promising for Biden administration, as well. Until February 2022... After that time it has been observed that Anglo-American bloc (reinforced by 2021 New Atlantic Charter) has chosen a path of consolidation of trans-Atlantic relations by suppressing the continent and pushing Russia. It is obvious that this process is not a sustainable option because of reasons; i. the need for Russia and its allies (esp., India) in the Pacific, ii. reactions from continental Europe, iii. a global economic crisis threat. Moreover, maybe the most important reason can be the threat of consolidation between China, Russia, India and many others from the Pacific region and maybe the Middle East and even Europe on a consensus for a search of a new world order. Although Russia is not capable of a global challenge, she being together with China is a total game changer.

For the close future, if the US-China rivalry is the main axis of international politics, what kind of rivalry would the world live and what kind of architecture would this create? Since politics are created by material necessities, that rivalry between the US and China should create a political discourse that will legitimize the current positions. At that

point, Kissinger's phrase can be a beacon for the debate. He was arguing that through all history, humanity created ways to explain the world around them, in the middle ages by religion, in the Enlightenment by reason, in the 19th century by history, in the 20th century by ideology. In other words, 20th century was dominated by identity and positions based on an ideological confrontation between the US and fascism first and socialism later. The 19th century was the age of nationalisms and was dominated by historical approach, which was the basis of national identities. The masses in the politics have brought the identity issue since then. Identity will be the core point of the politics if still masses will be the actors in politics (although the death of *koinon* and the dominance of *idion* were argued during the pandemic by dystopians), but the description of identity is the problem at that point. National identities did not fade away while the prior identity was the ideological one. This accumulation, despite replacement, will be the course again. So, national identities will remain, ideological identities will remain – as Biden calls the world to value-based politics, but the prior and new identity should be more complex and explaining the rivalry and convincing for the legitimacy, also creating cohesion for domestic politics of the West, esp. the US; which can be the concept of *civilization(s)*.

Civilization(s) is an ambiguous, even controversial term. Contrary to the general opinion, the term was used in a singular form for a long time. "We and others" issue, before becoming the problem of modern politics, finds its roots at the *Numbers* chapter at the Old Testament. All "we" were counted and the "others" were gentiles. Antique Greeks used the word "*barbaric*" for the others. Rome used the concept "*Romans versus savages*." So, the concept was based on the universality claims of the identity and it was dichotomic. Rome had become the only source of legitimacy that *four Roman Caesars* reigned at one same period. One in Rome, one in second Rome – Istanbul, one in third Rome – Moscow, and one in another Rome – Vienna, for which Voltaire was saying that "it was neither holy nor Roman, but a bunch of Germans." Latin word "*universal*," and Greek word "*ecumenical*" had been the basis of legitimacy until the Westphalian world, which granted particularism's legitimacy and enabled the triumph of nationalisms in the 19th century. At that time the term "civilization" was used to explain "*having manners*" or "*decency*" and it can be seen well at Mirabeau with the meaning of the *modus vivendi* belonging to the aristocracy. Later, in French again it regained its universal meaning by covering ages in humanity (chronologically multiple civilizations later), while German language has always preferred "*Kultur*" instead. At the same period, while France was creating a republican political model of nation on Rousseau-aen views, Germany was to form her own nation model on *Sittlichkeit* of Hegel and "*Addresses to the German Nation*" of Fichte – or a combination of von Ranke and Lamprecht from historiography.

In a search for a modern political identity concept, Alexander II's reforms which made Count Uvarov's "Czar-Church-Peoplehood" conception void; Russian Empire created a more suitable and useful formulation for her identity purposes, coherent to her current needs as an Empire. That was the book by N. Ya. Danilevsky, "*Russia and Europe: A Look at the Cultural and Political Relations of the Slavic World to the Romano-German World*" (1875). Dani-

levsky, in his book, for the first time categorized the civilizations and created the concept of civilization in a Westphalian *nation-ish* modern model with answers to cohesion of the masses with identity formulations. Of course, as in Mark Twain's saying, "*history never repeats itself, but often rhymes*," his formulation rhymed with Uvarov's by referring Czar and autocracy as an imperial (*Romanic*) loyalty, church as philosophy of Orthodoxy and peoplehood as a more Germanic national essence. (Of course, the term *samobytnost* 'uniqueness' for Russia of *Slavophile* thought which derived from German anthropology and philosophy, helped a lot.) However, it was miraculous in the way that it created an identity which an empire needed for modern politics and transnational domestic and even regional influence. It was so successful that Dostoevsky followed this categorization in the last years of his life, Leontiev's *Byzantinism* idea derived from this categorization, even Bakunin could argue that anarchy would have been successful only in Russian and Ottoman Empires based on this categorization of civilizations.

The plural form of civilization conception was followed only in Britain, not surprisingly, as another empire's needs were similar to Russia's. Spengler, first, in 1919, in his book "*The Decline of the West*" continued to use the plural form of civilization. Later Toynbee, in 1934, in his book "*A Study of History*" based his ideas on civilization-s. (Continental Europe was still using the term singular principally, but like *L'École des Annales* of France with Braudel's historical related periodical approach with the term "*synthétique géographies*" or not using at all like in Germany.) This British *Tory* mind was imported to the US by Leo Strauss, who was followed by pupils Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama.

So, the concept of *multiple rival civilizations* is not something the U.S., the UK or Russia are stranger to. (Although the continental European mind is far away from the concept, the EU itself can be accepted as an example of the concept, esp. with the founding ideas of Alexander Kojève, who was a Russian immigrant. Also, China with the pattern of imperial thinking and self-naming *Zhōngguó*, which means the middle-world, is not unfamiliar to the concept.) However, the reason why today this concept is functional and useful for a U.S.–China rivalry discourse formulation shall be explained briefly more than intuitions or *guesstimates* depending on given situation of the US, China and international politics. First of all, the concept is flexible enough to involve a large area of the world with its meaning larger than *culture* or *nation* and again flexible enough than the terms of ideology. It can be called like a *co-existence pacifique* of cultures and nations under a larger tolerant umbrella. (Although it can be easily argued that *civitas* and *culture* are rivals with a reference to Terry Eagleton.) Also, it is not strict like an ideological bloc-forming and welcomes different political patterns with narrow red lines. After it is understood well that post-nationalistic trends are just utopical and democracy should be described wider nowadays, with more applicable approaches and by paying regard to different patterns compared to the Chinese political system; the flexible concept of civilization can be useful to contain larger alliances. Although it is particularistic in nature, by the call for universalism it can be inviting and attractive. It has a basis of nearly two hundred years of westernization for the countries which can be called "*aux bords de l'ouest*"

(*on the Shores of the West*) with a reference to Jacques Rancière. It has a larger geographical advantage, from Japan to India; even from the post-Soviet geography by mutating/underlining the meaning of the term Eurasia – which is used contradictory to the West currently – to *Europeanized Asia*, to larger Middle East with an interpretation of “Mediterranean roots” including Islam to Judeo-Christian heritage. Finally, it can be argued that, the need for a new *telos* and the promise for a new *habitus* and *modus vivendi* – which all are the strongest sides for the West in the new rivalry – are probable and accomplishable with a discourse of civilizations. (In this framework, it can be argued that the German

use of *Kultur* and even *Kulturkampf* would be the essence of the world in the short term.) Instead of the 19th century alliances based on *nationalisms* and *history* or the 20th century alliances based on *blocs* and *ideologies* (but including nationalism as well), 21st century world can be founded on *civilizations* and *sociology* (maybe *culturology* or *anthropo-philosophy*) including ideological heritages and national sovereignties. What we should hope is that kind of configuration of world politics would bring a more peaceful and stable system and would not remind us Bauman’s view on fascism that it was a natural and compulsory result of modernity itself.

A. V. Uspenskaya¹

CH. DICKENS ON AMERICAN NATIONAL TRADITIONS

Speculations concerning the current state of Russian-American relations lead to the conclusion that the current unprecedented confrontation is caused not only by political and economic contradictions. These contradictions, especially between the major powers, have existed at all times: the struggle for regional and global hegemony, trade routes and markets, and, finally, for sources of raw materials. But the current confrontation is so bitter and full of pathos that it is difficult to perceive the politicians’ furious outbursts as a mere demagogic cover for vested interests – it seems that there is a conflict between some traditional values inherent in our countries. Even Dostoevsky said that people do not fight as fiercely for bread as they do for an idea.

At the heart of this spiritual confrontation are different values, cultivated for centuries in the public consciousness of Russia and countries of the West. Indeed, the Protestant ethics of the capitalist world, which was particularly evident in its Calvinist guise in the New World, where European Protestants emigrated en masse, contrasts with the assembly ethics that sustained the traditionalist society of the Russian Empire and partly of the Soviet Union, and that has axiological significance in Russia to date.

But what is the essence of these traditional values, inherent specifically in the United States, which encourage America to confront not only Russia, but also, in fact, Western Europe, which is increasingly deprived of political subjectivity and economic independence under pressure of its powerful partner? To answer this question, we should address the experience of Europeans, especially the British who are connected to their former colony; who saw, even at the dawn of the United States, some fundamental traditions

important both to the country and to the outside world, but symptomatic of acute deficiency.

From the late eighteenth to the early nineteenth century, the state that called itself the “United States of America,” hitherto abiding on the periphery of the European consciousness, began to attract increasing interest. The country that rebelled against the overseas empire overthrew the power of the colonizers, won its freedom with arms in its hands, proclaimed, like the ancient Greeks and Romans, the people’s power – the republic and free elections; all this evoked respect and even admiration of the liberally-minded European public.

Famous Romantic poets S. Coleridge and R. Southey, disappointed in the results of the French Revolution, wanted to flee to America to establish a commune in this free country, and only a lack of money stopped them.

One of Europe’s greatest writers, Charles Dickens, also had an interest in America. By the early 1840s, he, having already achieved all-European fame, was invited to give a course of lectures on ethical and literary topics in the United States. The authorities of the young American state were very concerned about creating a positive image of the country and invited famous academic and cultural personalities to come over.

But hopes for a favorable impression did not come true. First Dickens published “American Notes,” then resorted to the artistic form of reflection on the material that struck him – wrote “The Life and Adventures of Martin Chuzzlewit,” a novel where part of the action takes place in the United States.

First of all, Dickens and his protagonist, young Martin Chuzzlewit who, in an attempt of self-fulfilment, moved from England to America, were struck by deep provincialism of American culture. Small events, such as the election of a municipal councilor, are given an almost global dimension by the press. The very first encounter on the American shore vividly portrays the mass media that have tremendous power in the country. The press is loud, unbearably vulgar and corrupt; it will denigrate or glorify for money, constantly distorting the truth. Freedom of press has a very bizarre nature. Dickens lists the names of newspapers, ironically twisting them: “New York Sewer,” “New York Stabber,” “New York Family Spy,” “New York Pri-

¹ Professor of the Department of Philosophy and Cultural Studies of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Dr. Sc. (Philology), Honorary Educator of the Russian Federation. Author of more than 100 scientific publications and textbooks, including monographs: “The Anthological Poetry of A. A. Fet,” “Antiquity and Russian Literature. Motifs. Images. Ideas,” etc.; textbook “Conflictology of the Spiritual Sphere” (co-authored); papers “Merezhkovsky and Nabokov,” “Apollo – Conqueror of Python: Winkelman’s Ideas in Poetry and Essays by A. Fet,” “Otherness for the Hero: On One of the Sources of an Episode in M. Bulgakov’s ‘Master and Margarita’,” and others. Awarded the Medal “100 Years of Trade Unions of Russia,” Certificate of Merit of the Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian Federation, the badge of honor of the Russian Trade Union of Culture Workers. Professor Emeritus of SPbUHS.

vate Listener,” “New York Peeper.” But Americans like it: “It is in such enlightened means that the bubbling passions of my country find a vent,”¹ says one of them. The American calls the press “the palladium of rational liberty at home and the dread of foreign oppression abroad,” “to the envy of the world and the leaders of human civilization.”²

In general, spiritual provincialism is expressed in rejection of not only political reality, but also culture of the Old World; in the conversations of characters one constantly feels an intense, polemical opposition to Europe, which generates both a desire for hard isolationism and militant messianic sentiments. This is not surprising: the American nation was formed as a nation of immigrants who left their homeland in a state of resentment, rejection of their past lives, and incredible euphoric hopes of fulfillment in a world where everyone can start from scratch. The psychology of rejection of the Old World as obsolete, outdated, mired in sin and ignorance becomes a symbol of faith for the new society that grows on a greenfield. “You have brought, I see, sir, the usual amount of misery and poverty and ignorance and crime, to be located in the bosom of the great republic,”³ the American hails the emigrant. “Here you will learn what the sunlight is.”⁴ The very cultural memory of Europe’s great centuries-old achievements is mockingly ridiculed, perceived as something of a relic that the American, the new man, needs to get rid of.

The official American ideology, largely influenced by Protestant fanatical preachers from the very start, offers the society a Manichean myth, in which they are creating the New World – a world of natural men (something like Voltaire’s Savage) unburdened by the weight of tradition and moral prejudice, in opposition to the world of decrepit spiritual values, a world that is unnatural, full of evil and untruth. The old religious and common cultural values – moral judgement, sense of honor, love of neighbor, compassion, mercy – would indeed prevent the new man from pursuing individualistic success at all costs. In a society freed of all these “complexes,” overt social Darwinism triumphs; only the strongest, i.e. the least morally burdened, can survive and succeed.

Here, for example, is how Dickens characterizes a future congressman, Major Pawkins: “He was a great politician; and the one article of his creed, in reference to all public obligations involving the good faith and integrity of his country, was, ‘run a moist pen slick through every thing, and start fresh.’ This made him a patriot. <...> He had a most distinguished genius for swindling, and could start a bank, or negotiate a loan, or form a land-jobbing company (entailing ruin, pestilence, and death, on hundreds of families). <...> This made him an admirable man of business. He could hang about a bar room, discussing the affairs of the nation, for twelve hours together. <...> This made him an orator and a man of the people.”⁵

In absence of connections with world culture, the spiritual core of the society is dwindling, the cult of profit becoming its only religion. All conversations, “All their cares, hopes, joys, affections, virtues, and associations, seemed to be melted down into dollars.” “Men were weighed by their

dollars, measures gauged by their dollars; life was auctioneered, appraised, put up, and knocked down for its dollars.”⁶

In this society, all means are good for enrichment: there is a striking dominance of unbridled advertising consisting of lies, falsification and reticence. Dickens’ protagonist and many other gullible immigrants from the Old World, having no immunity to this kind of brainwashing, acquire land in the wilderness, where they are going to create a “New Eden” – a garden of paradise. Paradise turns out to be hell – harsh climate, terrible diseases, infertile soils; but thanks to advertising there are more and more emigrants, many of them arriving to certain death. Dickens himself, showing grotesque pictures of this Eden, says that it reflects the entire American society.

Messianic intentions are another striking feature of the young, newly formed, culturally backward American state of the 1840s. America’s enthusiastic propagandists present it as an embodied ideal of republican freedom, a true democracy: “...we are a model of wisdom, and an example to the world, and the perfection of human reason.”⁷ The American political system and way of life should be an unquestionable model for the rest of the world, mired in despotism. Such America-centric attitude becomes anecdotal in Dickens’ satiric narrative. An article by the local lowly journalist Brick, the Americans are sure, is “the most obnoxious to the British parliament and the court of Saint James’s.”

The rejection of cultural traditions and restraining morals, along with narcissism, give rise to another trait of young American society: imposture and amateurism. The public life is full of self-appointed philosophers and political scientists, delivering endless public lectures and appearing in the press with infallible maxims (“the philosophy of the soul,” “the philosophy of crime,” “the philosophy of vegetables” etc.). A housewife is ready to lecture on human rights, metaphysics, and hydraulics.⁸ There is no hierarchy of values: the more shrill, self-assured, and light-weighted the next lecturer is, the more attention he wins. The unparalleled national narcissism often takes an aggressive form: no one should criticize America! “...no satirist could breathe this air. If another Juvenal or Swift could rise among us tomorrow, he would be hunted down.” Any critic of the indigenous national foundations of American life is subjected to the “foulest and most brutal slander,” becoming an object of “the most inveterate hatred and intolerant pursuit.”⁹ “You are not now in A despotic land,” says the typical American Chollop. “We are a model to the airth, and must be just cracked-up, I tell you. <...> I have draw’d upon A man, and fired upon A man for less.”¹⁰

Dickens does not overlook the problem of slavery, which masked a more general problem of racial intolerance inherent in the American society. Even abolitionists find Negroes “funny,” “ridiculous,” “monkey-like,” and the antipathy between blacks and whites – natural.

Dickens primarily relied on his own impressions. But he was ingeniously able to guess some of America’s further social developments, which seemed to him, a representative of the cultural elite of the Old World, not only ridiculous and ugly, but also downright dangerous. The democratic

¹ Диккенс Ч. Собр. соч. : в 30 т. М., 1959. Т. 10. С. 316.

² Ibid. С. 317.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid. С. 329.

⁵ Ibid. С. 329–330.

⁶ Диккенс Ч. Op. cit. Т. 10. С. 336.

⁷ Ibid. С. 342.

⁸ Ibid. С. 352.

⁹ Ibid. С. 339.

¹⁰ Диккенс Ч. Op. cit. Т. 11. С. 123.

social order did not at all interfere with the propaganda of the American dream of constant advancement, expanding the borders, first into the Wild West, then around the world. Even at the dawn of American independence, in 1783, George Washington called the newborn country a "rising empire." The complex of superiority over the Old World, of messianic chosenness, was initially one of the semantic factors of this new civilization.

John Adams wrote in 1765, "I always consider the settlement of America with reverence and wonder, as the opening of a grand scene and design in providence, for the illumination of the ignorant and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind."¹ This complex of chosenness is also reflected in the fiction. G. Melville wrote, "We Americans are the peculiar, chosen people – the Israel of our time; we bear the ark of the liberties of the world... God has predestined, mankind expects, great things from our race... The rest of the nations must soon be in our rear."² In his famous novel "Moby Dick or The White Whale," however, Melville eschews unbridled optimism and depicts an allegorical picture: America is like a forlorn ship on a stormy sea, racing after a phantom target under command of a mad captain intent on exterminating the world's evil.

After witnessing the wonders of young American democracy, Dickens writes with anger and sarcasm about the American elite, which keeps demonstrating a complete lack of understanding of the great principles that created America: "...Who are no more capable of feeling, or of caring if they did feel, that by reducing their own country to the ebb of honest men's contempt, they put in hazard the rights of nations yet unborn, and very progress of the human race, than are the swine who wallow in the streets. Who think crying out to other nations, old in their iniquity, 'We are no worse than you' (*No worse!*) is high defense and vantage ground enough for that republic, but yesterday let loose upon her noble course, and but today so maimed and lame, so full of sores and ulcers, foul to the eye and almost hopeless to the sense, that her best friends turn from the loathsome creature with disgust."³

Dickens sincerely sympathized with the great ideas that inspired the founders of the American state – the ideas of freedom, equality and justice. But he also saw the dangers awaiting this country that were rooted in its very traditions; as he expected, the Americans responded with nothing but indignation. Nor did the people of the Old World harken to his warnings or take them seriously.

Cs. Varga⁴

TRADITIONAL VALUES AND WESTERN EFFORTS TO EXPORT "NEW ETHICS" VIA SOFTING LAW BY REFERENCE TO HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW

Panorama from the Past to the Present

In our thinking in Central Europe, what we have called with some simplification *the West* has always been a point of reference and orientation. In fact, what has been called *the East* has historically developed differently. Its political philosophy was based on partly different foundations and thus led to somewhat differing institutionalisation. Consequently, it is natural that the overall conception of statehood and the relationship between the state and the people living in it became very different, too. Given the size and the rich past of their empire, it was therefore quite natural that for her own thinkers the peculiar *Russian* way and ideals were to appear as a desirable and appropriate alternative to the one that might be offered in the event of a free choice. However, as soon as the various economies on earth became elements of the one-world economy and the inter-state relations that grew out of ones of the neighbourhood became truly international, the West transformed its economic predominance into political predominance and, what is even

more, into a quasi world-ruler position of bearing the flag of the ideal that could be demonstrated as the final progress of the humanity. It is a consequence of this that, gradually, geostrategic literature of the Atlantic world and Western Europe began to speak of a *centre*, represented by itself, and of *periphery(s)* in relation to any other territory, that is, to others' history and life pattern.⁵

There is a strong tradition of this vision of Western-centrism as a yardstick. For it was already present in its infancy, when the barely known rest of the world was opened up to the West in one way or another, almost thousands of years ago, so to speak. And it culminated in the age of colonialism, and then in the birth of the discipline of anthropology, which began with the comparative study of various human collectivities.

Intermediate Europe, which its own historians call *Central Europe*, began its development historically, emphatically, from the double grip of Byzantium and Rome.⁶ It is therefore no coincidence that the contrasted characterology of East and West was most eloquently formulated here.⁷ The historically standing and clear western orientation of local aspirations is indicated by the fact that, for example, Hungarian rulers have consistently voted for the latter as a natural choice from the Hungarian Middle Ages, i.e. from the country's alignment to Rome, and even more consciously from the 19th century, the so-called era of modernising re-

¹ Cited from: Лернер М. Развитие цивилизации в Америке. М.: Радуга, 1992. Т. 2. С. 428.

² Cited from: Шлезингер А.-М. Циклы американской истории. М.: Прогресс, 1992. С. 31.

³ Диккенс Ч. О.р. cit. Т. 10. С. 447–448.

⁴ Professor Emeritus of the Institute of Legal Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Pázmány Péter Catholic University (Budapest), Dr. Sc. (Law). Visiting professor at many foreign universities (U.S., Australia, UK, Japan, Russia, EU countries). Author of more than 500 scientific works published in English, German, French and other languages, including monographs "Law and Philosophy," "Paradigms of Legal Thinking," "Comparative Legal Cultures," "The Enigma of Law and of Legal Philosophising," etc. Advisor to the Prime Minister of Hungary (1990–1994), member of the International Academy of Comparative Law. Recipient of the Hungarian government's prize for scientific achievement.

⁵ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World-systems_theory.

⁶ Scott J. W. Rebordering Central Europe // Cross-Border Review. 2016. № 1. P. 9–28.

⁷ Iordachi C. Entangled Histories // Regio. 2004. Vol. 4 (1). P. 113–147; Szűcs J. The Three Historical Regions of Europe // Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae. 1983. Vol. 29 (2/4). P. 131–184.

forms. Increasingly, in the domestic and international scholarship of the modern era, the process of Hungary as a once European power having to make up for the lost ground left by the Tatar destruction, Turkish occupation, Habsburg oppressive liberation and the dramas of more recent times is being referred to more and more exclusively as *modernisation* in a western sense.¹

Through channels forced into hiding, this orientation has survived for half a century after the Second World War as the almost entire populace's exclusive dream, in opposition to the utopia of what was imposed as socialism. But by the time the changes in world politics around the 1990s came about, and Hungary was able to join the NATO in the year before the turn of the millennium and the European Union half a decade later, this West had already undergone a profound change of character, as if – symbolically – it were a triumph of, with a breakthrough by, the new moral preaching of the 1968 student revolts in America,² Paris and elsewhere.³ So, within a few decades Hungarians were confronted not only with the dysfunctions of the Western European and Atlantic sense of security and material abundance, of a lavish lifestyle that they did not even perceive, but also with the permanent deterioration, almost disappearance, of their sense of responsibility and of their ability to defend themselves indeed, if needed. Or, by the middle of 2010s, the signs of the crisis of today have already been visible. It included, among others, in addition to the complete disregard to anything surviving as tradition, the rampant migration, the rewriting of morals, the rejection of any taboos in sexuality as well as of humans growing up in a family, i.e. the very factors of social integration, which has led to the eradication of any culture by so-called cancel culture in America and then increasingly in Europe.

Interestingly, today's legal life, change of law, and the social debate around law, are all and constantly guided by two concepts that not only serve a specific aspect, but also play a direct guiding role. Concepts which are neither truly legal nor sufficiently defined, but which nevertheless serve as a kind of an ideal of law. One of these is to act in the name of human rights, the other is to demand the rule of law.

Legal Aspects? The Ideology and Practice of Human Rights

In their ancient forebears, human rights were conceived in terms of the dignity of person, holding the God's image [*imago Dei*]. It was the Enlightenment and its conclusion in the French Revolution that produced their first manifesto-like declaration. The early reactions to their ideologisation already perceived the lack of a real foundation as well as their arbitrary flexibility and contestability. And for scientific reconstruction it became clear that, while these claims asserted from outside the law are rhetorically based on their inherently irrevocable validity, the sole purpose of their activists was to make them inscribed in the law as a self-assertion of and by the law. And once this has been done, the complexity of the legal system will imply that only the le-

gal source level and contexture – the rank – of the human rights norm thus enacted will count, regardless of whether it was originally (politically) born of a specific human rights claim or other consideration.

As for the basis and source of the obligation originating from human rights, scholarly analysis can say only this: human rights are given, as a project. We are given a task; we live by it; we theorise accordingly; and then we adapt our behaviour accordingly. Thus its justification is simply circular. Accordingly, knowledge of human rights itself creates a human rights reality which will already correspond, to a large extent, to the description of the reality it presupposes.⁴ Or, in any formal normative, thus in law, too, the linguistic representation of the bond within a given understanding of the human medium, based on established social practice and the psychological conditioning of each individual participant, is capable, as a factor in the motivational system of action, of influencing it in such a way that it can, on a mass scale and with a certain effectiveness, actually shape action according to its patterns (or, more precisely, bring it into a framework set by its patterns).

Since the proclamation of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (1948), political, diplomatic, jurisprudential as well as political sciences and philosophical fora have been constantly working to expand and extend the officialised catalogue of human rights, almost continuously and almost arbitrarily, with no end in sight.

It is a debatable issue whether human rights are unilaterally conferred on man as an absolute right, independently of all other circumstances, regardless of whether their holder and addressee is under obligations to his fellow man, his community, his state, his world, and whether he has actually fulfilled these obligations, perhaps as a precondition for making these rights respected. Almost a century ago a most influential Spanish thinker warned against the proliferation of the *dissipation of responsibility*⁵ and, above all, the disruptive effect that universal care would lead us all back to a childish state.⁶ And the "rights language,"⁷ which has since been institutionalised as practically exclusive in America, is now a unilaterally expressed expectation of us, and always towards the rest and never towards ourselves, for aid and support, showing parasitism to the expense of the rest. The reason why human rights ideologies are shrouded in a silence expressing dislike at the idea of the unity of rights and duties⁸ is that their implicit aim is no longer this simply curative prevention, but more and more explicitly the atomising individualisation of society into mere singles.⁹

⁴ Sajó A. Az emberi jogok mint tudásrendszer [Human rights as a set of knowledge] // Állam- és Jogtudomány. 2004. Vol. XLV (1). P. 3–38.

⁵ Ortega y Gasset J. Revolt of the Masses. L.: Allen & Unwin; N. Y.: Norton, 1932.

⁶ Jonas D., Klein D. Man-child. N. Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1970.

⁷ Glendon M. A. Rights Talk. N. Y.: Free Press, 1991.

⁸ Although the basic tenet that "no rights without duties, no duties without rights" was as clear to Marx (see: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/iwma/documents/1864/rules.htm>) as it is today to the Social Doctrine of the Catholic Church, preaching "mutual complementarities between rights and duties" [Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace] Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church. 2004. § 156 (https://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/pontifical_councils/justpeace/documents/rc_pc_justpeace_doc_20060526_compendio-dott-soc_en.html).

⁹ Varga Cs. Rule of Law, Contesting and Contested // Central European Journal of Comparative Law. 2021. Vol. II/1. P. 245–268, see also: <https://ojs3.mtak.hu/index.php/cejcl/article/view/6041/4723>.

¹ Kulcsár K. Modernization and Law. Budapest: Akadémiai, 1992.

² Bork R. H. Slouching towards Gomorrah. N. Y.: Regan Books, 1996.

³ Varga Cs. Humanity Elevating Themselves? // Varga Cs. Comparative Legal Cultures. Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2012. P. 131–163; <http://mek.oszk.hu/15300/15386/>.

Legal Aspects? The Hidden Role of the Rule of Law

In its function, the demand for the rule of law, as it is common today, is not only similar to that of human rights, but its nature is also specific. It was not, in fact, born of this. In its first version, the German *Rechtsstaat*, as a modern formation replacing the *Polizeistaat* (or administrative state) at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries, became a category of the doctrine of the form of the state [*Staatsformenlehre*], characterised as an arrangement centred on constitutional organisation according to law, in which everyone, from the ordinary citizen to the ruler, is bound by law. And the *rule of law* proper was historically formulated as a general expression of the constitutionality of English statehood at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and its quintessential criterion was no more than the ability to settle any dispute before an independent court.

At the end of the Second World War, either term was virtually unknown. The English ‘rule of law’ began to take on its current role during the Cold War rage, in 1957, as a certificate of the West of what democracy is, in contrast to the Soviet dictatorship. To take a personal example, when I finished my university studies at Pécs in the mid-1960s, where one of the first universities in Central Europe had once been founded, we only heard of *Rechtsstaat* as a keyword for the Germanic modernisation of the state in the 18th and 19th centuries, and not at all of the term ‘rule of law,’ which at that time was indeed hardly more than an *epitheton ornans* of Western self-praise, used mostly as a legal designator of the West, without a meaning of its own. And this was true enough. Thus the almost vacuous message of *Rechtsstaatlichkeit* and the ‘rule of law,’ that the law was binding on all and could also be enforced in and by a court of law, said hardly more substantive than the otherwise dramatic German wisdom that *Das Recht ist das Recht* [The law is the law]. Yet, under the spell of “socialist normativism” dating back to Vyshinsky, Stalin’s henchman and legal theoretician concurrently, practically the same was professed for those studying law in books and swearing to operate it in action. And as a matter of fact, returning to us, students then, everyone in the whole of Soviet-occupied Central and Eastern Europe had to learn the same teachings; perhaps the only advantage we had from our westernised past was that we could really get to know the “bourgeois” and “imperialist” political and legal doctrines of the early 20th century modernity and the then present more intimately.

Interestingly enough, the international rise of this notion, that is, its becoming a key term that may encompass almost everything of the political, economic, and professional lawyerly expectations towards law, started practically at the same time as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the new path offered to Central Europe. Coincidence or strategic necessity for the remaining one great power may have been the reason? In any case, while the prevalence of the English version of the word in the e-world increased by a factor of around two to three between 1944 and 1991, the rate accelerated spectacularly thereafter: from 1992 to 2007 it increased by a factor of around 17, and from 2008 to 2020 it increased by a factor of 35! And what was behind this?

First and foremost, it was the incorporation of the rule of law as a criterion embodying a standard of values into the language of diplomacy and the conduct of international re-

lations. It was first used by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as organs of the United Nations, and thus by the international economic organisation, including worldwide aid policy, as a term that could now be used for blackmail as well. And then it became the number one key term in the campaign launched by the Secretary-General of the United Nations (2004), followed by the OECD (2005) and then the European Union (2011), which used it as a criterion of their own. Moreover, its impact was expected to be multiplied by the re-emergence of a policy of shaming in international relations in these particularly sensitive areas,¹ sometimes replacing rather than complementing the correct and unprejudiced use of language.²

Traditional Values of Humanity or “New Ethics” of the West?

From the perspective of either philosophy of law or legal policy, what is decisive in the above developments is that the *Rechtsstaatlichkeit* and the rule of law, despite their apparently theoretical expression, are historically particular concepts, since they have developed in the daily context of challenge and response in particular countries, in the pragmatics of particular places and times. That is, that both took shape locally in a particular way, since it was everywhere in response to quests that arose characteristically there and then. And it is only since then that they may have become somewhat more universal from their inherent particularities, thanks especially for the mutual assimilation of national experiences as a result of some mutual learning process. At the same time, however, the fact that the rule of law is an *undefined value* has remained unchanged as a pitfall. On the one hand, its historical meaning does not cover its contemporary use. On the other hand, its universalised overuse far beyond its rights have in the meantime inflated its very meaning.

According to literature dedicated to it, the rule of law itself is one of the so-called “essentially contested concepts,” with no obvious and clear-cut focus or boundaries, and in fact without any established dogmatics. And it is open-ended, while being caught in the crossfire of all kinds of political ambitions, the propensity to innovate or of any author’s desire to be seen as a forerunner, with, so to speak, free malleability – changeability and extensibility. Just as in the case of human rights, where day after day a wide variety of power groups, including marginal interests, too, demand support for themselves – always, of course, at the expense and tolerance of others, the rest of society.

In consequence, ‘rule of law’ is *not an operative concept* within law. This is also reflected in the fact that when in the mainly international documents that call for its implementation as a value, it is either used as a term in itself or as a conceptual generalisation with a list of desired components that are themselves nothing more than similarly undefined generalities.

Its lack of conceptual operability is thus already evident on two levels. On the one hand, it is *not factually defined*. That is to say that it is not defined by facts [*Tatbestand*] that may constitute a case in law – and is therefore *not a priori* capable of being applied in law, i.e. of being

¹ Badie B. Humiliation in International Relations. Oxford : Hart Publishing, 2017.

² Varga Cs. The Problematics of Human Rights // Varga Cs. Rule of Law, Contesting and Contested. Budapest : Ferenc Mádl Institute of Comparative Law, 2021. P. 246–264.

established in law as its case. The rule of law itself, on the other hand, is made up of a set of values which, when fully realised, may prove to be mutually exclusive. This means that their implementation in any case presupposes acts of weighing and balancing in search of an optimum solution at the last and least. It follows therefrom that the rule of law is an *ideal* that is impossible to achieve in its entirety, since whatever the solution reached, it will always remain debatable. Or, otherwise speaking, the rule of law is something that can – and must – only be aspired to, and approached to reach an optimum realisation, with varying fields and degrees of success.¹

‘Human Rights’ and ‘Rule of Law’ as Softeners of the Law and Vehicles of Importing the “New Ethics”

For decades, the main thrust of Western European and Atlantic legal philosophy has been to untie the law, hitherto enclosed in formalities and thus rendered secure, in everyday social practice, and thus, especially, in the political sphere, in the latter’s ever-changing amorphousness. This is the purpose of all attempts to *soften the law*, by infiltrating soft law into every available niche in order to *heterogenise* the law’s hitherto more or less safely preserved *homogeneity*.

Tellingly, the international declarations of the rule of law are not simply about establishing a *status quo* achieved by common agreement but, by their wording, which refers to human rights in general without specifying or enumerating them, i.e. without any restrictions, they are to make a *status quo post* binding. They thus pretend to impose on states blanket future obligations from the past, obligations that were neither created nor known at the time of the agreement or concluding a treaty in question, and which could even less have been undertaken by the signatory state.

Well, all of this is now being overwhelmed by what the European Union has meanwhile transmitted from Western Europe and the United States of America: migration, gendering cult and gender reassignment, the shaming of being white and Christian and heterosexual, and the extension of supposed obligations of reparation to countries which, having been colonised themselves, have never had a colony.

So, what is the state of the rule of law today, and, with it, of the rule of human rights?

Well, we could summarise today’s practice as follows: everybody has a few Jolly Jokers in their hand, and none of them predict how much their cards are worth. Perhaps they don’t even know themselves. However, everyone gets exactly what they declare when they play their cards. Or, sum-

ming up, it would be a mistake to assume a different conception of the rule of law behind the difference of opinion between – let’s say – Brussels and Budapest. All we can see is that one side is playing Jolly Joker as a fake card player with cards of no fixed value, so there is no card game in reality, and the other side is merely pointing this out as a perhaps non-negligible circumstance. Obviously, when the latter took on the values of the rule of law (or *l’État de Droit* or the *Rechtsstaat*) when it joined, it did so by tacitly accepting their then current understanding, which no one can regard or mistake as an empty frame that can be freely filled in again and again by anyone in a dominant position in whatever future. That is, if today I agree not to go to war, this is not meant that tomorrow I shall be giving up my wife with my extensive family and fortune.

According to the above, globalism is, on the one hand, an ongoing process and thus a fact to be acknowledged, but on the other hand and at the same time, it is also a matter of choice in terms of its desired and opted-for level and depth, nature, and impact. In any case, it is a choice to be done by cultures and nations involved. The question of *globalism* and *localism* is therefore not simply an either-or question, but an issue of responsible choice, namely in which areas and matters, to what depth and in which direction we wish to see the continuation of traditional values and the continuation of our own culture in our own localism complementing the current world current of globalism.

Conclusion

Drawing the arc of the social and legal transformation from the past to the present, we are now confronted on the one hand with attempts at implementing the utopianism of the limitless and conventionally non-democratic forces whose aim is an open society, globalised and atomised at the same time, and on the other hand with the gradual withdrawal of the components that may offer formal bonds and guarantees in law. As to human rights, they have been transformed from the person’s defence against state overpower into a means of the final individualisation of society, and as to the rule of law, into a framework that can be shaped freely by any dominant force at any given time to meet the political-ideological demands of any actual mainstream. Today, all this is aimed at serving the globalisation of a “new morality,” with characteristic symptoms of the ongoing decomposition in the West, including migration, genderism by choice replacing the male/female duality of human beings, and the substitution of family and national ties for the ideal amorphism of the new liberal desire of so-called open society.

¹ *Varga Cs. Idol, Deduced from an Ideal? Rule of Law, Universalization, Degradation // Philosophy of Law and General Theory of Law. 2019. № 2. P. 192–214, see also: <https://zenodo.org/record/6466110#.YlwXSzW8qUk>.*

A. V. Yakovenko¹

RUSSIA'S SPECIAL MILITARY OPERATION IN UKRAINE AS A CATALYST FOR SHAPING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

Imperfections of the contemporary world order, the need to adapt it to changing conditions, as well as the current processes of its transformation, are being discussed by political scientists and have been in the epicenter of real world politics for decades. The world order as a category and the main factor in the development of political, economic and social interaction between countries participating in the international relations is one of those phenomena whose scientific understanding constantly fails to keep pace with its real development.

The term “world order” was introduced into scientific and political discourse relatively recently. “The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics” by Hedley Bull, then Professor of International Relations at the Australian National University in Canberra, was published in 1977. In his study he uses the term for the first time and tries to analyze international development trends from this perspective.

As for the world order as a political reality and the basis for development of a system of international relations, this concept emerges in its modern sense and begins to function and define the world architecture at the time when the European continent begins to form nations in the framework of the state system.

Old world orders

In political science they distinguish several forms or stages in the development of the world order. While not claiming that my analysis is complete, I will outline the main stages of its metamorphosis. The first stage – Westphalian – emerges as a result of the Peace of Westphalia treaty in 1648, after which states gradually became the main elements of the international system. At the same time, due to the prevailing trends in world development until the first half of the twentieth century, the term “world” was essentially limited to the boundaries of Europe, which at that time played a major role and determined the nature and characteristics of development in other parts of the world as well.

The Westphalian period was succeeded by the Vienna period, which began with the signing of the Peace of Vienna after the end of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. It was characterized by the rise of a number of great European powers which gained more weight and influence than the rest of the countries. This system comprised not only

states but also unions of states. There is another definition of this stage: “the European concert system.” It was the period when such concepts as *great powers* and *multilateral diplomacy* emerged. This world order is considered to be the first example of implementation of the principle of collective security.

The results of World War I were cemented by the Versailles–Washington system of international relations. Its structure was formed by the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, as well as the agreements concluded as a result of the Washington Conference in 1921–1922. At this stage, the world order had transcended European boundaries, but had not yet become a universal system. Institutionally, a polycentric world was fixed, in which the adoption and implementation of major decisions were based on the agreements between the great powers, taking into account the interests of the others. The League of Nations was created.

The next stage started after the end of World War II. The principles elaborated at the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences were laid at the basis of the new world order. A new system of institutions ensuring international communication, stability and economic interaction was created. The Bretton Woods conference led to the formation of the monetary and financial system, which was transformed in the second half of the 1970s after the Jamaica conference. At this point, the term “world order” takes on its modern meaning.

The United States, which suffered the least damage in the war and received the greatest political and economic dividends as its result, emerged as the mightiest world power. Having suffered enormous material, human and structural losses, the Soviet Union, which bore the burden of the war on its shoulders and defeated fascism on the continent with the support of the anti-Hitler coalition, received a well-deserved position of the victorious country and one of the world's political superpowers.

This structure predetermined the bipolar configuration of the postwar international system, which assumed the form of two rival camps of states. At a certain stage, with the growth of unifying tendencies, there was a rise in importance and influence of European countries which distinguished themselves as an independent center of power during this period. However, at a later time these trends were suppressed by the Americans, and Europe, with its own consent, was actually relegated through the mechanisms of NATO to the level of a collective satellite of the United States and the Regional Wing of the created NATO bloc. For almost half a century, until the collapse of the Soviet Union, this system was characterized by a fairly high stability and defined the rules and nature of international peace.

The period that followed, which is considered to have begun after the end of the Cold War in 1991 and lasted almost without changes until 2000, had a monocentric configuration, characterized by the unconditional dominant role of the United States, a sharp increase in international instability, remaking of interstate borders and a large number of open armed conflicts with an increasing confrontational potential.

¹ Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor. Since 1976, he has held various diplomatic positions at the Central Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and abroad. Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia (2005–2011), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom (2011–2019). Author of several books on international space law, as well as more than 200 publications on international relations and foreign policy, science, education, and culture. Full member of the Academy of Sciences of the Republic of Tatarstan, member of the Space Council of the Russian Academy of Sciences, full member of the International Institute of Space Law (IISL, Paris), International Academy of Astronautics (IAA, Paris). Member of the Scientific Council under the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Professor Emeritus of the University of Edinburgh (United Kingdom). Awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky, Order of Honor, Order of Friendship, Medals of the Order of Merit for the Fatherland I and II degrees, Diplomas of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation.

After 2000, the world community entered the modern period of its existence. This stage is characterized by high instability, a growing trend towards a radical break in the balance of political and economic influence between a number of states, consolidation of the position of many actor countries in the political arena, especially the resurgent Russia, China, India, some other states; withdrawal of some previously influential international political structures from the political scene and emergence of new ones. The gradually emerging need to make significant adjustments to the architecture and principles of international political and economic relations, including the foreign exchange and financial system, was becoming increasingly evident.

The processes of preparing for a new transformation of the world order could theoretically be stretched over a very long time period in the conditions of relative stability. However, the situation developing before our eyes has led to a sharp exacerbation of contradictions in international political and economic affairs and intensified trends toward global metamorphosis. In the meantime, history of the world development shows that the transition from one stage of development of the world order to another has never taken place in an evolutionary way, but invariably became the result of a regional or global crisis. It looks like this time it will be no exception.

The Russian leadership's proposals to take into account the objective and vital interests of our country meeting a harsh and uncompromising reaction from Washington and the overwhelming majority of NATO member states, a number of other American satellites; the inevitable conduct of a special military operation in Ukraine, where Russia met with indirect but quite apparent and powerful opposition from the collective West; the economic and information war of annihilation declared against Russia – all of this signified the end of the possibility of evolutionary adaptation of the world order to modern realities, and has transferred these processes into an acute form of a crisis, more compressed in time.

New world order

At the moment it is obvious that the development course of the new configuration of the world order will be determined by a combination of factors. On the one hand, it will depend on the results of the special operation in Ukraine, our ability to resist massive attempts of the West to isolate Russia on the world stage without regard to any rules and frameworks of international law, to contain its development and destroy it through the use of economic and financial "weapons." On the other hand, it will depend on the ability of the U.S.-headed coalition to mitigate the objectively inevitable negative political, economic and social consequences of their declared total war against Russia.

Any assumptions are a risky and unrewarding task; and yet, as it seems, today we have a sufficient degree of confidence to make the first, so far preliminary, forecasts about the possible outcomes of the current stage of the developing crisis.

The course and nature of the special military operation conducted by the Russian Armed Forces in Ukraine testify to its generally good design and planning, the confidence of the Russian political and military leadership in the successful completion and achievement of the set tasks and goals.

Although, as we have mentioned earlier, the clash of Russian armed forces in a special military operation in Ukraine with the United States and NATO is formally indirect, this statement is only partially true. For a long time, the AFU have been prepared, equipped, trained, armed, and infrastructure for an offensive operation has been created with active assistance and involvement of significant efforts and finance of the collective West. These efforts, previously camouflaged, became overt at some point. The number of "mercenaries" from the countries of the explicit and implicit anti-Russian coalition accounted for tens of thousands.

At the same time, given the current level of Russia's military-technical capabilities, the West (NATO and the European Union) is not yet ready for active action. At this stage, attempts of the United States and the countries of the anti-Russian coalition to ensure a complete and global political and economic blockade of Russia have so far yielded limited results. Despite Washington's forceful and aggressive steps in this direction, these attempts in many cases provoke the opposite reaction. It can be assumed that this trend will only intensify, especially against the background of the expected success of Russian forces.

Russia's forced requirement for unfriendly countries to transfer funds for gas in rubles to Russia's accounts has entailed the developments that are quite symptomatic. The sharply negative initial reaction to this proposal at the level of the EU governing bodies "harmoniously combines" with the formula developed by the EU Commission, according to which the purchase of gas from Russia is possible "without violating the sanctions regime." A number of European countries have already agreed to pay for gas in rubles, and some others are looking into this proposal. The inevitable negative consequences of stopping gas supplies for the economies of the countries with the most radical positions will eventually force their leadership to develop a more sensible approach to this problem.

Russia's position is already supported by a whole set of decisions taken by the country's leadership regarding the use of gas in the event of a refusal by European countries; a whole range of future options has been outlined. This includes actively expanding the use of gas on the domestic market and redirecting export flows to eastern destinations. But the declared course for the systematic development of advanced processing of hydrocarbon raw materials offers particularly great prospects. This does not only expand opportunities to improve the structure of Russian exports, but, most importantly, provides a powerful impetus to the development of advanced sectors of national industry, bringing Russia into the ranks of influential economic and technological world powers.

What will happen?

The collective West will obviously focus on expanding the anti-Russian coalition with new members, reducing the possibility for Russia to rely on the assistance, support, or neutrality of the most politically and economically significant countries of today's world. In this context, very symptomatic and illustrative results were obtained at the consultations held on April 19, 2022 in the form of videoconference with the leaders of the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, Canada, Romania and Poland, with participation of the President of the European Council Charles Michel and President of the European Commission Ursula

von der Leyen. Participants in the consultations clearly formulated the main task: to prevent the success of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine. In addition, they essentially agreed on the action plan for its implementation, which includes, among other things, providing Kiev with financial aid, sending weapons, including heavy ones, and other military means into the conflict zone, and stepping up efforts to isolate Russia in the world. The meeting of NATO defense ministers and allies (representatives of more than 40 countries) held at the American Ramstein base in Germany on April 26 upon initiative of the U.S. should be considered in the same context.

However, the course and logic of events show that the anti-Russian coalition is unlikely to achieve its goals. Efforts to expand the membership of the coalition will apparently remain unsuccessful. Moreover, Washington's current policy of rigid pressure and "arm-twisting" will not yield the desired result, but will continue to force the leaders of influential states, including China, India, Brazil, and the United Arab Emirates, to openly demonstrate their rejection of unceremonious pressure and blackmail. For our country, this development will facilitate the implementation of the policy of preserving these countries as situational partners, if not allies, who understand the goals of Russian policy.

In the long-term confrontation, the emphasis will obviously be shifted to the economy, foreign economic relations, and finance. However, at the present stage, due to the factors outlined above, it is no longer possible for the collective West to achieve the failure and capitulation of Russia. Here our country's position will be strengthened by its abundant raw materials, energy and food supplies, and fresh water resources (whose critical importance will be increasing rapidly), which are sufficient not only to meet domestic needs, but also to maintain a strong export potential, the importance of which will only grow against the background of globally increasing shortages.

The U.S. position in the world, due to a series of failures in foreign policy, most obviously in the Russian and Chinese directions by that time, will be steadily weakening. This trend will be exacerbated by growing instability inside the country – in the economy, social and domestic policy, as well as in serious foreign economic problems and contradictions, reduction of the US share and weight in international economic affairs in general. However, given its remaining potential, as well as its considerable inertia, the U.S. will remain one of the world's poles (but no longer the only one) for a very long period. The boundaries of this period cannot be traced thus far.

It is somewhat more difficult to discuss the prospects and place of a united Europe from today's perspective. Certainly, the aggravation of problems – with energy, raw materials, possibly food supply – will seriously undermine the regime of the "measured European idyll." A series of growing social contradictions will be equally destructive, including those caused by ambiguous migration policies and their consequence – the increasing conflict potential of cultural, inter-religion and civilizational confrontation, first within several countries and then on a regional scale.

In case of failure of American policy, the inevitable decline of Washington's influence in the world, the growth of contradictions within the EU, the new aggravation of the struggle for European leadership – all this could reverse the

centripetal trend that is based today on Europeans' recognition of the unconditional leadership of the United States, the almost voluntary cession of sovereignty to Washington and the unifying effect of NATO membership.

At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that the possibility of growing friction with the United States, the divergence of interests and positions on a number of vital issues may push the countries of the Community to return to the idea of a strong united Europe with a common foreign and security policy and claims to position the region as an independent center of power. However, such a scenario would be theoretically possible only if powers oriented in this direction come to rule in a number of leading European countries and, most importantly, if a generation of new authoritative and independent, nationally oriented political leaders emerges. This is difficult to predict, at least today.

The growing democratic and economic giants, China and India, are also likely to take up their positions as independent world centers of the first order. Purposeful efforts by the leadership of these states to actively build up their military and technical strength will only enforce and substantiate their claims to global economic leadership, as well as their prominent role in international security and peacekeeping in the new world architecture.

Turkey will probably succeed in joining the ranks of the second echelon leaders. Already today, under the leadership of President Erdogan, it is consistently pursuing a policy of building a "new Great Ottoman Empire" and is trying hard to extend its influence on neighboring countries in Asia, North Africa and the Middle East, as well as several states in the post-Soviet area.

Such countries as Brazil, Indonesia, Pakistan and a number of others with the necessary potential have a fairly good chance of significantly raising their stakes and playing a more significant role in world affairs in the future. They will benefit from the multipolar structure of the emerging world. A lot in the future of these countries will depend on the arrival of sophisticated and visionary leaders, the ability to choose an independent course, reliable allies and partners.

The positions of a number of other states, including the Arabian region, will be determined by their ability to maintain their long-term position as global financial centers and stable suppliers of strategic energy resources and raw materials.

Today we are witnessing the situation where the mechanisms once developed to support the world's economic processes and interrelations between states have largely lost their universal character and effectiveness, and are sometimes simply discredited, reduced by the United States and its allies to the level of utilitarian means of achieving their goals. Such mechanisms for the system of the world economy, supporting foreign economic and trade relations, must be developed and newly agreed upon. They will be based on a balance of power and guarantees to exclude the possibility of unilateral action on the part of Western countries.

The new world foreign exchange and financial system, which is likely to become complex, multi-component and integral in its structure, should also occupy a special place in this new order. The last two sets of critical problems I have touched upon are certainly among the priorities that require separate and careful consideration.

Russia's place in the world

In conclusion, I would like to address the most important question for all of us: the place of Russia in the emerging global system. Despite the well-known difficulties and problems experienced by our country during its modern history, Russia was in the best possible state when it entered the phase of the acute global crisis imposed on it from the outside. The country's leadership managed to overcome the period of internal instability. Although the process of shaping the political system is not yet complete, it is functioning steadily, and effective mechanisms for maintaining social stability have been developed and put in place. The country has significantly strengthened economically and financially. Economic, scientific, technological and structural development programs have been designed and are being implemented, albeit not without problems. For the first time in known history, Russia is a world leader in the military-technical sphere.

All this creates a favorable basis for overcoming the unprecedented pressure exerted on our country, which could be more accurately described as an undeclared hybrid war of annihilation, to withstand and continue the transition

to progressive development and ensuring sovereign interests in all segments of the political and socio-economic domains.

We have every reason to be confident that, as a result of the current crisis, Russia will be able to secure for itself the role of one of the main poles of the emerging new system of the world order. The political dividends that our country will gain will not only make it possible to push back the foci of external threats from our borders, significantly strengthen our position in the former Soviet Union territory and in international organizations, but also to create the basis for building a mutually beneficial system of relations that fully meets our national interests with the majority of countries and global centers of power in a wide range of areas of the international agenda. At the same time, Russia's ability to maintain and strengthen its position in the new world order can be reliably ensured in the long term only if it maintains a certain level of political and military-technical stability, which is a visible and convincing factor of economic and technological power. All this will form the basis of the goals and objectives of Russia's development programs in the long term.

A. S. Zapesotsky¹

WHY THE UNITED STATES IS DESTINED TO BECOME A REGIONAL POWER

Global escalation of contradictions

For many years, the Likhachov Conference has been focused on the dialogue between cultures and civilizations. Initially we were convinced that further development of the world community is possible only on the basis of aspiration for mutual understanding, dialogue and equal partnership. Life has disproved, rather than reinforced, this view.

Scholars and politicians believed globalization to be a real form of dialogue of cultures and the only reasonable type of interaction between peoples and states; however, it only deepened the contradictions between civilizations. We have become witnesses (and in some ways participants) of a multiculturalism policy crisis. Many countries increasingly aspire to localize their economies, cultures, and political strategies. Competition between civilizations, opposition between countries and their alliances, sometimes reaching extreme levels of confrontations and clashes, intensifies in the world.

There is a growing struggle for status and resources, rights and influence of different countries within specific regions and the world community. Formats of this struggle vary from strong statements of politicians to large-scale

military action. Conflicts are becoming increasingly unpromising.

Many analysts hold the U.S. responsible for this course of events, as it could not bear the burden of leadership and failed to offer the world decent ways of interaction in a changing reality.

Today nearly every state – its scientific, financial, economic, political, cultural elite and society as a whole – is rethinking their national interests, looking for optimal responses to the challenges and threats posed by the world's transformation which generates global instability and uncertainty.

The Russian Federation is no exception in this regard. Our country is overcoming the crisis of cultural and civilizational identity, formation of the Russian national idea, search for its place in the new globalizing world.

For Russia, the problems of observing its national interests are now becoming particularly relevant and cover the widest range of phenomena – from state sovereignty, economic security of the country in the face of sanctions and crisis trends in the global economy to the preservation of relics of national culture and traditional spiritual values, preservation of its cultural, human, intellectual, technological potential, development of a number of industries, determining the vectors of modernization of education, implementing social programs, etc.

The United States is a country of ideological backwardness

The theme of this report, "Why the U.S. is destined to become a regional power," is of interest even beyond the context of the prospects of the currently unfolding confrontation between the U.S.-led West and the rest of the world seeking to escape Western dictates. Russia has now become

¹ President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation. Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Congress of St. Petersburg Intelligentsia. Author of more than 3,400 scientific works and essays. Member of the editorial boards of the journals "Philosophy and Culture," "Issues of Cultural Studies," etc. Academician of the Academy of Sciences and Arts (Paris), the European Academy of Sciences and Arts (Salzburg). Awarded the Order of Friendship and others. Awarded a commendation from the President of the Russian Federation (2012, 2021). Recipient of the Russian Government Prize (2007) and the St. Petersburg Government Prize (2010, 2016) in Education, the Gorky Literary Prize (2007), the Plekhanov Prize of the Russian Academy of Sciences (2015), etc.

the main target of Western aggression, but virtually the entire “non-West” no longer leaves any doubt as to whose side it is on.

The destiny of the U.S. is also interesting in terms of the lessons the world community (Russia being no exception) will have to learn from the declining hegemon’s loss of global leadership.

Some processes, developing rapidly and before our eyes, may look random and disparate. However, their systematical review can reveal the logic of the historical process, the objective facts and laws behind the seeming randomness and fragmentation, and thus create the prerequisites for determining the future strategy and tactics of the states defending the sovereignty in a dynamically changing reality.

The first thing we want to focus on is the question of meaning of the existence of the state as such. Essentially, the history of every state is, on the one hand, a search for an answer and, on the other hand, an answer to this question. I believe that by the end of the twentieth century the United States had failed in this regard.

History has proven that sustainable development and obtaining the competitive advantages of the state today cannot rest only on private economic interest, i.e. the desire of citizens for maximum material enrichment. Individual greed must be controlled and limited, while activity and effort must be directed in a socially acceptable course. It makes more and more sense to involve wide population in the development processes of a country, using motivation beyond material incentives. In this regard, economic development is viewed not as an absolute but as a relative value. It is only a means, not an end. This knowledge has been honed over thousands of years of philosophical and broader humanitarian thought: richness is valuable only insofar as it contributes to social progress and the spiritual and moral development of the society and individuals.

This quest is reflected in the concept of welfare state as an answer to the question of the meaning of the state’s existence. But the U.S. is far behind many countries in practical implementation of this concept. For example, it falls short of Norway, Switzerland, Canada, Monaco, the United Arab Emirates, Belarus, Azerbaijan, or Libya under Muammar Gaddafi. It is no coincidence that the U.S. has lagged behind China in terms of socio-economic development for many years. Moreover, the U.S. systematically consumes far more than it produces, being the world’s largest debtor.

For the economic, political, and cultural elite of the United States, the values of culture, humanism, and the public good have never been immutable. It is common knowledge that many spiritual cornerstones are represented in the form of proverbs and sayings in popular culture. In the United States there is a popular saying, “If you’re so smart, why are you so poor?” Its meaning is that the main measure of a person’s success is money.

American fiction literature has very fondly (and with great talent) described and introduced into the public consciousness the heroic image of an entrepreneur, the pioneer capitalist, so convincingly portrayed by Jack London and Theodore Dreiser. O. Henry’s character from “The Roads We Take” pronounces the quoted phrase “Bolivar can’t carry double,” reflecting the individualistic nature of American success and the ease of sacrificing friendship to self-interest.

Meanwhile, the development of the American and the wider Western model shows that some of the indisputable advantages of the capitalist world order have not only been exhausted, but have turned into their opposite, becoming the cause of social crises. The idea of a welfare state in the United States has come into clash with the idea of a consumer society.

Competition is no longer a development driver of the American capitalism

The country’s stalemate is caused by many factors. They include, primarily, the fundamental change in the market – the loss of the country’s role as an engine of economic development. The efficiency of classical capitalism in Karl Marx’s time was based on a free market driven by the spontaneous effects of economic mechanisms. It was based on the competition of producers who struggled to meet the needs of consumers by offering better products. But that market is now a thing of the past. The economic center of gravity shifted from the factory floor to the minds of people. Material production has been pushed to the periphery of the economy, replaced by the production of meanings; whereas needs started to be marketed as products.

Through manipulative advertising techniques, large corporations have succeeded in imposing unnatural values and life purposes on the mass population. This path of development of the Western civilization turned out to be certainly profitable for those in power, but a dead end for the country as a whole.

In the recent years, the U.S. scientific elite has been increasingly concerned about this course of events. In particular, the leading American theorists – Nobel laureates J. Stiglitz, P. Krugman and others raise the question of rethinking the central pillars of the dominant economic theory, ascertaining the fundamental flaws in the American model of capitalism and the need to strengthen state regulation of the economy, in fact – to return to the common sense.

Meanwhile, as is often the case, scientific thought and actual practice pursue different paths and toward different ends. Thus far, building the consumerist model of a human being and using workers as a means to an end turn out to be a serious economic and social problem. According to the forecasts of the U.S. mortgage agency Fannie Mae, the U.S. economy could face a crisis in the mid-term and go into recession by next year. Former U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations Nikki Haley believes China will soon surpass the United States in GDP, and warned of the country’s bankruptcy because of the policies of the American leader Joe Biden. Such predictions are becoming more and more valid.

For many years, the U.S. boasted very low inflation. In some periods it was equal to 1% and even lower, with a record of 0.01% in 2008. Nevertheless, in 2021 it reached 7%. During the great global crisis, the U.S. prevented devaluation of the dollar and failure of weaker companies. Much of this was done at the expense of building up the national debt. In 2022, it exceeded \$29 trillion. The debt ceiling has now been raised to \$31.4 trillion.¹ Economists believe that “changing the situation is not possible in the 2022 environ-

¹ Колташев В. США в воронке инфляции: как справлялись раньше и удастся ли теперь. URL: <https://tass.ru/opinions/13449227> (date of address: 29.08.2022).

ment – the U.S. financial sector needs a cash boost, and the government debt is so high that a rate increase would result in a default. The first problem will be the need to stop borrowing, as a result of which the economy will lose the impetus for growth – GDP growth depends largely on the growth of government spending, and the latter is supported by an increase in debt.”¹ These are all symptoms of ineffectiveness of the system – the U.S. is gradually losing its role as the financial center, the generator of the world economy and, eventually, the leading political and military player.

The decrepit, uncompetitive U.S. economy is increasingly living off the inflation of electronic financial bubbles, a monopoly on the virtual money machine. In today’s global financial system, the West has become the primary debtor, even though it dictates prices in world trade and turns unfair competition into an essential tool for survival. Of course, the world community does not welcome this kind of a global market.

The liberal model of the consumer society established in America and dominant in the Western world, based on a rather controversial assertion widely promoted in the media, scientific research, fiction, cinema, etc. – “The value of everything, including people, can be expressed in money” – is now exhausted and futile. According to Academician V. S. Stepin, a long-time participant of the Likhachov Conference, prevalence of such principles determining the values and norms of human society pushes humanity “along the path of increasing crises leading to ecological and anthropological catastrophe.”² These words were spoken by him in 2016 and turned out to be prophetic.

Today the U.S. world leadership is supported not through efficiency of the socio-economic model, but by armed forces, monopoly of the “printing press” and dominance in the global information space.

The Collapse of Democracy

Another important phenomenon is degeneration of the political system that has always been America’s pride: democracy. Democracy is known to be based on the method of collective decision-making with equal opportunities for citizens to participate in the process.

Democracy in the American way has come to the logical end of its development – a declarative form of government privatized by big capital. First, Donald Trump and his staff manipulated the minds of voters by targeting a campaign in which every individual voter was lured by a personalized image of “the best possible” president through social media (mostly Facebook). This image was pre-calculated on the basis of the analysis of so-called big data, accumulating almost all aspects of human life – from shopping and visiting doctors to types of recreation and watching TV channels or viewing Internet sites.

In the end, Trump was elected, but it turned out that he did not meet the demands of the ruling elite. In the next election, his opponents went for blatant and primitive fraud in the course of the “postal vote” and vote count. When Trump demanded a recount, it turned out that the ballots had been destroyed. The whole world saw that American

democracy appeared to be a dummy, a piece of scenery privatized by the ruling class. Obviously, such a “democracy” cannot drive the country’s development.

The same thing happened to the national mass media; in it, the U.S. lost another powerful driver of the country’s growth – the “fourth estate,” the freedom of speech. Trump’s unsuccessful attempt to “drain the Washington swamp” clearly demonstrated that all branches of American government, including the judiciary branch, have merged into a single organism that has shifted to a totalitarian government and society.

In the post-Trump U.S., problems have intensified – not only in socio-economic development, but also in interracial relations, political stability, and citizens’ attitudes toward history. Gender and family agendas have undergone previously unthinkable collisions. The society seemed to have lost freedom as the basic American value.

Degradation of the elite

Apparently the country has entered a fundamental crisis of its existence. History shows that when different nations enter such crises, the crucial factor of overcoming them is the quality of the national elite, its ability to analyze the situation, choose and put together a corpus of ideas capable of taking the country to a new upward trajectory of development.

Alas, there is a profound deficit in this respect as well. As capitalism developed, intellectuals – philosophers, scientists, writers, and university professors – played an increasingly significant role in the history of the West. Their ideas, arising from the analysis of economic, political, social, and cultural reality, had a meaningful, sometimes decisive influence on the authorities and society.

Today, however, we see that virtually all spiritual production in the West, and primarily in the United States, has been privatized by monopolistic structures. Intellectuals have become servants who produce ideas at the behest of elite corporations that do not have the public good among their priorities.

Add deformation and exhaustion of other strata of the national elite whose representatives have lost the ability to respond adequately to changes in the surrounding world and the situation in their country. The elite has exhausted its potential for generating new ideas and meanings and identifying promising development paths.

The collective portrait of the U.S. political elite is disheartening. In the primaries, Bernie Sanders, who was 79 years old at the time, competed against Joe Biden. The party could offer no other candidate. The actions of the current vice president Kamala Harris raise doubts in her adequacy. The Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi is older than Biden, and her speeches and actions also at times deviate from common sense. During her visit to Russia in October 2021, U.S. Under Secretary of State Victoria Nuland demonstrated an ignorance of geography unacceptable for her position. Hillary Clinton, John McCain, Sarah Palin, etc. are examples of the general trend of degradation of the American elite.

The lack of understanding by this “elite” of what is happening and their inability to see into the future, their helplessness in the face of change are striking. No wonder that the writings of many contemporary politicians, scientists, and cultural figures are full of concern. Piotr Dutkiewicz,

¹ Колташев В. О.р. cit.

² Степин В. С. Трансмутации ценностей и интересов на современном этапе развития цивилизации // Современные глобальные вызовы и национальные интересы : XVI Междунар. Лихачевские науч. чтения, 19–21 мая 2016 г. СПб. : СПбГУП, 2016. С. 236.

a renowned Canadian scholar and a long-time participant of the Likhachov Conference, believes that “the nature of the global contradictions of the modern world and the uncertainty of future prospects make fear of the future a driving force of human actions and a significant motivator of political decisions.”¹

The internal degradation of a very recent great power makes its global leadership increasingly problematic. There is a growing mismatch between the global superpower ambitions of the United States and its actual economic and political capabilities.

America versus Europe

The United States did not play a dominant role in Europe before World War II. Great Britain sought to set Germany against the Soviet Union and contributed to Hitler’s political nurturing. But this scenario did not fully materialize. Hitler created an “axis” with Rome and Tokyo that turned into a global adversary for the UK–U.S. partnership. It became clear even to the leaders of the major powers that the era of the independent existence of nation-states and their ad hoc alliances was coming to an end. The era of global confrontations of alliances was pending. De Gaulle began to nurture the idea of uniting the continental states of the Old Europe (the European Union), Churchill – the Anglo-Saxon project of uniting Great Britain and the United States, Stalin responded with the Warsaw Pact.

Today, the West is a complex geopolitical configuration. Construction of a united Europe took place under the military and political control of the Anglo-Saxon bloc (the United States and Britain), where Britain played the role of junior partner. With Brexit, the influence of the U.S. on the life of Western Europe has not diminished thanks to NATO. This military bloc ensures U.S. control over the European Union.

The modern American project of the world order originally did not provide for the equality of the countries that make up the European Union, nor for the independence of the EU. The equality of countries within the European Union is nothing more than a slogan. The countries of “Old Europe” are in the lead: Germany, France, Italy. The periphery of the European Union does not play a distinctive role.

Recently admitted to the EU, the former members of the Warsaw Pact behave like vassals of the United States, just as limitrophic countries should. As for the states outside the EU borders, the influence is ensured there through controlled, corrupt power structures and a deliberately cultivated environment of instability. Ukraine is a rather convincing example. As George Soros said in an interview to the British newspaper *The Guardian*, “what is happening in Ukraine is my best project.”²

Through the efforts of its corporations, the U.S. has become the world’s chief corrupt official, providing shady

profits to those in power in various countries and siphoning the super-profits from these countries.

It is no coincidence that it was the U.S. that contributed most to the destruction of the hard-won system of international law, which has been replaced once again by the law of force. New savagery and neo-barbarism are being committed ostensibly in defense of the true values that mankind has honed over thousands of years of historical development. In reality, these values are shamelessly trampled.

Agony of the West

The current situation in the world, which emerged after February 24, the start of the Russian army’s special military operation in Ukraine, has highlighted a number of phenomena that had previously been veiled. In particular, it turned out that the so-called “collective” West had the limits of collectivism. These limits run along the lines of national interests.

Beyond the borders of the EU, despite U.S. pressure, an increasing number of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America are choosing a path that is essentially oppositional to the West. China, India, Brazil, Turkey, Indonesia, South Africa and even Mexico refused to impose sanctions against Russia. This came as a shock to America, which is used to telling other states what geopolitical stance they should take.

Against the background of a weakening “collective” West led and guided by the United States, emergence of the “collective East,” “collective Asia” and other forces that increasingly openly ignore the role of the United States as world leader is becoming more pronounced.

As a result, the U.S. is moving painfully but surely toward being a regional power. America began to drift from the center of world politics to its periphery.

We will have an opportunity to discuss the peculiarities of this process at the 21st and subsequent Likhachov Scientific Conferences.

The American Dream Failed to Come True

For now, I will conclude with a reflection from the writings of William Faulkner: “The American Dream: What Happened to It.” The great writer recalls its meaning: “...every individual man... will have an inalienable right to individual dignity and freedom within a fabric of individual courage and honorable work and mutual responsibility. Because now what we hear is a cacophony of terror and conciliation and compromise babbling only the mouth-sounds, the loud and empty words which we have emasculated of all meaning whatever – freedom, democracy, patriotism – with which, awakened at last, we try in desperation to hide from ourselves that loss.”³

That’s a shame, of course. Millions of people in Russia were inspired by that dream.

¹ Дуткевич П. Ключевые противоречия мирового порядка // Контуры будущего в контексте мирового культурного развития : XVIII Междунар. Лихачевские науч. чтения, 17–19 мая 2018 г. СПб. : СПбГУП, 2018. С. 74.

² Джордж Сорос: «Происходящее на Украине – мой лучший проект». URL: <https://russtrat.ru/comments/20-aprelya-2022-0007-9994> (date of address: 29.08.2022).

³ Фолкнер У. О частной жизни : [перевод Н. А. Анастасьева] // Анастасьев Н. А. Владелец Йокнапатофы. М. : Книга, 1991. С. 408.

K. F. Zatulin¹UKRAINIAN ISSUE²

People of the older generation probably remember the basic dilemma of writing a scientific degree thesis in the Soviet era. “Should I write what I think or what I should?” the applicant asks his academic supervisor. The correct answer is, “You have to write what you think. And you have to think what you should.”

For me there is no point or possibility to pretend. I have been into the “Ukrainian” issue for too long. There are certain citizens, both here and in Ukraine, who think I and others like me are to be blamed for everything. At any rate, in Ukraine I have long been sentenced by the courts and by all presidents except Kravchuk and Yanukovich. “It all goes exactly according to your script,” they say.

Too much honor. Not according to the script, but according to the forecast. Two big differences, as they say in Odessa.

What happens to Russia and Ukraine after the Ukrainian campaign depends on how and at what it ends. Therefore, I would like to share a few confessional words about the past and present before I start to speak about the future.

Have I considered and do I consider Ukraine the main problem and threat to Russia in the version of its existence and development that has taken place since 1991? Yes, absolutely. Were there any chances and opportunities to push it off the anti-Russian path without resorting to war or a special military operation? Certainly there were. Whose fault is it that it didn’t happen? Ukraine itself, the West interested in the conflict, and all of us in Russia, of course. To varying degrees, as in the case of the collapse of the USSR.

The timer for the conflict with Ukraine was set in motion from the very beginning, in 1991. Many didn’t understand this or didn’t want to. But the speed of the time countdown before the collision was changing. As I see it, the first acceleration happened in 1999, as a result of the ratification in Russia of the Grand Treaty On Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership with Ukraine, signed in 1997: we gave up on the opportunity to keep Ukraine on the legal hook by recognizing the former administrative borders between the Ukrainian SSR and the RSFSR as state borders. We recog-

nized Crimea and Sevastopol as Ukrainian without sufficient guarantees and conditions. And did a disservice to the future leaders of the country who found themselves in the position of having to break the commitments made by Russia in 2014.

We were interested in the wrong things in Ukraine in the 1990s: not in the Russian language and education, not in the rights of the Russian-speaking regions, not in the fate of our common church, but in the plants, factories, and gas pipelines. And we were even more preoccupied with ourselves. With privatization (that is authority and business) and pursuit of the dream of a return to the Soviet reign of people simultaneously in Moscow and Kiev (that is the opposition in the Duma, CPRF). Personally, I was expelled from the People’s Patriotic Union of Russia for fighting against the ratification of the Grand Treaty. It happened at the meeting chaired by Gennady Zyuganov.

Under Putin, the situation began to change – but from the certainty that everything could be solved at the “upper level,” through inter-elite agreements with the presidents and oligarchs in Ukraine, we were too slowly moving to the need to mobilize ourselves for fighting for the minds and hearts of our yesterday’s compatriots across the border. Our government looked at many things through the eyes of its Ukrainian favorites.

I confess that I have never spoken to or met Viktor Medvedchuk in person: there has never been such an initiative on his part or mine. On his part, it is quite understandable: who is this Zatulin? To me, it was obvious from the very beginning that with Medvedchuk we were pulling a blank, like in dominoes. Unfortunately, our decision makers persisted in their stake, distracting themselves from the real needs. One delay in the distribution of Russian passports in Ukraine has played its fatal role in tempting the active minority to dare to take part in the Maidans and coups d’état. Would they risk it if a third or, even better, half of the citizens of Ukraine had a Russian passport in their pockets, in addition to the Ukrainian one? We did not overdo but underdid the competent, intelligent, and broad interference in these so-called “internal Ukrainian affairs.”

The new, significant acceleration of the timer happened in 2014. The consequences of the coup d’état, of the collapse of our illusions and our attempts to seduce the corrupt Ukrainian elite were the Crimea and then Donbass. The Russian government stopped viewing two million Crimeans, and then Russians in Ukraine in general, as hostages of the fake Russian–Ukrainian “friendship, cooperation and partnership.” The train of conflict was set on the track. But having said “A,” they did not say “B” in 2014, stopping at the gates of the abandoned Mariupol. Few people now are not strong in hindsight, regretting about it.

In the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the West saw a chance to teach Russia a lesson, to inflict preventive damage on it as a potential ally of China. Blinded by hatred of Russia, Ukraine has gone along with it, refusing to comply with the Minsk agreements. The time was working against us now: having taken actual responsibility for Donbass, we were unable to establish a normal life there under the bullets and shelling and to succeed in an unspoken but obvi-

¹ First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots, Deputy to the State Duma of Convocations I, IV, V, VII, VIII, Special Representative of the State Duma on Migration and Citizenship, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries. Author of hundreds of publications in the domestic and foreign media, including books: “33 and One More Story from the Life of Our Mainland,” “Between East and West. Ukraine against the backdrop of the Orange Revolution,” “Russia and Abkhazia: Two Countries – One People,” “The Russian Question,” etc. Member of the Scientific Council under the Security Council of the Russian Federation, member of the Government Commission for the Affairs of Compatriots Abroad, member of the Government Commission on Migration Policy. Awarded the Order of Alexander Nevsky, the Order of Honor, Friendship, Medals For Excellent Service in the Protection of Public Order, “In Memory of the 850th Anniversary of Moscow,” “300 Years of the Russian Navy”; Orders of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Order of St. Prince Daniel of Moscow, St. Sergius of Radonezh and St. Seraphim of Sarov, the Order of St. Sava of the Serbian Orthodox Church; orders and medals of the Republics of Armenia, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria Moldavian Republics, Diploma and Badge of Honor of the State Duma of the Russian Federation “For Merits in Development of Parliamentarism,” etc. Honorary Citizen of the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of Crimea.

² The report is based on a speech delivered at the 30th Assembly of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy on May 14, 2022.

ous contest: where is life better – in Donbass or in the rest of Ukraine, encouraged by the West?

For eight years, Ukraine and Russia have been in a trackstand, like in a bicycle vertical race. I am no cyclist, but people who know better say that the chance of losing is greater for the one who first breaks the pause by moving off. The fact that we “crossed the border by the river” on February 24, no matter what we say afterwards, has had and continues to have a huge impact on the global public opinion, and indeed on ourselves. And we should not be indifferent to it. We did not make that mistake with Georgia in 2008.

But now we have a “one way ticket.” It seems that the West has moved from the idea of weakening and preventive damage to the plan of inflicting life-incompatible damage on us. The temptation is too great and it grows as the special operation drags on. The worst is the ghost of the Soviet–Finnish War. As we know, Hitler drew a false conclusion from it – that the Soviet Union was a giant on clay feet – but the price of his miscalculation gives no reason to rejoice.

There should be no illusions – we are all in the same boat, and the defeat of Putin’s government is a prologue to the collapse of the country along the lines of 1917 or 1991. We must win at all costs.

Vyacheslav Nikonov in his “Big Game” is repeating his grandfather’s words: “Our cause is right. The victory will be ours.” But what is a victory? What does it consist in for us in today’s situation? The known formulated goal was neutrality and non-accession of Ukraine to NATO, demilitarization, denazification, recognition of the return of Crimea and the independence of the Donbass republics. I don’t believe in achievement of these goals as long as Ukraine retains its current government and the territories under its control.

Are we capable of overthrowing Zelensky and/or depriving him of the ground under his feet? We have plenty of outstanding experts and analysts who insist that in the course of the special military operation, we need to go all the way, to the border with Poland. Otherwise, the Ukraine that is hostile to us will keep existing. On my part it would be absurd to fight for preserving the hostile Ukraine. But can we count on success of the “Red Army’s liberating campaign” to the Western Ukraine? And, most importantly, will it not result in the re-launch of the Trojan horse into our historic space? Minister of the Interior Durnovo warned the Tsar against this danger back in 1904 in relation to Galicia.

The answer to the question of limits of what is possible in a military operation is up to our military and political leadership. As for neutrality, demilitarization and denazification, I do not believe in this in the territories that will remain under control of the Ukrainian government. Thus, to limit ourselves to recognition of Crimea and the republics of Donbass, which also cannot be achieved through ne-

gotiations, would be a defeat in the long term. Not to mention that it would call into question all the achievements in Kherson, Zaporozhye, and other regions of Ukraine.

We need to take our own, Novorossiia, to weaken the hostile Ukraine as much as possible and continue the inevitable fight against it in other forms. Saparmurat Turkmenbashi, explaining the ban on ballet in Turkmenistan, once said, “There is no ballet in the blood of Turkmen.” We have the right to decide that there is no sea in the blood of West adherents and Banderites. The return of Ukraine to the status of a non-seagoing country will temper the ambitions of all sorts of Johnsons to build naval bases on the Ukrainian coast, to supply Ukraine with arms by sea, and to consider the imperial shipyard in Nikolaev as British Crown property. Without access to the Transnistrian–Moldovan border, we encourage ideas of reprisals against Transnistria, which are already being prepared for implementation. I am convinced that strategically the hero city of Odessa is much more important than the hero city of Kiev. If you have to choose.

The question of how power should be organized and what form it should take in the liberated territories belongs to the near future: incorporation into the Russian Federation, accession to the DNR and LNR, formation of new republics, like the Kherson Republic, or after their model, or even “Ukraine 2.0.” The main thing about the issue of post-war arrangement must be its guarantees for Russia and for well-being of the local population. Especially since, as I said, there is no hope for enduring peace.

What is much more concerning now is the question of how to achieve a decisive turning point in the war, in spite of all the King’s Men of the West. How to organize the unity of the front and the rear to minimize today’s disconnection? Some of the people that I respect draw optimism from the fact that Ukraine, by definition, is more of a mess than we are. While I agree with this, I can’t help arguing that Ukraine now has people in the West supervising it. In World War II, they supplied us with Studebakers; now they send something more lethal and modern to Ukraine. I’ve been saying for a long time that we can hardly do without a new edition of the State Defense Committee. It’s not about restricting democratic rights and freedoms, it’s about building a shared will for victory. Didn’t Stalin have enough power in 1941? An emergency situation, a war requires extraordinary solutions and structures.

After the West has so blatantly intervened in the struggle in Ukraine, the special military operation is becoming more and more of a Patriotic war for us, day after day. This needs to be understood. And people, for the most part, understand that. Leave it to the narrow subject matter experts to talk about “proxy war,” “hybrid war,” etc. This is a Patriotic war, because the fate of Russia depends on its outcome.

Plenary Session

GLOBAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

June 9, 2022.

A. P. Petrov Theatre and Concert Hall, SPbUHSS

CHAIRPERSONS:

S. Yu. GLAZYEV	<i>Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i>
T. Ya. KHABRIEVA	<i>Director of the Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law under the Government of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy President of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor, Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honored Lawyer of the Republic of Tatarstan, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS</i>
K. I. KOSACHEV	<i>Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow)</i>
M. B. PIOTROVSKY	<i>Director of the State Hermitage Museum, member of the Presidium, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor, Chairman of the St. Petersburg Intelligentsia Congress, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS</i>
M. V. SHMAKOV	<i>Member of the State Council of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS</i>
A. S. ZAPESOTSKY	<i>President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation</i>

SPEAKERS:

I. I. BUZOVSKY	<i>Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk), Candidate of Sociological Sciences</i>
E. G. DRAPEKO	<i>First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation</i>
M. S. GUSMAN	<i>First Deputy Director General of the Russian News Agency "TASS" (Moscow), Dr. Sc. (Political Sciences), Professor, Honored Journalist of the Russian Federation, Honored Worker of Culture of the Russian Federation</i>
S. I. KISLYAK	<i>First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)</i>
G. B. KLEINER	<i>Deputy Scientific Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the RAS (Moscow), Head of the Department of System Analysis in Economics of the Financial University under the Government of the Russian Federation, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor</i>
A. S. MAKSIMOV	<i>Chairman of the Committee on Science and Higher Education of the Government of St. Petersburg, Candidate of Technical Sciences</i>
G. METTAN	<i>President of the United Chamber of Industry and Commerce "Switzerland – Russia and CIS States" (Geneva), Executive Director of the Swiss Press Club</i>
A. D. NEKIPELOV	<i>Director of Moscow School of Economics at Lomonosov Moscow State University, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS</i>
M. V. ZAKHAROVA	<i>Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary</i>
K. F. ZATULIN	<i>First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries</i>

M. B. PIOTROVSKY: – Good afternoon, dear colleagues, I invite Aleksandr Sergeyevich Zapesotsky to speak on behalf of the Organizing Committee of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Dear friends, we begin the plenary session of the 20th Likhachov Conference.

I am pleased to welcome everyone at our University. For many of you, this is the first time at this forum because the pandemic significantly updated the audience. This year, unlike in the previous years, we prioritized delegates from the Russian Federation over foreign participants.

The idea for this scientific conference was proposed by the first Honorary Doctor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Academician Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, who is a symbol of the Russian humanitarian culture and science, of the Russian intelligentsia. He was officially inducted as an Honorary Doctor of St. Petersburg State University of the Humanities and Social Sciences on the stage of the Theater and Concert Hall in 1993.

Initially, this scientific event was called “Days of Science at the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.” But after Dmitry Sergeyevich passed away in 2001, Daniil Aleksandrovich Granin, Honorary Doctor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, and I appealed to Russian President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin with a proposal to immortalize the memory of Dmitry Likhachov. Three days after our letter reached the Presidential Administration, the Decree “On Commemoration of D. S. Likhachov” was issued. Such a rapid response (unprecedented for peacetime) by Vladimir Vladimirovich and his administration, which prepared the documents, speaks of the president’s special attitude toward the personality of D. Likhachov, his scientific and moral legacy, and Likhachov as a spiritual symbol of Russia.

In 1999, shortly before Dmitriy Sergeyevich passed away, I registered the public movement “Congress of Petersburg Intelligentsia” at the initiative of D. A. Granin and following the instructions of Likhachov himself. By coincidence, all of its founding fathers were honorary doctors of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, except for me and one other person who is also our Honorary Doctor today. I will name the founders: D. S. Likhachov, D. A. Granin, Zh. I. Alferov, A. P. Petrov (the composer whose name is given to the hall we are now in), K. Yu. Lavrov (People’s Artist of the USSR, then artistic director of the Bolshoi Drama Theater), M. B. Piotrovsky (Chairman of the Congress of St. Petersburg Intellectuals) and your humble servant (Chairman of the Congress Executive Committee).

Presidential Decree No. 587 of May 23, 2001 “On Commemoration of D. S. Likhachov” contains clause 4, according to which the Congress of Petersburg Intelligentsia is assigned to hold the International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Some time later, Vladimir Vladimirovich supported the International Likhachov Scientific Conference with his grant. In 2022, the socially significant project “20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference” is implemented using a grant from the President of the Russian Federation for the development of civil society, provided by the Presi-

dential Grants Foundation in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 30 of January 30, 2019. The systematic support provided by the President of Russia to the Likhachov Conference explains its unprecedented scale: every year more than 1,500 people take part in the Conference (and 2022 is no exception).

Throughout the entire time, Likhachov Conference was attended by representatives of 59 countries – from Western Europe and the U.S. to Asia, Africa and the Pacific Islands. Every year before the pandemic, more than 25 countries participated in the forum. This year, in view of the difficult political situation and unwilling to put our friends (especially from NATO countries) in a difficult position, we have narrowed the guest list – the Conference is attended by representatives of 8 countries, most of all from Kazakhstan and Belarus, but there are also representatives of Western countries (Australia, Switzerland, Britain, etc.).

Today more than 20 academicians and members of the Russian Academy of Sciences, heads of major research institutes of the RAS, members of the Federation Council and the State Duma of the Russian Federation, representatives of trade unions, over 150 doctors of sciences, professors, representing about 40 regions of our country participate in the 20th Likhachov Conference, suggesting extremely large coverage and representativeness of our forum.

I give the floor to Mikhail Piotrovsky, member of the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Director of the State Hermitage and Chairman of the Congress of Petersburg Intelligentsia, to open the 20th International Likhachov Conference.

M. B. PIOTROVSKY: – Dear colleagues, I am glad to welcome everyone at the intellectual celebration which is the Likhachov Conference. Today, June 9, is a great day, 350 years since the birth of Peter the Great, so I think it is appropriate to quote D. S. Likhachov’s words about Peter the Great: “Peter’s reforms... were the natural result of the entire development of Russian culture,” that is, essentially, they were not a revolution, but a result of the evolutionary development of Russia.

Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov’s main testament is the “Declaration of the Rights of Culture,” which was prepared at St. Petersburg State University of the Humanities and Social Sciences and which we are working to implement. The Russian tradition is primarily the Roerich Pact (the Treaty for the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Historical Monuments) and Dmitry Likhachov’s “Declaration of the Rights of Culture.”

Recently an international conference was held at the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly to discuss, among other things, the problem of observing cultural rights in the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics, Abkhazia, Ossetia, and other places. A number of striking examples shows that there is a shift in the way we work to ensure respect of the rights of culture in the world.

After the start of the special operation and “canceling” of Russian culture, it turned out that many Russian exhibitions were abroad. Russia’s cultural “offensive,” including exhibitions in Western countries and the fact that many people had a chance to see them (e.g., “The Morozov Collection. Icons of Modern Art” in Paris, “Faberge in London: Romance to Revolution”), meant that at

such a difficult time the Russian flag flew over the countries of Europe.

The return of the exhibitions to Russia is a great victory, for which we are grateful to embassy officials, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian government and many others. To make it work, it was necessary to ensure observance of those guarantees (in particular, concerning the return of exhibitions), which in accordance with the "Declaration of Cultural Rights" and in development of its ideas, were formulated in due time and adopted by efforts of Russia in the global cultural space. All conditions were agreed in advance, so it was possible to put these guarantees to life. The story with the return of the exhibitions to Russia showed who is a friend, who is an enemy, and who took a middle position in the global cultural space.

We associate Dmitry Sergeyevich with memory of the siege of Leningrad and cultural life at that time. The life and efforts during the siege are always on our mind and can be seen as a guide to action. We know how well the system of safeguarding and protecting cultural property was organized during the siege. It was the time of a motto, "When the guns speak, the muses are not silent." Today this motto is more relevant than ever. The siege taught us to speak through its ring, overcoming its boundaries. Cultural events that took place in the besieged Hermitage (such as the Nizami Memorial Festival and others) were held not only for St. Petersburgers, but for the entire world.

Now Russia is also in a partial siege, and we are finding ways to communicate bypassing this ring. Just as the image of the Mother of God appears clearly visible in the clouds, so the phenomena of the Russian culture will be visible to all.

I thank everyone here for being with us today. The topics declared for discussion at 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference are relevant and interesting, important from the point of view of both today and the future.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Mikhail Borisovich. I give the floor to Mikhail Viktorovich Shmakov, member of the State Council of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Professor Emeritus of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

M. V. SHMAKOV: – Dear participants, first of all I would like to read greetings from President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin to the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

'Dear friends,

Congratulations with the opening of the anniversary 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

Holding your meetings at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences has already become a good tradition. The Likhachov Conference has an eventful agenda and engaged participants – famous scientists and politicians, public figures, representatives of culture and art. This ensures a productive dialogue on the most important problems of our time, substantive discussion of ways to solve them, taking into account the entire range of opinions. That is why the Likhachov Conference attracts unwavering attention of experts and the widest circles of audience.

I hope that this year's forum dedicated to international issues will serve to develop fruitful humanitarian ties, strengthen mutual understanding between countries and peoples, and, of course, become another contribution to the preservation and further study of the rich creative and spiritual heritage of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, whose humanistic ideas are especially relevant and in demand today.

I wish you effective communication and all the best.'

Aleksandr Sergeyevich Zapesotsky described the history of emergence and organization of the Likhachov Conference in sufficient detail. I just want to add that the Federation of Independent Trade Unions is a founder of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences and we are always attentive to all initiatives of the University.

Over 20 years, the Likhachov Conference has become an important event in the global humanitarian and cultural science. We believe that St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences makes a great contribution to the development of our country: trade unions (which include representatives of various professions from different sectors of the economy, production, culture, etc.) understand that the development of culture contributes to economic development, productivity and labor efficiency, no matter what work a person does. At the same time, improvement of culture cannot be effective if the economy does not develop. Only in symbiosis, where one thing flows from the other, can we build a society of free people living and working with dignity, with an objective view of life that is not clouded by various technologies of influencing consciousness, will, and actions.

For my part, I can say that St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences is the best humanitarian university in the world. First, there is not even a hint of such a scientific and educational institution in international trade unions. Second, if we look at the humanities universities that exist in the world as a whole and in our country in particular, we will not find such a unique one as St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Federation of Independent Trade Unions as the founder is proud of its offspring and will continue to develop the University.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to the Deputy President of the Russian Academy of Sciences, a renowned legal scholar, Honorary Doctor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Academician Tatyana Yarullova Khabrieva.

T. Ya. KHABRIEVA: – Dear colleagues, I would like to return to the topic of the plenary session, 'Global Conflict and the Contours of a New World Order.'

As a scientist, my first thought is that to predict the future, we need to assess the present. Such assessments have already been given in the materials presented for the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference. First of all, I studied what the legal scholars suggest, and here's what I think: Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov was absolutely right when he urged us to remember that the achievements of civilization must serve the good of people. And law is no exception.

But the question is, how do people feel when globalization advances (sometimes very aggressively) and pandem-

ics have not yet receded, economic wars are being fought, and international tensions are rising? How comfortable are they? Today one dwells in a multidimensional legal space (international, regional, national, local, etc.), but is that an improvement?

Our colleagues in the plenary and panel sessions will try to provide answers to these questions. There are politicians in the audience today who take the first punch, like Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova. But I speak as a legal scholar, so I think that first of all we need to understand what is going on with international law, and then propose a solution.

In assessing the general state of affairs, I can say that international law today is in a crisis (and my colleagues, such as RAS Academician A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, will agree with me on this). The fragmentation that has plagued international law has led to a loss of universality. Hence there has been a transformation of the common international law, its core, into a normative system of parameters of a unipolar world. It is a dysfunctional system, short-lived, and it is necessary to look for ways out of this situation using science, *inter alia*.

I believe that in this part it is necessary to use all means, scientific and practical, to revive the categorical imperative, the conciliatory nature of international law. It originated and was shaped precisely as the right of consent of sovereign states.

Another rescue trajectory is regionalism, which is also part of international law, but is not in a crisis. Regionalism, according to the logic of the development of civilization, begins to spread actively when globalization trend does not go upward. This is exactly the situation we have now. And the fact of proliferation of the international and regional integration law, these large legal frameworks, shows that it is regionalism that we must pay attention to. A successful example is the Eurasian Economic Union.

What good are these legal frameworks and why is it important to us now? Because these normative systems do not deny the core of international law and advocate the preservation of the UN Charter, universally recognized principles and norms of international law, as proclaimed in the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union. I believe that positive development of integration alliances will help us shape the outlines of a secure world as modeled by this union. Expectably, other integration associations, such as the SCO and BRICS, will also evolve. I would call this a "rescue trajectory" as it is one of the directions for creating a multipolar world to which we will aspire.

But there is another direction. In preparing for the conference, I turned to the research conducted by our Institute of Legislation and Comparative Law (in particular, we recently completed a translation of the constitutions of the world, 20 volumes all in all). Judging by the expert commentary, the states, increasingly striving to acquire political sovereignty, want to achieve value sovereignty as well, because the value component in the Constitution is becoming more and more important. Today, the focus of peoples and nations is on worldviews.

The constitutional reform that took place in Russia prepared us for the current situation. Our advantage in this regard is not only that we have returned to our roots, but also that now we can re-establish the legal and legislative system and prepare to create the outlines of a new world order

in which the sovereign rights of states and the cultures of all peoples will be respected.

That is, the vector of evolutionary development will turn not in one direction, which was, in fact, previously imposed on us, but towards recognition of the equality of all cultures and peoples, including the legal culture. In this sense, Article 79 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation was revised in due time: "The Russian Federation may participate in interstate associations and transfer some of its powers to them in accordance with international treaties of the Russian Federation, if this does not entail restrictions on human and civil rights and freedoms and does not contradict the foundations of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation. Decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation in their interpretation which contradicts the Constitution of the Russian Federation shall not be subject to execution in the Russian Federation." This article proposes a new relationship between the universal and the national, prepared by efforts of the RF Constitutional Court. In this part, we will be able to provide our citizens with better protections than those that have failed. We are now entitled to replicate our own legal designs.

I wish everyone success and confidence in the future in a stable multipolar world.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Talia Yarullovna.

Our Conference is held under the auspices of not only the Congress of Petersburg Intelligentsia, but also the Russian Academy of Sciences, as well as with the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is one of the most respected in our country. Two of its officers are more popular than movie stars – Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and our amazing guest, Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova. You have the floor, please.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – Aleksandr Sergeyevich, thank you for the invitation and for the high praise you have given to our work.

First of all, I would like to read the welcome address from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Sergey Viktorovich Lavrov, to the organizers and participants of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

"I bid a most cordial welcome to organizers and participants of the anniversary 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

This event organized at the premises of Saint-Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences has rightfully gained a reputation as one of the important venues for the joint intellectual effort of eminent public figures, scientists and cultural luminaries from various countries. It is inspiring that the experience of academician D. S. Likhachov who has made a priceless contribution in the common heritage of Russian and global culture is in high demand and still used in the search of responses for modern challenges and threats arising from the potential for confliction that has accumulated recently.

The matter of establishment of a truly democratic multipolar world that is studied at the Conference this year is particularly relevant today when we witness such a hot

and strong resistance to the current changes displayed by the states that do not want to lose their dominant position in the system of international relations — the resistance that contradicts all the legal, moral and ethical norms. It is important that special attention during the upcoming discussions is supposed to be paid to assets and culture as well as the place of Russia in the global processes.

I am confident that the work of the forum will be productive, and its result will give momentum to development of cooperation and mutual understanding between peoples for the purpose of solving global problems.

I wish you all fruitful discussions and all the best.”

During the plenary session, we will discuss the contours of a new world order, which is the theme of the session.

Today one often hears the phrase (from political scientists and public figures on television, radio, and the Internet): the international system that has evolved over the past decades has changed dramatically, the architecture of international relations has been completely transformed, the familiar, established format of communication is becoming a thing of the past, and so on. But it seems to me that this is not entirely true. We need to be more precise in wording, especially when the ones who speak are not participants of mass events, rallies and talk shows, but people who are engaged in science.

The system of international relations is fluid, it changes every day, responding to challenges and thus shaping reality when new circumstances arise. This process is like the flow of a river that changes every second.

What is happening today? In my opinion, new factors and arguments are appearing on the international agenda and are being presented to Russia. These factors are so global and serious that they cannot be ignored.

You can assess the place of the Russian Federation in the world however you want — as a regional player or as a global power; in any case, what is presented to us as an argument in international relations forms the agenda not in the regional, but in the global scale, because deep processes have been affected in all areas and in all parts of the globe. It would be misleading to think that everything that is happening now is a response to some specific recent facts and the apparent (for us) lack of respect for our country. In fact, this is not only about Russia as a regional player. It is a deeply thought-out and, in fact, suffered-out response to the processes that were taking place in the world in the late twentieth to early twenty-first century, which have already begun to change reality little by little, leading it to apocalypse. For two decades, Russia has offered the world, and especially those who called themselves the dominant power, a dialogue on an equal footing and in a respectful manner. By “dialogue” I do not mean communication between two subjects, but the development of new principles for the collective construction of the world order. And what was the response to our suggestions? The West’s unwavering, almost maniacal conviction of its infallibility and uniqueness. And most surprisingly, they did not even find it necessary to somehow soften it or put it in a more or less diplomatic form. On the contrary, their stance was rigidly manifested and also imposed on the rest of the world as a concept for perception of reality.

Undoubtedly, the events taking place today will be the subject of careful scholarly analysis. But I would like to suggest a way that we, the contemporaries, should see them.

Many people see this crisis as something dramatic and get discouraged. But those who know the history understand that this is the moment of profound change. A renewal must take place, the secondary and superficial things will fade into the background, and instead a new mainstream path of further world development will emerge.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: — Maria Vladimirovna, thank you. I give the floor to Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin.

K. F. ZATULIN: — Aleksandr Sergeyevich, I am flattered to be named the candidate of historical science, but I do not have an academic degree. I never got my Ph. D. in history. I was doing my post-graduate studies in the early 1980s, and when I tried to defend my thesis and said that we needed an overhaul of industrial management (the topic of my thesis was “Industrial Management from 1965 to 1980”), they wrote in the review of my work that while we did have problems in agriculture, there was nothing wrong with industry and we did not need any overhaul. As a result, the defense did not take place. This was the period when the country was led by Konstantin Ustinovich Chernenko. Then he was succeeded by Mikhail Gorbachev, and the word “perestroika” (overhaul) became common.

When I saw a heading in the mass media “Twentieth Likhachov Conference: Zakharova to reveal the essence of the West, and Zatulin to solve the Ukrainian question,” a famous saying of Kozma Prutkov came to my mind: “A specialist is like a gum-boil; his fullness is one-sided.” I have never sought to be perceived as an expert on Ukraine. Nevertheless, I am always, and now even more often than usual, invited to talk shows and other programs and events devoted specifically to the situation in Ukraine. Today we will also discuss this pressing topic in a panel discussion, but without ignoring other issues.

So what is going on in Ukraine? First of all, it seems to me that we should leave all these definitions — “hybrid war,” “proxy war” and the like — to narrow specialists. But it would also be wrong to reduce everything to the concept of a “special military operation.” In the early weeks, as you know, there was finger-pointing at those who said “war” instead of a “special military operation.” But as it becomes increasingly clear that we are fighting not only and not so much against the Zelensky regime in Ukraine as against the collective West, this military operation is turning before our eyes not just into a war, but into a domestic war, because the future of our country, the Russian Federation, depends on the outcome of everything that is happening. What will it become as a result, what will happen to Ukraine, Russia, and the whole world? I believe that’s how most of the population of our country perceives it. It is for the sake of Russia’s future that our people, understanding essentially what is happening, are ready to accept hardships and privations (preferably, of course, without them being catastrophic), and our military, engaged in this operation, are acting as their fathers and grandfathers did in the fronts of past wars, that is, with full responsibility, losing health and their very lives, but achieving their goals.

I think it makes no sense now to analyze in detail whether things could have turned out differently. Of course, it would have been desirable if there had been forces in Ukraine able to prevent this armed conflict before February 24. For many years, starting not even from 2014, but from

1991, efforts were made both inside and outside Ukraine to redirect it from the anti-Russia and now essentially anti-Russian path, because an anti-Russia state with mathematical precision turns into an anti-Russian state, which is what is happening today with the official Ukraine. But at the same time, our geopolitical rivals were trying their best to realize their goals that were the opposite of ours. They saw Ukraine as a convenient means to prevent the revival of Russia, to create problems for us for many years to come. But we have to admit that all attempts to solve these problems by humane methods, without taking matters to the point of a military confrontation, have proven futile.

Of course, we have had some effect through propaganda and other peaceful activities. We can see that those people who are now in the zone of action of our armed forces in Ukraine, not only in the territory of Donetsk and Lugansk regions, but also in Kherson, Zaporozhye, and Kharkov regions, quickly come back to an understanding of what really happened, because they know how forced Ukrainization was carried out in its time. Let me remind you that it took place under Soviet rule, in the 1920s and early 1930s. In such cases, sooner or later the opposite process begins.

Among my colleagues who are historians, including those whom I have known for decades, there are many highly qualified specialists who, like my classmate Aleksey Il'yich Miller, for some reason believe that Ukrainization is irreversible. Ukrainians are a different nation, and nothing else. But I believe that these processes are reversible, and everything depends on our efforts. Some may think we're fighting for territories, but we're really fighting for people. This needs to be understood. However, in our practical work, unfortunately, we do not always take this into account. At a time when our troops are sacrificing their lives, we, here in the rear, in the State Duma and the Federation Council, in the Presidential Administration and the Government, are inexcusably slow to respond to the needs of the new times. The organization of our economy, measures for refugees and unwilling migrants, and many other things attest to this.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Konstantin Fedorovich. Elena Grigorievna Drapeko, Honored Artist of Russia, is invited to the podium. Dear friends, I must say that Elena Grigorievna agreed to the demotion the moment she became a member of the State Duma: before that she was a professor at the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

E. G. DRAPEKO: – Dear colleagues, I am happy to welcome you at another Likhachov Conference. I am eternally grateful to the University for having found the warmest support here during the difficult time in 1993. It was at the University that I, an actress, was taught to approach any problem from a scientific point of view, to translate ordinary human language into the language of scientific works.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Professor Drapeko, like all other professors at our university, had a certain pedagogical rating set on a 100-point scale. Her rating was invariably between 99 and 100!

E. G. DRAPEKO: – Today I would like to take this opportunity to talk about the essential. What worries today's

deputies of the State Duma, forced to make both popular and unpopular decisions? We have real positional battles – debates about how the Russian Federation should act in today's international environment and how Russian culture should respond to the challenges of our time.

We continue to implement national projects, including in the field of culture. We are making rural culture centers more modern and comfortable, creating model libraries – and these are real palaces of knowledge! We are modernizing theaters for young audiences and children's puppet theaters. Russian cinematography receives a great deal of support; domestic films are being made, although with varying success. The program for the protection of historical and cultural monuments continues, and many are being restored. I think it is all very noticeable in St. Petersburg, but in other cities, too, it is quite tangible.

And what are the challenges of today? Mikhail Borisovich Piotrovsky talked about how we are fighting back on the outer contours, trying to reach out to our colleagues abroad through the barrier that fences us off, especially in Western Europe, which has chosen the path of canceling Russia. But inside the country some contradictions have also worsened, especially among the Russian intelligentsia. Since the 1990s our intelligentsia has been in a state of partial anemia, in my opinion, especially after the shooting of the White House in 1993. But today there is a change of vectors, which has exposed a lot of problems. We are trying to find a solution how to avoid a split in the society, and, on the contrary, consolidate it. We need to hear from everyone, both those who are “for the Reds” and those who are “for the Whites.” Because the rift runs along the very fracture that has been present in our society since the 1990s. I think we'll find a way out and we can come to an agreement. Such a large-scale forum as the Likhachov Scientific Conference will certainly contribute to this good cause.

Despite the success of the national project, the cultural management system in Russia still has to be improved. When demanding loyalty from cultural actors, the state must take the first step toward them. But how does the state help cultural actors? Creative unions have effectively been declared Stalinist collective farms and deprived of any support other than grants. The officials who sit in administrations, expert councils of the Ministry of Culture and other agencies are not representatives of cultural actors, but of their own persons. I think this is the main problem we need to solve, because associations of artists or intelligentsia express a common position. But their voices are not heard.

Another important and eternal topic is, who are the judges? Take cinema. On the one hand, producers are counting the proceeds from distribution; on the other hand, directors win prizes at international festivals in the nomination “Best spit toward Russia.” You know the names. They are the ones who define our elite today, who make assessments about what's going on. I think this is a very important problem. Culture has no other evaluations than expertise. It is impossible to weigh or measure the quality of this or that film – you can only evaluate it.

As for such a painful issue as monument protection, we have adopted many laws and bylaws in this area. I introduced another bill for consideration. It will regulate the use and preservation of architectural monuments which are now residential buildings, and ensure that the interests of citizens

living there are respected. I hope that we will discuss these problems in more detail.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Elena Grigorievna, you are always welcome and we are waiting for you on the first of September with a lecture about the protection of monuments. And now the floor is given to Academician Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – Thank you, Aleksandr Sergeyevich. First of all, let me congratulate you and your wonderful university on the anniversary Likhachov Conference. I am very pleased to be able to participate in it once again and to pass on to you the congratulations from the Eurasian Economic Commission.

Dear colleagues, as you know, we are creating the Eurasian Economic Union, in which we really lack the humanitarian dimension. Just two weeks ago the Eurasian Economic Forum took place; at the center of its attention were issues of culture and humanitarian cooperation. In the situation of dramatic trials experienced by our country and its allies it is very important to feel a spiritual affinity, common historic roots and a cultural basis that helps us build a future together. I would like to invite you, Aleksandr Sergeyevich, and your colleagues to join our initiative to create the Eurasian Network University. We believe that your participation will greatly benefit this project.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Gladly, we will be honored.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – Turning to the topic of our discussion, I must say that everything that is happening today was predicted by our academic science. More than fifteen years ago we developed a theory of long-term economic development as a shift of technological and world economic modes. And today, in full accordance with the scientific forecast, we are experiencing a dramatic moment: a technological revolution that radically changes the world's technological structure, and a governance revolution that completely changes the balance of power in the world.

This is the fifth transition in the history of mankind in the last 500 years, and such a transitions, unfortunately, has always been accompanied by world wars. We also foresaw the current events, and I can say with certainty how it will end: the defeat of the aggressor. Ten years ago I published a report titled "The Last World War: The U.S. starts and loses." Every time when the world economical patterns change, the countries that had dominated up to that point try to maintain their hegemony at all costs and wage world wars against their competitors in order to maintain their leadership. In the last century, Britain, seeking to maintain its hegemony, first unleashed the First World War and then provoked the Second, in which more than a hundred million people died. Monstrous figures. But as a result, the British Empire collapsed, because by that time it was already less efficient than its competitors – the United States and the Soviet Union, which had built the new world economy. Now it is crumbling, as did the previous ones. This cycle lasts about 30 years, and we predict that we will have another two or three years of military escalation in which the American ruling elite will unsuccessfully try to crush its rivals.

As always, a new leader will eventually emerge, and we can already see it. The countries of Southeast Asia have al-

ready formed a new world economic order. China and India are now overtaking the United States and the European Union in terms of production volumes. The destructive actions taken by the U.S., from sanctions to the cultivation of Nazi regimes against us, objectively entail consolidation of a new center of the world economy. There is no doubt that in five years the Southeast Asia will finally come to dominate the world economic system. The Eurasian Economic Union is well attuned to the current events: we are rapidly changing the structure of our economic relations by strengthening the ties with strategic partners in Southeast Asia. We intend to propose to our partners the creation of an anti-war coalition, one of the goals of which will be to break free from dependence on Western currencies – dollar, euro, pound. Instead we suggest to issue a new world currency, with its own exchange space and pricing system. I'm sure it will all come to fruition, but in due time. The next two or three years will be decisive in this regard.

Unfortunately, as in the previous dramatic eras, the main strike of the aggressor is directed against Russia. This is largely the result of the Russophobia inherent in the so-called geopolitics (a pseudo-science created in its time by the British and German thinkers). Russophobia calls for the destruction of Russia, because in the mythological constructions of Western politicians, the key to controlling the world lies in controlling Eurasia whose main actor is Russia. Therefore, fueled by utopian doctrinaire ideas, they are now unleashing their full power against us.

According to our predictions, the confrontation will peak in 2024. We have to survive this fight. As correctly noted by Konstantin Fedorovich, this global hybrid war differs from previous ones primarily because it is not fought for territory, but for the minds, influence, control of the global financial system, whereas the actual military action is used mainly for punitive purposes. Undoubtedly the victory will be ours, but I wish it had been less bloody. A modern understanding of the nature and driving forces of this war suggests that the key to victory lies in creation of a broad international anti-war coalition, restoration of international law, and formation of a new world economic order. And we, the Eurasian Economic Commission, are looking forward to your recommendations, because this war is not only a military operation, but above all a humanitarian one. I want to wish all my colleagues every success, and hope for further fruitful cooperation.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Sergey Yuryevich. I give the floor to Konstantin Iosifovich Kosachev.

K. I. KOSACHEV: – I will begin with a thought I loved from the famous German writer and philosopher Lion Feuchtwanger, who once rightly said that people watch the course of events the way children watch the clock: all their attention is fixed on the movement of the second hand, and they do not look at the minute hand, much less the hour hand. This is still the case today when we talk about events in and around Russia. Of course, I would like it very much to talk about specific events and about the course of the special military operation, about our relations with our neighbors in Europe and Asia, but I always try to distance myself from the situation, placing it in the context of the essential processes that continue to develop in the human history.

If we count the history of mankind since the appearance of homo sapiens some 200,000 years ago, then the period from Ancient Rome to the present day is the last half-hour on the clock face. And the entire history of our country, starting with, say, Rurik, is nine minutes. So what has been going on in the last hundred days is much less than a second. If you exclude the history of ancient peoples, I think you would agree that the last four to six centuries can be described as a history of the West's ceaseless attempts to master the rest of the globe. This occurred in many different forms and methods, sometimes in downright monstrous ways. We remember the largest genocide in the history of mankind – extermination of Indians in the North American continent, when about 15 million people died. Let me remind you that about six million people were victims of the Holocaust.

Be that as it may, at the initial stage the West did manage to secure itself an advantage over the rest of the world by being the first to master new technologies. Seafaring, the use of firearms, and the assembly-line organization of production enabled one of the first industrial revolutions. The West's advanced position in the world has long been attributed to its ability to do many things better than other nations have done elsewhere.

But with the advent of the twentieth century, the situation suddenly began to change. There were at least two reasons for that. First, the humanity has reached a relatively high degree of moral development. The advance of morality means that it is considered indecent to oppress other peoples by force and make them work for you, as was the case during the colonial era. Second, other nations are slowly gaining strength and becoming ready to compete with the West, no longer taking its leadership for granted. In my view, this was the main trend of the twentieth century: emergence of many centers of power and beginning of a real, inherently healthy competition.

What is happening at this moment to the West, spoilt by centuries of leadership and sincerely believing in its own exclusivity and being God-chosen? In countries of the West they truly believe that they bring prosperity and happiness. Those who doubt it are seen as evil opposing the good. However, the West is no longer able to “naturally” maintain its leadership position, so it begins to do all it can to contain its competitors. That is, from now on, it is an increasingly obvious strategy to keep other countries in a more backward position, creating impediments to their development.

The whole world has clearly seen these trends over the last 30 years, in the post-Cold War period. The policy for containment of competitors has become the main tool for Western countries to realize their geopolitical interests. In this context, I would note the following: we have not yet fully realized that the globalization we love so much was in fact one of the instruments of subjugation of others by those who invented globalization and at some point began to manage it.

What happened now? The West's policy of containment ended in failure. First Russia, and then, increasingly more, China, rushed forward heedless of this policy. By now many countries are participating in this rally. But the decisive stage came in February this year. There is no need to pretend anymore: the West has moved from a policy of containment to a policy of destruction, in this case of Russia. The same thing is certain to happen to any other coun-

try that does not want to fit into the concept of a unipolar world. There is no doubt that this is a war of annihilation.

The way out of this situation will not be quick. I think it is obvious to everyone that what is happening to Ukraine and Russia is only a small part of what is happening to the mankind. We came to a fork in the road, after which, like in the old comedy “Kidnapping, Caucasian Style,” we go either to the registry office or to the prosecutor. I am convinced that we have every opportunity to achieve first normalization, and then harmonization of international relations, but not under the principles that the West imposes, but under those that our country proposed to the world 30 years ago, defended them in the Charter of Paris for the New Europe and other documents up to December last year, when we put forward the well-known initiatives for a collective security organization. We were not heard in either case. Today we are undergoing severe trials, but sooner or later we will be heard; it is inevitable because there are simply no other alternatives for the development of mankind. We are on the right side of history.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Konstantin Iosifovich. I invite Professor Andrey Stanislavovich Maksimov to the podium.

A. S. MAKSIMOV: – Dear colleagues, It has already been mentioned here that today Russia celebrates 350th anniversary of Peter the Great. We are in the city founded by Peter, the cradle of science and education of the Russian Empire. Therefore, allow me to take advantage of the honorable mission and read the congratulations of the governor of St. Petersburg Aleksandr Dmitrievich Beglov to the participants, organizers and guests of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.

“Welcome to Saint Petersburg, to the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference!

Over two decades a largescale forum brings together public and political figures from Russia and countries of near and far abroad, people of science, culture and arts on the banks of the Neva River. This momentous event ranks high in the life of the Northern Capital and the international humanities community. We cherish the legacy of the talented scholar and educator – Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov, we are proud that he lived and worked in our city, that Russian culture can preserve the experience and traditions of different peoples of the world and assimilate the best aspects of humanity. These thoughts and observations of his acquire special value and significance when compared with the topic of the anniversary Conference “Global Conflict and the Contours of a New World Order.”

I am sure that your fruitful work will encourage further reinforcement of people-to-people ties and will become a foundation for new educational projects.

I wish you good health, well-being, productive and interesting discussions!”

I would like to draw attention to two other points. First, congratulations to all of us that after two years of the pandemic, we have the happy opportunity of truly getting together, seeing each other's eyes and smiles. It is especially wonderful that this is happening now at the 20th International Likhachov Conference.

Second, as Aleksandr Sergeyevich stressed, the international component of the Conference is very important for us

this year. On behalf of the Administration of St. Petersburg, I would like to express my gratitude and admiration for my colleagues from abroad, especially from those countries that pursue an unfriendly policy toward the Russian Federation. Today they are accomplishing a feat. And let me remind you of a wonderful thought of Anton Chekhov, classic of Russian literature: "There is no national science, just as there is no national multiplication table; what is national is no longer science." I wish you continued success!

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Andrey Stanislavovich. And our deepest gratitude to Aleksandr Dmitrievich.

Dear colleagues, the floor is given to Aleksandr Dmitriyevich Nekipelov, a prominent Russian economic scientist and Honorary Doctor of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

A. D. NEKIPELOV: – I join all congratulations on the beginning of the 20th International Likhachov Conference. It's a great pleasure to take part in it, especially after a two-year (for me, even three-year) break.

I would like to briefly speak about the economic problems we have faced. These problems are outlined against the background of serious changes in the world economic order, which, it seems to me, became particularly evident after the global financial and economic crisis of 2007–2009. It marked a turning point. Globalization has created an increasingly homogeneous market space in which firms and individuals were the main agents, with the state receding into the background. The prospect, albeit remote, was creation of a world government. After the crisis, globalization began to roll back, and for a number of reasons, in countries that were proponents of reducing the role of the state, this role was especially manifest. This was the case because previously state institutions in these countries were left out, and the trends of world development acted to their benefit.

For Russia, of course, the situation is now aggravated by large-scale sanctions. We faced a whole set of serious economic shocks: we were pushed out of international technology chains, and that led to shocks on both the demand and supply sides. Actually, problems of this kind had already existed during the pandemic, but now they have become long-term. It is obvious that a long and difficult period of transformation of the Russian economy is ahead – changing the nature of cooperation with other countries and transforming the entire production structure.

Importantly, a feature of our economy which has always been seen as its weakness, can become the key to its sustainability. I am talking about the fuel and raw materials orientation of Russia's economy. In this situation, the availability of almost the entire spectrum of natural resources and a fairly high level of agricultural development are of great importance. It seems that the countries that imposed sanctions on Russia miscalculated this circumstance.

Of course, there are problems associated with the changing location of economic resources. Some of these problems can be solved naturally by the market – in this sense, e.g., actions aimed at stimulating small-scale production are absolutely justified. Some changes may occur under the influence of relatively small adjustments in the functioning of the economic system, and in this case, too, the market mechanism is likely to work effectively. However, serious strategic decisions will be necessary to restore our position

in many technological areas. The state will have to play an important role in the redistribution of resources.

A separate group of issues, which I will omit now, has to do with the changes that have taken place in the monetary and financial sphere. I want to mention only one thing. We have to keep a very close eye on the current account of the country's balance of payments. In the first quarter of 2022, the current account surplus was \$58.2 billion, two and a half times higher than in the first quarter last year. Now the situation with settlements in currencies of unfriendly states is unstable, and the funds in the accounts of not only the Central Bank, but also private structures may be in danger. We need to take this into account.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Today outstanding Russian diplomat Sergei Ivanovich Kislyak is participating in the Conference for the first time. He was Russia's ambassador to the United States for a little less than ten years and witnessed, for example, the transition from B. Obama to D. Trump, and many other book-worthy events. He is now first deputy chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs.

S. I. KISLYAK: – The very first hours of the Conference prove the high intellectual level of the discussion that is unfolding in this forum: twenty years of experience have an impact. The Likhachov Conference already has a deep tradition, and of course, will develop further, continuing to help us better understand the events taking place in the country and the world. It makes me very happy to see so many young faces in the audience. It is not easy for the young people to understand the current situation and how it will develop; the fact that science helps them to do this is invaluable.

Returning to the topic of our meeting, I would like to say that I will have to be a dissident for a while: I do not fully agree with our basic thesis that there is a global conflict going on. There are many conflicts on the planet, each of them affecting the development of the world order to a greater or lesser extent. The objective reality is that the world is changing. In recent decades, new centers of economic power have emerged, which means the emergence of new centers of political and, in the long term, military power. It would seem that the important world players – Russia, Europe, and the United States – agree with this. However, in fact, Russia accepts the objective reality as it is, while the U.S. does not.

Americans see themselves as exclusive people who should lead the rest of us and, moreover, have the right of dominance to promote their own interests – economic, military and political. Hence the American thesis that the world now rests not only on international law but also on international rules. These rules have been shaped over the past decades by the United States and its allies in their quest for world domination.

Nevertheless, Americans cannot ignore the fact China is growing stronger. This is the biggest challenge to the U.S. at the moment, including the military aspect.

Russia also challenges U.S. security, although they consider this challenge to be short-term. Over the past decades, the concept of containment of Russia has been created, and this definition has evolved from "restraining" and "holding back" to "detention." All of these words translate almost

identically into Russian, but have different operative meanings. In the case of Russia, containment over the past decade or so has included three components.

The first component is military-political containment. It is realized by deploying forces near our borders and encouraging anti-Russian sentiment in the countries around us. Ukraine in this sense is the most striking, but not the solitary example. The second component is economic containment. The sanctions policy against Russia is not just a response to Russia's determination to defend its interests; it is part of a policy (now brought to the extreme) of containing Russia's development so that it does not become a serious competitor to the United States. The third component, which we often forget, is the psychological impact on our citizens, aimed at destabilizing the country from within. Never throughout the entire history of our confrontation with the United States, not even during the Cold War, efforts to hack our mentality from within have reached such an intensity, such a scale of funding and coordination with allied nations. The consequences of this impact will be felt by us for years to come, and this must be taken into account when building models of economic development and shaping approaches to the relationship between international and domestic law.

If you look at what our Western colleagues are saying about relations with Russia, you can see that they are mainly interested in what will happen when the military conflict in Ukraine is over. I'm sure it will end on our terms, but really, what is to be expected then? There seems to be a general consensus among Western political scientists that the era of the peace dividends is over and will never resume, or at least not for the foreseeable future. This economic, political, or even propaganda category characterizes the state's ability to divert the funds that went to military purposes during conflicts to domestic economic development. Consequently, from now on, the West will build its economy on the premises of military and political pressure. Can we withstand it? In my opinion, yes, but this point must necessarily be taken into account.

Western scientists disagree in their estimates of what the world will be like after the special operation. The range of opinions is very wide: from a tense Cold War to an enlightened society in which everyone understands that it is necessary to consider the interests of others, to develop consensus solutions, and to strive for peaceful coexistence.

I believe this optimistic theory is realistic, but its realization will require enormous effort and a great deal of time.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Sergey Ivanovich, we hope that this will not be your last visit to the University. I ask our guest from Belarus, its Deputy Minister for Information and prominent sociologist Igor Ivanovich Buzovsky, to take the podium.

I. I. BUZOVSKY: – The representatives of Belarus feel that we have been given tremendous trust to let us speak at the Likhachov Conference at such a difficult time. In my report I quoted a classic: "When face to face, there is no face to see. The big things, to be seen, require distance." Recent events in the Republic of Belarus confirm this. There is a concept of "emotional pacifism" – compassion and concern felt for reasons that seem unreasonable and incomprehensible to most people. What happened in

the Republic of Belarus can be repeated in any post-Soviet country.

We witnessed scary events. No one could have imagined that such a thing was possible in the year of the 75th anniversary of the Great Victory: in the main square of the country, mad (there is no other word for it) people covered the stele "Minsk – Hero-City" with a flag, which is associated with the betrayal committed during that war, and proclaimed slogans about truth and justice, causing common delight.

These events clearly demonstrated the trends taking place in our society. In fact, it is struck by schizophrenia: the ideals, meanings, and values that help understand what is "good" and what is "bad" are lost. We have lost the strategy of development, the vision of where we are going. The results of opinion polls conducted by Belarusian sociologists before the 2020 presidential election are revealing. It turned out that the vast majority of the population prefers a market development strategy, but at the same time points to the need to preserve the benefits and social privileges. This imbalance in value priorities leads to further value transformations, which is one of the problems of the current stage of development of the Republic of Belarus.

International studies have revealed that the residents of the Republic of Belarus consider such values as health and family as a priority. It would seem that nothing is wrong with that. But is such a trend really positive? The foregrounding of these values leads us away from global approaches to society's development strategy. The results of studies show that individualism and egoism are characteristic of Belarusians. Why aren't we talking about patriotism and collectivism, which were priorities before? Today, as we can see, the situation is just the opposite.

I would like to make one point to everyone in the room. We declare that we adhere to certain values: Christian, family values. But have we articulated them? Is there a list of such values that could become a reference point for each of us, unite not only the inhabitants of one country, but perhaps the entire global community? Either because of a misunderstanding of its importance, or because of a desire to promote tolerance of certain views, we still do not have a clear list of values that would unite the society.

The Chinese society has developed such a list. At one of the Congresses of the Chinese Communist Party, values were clearly defined and subsequently spelled out not only in political documents, but also in state orders for books, films, etc. I believe we also need to begin to form such a set of values as soon as possible.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich, I would like to invite you to the Day of Belarusian Written Language, which is celebrated on the first Sunday of September. For this holiday, we plan to create a set of books that would detail one of those values that unite the society: justice. I invite you to join me in a discussion about the relevance of this value. By the way, the event will be held on the border of three countries – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus.

I wish fruitful work to all the participants of the plenary session!

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Igor Ivanovich, we are pleased to accept your invitation on behalf of the University. I give the floor to Mikhail Solomonovich Gusman, First Deputy General Director of the TASS News Agency, Doctor of

Political Science, Professor, Honored Journalist of Russia, Honored Cultural Worker of Russia.

M. S. GUSMAN: – First of all, there are two things that make me very happy. The first is that the word “pandemic” has been mentioned only a few times in the past two hours. The second is that the work of the Likhachov Conference resumed, and we finally met again.

On September 1, 2022, TASS will be 118 years old. For all these years, the agency’s staff has gathered every morning for a planning meeting. In November 2019, these planners began to talk more and more about the disturbing news coming from our office in Beijing.

However, we could not imagine what expected the world in the very near future, including the scale of the information chaos in which it would find itself. Mankind was clinging to the screens of TVs and computers. It was a huge challenge for the information workers: we had an increased responsibility for the reliability and accuracy of the data related to the disaster that befell the planet. It seems to me that journalists from TASS, Russia’s oldest and, in my opinion, still leading agency, and their colleagues around the world have handled this challenge.

We remember that there were all kinds of versions of the origin of the coronavirus, all kinds of predictions about the situation, and opinions changed as new information emerged. The importance of digital media has grown dramatically, and they are now the undisputed market leaders. We can no longer imagine the print media without the digital version.

New threats have also emerged, especially the gigantic volume of fake information and cyber attacks. These threats intimidate any public institution, but especially information structures.

Here’s an example. TASS is one of the state institutions most well-protected from cyberattacks, as far as civilian organizations are concerned. Before the pandemic, there were powerful cyber attacks about once every two months, then they became more frequent, and now there are attempts to break into our systems almost every week. We are going through a very difficult period. Of course, the problems I mentioned are experienced not only by TASS and not only in our country, but they are especially relevant for us due to the fact that Russia has been involved in information warfare for many years now. With the start of the special operation, the number of information attacks on our country has increased many times over.

Response to these challenges must be highly professional. My words will sound trite, but I believe that the only response in this situation should be to place accurate, verified, objective and balanced information in the Russian media. Only the truth can be a weapon to win the information war.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to Georgy Borisovich Kleiner, Deputy Scientific Director of the Central Institute of Economics and Mathematics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

G. B. KLEINER: – I would like to speak about spiritual aspects, which, in my opinion, play a defining role in the society today. Now the world is fractured, it is falling apart. Consolidation in the form of a collective West or other alli-

ances is temporary. The current international situation can be compared to a kaleidoscope: a small movement changes the whole picture.

What, in these circumstances, can serve as factors for strengthening the interaction between states, companies, and other entities? In my opinion, there are four such factors. Under the vaults of this wonderful hall, where the Likhachov Conference is being held for the twentieth time, ideas are swirling that should consolidate us. Political scientists, sociologists, economists – we are all members of the same scientific community. The idea of consolidation, in my view, must be based on four pillars – the interaction of the intellect, the interaction of the soul, the interaction of culture, and the interaction of influence. These types of interactions must strategically shape the structure of the future world.

What is intelligence? We say that it is necessary to come to a society of knowledge. Knowledge is important, but it is the result of the activity of the intellect; it is the intellect that produces, stores and develops it.

The second factor is the soul. The intellect creates the structure of the world, and the soul brings emotion, humanity, spirituality into it. We are at St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, and it seems to me that it is on a humanitarian basis that spiritual interaction between countries in today’s fracturing world should be built.

The third factor is culture. Culture in this case refers to that which unites the past, the present, and the future, marking the trajectory of social development.

So, soul, intellect, culture, influence (or inspiration) are the factors that can prevent world disunity. Note that these are social factors, and they could, in my opinion, play a role that other kinds of factors, such as economic ones, could not. Each of these areas of public interaction should have leaders recognized by all. Intellectual leaders, spiritual leaders, cultural leaders, and leaders of influence must participate in governance on an equal footing with the formal structures of countries and corporations.

Thus, the four-pillar leadership structure, complementary to the formal governance structure, is, in my view, the only possible basis for peace consolidation in modern conditions.

This is the tenth time I’ve spoken at the Likhachov Conference, and I can say that the ideas that were proposed in this room were mainly aimed at integration and joint forward movement of the humanity.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Let me give the floor to our guest from Switzerland, a man of amazing courage who not only took a principled position on the Russian question, but publicly stated this position. I ask Mr. Guy Mettan, President of the Union of Chambers of Commerce Switzerland–Russia and CIS Countries, Executive Director of the Swiss Press Club (Geneva), to come to the podium.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – As Mr. Guy Mettan walks to the podium, I want to say that he has become one of the most quoted public figures and journalists of recent times by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I sincerely recommend everyone to read his seminal work “The West vs Russia: a thousand year long war. The History of Russophobia from Charlemagne to the Ukrainian Crisis.” The book is

dedicated to the culture of “cancelling” of our country, the history of this phenomenon: after all, it did not arise today, but centuries ago. The publication has been translated into Russian and is available in the original. You will really enjoy reading it.

G. METTAN: – Dear friends, I am very glad to be here today. I would like to thank Rector A. Zapesotsky for the invitation. It was very important for me to get to this meeting. I have come a long way from Switzerland. Until February 24, Switzerland was a three-hour flight away from Russia. Three months had passed, and now it takes twelve hours of flight to reach Russia. Thanks to European governments, Russia is now as far from Switzerland as Australia is. This is what European progress and efficiency have led to.

Let me speak about words, because words, as you know, are very important. Words can save and create, but they can also kill and destroy. That’s why they are so meaningful. You know from history books that in every dictatorship words have been manipulated. For example, at the time of the Nazi Germany, Hitler and Goebbels tried to manipulate the vocabulary of the German language. They formed new words and changed the meaning of the old ones. Jewish philologist Victor Klemperer was able to survive the Holocaust and wrote two important books. Over the 12 years of the Third Reich, he analyzed every change in the vocabulary of the German language made under Nazi pressure. Goebbels, the propaganda minister, said, “We don’t want to convince people of the rightness of our ideas. We want to reduce the vocabulary of the language so that it reflects only our ideas.”

On the other hand, the writer George Orwell, in his famous novel 1984, describes the new language of the dictatorship and how the Ministry of Truth and the Thought Police were able to shape the new vocabulary of the English language.

Basically, now there is somewhat of a soft dictatorship in the countries of the West. This soft dictatorship invents a new language which I termed the soft language. The soft language is trying to “sweeten” everything, make former concepts nice and sleek. On the one hand, it is highly technocratic, its speakers using and abusing words such as “cost-effectiveness,” “profitability,” “tough measures,” and “competitiveness.” On the other hand, this language is highly emotional: it is full of words like “discrimination,” “discrimination based on sexual orientation,” “gender discrimination,” “racial discrimination,” “human rights,” “democracy,” etc. Its speakers overuse words like “LGBT,” etc.

In conclusion, I would like to quote Confucius. Confucius has two very meaningful phrases. “When words lose their meaning, people lose their freedom.” And he also said, “If names are wrong, words have no basis. If words have no basis, then deeds cannot be accomplished. If deeds cannot be accomplished <...> people do not know how to behave.”

This is why the first thing the government must do is restore true meanings in the world. I would be grateful to you if you could help restore the meaning of my words to my European colleagues.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – After the break we will have a very promising continuation: a discussion between charismatic personalities who know how to argue and have a good understanding of the subject. I thank you all.

Panel Discussion

“THE GRAND CHESSBOARD” TODAY AND TOMORROW

June 9, 2022.

A. P. Petrov Theatre and Concert Hall, SPbUHSS

SPEAKERS:

- A. S. ZAPESOTSKY *President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation (moderator)*
- I. O. ABRAMOVA *Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- V. A. CHERESHNEV *Chief Researcher of the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ekaterinburg), member of the Presidium of the Ural Branch of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Medicine), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*
- E. G. DRAPEKO *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation*
- S. Yu. GLAZYEV *Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- Al. A. GROMYKO *Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS*
- A. K. ISAEV *Deputy Head of the “United Russia” party faction in the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Political Sciences, Professor of SPbUHSS*
- S. I. KISLYAK *First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)*
- D. A. LIKHANOV *Writer, Chairman of the Russian Children’s Fund (Moscow), Children’s Protection Fund, President of the International Association of Children’s Funds*
- A. G. LISITSYN-SVETLANOV *Chief Researcher of the Institute of State and Law of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Law), Professor*
- V. L. MAKAROV *Scientific Director of the Central Economic and Mathematical Institute of the RAS, Director of the Higher School of Public Administration of the Lomonosov Moscow State University, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor*
- V. K. MAMONTOV *Chairman of the board of directors of the newspaper “Komsomolskaya Pravda” (Moscow), Director General of the radio station “Govorit Moskva”, director of the Foundation for the Support of Network Initiatives “Smart Internet”*
- S. G. MUSIENKO *Director of the Analytical Center “EsooM” (Minsk), Member of the Public Advisory Council under the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Belarus*
- V. V. NAUMKIN *Scientific supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor*
- R. I. NIGMATULIN *Scientific supervisor at P. P. Shirshov Institute of Oceanology of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Physics and Mathematics), Professor*
- V. G. PETUKHOV *Professor of the Department of Theory of Law and Law Enforcement of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Candidate of Law, Judge of the Statutory Court of St. Petersburg (2005–2011), Honored Lawyer of the Russian Federation, Honorary Employee of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Lieutenant General of militia in reserve*
- V. N. PUNCHENKO *Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (Minsk)*

- M. V. SHMAKOV *Member of the State Council of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS*
- Zh. T. TOSHCHENKO *Chief Researcher at the Institute of Sociology of the Federal Research Sociological Center of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Chairman of the International Editorial Board of the RAS journal "Sociological Studies", Dr. Sc. (Philosophy), Professor*
- M. V. ZAKHAROVA *Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*
- K. F. ZATULIN *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries*

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Before we begin the second part of the discussion (which I think is very interesting, and I hope you will appreciate it), I would like to ask Andrey Konstantinovich Isaev, a professor at our university, one of the most famous members of the Russian State Duma, deputy head of the United Russia faction, to say a few words.

A. K. ISAEV: – Dear friends, I'll keep it short. I would like to read a special greeting from the Chairman of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin:

"Dear friends, the Likhachov Conference is a reputed academic forum where scientists, politicians, public figures, representatives of culture and arts discuss relevant issues and key trends of development of the modern world, the problems that concern people in our country and abroad. You will have thematic discussions about traditional values and a 'new ethics' of the West, a transition from unipolarity to the model of a multipolar world, the state of the global economy and the objectives of the Russian education. These issues are essential. I wish you interesting, fruitful work and all the best. Sincerely, Vyacheslav Viktorovich Volodin."

For myself, with your permission, I will speak during the panel discussion. Thank you.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I would like to invite to the stage a delegation of scientists, our friends from Belarus, headed by Deputy Minister of Information Igor Ivanovich Buzovsky. They asked for a small gift-giving ceremony. Our guests decided that 600 volumes in the University library was not enough and that we needed more. Of course, I couldn't disagree: who would refuse books for the library?

V. N. PUNCHENKO: – We give you the books published by the Union of Writers of Belarus (I am a member of the board of this organization). Among them is a whole series of publications signed for the University by the Belarusian writer Nikolai Ivanovich Cherginets, whose books have a circulation of 7.5 million copies. In addition, we present a valuable engraving and a commemorative address from the Belarusian State Academy of Art. In connection with the fact that your anniversary is coming, I have a proposal: if you allow, we can land in Belarus a joint crea-

tive scientific and cultural landing party. We also give you a selection of periodicals. Our country has a newspaper called "Nastaunitskaya Gazeta" (translated into Russian as "Teacher's Newspaper"). The same holding also publishes sports and scientific magazines. I suggest that some of the papers from the 5th section of the Likhachov Conference are included in these publications in order to cover the work of the event.

S. G. MUSIENKO: – To support the invitation to Belarus made by Igor Ivanovich, I present a prototype of the invitation letter – an oil painting depicting the historical center of Minsk. I also take the opportunity to present you a project prepared by the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies – "Value portrait of modern Belarusian society." It is the quintessence of our values: we will build our future on them.

I. I. BUZOVSKY: – Aleksandr Sergeyevich, I would like to present you with a calendar based on a unique private collection of photographs of Belarus. If you download the app and point your phone at a photo, it will come to life. How does it work? From the point where the picture was taken, you will be able to see how this place looks today. The calendar is eternal and symbolically called "Bat-kivshchyna."

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you very much. Friends, these gifts are especially dear to me, because I know: the people standing on the stage now have very recently done a lot to stabilize the extremely difficult situation in Belarus. They pulled it off brilliantly. We thank them for this.

Dear friends, we are starting the discussion. I invite Sergey Yurievich Glazyev, Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulín, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova, Andrey Konstantinovich Isaev, Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak to come to the stage. I also invite Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin. I haven't introduced him yet. This is an eminent scientist, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences, scientific director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. I think next to no one in our country knows more about the Eastern world than he does. Mikhail Viktorovich Shmakov also joins us.

So, I invited colleagues to discuss the transition from unipolarity to real multipolarity and the problems of the new geopolitics. For me, this topic breaks down into two questions, and I would like to clarify my colleagues' opinions on each of them. First, I ask the speakers to briefly describe the situation in the present-day Russia. Second, to express your views on the immediate prospects of the state of affairs in the world community. As the title of today's discussion, perhaps I would take Zbigniew Brzezinski's "The Grand Chessboard," not as a joke or parody, but as a reminder. In this essay, Brzezinski justified a simple idea: Russia with Ukraine is a great empire; Russia without Ukraine is a regional power. The book was written quite a long time ago, but it helps us understand what principles are ingrained in American politics and how today, many years after the publication, many things discussed in it come true.

To kick-off the discussion, I would like to present what I believe is a collective point of view that has been elaborated here at the Likhachov Conference. The fact is that there is a person among us who reads every single report of the Conference. It's me. During my life I have read more than 4,000 reports of the International Likhachov Conference. Over the last 15 years (about the same time a similar process was going on in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the idea that the world community was moving towards an era of the end of unipolarity was taking shape at the Likhachov Conference. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin spoke about this in Munich quite independently of us; the same conclusions were reached by the participants of the Conference. Moreover, the greatest philosopher of our time, and perhaps of the entire history of the world philosophy, our Honorary Doctor, Academician Vyacheslav Semenovitch Stepin, noted that the modern model of the Western civilization was in crisis. There was no globalization in the world; it was, in fact, Westernization – imposition of the Western model of life. Stepin observed that this model was in the deepest crisis, and very insightfully substantiated his observation in a series of papers at the Conference. Then we collectively looked into the causes of this crisis.

There are several main causes. First, the crisis in the United States: it is the most developed capitalist country, and if a certain socio-economic order comes to decline, it happens first to the leading country, and only then the process covers the rest. The example of the United States shows very clearly how a whole series of drivers of capitalism have ceased to work. The first of these drivers is competition. Competition in the form of Karl Marx's time no longer exists: it has been replaced by state monopolistic capitalism. Powerful monopolies, transnational corporations and the like suppress competition and deprive capitalism of this driver in its modern, most developed form. Also, such a powerful driver as freedom of speech is disappearing, because the entire press is being bought up by big capital. A few years ago, the proceedings of Likhachov Conference published a brilliant work by the Canadian professor of Polish origin, a very major scholar Piotr Dutkiewicz, which, as far as I remember, was titled "Market, Modernization, and Democracy. Reflections on Inter-Civilization Relations" Democracy is a very powerful driver of capitalism. When it is privatized, it ceases to work, being replaced by a money-bag contest: the one who gives the lar-

gest bribes and gets promoted by the corrupt press, wins the election.

Finally, the main driver is the national elite. Academician Oleg Timofeyevich Bogomolov and I have conducted a set of studies regarding the processes that took place in China, the USSR and other similar socio-economic formations. If the direction of the country's development is well chosen, then the system works productively for many years. Then faults start to occur, and at this point the national elite must have its say. If it is able to come up with ideas that will get the system out of a difficult situation, then a new round of development begins – this is what happened in China. If the national elite is unable to offer such an idea, the system will move toward disintegration, which may happen even to great empires.

From 1980s to 1990s, the elite of the Soviet Union failed to develop a new ideology, so it was decided to use the ideology of the West. However, we have done much worse than even the lagging Western countries, especially in the economy. China and Russia are not even comparable.

Nevertheless, the Western system has failed to work out a way to reform capitalism, which became evident with the arrival of Donald Trump. A number of personal qualities prevented him from being a good president, but he had an eye for the problems. If America had given him a chance to fix things and officials along with the national elite had done their duty, the U.S. would probably have had a great chance to prosper. Now that the U.S. has essentially returned to the state under Barack Obama, the chances of such an outcome have greatly diminished. My personal point of view is as follows: America is moving very quickly toward becoming a regional power. Putin started the special operation on time. Generally, in Russia things are not as good as they could be, but in the West they are downright bad. The events happening today could lead to a major reformatting of the world order.

Speaking at the Likhachov Conference three years ago, Academician Glazyev said that the Americans have very few serious trump cards left. The first is the Bretton Woods monetary system, which Russia, China and other countries are now destroying. By the way, the U.S. national debt is about \$32 trillion. It is an indicator of the disaster that is happening to the country's economy. It is very difficult, if not impossible, to get out of such a situation. The second trump card mentioned by Academician Glazyev is world leadership in the development of electronic technologies, particularly in the field of mass communication. China has solved this problem for itself, we are advancing towards the solution slowly, even sluggishly, but I think the time is approaching for countries to transition to nationally-oriented information systems. So, the two systems that give Americans an advantage – currency and information – will be destroyed. What will they have left? Military bases around the world, on which the U.S. officially spends about \$700 billion a year, and unofficially about a trillion. Soon such expenses will be beyond their means. So, again, we should expect reformatting of the world order.

Colleagues, you have an opportunity to share your opinions. I threw in some balls, now it's your turn. Sergey Yurievich, shall we start with you?

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – First of all, I want to continue my previous thought by reminding you that this transforma-

tion inevitably leads to the collapse of the core of the outgoing world economy, and the signs of the collapse of the American system in financial, political and other areas, as listed by Aleksandr Sergeyevich, are classic signs of the collapse of what remains. I would say that the old world economic order had two cores – the USSR and the United States. From the governance point of view, they were very similar, but radically different in terms of ideology. We have been in transition for 30 years, and a unipolar world is specific to this transition. The ruling elite of the only remaining core is trying to preserve its hegemony by starting a world war, as I mentioned earlier today.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich is absolutely right that the situation is heading toward the collapse of the American system. First, the ideological contour collapses – we can judge this by the collapse of the ideas of democracy in the United States and rigging of the recent elections there. The U.S. is no longer an example for the rest of the world. Further, the legal circuit is crumbling, as evidenced by systemic violations of international law on the part of none other than the United States. Then the money circuit collapses. In the war against us, the Americans in the Russophobic fervor played their main trump card – a monopoly on the issue of world currency. The dollar has lost that status, no one believes in it anymore, and there are hardly any fools who will continue to build up foreign exchange reserves in dollars. As for the production circuit, America has already lost to China in this area. This leaves the last vestige of social self-organization – the family circuit. However, it is ruined as well because of LGBT propaganda.

Thus, the U.S. is in a state of systemic disintegration. However, this country poses a great danger. Aleksandr Sergeyevich mentioned Brzezinski. His judgment that Russia without Ukraine would not be an empire is unscientific and archaic. But these kinds of ideas have poisoned Western public consciousness, and it has taken on a distinctly Russophobic direction.

Thus, we once again found ourselves in the midst of a world war. Obviously, China will win this war, as I have already said, and the future of the world economy will be shaped in a bipolar world – in competition between communist China and democratic India. The world development in this century will depend on these two countries, just as it did on the USSR and the United States in the last century. The other countries will begin, one way or another, to join with one of these cores. The new system will be based on three components. The first is socialist ideology, that is, the primacy of public interests over personal, private ones, characteristic of India and China, and of Asia as a whole. The second is market competition, which ensures the efficiency of the economy. The third is the primacy of national interests. Unlike in Soviet socialism, in the ideology of the new leaders, national interests will be more important than international solidarity of workers. This fusion of the three components will form the basis of the coming world economic order.

As for our country, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it found itself on the periphery of the outgoing world order. We blindly believed in a unipolar system, which in fact was no more than an instant in the process of change in the world economy. What do I mean by peripheral position? We have actually become donors who, before the current events, were sending billions of tons of raw materials

to the West. There was a drain of capital and minds. We now run the risk of finding ourselves on the periphery of both the old global economic order that is receding and the new one that is forming in Asia, to which Russia also supplies raw materials. In order to get out of this, I would say, unpromising situation, we need to consolidate the society, mobilize reserves, and create our own governance system with a traditional Russian ideology and reliance on national interests. Scientists of the Academy of Sciences came to the conclusion that Russia can reach the trajectory of economic growth of not less than 8% per year provided that it establishes a governance system similar to those of countries with the new world economic order.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Konstantin Fedorovich, please, you have the floor.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I want to get away from the general discussion to a more specific topic, which I have already touched upon today. Vyacheslav Alekseevich Nikonov, my colleague in the State Duma and formerly on the Komsomol Committee of the Faculty of History at Lomonosov Moscow State University, host of Big Game, in every program repeats the words of his grandfather V. M. Molotov: “Our cause is just, victory will be ours.”

I have no doubt that our cause is just. The question is different: what exactly is considered a victory, and when and how can it be achieved? Some, tired of their own underachievement, would declare anything a victory as long as the conflict comes to a quicker end. I am not in favor of this approach. It is now clear that the situation has gone beyond the goals of recognizing the Donetsk and Lugansk People's Republics or, say, securing Crimea for Russia, because we already control the population centers outside of these territories. Besides, it is clear that the official Ukraine, which is influenced by Western countries, is not ready to agree to anything today.

When the president of Ukraine speaks at events, the audience stands up because this is the fashion, this is the demand of the Western world. He basks in the glory, and apparently, unlike nationally oriented statesmen, he does not care how many Ukrainian soldiers are dying at the moment. His order is to harm Russia.

The other day in London, Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas received an award for opposing Russia and supporting Western efforts. The Estonian and British prime ministers echoed each other, urging not to make peace with Russia under any circumstances and to continue to fight, as we say, to the last Ukrainian. Looking at things like that, I think that after a certain time (I can't predict exactly how long), we will see the frozen confrontation turn into an active one.

I do not agree with those who believe that we are capable of fighting many adversaries at once and that the Western economy has exhausted its resources. In particular, it surprises me that Vyacheslav Nikonov says over and over again that our economy is grandiose and that the Western economy is nothing, a crumpled piece of paper, an empty wrap. I don't think so. The West certainly fell into the Thucydides trap when it took advantage of our confrontation with Ukraine to launch a preemptive strike against Russia as a potential ally of China. But in the process of this operation, I think it moved on to a bigger idea. Germany,

France, Japan, and Australia have all fallen into line and are playing by the rules that Washington dictates. They decided that they were in a position to inflict injuries on Russia that would be incompatible with life as a state. As long as the West does not give up on this idea, we can really speak of the domestic war of survival. We have to understand: it is costly for us, but at the same time we have absolutely no alternative. It's not that the West doesn't like President Putin – it doesn't like all of us and our state.

In between discussions I was able to attend the opening of the International Peter the Great Congress at the Hermitage Theater. At the congress, they said that Peter the Great's highest achievement and his dearest love was the city of St. Petersburg. I do not want to argue with this point of view, but I still think that the main creation of Peter the Great is not St. Petersburg, but the Russian Empire. I am very sorry that last year we celebrated the 300th anniversary of the proclamation of Russia as an empire with so little enthusiasm. Fortunately, this year there is a major celebration of the 350th anniversary of the first emperor.

In conclusion, I would like to say that dealing with today's problems will take a long time. There is an opinion that the unipolar world was unstable, while the multipolar world that will replace it will, on the contrary, be stable. In fact, a multipolar world can be much more unstable than a unipolar world. We have entered this period, and we have no alternatives, because things will never be the same.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – You are welcome, Maria Vladimirovna.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – I would like to draw on Konstantin Fedorovich's words about the prize that the British authorities gave to the Estonian Prime Minister. There is a very important nuance here: what exactly was the cause of the award? Clearly, we are not interested in the official wording, but in the true meaning of the event. Why the Prime Minister of Estonia? As if Estonia were the main interest of British politics. Of course, that's not true. Britain has interests in the Baltics, but also in Poland and many other countries. Could it be that the British are betting on Kallas, promoting her? With all due respect to Estonia, I don't think the country has any resources that could be of such interest to London. So what is it about? Konstantin Fedorovich said that it was for the support for the efforts of the West and the Kiev regime. But the regime is supported by many, especially in the countries of the NATO-centric system.

In my opinion, the cause is the idea promoted by the Estonian Prime Minister. Notice how anti-diplomatic and just plain stupid her actions are. Kaja Kallas did not come to power on her own. Her father is a politician and her great-grandfather was a police chief. Not every eastern emirate can boast such clannishness as the small Baltic democracy, where power is in fact practically inherited.

Kaja Kallas appeared on the Western media scene with a startling idea. She called on European leaders to stop any contact with Russia. At first it just seemed like an unfortunate wording. I began to follow Kallas' remarks. She kept insisting, not only giving interviews, but also writing for the European press. And she received the award for this very idea – to block all contacts of European grandees with Russia.

The topic of confrontation between the collective West and Russia regularly appears on the international information agenda. Washington simultaneously duels with Moscow and Beijing. Even Henry Kissinger was horrified by this two-handed shooting. He noted that Washington has never confronted two centers of such power at the same time (although their power manifests itself in different ways).

However, all this lies on the surface, but what is hidden inside? I am absolutely certain that Washington's target is not Moscow or Beijing. The U.S. wants to eliminate its main competitor, the European Union. Over the past 20 years it has become a real world leader. A strong currency emerged in the structure of the EU, which rushed into the global financial arena, gaining its place by the real sector of the economy, rather than as the dollar did – by the printing press. Mr. Glazyev, as an economist, could explain this much better than I. I am not an economist, but I want to draw your attention to the fact that the euro is secured by the real economic opportunities and resources of almost thirty countries.

That's what I think is the key to what's going on right now. That is why Russian energy resources were cut off from Europe: the blow was directed at them, not at us. All we've been talking about for the last thirty years was getting off the energy monorail. By and large, the U.S. was working to the benefit of our ideology in this case.

The European Union was formed at a time when there was an acute confrontation between the two systems in the world. This association was to contribute to the non-conflict development of Europe. The European Union is the artery that feeds Europe, and if this artery is cut, the consequences will be fatal.

That's why the talk about Brexit was even funny to listen to. There was speculation as to how such a thing could have happened, and whether the British were making a mistake. There was no mistake. There was a deliberate action to disengage the country from the association, which it initially joined only on favorable terms for itself. Such fundamental things for the state as currency and rules for crossing the border were still determined by Britain on its own. It was clear to the British that the next stage of the plan after their exit from the union was to weaken the EU, to put it in its place.

The last thing I want to talk about now is Russia's role in the current events. It is now much clearer how our place and the place of any other country is seen by the collective West. Everything became clear after the failed visit of Sergey Lavrov to Serbia. The West has made it clear that it would like to see any state in such a way that even taking a plane to it would be possible only with its permission. In the ideal Western model of the world, everything is submitted to the interests of the ruling elite in Washington. Russia understands this very well, but does not agree with this state of affairs.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Andrei Konstantinovich, please.

A. K. ISAEV: – During these hundred days I traveled through all eight federal districts of Russia and visited Donetsk and Lugansk. I had heuristic conversations with people (I would define the genre that way) about the situation we were in and what would happen next. Almost eve-

rywhere, except in the last two places, there was always someone who asked me something like this: "When do you think all this will end and the old, normal life will resume?" Since a pioneer must be not only polite, but also honest, I could only answer one thing: "Never." The world we are used to, the world that existed before February 24, or before the pandemic began, or before 2014, will never return. It will inevitably be different, both in the case of our victory and in the case of our defeat. Unfortunately, many of our countrymen do not understand this yet.

The war between Russia and the collective West for the redistribution of the world has begun. Unfortunately, in my opinion, it was inevitable. The economic and political order of the world entered an acute conflict. The political order is multipolar: five countries, representing five political systems, have veto power in the UN Security Council. The economic system is unipolar: the U.S. dollar and financial capital dominate. Thus, the world must either adjust politics to the economy or remake the existing economic system.

What are the objectives of our enemies in this war? In fact, there can be a variety of objectives in war: to force the enemy to retreat, to make it more accommodating, etc. But in this case it is different. You can listen and read what the traitors who fled the country have to say. They keep repeating the same thing: modern Russia is a direct heir to the Mongol-Tatar horde, the Moscow Kingdom, the Russian Empire, and the Soviet Union. It is an imperialist state by default and therefore must be destroyed. The war with us is being waged on a cultural level as well, and such a war always involves dehumanization of the enemy.

As a civilization, as a country, we face a choice: either win or perish. But what does it mean to win in a situation where we are fighting against the strongest country in the world and the strongest military and political bloc in the world – NATO? How are we going to win it? From my point of view, to win for us is to endure. If we stand up to the pressure, then the American-centric world will inevitably (here I agree with Sergey Yurievich) disintegrate. We have to hold out for a while. Does our country have the necessary resources for this? I believe it does. And the weakest link from this point of view is not economics. Such a link is ideology.

There is no coherent ideology in Russia today. Sergey Yurievich spoke of the crisis of American ideology. Yes, it may be in a crisis, but it is coherent, understandable, and can be presented in the form of simple and clear slogans and ideas for everyone. What about us? We have dealt with the past, honor traditions and build on them. The past, based on historical experience, provides an answer to the question of what we are up against. The future answers the question of what we are fighting for. For a multipolar world, we repeat. What is a multipolar world for us? There is a world where the United States dominates. Are we suggesting to create several worlds with one dominant country in each of them? It is unlikely that such an idea would gain support, and that we would find many allies. Or is a multipolar world something different for us? For example, the shift from a system where financial capital dominates production to a system where capital acts as a subordinate. That's what needs to be thought out and discussed. In order to endure and win, we must build a common national ideology that everyone in the country will share.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Sergey Ivanovich, please.

S. I. KISLYAK: – I agree with most of the opinions expressed by my colleagues, but I would like to argue a little with Andrey Konstantinovich. Why I don't think this is a global conflict? Undoubtedly, there is a fateful struggle for our interests, deciding our future in the world. But the Americans are trying to make this conflict global – primarily to draw a new dividing line in the world, so that those on the other side of the line, on the side of the so-called advanced democracy, would unite against Russia.

The division of the world into democracies and autocracies is a new ideological fracture that the West is trying to impose on us in order to make it easier to explain the economic pressure and its hostility towards Russia. But let's look at the world map: the vast majority of countries are unwilling to impose any sanctions against Russia, despite the massive machinations and even threats from the United States. This is very important to us. However, we must bear in mind that their behavior is not due to their special disposition toward us, but to the fact that the duplicity of the West is reflected in the lives of these countries, both in the present day and in the future. They believe that in such a situation, it is better not to follow the orders of the great powers of the world, but to remain independent and make their own decisions.

That's why I think the current conflict is extremely complicated and requires maximum mobilization of our forces. What can be done? Sergey Yurievich gave the answer: to develop the economy. We have a beautiful country – with enormous reserves of natural resources and very talented people. All that is required is to organize rational use of this wealth. But we must stop looking up to Western countries and buying from them whatever they are willing to sell. We have to think several steps ahead. This is important because the West seeks to consolidate its dominant position in the economy by imposing its standards in industry. They have especially advanced in this strategy during the Obama presidency. The stake was placed on the development of new industries and manufactures. The U.S. planned to implement its own standards, then to take and strengthen its position where it had not yet done so, and to gain new opportunities to advance its interests in the field of economics.

Yes, the U.S. is going through a lot of difficulties right now, primarily in the domestic politics. The country is split over almost all issues except one: attitude toward Russia. There is a nationwide competition to see who can come up with the best proposal to damage the Russian economy. We cannot take it lightly, because we have a serious fight ahead of us, and in any fight you need to understand your opponent. Thirty-two trillion dollars is not the entire debt yet. To this one needs to add social obligations of the U.S. government to the population, and this is also a huge amount of money. But the American establishment is not very worried about that. Why? The U.S. can print any number of dollars, allowing it to build up its debt almost without limit. Every new president criticizes the previous one for increasing the national debt by several trillion dollars, and almost immediately begins to do the same. The secret is that Americans have never had to pay their debts in full. Therein lies the biggest problem for the whole world. The U.S. actually exports inflation without restraint, but so far the dollar in the world market not only remains a reserve

currency, but is considered the most reliable means of payment.

Many economists, and I among them, believe that confidence in the dollar will fall, but let's face it: it won't happen tomorrow or even in the next few years. Dollar flows – not only mainstream, but "capillary" – have penetrated virtually every area of world trade, so their withdrawal will be painful. But the world is undergoing transformation, the balance of power is changing, and our place in it is becoming different. It is predicted that by 2030 China will overtake the U.S. in GDP in absolute terms, and now they are already equal in such a sly indicator as the purchasing power of the yuan and the dollar. Twenty years from now, according to experts, China's GDP will exceed that of the United States by 40%, with India coming in second.

And where is Russia's place in this configuration? By the same estimates, at the end of the top ten to the beginning of the second. But for that, from all points of view, it's important that we're not in a situation where we have to adapt to all the rest. I'm pretty sure we have all the right opportunities, but we haven't learned how to make the most of them yet. I believe this should be a priority in the coming struggle for our place in a future multipolar world.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Sergey Ivanovich. Academician Naumkin, please, you have the floor.

V. V. NAUMKIN: – I absolutely agree with all the colleagues who have spoken, but I would like to add a few drops of tar to this barrel of honey if possible.

Of course we need an ideology, but today, in my opinion, what we need in the first place is not so much a holistic ideology in the traditional sense, but something that can help fully consolidate, unite our people in opposition to the unprecedented pressure that is being exerted on the country. We see the significance of such symbols as, say, Peter the Great's birthday, which we celebrate today. Victory in the Great Patriotic War, the memory of it – these are also unconditional values that work to consolidate the society, including young people, which is especially important.

As for the special operation in Ukraine, I agree with Konstantin Zatulin. We must realize that this is not really a global war between Russia and the West. Any full-fledged war must inevitably degenerate into a nuclear war, but no one wants that – neither we nor our adversaries. Therefore, it is necessary to understand where the red lines are, which cannot be crossed, but can and should be used in one way or another.

It would be good to understand what's going on in the world in general. In my opinion, colleagues have pointed out quite fairly that a new world order is now taking shape. But it is also clear that the contradictions between the neoliberal model of globalization and the civilizational identity of peoples, including Russia, which defends its values, are growing and intensifying. All states that exist in the world today can be divided into two categories: traditional nation-states that are experiencing an acute crisis, and the so-called civilization states (China, India, Russia), which are increasingly developing on the basis of their civilizational component, their identity and their own position in the world. I think that in many ways this is the source of power to which we could appeal.

Globalization is really bursting at the seams today. The West wants to deprive us of benefits to which we already had very limited access. Freedom of movement of people and capital, dissemination of information, and cultural exchange have all been declarations rather than realities, given the protectionism that no state has ever abandoned. But now even the narrow window of opportunities that we had is closing. This is evidenced by incidents involving the detention of works of art that had to be returned to Russia after exhibitions abroad. But we are able not only to successfully oppose such a policy, but also to use it to our advantage.

And another important aspect of today's international politics. The West, which opposes us, is trying with all its might to turn the countries of the East, which sympathize with Russia, against us. They are threatened with secondary sanctions, new isolation, etc. For example, today the media reported that China is forced to impose restrictions on the activities of Huawei in Russia. Therefore, special tasks are assigned to Russian diplomacy. We are aware of the high qualifications of our diplomatic corps and we are confident that they will be able to unite as many states and nations as possible around Russia.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to Mikhail Viktorovich Shmakov.

M. V. SHMAKOV: – Just like Vitaly Vyacheslavovich, I intend to add two spoons of tar to our great barrel of honey. Russia is conducting a military special operation in Ukraine, but our compatriots live as if nothing is going on – there is full serenity everywhere. Of course, we have to discuss the current state of affairs and talk about prospects, but this is not enough. I believe that Russia should take more decisive action. In early June, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov was forced to cancel an official visit to Serbia because the countries he was flying over did not allow his plane to pass. However, despite the unfriendly attitude towards us, we continue to supply energy resources to these countries, and Russia has not recalled its ambassadors from them or announced the severance of diplomatic relations. We have previously failed to respond appropriately to accusations against our athletes when, under false pretenses, they were not allowed to participate in the Olympics. Why? Some would argue that it is easier to destroy than to rebuild, but I do not agree with this argument. The tougher we act, the more respect we will get. Especially now, when war is being waged on all fronts – in the economy, politics, the information field, and only last of all, the military special operation in Ukraine.

Why does Estonia allow itself to display a hostile attitude toward Russia? In the Baltic States do not want to remember that in 1721 the Treaty of Nystad was concluded, according to which Russia received a large part of the territory on which they are located today, and, in addition, Peter I paid a large ransom for them. But Estonians and Latvians are well aware of this, as well as the fact that their land should become Russian. So the more firm we are, the easier it will be to talk to them.

What happens next? A leftist turn is brewing all over the world – in economics, politics, ideology. And this means that the role of the state will increase, monopolistic capitalism to be replaced by nationalization. Are we ready for this? What will we have to do and who will lead this pro-

cess? How to moderate the appetites of large corporations and oligarchs who are de facto selling out the country? Mariupol could have been taken without a fight in 2014, but our oligarchs did not let this happen, saying that they had a joint business with local entrepreneurs there and they would solve all the problems. They did not. What do we have in the end? Mariupol is taken, but with great losses.

Konstantin Zatulin says that there are various scenarios for the end of the special operation. One of them is to conclude an agreement, say, “Minsk-3,” fixing the borders along the lines of contact, and there will be a peaceful life. But such a “peace” would actually be a defeat for Russia and would lead to an even bloodier war in a year or two. This cannot be allowed, I declare as a citizen of the Russian Federation.

Let us recall the events of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, which resulted in a significant change – redrawing of the geographical map and introduction of new ways of managing the society. In the past century, the first shock to the world community was sinking of the Titanic, followed by World War I, which resulted in a collapse of several empires. World War II was an attempt to finish the “business” of the First and led to the consolidation of the Anglo-Saxon diaspora around the world.

At the very beginning of the new century there was a terrible terrorist attack – the destruction of the twin towers in New York, with thousands of casualties, yet again. After that, the world rallied against terrorism, but the intelligence services of all countries, including Russia, were effectively subordinated to Washington who coordinated these activities. This has not bypassed our country either.

Now the events in Ukraine have become a challenge to the world community and a pretext for unleashing hostile actions against Russia. Now a new plague awaits us – monkeypox (which, by the way, does not threaten Russia), and the press, including the Russian media, implant in the minds of people that this is a terrible new infection, so you should not kiss or even shake hands, because you can get sick. And so on. Day by day, new fakes emerge that are elevated into the category of ideology, and armed with such an ideology, it is very easy to rule the society. After all, how did they combat coronavirus? With total isolation – everyone stay indoors, don’t go outside. The same could be justified with monkey pox.

I repeat, the more firmly we behave, the more sharply we respond to insults and hostile actions, the more we will achieve. The Rubicon was crossed, and war broke out on all fronts. So we have to fight, or else we shouldn’t have gotten into it.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Mikhail Viktorovich. We will now hear from Irina Olegovna Abramova, Russia’s foremost expert on Africa.

I. O. ABRAMOVA: – I will speak from the point of view of an Africanist. In Russia people often say, “We are not Africa, we are not Zimbabwe.” But if you look deeper, you can find some similarities. After all, what was the strategy of the states that had built their prosperity not only on new technologies, but also, in large part, on the enormous amounts of resources that they exported from the colonies? They not only robbed these countries, but also corrupted their elites, tried to dilute the national identity, including

by reducing the use of national languages, etc. Today, all of this is being fully implemented with regard to Russia. So instead of looking arrogantly at Africa, we should learn from their experience. Now they are fighting the influence of the West as hard as they can and are trying to cooperate with us. Why? They understand very well what is going on in international politics. After the UN vote on sanctions against Russia over the events in Ukraine, I received many messages from my colleagues in Africa. Let me remind you that their votes divided almost equally – half voted for and half against. And all of them say, “Please understand, we are under tremendous pressure. But we are well aware that you are now in the same position as we are.”

And the second thing I would like to say is that in recent decades there has been a tremendous change in the way our mind perceives the world. Philosophers continue to debate the relationship between existence and consciousness, but information technology is making its own adjustments. Virtual reality affects everyone, in many ways shaping the ordinary, material reality. If an event is not on the Internet, it’s as if it doesn’t exist. But this situation cannot last long, because a man needs a roof, something to eat and somewhere to sleep. Therefore, the material component will eventually manifest itself as very important, if not dominant. In that sense, we are in the same boat with Africans. Both Russia and Africa have enormous resources, so in the future the world will largely take into account not only the interests of the West, China and India, but also those of Africa and Russia. This should be kept in mind at all times.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you. I give the floor to Academician Valery Aleksandrovich Chereshevnev.

V. A. CHERESHNEV: – Many colleagues mention SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, or COVID-19. Indeed, it has become a great problem for mankind. And monkeypox, while not as dangerous, can transform into something much worse as no one knows how its mutogenesis will go. Immunologists and virologists around the world are studying why these situations have become possible. In particular, the Russian Academy of Sciences concludes that the gravest ecological crisis is to be blamed. New infections arise as a result of processes occurring in the biosphere, which in recent decades has been subjected to the destructive effects of human activity. After all, the biosphere is the living things that inhabit the thin shell around the Earth: 18–20 kilometers above the surface of the planet and 9–11 kilometers down, that is into the depth. All in all, this is the space where life exists. And the three components of life are plants, animals, and microorganisms.

People cut down forests, huge fires are destroying enormous green areas – 28 million hectares annually! The fires also kill millions of animals. And the life of microorganisms is closely interconnected with the life of the rest of the biosphere. When the environment of a particular bacteria or virus disappears, it seeks out and finds a new host – a plant or an animal. Today *Homo sapiens* has become such a host, and microorganisms are increasingly difficult for us to resist. Biologists have proclaimed the 21st century the “age of viruses.” Yes, we live in a virus-saturated environment: one teaspoon of seawater has a million viruses in it.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Valery Aleksandrovich, is it possible that the coronavirus appeared in the laboratories that the Americans placed in Ukraine and Georgia?

V. A. CHERESHNEV: – During scientific expeditions which were organized to the Caucasus and China for the purpose of biological study of bats, hibernating individuals were studied and a virus completely corresponding to Omicron was isolated from their intestines. It is unlikely that these mice were infected with a laboratory-derived virus.

I recall that 40 years ago, in 1982, two Nobel laureates, Luc Montagnier and Françoise Barré-Sinoussi, who worked at the Pasteur Institute, discovered the human immunodeficiency virus. After that, there were rumors for several years that it was a biological weapon developed in secret laboratories. It was only when it was proven that the monkeys – the gray mangabey and chimpanzees – were the source of HIV that the bacterial weapon theory was abandoned.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Valery Aleksandrovich, thank you very much! Dear colleagues, I present to you the writer Dmitry Likhanov. His father, the famous writer and social activist Albert Likhanov, was an Honorary Doctor of the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences. Dmitry Albertovich, please!

D. A. LIKHANOV: – I want to support Mikhail Viktorovich Shmakov and Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulyn who spoke about the People's Republic of China. Several years ago, China's president, Comrade Xi Jinping, said at one of the Party Congresses that by 2050, China would remain the world's only superpower. There will be no United States of America, no Russia – no one else. This means that Lenin's thesis of the victory of communism throughout the world will be confirmed. So the leftist turn has already happened. This needs to be said honestly to all of society.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Vladimir Konstantinovich Mamontov would like to express his opinion. We would love to hear it!

V. K. MAMONTOV: – Dear colleagues, I have two theses, both starting with an "I". The first one is ideology, the second one is IKEA.

So, ideology. Let me remind you that during the Great Patriotic War, with Stalin's permission, churches began to reopen. This was necessary in order to gain the support of the population, most of whom at that time continued to be believers. Stalin's policy on religion and churches is a good example of how ideology can and should consolidate society, rather than divide and impose one point of view.

Now about the Swedish furniture company. I thought long and hard about how to formulate our goals more precisely. Why do we need everything that is being done in Ukraine today? We're taking Mariupol, what for? Do we need IKEA to leave or to come back? This is a very important point. When we come to a consensus on IKEA, a lot will become clear. Personally, I recently restored a 1959 Moskvich with my own hands. It took two years of toil. Well, there's not a single imported nail in it. That's what we need to think about, first and foremost.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I would like to ask a question to Lieutenant General Petukhov. Veniamin Grigorievich, will we win in Ukraine?

V. G. PETUKHOV: – We just have to win!

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to Academician Jean Terentyevich Toshchenko.

Jh. T. TOSHCHENKO: – I share the opinion that along with economics and politics, ideology – that is, a set of ideas that unite people – plays a huge role. I think you will agree that during the Great Patriotic War, in addition to the power of Soviet arms, it was the idea of unification that played a huge role in resisting the enemy. But what ideas are we talking about today? They have to be formulated by scientists and politicians, but in order to do that we have to know what people want, what they aspire to. This will be the basis of the ideology.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you. Dear colleagues, here in this room today is a man with the legendary surname of Gromyko, a hereditary specialist in international relations. His grandfather headed the Soviet Foreign Ministry for many decades, took an active part in the creation of the United Nations, and enjoyed the highest authority in international diplomatic circles. And now Aleksey Anatolyevich Gromyko will share his point of view. Please.

Al. A. GROMYKO: – Aleksandr Sergeyevich, thank you for your kind words about our family.

We are really in a situation now that is perhaps the most threatening since 1945, or at least since 1991, when we lost a large country where the core were the Russians who lived in the RSFSR. The uncertainty is off the charts, and the risks are very high. What scenarios may materialize in the next 2–3 years – no one knows, as many processes are transferred under manual control.

Today many speakers have said that market laws no longer work. Indeed, for many years they have been ineffective, and now we can forget about them altogether. The West has moved from targeted sanctions against Russia to "carpet bombing," and this will continue. What can be done? Russia is a great power in every sense: military, diplomatic, cultural. It is clear that we will use all components of this potential in the future. But we would like to be a great power in the new world, in the world of the twenty-first century, and our potential allows us to maintain this status.

Now I would like to return to the topic that has also been touched more than once today: our worldview, our idea of what place we will occupy on the geopolitical and value map of the world in 10–20 years. We remember that in the twentieth century, the United States grew on the concept of the "American Dream," which proved very successful. Millions of people moved there, capital flowed in, and the country benefited greatly from it.

There was also the "European dream." However, this concept became quite large-scale only in the beginning of the twenty-first century. Eurocentrism ended in 1945, but in 1957 the unification of Europe began, and Europeans were confident that after the collapse of the USSR, the European Union would lead and set the tone in the world on an equal

footing with the States. However, so far it has not succeeded, although the economy of the European Union is one of the three world leaders, along with the economies of the United States and China.

What about the Russian dream? There is a concept of the Russian world, which has been widely and actively promoted in the last 20 years. And it did in fact play a very important role in unifying the people as the ideological “tooling” of our actions in the 2010s. In the future, formation of ideals and values of people in Russia will be influenced by a variety of conditions. What happens around will become less important, although it is vital for us to have a strong position in the world. But the main things will happen inside the country. To what extent can we materialize the principles and ideals of social justice, the society of opportunity, meritocracy, social lifts, etc. are very important questions at all times, but now, after 30 years of hard and uneven development, they are becoming especially acute. Whatever external risks and challenges we face now are secondary factors. We must prove – not only to the world (this is secondary), but first and foremost to ourselves – that we can be successful. But in order to do that, we have to change and restructure a lot of things.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I invite Academician Robert Iskandrovich Nigmatulin to the microphone.

R. I. NIGMATULIN: – Dear colleagues, I agree with absolutely everything that has been said here, but I would like to draw attention to one detail. The situation is much more disturbing than most of us imagine, because economically we are opposing 950 million people in the world, while the population of Russia is about 145 million people. It is almost one billion people with their new technology, through which we have built our consumption. So the matter of concern is not so much exports as imports. In this regard, we have to solve the difficult task of import substitution. Why is it difficult? First, the qualifications of our government’s economic bloc leave much to be desired, and second (and worst of all), there are no qualified engineers left in our industry.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – So what can be done?

R. I. NIGMATULIN: – Educate. This is very serious. And speaking of the leftist turn, which, of course, happens in the world. As a mathematician, I will outline the theorem; it is especially important to do so in the presence of members of the State Duma. As long as a professor, associate professor, assistant professor, or teacher receives a salary 10 times less than that of a State Duma deputy, we won’t be able to do anything about import substitution. As long as the Ministry of Education and Science, which is responsible for the Academy of Sciences, does not have a single narrow specialist, but only lawyers, nothing will work either. Science and education should be led by experienced professors who have previously lectured and written textbooks. This is extremely serious. And the Russian Academy of Sciences and, in general, the management of fundamental science in our country was organized optimally. Best in the world. My American colleagues told me about it with envy. In 2013, the State Duma committed the grave sin of destroying this system. But we are waiting for you to reconsider those de-

cisions, otherwise no scientific achievements in Russia will be possible.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Academician Makarov, you have the floor.

V. L. MAKAROV: – Dear colleagues, like many of you, I want to emphasize the term “ideology.” Why is this important? The world is divided by various criteria, but the main division is along ideological lines. However, our Constitution denies state ideology, although that is exactly what can unite us. Ideology is indispensable! And the leftist turn that is currently taking place needs to be fixed in some foundational documents...

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I invite Academician Lisitsyn-Svetlanov to speak. Andrey Gennadyevich, please.

A. G. LISITSYN-SVETLANOV: – In all historical eras there have been wars, which in one way or another have always ended in peace. Even now, being in a state of war, we expect that sooner or later the conflict will be resolved and peace will come. But how would a peace agreement be made, on what terms? Who will negotiate and sign legally significant documents? We all know the joint photograph taken during the 1943 Tehran Conference – Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin at the table. These leaders of states had their disagreements, but in those years they acted as allies, which enabled the eventual victory of Hitler’s Germany and the creation of a new model of the world order.

So the question is, who is going to make peace now? And what will be the basis for it, what circumstances will be taken into account as significant? After all, the legal principles that formed the foundation on which all international relations were built after World War II are hopelessly broken. Once the conflict is over, an agreement needs to be formulated, but who will draft it? That is a problem.

We have the United Nations, but we see that the specialized agencies of the UN are not performing their functions properly. In the end, if we do not take up this difficult task and work out the terms of the future peace on our own, we will find ourselves in the position of Winston Churchill, who, as he later confessed, felt like a small English donkey sitting between a huge bear with its legs crossed and an equally huge bison.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you very much. I address deputy Drapeko. Elena Grigorievna, Lieutenant General Petukhov said that Russia would win. And what will help Russia win, what will be the decisive condition?

E. G. DRAPEKO: – In its more than thousand-year history, Russia has spent only 300 years in peace. We were attacked from the east, south, and west. But we are genetically conditioned to win wars, it’s in our blood. In peacetime we do not think about it, but as soon as the need arises – we will all hold hands and show what we can do!

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – As a philosopher, I declare that ideology is the most important form of social consciousness. If the country has no ideology, it will not be able to develop normally and will eventually perish. In Rus-

sia, in my opinion, there is a misunderstanding of ideology as a post-Soviet disease syndrome. According to Article 13 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, "no ideology may be established as a state or obligatory ideology." This article is understood to mean that there should be no ideology in our country, moreover, it is forbidden.

Tomorrow, one of the authors of this constitutional article, Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and Honorary Doctor of the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences Gadis Abdullaevich Hajiyev, will speak at the Likhachov Conference. In particular, he explained that when they adopted this norm, they proceeded from completely different considerations: there is no single ideology that is obligatory for everyone. A political party must win elections because the people share its ideology. Ideology should be formulated and society should understand it.

As a result, the ideology of the omnipotence of money was adopted by the bureaucratic class and the elite. According to the principles of this ideology, money is the most important thing of all, and people should devote their lives to earning it. But this ideology does not mention the Motherland, friendship, and spiritual values.

In my view, the greatest danger for Russia today is its elite, which over the past 30 years has become so attached at heart to the West that it is willing to sacrifice the interests of the country so that Russia can once again become a donor. This elite annually exported about 100 billion from the country, and according to other data (from the oligarchs) – about a third of gross national product. They said with a chuckle, "Only a country as rich as Russia can afford it." None of this should come back.

I give the floor to Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I listen with interest to everything that is said in the discussion about ideology, and I think that in the Russian Constitution, not all the wordings are really successful, probably they shouldn't have put such an article in it. In the 1990s, this was done to finally say goodbye to the cursed past. Then it turned out that the past was not so cursed. Today this article of the Constitution looks odious.

If we try to construct ideology the way they did in the late 1990s, including those who proposed this article, nothing will work. Let me remind you that Russian President Boris Yeltsin instructed his assistant G. A. Satarov to find a national idea and a new ideology, but nothing came of it.

If our Constitution will say, "Russia is above all," it would be like "Deutschland über alles" or "Ukraine – above all." We must understand that if the people in power and in the field are not inspired by the idea of serving their Fatherland, then the time will be out of joint, and the same will happen that happened to those who today find themselves outside our country and speak about it.

I believe that it is necessary to continue discussions on this topic, including different stages of our country's history, in particular the multinational empire. During a meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, I asked the president a question: "Why did we celebrate with grandeur the 800th anniversary of Alexander Nevsky's birth in 2021 and almost at the very last moment remembered the 300th anniversary of the Russian Empire?" In my opinion, it happened because it is uncomfortable to admit that Russia is an empire.

The country is currently celebrating the 350th anniversary of the first Emperor Peter the Great, and last year it was long pondered whether it was convenient to celebrate 300 years of the Russian Empire: what if we upset someone with the fact that we are an empire? In the framework of the Marxist-Leninist theory, it was customary to scold everything connected with the empire; here it is appropriate to recall the work of V. I. Lenin's "Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism."

But the empire is first and foremost a multinational world, equality of all before the law. In the 1990s, the national question in our country was understood exclusively in the spirit of the CPSU Central Committee – that is, to protect the rights of small nationalities and indigenous peoples of the North. And by the 2000s, another – Russian – national question arose. I made an amendment to the Constitution of the Russian Federation about the Russian people as state-forming people, and it was incorporated into it in a slightly modified form. Finally, the Russian people appeared in the Constitution of the Russian Federation, which was not there before: "The state language of the Russian Federation on its entire territory is Russian as the language of the state-forming people who are part of the multinational union of equal peoples of the Russian Federation."

A month ago we received a clarification from the Presidential Administration on how to understand this thesis in connection with the arguments I have been having around the topic of compatriots. It said that the concept of "state-forming people" referred to language, but not to nationality. That is, there are no Russian people, but there are some people who speak Russian. There is no understanding in this matter that without the Russian people Russia cannot exist. And this must be realized and put into practice. A similar idea can be seen in Putin's article that Russians and Ukrainians are one people.

In today's discussion, many ideas were expressed. Is it possible to believe that in 1941, in the beginning of the war, Stalin had a problem with power, he was not recognized, and therefore he was forced to take extraordinary measures? In fact, by this time the fullness of Stalin's power was obvious. But the day after the outbreak of war the Supreme High Command General Headquarters was established, and a week later – the State Defense Committee. It is necessary to draw this line everywhere. And now it turns out that if the order is not formulated, then we do not fulfill it.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Konstantin Fedorovich. I give the floor to Andrey Konstantinovich Isaev.

A. K. ISAEV: – Dear colleagues, due to the fact that the word 'ideology' turned out to be provocative and provoked a discussion, I would like to make a comment. I agree with V. K. Mamontov that ideology should unite those who remain. Because those who have left (mentally and physically) are no longer connected to us.

I completely agree with the president that Russians and Ukrainians are one people, as K. F. Zatulin has already said. A war waged within one people is called a civil war. And here, in addition to the global dimension, there is another. In fact, we are faced with a civil war delayed by 25 years, being fought on the territory of the former Soviet Union. There can be no compromise in a civil war: the debate,

which is conducted with howitzers and mortars, is about one important issue: the choice of the nation's development path. And in this battle only one can win.

It just so happens that the choice of the path is associated with specific territories. Westerners are those who have accepted the role of a colony. They think we lost World War III and have to adjust to the winners. But there are also those who believe that we should claim the role of a great country in our own right.

If we talk about ideology, we do have a lot in common, the past above all. But we have to present an image of the future. We don't have enough willpower to organize everything, because we lack ideology. It defines the tasks and the personnel who must solve them, but all this must be done with the image of the future in mind.

Without ideology, and this is important in a global war, we will have no allies in the world. In the Soviet Union one could imagine those who supported it, let's say the communists of Southern Rhodesia were ideological supporters of the USSR. And how to find in Southern Rhodesia (now the territory of Zimbabwe) ideological supporters of the Russian world is a big question.

If we say that the image of our future is the American way without the United States, we are unlikely to be supported. If we offer an alternative image of the future, we will gain allies throughout the world, not only at the state level, but also at the human level.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Thank you, Andrey Konstantinovich. Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova has the floor.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – Over the past few years I have often heard demands to revive ideology, *inter alia*, from people who are themselves the spokespersons for the ideology of entire spheres of our life: they act as their symbols and creators. This is rather strange, because people who have managed to reach fantastic heights (not only in appearance, but also in essence) lack something to portray the future. Even now, the speakers in this audience, who are our future because they laid it down, have asked to paint this picture.

Aleksandr Sergeyevich said that people are afraid to talk about ideology because of the post-Soviet syndrome. Why are they afraid of that? Not because the ideology was so strong that it claimed the world status and led nations and peoples in the absence of an information revolution (when there were no telephones or the Internet). This ideology united people all over the world. To date, no one, despite the information and communication capabilities, has been able to even come close to this level of ideological influence. It was the strongest ideology, not domestically, but globally. But what was the outcome? And yet at the center was a country with its role in the world, leading domestically and internationally.

The point is that the strongest ideology does not at all mean its collapse. But the destruction of ideology, tools, etc. has occurred. That is, we need an algorithm based on our geopolitics, resources, capabilities, culture and traditions, and most importantly – one that would work.

I listened attentively to the speeches of all the participants. Everyone is so insistent in saying that an ideology is needed, that I get the impression that only something that already exists can be defended in this way. I'm sure each

speaker has their own model, perhaps unifying and state-centric.

In the concept of national security and others all ideas are already described. But first, there is no engine developed that can run this mechanism, and second, people (from the elite to the regular population) are not taken into account. In my opinion, everything has already been invented, these ideas can be reanimated.

The ideology and the national idea are obvious: first, a person should want to live in his state; second, a person should want his children to live in that state. This is the kind of ideology our country should have. Everything else – the tools, the way in which this concept can be implemented (using force, suggestion, creating conditions, education) – is secondary.

It must be a state in which people (people in general and individuals in particular) will want to live and continue their lineage. Procreation is all about culture, education, and tradition. Without this, no superstructure ideology will succeed. If only for a while, but it will end the same way it did before. Everything else is packaging and methodology.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Maria Vladimirovna, your concept is clear, thank you. I give the floor to Mikhail Viktorovich Shmakov.

M. V. SHMAKOV: – During the discussion we raised the issue of ideology not only to the academic level, but also to the peacemaking level. I would like to draw the attention of the audience to the ideology of a common man. I lived in Maryina Roscha, where a simple ideology was prevalent – the one who is stronger is right. As simple as that: if you are strong, then you will lead, you will be respected; if not, then you will obey everyone. Therefore, Russia as a state must be more firm and decisive in its actions, and then we will be respected.

A few words about public diplomacy. In 2014, Australia hosted the G20 meeting, which was also attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin. In the evening at the restaurant, the Australians, hearing unfamiliar speech, ordered first-rate beer for our table. After such a gift, we asked to bring them a bottle of expensive wine from us. We told them we were Russians and came to the summit as part of Putin's delegation. They thanked us and carefully took the bottle. Therefore, in my opinion, ideology is about communicating with ordinary people, about people's diplomacy.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – We cannot have any other ideology than the ideology of social-conservative synthesis. The social component is social justice and the primacy of public interests over private ones. The whole system of governance must work like this, including the regulation of wages, property rights, distribution of incomes, taxes, etc. The second component, the conservative one, is the values of a family, of each person, their rights, something that was treated somewhat lopsidedly under Soviet socialism.

Here are examples of social-conservative synthesis ideology in different variants: Christian socialism, Islamic socialism, Confucian socialism, Mahatma Gandhi's socia-

lism. Today it is embodied in the new world economic order – a mixed economy where the socialist ideology is implemented not in words, but in practice. It permits private business, but encourages it in areas where there is an increase in public welfare. *Huawei* raised production from scratch and turned into a giant, but it does not allow private business to engage in speculation, to profit at the expense of society, and there are many such examples.

The ideology of social-conservative synthesis fits into our spiritual and moral culture, we do not need to invent anything. Especially since this ideology has come to dominate in the world: socialism acts as a general idea that determines the regulation of the market economy. Some atheists call this system market socialism, relying on instrumental things and the immutability of conservative values.

I want to support Konstantin Fedorovich in saying that we should not become complacent. The worst thing is to underestimate the enemy. After all, they spend 10 times more than we do on military needs, 100 times more on scientific research, and print 1000 times more money. And these are specific technologies: things that ride, shoot, etc.

Our opponent professes the ideology of posthumanism. What do they offer us today in their concepts and reasoning? The ideology of dehumanization, the deprivation of human beings of all signs of collectivity, turning the world into an electronic concentration camp to be ruled by the world government.

I have already said that the hybrid world war will end with the creation of a new world economic order with a mixed economy and socialist ideology, but there is no one hundred percent certainty. It is quite possible that unfriendly countries will be able to implement their plan: first, to wipe Russia off the map (and we should have no illusions about this), second, to destroy Iran, and third, to isolate China. I don't think they can implement that idea. It won't really work, because American superpowers don't work anymore. Even cautious Hindus are already trying to brush America aside. But this outcome is theoretically possible, essentially the end of human civilization, the transition to a posthumanoid state, where people will be controlled by artificial intelligence.

Therefore, the events in which we find ourselves force us to mobilize in every sense. The fate of all mankind largely depends on us.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak.

S. I. KISLYAK: – I listen with great interest and respect to all opinions regarding the need for an ideology, and I ask myself: are we capable of formulating a new ideology in the current circumstances? For Andrey Konstantinovich, this is not a problem, because he is a member of a party that has a clearly expressed and shared ideology that the party offers to the country. And other parties may have no such ideological platform.

Besides, I ask myself: if we decided to create an ideology for Russia, which one would we choose? Of the Communist Party? No. As a former member of the Communist Party, I would borrow a lot from it, but in the current climate, when young people are not trained to handle ideological tasks, it would cause a big problem that could start to rock the boat.

So for me now it is more important to try to formulate indisputable ideas on the basis of the Russian Constitution, which provides a good foundation, and in this sense I am ready to support Maria Vladimirovna. I would call that a national idea that should unite us. It can be supplemented as the state develops, acquiring consensual additions.

But I am wary of the formalized process of forming an ideology for the Russian Federation. This will cause the country to split. Ideology must emerge as a result of Russia's struggle for its place. We have a common basis for this: in the Constitution, in our history, and even in the programs of the parties represented in the State Duma.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – I give the floor to Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin.

V. V. NAUMKIN: – Everything that has been said is true, but I would like to add one small thing. The society is tired of the use of the term "ideology," especially the younger generation. They are suspicious of everything that is imposed.

We need to solve the problem of our identity, which is at the heart of everything. Konstantin Fedorovich spoke correctly today about the imperial heritage as part of our identity – it must be developed. And what is being done today can serve as the basis for a new patriotism. The problem of identity is also important when we talk about the Russian world and the appeal of the Russian idea.

Around Russia is the Slavic world. But many Slavs today oppose our country. For example, the Bulgarians, whom we have been saving from enslavement for centuries, were against Russia in World War I, in World War II, and now, when there is a threat of World War III.

And our Chechen brethren, part of our multinational people, are showing themselves amazingly during the special operation in Ukraine. We owe them a lot. Their participation is an expression of ethnic solidarity.

We need to learn lessons from the recent years, not the distant past. Today we are talking about import substitution, that we have to do a lot of things ourselves. But who will be responsible for the fact that our entire industries are destroyed, in particular the aircraft industry? Where are the domestic aircraft developments that were killed at the root several years ago? We're going to be dealing with this aftermath for a long time to come.

I suggest that everyone should think about how to preserve the principle of justice, which should be at the core of ideology.

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Dear colleagues, our discussion has come to a close. I will not undertake to summarize it, so I suggest that each of you does it on your own.

I think it is no coincidence that we devoted the second part of the discussion to ideology. In connection with this important issue, I will tell the story of how Soviet ideology was replaced by today's ideology. Several years ago, the patriarch invited the heads of federal television channels and asked why programs that cripple human souls were being produced. One of the TV bosses replied: "We have nothing to do with it. Television is just a mirror of life, we just show it." After that, one of them, K. Ernst, went to give a lecture at the Faculty of Television at Moscow State University, where he stated that Channel One created the ideology of

the new times. When the Soviet Union collapsed and a new life began, people did not know what to do and how to behave in the new conditions. The government had nothing to offer them. And then television began to show soap operas that offered new values and models of behavior in different cases of life to a mass audience.

I'm sorry that G. Satarov was unable to offer anything as a national idea at the time, unlike the TV channel scriptwriters. People watched soap operas and assimilated new models of life by copying them from the screen. "Who is a teacher in a school?" Ernst used to say. "Any schoolboy can ask, who are you, and who can confirm the truth of your postulates? We're free now." Irresponsibility is the hallmark of our freedom. And in a cultured society, freedom is always associated with responsibility. Ernst says, "Teachers can be insulted, but you can't insult the television, because we don't impose anything, we just entertain." By having fun, people learn new values of life.

The website of the St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences has 1,332 works by Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov and approximately 180 works by professors of our University (150 of them are mine) devoted to the understanding of Likhachov's spiritual, moral, and scientific heritage. D. S. Likhachov, twice an Honorary Citizen of St. Petersburg, is the quintessence of the St. Petersburg intelligentsia. Few people know that Likhachov's grandfather, Mikhail Mikhailovich, was also an Honorary

Citizen of St. Petersburg in pre-revolutionary times. And then this title, like nobility, was inherited. This is the recognition of a kind of St. Petersburg benchmark.

Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov said that when the revolution happened, a lot of people went abroad as they couldn't accept it. It was hard for the Likhachovs, too, but they couldn't leave the country because they felt like they were at the bedside of their seriously ill mother: "I couldn't leave my homeland, just as I wouldn't leave my sick mother."

I agree with Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova that there are fundamental things that we either have or we are not a nation, not a country. I later encountered a similar metaphor in the work of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, a man who greatly respected D. S. Likhachov. In particular, talking about his perception of our country in the 1990s, he noted: "Russia is a gravely ill mother at whose bedside I am. I cannot leave my homeland, abandon it, I will be with it to the end and share its fate." This was his inner conviction.

Many of us feel the same way. We could go away and get great jobs at Western universities, get big salaries. But we live in Russia. And no matter what happens, we will work for the country, for its prosperity and victory in the most difficult situations.

On this patriotic note, we conclude the first day of the 20th Likhachov Conference. Many thanks to the participants for an interesting discussion!

Round Table

THE TRANSITION FROM UNIPOLARITY TO REAL MULTIPOLARITY: THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW GEOPOLITICS

June 10, 2022.

“Stasov/Ushakov” Conference Hall (“Radisson Royal” Hotel)

CHAIRPERSONS:

- S. Yu. GLAZYEV *Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the Eurasian Economic Commission (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- P. N. GUSEV *Editor-in-chief of the newspaper “Moskovsky Komsomolets,” Chairman of the Commission of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation for the Support of Mass Media, Chairman of the Union of Journalists of Moscow*
- S. I. KISLYAK *First Deputy Chairman of the Committee of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on International Affairs (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017)*
- K. F. ZATULIN *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Director of the Institute of CIS Countries*

SPEAKERS:

- I. O. ABRAMOVA *Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), member of the Presidium of the RAS, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- D. O. BABICH *Journalist and columnist for the RIA Novosti news agency (Moscow)*
- I. I. BUZOVSKY *Deputy Minister of Information of the Republic of Belarus (Minsk), Candidate of Sociological Sciences*
- V. A. CHERESHNEV *Chief Researcher of the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Ekaterinburg), member of the Presidium of the Ural Branch of the RAS, Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Medicine), Professor, Honorary Doctor of SPbUHSS*
- E. G. DRAPEKO *First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on Culture of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Deputy to the State Duma of the Russian Federation, Candidate of Sociological Sciences, Honored Artist of the Russian Federation*
- L. L. FITUNI *Deputy Director of the Institute for African Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Head of the Center for Global and Strategic Studies of the Institute, corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor*
- Al. A. GROMYKO *Director of the Institute of Europe of the RAS (Moscow), corresponding member of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (Political Studies), Professor of the RAS*
- A. KEVIN *Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University (Canberra), diplomat (1968–1998), independent expert, recipient of literary prizes*
- Ye. V. KHARITONOVA *Senior Researcher at the Institute of Africa of the RAS (Moscow), Candidate of Psychological Sciences, Associate Professor*
- V. V. NAUMKIN *Scientific supervisor of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the RAS (Moscow), Academician of the RAS, Dr. Sc. (History), Professor*
- V. N. PUNCHENKO *Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (Minsk)*
- V. A. SHAMAKHOV *Scientific supervisor of the North-West Institute of Management of the Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (St. Petersburg), Dr. Sc. (Economics), Professor, 1st class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Colonel General of the Customs Service*

- S. A. TSYPLYAEV *Editor-in-Chief of the national scientific-political journal "Vlast" (Moscow), Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, 3rd class State Councillor of the Russian Federation, Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy*
- M. V. ZAKHAROVA *Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary*
- A. S. ZAPESOTSKY *President of St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences, corresponding member of the RAS, Academician of the Russian Academy of Education, Dr. Sc. (Cultural Studies), Professor, Scientist Emeritus of the Russian Federation*

A. S. ZAPESOTSKY: – Dear friends, the theme of the section is outlined, it continues to pursue the subject we have discussed yesterday, so please, as you speak, give feedback to your colleagues who spoke on the previous day of the Conference. Then we will have an actual discussion and not a series of monologues. Thank you. The section is moderated by Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev and Konstantin Fedorovich Zatulin.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – I will start with an introduction to outline the features of the transition to real multipolarity.

The transition to multipolarity and an integrated world economic order involves restoration of national sovereignty, since it is the basis for international law. The defunct imperial world order was characterized by the presence of two nuclei – the USSR and the United States. Each of these centers of power sought to rebuild the world in its own image. In the countries under its influence, the Soviet Union established its customary structures of governance, while the U.S. tried to impose the use of the dollar on the world and created the most favorable conditions for the work of its transnational corporations.

The fundamental difference between the integral way of life and the imperial way of life is that the former will not have a center imposing the rules of the game on the rest. Of course, there will be a nucleus: as I said earlier, the competition will mainly be concentrated between India and China, at least in the economy, because today these countries produce more products than the leaders of the previous world order.

The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by a period of liberal globalization, but now the main focus of international cooperation is a combination of competitive advantages and the creation of conditions for joint investment, production and infrastructure projects. Again, the countries of the new world economy do not seek to establish universal rules of the game for all actors. Yes, there is the World Trade Organization, the World Monetary Fund, conventions that need to be respected, but there is no pressure on other players to act in exactly the same way, such as liberalizing currency regulations. A variety of systems of economic regulation, including currency restrictions, becomes acceptable. At the same time, regional associations are being formed. Clearly, the countries differ in scale, and relatively small states tend to create regional economic associations, within which barriers are erased and common norms of regulation begin to work. The variety of these associations is very broad: from rather amorphous structures like MERCOSUR to a bureaucratic empire, as I call the European Union.

The EU, which is characterized by a very rigid system of governance, is somewhat of an offspring of the previous imperial world economic order. In contrast to this association, the Eurasian Economic Union is flexible: it is responsible only for regulating common markets and decisions are taken by consensus, where each state can block a proposal that it does not like.

Today Nur-Sultan hosts a regular meeting of the Council of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC). Being the Minister for Integration and Macroeconomics of the EEC, I can say that over the past 10 years we have made over 5,000 decisions, and consensus has been found on all of them. This means that in the Eurasian Economic Union, the commonality of interests dominates over country differences. We form many areas of international economic cooperation: sign memorandums, form preferential trade zones, and establish large-scale trade and economic relations with China. A network of international relations created in this way takes into account the characteristics of partner countries.

Perhaps the most large-scale interaction of the Eurasian Economic Union is unfolding as part of the conjunction with China's One Belt One Road initiative, and it is an example of cooperation in a new world economic order: it adheres to the principles of mutual benefit and respect for partners' sovereignty, its efforts are focused on joint investments, and none of the partners imposes their conditions on the others. This is the only way that our economies together create new, better and more efficient goods and services, for the living standards of our countries to rise.

International law in the new world economic order will obviously be more extensive. In particular, the EEC promotes the idea of signing an international treaty establishing a new monetary and financial system. No country should be able to privatize the world's currency, because all economic relations in the new world order should be based on mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit. Accordingly, it is proposed to create a new world currency. It is based on two components: a basket of national currencies and a basket of exchange-traded commodities. With such a model, the currency will be stable and efficient in terms of pricing and the formation of a transparent system of payments and settlements, where no one can introduce sanctions, impose their interests and extract seigniorage due to the monopoly on the issue of world currency.

Of course, the fundamentals of international trade law will be preserved. In addition, I consider cybersecurity to be a very important legal issue today. Clearly, an international convention on cybersecurity must be concluded to ensure that no state engages in cyberterrorism. Perhaps coun-

tries that have ratified the convention should impose embargoes on the use of information technologies and networks of those states that have not signed the convention. Currently, the U.S. opposes such an initiative and it is clear why: they are the leaders of cyberterrorism. It is also necessary to achieve conclusion of a biosafety convention and create measures that would force states, especially the U.S., to comply with the norms of this convention. This will prevent the emergence of a global electronic concentration camp under the auspices of the World Health Organization or other structures.

To quit the hybrid war, an international coalition is needed. I think that in building such a coalition, one can start from Asia. We are working on the implementation of the Russian president's idea of forming a Greater Eurasian Partnership, which could become the prototype of a new world economic order. It embodies the principle of integration of integrations, since it involves not only the Eurasian Economic Union, but also the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the ASEAN-China regional partnership.

Thus, the creation of mutually beneficial economic relations based on a reliable legal framework is the most important task that must be solved to quit the global hybrid war. The aggressor must understand that it can be irreparably damaged. Abandoning the use of dollar and euro would entail this damage – it would destroy the gigantic currency and financial pyramids that now loom over the world economy.

Of course, it is very difficult to reconcile the interests of the players on the world stage. However, Russia today is in the state of the country most interested in initiating these kinds of large-scale proposals to reform the international economic and political system. I invite the section participants to discuss this and other questions. I give the floor to Konstantin Fedorovich.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Dear colleagues, Now we know where to start the discussion, but we don't know who to start with yet. Are there any volunteers?

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – It would be my pleasure.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Maria Vladimirovna Zakharova has the floor.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – Speaking recently at the World Economic Forum in Davos, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz said (direct quote): “When we realize that our world is becoming multipolar, it should push us toward even more multilateralism, even more international cooperation.” In a multipolar world, very different international partners want more political influence pro rata to their growing global influence. But if you believe that this idea is a discovery of the Western Europe, you will be disappointed. In fact, the same thing has been discussed in Russia for about twenty years. In my Telegram channel I published a selection of quotes from the country's leadership about multipolarity. One of the earliest theses in it belongs to Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov. His ideologeme was reflected in the Foreign Policy Concept of Russia of 2000 and has since become one of the key principles of our country's international relations. And suddenly, 22 years

later, Olaf Scholz announces that we are living in a new multipolar world.

What does that tell you? First, that they did not hear us to the west of Moscow, did not take our words seriously. However, the idea of multipolarity was being explored, not because of quotations from Russian politicians or their concepts, but simply because of the objective reality of the emergence of new centers of influence. Despite all this, the U.S. and its allies still consider themselves the masters of destiny and continue to harbor the illusion of a unipolar world order model with a single decision-making center in Washington. Their task is clear – to prevent the loss of their own hegemony at all costs, even if only in words, because this is also important. We understand that shaping up the reality can begin in virtual domain. Recall the telling words of U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, uttered shortly before the end of Barack Obama's presidency, at the UN Security Council meeting on Syria. The participants' assessments of events differed so much that Kerry exclaimed: “I don't know whether I'm in a real or virtual dimension!” Of course, these dimensions influence each other.

Of course, in order to maintain this virtual unipolarity and impose it in the format of Realpolitik, the West uses a wide range of tools, from sanctions of all kinds to direct coercive pressure. In general, the sanctions that are now being imposed on Russia can be considered a direct coercive pressure, because their purpose is to break the back of the state. It is a hybrid, but fundamentally a forceful method of struggle. We are not talking about pinpoint methods, not “red flags,” but weapons, tools that can inflict lethal damage on the state. The main question is whether the state has ways of resisting such tools.

The strategy of imposing hegemony and monopolizing all spheres by the leader has led the world to millions of civilian casualties. And I'm only referring to the last thirty years.

Why has the West now begun to incorporate the word “multipolarity,” even though it is clear that confidence of Western countries in their own exceptionalism denies the very essence of this concept? As I said, the concept of multipolarity is being worked on. The West will never recognize a real multipolarity – it will create its own. It has already begun to do so. By the way, I know that many people don't like the term “multipolarity” because technically there are only two poles. In my opinion, this metaphor has the right to exist. Besides, if Joe Biden is to be believed, there are more than two hemispheres on Earth.

Of course, the United States sees itself as the main pole of Western multipolarity. The place of the natural companion of the main pole is given to the European Union. The other poles will be shaped by the leaders without recognizing any of the existing candidates for this role – the SCO, the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), African states, etc.

In my opinion, the Quad Alliance concept is one of the clearest examples of how a new reality is taking shape. There is a stable concept of the Asia-Pacific region, which requires no further justification or explanation. It is used by everyone, geographers, politicians and journalists alike. To promote the idea of new poles, the West abandons the term APR and introduces the concept of “Indo-Pacific region.” This is an apparent distortion of the existing perception and planting of a new one, replacing the natural pole

with an artificial one. The same can be said of the U.S.-initiated "Summit for Democracy," where invited countries were divided into liberal democracies, weaker democracies and states with characteristics of authoritarianism.

I would like to conclude by outlining two crises. The first is the crisis of liberalism. Liberalism, of course, has completely departed from the true and deep concepts that originally constituted its idea, and one can now speak of a dictatorship of liberalism or a liberal dictatorship, totalitarian liberalism, etc.

The second crisis is the crisis of law. The system of international organizations does not fulfill its functions; the principles prescribed in the fundamental conventions are not applied in practice. Can we, the people in this room, freely operate the legal machinery? We have not a slightest idea of how many legal rules directly affecting our lives appear on a daily basis. And people gathered here can not only read, but also analyze. All of this suggests that the law has approached a crisis, or perhaps a stalemate of development. Hence, there are many related problems.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Now I would like to give the floor to representatives of the West, although in this case geographically it is the representative of the South. I greet Mr. Anthony Kevin, honorary member of the Australian National University.

A. KEVIN: – Thank you for inviting me to speak. I had come a long way from Australia, flying 24 hours, as did my Swiss colleague Guy Mettan. He and I are the only Westerners to attend this conference.

The aspect of multipolarity to which I would like to devote my remarks is the situation in light of the special military operation in Ukraine. Of course, as noted yesterday, the operation was a major turning point in international relations, and the world will never be the same as it has been for the past 25 years. I do hope that one day there will be the multipolarity that my colleagues talked about yesterday.

Two days ago I met with Mr. Grigoryev, chairman of St. Petersburg Committee on Foreign Relations. It was a great honor. We had an excellent, very wide-ranging conversation, and I said that East and West are in a state of disconnect. As they say, we broke up. I think the Russian word "razvod" ("divorce") describes the situation very accurately. As a result, the influence of the West is weakening and the influence of the rest of the world is increasing, and Russia plays a very important role in this process.

The title of my work "Towards Novorus" speaks for itself, and I strongly advise my colleagues to read it. Now I'd like to add a few words on my personal journey. I was Australia's ambassador to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Cambodia. By all standards and traditions, I should have been a respected elderly statesman in my country. Except I'm not: I don't have the right to vote in Australia. Everything I write goes in the desk. I am not invited to meetings of the Australian Broadcasting corporation. I am not invited to discuss. I was safely cancelled. I wish I could pass greetings to you from my country and my government, but I can only say hello from your magnificent Ambassador Alexei Pavlovsky and from your wonderful TASS correspondent Anna Arkaeva.

An avalanche of false information about the special operation in Ukraine has hit the Russian community in Aus-

tralia. The situation within this community is very tense right now. It is a tragedy. I can say with all confidence that I have studied the war with the help of various sources – all open sources on both sides – and as an experienced diplomat with a strong background, I declare that the operation is necessary. I believe that it exacerbates the trends that have threatened Russia since 1991 and demonstrates with incredible clarity that Russia's very existence has been put at risk. I am an Australian patriot, and I have always believed in the importance and necessity of a policy of detente, of the normalization of relations between the East and the West. It's unlikely to be possible now – certainly not in my lifetime.

When I came to your country this time, I could not change money into Russian money. I was reimbursed for my airfare in rubles, which gives me a very pleasant vacation here. It starts tomorrow. I couldn't get an insurance, so I bought it here from Ingosstrakh. I could not find a safe way to bring 120 thousand rubles across the border, but I obtained a debit card from Sberbank. In fact, if I got paid a salary for what I write, I might as well live here now, because I have insurance and ID. Here, if you will, is a small example of how the world is being divided.

I think I'll finish here. Thank you for your generosity. Russia must remain strong in this time of trial. Yesterday we witnessed free expression of diverse, contradictory ideas, and I would like to pay special tribute to Maria Zakharova for attending this event. Such a discussion would not be possible in Australia in these times.

Unfortunately, we are a very small and humble member of the Five Eyes Intelligence Alliance, but there are other voices in Australia. We are not many, but we exist. With this, I conclude my presentation.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Mr. Kevin, we welcome you as a prisoner of conscience.

Now I would like to give the floor to Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of our country to the United States from 2008 to 2017, and current Senator of the Russian Federation from the Republic of Mordovia.

S. I. KISLYAK: – First of all I would like to thank the organizers of the event, because we really need to think seriously about what we mean by real multipolarity or polycentricity. The term has become so commonplace that people, as always happens in such cases, no longer wonder what is behind it or how to achieve it. And it's really not easy to achieve.

I am ready to subscribe to every point made by Sergey Yuryevich. The problem is how to achieve polycentricity (I like that term better than "multipolarity"), because we live in a world where resistance to the goal we are now discussing will be very tough. Besides, we must not forget that our opponents still have a lot of strength.

Speaking of our main opponent, the Americans, I would like to point out a peculiarity of their thinking that is especially evident under the current presidential administration. These people came to power based on the argument that the U.S. has an obligation to ensure its leadership in all spheres of life in the world. The word "leadership" in the American (not English, but American) is understood as "natural management." The explanation is also formulated in the purely American way: if the Americans do not ensure their lead-

ership, someone else will become the leader. That is, the very idea of polycentricity as we understand it – a consensus concert of states – does not exist in American political thinking. Thus, Americans believe that if they do not define the rules of behavior of the world community, then someone else will do it, which they strongly dislike.

Of course, they are well aware that there is an objective reality and polycentricity matures regardless of what they say about it. So, again, Biden administration officials are making a particularly notable effort to promote American leadership. Their logic is as follows: if other centers of influence emerge, it is necessary to take control of this process and put the right people at the head of the potential centers. In doing this, they use support of allies that are selected in each region based on the situation there. Of course, they also need an adversary against whom all actors are united. In the end, strictly speaking, polycentricity as a concept of the future world order is not rejected by the United States, but their understanding of polycentricity has nothing in common with ours.

The events in Ukraine, which have essentially been imposed on us, and what is happening around them is a prime example of how the U.S. will use objectively existing problems in the world to build polycentricity under its own leadership.

Returning to the ideas of Sergey Yuryevich (I emphasize again: each of them is in our interests), I wonder how to implement them. The question arises: who can be our most powerful partner in creating the new world? The objective reality is that now we are closest to the European Union. Time will tell how close we are, but I personally have no doubts that the EU is closer to Russia than the others. However, Russia also needs allies who can seriously influence the formation of the world system. Today, China and India are the most prominent of these countries.

As for China, the immediate question is, does it need the change? The U.S. (and the Chinese themselves admit it) does not deny that China has grown into the current economic superpower within the rules of the liberal economic construct, which was created and managed by the Americans. To the dislike of our Western partners, China, being inside their system and relying on market mechanisms that they created for themselves, has become their most powerful competitor, capable of eventually taking control of the world markets as well. This is one of Americans' most troubling prospects in terms of development of the world economy. Will the people of China, whose national thinking spans centuries, be ready to change the system quickly with us under the current conditions? Based on our own character, the needs of the domestic economy, and the political situation in the world, we are interested in a rapid change. Otherwise, we just won't feel the effects of them. The Chinese, however, are unlikely to give up easily upon a system that they have managed to adapt to and where they already feel comfortable.

Here is a small but illustrative example. It has been reported that Huawei will not supply communications equipment to the Russian Federation. Obviously, the Americans pressured the Chinese, or maybe not in this particular case, because the overall history of pressure on Huawei by the Americans is so long that the Chinese themselves could have calculated the consequences. What has happened suggests that China will not seek new ways of economic inter-

action with Russia, but will continue to proceed on the basis of what opportunities it still has in the system where it has succeeded.

What kind of an ally can India become in the economic and political context is also a topic for serious analysis. India is a very interesting country, it has its own view of the world. Its population is growing very rapidly, and even only because of this, India has every chance of becoming one of the most influential economic powers along with China in the near future. Yesterday I quoted the International Monetary Fund's forecast that the Indian economy will outpace the American economy by 10–15% by mid-century. In my view, the Indians will not be able to partner with Russia to the extent that it needs to build a unified polycentric system based on principles that are fair and reasonable, from its point of view.

Last but not least, I would like to focus on international law. It is under serious pressure – I fully support Maria Vladimirovna's opinion. We should be extremely aware that the world has become unusually cynical. Many countries abide by the principle that law is a tool to protect the weak, and they need it more than the strong, so the latter do not necessarily need to develop and strengthen the law, or adhere to its norms. This principle is increasingly reinforced in the mentality of Americans, and indeed of all Anglo-Saxons and at least half of Europeans in general. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia (and all of us as much as we can) is publicly trying to fight the concept imposed on us that the world must act on the basis of rules rather than law. This, of course, it is not simply a matter of choice of words: rules can include the law without being limited to it. In the view of Western countries, the rules should be shaped by the one who is able to do so, that is, the strong one. Until today, they were that strong player. And so the rules extend much further than international law, to which the weak are believed to be clinging.

Consequently, a return to the understanding that international law must be seen as the dominant instrument in the construction of any polycentric schemes must remain one of the central elements of our foreign policy, in whatever dimensions we pursue it – in cooperation with the EU that is close to us or in the struggle at international arenas.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I give the floor to Alexei Anatolyevich Gromyko, Director of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

AL. A. GROMYKO: – In the lives of politicians, diplomats, and big business, there are at least two tyrants – time and the underlying currents of history. Often we mistake a lurch of history for fundamental shifts. There are events that should be measured not by months or even years, but by decades.

Let's try to imagine the year 2050. Who, in a little less than thirty years, will be among the top ten countries in the world in terms of GDP, taking into account the purchasing power parity? At the end of 2021, Russia was in sixth place by this indicator. I would guess that in 2050, the top five will very likely be centers of power such as China, the United States, Japan, India, and possibly Germany. Brazil, South Korea, Turkey, Mexico, and Indonesia will seriously compete with Russia for a position in the top ten. Mind that by 2050, out of the European countries (and they under-

stand it quite well in Europe), only Germany will be able to claim a place in the top ten largest economies in the world. There probably won't be Britain or France, let alone smaller countries. For Russia, such a development would be a challenge. And its position will depend not on the actions of other countries, but on the internal situation, primarily in the socio-economic sphere.

Next I would like to say this. Recently, especially during the pandemic, we have heard a lot of speculations about whether things that are now happening in the world are actually a new thing. Perhaps it is only a well-forgotten old thing. I believe that those phenomena that have been considered new since about 2020 (the emergence of tensions between the collective West and Russia, the United States and China) were really just a continuation of major trends and events observed back in the 1980s and especially in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the fundamental prerequisites were laid down for the third decade of the 21st century to present us with a very tough, competitive and dangerous world. Nothing is accidental or unpredictable. The law of the rise and fall of great powers, which has been in effect for centuries, will also be in effect in the twenty-first century.

How to behave in such an unstable and dangerous world? Most likely, the right strategy is not to swing from one extreme to another, but to try to hedge risks, maximize internal stress tolerance, seek balance in everything and draw on the common sense, not on ideologemes if possible.

In this context, I want to touch briefly on the question of sovereignty. There is much debate about sovereignty; it is now trendy to declare that sovereignty must be complete. However, it is clear that sovereignty, like freedom, is never absolute. A society can be open or closed, there is autocracy. If a society opens up to the outside world, then naturally there is the question of vulnerability to external competitors. How closed or open does one have to be? Should we turn import substitution into re-creation of our life only in the domestic contour? I think it is very important to understand that the twenty-first century, like the twentieth century, will be the century of nation-states, and the institution of the nation-state will remain the foundation of those mechanisms by which the issues of global governance and regulation and the development of regional structures will be addressed.

In the European Union, in the United States and in Russia, there is talk of political, economic, technological and informational sovereignty. Such talk is justified, but how can one put it together with the fact that no center of power can unilaterally solve issues that concern its national interests? This is where the notion of alliances – regional or transregional – comes into play. Alliances act as a multiplier using which the state (or states) that has become the core of the alliance can achieve what it wants and shape the world according to its own convenient rules.

In this sense, great examples are France and Germany, which have managed to create around themselves what is now called the European Union – the largest economy on the planet. Apparently, this will be the main tool of their efforts for the benefit of themselves and their allies in the 21st century.

China is looking for its own path. Although the development of this state-civilization is now on the rise, it will not be able to exist on its own. For that reason, China is systematically, with great effort, forming a whole mechanism

through which dozens of other countries can help it become the largest center of power.

Finally, Russia. Our country also has potential multipliers. These could be the Union State, the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization and other mechanisms through which non-Western centers of power can be drawn into our orbit, or we can insert ourselves in their orbit. I am referring primarily to BRICS, SCO, OPEC+, and ASEAN+.

A few closing remarks. First, in my view, the neoliberal model of globalization is completely a thing of the past. Second, we are already living in a polycentric world, but we do not yet understand how polycentrism will develop. This can be either polycentrism acting under the jungle law, or polycentrism where states respect each other. Third, there is a strategic disconnect between the U.S. and Europe, although it is now being obscured by their consolidation around the events in Ukraine. It is also absolutely clear that the U.S. is on course to unleash a new cold war with China. This is their strategy for many years to come.

And one last thing. Can we say that we are witnessing the formation of a new bipolarity? There is a widespread belief that the U.S. and China are the new centers of world power, to which other countries will adjoin. I believe that we are probably dealing with an analytical trap, because a polycentric world cannot simultaneously be a world of a new bipolarity. I don't see how the new bipolarity would include Russia, India, and other countries that such a system would make dependent, driven, and certainly unable to shape the world around them according to rules that benefit them and not others.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Alexei Anatolyevich went beyond Europe in his speech, and I give the floor to Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin, President of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences; hope that he too will not limit himself to the East, although the East is very interesting to us.

V. V. NAUMKIN: – The East is very large, and it probably won't be hard to stay within the boundaries of this topic. However, I want to build on what Alexei Anatolyevich Gromyko said. I don't think we need to get carried away with predictions right now. Whether Russia ranks fifth, sixth, or eighth, the citizens of the country, by and large, do not care. What matters to them is a sufficient level of comfort of living, adherence to the norms and values to which our society is accustomed.

However, since the question of ranking has been raised, perhaps we should look at the possible position of states that are primarily within the orbit of our influence – the countries of the South Caucasus, Central Asia, and some others. How will the situation develop in these regions? There are a number of disturbing trends there that we sometimes undeservedly neglect. Konstantin Fedorovich probably understands better than anyone else what difficulties I am talking about.

Also, in my opinion, our national priorities should include increasing Russia's economical, political and cultural appeal. In this context, we had both achievements and failures. Of course, sanctions set us back, to some extent. However, I believe that we will cope with their consequences, and we need to focus primarily on the other problem.

This is the problem of interaction with neighboring countries, including eastern countries, which I have emphasized by mentioning Central Asia and the South Caucasus. Undoubtedly, Russia's relations with the Islamic world, along with Russian-Chinese relations, are a key area of foreign policy that requires special attention. Probably Russian-Chinese relations are not free of problems either, and different scenarios are possible, just as Alexei Anatolyevich said. Our interests do not always align, and we should get used to some asymmetry in relations with China, especially since it is a particularly important partner for us as a major provider of services and goods. It is very important not to concede on certain issues, and, on the contrary, to rely on China in others, if we can be sure that this will not violate our sovereignty.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Can we rely on China?

V. V. NAUMKIN: – Generally, yes, we can. However, we have to keep our ear to the ground, which I think we sometimes lack.

Everywhere, just as in the CIS, there are lobbyists for the interests of other states of the world, and it is very important to understand what they want and how they will use what they want, including in their internal political struggle. Alexei Anatolyevich correctly noted that Russia needs a certain amount of over-cautiousness, or risk hedging. I would say that it is more about reassurance, so that our partners, especially in the East, are confident that working with Russia is not detrimental to their national interests. Representatives of the CIS countries also have such concerns, which they often share in private conversations. We need to figure out how to convince potential allies that Russia poses no threat to them, how to get them to cooperate with us rather than with our adversaries. In my opinion, this issue is not given the attention it deserves.

Yesterday we touched the topic of conflict with the environment. It escalated, and the world became noticeably more vulnerable. There has been an unprecedented amount of fires, floods, droughts and other natural disasters. Given the vast area of our country, we can feel more confident than others: if one part of the state is affected, others will probably remain unscathed. On the other hand, there must be a well-thought-out strategy for dealing with the environment, tailored to the vision of the situation as a whole. An environmental conflict leads to all kinds of diseases, and I suppose we should expect more pandemics and epidemics.

So far, no one at the Conference has talked about our relationship with space. Meanwhile, our opponents are eagerly accusing Russia of polluting space. As far as I know, the Americans have special programs on this issue, directly targeting Russia. Here, too, an ideological war is being waged, in which I believe us to be inferior. The problems of space, including its militarization, should not be overlooked.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Dmitry Olegovich Rogozin suggested decorating rockets with Gzhel and Khokhloma painting.

B. V. NAUMKIN: – That is a wonderful idea.

Unfortunately, the idea of the Russian world has lost its significance. As I mentioned earlier, our country is not attractive enough for the world community. Frankly speak-

ing, we are lazy to promote the idea of the Russian world, we turn a blind eye to the shortcomings that exist in this direction. We need to appeal to our common history – common not only with the countries of the CIS, but also with the Eastern Europe. Yesterday I already mentioned the effectiveness of meanings associated with it. There are people in different states who cherish the legacy of victors in World War II – it's their war, and of course ours, too. We should use it to our benefit.

Let me emphasize: in a polycentric system, it is necessary to create alliances and look for allies. On the one hand, of course, the world's shift toward polycentricity weakens the West against the non-West. On the other hand, polycentricity brings threats with it. Take the not-always-easy relationship between Russia and Turkey. Turkey is a very important partner for us, and there are many other states with which it is fundamentally important to establish contact, despite all the difficulties that arise along the way.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Thank you, dear colleagues. I want to ask you (primarily those who have already spoken) two questions. We stand against unipolarity and for multipolarity, polycentricity. But is there a risk that polycentricity will become a war of all against all? That's the first question. My second question was prompted by Vitaly Vyacheslavovich's words. When we talk about our allies, we usually mean former republics of the USSR. But are these states really our friends or are they hidden, semi-concealed, or even overt opponents of our strengthening? For example, a currently prominent Armenian political figure (I will not share his last name) said that Armenia was against Russia's victory in Ukraine because this would lead to restoration of the Soviet Union.

I. I. BUZOVSKY: – As a representative of one of the former Soviet republics, in response to the question about the preference for polycentricity or unipolarity, I would like to say that if we dominated, then we would definitely advocate unipolarity. Further on, a decision would be made to delegate authority, etc. The struggle reveals the need for dominance; now we need to think about the methods of work and struggle.

All of the former Soviet republics are searching for their place, trying to figure out their path. The speeches that we have already heard fit within this understanding, but at a higher level of generalization, a question arises: which is more important – the spiritual or the material? Vitaly Vyacheslavovich Naumkin spoke about the need to promote the idea of the "Russian world," the ties based on our common history, etc. It's not just the economy that's important, but also the goal, the understanding of where we're going and what we're fighting for.

Today, in a very difficult period, we can say that our adversaries, or to put it bluntly, enemies, have been bribed; that is, they have been drawn into the unipolar flow for money. But it must be understood that this is not as much of a bribe as shaping of a context in which they believed in a strategy and ideology that helps them move in a direction that does not suit us today.

If we talk about the Republic of Belarus, we are still analyzing the causes of the protests that took place in our country in 2020–2021, trying to answer the question of how it could have happened. Why did the relationship that deve-

loped between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus lead to the need for intervention? And once again I would like to thank Russia for its assistance (and I am not only talking about its armed component).

We need to formulate strategies and think about where we are going. Head-on advertising, news block, speaking from the strong position when one dominates and the others listen, are the technologies of the last century. In 2020, almost all PR agencies in Belarus took the other side. PR affects the unconscious, so it should be an integral part of our work. Calculation does not work in relationships; another thing matters – that the information gets to the heart, affecting the unconscious. We need to switch to values and ideals, talk about what we mean by them and articulate our activities in general.

To summarize, the search for a development strategy and the definition of values that should consolidate us lie at the heart of the answer to the question about polycentricity and unipolarity. We advocate multipolarity, common values, but we must understand where we are going, perhaps even under a common flag.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – One gets the impression that we cannot get out of a vicious circle: values, path choices, ideology – it's all about the future, as if without understanding what will happen to us tomorrow, we cannot move forward. We think we're the smartest, so we have to know where we're going to end up. Our life resembles the movement of a train that runs on rails along a given route. But we are not a train, we are people endowed with principles – these are traditional values that are enshrined in the founding documents. They are obvious and simple, they contain a philosophical, ideological basis that was being created for thousands of years. It is a state based on a family consisting of a man and a woman giving birth to girls and boys, not individuals of the middle gender. We have defined the form of organization of the society (from the initial cell to the top) and enshrined it in the founding documents.

The development path suggests that a person works and gets remunerated according to the results of work and creative effort (which suggests freedom, etc.). Money, obtained by any means and used as a tool, is in no way a supreme value.

I agree with Igor Ivanovich that we need to explain ideas to people using simple words. Remuneration for work, not greed for the sake of accumulation and power. Everything can be spelled out like in the song “Where does the Motherland begin?” But we believe that in our high society we should not speculate about such trivial things.

Sergey Ivanovich mentioned that *Huawei* will not supply communications equipment to the Russian Federation because they were pressured by the Americans. But that's probably not entirely true, because we only have data from open sources, while there are classified sources as well. In addition, we should keep in mind that we tend to react emotionally.

I believe that it is necessary to work with all parties on all issues. Example – despite all disagreements, the US sent a delegation to *Venezuela* that met with representatives of Nicolas Maduro's government. And Russia needs to do the same.

How have Russia's relations with China evolved over the past 20 years? Our elite stigmatized this direction. This is

why there are virtually no Russian media correspondents in China. There are only 1.5 representatives of Russian media per 1.4 billion Chinese, a huge number of provinces speaking different languages. And how many of our correspondents do we have in Europe? Our media describe in great detail who said what, as if it were of value, given that the European Union countries have a unified foreign policy, and it is not formed in Brussels. Russia manifests the same attitude toward other parts of the world: zero attention to Africa and Asia in terms of media, both externally and internally.

In a conversation with the heads of channels and other personalities who determine the broadcasting schedule, one person confided to me that he was afraid of China because it is very incomprehensible. The Russian economic elite argued that it had no possibility of supplying products from China, even though we already had the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal-Amur Mainline.

To make the Chinese destination attractive, we could increase funding and engage marketing. Instead we use the *port of Hamburg* as the most important hub opening the way to the *ports* of other regions of the world, and we pay them a lot of money, despite the fact that the Russian-Chinese border is the second longest in Russia and we have a railroad. Supplying goods by rail, we would feed the whole country via that direction.

For 20 years, our economic elite has done everything to alienate people from China, scaring us with the return of the “shuttle traders,” who, by the way, ensured survival of the population in the difficult 1990s. Now the “shuttles” will not carry plaid bags but nice briefcases; but in many ways they will repeat the same path. Small and medium-sized businesses supplying products to Europe and transferring money there were not given the opportunity to take a pragmatic look at the Chinese direction.

Now we should disregard the nuances that are inflated by our elite and cited as an example that we have nothing to do in China. We need to look into this direction. We finally figured it out.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Thank you, Maria Vladimirovna. I give the floor to Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – In answer to Konstantin Fedorovich's question, I would like to say that there will be no war of all against all because of the high degree of interconnectedness in international economic relations. We are now experiencing this interconnectedness, and so does China. The concept of the new world economic order is focused on close ties, because it is not about freedom of trade and movement of money, but rather about joint investment cooperation. I fully agree with Maria Vladimirovna who is in favor of expanding cooperation with Asia.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – Sergey Yuryevich, this is I who agrees with you: your ideas are dressed in calculations, supported by statistics and presented in a pragmatic way. In response to journalist K. Remchukov's question about whether we are afraid that China and Asia will betray Russia, I replied that Europe has betrayed us more than once. Potentially, we should not only calculate, but also factor in these risks and keep working together. We face betrayal all the time, and every time we go back to the traitors. It's time to stop.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Maria Vladimirovna, Emperor Alexander III answered these questions by saying that Russia has only two allies: the army and the navy.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – I would like to draw attention to the fact that China was once comfortable doing business with the United States, but they sobered up after the trade war that Trump announced.” Xi Jinping’s financial advisers, with whom I was in close contact, did not believe that sanctions would be imposed against them. It was a revelation to them at that time. And now they look at the world very differently and are dumping dollar reserves.

I would like to revert Konstantin Fedorovich’s question about allies to the Russian side. Maria Vladimirovna talks about bilateral relations, but within SCO, the Americans, together with the Bank for International Settlements, are already forming (and one might say, imposing) 20 agendas. Representatives of the Russian Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank sign documents without even reading them. That is, we need to propose initiatives, especially in the SCO, which is open for dialogue. China and India are waiting for us to take the initiative because they (even with their enormous size and power) do not have the international experience that Russia has, but they will soon stop waiting.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I give the floor to Sergey Ivanovich Kislyak.

S. I. KISLYAK: – It is necessary to understand the problems that we will face and start working on them today. This includes helping the Chinese to overcome boundaries before they go beyond their world in which they have taken a leap, but are already looking at new horizons. China was counting on a change for the better when D. Trump would no longer be a president. Indeed, things have gradually got milder, but the process has not been reversed. We need to remember what the Chinese are focused on and what they fear, because objectively Russia needs allies who can help build the new world order. And China, of course, is our number one goal in this regard. I doubt that our Chinese friends are interested in a bipolar world. They are ambitious, but their mentality is such that they will not take risks and are realistically assessing their capabilities. They are not interested in running the world, which means taking responsibility for it, and the Chinese are not ready for that yet. They are interested in working with us, and Russia should not miss this chance.

K. F. ZATULIN: – In Russia, there is a perception that millions of Chinese are just waiting for an opportunity to cross the border and invade Siberia. However, it should be made clear that China has always been concerned about one problem: how to feed their huge population. There is a Temple of Heaven in Beijing where the emperor offered a sacrifice every year, asking for a good harvest. The aggressiveness of the Chinese is tempered by an understanding of the need for a peaceful life, which is necessary in order to feed a huge number of people.

I was surprised to learn what the Chinese call Russians.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – Europeans, according to the Chinese, are long-nosed barbarians.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Chinese newspapers describe Russians as a belligerent nation. And it is a cause for reflection: to what extent it is a compliment and to what extent a warning.

I give the floor to Pavel Nikolaevich Gusev, editor-in-chief of *Moskovsky Komsomolets*.

P. N. GUSEV: – Maria Vladimirovna said that Russian media are practically not represented in China. About 15 years ago, as head of the Union of Journalists of Russia, I tried to open a number of Russian-language publications in China through various structures and departments. In the PRC, everything to do with journalism is under control of the Chinese Communist Party; there is no private initiative in terms of propaganda, information, or anything to do with the word. It would take an appropriate decision of the Central Committee of the Party and execution of a large number of documents, the meaning of which did not correspond to the motives with which we wanted to enter China. It was impossible to overcome the barriers, at least in that period. That’s when we gave up staff reporters as well.

As for the development of relations between Russia and China, I recall a meeting of the Moscow government when Mayor Luzhkov categorically stated that there would be no Chinatown or Chinese in Moscow.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I give the floor to Elena Vladimirovna Kharitonova, Senior Researcher at the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

E. V. KHARITONOVA: – In our discussions, we periodically move from economic and political issues to ideological, ethical, moral, worldview issues, often mentioning “the Russian world.”

When Igor Ivanovich asked what we were fighting for and where we were going, Maria Vladimirovna answered: “Why do we need to know where we’re going?”

I have great respect for Maria Vladimirovna, but I want to argue with what was said at the plenary session that ideology is when a person wants to live in his country. After all, a targeted selection can be made, such as the one recently announced in higher education: we are not forming a creator, but a consumer. That is, it is possible to breed a kind of people who will be comfortable in one society but uncomfortable in another. Many of you probably remember John Calhoun’s Universe-25 experiment conducted in the 1960s and 1970s on rodents, when they were placed in incredibly comfortable conditions, but at some point they all degenerated and died.

Speaking of the “Russian world” and ethics, which is part of culture, determines the worldview component of the governance cycle and is therefore under constant attack in hybrid warfare (both externally and internally), I would like to formulate dilemmas characteristic of our type of ethics:

- the general over the particular (formerly, the public over the personal);
- justice over the law (as we know, our strength is in the truth);
- the spiritual over the material;
- power over property (Maria Vladimirovna also mentioned this);
- service over possession.

These dilemmas are not imposed on Russian ethics, but were shaped in the course of traditional development. As a representative of the Institute for African Studies, I can say that these principles are close to the traditional African ethical system. This model was attractive to Third World countries (those who needed justice, a new world order in the sense not of a new economic system but of an ethical system), which from the Anglo-Saxon point of view have always been peripheral, unlike the metropolises, for which this model is destructive because it undermines their foundations. And in many ways this is why the Soviet project to decolonize Africa was successful.

In the days of the Soviet Union, we had something to offer the world, and so this model was a success. But yesterday, a question arose at the plenary session: why, with the strongest ideology and observance of the moral code, did the USSR disintegrate?

Civilizational development has the form of a spindle in which there is a lower part – traditional, an upper part – strategy, goals and objectives of development, and a middle part – existential, oftentimes overlooked. If we only bet on the lower part – the tradition – we go below the water-line and the ship sinks. If we neglect history and focus only on the top of the spindle, the boat turns over. If we lack the existential part, the basic part, it causes discontent. It is especially so if there is a penetration of knowledge about another way of life, which after the lifting of the Iron Curtain began to destroy us, both spontaneously and purposefully. The strength is in the balance, the golden mean in our tradition, the way of the Tao in the Eastern, Eurasian tradition, which we are now betting on, the truth in my view and understanding.

I am a member of the executive committee of the World Federation of Scientific Workers. In 1946, F. Joliot-Curie created it as an organization of scientists who should be responsible for the fate of the world in connection with their discoveries. This happened after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And to this day, members of this organization still talk about disarmament. But in the established order of the unipolar world, disarmament is out of the question. A striking example is the DPRK, which is developing nuclear weapons (these are weapons of deterrence that imply the possibility of striking an enemy), and Muammar Gaddafi, who has abandoned the nuclear project. Africa could be a mirror of the events we are facing right now.

One nuance related to the paradox of disarmament is noteworthy. Before Gorbachev, the two poles of the bipolar world had about 30,000 warheads, which, indeed, could have led to a nuclear winter, the destruction of humanity. Everyone understood that. After the arms reduction, the Western elite had the illusion, which still persists, that it is possible to survive a nuclear war by equipping a bunker, etc. Fear of the possibility of a strike diminished.

We are striving for a multipolar world. Globalization implies concentration of funds and management capabilities in a single center. And if we are talking about centers of power, the key word here is “power,” that is, this center must be strong on the outer circuit as well as on the inner circuit. And the outer circuit is not just about military force. We know that hybrid warfare is waged at different levels, the first of which (educational system, memory of the war and heroes, the monuments) is constantly under attack – historically, factually, and ideologically. The se-

cond level – financial and economic (Bretton Woods system, sanctions, etc.) – is a powerful weapon in a hybrid war. The next level is military (peacekeeping operations, special operations, war against the gene pool through alcoholization, drug stuff, etc.).

We must be strong in order to be able to claim our sovereignty.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I give the floor to Irina Olegovna Abramova, Director of the Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

I. O. ABRAMOVA: – June 9 is the 350th anniversary of the birth of Peter the Great. Our history (including polycentricity and multipolarity) might have turned out differently if the expedition to Madagascar that Peter the Great had planned in 1723 at the suggestion of Vice-Admiral Daniel Jacob Wilster had taken place (but the ships got a leak and returned to Revel). The situation is similar with the Republic of South Africa.

Why is Africa always on the periphery in all areas of our relations with other countries? Because it is practically absent from the information space. From January 25 to February 2, 2022, we conducted a study that found that the percentage of mentions of the U.S. in our media at that time was 14% and Africa (54 states) less than 0.5%. And this is a relatively high figure because it was at the time of the coup in Burkina Faso, the discussion of Wagner's private military campaign, S. V. Lavrov's commentary, the announcement of the exarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church in Africa, and the African Football Championship. Now the figure is less than 0.01%.

Maria Vladimirovna also touched on this topic in her speech. There are five TASS offices in Africa: three in North Africa, one in South Africa and one in Kenya. In other words, all of sub-Saharan Africa is not covered by Russian information, so all of its countries receive information about Russia from the Western media, which shapes their public opinion along with other sources, although at the level of ministers and top leaders they make curtsies in favor of Russia. Incidentally, Eritrea is one of the countries, besides Syria, Belarus and North Korea, that did not support the U.S.-Ukrainian resolution. And our closest surrounding, the Eurasian Economic Union, abstained from voting for fear of sanctions. Eritrea is ruled by a dictator, but in geostrategic terms this country is interesting for Russia.

A few words on why we should look to Africa as another emerging pole of development. First, the young population of Africa (under 25 years old) accounts for 60%. This is our future, as young people generate the main demand for modern goods and services. Second, beginning in 2040, the growth of the middle class – the main consumer – will occur not in Asia, but in Africa. Third is the security issues. Creation of the new AUKUS bloc (a defense alliance between Australia, Britain and the United States) has created a huge territory involving the African continent. We should also look at Africa from the point of view of placing new points of counteraction to Russia there. Negotiations are already underway with Kenya and South Africa. Finally, Africa is 54 countries, that is, 54 UN votes.

Sergey Yuryevich Glazyev expressed his fear that Russia will become the periphery of China. We constantly turn exclusively in one direction, now to the West, now to the

East (China and India), whereas Africa is absent from Russia's field of vision. In order to effectively implement policies and avoid becoming peripheral, Russia needs to consider more players.

Sergey Yuryevich also spoke about the formation of a new system of global settlements. Africans are very interested in this system, including national currencies and real exchange goods, because they, like Russia, have 35% of the world's resources necessary to produce high-tech goods. If we talk about digital currencies, we can learn from Africa, because the first online payment in the world was made in Kenya and not in the West, Rwanda abandoned paper money, etc.

Elena Grigoryevna, what is the number of women in the State Duma?

E. G. DRAPEKO: – 14%.

I. O. ABRAMOVA: – And in Rwanda – 64%, in South Africa – 35%. Among other things, they pay great attention to the role of women.

We should start from the other side. Everything that is happening today in Russia and Belarus has previously been tested on Africa: colonial technology, turning into a raw materials' appendage of the West, working with young people and unleashing "color" revolutions (with the involvement of youth, network transmission of information, involvement of children).

Everything that happens in science was also done in Africa: tying African science to Western science, brain drain, grants in fields where Africans have reached a certain level (primarily epidemiology and medicine). According to public records, there are 45 U.S. biological laboratories in 20 countries in Africa. Think of the large number of infectious diseases in Africa and how this fact can be manipulated. In terms of our biosecurity, this is also extremely important.

Another technology that has been tried in Africa is the destruction of national identity, the abandonment of the national language that shapes thinking. All African countries are either Francophones, or Anglophones, or use Portuguese, Arabic and Spanish (we are talking about black Africa).

Igor Ivanovich spoke about the technologies of manipulating public consciousness – they have also been tried in Africa. I worked with African migrants for many years through the Council of Europe, and I have seen how representatives of this organization act, using linguistic methods inter alia.

We have to think strategically, and we're always a little behind. China has become a great power, and now we are friends with it. And in 1990, when no one paid attention to China in Russia, the country's GDP (\$389 billion) was comparable to that of Ukraine (\$293 billion).

Africa is the continent of the twenty-first century, and if we disregard it today, we could lose a lot in terms of allies and future development. In relation to Africa, we should talk about technology rather than trade. Russia has the technology that Africa needs and that we can offer to the huge, rapidly developing market for the young generation. And then both Russia and the African continent will be successful. In terms of ideology, we have affinity to their two theses – sovereignty and justice.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Irina Olegovna, I support everything you just said – probably as do many people here. In the Soviet Union, it was believed that the Soviet Union's best friends were the oppressed peoples of Africa.

E. G. DRAPEKO: – Africans would like to send a delegation to Russia and establish contacts at least at the level of culture, but there is resistance from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – The Foreign Ministry, as stated by Minister Lavrov and repeatedly by the ministry itself, is now redistributing human resources. The departments in charge of Asian and African relations will be strengthened by new resources, but this cannot be done overnight.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I give the floor to Academician Valery Alexandrovich Chereshev, Chief Researcher at the Institute of Immunology and Physiology of the Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

V. A. CHERESHNEV: – In connection with the celebration of the anniversary of Peter the Great, I want to say that it was he who invented the brain drain, inviting 17 prominent scientists from four countries (Switzerland, Germany, France, England) to Russia to create St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences and Arts (the forerunner of the Academy of Sciences). Since none of the foreigners knew Russian at the time, Peter placed his physician-in-ordinary, Lavrenty Lavrentyevich Blumentrost, as president and interpreter over them. In the middle of the 18th century, the number of foreign and Russian scholars was equalized. Perhaps we should follow the example of Peter the Great: do what is expedient.

People before the twentieth century lived with a sense of their own immortality. Even though there were wars, epidemics, and cataclysms, humanity recovered itself and grew in numbers. The first bell rang in August 1945, when the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Then it became clear that this was a self-destruction mechanism which would leave nothing alive. A few decades later, a second bell rang – the environmental crisis.

In the 1930s, Vladimir Ivanovich Vernadsky created the doctrine of the noosphere. The technogenic pressure, which began in the middle of the 18th century and has been going on for 240 years (and we are now at the peak of the technosphere), is increasing and will inevitably lead to self-destruction of the humanity.

In 2002, the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development dedicated to the conservation of the planet's nature was held in South Africa, discussing comprehensive environmental programs and the transition to zero-waste closed-cycle production. Everybody understood that there could be an environmental crisis, and a sum of contributions was agreed upon to solve the problem of release of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. But the U.S., leader in the emissions, has blocked its accession. And it ended in 2002 without even having begun.

Health is essential. In Africa, life expectancy in the mid-1990s was 54–55 years, in Japan it was close to 80 years, and in Russia it reached 70 years. And today the average life expectancy in Japan is 85 years, in the United States – 80, in Scandinavian countries – 82, in developed countries –

82–83, and in Russia – 72. Besides, Russia has the largest difference between life expectancy of men and women: as a rule, the difference is 1–3 years, and in Russia it is 11–12 years (our men live on average 66–67 years, and women 78–79 years).

According to scientific data, there should be at least 10–12 years between retirement age and the age of living. One can retire at 70 if the average life expectancy is 82–84. But if, on average, people live 67 years and retire at 65, that has to be explained somehow and there should be a scientifically-based response.

Unfortunately, in Russia, since 2014 there has been a systematic destruction of the Academy of Sciences and its transformation into a social club. In the West, academies are not government-run, but non-governmental. Membership in the U.S. National Academy of Sciences is valued at \$100, for which a member receives four issues of their journal a year and must attend two general meetings. Members of Western academies are not academicians, but Doctors of Philosophy or Professors. In Russia, starting from Peter the Great's time, the Academy of Sciences, which was called the Vasilostrovsky Vatican, because it was located on Vasilyevsky Island, encompassed the intellectual elite.

It is not uncommon now to say that the Academy of Sciences is an obsolete form of organization. For instance, China created its Academy of Sciences after the template of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1949. But the PRC had appropriate funding. Where the system is in place and science is given enough attention, the academic form is effective and quite capable.

The Russian Institute of Immunology and Physiology and the Chinese Institute of Microbiology and Immunology in Harbin signed an agreement in 1990. At that time, our conditions were comparable: 150 employees and two two-story buildings. Now China has five 20-story institutes and one research laboratory, 1,500 employees; while we are still left with our 150 people. Besides, China has a biotechnology building that is half-full, as workplaces there await for young professionals to return from Europe and the United States and develop areas related to vaccinology and immunoglobulins. A popular slogan in China today calls for all those who have been trained to return to their native country.

Another important problem of our time is the proliferation of biolaboratories. For example, there are 60 such laboratories in Africa, 8 in Georgia, 40 in China, etc. Nature creates pathogenic strains, and laboratories upgrade them to higher pathogenicity levels. Recently, they started studying bats, and it turned out that they are saturated with highly pathogenic strains, just like monkeys, but don't get sick because there are no receptors on their lymphocytes that can pick up viruses. And humans have receptor proteins; once in the body, the virus begins to multiply, causing disease and death.

A few words about polymorbidity and comorbidity. Polymorbidity is the presence of several synchronous diseases in an individual in different phases and stages of development. By the age of 60, a person (no matter what country he or she lives in – Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, or Russia) accumulates a bunch of diseases (atherosclerosis, cholecystitis, arthritis, etc.). In the body they do not interfere, but balance each other; the main thing is to avoid exacerbations. A powerful viral infection turns out to be a stimulant

that triggers chronic processes. As a result, one comorbid disease provokes all the chronic ones.

Let us look at the difference in statistical data in Russia and in the West concerning the number of deaths from COVID-19. Let's say a person died of a myocardial infarction, but a PCR test showed that he had COVID-19. However, "heart attack complicated by coronavirus" is cited as the cause. And it has to be vice versa, because COVID-19 triggered the heart attack. Were it not for COVID-19, the heart attack could have been managed. That is why statistics show 370,000 deaths in Russia and 1 million in the United States. However, when the data for two years were analyzed in Russia, it turned out that there was an increase of 985,000 deaths. You can't fool the numbers.

A polycentric world is necessary, but there are certain advantages to a monocentric world as well. The main thing is to solve problems in all important areas, including education.

K. F. ZATULIN: – In the State Duma, I represent the city of Sochi where we have a popular saying, 'The rescue of a drowning man is the drowning man's own job.' If the Academy of Sciences is unable to solve problems on its own, there is no one to blame. Can't a large number of respectable people organize themselves to prove their case and the right of the academy to exist? What happened to the Academy of Sciences is wrong. As a historian by profession, I am well aware of the significance of the Academy of Sciences and the path that it has taken in its development.

I give the floor to Sergey Alexeevich Tsypliyev, member of the Council for Foreign and Defense Policy.

S. A. TSYPLIYAEV: – The anniversary of Peter the Great is a good time to talk about the fact that today, in the twenty-first century, the window to Europe is being shut – quite tight, as it seems – in anticipation of frost. At the same time, for several years the Russian elite has been repeating that we will now turn to the warm East: it will be the destination for our export products, finance and technology will flow to us from there, and China will be our loyal friend. I agree that for quite a long time no one was interested in China economically: only in 2009 did we list Russia on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and the first pipelines were not laid there until 2011, when a supply agreement was signed between Rosneft and China's CNPC.

And now we are astonished to see China pursuing a policy that is not in our interest. How come? And it's not just the HUAWEI story. Ban on double-registered planes, refusal to supply spare parts for planes, airbuses, upcoming withdrawal of the Chinese company from the Arctic LNG-2 project...

In my view, our frustrations stem from the fact that although we talk about multipolarity, that is not what we really mean. Multipolarity is nothing more than the antithesis of unipolarity, and in fact, we want to be at least the second pole and still see the world as a bipolar system. If China has a problematic relationship with America, we think the Chinese should be our friends.

In believing so, however, we disregard China's history, culture, and stance. A country, which at times produced up to 40% of the world's GDP, which considered itself the center of the world and all others as tributaries, will never be a loyal ally who will support you to its own disadvan-

tage. It is telling that when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared in China in the 19th century, it was called the Ministry for the Administration of All Peoples' Affairs. This is how China perceives itself. And now they are saying, walk beside us if you want to; if you don't want, don't come. Nothing more than that.

I remember that at one of the forums of the St. Petersburg Dialogue series, General L. G. Ivashov said that a powerful anti-American military bloc will be created, which will include Russia, India, and China. In response to the experts' snide question about who would lead this bloc, he replied with a smile, "Russia, of course." And he proceeded to talk about our advantages which would make other participants accept it. So right now I wouldn't hold out much hope for China. However, it would be wrong to say that the Chinese are not ready to take responsibility. In all recent conferences (and in China, too) where I have had the opportunity to talk to them, they have constantly been pursuing the same idea: the world is now dependent on two centers, the United States and China, and the relationship between these countries determines what the world will look like in the future. They agree to be friends with Russia – why not? They say, you have such a large territory, so many extractable resources. This is their attitude that we have to reckon with.

Again, out of habit, we do not perceive China as a separate center of power, and our multipolarity does not seem to extend beyond the two poles. Once, at a meeting of the Russian Council for Foreign and Defense Policy, Sergey Lavrov delivered a rather long and heartfelt speech about the need for equality of all states in the world. I asked the question: then how do we look at the right of veto in the UN Security Council? It is a special position of the five countries, not equality. He said it was right, that's how it should be. And this, too, shows that we do not envisage any more poles, moreover – we deny even the EU to be a pole, considering that it goes in the fairway of America. I don't think we are ready to reconsider our attitude to "multipolarity."

And what is our strategic objective? To be universally recognized as a pole, military power alone is not enough – you have to be a powerful economic and cultural center. But what is our task in the economy today? We have actually begun to re-industrialize, because to be in the post-industrial world bypassing the industrial phase is not possible, it is an illusion. And we cannot rely solely on agriculture, clean water and tourism. This, of course, is all necessary and good, but it means a complete change in our national character, which is hardly possible.

Let us recall how industrialization occurred in the Soviet Union. It was not written in our textbooks that Stalin invited the American architect Albert Kahn who received orders for huge sums and built more than 500 factories here. The Stalingrad Tractor Plant was cut in America, brought here and assembled; the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Plant was a copy of the plant in Gary, Indiana, etc. Dnieper hydroelectric power plant was designed by the Americans, who also built 15 of the 16 turbines; the generators were made by the Germans; Uralmash was fully fitted with Western equipment. One could go on and on: there are American blast furnaces in the shops of Magnitka; the Demag German forging press launched in the 1930s was stopped only in the early 2000s. This is not a reason to dust our heads with ashes – it is clear that for that time, it was the only possi-

ble solution. If the proponents of total import substitution had won in those years, what would we have by 1941? With Mosin rifles. Today is the same story – if we try import substituting everything, the country may find itself in an extremely difficult situation.

The question is, what is China's interest? It is not interested in Russia as an industrial competitor. China is now an industrial factory for the United States, trying to take over the market in Europe completely, and it is not willing to sacrifice its position to help us in whatever it may be. It is absolutely pragmatic in its actions. We had (I don't know if we still have) a chance to reindustrialize the country on the basis of domestic business with the help of Western technology and Central Asian labor. On this list, getting technology is a matter of life and death.

My work history includes the position of a scientific secretary of the largest defense research institute in the country, so I know the price of complacency. It is impossible to replace high-tech imports in one fell swoop. We remember how this happened in the previous years and how many lives it cost, for example, in Afghanistan, when a night vision device was needed, but it could not be made, despite all efforts of engineers and heroes of socialist labor. In reality things look different than in dreams and talks.

A few comments on general discussion of ideology. I am very concerned about the emergence of a "new religion" in ideology; its adherents say that everything in this world was organized and done by Americans because they are almighty. I call them the cult of American worshippers. Such speeches instill in us a helplessness that stifles our initiative, ability, intelligence, etc. These are no better than stories about how detestable the West is. We're good, we offer great solutions, but they reject everything. It turns out that Russia is the unfortunate victim of villains. This, too, is nothing more than learned helplessness.

Colleagues have rightly reminded us of the attitudes that guided China at the beginning of its spectacular rise. The Chinese did not accuse the West and did not try to change the rules of interaction with it, but used these rules to their advantage as much as possible. The wise Deng Xiaoping said that no country in the world, regardless of its political structure, is able to carry out modernization if it implements a closed-door policy. Another wisdom of Deng Xiaoping is to hide one's true intentions and keep a low profile, that is, not to impose one's will on anyone, not to get involved in conflicts, but instead to make every effort to develop internally; this is a measure of the effectiveness of foreign policy as well.

I cannot agree that India and China will soon become world leaders in GDP because technology is still generated in the West. The only country that is not a net importer of technology is the United States. Even the Japanese who successfully industrialized themselves were not able to do anything in the field of technology and eventually remained users. Creating technology is a very complicated business, so we should not expect India and China to inspire us with their example of achieving world leadership through simply flooding the world with cheap goods.

In conclusion, I would like to address today's jubilee again. It is known that Peter invited European scientists to Russia, borrowed technology, sent children of the nobility to Europe to study, and went there himself for the same purpose. As Pushkin wrote, "all flags will be our guests." It

feels like we want to disprove the rightness of both Peter the Great and Stalin and perform a miracle – a breakthrough in the conditions of isolation. I'm afraid it will cost huge and unreasonable money, and China won't help.

As for a multipolar world, we have a great illustration of our readiness for it. In St. Petersburg there is an Interparliamentary Assembly of the CIS countries, whose rules stipulate regular re-election of the chairman with mandatory rotation. So, since 1994, the "rotation" has taken place in such a way that the chairman is always a representative of the Russian Federation. So let us have no illusions. If we really want a multipolar world, we will have to change a lot in our lives and minds.

K. F. ZATULIN: – To begin with, I would like to clarify that we never said that we were going to develop multipolarity within the CIS, otherwise there would have been madness. By the way, multipolarity in the CIS was also proposed by those who organized the GUAM Union (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Moldova) along with the CIS and are still trying to make Ukraine an entity that can confront Russia. This was the attempt to create multipolarity in the CIS. So Russia's actual chairmanship of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly is quite logical.

As for Stalin's industrialization, many people know how it was carried out. For example, I studied this process when I was in graduate school. I will not argue with you, my only objection is that we were too late then. By 1941, it was too late to develop cooperative ties with Germany, although German industrial equipment would have greatly helped our industry. In my opinion, 1941 in relations with Germany is about the same as 2022 in relations with the United States. It would be strange to invite American specialists now, although they could be very helpful.

As a member of the State Duma, I can tell you about the actions the government feels due to be taken first and foremost in the current situation. Parliament, like the president, has quite a lot of confidence in the government in this regard. In the first package of measures, for example, it is proposed to adjust the duties. So, purchase of a car from a foreign brand was subject to a luxury tax if its value exceeded 3 million rubles. Now it is proposed to raise the limit to 10 million. This measure is taken as part of the structural transformation of the economy in the context of a special military operation. However, in the military industrial sector, unfortunately, we are still dominated by financiers. Does your company want an order to produce rockets and airplanes? Then take out loans secured by your property. This is a typical managerial approach, not the mobilization of the economy that is so necessary today.

I left the good thing for the conclusion. Submarines are made in St. Petersburg – designed by the Malakhit Design Bureau and manufactured by the Granit Concern. I know a little bit about the technological process, and I assure you that there is no American equipment at these plants. So we have the potential, given the will. And the Americans, I think, are smart people, which is why they still have an airplane and helicopter manufacturing company that was once founded by our former compatriot Igor Sikorsky.

E. G. DRAPEKO: – May I add? In St. Petersburg all defense enterprises operate with negative profits.

S. A. TSYPLIYEV: – The economy is not limited to the military sphere. It is necessary to create and develop civilian industries for a peaceful life, and here we face great difficulties.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I agree. I'm ready to repeat my point: we're late again. A lot of things should have been done before, but now it's no longer possible. Now we are in a special situation, and we have to do another thing.

I invite Shamakhov Vladimir Alexandrovich to speak.

V. A. SHAMAKHOV: – I just have a few remarks. First, the new world order is multipolar and cannot be different. But it is noteworthy that both in the academia and in the household, people tend to ask questions: Who are we with? Where are we going? We are currently choosing with whom we will cooperate more and with whom less. In any case, in relations with the United States, China, India and other countries, we need a strategy, and there can be no strategy without ideology. Both the U.S. and China have an ideology that is very powerful, consistent and systematic.

Second, Russia often treats ideology as a faith or a dream. In fact, ideology is primarily goal-setting. If we don't decide that from the beginning, it will be hard to move forward, and we'll keep staggering back and forth. This is especially important now, when international law has all but collapsed. We have to decide that for ourselves.

Third, again about the poles. We speak of economic poles, political poles, etc. I suggest that we return to the traditional understanding of the pole as a physical phenomenon. The North Pole, or more precisely the Arctic, is a huge geostrategic resource. We don't believe this resource to be very important, but I suggest we look not only west, east and south, but also north. A global breakthrough, including an economic one, can be achieved through the Arctic.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Leonid Leonidovich Fituni, you have the floor.

L. L. FITUNI: – My colleague Shamakhov sees ideology as goal-setting. Let me remind you that ideology is commonly understood as a system of conceptualized ideas that express the interests, worldviews and ideals of a certain community – state, social class, etc. Therefore, it is necessary to formulate a few ideas that will meet this notion.

If we talk about a class worldview, it will be class ideas, if we want to formulate an ideology for the country, it must be something that would unite the country. An ideology that is acceptable to the entire world must include ideas that are perceived by the entire world as positive.

There is a rather beautiful concept of multipolarity, which was developed back in the 1990s by the remarkable Russian statesman E. M. Primakov. According to his prediction, the multipolar system will be based on three pillars – Russia, India, and China. But is this assumption correct? Will it really only be three countries? Or maybe more – plus, for example, the United States or some other state – Turkey, Iran? Are we ready for more poles of power? I don't think we would like that multipolarity very much. It would be worse for us than bipolarity or even unipolarity, because we would have to spend a lot of energy and resources to resist the pressure. So the future multipolar world requires careful study and scientifically sound, carefully

calibrated forecasts. In this sense, I am ready to support Maria Vladimirovna's thesis about China. She emphasized the foreign policy and partly the informational dimension of this issue. Once upon a time (not very long ago) China was indeed talked about in a mostly negative way. But I want to recall the attitude of the famous politician Anatoly Chubais, who, in the 1990s, responded to proposals for certain economic measures with the following objection: "Do you want us to be like China?" Back then, no one wanted to be "like China." By the end of the 1990s, a different point of view prevailed: China is growing so fast, but we have a different path. In the 2000s, the opinion changed again: why not be like China, if they have such impressive success?

As for Chinese history and mentality, there is one important detail to keep in mind. Those "quotes" that are often presented to us as Chinese wisdom sometimes come from nowhere. Much of what we allegedly know about China comes mostly from English-language sources. What exactly the Chinese say and what they mean by it – this information tends to come to us in an indirect form, since very few of us are able to read the original texts. Some of my closest relatives are Sinologists, so I trust their judgment in this matter.

So, in most cases, the Chinese do not have the concepts that we pass off as their vision. I had to deal with this from my own experience when a Chinese delegation came to the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. The president of the academy said that we know the Chinese curse: may you live in an age of change. The Chinese interpreter couldn't translate it for a long time, asking what that would mean. A few minutes later it turned out that they didn't have such a saying.

We believe that we understand the Chinese (and not only Chinese) vision correctly. We say, China has always been an empire, it resisted any expansion, etc. However, for the last 300-plus years the Chinese, I mean the Han Chinese, have lived under the Manchu dynasty. The Han Chinese may have won wars millennia ago, but for centuries they have essentially been a colony of the Manchu state.

K. F. ZATULIN: – It is as much a colony as we are a colony of Vikings.

L. L. FITUNI: – More like a colony of Tatars.

K. F. ZATULIN: – No, Vikings.

L. L. FITUNI: – All right. And one last thing. The question of our foreign policy and multipolarity. In order to come out to the world with ideas, one has to be sure that these ideas are properly understood and will be supported. For us, the idea of the Russian world seems natural and obvious. But even for Africans, who for the most part support us, this idea is not entirely unambiguous. The Russian world is probably a good thing, but what good is it to us? Therefore, for interaction with these countries, I suggest another idea (as an option) – the idea of liberation. The concept may be as follows. In the 1990s, Russia, just like African countries at an earlier time, was essentially colonized – not as it happened 200 years ago, but with adjustments for the twenty-first century. A formally independent state, but in reality an oppressed and plundered periphery, from which the West drains resources, including brains. To some extent, we have repeated the experience of Germany

after World War I, when vast territories were taken away from it, and contributions, reparations, etc. were imposed. The main idea: you and us, we are ready to take the lead in a world that will be free from exploitation by the more developed countries. This message will be understood. I am not saying that we should forget about the Russian world, but, let me repeat, you can only look for allies and hope for support when you talk about common interests which are driven by common ideals.

Speaking of terms. The word "ideals" is closer to us, Russian people, than "values." European values are really values: something that can be mortgaged if you want to, something you can cash in on. A Russian and generally Orthodox person prefers ideals – something you fight for, that cannot be betrayed.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Thank you so much.

L. L. FITUNI: – Let us not forget why the USSR and China parted ways in the 1950s: it was the ideology. The Chinese said, don't give up on what you have achieved in 40 years of Soviet power and what we have learned from you. But we answered that we were going to start over. Now is the time to remember that lesson.

K. F. ZATULIN: – I agree that was one reason, but not the only one. And the main one was that China was raising on its feet and was no longer willing to submit to the leadership from Moscow.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – Few people now remember the past rupture of relations between the USSR and China, but it actually happened. Today we resent our diplomats being expelled from various countries, but in China it was even worse: explosions at the embassy gates!

Why am I talking about this? In my opinion, all of this should be seen in the context of the country's policy in those years on a number of fronts. The refusal to engage with the Communist-oriented China was strategic. Indeed, those were primarily ideological differences – against the background of the fact that the long border between the countries did not disappear and the economic ties were quite strong. And all of a sudden, boom! – and something "snapped." Why? We talked all the time about how China doesn't want us to be strong. But no one in the world, not even the smallest country, wants anyone to get ahead of them.

Regarding the statement that the right of veto is a clear sign of inequality, I strongly disagree! We should not confuse inequality with the distribution of functional responsibilities. If someone is driving and you are a passenger, that does not mean there is inequality. You just have different functions at the moment. A small country cannot even physically afford to deal with the world agenda as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a fairly large staff, and solving global problems requires a tremendous amount of capacity. Therefore, the distribution of functions is, on the contrary, a sign of the balance of power, so that countries have the opportunity to implement equality.

It is nothing more than a myth that the Chinese have no friends. Yes, they call us "big noses," etc. China always perceived itself as the "Middle State" – Zhongguo – but

they did not demand tribute from anyone. They had vassal countries in their history, but here's the amazing thing – the Chinese lavished benefits on them! Delegations left them with gifts.

Unfortunately, it is now almost impossible to integrate into the Chinese information space, and we need our own correspondents, “eyes” on the ground, so to speak, in order to better understand what is happening there.

K. F. ZATULIN: – We did not advocate equality. We wanted to address the fact that they wanted to humiliate us and deprive us of the status we believe we have. We naturally use the rhetoric of equality as propaganda because we don't like it and we want to gain allies. It seems to me that we should not be deceived about it.

As for the characteristics of different peoples, it is known, for example, that the Chinese, like the Turks, have no conscience. There is simply no such moral category. They have respect for their elders, which is why the pension system did not develop for a long time (why spend on it if young family members have to feed the aged?). The Japanese have no sense of humor – it is also a national trait.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – They have conscience in the form of the concept of losing face.

K. F. ZATULIN: – This is not exactly what we mean when we talk about conscience in the Christian sense. Just different matrices.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – There are mostly Christians in the United States, but they have no conscience.

K. F. ZATULIN: – The U.S. is not an Orthodox country. I am talking about Orthodox Christianity, not Protestantism which postulates that if you are rich, then you are close to God and should be looked up to. We have the opposite – if you are rich, you have to repent, because you probably stole somewhere or cheated someone.

I suggest that our colleague from Belarus speaks out.” Vitaly Nikolaevich Punchenko, please.

V. N. PUNCHENKO: – I will address a few points in the context of today's agenda.

First thesis. We are trying to formulate the meaning of our actions while essentially being in attack. But it seems that a more successful formula is first to create the semantic basis for action and next to perform the action itself. In our opinion, those on the other side of our civilization understood that first it is necessary to establish a point of unity (this is ardent Russophobia), and then they can proceed to action – sanctions, arms supplies, fake information. In the meantime, the Russian society, in our opinion, has not yet fundamentally changed its model of behavior. Indeed, the coherence and mobilization has not yet been achieved.

My thesis is as follows. The West mobilized on the basis of the prefix “anti,” that is, against a common enemy. This is certainly a strong base, but only in the short term. The ideologeme of creation is always long-term and requires considerable effort to gain adherents, otherwise it will not work. Thus, Ukraine, carried away in its time by Russophobia, lost the opportunity to become the center of Orthodoxy, the center of Eastern Slavicism. But it is very important for

us today not to remain in this point of “the West is the enemy, period.” This is not enough. The ideologeme we see today has not yet been articulated, but it is obvious that it is a restoration of historical justice for the sake of the eternal mission of preserving human civilization based on the Christian, namely Orthodox concept. Or we should urgently propose a new ideology which, as the experience of Belarus shows, is impossible. It is very dangerous to underestimate the internal processes that can change the trajectory of mass consciousness overnight: trust can be replaced by distrust, acceptance of difficulties by protests.

To elaborate on what Igor Ivanovich said, I will add: yes, Russia saved us politically, economically, psychologically, but in the ideological sense, everything depended on ourselves. In 2020, we carried out a special operation for self-denazification in Belarus, eradicating the symbols of the country's split and destruction from the mass consciousness forever.

Apart from the force, what is the recipe for overcoming the split in the society? We acted in the following way. 2021 was declared the year of national unity, thus sending a signal to the society that it is necessary to reconcile and unite around the authority. In the same year, National Unity Day was established on September 17. The society was engaged in an extensive dialogue about the new constitution, which was later adopted in a republican referendum. Now the task is to involve the society in new projects – consideration of the national security concept and building constructive, pro-state institutions of civil society, holding of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly.

Unfortunately, we don't pay sufficient attention to the topics that everyone understands, such as the value of peace. And yet such rhetoric could be a powerful incentive for the society to unite in support of the state. This is actually an image of the future which we will come to as a result of the purification.

I would like to remind you that the West issues ultimatums not only to Russia, but also to Belarus as its faithful ally. In this regard, the uncertainty expressed by many about the allied position of Belarus is very surprising. I am very grateful to Alexei Anatolyevich for the fact that our Union State was the first to be named among the multipliers of Russia's regional policy. Indeed, the Union State of Russia and Belarus should become a benchmark for scaling further projects, and we are ready for it. We look at Russia, we analyze. And for us Russia's vision of its future is very important – does it see itself as a civilization state or as a national country that is looking for someone to lean on.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Thank you very much. Dmitry Olegovich Babich, please.

D. O. BABICH: – I will begin with one, perhaps, funny remark. Colleagues cited a well-known saying that Russia has two allies – the army and the navy. But let us remember who ruined the Imperial Russia in February 1917. Revolutionary sailors of the Baltic Fleet! Even Chairman of the State Duma Mikhail Rodzyanko (we know what role he played in this revolution), who regularly received information about the sentiments of the Baltic sailors, said that it was better to sink this fleet than to have such an “ally.”

I think everyone would agree that you can't do without allies in modern international politics. And we need to

think about who our allies might be and why our adversaries are such. And here I will try to disagree with Sergey Alexeevich. We must proceed from the premise that it is not the people who are against us but the ideology. As soon as we say that the Anglo-Saxons or Poles are against us, we immediately lose, because it is impossible to defeat a nation. Unlike ideology.

Recall the last years of the Soviet Union and the rhetoric of the West during that period. "We are not against the Soviet people," they said. "We adore the Russian people, the Ukrainian people, the Kazakh people. But you have a bad ideology." And the Soviet people, tired of the queues and other inconveniences of late socialism, responded, "But we don't like it either, let's live without any ideology at all." Now that we are talking about the need for a unified ideology, let me remind you of a meme: Mark Zuckerberg holds a portrait of Stalin in his hand and says, "Why is it that when the debate about this mustachioed man starts, our traffic skyrockets? If you know him, why doesn't he work for us?" It's a good indicator of the rifts that exist in our society. Stalin is indeed a statuesque figure, over whom Russian society still breaks down its spears.

I see at least three ideological arrays that have been shaped by Russian history itself, rather than implanted by someone's malicious will. First of all, we have Soviet patriots – it is clear why, since 70 years of Soviet power could not pass without a trace. Secondly, patriots, let us say, of the country in general, some of whom resolutely reject the Soviet period. For example, true Orthodox believers who commemorate new martyrs every week, if not more often. Can they agree that the Soviet years were the best in Russian history? Of course not. Third, we have pro-European liberals. No matter how much we talk about cooperation with China and Africa, Russia remains a European country. For 70 years, our contacts with the rest of Europe and the Western world have been kept to a minimum. This enclosure has become a traumatic factor for many, which must somehow be mitigated. But, unfortunately, now such limitations have become unavoidable again, and here I agree with Konstantin Fedorovich.

What were the prerequisites of this situation? Let us address the recent history. Three post-Christian ideologies emerged in the early twentieth century: socialism, nationalism, and liberalism. Each of them had huge masses of adherents. All ideologies looked effective. Take socialism: it introduced public education, healthcare, polyclinics. People saw that it was not necessary to hire private teachers or call a private doctor; instead, services could be received in special institutions, and the quality of these services would be much higher.

But all three ideologies were simplified as they spread and degenerated into a bastardized version for billions of people. Nineteenth-century European nationalism was transformed into the monstrous Third Reich; a simplified version of the very sound socialist ideas of the late 19th century was embodied in the early Soviet Union, Maoist China, North Korea, etc. We are now living in a simplified, primitivized version of liberalism. I like your wording, Maria Vladimirovna – *totalitarian liberalism*. Some say "neoliberalism," but I don't think that term captures the essence of the phenomenon.

Here is a historic example. When works of art were being destroyed in revolutionary France in 1793, Abbé Henri

Grégoire who had been fighting against it coined the term "vandalism." He explained why he chose this word for the actions he hated: the Vandals were the tribes of barbarians who sacked Rome.

Why do we need to find a word for the phenomenon that liberalism has become, why is it dangerous, and why is it impossible for us to reconcile with this ideology? First, because it has no "reverse" like other totalitarian ideologies. It is based on a total denial of history, which is associated with this very ideology. Just as Russian history had the uprisings of Yemelyan Pugachev and Stepan Razin, and then the Decembrists, the Narodniks, the Bolsheviks, so Americans had the struggle against racism in the 1960s, the feminist movement, the struggle for gay rights. And the rest of the history has to be crushed. We see monuments being demolished there, just as they did in Russia in 1918.

Second, there must be a formerly oppressed class in whose name the rights of other people can be restricted. By the time the Bolsheviks came to power, serfdom had been non-existent in Russia for 56 years, but from their speeches it seemed like it had disappeared literally the day before. They talked about protecting the proletariat, which accounted for no more than 8% of the population. We are witnessing the same thing now in the United States. Black people were equalized in rights with everyone else 50 years ago, but the fight against racism continues. If you look at what is going on in the arts, you will get the impression that these people were slaves just yesterday.

Third, global ambitions are characteristic of totalitarian socialism, totalitarian nationalism, and contemporary ultra-liberals. They claim world domination, presenting it as happiness for everyone.

By the way, the desire to make everyone happy is a great excuse for repression. What prevents us from achieving universal happiness? Rich peasants? Children of priests? Just get rid of them – no one will ever remember. Indeed, in the 1960s it seemed to be completely forgotten. But then they did remember, with known consequences.

We see the same thing today. The population of Donbass – who are they, anyway? A barrier on the journey to the development and happiness! Remove this population, and that's it. That's why we talk about Ukrainian Nazism and denazification. But let's face it: the ideology that now dominates the United States and the European Union is certainly not Nazism. This is totalitarianism, but in a new, third form. And in the end, it is conflated with Nazism, because it is once again about world domination. Totalitarianism is always accompanied by enmity with large states. The Soviet Union was at odds with the United States, and before that with the British Empire, and now the West is going to fight Russia and China. But this state of affairs is a powerful basis for our alliance.

There can be no homogeneous environment in a large state. It is bound to have frightened neighbors, like China does today, or national minorities, like the Soviet Union did. So it turned out that in fighting the large countries, ultra-liberals are willing to support hard-core nationalists in these minorities or neighboring countries – current Ukrainian Nazis, Croatian fascists against Serbs, Uighurs against the Chinese. They use these radicals, but they don't become radicals themselves. A good example is Poland, which is close to my heart. I know the Polish language, I've been keeping myself updated on this country for a long time, and I know

that the Kaczynski brothers have always been nationalists and haven't changed their ideology since the 1980s. But recently, about five years ago, sanctions had been imposed on them, all of a sudden. Why? Because it had seemed to the United States and the European Union that the line of struggle with Russia was no longer on the border of Poland, but moved to Donbass. That is, the Kaczynskis found themselves in the rear. And then they were reminded: your Catholicism is wrong, and there is something wrong with family values, and you prohibit abortions. However, the pressure on them is not so strong now, because they are on the border again.

The problem with this new, third kind of totalitarianism (let it be totalitarian liberalism, though it would be better to find a shorter term) is that this machine has no reverse. If the evolution of a true democratic society is difficult to predict, the trajectory of a totalitarian regime is always the same – only forward.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Thank you, Dmitry Olegovich. Dear colleagues, once again we are talking about what kind of an ideology we need and whether we need it at all. Apparently, it's such a vital topic that we inevitably return to it. I am very cautious about this problem, because I have witnessed futile attempts to create a new artificial ideology, just to set it against the old one. I am sure that the relevant article of the Constitution is long outdated, but that does not mean that another one should appear in its place – that we have or should have an ideology. In my opinion, ideology is a necessary attribute of political parties, movements and other communities that can gain support of the population during elections and then implement their ideas.

However, we need common benchmarks to develop some kind of an understanding. We have discussed that, too. For example, Mrs. Kharitonova outlined our priorities. Of course, Russia should be a self-sufficient country – the quality that we sometimes lacked at different stages of history. We worry all the time about the opinion of others, and very often it is detrimental to us. The entire history of perestroika was impregnated with that attitude: are we approved, are we applauded for our efforts to preserve peace and disintegrate the Soviet Union at the same time? Now we are beginning to get rid of it.

The memoirs of the hapless Field Marshal Count Burkhard von Münnich, who once said that Russia was a country ruled by God, because otherwise it is unclear how it could exist at all, have recently become popular. We have a lot of problems that need to be solved urgently. One such problem, and a major one, is that on February 24 this year we spurred a horse without fully resolving many of the smaller but important issues that should have been addressed in this case. And now we have to do it “on the march” – we have no other choice. It makes no sense now to discuss whether it was possible to do otherwise. In order not just to survive in this struggle, but to achieve the desired result, we have to do a lot. Let me remind you that Russia has never lost a domestic war. Other wars – yes, it did. It lost the Russo-Japanese War and the Crimean War, although the end of the latter might have been different, but Alexander II came to power and considered it a good thing to make peace. But domestic wars always ended in victory. The price for such victories is always very high, but people understand it, because such wars are about survival of the country, the state, each of us – those who are not ready to kneel.

I hope that we will quickly put the economy on a new track and mobilize all other resources. I am against internally searching for the enemies of the state. Even if there are such enemies, let us remember the sad experience of the twentieth century. It's better to leave them alone and stop worrying about it. And as to those who left, let them horse about there, as long as they don't disturb us here.

I thank all participants for the interesting and engaging discussion, and hope that we will continue to meet at the Likhachov Conference and other venues in the future.

S. Yu. GLAZYEV: – I thank all the participants of the section for the informative and interesting discussion.

M. V. ZAKHAROVA: – A couple of words about ideology. Last summer, Russia adopted a National Security Strategy. I think we can consider it our ideological guide. Morality, philosophy, economics, and everything else – every question has been answered.

K. F. ZATULIN: – Thank you very much.



Opening of the Plenary Session in the A. P. Petrov Theatre and Concert Hall of SPbUHSS.
On the rostrum: Chairman of the Organizing Committee Rector of SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **S. Yu. Glazyev**



Director of the Information and Press Department
of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary **M. V. Zakharova**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **T. Ya. Khabrieva**, member of the State Council of the Russian Federation,
Chairperson of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia **M. V. Shmakov**, Rector of the SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky**



Presentation of the University's new editions at D. A. Granin Scientific Library in SPbUHSS



Members of the Russian Academy of Sciences **I. O. Abramova**, **Al. A. Gromyko**, **G. B. Kleiner**, **R. I. Nigmatulin**, **Zh. T. Toshchenko**, **A. S. Zapesotsky**



Academicians of the Russian Academy of Sciences **S. Yu. Glazyev**, **A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov**, Professor Emeritus of the SPbUHSS **D. N. Katysheva**



Rector of SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky**, Rector's Advisor on Creative Issues, writer **O. V. Solod**



Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Education, Professor **O. E. Lebedev**



Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation Council **K. I. Kosachev**



First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Federation Council, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the USA (2008–2017) **S. I. Kislyak**



First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on Culture **E. G. Drapeko**



First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs **K. F. Zatulin**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **M. B. Piotrovsky**



Deputy Minister of Information of Belarus **I. I. Buzovsky**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **A. D. Nekipelov**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **T. Ya. Khabrieva**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **V. A. Chereshev**



Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia **M. V. Shmakov**



Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia **E. I. Makarov**



Chairman of the Leningrad Federation of Trade Unions **V. G. Derbin**



Deputy Head of the “United Russia” party faction in the State Duma, Professor of the SPbUHSS **A. K. Isaev**, Rector of SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky**



Scientific Director of the North-West Institute of Management RANEPa **V. A. Shamakhov**



Head of the Committee on Science and Higher Education of the Government of St. Petersburg **A. S. Maksimov**



Director of the North-West Institute of Management RANEPa **A. D. Khlutkov**



Vice-Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation **O. G. Karpovich**



First Deputy Director General of TASS agency **M. S. Gusman**



Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences **I. O. Abramova**



Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **V. V. Naumkin**



Professor of Moscow Kutafin University of Law **Ch. Goddard** (United Kingdom)



Deputy Director of the Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies **V. N. Punchenko**, member of the Public Advisory Council under the Ministry of Education of Belarus **S. G. Musienko**, Rector of SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky**



Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS **V. E. Triodin**




Professor Emeritus of SPbUHSS **A. P. Markov**




Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov**

Panel Discussion “‘The Great Chessboard’ of Today and Tomorrow” (A. P. Petrov Theatre and Concert Hall of SPbUHSS)



Judge of the Statutory Court of St. Petersburg (2005–2011), Professor of SPbUHSS **V. G. Petukhov**, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* **V. K. Mamontov**, writer **D. A. Likhanov**



A photograph of an elderly man with white hair, wearing a dark suit jacket over a light-colored shirt. He is holding a microphone in his right hand and gesturing with his left hand. A name tag is visible on his lapel.

Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **V. L. Makarov**



Round Table “The Transition from Unipolarity to Real Multipolarity: the Challenges of the New Geopolitics”
 (“Stasov/Ushakov” conference hall)



Director of the Information and Press Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia **M. V. Zakharova**, First Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs **K. F. Zatulin**, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences **S. Yu. Glazyev**, Rector of SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky**



Professor **V. A. Shamakhov**, Academician **V. A. Chereshev**



First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on International Affairs of the Federation Council **S. I. Kislyak**, editor-in-chief of the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets **P. N. Gusev**



Head of the Department of Pre-university training of SPbUHSS **E. L. Kolpakova**, Head of the Department of Social Psychology of SPbUHSS **M. V. Sozinova**, corresponding members of the Russian Academy of Education **O. E. Lebedev**, **E. I. Kazakova**, Professor of SPbUHSS **A. A. Melnikova**



Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Professor **G. A. Hajiyev**



Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation (2000–2020), Professor **N. S. Bondar**



Chairman of the Russian Children's Fund, Writer **D. A. Likhanov**



Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia **E. I. Makarov**, Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences **Zh. T. Toshchenko**



Associate Professor of SPbUHSS **T. V. Efimova**, Honorary Professor of SPbUHSS **G. M. Birzhenyuk**, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* **V. K. Mamontov**, Associate Professor of SPbUHSS **D. V. Lobok**, Editor-in-Chief of the newspaper *Solidarnost* **A. V. Shershukov**, Head of the Department of Conflict Resolution Studies of Kazan Federal University **A. G. Bolshakov**



Head of the Department of Theory of Law of Tver State University **V. I. Kruss**



Deputy Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia, Editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Solidarnost* **A. V. Shershukov**



Students of SPbUHSS



A tour along the Neva River on a motor ship




Corresponding members of the Russian Academy of Sciences
L. L. Fituni, I. O. Abramova



Journalist D. O. Babich with his daughter



Political scientist, journalist G. Mettan,
Deputy Minister of Information of Belarus I. I. Buzovsky



Cruise along the rivers and canals of St. Petersburg:
Anichkov Bridge



Deputy of the State Duma of the Russian Federation
K. F. Zatulin with his wife



Cruise: the Neva outlet



Independent expert, diplomat (1968–1998)
A. Kevin (Australia)



The First Vice-rector of SPbUHSS **L. A. Paseshnikova**



Editor-in-chief of the magazine *Vlast* **S. A. Tsyplyaev**, President of the United Chamber of Commerce and Industry "Switzerland — Russia and CIS countries" **G. Mettan**



Concert for honorary guests of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference.
On stage: Turetsky Choir Art Group (Grand Hotel Europe)



Virtuoso violinist, conductor **S. Stadler**



Rector of SPbUHSS **A. S. Zapesotsky** and the group
Turetsky SOPRANO



Honored Artist of Russia **N. Shatskaya**



Reception at the Grand Hotel Europe

INDEX OF NAMES

Abramova I. O. 17, 167, 183, 184
Babich D. O. 21, 189
Birzhenyuk G. M. 23
Bondar N. S. 26
Bülbüloğlu P. 30
Buzovsky I. I. 32, 157, 161, 180
Chereshnev V. A. 167, 168, 184
Danilov A. N. 36
Drapeko E. G. 153, 169, 184, 187
Fituni L. L. 39, 187, 188
Glazyev S. Yu. 44, 154, 162, 171, 175, 181, 182, 191
Goddard Ch. 47
Gromyko Al. A. 49, 168, 178
Gusev P. N. 182
Guseynov A. A. 51
Gusman M. S. 158
Hajiyev G. A. 42
Isaev A. K. 56, 161, 164, 170
Karpovich O. G. 61
Kevin A. 65, 177
Khabrieva T. Ya. 70, 150

Kharitonova E. V. 182
Khlutkov A. D. 76
Kislyak S. I. 156, 165, 172, 177, 182
Kleiner G. B. 158
Kosachev K. I. 154
Kostina A. V. 78
Köchler H. 80
Lebedev O. Ye. 84
Likhanov D. A. 168
Lisitsyn-Svetlanov A. G. 86, 169
Makarov V. L. 169
Makarov Ye. I. 89
Maksimov A. S. 155
Maksimtsev I. A. 91
Mamontov V. K. 93, 168
Markov A. P. 96
Mettan G. 99, 159
Mosolova L. M. 104
Musienko S. G. 161
Naumkin V. V. 106, 166, 172, 179, 180
Nekipelov A. D. 108, 156
Nigmatulin R. I. 111, 169

Nikonova S. B. 113
Petukhov V. G. 168
Piotrovsky M. B. 149
Punchenko V. N. 161, 189
Shamakhov V. A. 76, 187
Shershukov A. V. 115
Shmakov M. V. 117, 150, 166, 171
Tishkov V. A. 119
Toshchenko Zh. T. 123, 168
Tsypliyev S. A. 127, 185, 187
Türker T. 130
Uspenskaya A. V. 133
Varga Cs. 135
Yakovenko A. V. 139
Zakharova M. V. 151, 158, 164, 171, 176, 181, 182, 184, 188, 189, 191
Zapesotsky A. S. 142, 149–159, 161, 163–172, 175
Zatulín K. F. 146, 152, 163, 170, 176–185, 187–189, 191

Scientific edition

GLOBAL CONFLICT AND THE CONTOURS OF A NEW WORLD ORDER

The 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference

June 9–10, 2022

(ГЛОБАЛЬНЫЙ КОНФЛИКТ И КОНТУРЫ НОВОГО МИРОВОГО ПОРЯДКА)

XX Международные Лихачевские научные чтения

9–10 июня 2022 года)

Ответственный редактор *З. Н. Киселева*

Художественное оформление *А. В. Костюкевич*

Технический редактор *Л. В. Климкович*

Корректоры: *Я. Ф. Афанасьева, Т. А. Кошелева*

ISBN 978-5-7621-1194-2



Подписано в печать с оригинала-макета 31.08.2022. Формат 60х90/8
Гарнитура Times New Roman. Усл. печ. л. 24,0. Тираж 300 экз. Заказ № 22585

Санкт-Петербургский Гуманитарный университет профсоюзов
192238, Санкт-Петербург, ул. Фучика, д. 15

Отпечатано в ООО «Типография «НП-Принт»
197110, Санкт-Петербург, Чкаловский пр., д. 15

About the University

St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences was established by the Trade Unions of Russia on October 9th, 1926. Its first task originally was to educate trade unions' leaders for socialist countries and institutions of culture and tourism. Since 1992 this institution of higher education has been working in the status of university educating specialists for a market system that has grown in our country. For the last 25 years SPbUHSS has become one of the leaders of higher education in Russia. Today there are more than 8 000 students here. The University has 5 branches in Russia: Kirov, Krasnoyarsk, Moskovsky region — “Institution of Arts and IT” (Zelenograd), Samara and one abroad — in the Republic of Kazakhstan.

The University works with programmes of higher professional education (Bachelor, Specialist, Master), graduating professionals of higher qualification in the spheres of Law, Economics, Management, Conflict Studies, Journalism, Advertising and PR, Psychology, Linguistics, Art Management, Applied Informatics, Social Work, Stage Direction in Theatre, Cinema and Television, Audio Engineering, Acting Techniques, Choreography and others and has also a supplementary educational programme “Interpreter in the sphere of professional communication”. There are two forms — full-time and part-time education. There is also postgraduate and doctorate education.

More than 45 000 different specialists have received their degrees of higher education since the time SPbUHSS became a university.

The University collaborates with the Russian Academy of Sciences, the State Duma, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Russian Academy of Education, creative unions of Russia, regional administrations, scientific journals, and academies of science in different countries. Our partners are universities of Russia, Western Europe, the USA, Asia we have student and professor exchanges and joint researches. Among the most famous scientific researches of the University there is “the Declaration of the Rights of Culture” developed under the direction of academician D. Likhachov. The culture-centred model of university was recognized by the Russian Academy of Sciences as the most innovative and perspective for Russia in the 21st century.

20 scientific conferences take place in SPbUHSS annually, including the International Likhachov Scientific Conference — the largest forum of humanitarian knowledge in Russia. In 2001, by a special decree of the President of Russia, the Conference became the state conference. Since 2007 the Conference has been organized with the help of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia.



The Proceedings of the 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference held on June 9–10, 2022 in St. Petersburg University of the Humanities and Social Sciences were published in the present collection in accordance with the Decree of the President of the Russian Federation V. V. Putin “On perpetuating the memory of Dmitry Sergeyevich Likhachov”. Representatives of 10 countries took part in the 20th Readings.

The 210 authors of the collection include prominent national scientists, members of the Russian Academy of Sciences: I. O. Abramova, S. Yu. Glazyev, Al. A. Gromyko, A. A. Guseynov, A. S. Zapesotsky, G. B. Kleiner, A. G. Lisitsyn-Svetlanov, V. L. Makarov, A. D. Nekipelov, R. I. Nigmatulin, M. B. Piotrovsky, V. A. Tishkov, Zh. T. Toshchenko, T. Ya. Khabrieva, V. A. Chereshev and others; the heads of academic institutions and research centers, representatives of universities, well-known state and public figures, heads of mass media: Judge of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation G. A. Hajiyev, First Deputy Director General of the Russian News Agency TASS M. S. Gusman, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on Culture E. G. Drapeko, First Deputy Chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma Committee on CIS Affairs K. F. Zatulin, Director of the Information and Press Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary M. V. Zakharova, Deputy Head of the “United Russia” party faction in the State Duma A. K. Isaev, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs S. I. Kislyak, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council K. I. Kosachev, Member of the State Council, Chairman of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia M. V. Shmakov, Ambassador of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom (2011–2019) A. V. Yakovenko and others.

Foreign authors of the collection include Deputy Minister of Information of Belarus I. I. Buzovsky, Ambassador of Azerbaijan to Russia P. Bülbüloglu, Honorary Associate of the Australian National University A. Kevin, President of the United Chamber of Commerce and Industry “Switzerland — Russia” G. Mettan, Director of the Eurasia, Russia and Eastern Europe Studies Centre (Turkey) T. Turker; professors: Ch. Varga (Hungary), Ch. Goddard (United Kingdom), H. Köchler (Austria), and others.

President of Russia Vladimir Putin highly appreciates the role of the Likhachov Conference: “I expect that this forum, dedicated to international issues, will serve to develop fruitful people-to-people ties and strengthen mutual understanding between countries and peoples”.

www.lihachev.ru



The 20th International Likhachov Scientific Conference is funded by the Presidential Grant for Development of the Civil Society, provided by the Presidential Grant Foundation